Learning to be Oromo: Nationalist Discourse in the Diaspora

[me]

Learning to be Oromo: Nationalist Discourse in the Diaspora

 

JOHN SORENSON

Brock University, St Catharines, Ontario

 

 

Background to the Oromo Diaspora

 

Although Ethiopia is home to myriad ethnicities , the situation of the Oromo has

emerged as a pressing component of a state newly reconfigured by the toppling

of the dictatorship which had ruled the country since 1974. The Oromo are the

largest ethnic group in Ethiopia; estimated at 20 million, they constitute 40 per

cent of the population and are one of the largest language-groups in Africa

(Baxter, 1994: 167). Baissa Lemmu (1993: 99) argues that most Oromo people

shared a common republican system of government until the Shoan conquest in

the late nineteenth century and Holcomb (1991: 4) contends that the cultural

and political sys tem of gada organised the Oromo people in an all-encompassing

democratic republic but, in the past, the Oromo were not organised under a

single state; Mohammed Hassans (1990) major historical revision describes the

development of a number of distinct Oromo states in the Gibe region.

 

Lewis (1993) also notes the variety of political forms which existed among Oromo

groups prior to the Abyssinian conquest. Cultural and linguistic commonalities

existed, but the Oromo have been distinguished by their pursuit of diverse

economic strategies, regional differences and religious affiliations (although the

Oromo practised their own indigenous religion most have adopted Islam or

Christianity). Although a numerical majority, they have remained politically

subordinate. The Oromo were brought into the Ethiopian state in the nineteenth

century through violent conquest, as Abyssinian rulers expanded from the

northern highlands. Under the neftenya-gabbar system, most of the Oromo were

brutally subordinated to those who occupied their territory and forced to

contribute labour and crops to those who controlled them. Formerly this system

was described as a semi-feudal one but Oromo nationalist intellectuals, as well

as Western activists and anthropologists, argue that the situation should be seen

as a colonial one. Considerable energy has been devoted to these terms, given

that Marxism furnished the discursive terrain for competing political groups

throughout the region over the last two decades and seemed for many,

including Oromo nationalists, to set the conditions by which political aims could

be considered legitimate. Lewis (1983: 12± 14) notes some of the positions and

concludes that such terminological distinctions are inevitably arbitrary.

What does seem clear, however, is that the Oromo were economically and

politically subordinated and their culture was denigrated. Ethiopian historians

and politicians established a narrative version of history which portrayed the

Oromo (then known by the derogatory term Galla) as primitive barbarians, and

focused on the glories and achievements of the highland elites . As I noted in

Imagining Ethiopia, the elements of this discursive construction included the

projection of the borders of the contemporary state three thousand years

backward into the past through assertion of direct links with the ancient empire

of Axum; the legend of Solomon and Sheba which linked the Abyssinian rulers

to the ancient Hebrews; the image of Prester John (the mythical Chris tian ruler

who would save Europe from the threat posed by invading Islamic armies); an

emphasis on the Christian identity of Ethiopia and the similarity of its rulers to

those of Europe; classical Greek and biblical references to (a vaguely-positioned)

Ethiopia; the peculiarities of Ethiopia's own discourse of race; and the personal

prestige of the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, widely regarded as a pro-Western

moderniser. Western scholars and journalists collaborated in the construction of

this narrative of Greater Ethiopia, consigning the Oromo to an inferior role.

 

Despite the cruel exploitation of the majority of Oromo peasants and the

antagonism directed against their culture, some Oromo collaborated with the

Abyssinian forces and class interes ts merged across ethnic lines . Some Oromo

obtained high ranking positions, especially in the military, and several members

of the royal family were of partial Oromo descent. When Emperor Haile Selassie

was deposed by a military junta (known as the Derg) in 1974 many Oromo welcomed

the new regime and expected to benefit from its programme of

nationalisation of land. Indeed, the regime was originally seen by some as an

Oromo movement, due to the large numbers of Oromo in the military and in the

leadership of the Derg itself, and it appears that during the initial stages of the

Derg's rule, the Oromo peasants were the major beneficiaries of land reform

(Clapham, 1990; Gilkes , 1983; Halliday and Molyneux, 1981). However, many

of the Oromo members of the Derg were weeded out, often violently, and

assessments of the land reform are mixed. For example, Markakis (1990: 261)

states that peasants in the south gained control of the land and most of the

Abyssinian landlords lef t the countryside, and that the reforms dissolved the

correlation of class and national divisions while Baxter (1983: 134) contends that

many of the neftenya landlords remained in Oromo areas despite land reform

and that the Derg used armed northern peasants to control Oromo areas. Lefort

(1983) sees the land reform as largely beneficial, while Clapham (1990) regards

it as successful in its aims but disastrous in its effects, as it guaranteed land to

peasants but kept them in impoverished conditions. Despite the benefits that

may have resulted from its initial policies, the Derg rapidly alienated itself from

the general population through its violent and repres sive actions, its brutal

implementation of policies of collectivisation and villagisation, and its monopoly

on agricultural prices, achieved through the state marketing boards. Resistance

to these policies traversed ethnic lines although ethnicity became one of the

major modes of mobilising opposition.

 

Among the Oromo, Halliday and Molyneux (1981: 197) characterise political

opposition to the Derg as extremely varied ... partly because of the diffuse

character of those speaking Orominya, spread across twelve provinces, with no

cohesive social or political institutions of any kind, and with a high degree of

sub-division into clans and dialects. However, a nationalist movement, the

Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), was created in 1974 with the goal of establishing

an independent state for the Oromo. The OLF received training from the

Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and cooperated with other opposition

movements but its relations with them, particularly with the Tigrayan Peoples

Liberation Front (TPLF) based in the northern province of Tigray, were not

always good.

 

In 1991 the Derg was overthrown and the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of opposition movements dominated by

the TPLF, took power. Reacting to global political changes , the TPLF abandoned

the Marxist-Leninis t rhetoric that had been the dominant discourse of regional

politics and adopted that of democratic capitalism. The EPRDF established itself

as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), promised to institute a

democratic system and held a series of elections from 1992 to 1995. The elections

were widely criticised but many observers attributed this to inexperience and

expressed faith in the EPRDFs democratic intentions. National elections in 1995

resulted in an overwhelming victory for the EPRDF but were boycotted by the

major opposition groups who denounced the entire process as a sham intended

to legitimise the EPRDFs seizure of power.

 

In 1993, an internationally-supervised referendum was held in Eritrea, the

former Italian colony on the Red Sea coast, which had fought for independence

from Ethiopia for thirty years; the results in favour of independence were

virtually unanimous. International observers found the process free and fair and

the new Ethiopian government was among the first to congratulate independent

Eritrea. The referendum concluded what had been one of the longest wars of the

twentieth century and although Eritrea had been devastated by the conflict

many regarded it as a symbol of renewed hope for Africa. Conditions within

Ethiopia itself were less promising. Faced with a bankrupt economy, drought,

famine, widespread banditry and armed political opposition on several fronts,

the TGE became more rigid and repressive. Reports from international human

rights organisations indicated a pattern of serious violations including killings,

disappearances, torture, rape, detention without trial, and harassment and

intimidation of journalists and political activists. The EPRDF had come to power

in a situation of competing nationalist movements, most of them ethnically

based, and the nationalities question emerged as the central one in Ethiopian

politics. The government's solution was to redraw the administrative map into

ten ethnic regions and to establish a policy of ethnic self-determination including

possibility of secession. It has also sought to maintain control of ethnic politics

through the creation of a number of political parties which act as surrogates.

 

In 1991 the OLF had joined the TGE but remained suspicious of the EPRDF,

which gave its preference to another Oromo organisation, the Oromo Peoples

Democratic Organisation (OPDO); the OLF dismissed OPDO as a TPLF/EPRDF

puppet. Relations quickly deteriorated, and the OLF withdrew from the TGE in

1992 stating that it was not allowed to campaign freely in the election and

that its activists and supporters had been harassed while the government

countered that the OLF was simply interested in acquiring power rather than

participating in a democratic system. The OLF claimed that armed struggle

remained the only option but the EPRDF forces launched a sudden attack on its

encamped forces and captured thousands of OLF supporters . Although

weakened, the OLF has continued to launch military attacks against the

government and to engage in military battles with other Oromo groups. In the

course of escalating violence, both sides have been charged with human rights

violations. Pausewang (1994: 37± 38) argues that the ideological differences

between the various Oromo groups and between the Oromo and the

government are not insurmountable, and suggests that by its emphasis on armed

struggle the OLF is losing out to the OPDO, which can at least partly deliver

what the peasants need most and what OLF hardly can promise: peace, stability

and reasonable conditions for undisrupted work.

