Reasons to Object to the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU

[Arafaat]

Reasons to Object to the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU

10 January 2024

Absent the MoU, we have relied on the initial brief provided by President Bihi and the subsequent public statements from Ethiopian officials to piece together key elements of the deal. Bottom line is that this MoU is not good for Somaliland in a myriad of ways.

Below are some of the key concerns related to MoU:

1. The MoU has yet to be shared and there have been mixed signals from both Somaliland and Ethiopian officials on the scope and location of the Ethiopian investments – Is it a port deal? Naval base? Is it providing 20kms on the coast? Where exactly – Loyado/Lugaya/Bulahar? Or is it a land bridge connecting Ethiopia to the sea? What are the payment terms and how much?

2. Ethiopia’s historic claims and recent public statements from Abiy and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate an intent to obtain “permanent and reliable” access to the sea for the landlocked country. Therefore, the plans for a naval base, commercial port, and land bridge all should elicit concern that the endgame for Ethiopia may be to redraw the map of Somaliland. One such possible outcome is the map below in which Ethiopia is able to obtain a 20km wide land bridge to the Gulf of Aden:

 

There is a high risk of annexation of land by Ethiopia, as a powerful and much larger neighboring country would never give up military strategic assets and land, and if relations deteriorate would likely choose for annexation, as per example of the Ukrainian region of Crimea annexed by Russia.

3. There should be serious doubts about Ethiopia’s ability to honor any potential payment terms given the fact that the country only just last month (Dec 2023) failed to make a $31 million bond payment. The debt default underscores the Ethiopia's severe financial challenges and explains why the initial payments terms include shares in Ethiopia’s airline and telecom sector or provision of electricity in lieu of cash.

4. The practice of leasing coastal areas to foreign military has not proven to boost overall economic activity in the host country. Djibouti has one of the highest extreme poverty and income inequality rates in the world despite earning hundreds of millions in annual rents from foreign bases on its territory. https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_DJI.pdf  

5. Even if there is no formal annexation of land by Ethiopia, the influx of Ethiopians into the 20 kms of territory will change the demographics of Somaliland and provide Ethiopia with de facto control of the land. Somalilanders have already seen a dramatic increase of mostly Oromo people in the country, most as laborers. There are now several generations of Oromos in Somaliland with children who speak fluent Somali. Social media posts from prominent Ethiopians are clear on their goal to rewrite what they consider an historic wrong.

6. Ethiopia has no ability to ensure that Somaliland becomes an internationally recognized country with acceptance into African Union, IGAD, UN, or the new bloc of BRICS. Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey and Transnistria is only recognized by Russia. Both countries are largely isolated and economically and militarily dependent of the larger neighboring country. Somaliland would require financing to largely be acquired from Ethiopia as it would have no access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.

7. The construction of a port for Ethiopian commercial port in Lugaya, Loyado or Bulahar would have disastrous effects on the port of Berbera. In addition, the 20 kms area of the coast that will be controlled by Ethiopia will impact Somaliland’s own commercial activities such as fishing.

8. Ethiopian access to the Red Sea jeopardizes regional stability as Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea would feel existential threats by Ethiopia surrounding them both on coast and hinterland. In addition, the current high stakes conflict in the Red Sea, where multiple foreign navies are jockeying for relevance, could also draw Somaliland into conflict unwillingly.

9. The debate over the MoU has resulted in several Somaliland communities expressing their opposition to the presence of Ethiopian military in the country. Should the MoU move forward without broad-based support, there is a high chance that internal violent conflict may breakout. After the loss at Gojacadde, a return to war would be devastating for a Somaliland.

10. The presence of Ethiopian military in Somaliland will be draw for Al Shabaab to the region, as the extremist group has already made a public statement vowing to fight “foreign invaders”. Ethiopia’s presence in Mogadishu was also what ignited and gave birth to AS and created a breeding ground for extremism.

11. Somaliland will be affected by the complex internal political and economic turmoil in Ethiopia. Somaliland is already economic dependent on trade with Ethiopia, and adding political and security dependency would leave it at the mercy of the whim of whichever Ethiopian regimes comes to power.

[Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar]

Jabuuti iyo Ismaaciil Cumar Geelle ma ogaalanaayaan. I am sure he will arm tolkiisa oo dhulkooda Xabashi la siiyey, plus qabiilkiisa la kala qeybiyey dhulkooda, plus Soomaalida dhexdeeda xuduud beenaad Xabashi ka sameysaneyso, plus Jabuuti Xabashi ayee dhexda u gali doontaa. Jabuuti will arms qabiilada dega Awdal. If Muuse thought Sool inay ku adkeyd, hadduu arki doonaa dhibka ka sii weyn.

Ismaaciil Cumar Geelle is shocked sida la sheegaayo, oo Muuse Muqayil saan kama filaneynin. But Muuse qasabkii lagu qasbay inuu aqbalo inuu Xasan madaxweynihiisa yahay ayaa ka xanaajisay, toosna iskugu dhiibay Xabashada. He would rather have a Xabashi master than a Soomaali president of his.

[Xaaji Xunjuf]

You are wrong MMA  on this the awdal dynamics work differently   As ismaaciil might be opposed to the deal for obvious reasons he wasnt so vocal about it. U SAW  the igad announcement. ismaciil cant support the borama clan or arm. them against the Somaliland government.- or against other clans. the first target the Borama clan will do is fight the Jesus clan and cleanse them from their last remaining territories from Selel region. the ownership of zeila is contested really Ismaciil doesnt want to boost the boramae clan against his own clan that would be suicidal. 

Also another issue is he cant openly oppose Ethiopia since Ethiopia is his biggest client he cant antagonise Ethiopia for looking for other parts to get access to the sea. the Ethiopians might boycott him and he will be out of Bussines.

 

 

and last but not least i dont think any one who sane cant qasab muuse to come under any one ma ninki afweyne diiday oo ka awood badna culuso ,, oo bunker ugandhees ah ku xaraysan.Ma isleedahay am ninkaasu ina bixii wax ka dhegeysanaya

[Tallaabo]

If the Xabashis get hold of the sea and the land bridge as indicated by the map, what will stop them from expoiting our entire coast's fishing stock. They will probably go as far as the south with their fishing fleet guarded by their navy. The so-called politicians in Somaliland are just so clueless and incompetent. May Allah protect us from the evil of our own "leaders".

[Illyria]

5 hours ago, Arafaat said:

Reasons to Object to the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU

10 January 2024

Absent the MoU, we have relied on the initial brief provided by President Bihi and the subsequent public statements from Ethiopian officials to piece together key elements of the deal. Bottom line is that this MoU is not good for Somaliland in a myriad of ways.

Below are some of the key concerns related to MoU:

1. The MoU has yet to be shared and there have been mixed signals from both Somaliland and Ethiopian officials on the scope and location of the Ethiopian investments – Is it a port deal? Naval base? Is it providing 20kms on the coast? Where exactly – Loyado/Lugaya/Bulahar? Or is it a land bridge connecting Ethiopia to the sea? What are the payment terms and how much?

2. Ethiopia’s historic claims and recent public statements from Abiy and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate an intent to obtain “permanent and reliable” access to the sea for the landlocked country. Therefore, the plans for a naval base, commercial port, and land bridge all should elicit concern that the endgame for Ethiopia may be to redraw the map of Somaliland. One such possible outcome is the map below in which Ethiopia is able to obtain a 20km wide land bridge to the Gulf of Aden:

 

There is a high risk of annexation of land by Ethiopia, as a powerful and much larger neighboring country would never give up military strategic assets and land, and if relations deteriorate would likely choose for annexation, as per example of the Ukrainian region of Crimea annexed by Russia.

3. There should be serious doubts about Ethiopia’s ability to honor any potential payment terms given the fact that the country only just last month (Dec 2023) failed to make a $31 million bond payment. The debt default underscores the Ethiopia's severe financial challenges and explains why the initial payments terms include shares in Ethiopia’s airline and telecom sector or provision of electricity in lieu of cash.

