The lesson the west has learned from our history!

[Liqaye]

Two cultures

The mad mullah who shamed us in Somaliland

 

AMERICAN troops are now scouting the al-Qa'eda nests of Somalia. Eighteen US Rangers were murdered in 1993 in Mogadishu, the capital, and America may now settle the score. But, as in Afghanistan, so in Somalia did we Brits precede the Yanks.

 

It was in 1899 that Mad Mullah Mahomed bin Abdillah Hassan declared a jihad. The territory, then known as British Somaliland, was our protectorate, but the mullah wanted us out.

 

The mullah was a precursor of Osama bin Laden. Initially our ally in various tribal skirmishes, he turned on us after he had collected some 5,000 militants. Promising his followers eternal paradise on dying in battle, the mullah wrote to the British vice-consul at Berbera, the local capital: "I like war, you do not."

 

Actually, we British are a violent bunch. We do like war, and by 1904 we had driven the mullah into exile in Italian Somaliland. But in 1909 he returned, bolstered by fresh men and renewed propaganda: "The country is a useless jungle. There are many stones. There are many ant heaps. The sun is very hot."

 

Shamefully, on the mullah's return, we withdrew our soldiers from the interior. But the mullah's cruelties drew us back to re-establish order, and in 1912 the Camel Constabulary marched on him.

 

Yet it took until 1920 - and deaths on both sides - before we eventually rooted him out. He hid in caves, and only after the RAF bombed him did he again retreat into Italian Somaliland. There he died, of the flu.

 

The best account of these campaigns can be found in the Memoirs of Lord Ismay, published in 1960. General Hastings "Pug" Ismay was one of Britain's great military administrators, rising to be Churchill's chief of staff during the Second World War and, later, secretary general of Nato. Churchill wrote that they were friends who "worked for many years hand in glove".

 

Ismay was a decade and half younger than Churchill and, having as a youth read Churchill's books, he modelled his own career on his. Like Churchill, Ismay attended an excellent school (Charterhouse to Churchill's Harrow) and, like Churchill, he was fiercely intelligent. But he was another duffer at exams, so he was reduced to following Churchill into an Indian Army cavalry regiment, then an unintellectual branch of military life.

 

It was on India's unruly North-West Frontier, facing Afghanistan, that Ismay learnt to fight - and where, like Churchill before him, he played much polo. But in 1914 Ismay was sent to Somaliland and, despite his many requests to transfer to France, he was kept there until 1920. It was, though, because he was fighting the mullah and not the Germans that he survived the First World War.

 

On returning to Britain, Ismay discovered that he loved high-level staff work, but despite his eminence he could not save British Somaliland

 

from subsequent maladministration. He was appalled when, in 1940, in the face of Italian aggression, we yet again withdrew our soldiers from the interior to Berbera. There, the Italians overwhelmed us, whereas we could have held out indefinitely in the hills with friendly tribes.

 

We eventually retook the protectorate, but after the war - anxious to shed our imperial burdens - we gave it, remarkably perhaps, to the Italians. They left in 1960. Ismay always felt that, had British rule been maintained without disruption, the region would have been pacified and tribal warfare could have been expunged.

 

If America moves in now, let it show the commitment we did not. Let it prepare for a long involvement, and let it establish the institutions of order, secure government and the rule of law that we failed to implant firmly.

[Thinkerman]

The above article i think is written from a very confussed angle, that is void of the recent history and reality of Imperial aggressions of super powers on both global and regional levels.

 

I would just ask who wrote the article?

 

If its a non-somali, then am not supprised of the view pint taken, however if t is by a somali? then am quite dissapinted at the direction it took and the title itself.

 

It would be easy to cast a shadow over Mahomed bin Abdillah Hassan (whos life i have little knowledge of)from behind the comforts of a computer screen, but the conclusion shows a certain degree of weakness that is pervading our whole ppl.

 

We cannot continue to wait and hope that other nationalities will come to our rescure. We must look to ourselves first.

 

Not the Yahudii-Yankeee, Poddle-brits, or even the Corrupt leaders of this Arabian gulf countries.

 

There interest lie else where

[Liqaye]

Soory sijui-1 that article was written by Terence Kealy vice-chancellor of university of buckingham

In the daily telegraph

 

 

By Ken menkhaus (foreign policy in focus think tank.)

 

Somalia and the U.S. are apparently doomed by fate to collide at critical moments in global politics. The collision has never brought anything but trouble to both parties. We are about to crash into one another again, this time in an expanded war on terrorism.

 

It was Somalia that attacked Ethiopia in 1977, triggering a series of Soviet moves that led to the end of détente between the superpowers and the rise of "Cold War II." Détente, it was said, was buried in the sands of the Ogaden Desert.