 

Over the last several decades, impoverishment, political repres sion, war and

famine have created huge refugee movements in the Horn of Africa. Among

these, it is estimated that half a million Oromo fled Ethiopia as refugees or

immigrants and are scattered throughout neighbouring Sudan, Kenya and

Somalia as well as throughout Europe, the Middle East and North America. The

overthrow of the Derg was followed by the repatriation of some refugees ,

particularly from other states within the region, but many of those who came

to North America have remained in the diaspora.

 

The Oromo Diaspora

 

No precise figures enumerate the Oromo in North America but among a

population that is unlikely to number more than several thousand it is possible

to distinguish those who are Oromo in terms of ancestry and those who are

Oromo in terms of (factionalised) political commitment. Until the 1990s, political

activism on the basis of an ethnic identity was not significant and many Oromo

may have identified themselves , particularly to North Americans, as Ethiopians

but the sense of a distinct identity has been developing. Hamdesa (1993: 11)

reports that attendance by one thousand people at an Oromo conference held

in 1990 constituted a record high (at this point in time the collapse of the

Ethiopian government was imminent).

 

Like other diaspora populations, the Oromo in North America must adapt

to new material conditions. They must do so in a context shaped by their own

concerns for relatives and political events in Ethiopia, factors which draw their

focus back to their country of origin, as well as by global economic changes ,

growing racism and calls for reduced immigration, factors which constitute them

as undesirable visible minorities and obstruct their integration into their host

societies . Many of these individuals who have opposed various Ethiopian

governments perceive themselves to be living in a state of indefinite exile and

operate under the assumption that they will eventually return to their original

homes once an independent Oromo state has been established. Thus, the

activities of the Oromo nationalist movement in Ethiopia are of substantial

concern to many individuals in the diaspora who share information through

informal networks as well as receiving it through OLF communiques and a

number of Oromo publications. However, the resolution of the situation is by

no means certain and just as many other diaspora groups maintain a myth of

return that often remains unrealised, the mass repatriation of Oromo from North

America may be something that remains only a fantasy, regardless of political

events in Ethiopia, particularly as individuals become at least partially

established with homes and families in their new countries of residence.

Oromo nationalists in the diaspora do maintain contact with relatives in

Ethiopia and in other countries (many families , from all ethnic groups, have

been scattered among various countries during Ethiopia's decades of war and

political turmoil; economic conditions have also encouraged individuals to seek

education and employment opportunities abroad). Some may make occasional

visits to Ethiopia and a few particularly committed individuals have returned

for periods of what they term national service with the OLF. For the most part,

however, supporters of Oromo nationalism in the diaspora are removed from

direct contact with the Ethiopian state and face entirely different conditions from

those in Ethiopia.

 

Many nationalist movements derive significant financial and political support

from sympathisers in diaspora populations and the processes of nationalist

politics among diaspora groups seem to have their own particular momentum

and constraints. Diaspora supporters of dissident nationalisms often are not

laced with the direct consequences of their actions; they derive much of their

information second-hand, their motivations and commitment are affected by the

material and cultural conditions they face in their new country of residence,

their desire for the establishment of an independent state is conditioned by

nostalgia and the idealisation of the homeland they left as well as by the degree

of integration they achieve and acceptance they experience in their new homes.

All of these factors mean that diaspora populations are particularly fertile

breeding grounds for the social construction of nationalist mythologies .

Here I am particularly interested in the nationalist discourse produced by

members of the Oromo diaspora population in North America and turn to an

analysis of political speech by examining a series of meetings organised by one

diaspora organisation, the Oromo Studies Association (OSA). This involves the

study of the symbolic expression of political action but along with Szemere

(1992: 625), I do not see these symbolic practices as 'epiphenomenal to

nonlinguistically constituted realities [but as] practices that shape actors

consciousness and their resulting interactions, interes ts and activities'.

 

The OSA was created by Oromo intellectuals in the diaspora with the

assistance of non-Oromo academics, political activists and supporters from

religious groups active in relief work in the Horn of Africa. It was organised in

1991, growing out of an earlier Oromo Studies Committee formed in 1989 under

the auspices of the Union of Oromo in North America (UONA), one of the mass

organisations of the OLF, at the Unions fifteenth annual congress held in

Toronto from 12± 17 August 1989. From that time, meetings have been held

annually, alternating between Toronto and Minneapolis, two centres which have

organised Oromo communities (in 1989, it was estimated that there were five

hundred Oromo living in and around Toronto (OLF, 1989: 81); another five

hundred Oromo live in Minneapolis, (Hamdesa, 1993: 25)); in 1995 the OSA

meetings were held in Washington DC, another city with a large population of

expatriates and exiles from Ethiopia.

 

In 1993, the OSA published the first issue of The Journal of Oromo Studies,

designed for the inclusion of papers on all aspects of Oromo culture and society

and dedicated to the preservation of Oromo culture and identity through

scholarship. Those who attend the OSA meetings and contribute to the journal

are engaged in a project to rewrite the history of the Horn of Africa, particularly

the history of the Ethiopian state. They reject the picture of Ethiopia which has

been created in the work of scholars such as Donald Levine, Richard Pankhurst

and Harold Marcus, all of whom have focused on the culture and history of the

Amhara. Rejecting the notion that Ethiopia is one of the world's most ancient

states, a new wave of Oromo and Western intellectuals argue that Ethiopia is a

recent creation, achieved through the collaboration of European imperialism

with an expanding Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century. The fullest

exposition of this thesis is outlined in The Invention of Ethiopia by the Oromo

nationalist intellectual Sisai Ibssa and anthropologist Bonnie Holcomb, both

based in Washington DC (Sisai and Holcomb, 1990). From this perspective,

rather than providing a unifying force for national integration, Abyssinian

hegemony is regarded as a brutal imposition which subdued and destroyed the

culture of groups such as the Oromo, who suffered from discrimination and

remained subordinate until the 1970s when the OLF was established to fight for

self-determination. The OLF's goal is stated as self-determination for the Oromo,

 

to be achieved through the creation of an independent state, to be called

Oromia.

The OSA's meetings are modelled along the lines of a scholarly organisation,

with panels of speakers who present written papers ; most speakers are Oromo,

many have PhDs and teach at universities in the United States, although

non-academics and representatives of the OLF also speak. Non-Oromo

participants also attend and present papers ; these are mainly anthropologists

who have conducted research in the Horn of Africa, and those affiliated with

religious organisations who maintain relief and proselytisation operations there.

 

Almost all speakers are male, as is the majority of the audience. Audiences

number between four and five hundred people, mainly Oromo. Most papers and

discussions are conducted in English, although some papers and questions are

given in the Oromo language, Oromiffa. The meetings entail a curious mix of

academic presentations, political mobilisation and deliberate efforts to construct

and solidify a dis tinct Oromo identity. Oromo culture is represented also by

singers and dancers who perform during the evenings.

 

Although organised on the lines of an academic gathering, not all members

see the presentation of scholarly research as the most significant goal of the

OSA. For example, in the 1992 Minneapolis meeting Jimma Tufa's analysis of

recently-declassified cables issued by the US Embassy in Ethiopia from the 1940s

to the 1970s was abruptly terminated by the panel chairperson. This was not

done for lack of time, as the OSA meetings do not follow a strict timetable,

habitually beginning several hours behind schedule and extending beyond the

indicated closing time, but because the chairperson decided and explicitly stated

that the paper was irrelevant to the contemporary political needs of the Oromo.

Thus, it is clear that at least some participants see the major role of meetings as

being instrumental in creating a sense of Oromo consciousness in order to

mobilise support for current political objectives and that the historical conditions

of such a consciousness should be shaped within a narrow narrative range.

 

While participants stress that Oromo unity has reached an unprecedented

level, there are divisions within the OSA itself and a second group, composed

of UONA activists, has organised counter-conferences in Toronto and

Minneapolis which are held at the same time and in a nearby location.

Participants in the main OSA conference have been reluctant to speak about the

existence of these alternate meetings , at least partly because of a desire to

present a picture of a unified Oromo community. One informant indicated to me

that the split was based on egotism and in-fighting between members of the

OSA's Executive Committee while another indicated that political differences

also played a role. Former OSA Secretary Hamdesa Tuso (1993) provides some

details of the internal politics of the OSA. Essentially, Hamdesa describes OSA's

take-over by the UONA and the latter organisation's determination to control the

OSA for its own political goals rather than to have it exist as a independent

scholarly association. Hamdesas version indicates both the existence of personal

ambitions and divisive regional and religious divisions in the Oromo diaspora

communities . Hamdesa describes the UONA as unpopular with the majority of

Oromo in North America and subject to divisive bickering; in 1986 the Washington DC

chapter split, and UONA characterised the breakaway Oromo

Democratic Organisation in North America as anti-OLF.

