With Ethiopia as a Friend, Somalia does not need a foe

[Wiilo]

With Ethiopia as a Friend, Somalia does not need a foe:

 

Abdi Ismail Samatar

University of Minnesota

 

The Ethiopian Prime Minister has often swanked about the generosity of the Somali people and government to him and his party during their long and bloody struggle against the Mengistu dictatorship. Somalia’s kindness came in multiple forms: Somali passports at the disposal of key leaders of Zenawi’s party (Tigray People’s liberation Front -TPLF), refuge for him and others in Mogadishu, and material and military assistance for their struggle. When the Mengistu regime collapsed and Zenawi’s party took over the reign in Ethiopia, Somalis breathed a sigh of relief assuming that a new era of friendship and mutual understanding between the two countries will be ushered. The Somalis’ naiveté lasted for quite sometime despite the clear evidence that the new regime in Addis Ababa was engaged in a divide and rule tactic with the population in its Somali region. But perceptive observers could also detect Ethiopia’s cunning approach in its attempt to play a seemingly honest mediator of the Somali conflict in 1993 when the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea told the international community that their brand of leadership was best suited to resolve the Somali conundrum. Shortly after this, the OAU asked Ethiopia to lead the charge on Somali peace. Unbeknown to most Somalis and other Africans, Ethiopia finally got the long-desired opportunity to manage Somali Affairs. One keen Somali observer noted in Addis Ababa in 1993 that Ethiopia’s strategy for Somalia was to produce one of two futures: a) help create a compliant Somali government that will be under its tutelage; b) or ensure that Somalia is divided into Bantustans that shall never challenge its hegemony. How telling these incredibly insightful words were!

 

 

Several instances demonstrate Ethiopia’s strategy. First, Ethiopia’s subversively cozy relationship with the secessionist project in northern Somalia was the first clear sign of what was to come. Although Ethiopian leaders publicly enunciated their respect for Somali unity and territorial integrity, their actions manifest a contrasting story. For example, Ethiopia was the only country to allow the use of the secessionist passport for travel through its territory. Neighboring Kenya and Djibouti alone honored the old Somali passport. Further, Ethiopian authorities told the secessionist leaders that they would like to recognize them, but only after another country does so. Finally, they have helped the secessionist operation to gain some traction at the AU’s most recent meeting in Banjul, Gambia. There, they helped them to gain access to the AU meeting corridors to lobby other African leaders. This devious attempt was discovered and the lobbying effort was confined to the exterior margins of the convention. While Ethiopia was managing this affair, the leadership of the Transitional Government of Somalia, which it literally foisted on the Somali people by manipulating the IGAD sponsored peace process, was attending the same meeting without registering its displeasure with the Ethiopian maneuvers.

 

 

Second, on Earlier occasions, Ethiopia sabotaged efforts of other governments trying to help reconcile Somali warlords and faction leaders. Among these was the Egyptian sponsored conference in Cairo that brought together most of the combatants. Once it became clear that progress was being made, Ethiopian handlers instructed some of their warlord clients to immediately leave Cairo and abandon the conference. But the greatest subversive effort was made to undermine the most successful Somali Peace conference in which Somalis were negotiating with each other without outside mediators. This was the conference held in the resort town of Arta, Republic of Djibouti in 1999. The delegates to this gathering were principally members of civil society groups and only a few warlords participated. An agreement was reached on a transitional charter and a broad-based government was formed. Among the IGAD dignitaries that came to the closing ceremony was the Ethiopian Prime Minister. The first signal of trouble was the transparently unhappy presence of Mr. Meles Zenawi among the dignitaries. Despite attempts to reach out to the Ethiopian government, the transitional Somali authorities were unable to convince Mr. Zenawi’s government to cooperate. Instead, the latter accused the TNG of having radical Islamcist members who were a danger to Ethiopia’s national security. The Ethiopian government then helped establish an umbrella structure for most of the warlords (SRRC) to challenge the TNG. Warlords’ resistance on the ground, Ethiopian campaign in the AU and IGAD, and the incompetence and malfeasance of the TNG leadership led to the demise of the TNG.

 

 

Third, the machination did not end there. At the opening ceremony of the 14th Somali reconciliation process in Eldoret, Kenya, several heads of states and governments spoke to the Somali delegates. While President Musevani scolded the Somalis as the "shame of Africa" Zenawi shed crocodile tears by stating "we have let down the Somali people and we must do everything to establish peace." Before the tears were dry, however, his representatives were deeply involved in delisting members of civil society groups who were invited to the conference. They were successful in replacing most of these with others who were loyal to the Ethiopian agenda. The end result of this process, with the consent of the Kenyan manager of the conference, and the ineptitude and disloyalty of the TNG delegates, was that the warlords single-handedly chose the members of parliament. The upshot of such gerrymandering was the appointment of Ethiopia’s principal client, Abdullahi Yusuf, as transitional president for Somalia. To add insult to injury, the Ethiopian government was able to have one of its other warlord clients vacate his parliamentary seat in order to bring in another of their supplicants who was then appointed prime minister. The only major post that escaped Ethiopian control was that of the speaker of parliament.

