Somalia: The Potato and the Technical: [Godane Vs Roobow]

[General Duke]

Somalia: The Potato and the Technical: Decisive elements in combat

10 Oct 10, 2010 - 9:48:51 AM

 

by Frans Barnard**

Special to Garowe Online

 

The recent (27/09/10) helicopter attack in Merka in which a meeting of senior Al Shabaab leaders was targeted has brought fresh focus to the ongoing debate about a possible merger between Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiya. This discussion is neither new nor surprising. Given the recent expenditure of materiel in the Ramadan push by Shabaab and Hisbul against the TFG/AMISOM in Mogadishu, a merger makes sense - at a superficial level.

 

As always in anything to do with Somalia, the superficial needs to be treated like a lion – no matter how much you may think you understand the behaviour and actions, just when you do, it turns and savages the best thought through analysis.

 

While Shabaab is having it’s own internal debate, primarily between the

two “camps” headed respectively by Emir Axmed Abdi Godane (Isaak) and Sheekh Mukhtaar Robow (Rahanwein), Shabaab is also in ongoing negotiations with Hisbul. Paralleling this process is the internal struggle within the TFG between the President Sharif and the now ex Prime Minister Sharmake.

 

All of this comes at a time when after months of stalemate, all actors - internal, regional and international - are doing their best to regroup. In considering this time of rethinking, reorganization and regrouping, it is perhaps useful to attempt an examination of just one element in an effort to understand the complexity of these processes and the inherent danger in simplistic thinking.

 

In reading the excellent book “Collapse” by Jared Diamond, this writer was particularly struck by Diamond's comments on how the introduction of the potato to New Zealand Maoris led to an unprecedented period of conflict, which turned previous patterns of inter-tribal conflict upside down. The simple potato achieved this by virtue of being a vegetable that had a longer shelf life than the native sweet potato. This meant the tribe who first secured potatoes was quite simply able to stay in the field longer and consequently conquer more territory.

 

In considering this, I have been fascinated by the ongoing reporting of negotiations between Al Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiya and am indebted to some very well situated Somalis who have shared their thoughts and observations. A review of most English language media articles and the analysis done on this subject, usually focus on the ideological divides and the more prosaic issues of name and hierarchy.

 

Within Shabaab the belief that ideologically very little differentiates between the TFG and HI creates a real block. Given the well-documented mentoring relationship that was enjoyed between Sheekh Xasan Daahir Aweys (**********) and Sheekh Shariif Sheekh Axmed (Abgal) this is not surprising. The divide also focuses on internal stressors that have escalated in the light of the Ramadan Offensive.

 

For many within Shabab, it is felt that forces from Bay and Bakool loyal to Mukhtar Robow have paid a significantly higher price in the number of casualties incurred. This is then further aggravated by financial pressures; financiers in Bay and Bakool believe they have contributed the lion’s share of operational funding. This issue is amplified by reports indicating that Godane has appointed a cousin of his to be responsible for Shabaab fund raising. There is also the belief that the Government of Kenya's financial crackdowns and the recent peace agreements in Ethiopia with ******i supported groups, like Itihad, might divert finances to support clan interests such lobbying for the possible appointment of an ******i Prime Minister to replace Sharmake, an action which would further undermine Shabaab's financial liquidity.

 

Each of these stressors is further situated within a complex of clan dynamics. With Al Shabaab being strongly represented both geographically and numerically in South Somalia, Godane who hails from Somaliland has been repeatedly accused of “loading” the leadership of Shabaab with his kinsmen. Given his lack of physical clan support in South Central Somalia it is not surprising that leadership friction exists. That this has exacerbated difficulties between Godane and Robow has been made manifestly evident since the “interrupted” leadership summit in Merka with accusations being leveled by both actors against each other. Interestingly Godane even granted Time an interview – which some observers believe was a strategic decision to reinforce his leadership position.

 

This fear of commanders who come from the major Somali clans of senior Shabaab commanders from minority clans, has arguably had more to do with the present configuration of foreign fighters supporting Godane that ideology. The priority for Shabaab commanders who come from the minority clans and their foreign fighters is to ensure that commanders such as Robow from the major clans do not set the agenda. This is largely driven by a fear of clan influence and clan priorities.

 

Currently within Shabaab leading commanders are from Isaak, Galjacel,Bade-Adde, and other minority clans within the ****** and the ******; in traditional Somali fashion this leads to a fear of large clan domination.

 

Beyond the inner Shabaab positioning, the concept of a merged Shabaab and Hisbul Islamiya also leads to a concern beyond ideology. Godane is considered to be very concerned about a dilution of his authority if he has to share power with Sheekh Xasan Daahir Aweys (**********). On the Hisbul side of the equation we come to the equivalent of the potato in New Zealand – the single factor issue that can change the face of a conflict. Confirmed reports indicate that Hisbul do not own their Technicals, these fighting vehicles made famous in the movie Blackhawk Down, are owned by Somali businessmen. It is these wealthy and influential businessmen who are the critical block in the merger discussions. Before any merger can occur, they will want to have a clear understanding of how they will retain ownership of their assets, or be appropriately compensated for them.

 

So a potato made the difference in Maori tribal conflict between1818 and 1833, and the ownership of Technicals could do the same in Somalia 2010.

[General Duke]

This fear of commanders who come from the major Somali clans of senior Shabaab commanders from minority clans, has arguably had more to do with the present configuration of foreign fighters supporting Godane that ideology. The priority for Shabaab commanders who come from the minority clans and their foreign fighters is to ensure that commanders such as Robow from the major clans do not set the agenda. This is largely driven by a fear of clan influence and clan priorities.

 

Currently within Shabaab leading commanders are from ....., .......,......., and other minority clans within the ****** and the ******; in traditional Somali fashion this leads to a fear of large clan domination.

Poor Godane he is having the same inferiority complex as the secessionist leaders in Hargaysa