 

Language and the Social Construction of Meaning

 

The observations made in this paper are based on attendance at the main OSA

conference from 1989 to 1994. To understand the OSA meetings as a site for the

social construction of identity, it is useful to turn to the insightful work of

Bohdan Szuchewycz on the study of Irish Catholic Charismatic prayer meetings .

Szuchewycz (1994: 390) employs discourse analysis to investigate how members

of those groups use language to participate in the communal creation of a

spiritual message. Prayer meetings provide the social context in which

participants demonstrate their acceptance of (and thus rein force) the sect's

ideology, so that the prayer meeting, through its repeated performance, conveys

the message which lies at the heart of charismatic ideology (p. 391). Szuchewycz

examines how this communal spiritual message is socially constructed,

emphasising:

 

the creation of religious experience/meaning really is work: it involves the

deliberate linguistic effort of individuals who exhibit different degrees of

competence. It is also crucially social work: cooperation, attention,

negotiation, and support are essential. (p. 391)

 

Szuchewycz's analysis of the social construction of religious messages and

meanings can be extended to the study of political messages and the creation of

social identities through appeals to nationalism. As Szuchewycz himself notes,

although religious and political discourse are considered different types of

speech, in both it is the form of language which is identified as providing the

speech with its authority, rather than the actual content (p. 405). As is true of

political meetings in general, one goal of the OSA events is to demonstrate the

urgency and significance of the events that will take place in the sessions.

 

The OSA meetings employ the same inaugural device used in meetings organised

by other nationalist movements such as the EPLF and TPLF, a moment of silent

tribute to the martyrs who have been killed in the struggle. Referring to the

work of the Basque nationalist organisation, ETA, Heiberg (1989: 229) describes

how the meetings of that organisation also involve the invocation of martyrs for

the cause. Heiberg describes ETA as a charismatic organisation in which the

relationship of members to the nationalist cause is mediated by these martyrs

in much the same way that saints mediate the relationship between religious

believers and the divine. Images of death and torture of ETA militants are

presented in order to provide a sacred and sacrificial aspect to the nationalist

movement, to provide it with legitimacy, to give a sense of immediacy and

reality to an abstract cause and to reaffirm the solidarity of nationalist

supporters . Similarly, one important goal of the Oromo meetings is to create a

sense of shared community and belonging and to enlist participants in support

of the OLF's political programme by creating a link with the fallen martyrs : We,

the children of OLF, will carry on the struggle.

 

Although designed on the model of a scholarly association, the OSA meetings

are explicitly political and are mainly devoted to the presentation of a single

perspective, that of the OLF. As articulated by OSA's President, Asafa Jalata

(1993: 1), the goal of the organisation and of UONA is to defend Oromo

interests and produce and disseminate Oromocentric knowledge. This goal is

to be achieved under conditions of crisis :

 

The Oromo have very few friends. There is no single country that

supports our struggle. Beautiful and rich Oromia and its people have

been attacked for more than a century from all directions. Our enemies

have raped our resources and destroyed the Oromian natural and cultural

beauty. (p. 2)

 

Here, Asafa touches on the key themes of Oromo nationalism, themes typical

of nationalist discourse in general: the golden age of the past, contemporary

persecution and isolation. We may also note here the influence of North

American society and the discourse of Afro-centrism on Oromo nationalist

efforts to reconstruct and reclaim an essentialised identity. Under these

circumstances, Oromo nationalism is presented as a force which will allow the

Oromo to regain their true identity and their true place in the world. Oromo

nationalism contends that, hitherto, the Oromo have been deceived and blinded

to their actual history and culture and to their own true nature by the

imposition of Abyssinian hegemony disguised as an Ethiopian national identity.

 

At the 1993 OSA conference held in Toronto, Asafa stated that millions of

Oromos had been killed fighting in the service of Ethiopia and Somalia while

not being aware of their own identity:

 

Most Oromos were decultured, i.e. Ethiopianised, Somalised. Adarised,

and Arabised and rejected their original Oromo identity. Because of these

identity crises, Ethiopia, Somalia and other enemies were effectively able

to mobilise millions of Oromos against their own national liberation

struggle. (Asafa, 1993: 2)

 

However, Oromo nationalists argue that a psychological transformation has now

occurred; for example, Asafa defines the 1990s as a decade in which the majority

of the Oromo people had been awakened:

 

Most of the decultured and assimilated Oromos have been re-Oromised.

There are only a very few Oromos who have continued to serve our

enemies. The process of Oromo national awakening is at its highest peak.

(p. 2)

 

Arguing that a turning point in Oromo consciousnes s has now been

achieved, Asafa urges that the Oromo in North America should mobilise their

cultural and financial resources in order to regain their cultural history and

suggests that in doing so they will be able to overcome the identity crisis that

affects many of the Oromo in the diaspora. Thus, the nationalist project is

conceived as one which will bring positive benefits not only to the Oromo in the

Horn of Africa but to those in the diaspora as well.

 

Noting that some Oromo have subordinated their Oromo-ness to personal,

religious and regional interests, Asafa (p. 3) argues that it is time to go beyond

this and to reclaim a more basic identity. Oromo nationalist discourse presents

an identity which is derived from citizenship in the Ethiopian state as a form of

false consciousness, opposed to an ethnic identity which is more real and

essential. Authenticity and normalcy can be achieved only through Oromo

nationalism which seeks to create an independent state. According to OLF

supporters , government efforts to construct a new form of civic nationalism in

Ethiopia are fraudulent because they are only a screen to mask the real

intentions of an ethnic regime which seeks to continue the domination of other

groups by the people of the north-central highlands. Waldhannsso, the journal of

the Union of Oromo in North America (UONA), expresses this :

 

Even when the OLF seemed to have acceded to the possibility that the

quest for total independence of the Oromo might be delayed if full rights

of self-determination are given and the people choose to stay in some

kind of union with other peoples of Ethiopia, Meles and his troops went

out of their way to show that it is impossible for one to be an Oromo and

an Ethiopian at the same time. This is the point we have tried to

emphasise for years and those who are devoted to the sanctity of the

ill-gotten Ethiopian imperial territories tried to say we can be free Oromos

and become full citizens of Ethiopia too. The argument now is a choice

between being an Ethiopian subject with ever diminishing national or

individual rights, or being an Oromo freedom fighter. (Union of Oromo

in North America, 1992: 2)

 

What is unclear is whether it is civic nationalism itself which represents a

threat to Oromo identity or whether this is a threat only because it has not been

sincerely attempted. UONA takes the position that even if the Oromo had full

rights of self-determination ...the quest for total independence ... might be

delayed, but does not indicate that full rights would lead to the abandonment

of the quest for an independent state. Apparently, then, the only acceptable goal

for UONA is the creation of an independent Oromia, regardless of conditions

in Ethiopia. Oromo nationalist discourse rejects the form of identity that has

been constructed by the Ethiopian state. This is regarded as a form of

colonialism and of cultural imperialism which has sought to erase Oromo

identity:

 

We must reject Ethiopian ways of doing things and develop Oromocentric

values and knowledge. Successive Ethiopian colonial governments have

prevented the development of Oromocentric knowledge. Oromos were not

allowed to have schools and teach their culture, history, and values to

their children. A few Oromo children who went to Ethiopian schools were

forced to learn Ethiopian history, culture, and values that contradicted the

Oromo. Oromo students were forced to despise their identity. Only those

revolutionary Oromo scholars who have overcome these obstacles and

understood the significance of the Oromocentric culture challenged

Ethiopian mythologies and provided central leadership to the Oromo

nation in political and intellectual fields.[/] (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 4)

 

What is required to overcome this identity crisis is the development of

Oromocentric knowledge which will allow participants to re-learn their

authentic identity as Oromo. This process of learning to be Oromo involves the

mobilisation of an Oromo cultural identity. Oromo nationalism emphasises the

value of Oromo cultural traditions, stressing how they differ from those of the

Abyssinians. One key aspect of this cultural mobilisation is the goal of

resuscitating the gada system. Gada is a complex and fascinating cultural system

based on a succession of age-grades which incorporated economic, political,

religious and social factors and contained the central values and concepts of

Oromo culture (Asmarom Leges se, 1973). Oromo nationalists emphasise that

gada is one of the central institutions of Oromo culture and praise it as the most

sophisticated democratic system ever in East Africa or maybe even in the entire

of Africa (Namara Garbaba, 1993: 42).