 

 

Addis Ababa’s disingenuous claims and its hostile interventions produced a Somali transitional authority that is an Ethiopian Trojan Horse. Immediately after his appointment as president, Mr. Yusuf flew to Addis Ababa to meet with Mr. Zenawi and solicit his help in requesting the deployment of 20,000 African Union troops in Somalia. Just when the Ethiopian government and its Somali supplicants thought they were in command, some parliamentarians and Mogadishu-based warlords rejected the idea of AU force, particularly if it included Ethiopian troops. This stalemate afforded warlords in Mogadishu, who never took their cabinet posts seriously, the opportunity to hold onto their power. In the meantime, these warlords, reportedly paid by outside forces, formed what they called "Anti-terror Alliance" whose aim was to hunt down religious people who were considered extremist, by outside actors, and foreign "terrorists" presumed to be hiding in Mogadishu. The subcontracted war on terror backfired as the population in Mogadishu turned their anger against the warlords and gave their support to the Islamic Courts. It took a mere two months to liberate the capital city from the grip of warlords. Mogadishu was finally at peace and under one authority, the Union of Islamic Courts.

 

 

The rise of the Union of Islamic Courts (UICs) and the mobilization of the population on the basis of Islamic principles were not anticipated by anyone, including the leaders of the courts. Ethiopia saw this change as an affront to its agenda of having a client government in Somalia. It immediately sounded the alarm bells and passed false intelligence to its principle western ally by claiming the UICs are terrorists and extremists. All of a sudden powerful countries that had not supported the TFG jumped on the bandwagon and began to talk about the international legitimacy of the TFG. Ethiopia and its Western allies were concerned about the popularity of the courts and their spread to the rest of the country. Consequently, they warned the Courts not to attack the TFG and confine its operation to the areas they took over during the first days of the people’s revolt. On July 16, about 150 militia men of the TFG fled Baidoa for Buur Hakaba and appealed to the Courts for their rescue. A member of the UICs made a unilateral decision and sent several armed technicals to Buur Hakaba to bring the rebels to Mogadishu. Once the TFG got wind of this, it announced that the UICs have attacked one of the towns under the TFG’s control and was enroute to take over Baidoa. This was the pretext the Ethiopian government was praying for and it immediately sent more troops to Baidoa. The TFG continued to deny the presence of Ethiopian forces although independent journalists and the population of the region have confirmed their presence. It was on July 22 that the Ethiopian PM finally admitted to the African Peace and Security Council (APSC) that its forces are in Somalia and pleaded with the Council members not to condemn his government’s action. The deployment of Ethiopian forces has given the TFG leaders a false sense of confidence such that they refused to send their delegation to Khartoum to negotiate with the UICs. It seems that the Ethiopian intervention was designed to preempt the conference and the possibility of compromise, although external pressure has finally brought the TFG to change its stance.

 

 

It appears that the Khartoum conference and the probability of the two parties agreeing on a common agenda might have been derailed. IGAD and the AU which could have played a constructive role are either partisan or lack the capacity to act in a productive manner. If the APSC fails to condemn Ethiopia’s military intervention in Somalia and accepts Mr. Zenawi’s plea, it should know that its inaction will set a precedent: some member countries will act in contravention of the principles of the Council and expect not to be sanctioned for their illegitimate behavior. Regardless of what APSC does in this instance, it seems that the die has been cast and the attempts to strike a compromise between the TFG and UICs has suffered a severe setback. Such outcome might have been the exact purpose of the Ethiopian intervention.

 

 

Given this history, what are the implications of the Ethiopian military intervention and how should Somalis respond and relate to Ethiopia? First, the TFG’s justification of the intervention to protect itself from UICs attack seems preposterous at best and terribly unintelligent. Seeking the country’s enemy to protect you from the very people whose government you claim to be is incomprehensible. The behavior of "Somali leaders" and Ethiopia’s intervention have utterly eroded whatever shred of legitimacy the TFG had with the Somali public. The most serious consequence of this is that Ethiopia holds hostage the "internationally legitimate" TFG, with connivance from the West, thus successfully stalling Somalia’s opportunity for reconciliation. In a nutshell, Ethiopia has temporarily attained its original objectives of setting up a client Somali government and of fragmenting the nation’s political fabric into Bantustans.

