Bye Bye Bihi: the cost of repression, corruption, nepotism and Clan Divisions

[Deeq A.]

Bye Bye Bihi: the cost of repression, corruption, nepotism and Clan Divisions
By Mohamed Harun

Somaliland stands on the precipice of a pivotal moment in its history. Tomorrow, this unrecognized state will hold a long-awaited presidential election that could radically alter its political and social fabric. With the fate of its 4.5 million citizens at a crossroads, the stakes could not be higher; and choices could not be clearer. The main candidates are the incumbent Muse Bihi Abdi of the Kulmiye party, seeking a second term, and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi of the Waddani party, a former House of Representatives speaker.

In this article, I argue that Bihi will lose the tomorrow election, primarily because his tenure was characterized by divisive clannism, repression, corruption, and needless bloody conflicts. In other words, a new term under Bihi would simply mean a continuation of the same disasters of the past seven years. This article will assess the key challenges that shaped his leadership, as well as the consequences of Bihi’s unlikely return to power, based on his track record.

One of his most significant blunders was his unconstitutional decision to cancel the 2022 presidential elections, leading to violent protests and a severe government crackdown. On that day, plainclothes armed forces, reportedly following orders from the President’s office, opened fire on unarmed young protesters, leaving many killed or wounded. Efforts to initiate a parliamentary investigation into the incident were deliberately obstructed by the administration.

As a result, no one has been held accountable, and those involved remain at large, with some even receiving promotions. This practice led to further conflict and gave rise to the “Oofwareen” militia—a group formed by members of the Garhajis subclan of the Isaq. In response, President Musa attempted to address this issue using military force, disregarding calls for calm and peaceful solutions. On August 11, 2023—exactly a year after his forces had killed civilian demonstrators—he deployed heavily armed troops to confront the Oofwareen militia. The encounter resulted in up to ten soldiers losing their lives.

This crisis, like many others during his tenure, was eventually resolved by clan elders—a committee of clan leaders from the East Burco Clan subclan of Isaq, in cooperation with the Garhajis Committee. Although he initially supported their efforts, Bihi later withdrew; and even today, during election rallies, he publicly criticizes the committee of elders and those involved in the peace process. Bihi has shown a pattern of initiating crises but limited or no interest in resolving them.

However, this was not the only instance of violence during his time in office. Another major issue was his handling of the Las’anod conflict in Sool. Disregarding the comprehensive peace agreement established by former President Silanyo with the late Prof. Ali Khalif, then leader of Khatumo, Bihi escalated a localized dispute into a broader conflict. Despite repeated calls from both domestic and international entities urging peace, he remained unwilling to engage in negotiations. Consequently, Las’anod slipped from control, with the military suffering significant losses in both personnel and resources. This conflict has impacted Somaliland’s economy and political stability, raising concerns that similar unrest could occur in other regions if this approach to governance persists.

Bihi’s treatment of certain clans has also contributed to societal divisions. For example, his remarks about the Garhajis clan, referring to them as “the enemy within”, without providing evidence, have led to distrust and division. The Garhajis clan perceives Bihi’s approach as a significant threat to them. In the event of his reelection, despite all his blunders, clans like Garhajis and Awdal Clan may reassess their relationship with Somaliland altogether.

In Somaliland’s western regions, the Awdal Clan clan has expressed concerns primarily related to power-sharing. Over the past seven years, Bihi’s administration has not addressed these issues, leading to a sense of exclusion among Awdal Clan communities. Despite efforts to negotiate with Bihi, there have been no significant outcomes. Instead, he has taken extreme actions, such as exiling key clan leaders and imprisoning a prominent parliamentary representative from Awdal without legal proceedings. There is concern that, without leadership change, Awdal may experience unrest similar to that seen in Sool. If these tensions remain unresolved, Somaliland could face further internal conflict and fragmentation, to which Bihi can only make it worse.

Internationally, President Bihi’s foreign policy decisions have contributed to Somaliland’s continued isolation. His tensions with neighboring Djibouti have strained diplomatic relations, and his proposal to host an Ethiopian Red Sea naval base—amid the Ethiopian-Egyptian rivalry—compromised Somaliland’s neutrality without yielding clear benefits. Furthermore, Bihi’s alignment with Taiwan over China, despite claims of neutrality, has raised concerns among diplomatic experts who view this move as a potential misstep with serious implications for Somaliland’s international standing.

Bihi’s actions extend beyond foreign policy, conflict initiation, and the suppression of protests. He seems to misunderstand the egalitarian nature of Somali society, which emphasizes shared leadership and consensus-based decision-making. This cultural ethos generally does not support dictatorial or hierarchical rule, which contrasts with the traditional Somali way of life. By attempting to exert unilateral control, Bihi has distanced himself from this cultural norm, leading to significant consequences for Somaliland.

Evidence of Bihi’s unprecedented authoritative governance is evident in his government appointments, particularly with the elevation of his son to a high-ranking position within the intelligence and security services. His son, leading what is locally referred to as “Sirdonka leexsan,” or “the alternative intelligence,” functions outside established legal frameworks, employing covert methods to suppress dissent. This unit is known for its nighttime operations against opposition figures, often skirting the edges of legality. Accounts of such activities, especially in Hargeisa, have become widely discussed among residents, alongside growing resentment regarding perceived nepotism. Contracts for significant government projects—such as military supplies and fuel logistics through the Port of Berbera—have been awarded to immediate family members without proper procedural adherence. These practices raise concerns about potential corruption and further consolidation of power if Bihi continues in office.

As the election approaches, influential figures across Somaliland have expressed strong opposition to Bihi. In cities like Buro, Berbera, El Af-Weyn, Hargeisa, and Borama, clan elders, business leaders, and political figures from all clans have called for change. Even the incumbent Vice President Abdirahman Saylici has publicly urged Somalilanders not to reelect Bihi, and accused him of serious constitutional violations and naked favouritism. In a similar vane, artists, poets, and singers have produced unprecedented volumes of work criticizing Bihi’s administration, calling for change.

In contrast, opposition candidate Irro has proposed revisiting Somaliland’s constitution as part of his reform agenda. This includes addressing issues like power-sharing, resource allocation, and the roles of the police and president—matters that have been under discussion since the era of President Egal. If Somaliland is to address its long-standing, multidimensional challenges, opposition-driven reforms are widely seen as the only viable path forward.

All in all, it appears that a significant majority of Somalilanders have already made up their minds and are prepared to vote for change. If this election results a decisive victory, Musa Bihi is likely to concede. However, if the outcome is close, as it was in 2005, he may seize the opportunity to delay and cling to power. Such a scenario has many worries. Given Somaliland’s fragile judicial system, the only feasible internal mechanism would be the intervention of clan elders, yet Bihi is on poor terms with most of them, which may undermine their role. In that case, intervention from external actors, particularly Western donors based in Nairobi, may be necessary. Through a combination of diplomatic pressure and incentives, these actors might be able to break a potential deadlock.

In summary, on November 13, Somalilanders face a choice that will shape their country’s future stability and development. The results of the election will be felt for years to come. Reelecting Bihi will only increase the risk of civil conflict and deepen clan divisions. Electing a new leader could offer an opportunity for reconciliation and renewal. For better or worse, beyond Wednesday’s election, Somaliland will never be the same. Let’s hope Somaliland to rise once again, pick up its shattered pieces and attempt to move forward in a way that is consistent with their long standing history.

Bio: Mohamed Harun is a political analyst; Contributer at Qaran News; a researcher in social affairs with a particular focus on human rights, a translator and story writer, and a blogger – he can be reached at mbiixi@gmail.com

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