 

As a political sys tem, it constitutes an indigenous form which ensured the balance

and periodic succession of authority. The precise origins of gada are unknown

but it seems to have been inplace by the sixteenth century. By the nineteenth century,

the gada system was weakened as power became concentrated in more state-like societies ,

but these institutions of the Oromo were ultimately swept under by the southward

expansion of the Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century and deliberate

attempts to undermine Oromo culture. The practice of gada continued only in

Borana and those now living in the diaspora did not grow up in a society in

which gada functioned as it had traditionally. Despite the fact that it is no longer

widely practised and that few Oromo have direct experience of it, Oromo

nationalists emphasise the importance of the gada system as the basis of a

dis tinct Oromo identity and sugges t that it can be revived to form the political

basis of an independent Oromia. Others have challenged both the egalitarian

character of gada and its universality, however, pointing out that it is based on

age grades with different levels of authority, that it discriminates on the basis

of gender by excluding women and that it did not function to encompass all

Oromo groups under a central state, while also pointing out that Oromo

organisations such as the OLF are not organised on gada principles.

 

Identity and Tradition

 

Typically, ethnic nationalism places great emphasis on the revival of rural

traditions, folklore, dances and ethnic cuisine. These traditions are considered

to be imbued with the essence of the group and they provide nationalists with

the symbols that can be used to differentiate the group from others , not only

culturally but also in terms of the moral values that are associated with such

symbols . Often, these cultural traditions and moral values are racialised and

presented in terms which depict them as the result of essential differences. The

outward markers of culture, such as folkdances, costume and cuisine, are

regarded as the expression of a group's distinct essence, the manifestations of

deeper and more fundamental differences which structure social life in unique

ways. While these fundamental characteris tics are viewed as timeless and

enduring and are assumed to create the moral boundaries for the ethnic

community, they are also subject to dilution by exposure to alien forces. Survival

of the group is considered to depend on the protection of these fundamental

qualities . Nationalist intellectuals believe that it is their role to preserve these

distinct cultural features and to prevent them from becoming polluted through

interaction with other groups; in many cases, it is argued that acquisition of an

independent state is required in order to ensure such protection.

Often, cultural revivals in the service of nationalist goals are promoted by

urban intellectuals who are themselves dis tanced from such traditions.

 

Fitzgerald (1993: 89) suggests that the most vocal champions of cultural revivals

are almost always the educated elites among such minorities . This is paradoxical

because the slogans of ethnogenesis are formulated by the very people farthest

removed from the traditional culture. Those traditions may be viewed quite

differently by the intellectuals who seek to revive them and the rural, peasant

or folk populations from among which they are to be extracted and preserved.

For example, writing on Basque nationalism, Heiberg (1989: 95) finds that many

peasants regarded their rural Basque background as an impediment to their

success in urban centres and attempted to distance themselves from a Basque

identity by speaking only in Spanish and avoiding things considered Basque.

 

Similarly, Handler (1988: 77), writing on Quebecois nationalism, finds that the

folk come to abandon and even ridicule the traditions that urban collectors have

come among them to discover. A similar process has taken place in Ethiopia

among Oromo peasants who have seen greater opportunities for themselves

through the adoption of Amharic names and speech; what must be emphasised

here is the overall historical context of domination. Handler also notes the

various transformations of tradition that occur through the process of collecting.

 

Aspects of social life are regarded as objects of study, selected and reinterpreted,

thus changing their meaning. When cultural traditions are mobilised both as the

markers of a group's essence and as the basis for contemporary political

movements there is often a need for pruning. As Lewis (1993: 170) notes, the

elevation of gada to a central ideological place in Oromo nationalism has

required that Oromo intellectuals minimise the role of powerful Oromo chiefs

and kings in some areas. Similarly, violent aspects of Oromo history are

downplayed to create images of unity.

 

Referring to black political movements based on ontological essentialism,

Gilroy (1993: 32) sugges ts that such movements typically see the intellectual as

a leader, and are frequently disappointed with the actual cultural choices and

patterns of the mass of black people ... The community is felt to be on the wrong road,

and it is the intellectuals job to give them a new direction, firstly by recovering and then

by donating the racial awareness that the masses seem to lack.

 

Oromo intellectuals in the diaspora have taken on the mission of alerting their

communities to the necessity of supporting the nationalist struggle and to the

need for resuscitating an authentic cultural identity which will one day find its

full expres sion in an independent Oromia. However, these diaspora intellectuals

are doubly distanced from the traditions that are taken to constitute the essence

of Oromo nationalism. Not only have many of them come from urban areas in which

these traditions were not maintained but, according to Sisai Ibssa (1992:

66), they are also flawed due to their class character as members of the petit

bourgeois ie: opportunistic, vacillating and insecure ... by nature fearful, indecisive ...

always battling amongst each other to appear better than the next person

in order to reap some benefit to be bestowed by members of the more

powerful class above.

 

Nationalist discourse also suggests that exile in North America has further

estranged these members of the diaspora from the authentic moral community.

This is presented as a result not only of geographical distance but also of the

dilution of Oromo values by another polluting force, that of Western culture.

Many Oromo who live abroad in North America or Europe have been

exposed to Western thoughts, which appear to hold the individual as the

primary and most significant unit of difference in society. Accordingly,

the individual is right-based but interest-orientated, and not responsible

for fellow members of the community ... Emphasising individual interests

more than collective or social interests confuses the primary issue of the

struggle for achieving the common goal, Bilisummaa [freedom]. To remain

clear and focused, the Oromo need to emphasise the collective interest,

strengthen their unity, and contribute their fair share to the united efforts

for intens ifying the struggle. (Addisu Tolesa, 1993: 62)

 

Here, Oromo in the diaspora are depicted as being divorced from their true

place in the world. Exposure to Western thoughts has had the effect of

individualising the Oromo and separating them from their culture and their true

style of thinking and behaving. Living in the diaspora, outside ones place,

creates individuals who have become dis jointed and mentally confused.

(Diaspora thus doubles the displacement of the Oromo already decultured by

Abyssinian colonialism.) This discursive construction is not unique to the

narrative of Oromo nationalism. For example, the phenomenon of reclaiming an

ethnic identity frequently has been noted among the third generation of

immigrant populations.

 

Individuals feel that something is lacking in their lives and that this absence

can be overcome by embracing the cultural traditions of

previous generations. The passage of time and changing conditions mean that

it is unlikely that these traditions can be adopted completely and further

difficulties confront diaspora groups who seek to engage in such reconstructions.

As a result, this process typically involves considerable imaginative efforts. It is

both an endeavour to partake of a romanticised past in which life was peaceful

and harmonious and to reshape the self.

 

In the case of the Oromo in the diaspora, Western values of individualism

are seen as a threat to the unity of purpose demanded by nationalist organisers .

From this point of view, it is more important for individuals to sacrifice

themselves in order to preserve a shared culture than for culture to serve as a

mechanism for the realisation of individuality. However, it is only through

immers ion in Oromo culture that one can regain the true self:

 

All Oromos who want to be mentally and politically free need to learn

from their original culture. Oromocentric knowledge and values are the

building blocks of Oromo identity and nationalism. The lack of

Oromocentric knowledge and values has caused ideological and mental

crises in some Oromos; such Oromos subordinate Oromo-ness to personal,

religious and regional interests. (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 3)

 

According to Sisai Ibssa (1992: 69), the cultivation and attainment of nationalist

consciousness can also cure the ills that he considers characteris tic of the petit

bourgeois ie: Fortunately we are more than merely petit bourgeois ie. We were Oromo

first. We do have something to bind us to each other beyond our class

nature. We have the Oromo experience and that heritage to reclaim. And

we can reclaim it. But in the meantime, whatever group becomes involved

in organising the institutions of society must safeguard the people from

the illnes s of the petit bourgeois ie while we recover.

 

Nationalist discourse proposes that both a reconstruction of the damaged self

and of the damaged nation will be achieved through the propagation of

Oromocentric knowledge and values. Reconstitution of culture and revival of

traditions such as the gada system are the means by which the political goals of

nationalism are to be achieved:

 

The success of the Oromo liberation struggle requires the total

mobilisation of cultural, financial, intellectual and human resources.

Without unders tanding Oromo cultural foundations and mobilising them,

it is very difficult to know the original meaning of Oromo-ness, Oromo

nationalism and the true liberation of Oromia. The mobilisation of Oromo

cultural resources eliminates identity crisis , cures psychological and

mental damages, and facilitates liberation. (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 3)

 

This immersion in Oromo culture and Oromocentric knowledge not only offers

healing of the damaged self but is also regarded as a means of preparing for

repatriation and the assumption of a more powerful role; as one audience

member stated, We need to learn all we can about our culture so that when

bilisuma comes we can go back and take over.

