Al--ITAHAAAD, Where are they ?

[NASSIR]

A little glimpse of history

 

 

Africa and the War on Terrorism:

The Case of Somalia

 

Theodros Dagne

 

 

Al Ittihad

 

Al Ittihad is perhaps the most active and was, at one point, the most successful

of all the Islamic groups. Indeed, al Ittihad is an Islamic fundamentalist

group whose principal ideology and objective is to establish an Islamic

state in Somalia. Founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, al Ittihad

unsuccessfully sought to replace clan and warlord politics with an Islamic

state. In the early 1990s, it had modest successes; it administered territories

under its control in the south, but it never emerged as a major military

or political force in Somalia. The clan-based groups and factions led by warlords

in Mogadishu are secular and have been at odds with al Ittihad, even

though some of these groups maintained tactical alliances from time to time

with the group. Al Ittihad’s failure to maintain control over territories and

spread its ideology led to a shift in strategy in the mid-1990s, when it abandoned

its ambition to spread its ideology through military means and began

to concentrate on providing social services to communities through Islamic

schools and health care centers.

Al Ittihad’s Somalian social activities and religious objectives seem

inconsistent with its activities in the Somali region of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia,

al Ittihad is actively engaged in military activities in support of ethnic

Somalis. It closely coordinates its activities with elements in the ******

region that are at war with the Ethiopian government. Several anti-Ethiopian

groups are active in the Somali region, and al Ittihad operates with these

groups in carrying out attacks against Ethiopian targets. In 1999, the

****** Islamic Union, under the leadership of Muhammad Muallem Omar

Abdi; the Somali People’s Liberation Front, under the leadership of Ahmed

Ali Ismail; and the Western Somali Liberation Front, under the leadership

of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Hussein, formed a coalition called the United

 

Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, their term for the Somali-inhabited

region of Ethiopia.4 The ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) also

claims to be engaged in military activities in the region and had in the past

formed alliances with other Ethiopian opposition groups.

Many Somali watchers believe that al Ittihad’s strength is highly exaggerated

and that information about its alleged links with international terrorist

organizations is unreliable. There is no reliable information or pattern of

behavior to suggest that al Ittihad has an international agenda, as has been

the case with the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan. Some

observers note that if al Ittihad had a clear internationally oriented agenda,

its obvious ally in the region would be the NIF regime in Sudan or the

Sudanese-backed Eritrean Islamic Jihad. The Sudanese regime did back

regional extremist groups and international terrorist organizations, but there

was no apparent relationship between the NIF and al Ittihad. Others accuse

al Ittihad of being a secretive group that coordinates its activities with terrorist

organizations. Some observers contend that al Ittihad and al Qaeda

were behind the killings of the eighteen U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu in

1993.5 Al Ittihad is also accused of receiving funds from al Qaeda.

Since President Bush placed al Ittihad on the list of terrorism-related

entities in September 2001, press reports and information about this group

have increased.6 Somali warlords, especially those backed by Ethiopia, such

as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), headquartered

in Baidoa, and vehemently opposed to the TNG, have been actively

engaged in a public relations campaign to portray their political enemies as

terrorists. The government of Ethiopia has also been very vocal in portraying

al Ittihad and TNG as terrorist groups.7 Information from these sources

is generally vague and lacks clear evidence.

Moreover, neither the Ethiopian government nor others have been able to

provide information about locations of training camps, links between TNG

 

and al Ittihad and al Qaeda, or the identity of members of al Qaeda or their

activities in Somalia. Nor have they offered clear evidence on acts of terrorism

against U.S. targets by al Ittihad. Somali observers note that al Ittihad

does not have territories under its control and does not have the military

capabilities to wrest control from any of the well-entrenched warlords. In

December 2001, however, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “some

bin Laden followers are holed up there [somalia], taking advantage of the

absence of a functioning government.”8 Moreover, the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, stated late in the same month that

the United States has “strong indications Somalia is linked to Osama bin

Laden.”9 In January 2002, U.S. and allied forces reportedly expanded their

military presence in East Africa. According to press reports, the United

States and its European allies have increased military reconnaissance

flights and other surveillance activities in Somalia.