4. The practice of leasing coastal areas to foreign military has not proven to boost overall economic activity in the host country. Djibouti has one of the highest extreme poverty and income inequality rates in the world despite earning hundreds of millions in annual rents from foreign bases on its territory. https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_DJI.pdf  

5. Even if there is no formal annexation of land by Ethiopia, the influx of Ethiopians into the 20 kms of territory will change the demographics of Somaliland and provide Ethiopia with de facto control of the land. Somalilanders have already seen a dramatic increase of mostly Oromo people in the country, most as laborers. There are now several generations of Oromos in Somaliland with children who speak fluent Somali. Social media posts from prominent Ethiopians are clear on their goal to rewrite what they consider an historic wrong.

6. Ethiopia has no ability to ensure that Somaliland becomes an internationally recognized country with acceptance into African Union, IGAD, UN, or the new bloc of BRICS. Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey and Transnistria is only recognized by Russia. Both countries are largely isolated and economically and militarily dependent of the larger neighboring country. Somaliland would require financing to largely be acquired from Ethiopia as it would have no access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF.

7. The construction of a port for Ethiopian commercial port in Lugaya, Loyado or Bulahar would have disastrous effects on the port of Berbera. In addition, the 20 kms area of the coast that will be controlled by Ethiopia will impact Somaliland’s own commercial activities such as fishing.

8. Ethiopian access to the Red Sea jeopardizes regional stability as Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea would feel existential threats by Ethiopia surrounding them both on coast and hinterland. In addition, the current high stakes conflict in the Red Sea, where multiple foreign navies are jockeying for relevance, could also draw Somaliland into conflict unwillingly.

9. The debate over the MoU has resulted in several Somaliland communities expressing their opposition to the presence of Ethiopian military in the country. Should the MoU move forward without broad-based support, there is a high chance that internal violent conflict may breakout. After the loss at Gojacadde, a return to war would be devastating for a Somaliland.

10. The presence of Ethiopian military in Somaliland will be draw for Al Shabaab to the region, as the extremist group has already made a public statement vowing to fight “foreign invaders”. Ethiopia’s presence in Mogadishu was also what ignited and gave birth to AS and created a breeding ground for extremism.

11. Somaliland will be affected by the complex internal political and economic turmoil in Ethiopia. Somaliland is already economic dependent on trade with Ethiopia, and adding political and security dependency would leave it at the mercy of the whim of whichever Ethiopian regimes comes to power.

Consider the following:

Ethiopian interest in ports:

• Unification of the Horn of Africa

Background:

• The modern Ethiopian Navy was established by Emperor Haile Selassie, with the assistance of the United Kingdom, in 1955 and had its Naval Headquarters in:

            - Massawa with presence in:
                    - Assab
                    - Dhalak Islands and
                    - Asmara.

• From 1991, its navy started using Yemeni bases.
•   Then Jabouti, but by 1996, its navy ceased to exist, but with commercial fleet using Massawa & Assab.
•   That also ended after the 1998 war between Ethiopia & Eritrea.

The grand plan:

• The plan, Mr Birhanemeskel said, was to push for the "unification of the Horn of Africa as an economic bloc and the navy is part of that project".
• 11 Ethiopia commercial ships in a "very volatile" Red Sea area where Ethiopia has other economic interests.
• Kenya, Somaliland and Djibouti as possible locations for bases.

The Kenyan option

• Ethiopia agreed a deal with Kenya to facilitate the acquisition of land in the island of Lamu as part of the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (Lapsset) project, a $24bn (£18bn) transport and infrastructure plan to link the two countries and their neighbours.
• The project was signed in 2012 but has been beset by funding delays and security problems in both countries.

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-44369382

 

Postscript:
The Lamu port project mainly failed for lack of funding. Now how is Ethiopia, which is struggling to pay off interest on loans, and is strapped for cash going to fund construction of a new port?

Without even considering the security ramifications, just thinks about the trade and economic implications said port shall have on trade at Jibouti and Berbera.

 

[Arafaat]

Perhaps the biggest hindrance of all, not mentioned in the piece, are Abiy and Muse’s impediment leadership, the political trajectory and sense of desperation over internal state and anxiety over own position. Which will not be turned by this deal, on the contrary it will further destabilise both countries and at larger the region. Remember how Ethiopia and Somaliland got to the current precarious internal political state in the first place. 

Will this deal be the healing cure for the political disarray, or perhaps on the contrary become the tipping point?