 

One significant aspect of the personal and cultural revival associated with

Oromo nationalism is an interest in developing the language, Oromiffa. Mekuria

Bulcha (1993) notes that it is second only to Hausa in the number of speakers

in Africa but that Oromiffa lacks a development of its literature, a situation

which he attributes to deliberate efforts by successive Ethiopian regimes to

undermine it. Indeed, Oromiffa was suppressed by a variety of means and

Amharic was the language of ins truction in Ethiopian schools . As a result, many

Oromo do not speak Oromiffa and several of the Oromo newsletters and papers

offer instructions in basic vocabulary and pronunciation. Given that Oromiffa

developed mainly as a spoken language until the 1970s, some Oromo

intellectuals have concentrated on the collection of oral poetry. Speaking at the

1994 OSA conference, Addisu Tolesa explained that poetry conveyed the cultural

essence of Oromo nationalism, both through references to tradition and through

its expression of the Oromo struggle for liberation.

 

This poetry expresses the rural life of the Oromo, the backbone of the Oromo struggle.

It expresses the moral basis of Oromo culture and the ethical principles that will guide it.

Culture then is used to demonstrate a sense of difference and stands as the

essential core that legitimises political struggles for land, resources and power.

Poetry and lyrics to songs express the world-view of Oromo nationalists,

emphasising the need for loyalty and calling for all to rally together to drive out

aliens, exemplified in Addisu's translation of one such song:

 

Ah, our Front, source of our freedom,

OLF comes from our people, be strong and defend our nationhood,

Enemies, if you run north or south, the Oromo are there,

If you climb trees , the Oromo will cut them down and catch you.

 

Discourses of ethnic nationalism insist on the unique essence and particularity

of the group and invoke a mystical connection between self, nation and state.

Depending upon exclusivist categories , ethnic nationalism polarises social life

and seeks to create boundaries between groups which it presents as being

impermeable. At the same time, hyperbole is a common style of political

discourse and Oromo nationalists often employ totalising figures of speech in

their claims to represent all the Oromo. This rhetoric also involves the attempt

to mask internal differences within the group identified as a unified nation.

 

Learning to be Oromo

 

The OSA meetings are devoted to the creation and recognition of a national

identity in exile and exemplify what Szuchewycz (1994: 391) terms the social

work involved in the production of meaning. The sessions involve

condemnations of the Ethiopian government as well as consistent incitements

to audience members that they should identify themselves fully with an Oromo

identity and with the political programme of the OLF, which demands an

independent state. Speakers continuously pose explicit challenges to the

audience: to commit themselves , to contribute financially, to help the OLF and

the Oromo Relief Association (ORA), to learn more about the Oromo language

and culture, to adopt an Oromo identity which will replace the artificial

Ethiopian identity which has been imposed through violence and indoctrination.

 

Audience members respond to these challenges not only by endorsing (and thus

further encouraging) pro-Oromo statements with applause and comments but

also by making emotional public pledges of their commitment and support.

Imbedded in this pattern of assertions, exhortations and responses is a persistent

vilification of the Abyssinian or Ethiopian Other.

 

The process of learning to be Oromo is not only a cultural project but a

political one. The (re)discovery of Oromo identity is consistently linked with

acceptance of the programme of Oromo nationalism. Speakers continuously

emphasise the importance of Oromo identity which is linked to the necessity to

support the OLF rather than other organisations which claim to represent the

Oromo people. No allowance is made for those who value a sense of Oromo

ethnicity but do not support the OLF's nationalist programme. For example,

Tilahun Gamta, speaking at the 1992 conference stated, An Oromo can change

his religion but not his Oromo-ness. Those who do not support Oromo

nationalism are traitors.

 

This linkage of identity with acceptance of only one political position is not

unique to the discourse of Oromo nationalism but seems to be a characteris tic

of ethnic nationalism in general. For example. commenting on the work of

Basque nationalist Sabino de Arana-Goiri, Heiberg (1989: 56) notes:

 

In nationalist ideology and politics it was not sufficient to be Basque in

terms of surnames, language or religion. One had to be a good Basque

... Arana had to make race a politically operative category not a matter

of once and for all biological inclusion or exclusion. [The a good Basque

status was only awarded to those who accepted Arana's political

programme.] In short, a real Basque could only be a Basque nationalist.

 

A number of the main themes of nationalist discourse appear in the following

statement made by a member of the OLF Central Committee:

 

Some Oromos are being told they are Somalis. Some who are

Christianised think they are Amharas. We lost our identity. That was our

first project, to restore our identity so that someone can be proud to say

he is an Oromo. The question of dividing Oromos by different names is

over. The fire is burning. Everywhere the Oromo are fighting their

enemies. They are dying by thousands, they are killing the enemy by

thousands. Even the technocrats, even the scholars are telling them. You

cannot rule us any more. University students left school because they feel

they want to die for their country [standing ovation from audience]. We

have never had this unanimity. Now the spirit of our forefathers is

moving us. Someone said there were five Oromo organisations. We dont

have five Oromo organisations, all of them are united now. We never

consider OPDO an organisation [applause]. If you were there I'm sure

each one of you would die for his country. We expect our scholars to be

behind our organisation. If he is an Oromo there is no way he can not

support the Oromo cause.

 

These statements demonstrate some of the basic elements of Oromo nationalist

discourse: emphasis on a fundamental ethnic identity that is revealed beneath

the superficial imposition of foreign culture; assertions of complete unity among

all Oromo; stressing links to the past; appealing for support from the audience;

and rejecting alternative political views as inauthentically Oromo.

 

There is no doubt that the Oromo have been discriminated against in

Ethiopia. They were viciously subjugated by the expanding Abyssinian empire;

their culture was denigrated and their language suppressed. The Oromo were

regarded as inferior to the members of the ruling Abyssinian culture,

particularly those of the Amhara ethnic group. This negative view of Oromo

culture has survived the most recent change of government. For example, New

African (March 1992) reported that in a demonstration organised in Dire Dawa

by Amharas who felt that they had been excluded from power, participants had

labelled a donkey as an Oromo, leading to a gunfight.

 

Just as Amharas have denigrated the Oromo as being essentially inferior,

speakers at the OSA meetings continually stress the essential differences

between Abyssinians and Oromo, with the difference being that it is the

negative characteristics of Abyssinians that are now emphasised, as indicated in

the following statements made at various OSA sessions:

 

· if you take power from an Abyssinian, he will beg it back from you;

· the Oromo culture is one of peace and Abyssinian culture is one of war;

· Oromos are democrats, that's our his tory;

· Oromos want peace. They are the most peaceful people in the world.

 

Abyssinian influence is cited as an explanation for any negative behaviour; for

example, when one Oromo meeting began several hours later than scheduled,

speakers explained this through reference to ethnic difference and the dangers

of pollution: It's a bad habit we learned from our Abyssinian masters.

Ethnic nationalism in its various manifestations relies on distinctions of this

sort. Often these distinctions involve the false notion that there are distinct

human races which exist and possess unique characteristics which sharply

differentiate them from other such races. For example, Heiberg (1989) discusses

the function of the idea of race in the ideology of Basque nationalism.

 

Nationalist ideologues such as Sabino de Arana-Goiri employed the idea of race

as a key symbol, an exclusive moral category determined by birth. Although

integration of these supposed races was impossible because of their fundamental

differences, race could be lost through intermarriage and thus had to be

preserved through the maintenance of boundaries. Arana emphasised the

positive moral characteristics of Basques (intelligence, nobility, masculinity),

while noting the servile, effeminate sullennes s of the Spanish, under whose

influence Basque character would only degenerate.

 

Thus, ethnic nationalism depends on the creation of difference and its

continual representation. Oromo are defined as being fundamentally distinct

from those defined as Abyssinians or Ethiopians. Oromo nationalists use these

terms interchangeably and some apply them to Eritreans as well, despite the fact

that Eritrean nationalists argued for the existence of significant differences

between themselves and Ethiopians based on Eritrea's experience of Italian

colonialism and the similarity of the Eritrean case to other former European

colonies which became independent. Although Eritreans fought for thirty years

before achieving their independence from Ethiopia, and provided training to the

OLF during the organisations early years and assistance during the latter part

of the war, some Oromo nationalists now believe that the Eritreans betrayed

them by not supporting independence of Oromia and instead assisting the TGE.