 

 

Regional Actors and Concern over Terrorism

Ethiopia

Over the years, al Ittihad’s principal target has been the government of

Ethiopia. Ethiopian officials have consistently accused al Ittihad of having

links with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and have portrayed al Ittihad

as a threat to regional peace and stability. Al Ittihad has carried out a

number of terrorist attacks against Ethiopian targets, and Ethiopian security

forces have violently retaliated against the group and its supporters. The

fighting with al Ittihad was triggered in the early 1990s when Ethiopian

security forces brutally cracked down on the ONLF, a member of the first

Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The ONLF joined the TGE in

part because the Transitional Charter provided nations and nationalities the

right to self-determination. The ONLF push for self-determination created

tension between the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic

Front (EPRDF) and the ONLF. In the early 1990s, Ethiopian security forces

assassinated a number of ONLF leaders, cracked down on the organization,

and moved the Ethiopian Somali Region capital from Gode to Jijiga, a central

government stronghold. Members of the ONLF fled to Somalia and

joined al Ittihad, a fairly new group at that time. Hence, some observers

view al Ittihad as a group largely concerned with domestic issues, although

some within the leadership might have links with outside groups.

Ethiopia’s principal interest appears to be to ensure that a united Somalia

does not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhibited region of

Ethiopia remains stable. Successive Ethiopian governments had to deal with

Somali irredentism. In the late 1970s, Somali rebels backed by the Barre

government overran Ethiopian forces and captured a large swath of territory.

Ethiopian forces ejected the Somali forces with the help of troops from Cuba

and Yemen. In the 1980s, Ethiopian dictator Mengitsu Haile Mariam began

to arm and train Somali dissidents. Several Somali groups were created with

the help of Ethiopian military and intelligence and were given training

camps inside Ethiopia. The Barre government in Somalia, on the other

hand, provided financial and political support to Ethiopian opposition

groups, including to the current ruling party, the EPRDF. Somali rebels succeeded

in 1991 in ousting the Barre regime, while the EPRDF forces overthrew

the Mengistu regime in May 1991.

Some of the armed factions in Somalia today are the same ones that were

allied with the Mengistu regime in the 1980s. It did not take long, however,

for the EPRDF-led government and some of the factions to forge a new

alliance. Ethiopia was an active participant in efforts to bring an end to the

civil war in Somalia in the mid-1990s. Ethiopia organized a number of

peace conferences over the years, but none succeeded in bringing an end to

factional fighting. In recent years, however, Ethiopia has contributed to the

unrest in Somalia, supplying warlords with arms and at times sending its

troops into Somalia to fight faction leaders. Ethiopia appears determined to

establish a friendly, proxy government in Mogadishu. Al Ittihad is seen as a

major obstacle in achieving that objective. Regional actors such as Kenya

and Djibouti express fear that Ethiopia’s military activities and support for

warlords may cause an increase in regional instability and may lead to more

refugees fleeing to neighboring countries.

 

Ethiopian officials by contrast point to al Ittihad and the TNG as a threat

to Ethiopia and regional stability. Since the war with Eritrea in 1998,

Ethiopia’s interest in ensuring stability and eliminating potential threats

coming from Somalia has increased, in part because of concerns of fighting

two wars simultaneously. If the perceived threat from Somalia and the

Somali region is not dealt with decisively, Ethiopia could be forced to maintain

robust forces in both the north and the southeast. But a friendly government

in Mogadishu or Hargeisa could relieve Ethiopia of the burden of

maintaining a large force along the Somali border, saving Ethiopia scarce

resources and helping concentrate its forces along the Eritrean border.

Ethiopian officials are also concerned about alliances being formed between

Somali groups and non-Somali Ethiopian opposition groups.

