Can Somalia win its war against al-Shabab? | UpFront

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

 

 

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

deputy pm spoke very well he is very  articulate he is a bright future

 

 

[Illyria]

No need for a war between Somalis / Muslims, besides the US bogus war on terror died with Bush Jr. Move the effing on from being camiiliin.

[maakhiri1]

2 hours ago, Illyria said:

No need for a war between Somalis / Muslims, besides the US bogus war on terror died with Bush Jr. Move the effing on from being camiiliin.

I honestly agree, we have to negotiate asap, enough of killings. I am surprised HSM did even attempt to open talks

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

if hassan sheikh could not reach  a deal with Somaliland after 12 years talks  as a two term president

what makes u think he can give any sort of concessions or make a deal with Alshabaab

[galbeedi]

35 minutes ago, Xaaji Xunjuf said:

what makes u think he can give any sort of concessions or make a deal with Alshabaab

Al-shbaab could no longer disrupt life and bomb Mogadishu at will anymore, and this was achieved through hard work . People paid through blood and treasurer to to reduce the threat. I agree that eventually there will be a negotiated settlement. I was one of those who wanted to sit down with Al-shbaab no matter what, but the reality is different from the ground.

You can't negotiate in a position of weaknesses. You have to remove the gun from your head first, build your capacity, weaken your enemies threat to eliminate you and then negotiate.

Just this week, the government had closed 110 business accounts of associates of Al-shbaab with millions of dollars taken in. These moves are more damaging than the gun. A cash starved Al-shbaab would no longer bribe soldiers or hire people for the crime. I believe that an offensive must be waged in Lower Shabeelle before negotiations could take place because that will allow to negotiate from the position of strength.

 

[galbeedi]

No need to negotiate the Hargeisa regime unless they denounce secessions, period.

All they are looking is cash.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

 time will tell indeed if Somalia can defeat Alshabaab  its been over a decade now lets how long this continues

 

[Illyria]

6 hours ago, galbeedi said:

No need to negotiate the Hargeisa regime unless they denounce secessions, period.

All they are looking is cash.

For the public good, and best outcome, of course negotiate with both SL & AS, as was the advice the US/EU offered XSM in his first trip to the US before he initiated a war he knew he could neither win nor had the support, militarily, logistically, or financially.

6 hours ago, galbeedi said:

Al-shbaab could no longer disrupt life and bomb Mogadishu at will anymore, and this was achieved through hard work.

Let not the aesthetics of Xamar seduce you, as AS is very much present, in control of its vital organs, business or otherwise, laying low with their leaders still in the city, collecting dues at the airport, port, even government officials, and could easily disrupt taking over the city, but the question is: could they hang on to it. Recall how everyone thought Thaliban were dead and buried, yet it took them a week to take over Afghanistan. Same tactics and methods in play here.

[Illyria]

AS retakes Bacaadweyne, Camaara, and Shabeelow. Balcad & Cadale feared to be next. If accurate, then it is as predicted.

https://fb.watch/qLGJ9GAwd-/

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Hudson institute, a DoD outlet released its September report. Its conclusion:

Consequently, the situation looks less promising than it did at the end of 2022, and al-Shabaab is unlikely to face a meaningful defeat in the coming months. Instead, the best-case scenario would see this military offensive degrade al-Shabaab over the coming months to the point that the terrorist organization partially fractures and loses some of its popular support, possibly opening up room for the FGS to negotiate with factions of the group. A more likely scenario, however, would see the conflict remain a stalemate, with the government’s current offensive bringing only temporary or superficial gains that do not meaningfully degrade al-Shabaab’s capacity.

Given the improbability of a decisive military victory in the coming months or even years, the previously taboo notion of negotiating with the terrorists has gained traction in certain Somali political circles of late. President Hassan Sheikh has even oscillated between claiming that the objective of the current offensive is al-Shabaab’s complete battlefield defeat and claiming that the offensive aims to push the group into negotiations.

[ ]

In principle there is no reason to prefer an endless and fitful counterinsurgency to negotiations, but in practice it would be difficult to secure anything like an acceptable compromise at this stage. Some Somali security sources with knowledge of the group suggested that while al-Shabaab might enter negotiations with international powers, such as the US and Turkey (likely with mediation by Qatar, whose role in Somalia has proven controversial), it has no interest in speaking to the Somali government, which it sees as illegitimate and weak.

[ ]

At present this looks to be the best-case scenario, though unfortunately not the most likely one. But policymakers would do well to consider scenarios that might be acceptable to their interests rather than buy into unrealistic claims about the impending defeat of Africa’s most powerful jihadist group.

https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/Faltering+Lion+-+James+Barnett+Sep+2023.pdf

 

[Illyria]

al Shabab vs SNA
The Somali National Army Versus al-Shabaab: A Net Assessment – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

Army:
SNA: 7,000 - 19,000  
AS: 7,000 and 12,000

Budget:
FGS: 1bn+ (actual revenue 300m+)
AS: 100m+

Hardware:
SNA: The SNA is a relatively low-tech army consisting of small battalions of about 400 soldiers with limited vehicles, few armored vehicles, and mainly small arms and light weapons.

AS: Al-Shabaab’s arsenal includes AK47, PKM, Dushka, B10, grenades, and RPGs, while its heavy weapons include ZU 23/24 and mortars, particularly 60mm and 81mm and reportedly a limited number of 120mm.30 Significant arms and ammunition are thought to come from Yemen, especially via the Mukalla network of arms smugglers.31 But al-Shabaab has also captured significant military materiel from A.U. and Somali forces. Overrunning A.U. and Somali forward operating bases has enabled al-Shabaab to restock weapons and ammunition.

Cohesion & Morale

SNA: The SNA is comprised of a very fragmented set of units, some of which remain heavily clan-based and many of which have experienced different training regimes and operate different types of equipment. Since its reconstitution, the SNA has suffered from desertion, defections, soldiers working multiple jobs, and infiltration by al-Shabaab ...

AS: Al-Shabaab’s cohesion and endurance stems from a mix of its nationalist credentials, coercion, and intimidation. Al-Shabaab maintains legitimacy with populations who see the group’s members as Somali nationalists fighting foreign invaders and a corrupt, ineffective FGS that is dependent on those same foreigners.

https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-somali-national-army-versus-al-shabaab-a-net-assessment/