 

Oromo nationalist discourse also overlooks the ethnic diversity of Eritrea, where

nine ethnic groups are recognised. By linking Eritreans with Ethiopians, Oromo

nationalists subsume an Eritrean national identity within the terms of their own

ethnic discourse, focusing on the culture of the southern and central Christian,

Tigrayan-speaking areas of Eritrea that share similarities with the adjacent

Ethiopian province of Tigray and ignoring the fact that Eritrean nationalism

emphasises its multicultural character. Indeed, early support for Eritrean

independence came largely from the Muslim segment of the population and

various Ethiopian regimes sought to discredit it on that basis .

 

With the notable exception of Mohammed Hassan (1994), many Oromo

nationalists ignore the multicultural character of Eritrean identity and revert to

a discourse of ethnic essentialism that construes lack of Eritrean support for

independent Oromia as part of a plot in which the EPLF and TPLF seek to steal

Oromo resources. Thus, although Eritrean independence was a significant event

in the Horn, the large map used at the OSA meetings did not indicate an

independent Eritrea either in 1991 (when Eritrea's de facto independence was

attained) or after the 1993 referendum. In Minneapolis, Chaltu Deressa referred

to Eritreans, Tigrayans and Amharas as Ethiopians, all those who claim to be

a part of Ethiopia, disregarding Eritrea's struggle for and achievement of

independence from Ethiopia.

 

Similarly, at the same meeting, Bichaka Fayissa drew a political connection

between Eritrea and Tigray:

 

The Eritrean plan and the Tigrayan plan is a joint effort. They can't exist

without each other. The first step is for the EPLF and the TPLF to topple

the central government. Eritrea will get independence but independence

without resources is nothing. The EPLF and the TPLF are now

channelling resources to the north.

 

A similar statement was made by Namara Garbaba, reporting on a recent visit

he had made to Ethiopia:

 

The TPLF is extracting resources from Oromia and using them to build

up the north. The government controls all businesses and only gives

licences to Tigrayans and Eritreans since they both speak the same

language ... The Derg planted trees but the EPRDF strips them. I heard

that the wood was being taken to Eritrea to build houses.

 

Many of the accusations made by speakers about the current discrimination

and exploitation of the Oromo seem to be based on the slightest of pretexts.

Another speaker, also a recent traveller, encountered a number of Tigrayans

staying in a hotel and concluded that the hotel was excluding other guests,

although he noted that he had no proof of this . He also reported that he only

heard Tigrinya being spoken on his flight and concluded that this provided

further evidence that commerce was being monopolised by Tigrayans.

 

Social Work

 

Speakers and audience work together in order to construct positive images and,

in essence, to create that of which they speak. Statements which indicate the

uniqueness of the Oromo are applauded by the audience. For example,

Reverend Ronald Ward, of Toronto Baptist Intercultural Services, referred to his

travels from highland Ethiopia to Kenya: These Oromos were very different

from Kikuyu and Somalis (applause). What a beautiful country (applause).

There's no place on earth like it (applause). Through such processes of social

work, audience members also contribute to the effort to mobilise support for

OSA's efforts to develop Oromo nationalism.

 

Construction of such positive images and the sense of a unified community

often do constitute rather difficult social work. Throughout the course of the

meetings each year there are repeated assertions that the Oromo are all united

in their struggle for independence. At the same time, there are continuous

appeals to audience members for unity, for greater commitment, for efforts to

influence Western governments, for moral and material support to the OLF and

for better organisation. Admonition of insufficient effort and encouragement of

greater commitments in support of the movement constitute a persistent theme

in the discourse of Oromo nationalism. The meetings are intended to create

commitment, unity and political activism. The fact that these have yet to be

created also suggests that for some participants, the OSA meetings may play

functions other than or in addition to supporting independence for Oromia.

Particularly for those who live in North American cities where Oromo do not

have organised communities , the OSA meetings offer a space for social

interaction with people who are considered to be the same in some

fundamental ways, a chance to speak one's own language, reconnect with

friends, reminisce and exchange information on various topics, including, but

not necessarily restricted to, political events in Ethiopia. These activities are

made even more pleasant by the inclusion of performances by Oromo singers ,

bands and dancers . The importance of such attractions should not be

underestimated for a first-generation diaspora population which encounters not

only cultural differences but racism in North America, and for some the social

benefits of such meetings may be more significant than political activism. Some

speakers acknowledge that support for Oromo nationalism needs to be

cultivated among the diaspora. For example, Sisai Ibssa stated at the 1992

meeting:

 

The Oromo know who they are and what they want. Are Oromos in the

diaspora helping? Oromos in the diaspora have done very little ... The

task is to transform ourselves . We must advise fellow intellectuals to do

their part. If we don't participate in building Oromia then we may become

part of breaking it apart in the future. We know we should participate.

 

During the conference, what did we do? We exchanged greetings.

The following year, Asafa Jalata made a similar criticism of Oromo in the

diaspora who were not sufficiently committed to and active in the cause of

Oromo nationalism:

 

There is no doubt that the majority of Oromos support the OLF. Still,

some Oromos are lagging behind. They must catch up. All of you have

a national responsibility.

 

These repeated appeals indicate that the conference is not simply the expression

of an already existing and fully- formed nationalist sentiment but rather that it

is itself a means of creating that sentiment, of creating the same identity it

celebrates. Speakers frequently take the role of exhorting the audience to greater

commitment; responses from audience members also become part of these

speech rituals. Just as speakers continually encourage the members of the

audience to be more committed and active in the nationalist cause, so do

audience members encourage speakers to show more leadership in such

mobilisation and to achieve practical results. As one individual stated:

 

I hear lectures every year just telling me what Amharas have done to us,

telling me about my culture. I don't need to know this . Why not tell us

what to do? I am happy when I see foreigners here because I think they'll

tell us where the guns are. But they just say the same things.

 

This can also take the form of criticism of the political leadership of the OLF

itself. For example, Idris Jamal, speaking at the 1994 conference, was extremely

critical of the OLF: The Oromo national movement has failed to advance revolutionary

culture ... The OLF leadership has failed to develop solutions to Oromo

problems of feudalism, Amhara-ism, nepotism ... The OLF leaders are

acting like feudal lords in relation to the people [applause]. Innuendo and

character assassination are characteristics of Abyssinian culture. Can you

be Oromo nationalist and Ethiopianist at the same time? ... The Oromo

movements have high levels of regionalism, nepotism and religious

difference. That's why the Oromo national struggle is going backwards.

The UONA has kept Oromo nationalism alive. UONA's contribution is

favourable but weak in political education. It hasn't developed study

circles. There is a discrepancy between intellectuals and the masses.

 

There are also problems between regions. UONA's support to the OLF is

unequivocal as long as it exists. This is wrong for two reasons. There

should be no carte blanche given to any organisation. There's always the

possibility of vacillation. Washington DC was the only office to question

Oromo academics. Ego may play a divis ive role. The OSA split into two

due to egotistical needs. There are too many blind followers of the

now-defunct OLF leadership. The OLF is for all Oromos, it's not the

property of the OLF leaders . Our major task is a critical examination of

our own position. We need political education to create new revolutionary

people. UONA must be independent of the OLF. OSA must resolve its

contradictions and look beyond the cult of leaders . Former OLF fighters

are acting like armchair revolutionaries , they must take part. The present

OLF leaders are putting communities against each other. We need new

leadership. [applause]

 

Audience members may rise not only to ask questions but also to give

testimonials that reaffirm the existence of Oromo identity, to express their

solidarity and generally to raise the emotional level. For example, in

Minneapolis in 1992, one audience member stood up to declare that he was

ready to give his life for the nationalist cause, an assertion that was vigorously

applauded by the audience. Other participants made emotional and similarly

well-received testimonials to their convers ion to the cause of Oromo nationalism:

For sixteen years I was a diehard Ethiopian. I spoke Amharic. When news

about Eritreans and Gallas came I was the first to tear it up and throw it

away. Thanks to the Oromo Support Committee I'm now convinced that

nothing short of bilisuma will satis fy Oromos. Similarly, another stated: A year ago, t

here were many of us who did not dissociate ourselves

from the mythical Ethiopia. The situation has changed now.

Through these processes of mutual exhortation, criticism and confession,

speakers and audience engage in the creation of Oromo identity.

