A PEACE MAKING HANDBOOK FOR SOMALIA: BY INTERPEACE

[GAAROODI]

http://www.interpeac e.org/images/pdf/the %20search%204%20peac e%20apd.pdf

 

A MUST READ HOW SOMALILAND GOT ITS PEACE TODAY.

[GAAROODI]

It sunday after reading the report its clear, when somalilanders have the oppertunity to destroy they choose peace over war. I think this mentality has given us what we have today, because in the end god does not like transgressors.

[GAAROODI]

A number of factors contributed specifically to the success of the series of meetings leading to the Burao

conference:

• Initially, the SNM’s military dominance in the Northern Regions was clear, providing an unequivocal

focus for negotiation between clans;

• The SNM policy of non-recrimination against the non-SNM northern clans enabled a meaningful

dialogue between adversaries, in which clans that had supported the Siyaad Barre regime were able to

play a genuine part in negotiating the terms of peace;

• The civil war had been fought between the SNM and the Siyaad Barre regime, rather than being a clan-

based conflict. This can be a difficult distinction to analyse, because Siyaad Barre clearly employed a

policy designed to accentuate divisions between clans in an effort to sustain his own rule. However,

the fact that the eastern clans and far western clans played such an important role in post-war reconciliation and

peacemaking is perhaps an effective illustration of this;

• When divisions within the SNM flared into conflict, the system of customary leadership remained

sufficiently strong for elders to apply traditional conflict resolution procedures;

• Events in the south served as a powerful reminder of many of the things that were most despised about

successive governments after the union in 1960. The announcement by Ali Mahdi of the establishment of a government in Mogadishu without consultation with the SNM and in violation of agreements

between the SNM and USC was probably the single most important of these.

There were also a number of more general factors that can be said to have contributed to the broader process

of reconciliation in the Northern Regions. One of these is undoubtedly the sense of local ‘ownership’ of the

process. Negotiations occurred largely away from the view of external actors. There was some awareness

and some limited support for conferences, but the peace process was overwhelmingly an indigenous one.

The reconciling parties were therefore familiar with the conflict resolution traditions that formed the basis

for meetings and negotiations. Traditional elders, who were known to their clans-fold and largely trusted

by them, played an important role, and the influence of external factors (individuals or organisations) with

foreign agendas was limited.

This ‘localisation’ of the process extended to funding: the vast majority of the resources required to run the

meetings and conferences was sourced from local people, or from Somaliland diaspora. This undoubtedly

constrained the process at times, but more significant was the effect it had in sustaining the sense of

local ‘ownership’ and focusing the minds of those taking part on the resources available for negotiation.

There is an apposite Somali proverb: haddii la doonayo in cid nabadda la ogoleysiiyo daankaa lagu dilaa,

meaning ‘if it is intended to make one side accept the peace that side should be burdened with feeding the

guests’. There was always an awareness of who was paying, how far the resources would stretch and the

implications for the process itself (Rashiid Gadhweyne in APD, 2007b).

[Jacaylbaro]

maqashaye ka dhego la' ,,,, sxb ka daa ha ku kaakicine ,,,

[Poker]

I need to get this book.

 

Gaaroodi,

 

Can I order it online?

[Jacaylbaro]

You can simply print it out dee ,,, it is a PDF file

[Haatu]

Congrats to the reer waqooyi for their far sightedness and peace loving nature at that time. The only major blunder was going against and undoing the work of their forefathers and liberators.

[Taleexi]

Pros:

• Great analysis for shedding light on: how the coexistence and peace among northerners have evolved and prevailed.

• A testament to the fact that peace will never be an orphan, in another words, when Clan A vs Clan B, peace is beneficial evenly to both clans if they can figure out its importance together.

• It addressed the much pronounced model for Somali conflict: the bottom up approach.

Cons:

• Research is biased because it speaks in the lenses of Somaliland which is a clan enterprise to many in the north and beyond.

• Research ignores the reality of the ground because SL’s double stander is self-evident. For instance,its occupation of parts of Sool region and the enslavement of its people while the same admin calls for peace and coexistence.

• SL has the potential of déjà vu all over again if they don’t leave eastern regions alone. This is what I call "frozen conflicts".

[xiinfaniin]

Allow somaliland nabadda u daa

[Haatu]

^^^^Oodweyne ask the TRUE natives of Sool who they favour, Somalia or Somaliland.

[Taleexi]

Originally posted by Jaanjumow:

^^^^Oodweyne ask the TRUE natives of Sool who they favour, Somalia or Somaliland.

Or to be their own admin

[Haatu]

^^^^^ I can understand what's wrong with Somaliland, but what's wrong with a united Somalia???

 

Or do you want to be another unrecognised seccestionist entity?

[Taleexi]

It would be a big disgrace and fiasco for me if I call another unrecognized entity in my territory, after the fact my people sacrificed so much and paid more than their share in terms of human life and material wealthy to the struggle of our independence. jaanjumow, I was implying that SSC regions can be a self-governing body of its own within federal Somalia, anything wrong with that?, they don’t have to either be with PL or SL, but the choices are many, aint they?

[Haatu]

^^^ True say. I can live with that.

[Thankful]

I believe Lascaanod is a place that has yet to stamp where it wishes to choose it's future. Whether it be with NE or NW Somalia or on it's own. In this decade alone the NW Somali President Dahir Riyaale made a trip to city, and was nearly assasinated and had to flee within in the same day he arrived. The President has never returned since that day in 2001! It seemed the people in the city felt that the admin was trying to rule over them and they wanted to send a message by forcing Riyaale back to safety of Hargeysa. The major player in Lascaanod is Habsaade, who ever he aligns himself with determines where the city will "tentatively" work with.He was not welcome in Hargeysa and by the next time Riyaale came to Lascaanod he was chased out. Then within weeks of being fired from the Ministers post in Puntland, Lascaanod switched sides.

 

I highly doubt their will be elections in September but if they have them, we will see if Riyaale campaigns there. Regardless, Reer Sool knows that the one major tribe in NW Somalia will win the next elections. They will either be the President, or if Riyaale wins they will be vice (both opposition parties are lead by the same family). NO reer Sool or Sanaag are running for president.