 

 

Somalia: U.S. Concerns and Policy Options

In late September 2001, the Bush administration added al Ittihad to a list

of terrorism-related entities whose assets were ordered frozen by a presidential

executive order. Bush administration officials accused al Ittihad of links

with al Qaeda. The administration did not offer evidence to prove its allegations,

but some officials asserted that links between the two organizations

dated back to the U.S. presence in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope

(1992 to 1994). According to a Washington Post article, “An interagency

working group involving analysts from the State Department, Pentagon, CIA,

and the National Security Council has been meeting for the past three weeks

to discuss where and how al Qaeda operates in the East Africa country.”11

Some observers are skeptical that al Ittihad is an international terrorist organization

or that there is a strong link between al Qaeda and al Ittihad. They

argue that there are no credible reports that al Ittihad ever targeted U.S.

interests in Somalia or Africa. Some observers assert that al Ittihad does not

have a regional reach let alone a global reach. Moreover, some Somalis

credit al Ittihad for its social services and for restoring law and order in

areas where it has maintained presence.

The focus on Somalia and Somali groups is expanding in Washington,

 

nonetheless. In early November 2001, federal authorities raided several

Somali-owned money transfer businesses in the United States operated by

al Barakaat companies. The Bush administration ordered the assets of al

Barakaat frozen because of its alleged links to al Qaeda. Al Barakaat was

reportedly founded in 1989 by a Somali banker and currently has several

dozen affiliates in Somalia, other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and North

America. After the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991,

the banking system crumbled. As a result, al Barakaat and other small companies

became key players in the money-transfer business and other financial

transactions for many Somalis inside Somalia and overseas.

In early December 2001, American officials reportedly visited Baidoa,

Somalia, and met with faction leaders and Ethiopian military officers. Washington

did not reveal the purpose of the one-day visit, but reporters in the

region stated that these officials had asked about terrorist networks in Somalia.

Bush administration officials have repeatedly stated that Somalia supports

terrorism and that al Qaeda has used Somalia as a base of operations

to attack U.S. targets. Bush administration officials are concerned that al

Qaeda members may flee to Somalia from Afghanistan. According to Assistant

Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner, Washington has three

policy objectives. First, the United States will work with neighboring countries

to make Somalia “inhospitable” to terrorist groups. Second, the United

States will ensure that any activities in Somalia would not affect its neighboring

countries. Third, the United States will work toward a lasting peace

and economic development in Somalia.

U.S. officials have not yet presented evidence linking al Ittihad and the

TNG with al Qaeda. In the absence of a central government and with numerous

armed groups scattered throughout the country, it would be difficult to

hold anyone accountable for past deeds or current activities. Al Ittihad is the

only Somali group identified by the Bush administration as a terrorist organization,

but al Ittihad does not control a single administrative area in

Somalia and does not have fixed assets that Washington could go after.

Nonetheless, the United States has several options to consider. Washington

could seek to apprehend individuals in Somalia suspected of terrorist activities

and bring them to justice. Another option is to infiltrate Somali groups

 

suspected of terrorist links in order to monitor, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist

networks.

A long-term and a potentially complicated policy option, in the view of

some analysts, is to address the root causes of the problem. A stable Somalia

under a democratic authority is perhaps the only guarantee of a terrorist-free

Somalia. But establishing a representative government is a major undertaking.

Some observers are convinced, however, that after ten years of instability

and bloodshed, Somalis might be ready to resolve their differences with the

help of the international community. Another contributing factor to the problem

in Somalia has been the interference of regional actors in the country,

driven largely by their own national interests. The United States can play a

pivotal role in forging a strong regional alliance that can play a constructive

role in bringing about an end to the instability in Somalia.

Simply monitoring events in the country is also a policy option, but some

see this cautious approach as one that would allow the terrorist threat to

increase. On the other hand, a heavy-handed approach in the absence of

clear evidence could be seen as targeting a weak and defenseless country.

U.S. military measures could also be seen as settling old scores. Some

Somalis believe that they will be targeted by the United States not to deter

terrorism but to avenge the killings of the eighteen U.S. Rangers killed in

battle in Mogadishu in 1993.

Many observers contend that Somalia may be a safe haven for Somali warlords

but not for foreign terrorists. Somalis are notoriously independent; foreign

terrorist groups would have a difficult time establishing a strong presence

in Somalia because, experts contend, it is difficult to hide in Somalia

due to the nonsecretive nature of Somali society. Somali experts further

believe that, even if a foreign terrorist organization manages to establish a

presence, the group is likely to be betrayed by potential allies because there

are no permanent loyalties in the Somalia of today.