 

Gender and Oromo Nationalism

 

In general, nationalist discourses construct an image of an undivided community

and seek to disregard internal differences, regarding these as divisive for the

struggle against external enemies. Gender emerges as one of the key differences

and paradoxical issues of nationalism. While some nationalist movements stress

a need for women to remain in or return to the domestic space and maintain

traditional roles of wife and mother, others may appeal to women through a

discourse of emancipation from gender inequality. In most societies of the Horn

of Africa, women have been consigned to a subordinate role; both the Eritrean

and Tigrayan liberation fronts used a rhetoric of emancipation for women in

order to gain support and the role of women in Eritrea and Ethiopia following

the acquisition of state power by those two groups will be a matter of

considerable interest. In contrast to these cases, the role of women in the Oromo

national struggle receives little attention. In part, this is due to the emphasis on

reclaiming traditions such as gada, which excluded women, as the basis of

identity.

 

Most of the OSA panels are composed entirely of men and do not address

gender issues. In 1992, a women's panel was put together at the conference itself

and in 1993 and 1994, women were scheduled as speakers . Seada Mohammed

outlined the suffering of Oromo women under both Abyssinian colonisers and

the Somali invasion of the ****** region during the mid-1970s. This included

death in military attacks, rape, slavery, forced marriage and prostitution in order

to survive. Seada (1993: 122) told a story of the rape of an Oromo girl by a

soldier in Djibouti:

 

In one of those outrageous dark nights this unfortunate Oromo girl was

taken by an impotent military man. She was a virgin, and he tried to

penetrate her night after night but he could not. What seemed to him to

be the most logical thing to do was to use an opening instrument to pave

the way for his victorious entrance. So, he used a kitchen knife and cut

her and opened her. The girl was bleeding to death when word got out

to the refugee camp.

 

Response from the audience included considerable laughter at Seada's reference

to the soldier's impotence. Although this was silenced fairly quickly by the grim

details that followed, the laughter does indicate that nationalist discourses are

narratives of power, frequently expressed in what we might call masculinist

terms. For example, discussing rape as a device of ethnic marking in wars in

Eastern Europe, Meznaric (1994: 76) argues:

 

Women are the special victims of nationalist ideologies and quests for

ethnic purity. As with every nationalism, conservative Balkan nationalism

(Albanian, Serbian, Croatian) reassert the theme of the home and hearth

as womens natural location. Nationalist exhortations disguise the

opposition between men and women that inevitably accompanies the

entrance of women into the public domain in traditional societies .

 

My notes from Seada's presentation record other examples of abuse suffered

by Oromo women as refugees in the diaspora:

 

Women had to have arranged marriages with any available person. They

go to Saudi Arabia and then the man becomes a beast ... Women can't

travel by themselves ... Only when the OLF gets a good position will we

get our slaves back ... Here Oromo women are isolated. They have a baby

every year. They can't go to school. They are in prison [in their homes].

They face violence from their husband. They need translators to go to the

doctor. I appeal to Oromo men. You are supposed to be our next-of-kin.

How could a next-of-kin tie up a woman and burn her with cigarettes ?

Our next-of-kin aren't doing much. Try to help your sisters.

 

Seada also referred to a contradiction between the OLF's rhetoric of liberation

and its failure to incorporate the emancipation of women into its practice.

Women joined the OLF but were only allowed to do the cooking. We

didn't expect much from the Derg's organisations. We expected more from

the OLF. But the OLF ignored women's issues. We must not wait for

national liberation, we must work for equality. Most Oromo men are

afraid to work with women as equals. You have subordinated women all

your lives . We must work together. We need separate organisations to

find our voices but we must get organised together .

 

Seada's presentation indicates the paradox faced by many women who have

supported nationalist movements. As Yuval-Davis (1994: 414) puts it,

Often, the particular culture they would like to assert vis-à-vis the

hegemonic culture includes also elements which they feel subordinate

them as women and which they would like to resist and transform within

their own community.

 

The Algerian case is often taken as a prime example of a tendency on the part

of patriarchal nationalist organisations to roll back freedoms gained by women

during the course of the struggle for independence. Discussing the involvement

of Palestinian women in the national movement, Peteet (1991: 209) points out

some of the contradictions those women faced.

 

Women's perceptions of themselves were in dissonance with those of a

leadership that continued to propagate the idea of womens participation

in national politics, but in a secondary manner, vacillating between

conception of female persona as sex and citizen ... Activist women were

caught between the demands of loyalty to the national movement and

knowledge of the inextricability of their struggle from the Palestinian

struggle and an awareness of the need for an autonomous struggle.

Writing in the newsletter Qunnamtii Oromia, Sabboontuu Jiilchaa (1992: 24)

takes a more aggressive tone in her rejection of the patriarchal aspects of Oromo

culture:

 

The womb that carried you is convulsing with fury and blood is dripping

from the breasts that once suckled you with milk. You've changed our

necklaces into chains and our bracelets into handcuffs. Our wedding rings

have become tormenting, sharp hot irons that burn and cut into our flesh.

Instead of a home, you gave us a prison which has become a living hell.

The heart that once loved you passionately, now aches with deep pain

when you, Oromo men, call yourself liberators. Can we, Oromo women,

agree with you, knowing what you're doing to us? How are you different

from the Tigrean liberators? ... You call yourself liberators but you are

ens laving women, or do you think slavery is a delicious dish when the

cooks are Oromo men?

 

While a number of Oromo women have raised issues of gender inequalities and

the need for Oromo nationalism to addres s them, it is clear that some Oromo

nationalists are not convinced that such issues are significant. For example,

although Seada's presentation was applauded by the audience, one man rose

from the audience to ask the question, Are you looking for a separate country

for yourself?. Delivered in a swaggering tone, this question clearly was intended

to trivialise any claims made for the necessity of women's emancipation. The

question was followed by laughter from other men, who apparently

sympathised with the man's position. Another male questioner asked to what

extent Seada had been influenced by Western feminism; this is not an

uninteresting question but, as Seada indicated in her response, it also serves as

a device to delegitimise the concerns of Oromo women through a resort to the

notion of tradition and by portraying them as infected with the values of a

foreign culture. Dismissal of gender issues as simply a creation of Western

feminism is another facet of nationalisms attempt to construct and maintain the

image of an authentic, undivided self.

 

Non-Oromo and the Creation of Oromo Identity

 

In looking at the creation of Oromo identity in the diaspora we must understand

this as a discursive project which is undertaken not only by those who consider

themselves to be Oromo but also by non-Oromo observers , commentators and

supporters . Historically, European imperialism has had a significant impact in

shaping Oromo nationalist discourse. For example, Mekuria Bulcha (1993) has

outlined the role of European travellers and missionaries in developing a written

Oromo script and their influence on ethnic identity and nationalism among the

Oromo in the nineteenth century.

 

During the years in which numerous forces struggled to overthrow the Mengistu

regime, many of those groups sought to convince foreign politicians, journalists, intellectuals

and activists of the legitimacy of their cause and to encourage their support. Despite some

protestations to the contrary, virtually all of the Western writers who have

commented on political struggles in Ethiopia during the last two decades can

be identified by their strong sympathies for one or another of these conflicting

forces. In this context, readers may wish to bear in mind that I have been

associated with the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) for a number of years.

Western supporters of the OLF also have contributed to the discourse of

ethnic essentialism and to the social construction of the idea of an independent

Oromia. For example, speaking at the 1993 OSA conference in Toronto, Rev.

Ronald Ward claimed that Oromia is now a reality that had been recognised

by expatriates (referring to Western observers ). On the basis of two vis its to

 

Oromia in 1993, Ward noted that there was a tremendous affirmation of

Oromo-ness ... a new sense of pride and expectancy in being Oromo throughout

the area, which he depicted as a tremendous bee-hive of activity. Ward stressed

that the Oromo had been betrayed by the TGE and that Oromos here [i.e., in

North America] must take leadership roles, thus discursively constructing the

diaspora audience as a significant actor with a decisive role to play in the

nationalist struggle in north-eastern Africa. Having suggested such a role for his

audience, Ward stressed a sense of imminent danger for the Oromo: Our

enemies are not sleeping. The EPRDF is setting up a puppet OPDO government

in Oromia while doing anything to discredit Oromia. Here Ward explicitly

identifies himself with the Oromo cause, creating a sense of a community

threatened by the Ethiopian government, which is represented as a hostile force

gathering for harmful purposes. Ward's proposed solution to this threat mirrors

that chosen by the OLF: he stresses the need for the Oromo to have an

independent army to avoid the betrayals of the past. Rather than suggesting

peaceful means of negotiating equal rights for the Oromo, Ward advocates

further violence, by playing on the image of the Oromo as warriors (The

Oromos are the fighters of the Horn of Africa) and by referring to Dylan

Thomas poem Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night: Sometimes I find you

people have lost your rage. You seem to potter around. Brothers and sisters,

rage! rage! rage!.