 

Somalia was also the graveyard of the new world order. In December 1992, hoping to set a precedent for more robust principles of humanitarian interventionism, the United States chose Somalia as the site of a major peace operation to put a halt to its famine, warlordism, and anarchy. Instead of setting a precedent for humanitarian intervention and post-cold war peace enforcement, events in Somalia nearly destroyed the credibility of UN peacekeeping and ruined the American appetite for international humanitarian operations and nation-building exercises. In the years that followed, the U.S. grew cautious about peace operations, cynical toward multilateralism and the UN, and indifferent toward failed states in the Third World. As for Somalia, our punishment for its impertinence was to pretend it didn't exist.

 

But a decade later, the seemingly inconsequential country of Somalia appears destined yet again to play a major role in American foreign policy. This time, Somalia, which is near the top of the list of our next targets for military action, may become the litmus test for how we define and execute an expanded war on terrorism.

 

What could go wrong in Somalia? Plenty, particularly if we intervene without adequate knowledge of the country's complex politics. One of the costs of ignoring Somalia since 1994 is that we are now caught trying to formulate policy about a country we know virtually nothing about. When information is bad, analysis and policy are likely to be flawed as well. American policymakers need a few important correctives that can prevent our policy on Somalia from descending into a repeat of the debacle of the early nineties.

 

First, Somalia's Islamist movement, Al-Ittihad, is not synonymous with Al-Qaeda, and media insinuations to the contrary are wildly wrong. Al-Ittihad is a small, relatively weak organization, with a mainly domestic agenda. Some individual members have had links to Al-Qaeda that merit close scrutiny, but the group as a whole is in no way a subsidiary of Al-Qaeda.

 

Second, Somalia's Transitional National Government (TNG) is not a front for al-Ittihad, and is not the Somali equivalent of the Taliban government. It is extremely weak, controlling only half of the city of Mogadishu, and while it has some Al-Ittihad members in its parliament, it is by no means a front for violent Islamists.

 

Third, Somalia does not currently harbor active terrorist bases and camps. Somalia's Al-Ittihad movement abandoned the few towns and rural outposts it once controlled, and has since integrated into local communities as teachers, health workers, and businessmen. Bombing abandoned outposts would be a pointless exercise in rearranging rocks.

 

Finally, Somalia is not a likely safe haven for fleeing Al-Qaeda members. Concern about Somalia as a terrorist refuge is understandable. It is a collapsed state with no functional central government; global outlaws there could presumably escape the reach of law. In reality, however, Somalia is a lousy hideout for non-Somali radicals. Foreigners cannot operate in secrecy in Somalia; everyone knows who you are and what you're doing, and locals would not hesitate to expose the presence of non-Somalis in their midst.

 

What does all this mean for an expanded war on terrorism in Somalia? It suggests that the only military action that might be appropriate in Somalia is a limited operation of capturing one or several major suspects. Chasing down minor players in the armed, clannish neighborhoods of Mogadishu would be dangerous and counterproductive.

 

Ideally, U.S. policy toward Somalia should be a combination of close monitoring, surveillance, and naval interdiction--which we are already doing--as well as constructive engagement with Somalia's many local and regional authorities. Somalis are above all else pragmatists, and if presented with the right combination of carrots and sticks--and if treated with respect--will work with us in the war on terrorism. Threatening military moves are not likely to achieve that goal. U.S. policy in Somalia will shed light on whether the war on terrorism is an essentially military campaign, or if we are clever and patient enough as a country to draw on the many tools in our toolbox besides the hammer

[Thinkerman]

Terence Kealy vice-chancellor of university of buckingham

 

:rolleyes:

[Liqaye]

Oh why oh why do you roll your eyes sijui-1, is it because buckingham university is not impressive enough?

 

This is someother things Terence Kealy is into:

 

.Member of commonwealth group (cross party foreign policy lobby group)

.Member of Institute of strategic studies, in the U.K AND Canada

.Ex-oficio member of daily telegraph board of directors

and so on

and so forth.

 

This is a man who is listend to very carefully by foreign policy gurus in the U.K and is to the conservatives what Richard pearle is to the republicans.

 

You never know what might happen down the road he might be the man who writes the master plan for a play in somalia.

 

http://www.dailytelegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=%2Fopinion%2F2001%2F12%2F20%2Fdo2003.xml

[Thinkerman]

and is to the conservatives what Richard pearle is to the republicans.

 

Akhas a british version? I guess i shouldnt be supprised, the theme and arrogance of the article's presumption's sounded like something straight out of the neo-cons 'enlightend imperialism' project of a new world order

 

Richard pearle :mad: , now that man is another plague on the muslims

[Liqaye]

Precisely why we should know in advance what him and his Ilk think about somalia.

[Thinkerman]

I agree and i would guess that everyone by now would know what to make of supposed 'international help/humanitarin intervention' :rolleyes: . At least the Neo-cons are open about there plans

 

No the big problem for somalis is the people of power, the warlords, the corrupt leaders, the undercover business men expoliting whatever there is to expolit. They are the ones who are in a position to exact ereprable damage to our people and the natural resources.

 

The Gaalo are doing what they will do naturally