 

 

Now, the question is how patriotic Somalis should respond to Ethiopia’s sustained assault on their dignity and collective wellbeing. It is important for Somalis to distinguish between the majority of the Ethiopian people who are themselves oppressed and the regime. Both societies will benefit immensely from peace and democratic political order. Under such order, the vast resources of the two countries which have been devoted to the instruments of violence can be invested in improving the quality of life of the two peoples. Thus, it is imperative for both groups to work towards that goal. For the Somalis, they must recognize that the UICs, unlike previous revolts led by sectarian people have so far not eagerly jumped on forming another sectarian administration, but are cautiously moving forward in order to avoid past mistakes. They deserve the population’s support as long as they remain committed to justice, peace, and inclusive dispensation. The regime in Addis Ababa will try every trick in the book to destroy the courts and this precious opportunity for peace. Ethiopian leaders have done everything in their capacity to undermine Somali nationalism and have strongly motivated for the institutionalization of a clanist system. This strategy produced a transitional government whose two most senior leaders literally take their instructions from Addis Ababa. Recent events in Baidoa, where the Ethiopian Foreign Minister instructed the Somali leaders to reconstitute the cabinet, demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt who is the boss. Somalis must remain united and determined not to let the Ethiopian regime and its TFG clients spoil this chance for peace. Ethiopia’s militarist leaders would like to engage the courts in a shooting war but the latter and the population must resist such a provocation. Instead they should concentrate on establishing an effective, transparent and just administration for the areas under their control in order to demonstrate to the Somali people and the international community that the Courts’ agenda best reflects the future of a free Somalia. Such a development will be in sharp contrast to the deeply corrupt operations of the TFG and other regional administrations. Moreover, the best defense against Ethiopian aggression is a mobilized and organized population prepared to stay the course and to protect their rights.

 

 

Finally, the Somali people’s support for the TPLF at the hour of its need has been acknowledged by the latter. In return, TPLF and the Zenawi government have since their triumph engaged in sustained efforts to undermine reconciliation among Somalis and cunningly campaigned against the reemergence of a united and independent Somali Republic. Crocodile tears notwithstanding, the penultimate evidence of the ill-will of the Ethiopian regime are:

 

1 - the imposition of an incompetent and corrupt warlord government on the Somali people;

 

2 - the most recent and massive invasion of Bay and Bakool regions on the pretext of preempting hostile Islamicist forces against the TFG and itself;

 

3 - the attempts to convince the West that the UICs is a terrorist organization which must be destroyed. Such a claim is contrary to the fact that most Somalis support the UICs and their use of the Islamic faith to undo the divisiveness of clanist politics and restore common citizenship.

 

 

If there ever was any need for a proof of the enmity of Ethiopian governments (past and present) towards Somalia, therein lays the verdict. However, Somalis must not confound these regimes with the vast majority of the Ethiopian population who are themselves oppressed and exploited, but make no mistake about the intentions of the Highland regimes.

[Gabbal]

Informative. Thanks Wiilo!

[me]

How did that saying go? Somalia too far from god and too close to Ethiopia.

 

Only unity will defeat this foe. Do not under estimate what you can do for your nation.

[Abu-Salman]

Brillantissime!

This article definitely enlightens everyone on the Devil's hand that have undermined peace as well as Somali's unity and continue to destroy any hope of reconciliation among us.

 

the greatest subversive effort was made to undermine the most successful Somali Peace conference in which Somalis were negotiating with each other without outside mediators. This was the conference held in the resort town of Arta, Republic of Djibouti in 1999.

 

The delegates to this gathering were principally members of civil society groups and only a few warlords participated. An agreement was reached on a transitional charter and a broad-based government was formed.

 

Among the IGAD dignitaries that came to the closing ceremony was the Ethiopian Prime Minister. The first signal of trouble was the transparently unhappy presence of Mr. Meles Zenawi among the dignitaries. Despite attempts to reach out to the Ethiopian government, the transitional Somali authorities were unable to convince Mr. Zenawi’s government to cooperate. Instead, the latter accused the TNG of having radical Islamcist members who were a danger to Ethiopia’s national security.

 

The Ethiopian government then helped establish an umbrella structure for most of the warlords (SRRC) to challenge the TNG.

 

Warlords’ resistance on the ground, Ethiopian campaign in the AU and IGAD, and the incompetence and malfeasance of the TNG leadership led to the demise of the TNG.

Let's hope that hardcore tribalists and others Ethiopian propaganda victims will stop emphasizing clanic allegiances in the Somali equation as we were nothing but mere primitive clans!

[axmed_fiqi]

well written, This informative aryicle will crush those who try to potray the meles regime as an friend to somalia