 

Speaking again later on another panel at the same conference, Ward

addressed The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Oromo. In

this paper, he also portrays the Oromo as victims who have been unfairly

treated: My topic NGOs and the Oromo might also be titled, Why do NGOs

ignore the Oromo?. There can be little or no doubt that the majority of aid

which flows into Ethiopia through NGO sources goes to the north

particularly Eritrea and Tigre [sic] (p. 17). Ward identifies the major up-front

reason for the imbalance as the activities of the Eritrean Relief Association

(ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the relief organisations

maintained by the EPLF and TPLF, respectively. Ward stated that both operated

well oiled public relations machines and produce unlimited numbers of

pictures, reports, statistics, videos, etc. They are user friendly for western

NGOs (pp. 17± 18).

 

Adopting the terms of an Oromo nationalism that does not distinguish

between Eritrea and Tigray but identifies both as Habasha or Abyssinians on

the basis of shared ethnicity and political objectives, Ward makes no effort to

differentiate between the two organisations; yet even if one were to overlook the

subjective aspects of identity formation in favour of a version based on

similarities of culture and language, this position is still problematic because of

the (not always cordial) relations that existed between the Eritrean and Tigrayan

liberation movements and the different types of relationships that their relief

organisations established with Western institutions. Overall, ERA was much

more successful than REST in dealing with Western agencies, a situation

explained in part by the relative underdevelopment of Tigray, the greater

numbers of Eritrean intellectuals and professionals (many of them educated

partially in Western countries ), and the fact that the TPLF was perceived as

being more rigid ideologically. REST's resources were much more limited and,

especially in North America, its production of information could hardly be

termed unlimited. While the steady production of information might be

considered a useful activity on the part of indigenous organisations, Ward hints

that deception is involved.

 

The provision of detailed information is presented as merely public relations.

Ward indicates that he does not object to aid in the north. God knows Tigre [sic]

and Eritrea are little more than devastated deserts. There are thousands of terribly

poor Tigreans [sic] and Eritreans. They need help but they should not grab

everything. (p. 19)

 

Due to the fact that famine did not affect all parts of the Horn equally over

the last few decades, Wards argument is problematic also because he does not

offer a precise time-frame for his charges of imbalanced relief aid. During the

early 1980s, starvation first struck at the northern regions and it was only later

that massive numbers of people in the southern areas faced widespread

emergency. Furthermore, he ignores the argument made by both ERA and REST

that not enough relief aid was supplied to Eritrea and Tigray to alleviate the

crises of the 1980s, and minimises the continuous lobbying efforts conducted by

both organisations as well as by Eritreans and Tigrayans in the diaspora. While

Ward notes that some of the Canadian NGOs claim that more has gone to the

south in recent years than to the north, those claims are simply dismissed with

no counter-evidence other than the statement that statistics are very deceptive

things and that according to Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

in 1993 roughly the same amount of relief food has been assigned to the south

as the north (p. 19). In the absence of any detailed presentation of needs,

accessibility and distribution, an alleged discrepancy (it is very hard to check)

between more and roughly the same amount of aid is offered as evidence of

a plot against the Oromo (p. 19). Ward downplays the fact that famines hit the

north harder in the 1980s and that Eritrean and Tigrayan groups, both in the

diaspora and in the areas controlled by the EPLF and TPLF, organised to

dis tribute aid effectively. Rather than seeing either organisation as a model for

ORA, arguing that these relief organisations might have common goals and that

all should live up to their avowed humanitarian principles by working

cooperatively to ensure that relief aid was delivered all who needed it, or

considering that ORA may have been less organised and effective than the other

organisations, Ward ins tead presents ERA and REST not only as competitors but

as agents in an ethnic plot who are acting unfairly (they should not grab

everything). Ward stressed this image of a struggle for scarce resources in a

statement not included in the published text of his paper, sugges ting that

Competition is very high. If you don't get the money, ERA and REST will get

it.

 

Ward's statements focus on criticism of what he sees as the unfair activities

of Eritreans and Tigrayans who grab everything. In addition, Ward charges

that NGOs are ideologically predisposed against the Oromo. In his view, they

are driven by an Ethiopianist bias which favours the highland cultures and are

quite ignorant of the ethnic composition of Ethiopia. Adhering strictly to the

ethnic essentialism of Oromo nationalist discourse, Ward also criticises NGOs

which have a vision of one humanity, internationalism in which there is no

room for ethnic identity, dismissing this internationalist ideology as unrealistic

and unworkable: it is something like the Kingdom of God (pp. 19± 20). That

Ward's comments explicitly conveyed and contributed to a sense of persecution

was indicated in the summation by discussant Bichaka Fayissa, who informed

the audience that governments, NGOs and Ethiopianists are all against the

Oromo.

 

Despite numerous ins inuations and direct assertions that the Oromo have

suffered from plots directed against them, some Oromo recognis e that an

alternative interpretation also exists to explain the lack of support to ORA rather

than the machinations of enemies. Several speakers attributed ORA's limited

achievements to lack of support from Oromo in the diaspora. For example, at

the 1992 OSA conference in Minneapolis, ORA representatives themselves both

criticised the limited involvement in relief work on the part of Oromo in the

diaspora and acknowledged their own res tricted efforts in the areas in which

they worked. Terfa Dibaba, ORA representative from Germany, referred to a

discrepancy between the aid money that went to ERA and REST and that which

went to ORA and stated The others have worked hard. Have we? The stronger

you are fed, the stronger you grow. You have lef t us alone; we were not fed

properly. Similarly, in his remarks at the 1993 conference, Mohammed Hassen

criticised the inactivity of Oromo in the diaspora: We have not done a fraction

of what is expected of us ... We have not done our share. Please let us mobilise

our resources to help our people. An audience member responded by stating

We haven't done what we have to do. I accept that.

 

Ward's presentation is significant because it indicates the importance of

external legitimisation for nationalist discourse. Most of the protagonis ts in the

struggles that have taken place in the Horn have sought support from external

sources. In turn, opponents have used these external sources of support as signs

of illegitimacy, claiming that external agents are the source of discontent and

that if these inauthentic elements could be purged, the real sentiments of the

people would be expressed. In Imagining Ethiopia, I argued that the trope of the

foreign agent was a typical rhetorical strategy used in such a way. While the

foreign agent cannot be used to explain all sources of conflict, it is also

important to recognise that foreign academics, journalists and other writers have

been active in the production of nationalist discourses and that their

contributions are encouraged by the main protagonis ts. Wards statements

indicate that the emotions of nationalism are not confined only to those who are

considered to be full ethnic members of the nations concerned and also raise

further questions about the creation of other types of selves .

 

Conclusion

 

Just as the discourse of Greater Ethiopia has relied on a particular version of

history which sought to project the existence of the contemporary state

backwards into time in order to claim the legitimacy conferred by a continuity

of three thousand years, Oromo nationalism has sought to deconstruct this idea

of the past and to substitute its own version. As Szemere (1992: 636) notes, the

evocation of the past is intended to erect a structure of feeling vital to a

tragic-heroic sense of national identity. The attractions of such an identity may

be particularly appealing to members of a diaspora population, especially to

intellectuals, who may find in the nationalist project of creating a new

homeland, a broader projection of their own personal efforts to deal with

displacement and modifications of their own identities . Annual conferences

organised by Oromo nationalist groups provide a site for creating a sense of

identity and community among the diaspora population through the emotional

focus provided by the project of creating an independent state.

Even those who do not agree with the position taken by the OLF, UONA and

others that independence is the only possible path that can lead to Oromo

self -actualisation should bear in mind that some of the claims made by Oromo

nationalists about historical mis treatment appear to be valid. While nationalist

discourse seeks to overlook the matter of class alliances formed across ethnic

lines , it is the case that the bulk of the Oromo have been dominated and

exploited and their current predicament should be addressed. Assertions of the

superficiality and the imposed character of Ethiopian identity also should be

taken seriously; as Baxter and Blackhurs t (1978: 160) note, many of the groups

who are now included as members of Greater Ethiopia have been under control

of the state for a comparatively short period and not all of them have a strong

sense of Ethiopian-ness, especially one which is based on the history and culture

of a dominant minority. Nevertheless, the recognition of these factors should not

blind us to the constructed aspects of Oromo nationalism, particularly to its

essentialism, romanticism and chauvinism. Finally, it is also true that the

primary concern of the vast majority of Ethiopians, regardless of their ethnic

background, is an improvement in their material conditions, which remain

desperately impoverished.

[Sharif_seylaci]

are u alowd 2 name tribes oromos

[me]

Oromo are not a tribe but a Nation.