THE WALWAAL INCIDENT

[Viking]

Walwaal is the name of a small insignificant village in North-Eastern Ogad*n region of Ethiopia which also happens to be a major watering point for Somali camels and sheep. The historic event known as the Walwaal incident refers to a minor military incident between the Ethiopian and Italian colonial forces in 1935 that later escalated into Italy’s full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. Apparently, the two forces clashed because the frontier boundary was not demarcated on the ground. To this day, independent Somalia’s border with Ethiopia remains unmarked on the ground. Consequently, Italy was able to occupy Ethiopia and later threw out Britain out of its Somaliland Protectorate in 1940. However, following Mussolini’s alliance with Hitler during the Second World War, Britain defeated Italy not only in Ethiopia and British Somaliland but continued to occupy Italian Somaliland too. As a result of this war in 1941, the entire Somali-inhabited territory (except the tiny territory of French Somaliland) fell under British Military administration.

 

The tiny village of Walwaal, however, was destined to play a more important role in Somali history. In 1943, the then British foreign secretary, Lord Bevin, came up with the brilliant idea of uniting all Somali territories. He argued at the then League of Nations that as a homogeneous, pastoralist Muslims, the interest of the Somali people could not in all fairness be served if they shared state with neighboring Christians. He therefore proposed a greater Somali territory under British rule until such time it was ready for independence. Consequently, Somali clan leaders from British Somaliland, the Ogad*n region, the former Italian Somaliland and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya colony (NFD) were invited and attended a meeting in Walwaal under the auspices of Britain to discuss the Bevin plan. Sadly, however, Somali clan elders at the time could not understand the importance of the plan which they only looked at from the perspective of rival clan politics and rejected it.

[xiinfaniin]

The story of Walwaal, and the pastoral elders of yesteryears. Interesting. Shame is how they lacked foresight. But today’s traditional elders hardly perfomed any better.

 

Ma dhaxal baa beledu? Maasha dhibkaani naga hari waa. What do you think, good Vikings?

[Viking]

Good xiinfaniin, I have more questions than I have answers/solutions. The irony is that we were and still are hostile towards the only thing that can give Somalis a chance to unite, a central government.

[Haneefah]

Interesting stuff, thanks walal.

 

Just what if they had complied (mid caqli yeesha ma laga waayey), what would have been?...aah what ifs...

 

PS. Would you happen to know of a book (written in Eng.) that further illustrates the details of this incident and the British plan walal?

[Yeniceri]

I've heard about the story of the British offering to unite all Somali-speaking territory under one flag and how the Somali leaders rejected it, but I didn't know the Walwal village connection. In some ways, the mistake that was made then has contributed to the misunderstanding, disunity and confusion that's been prevalent in Somali society and politics in the post-colonial era.

[S.O.S]

Dear all,

 

May I suggest to you not to flatter yourselves by pretending that the (mental) prison-cell divisions of Greater Somalia to be the result of a disagreement of Somali elders themselves who choose to be divided. The Somalis never had any say on the outcome of either pre-independence or the immediate post-colonial changing stages in the case of former, and the status quo in the latter case. To state otherwise is simply false! In fact, the Somali folk during that time were more united than they've ever been since

 

The opinion of better informed historians, even though I don't agree with it entirely, is as followed:

 

In January 1948 the Four Power Commission dealing with the ex-Italian colonies, made up of the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union and France, arrived in MaÎdiê9å and discussed the situation with the various interested parties, including the SYL, the HDMS as well as the Italian societies. The four powers, however, failed to agree among themselves, handing the final decision of what to do to the General Assembly of the United Nations, who, in November 1949, placed what had been Italian Somalia prior to the invasion of Ethiopia under United Nations trusteeship for ten years, to be administered during that time by Italy, following which the country would gain independence. It was in 1948 also that most of the Ogad*een (Og§d¿n [q.v.]) area (leaving aside the northern and north-eastern region known as the Haud and the Reserved Area) was handed back to Ethiopia, despite strong resistance on the part of the majority of the Somali inhabitants and the reluctance of the British, who had supported a plan proposed by the British Foreign Minister, Ernest Bevin, for the creation of a Trusteeship of the Union of Somali territories. It was later in 1954 that the Haud and the Reserved Area came under Ethiopian rule, and it was this move in particular which sparked a greater political consciousness in the British Protectorate and also led to the organisation of another political party, the National United Front (NUF).

Source

[Al-Rasheed]

The General Assembly of UN is an evil tool used to deprive Muslim nations of their rights. In 1947, it is used to divide the holy land of Palestine giving large part of it to jews. One year later, it is used to rob the homeland of Somalia giving many parts of it to christians .

 

One day, these Muslim nations will defeat the jungle law of the UN.

[ATLAS]

^^^^

[S.O.S]

Oooh, the UN; the professional painters...

 

Channel 4 News has seen minutes from that meeting, which took place in the White House on 31 January 2003. The two leaders discussed the possibility of securing further UN support, but President Bush made it clear that he had already decided to go to war. The details are contained in a new version of the book 'Lawless World' written by a leading British human rights lawyer, Philippe Sands QC.

 

President Bush said that:

 

"The US would put its full weight behind efforts to get another resolution and would 'twist arms' and 'even threaten'. But he had to say that if ultimately we failed, military action would follow anyway.''

 

Prime Minister Blair responded that he was: "solidly with the President and ready to do whatever it took to disarm Saddam."

 

But Mr Blair said that: "a second Security Council resolution would provide an insurance policy against the unexpected, and international cover, including with the Arabs."

 

Mr Sands' book says that the meeting focused on the need to identify evidence that Saddam had committed a material breach of his obligations under the existing UN Resolution 1441. There was concern that insufficient evidence had been unearthed by the UN inspection team, led by Dr Hans Blix. Other options were considered.

 

President Bush said: "The US was thinking of flying U2 reconnaissance aircraft with fighter cover over Iraq, painted in UN colours. If Saddam fired on them, he would be in breach."

 

He went on: "It was also possible that a defector could be brought out who would give a public presentation about Saddams WMD, and there was also a small possibility that Saddam would be assassinated."

 

Speaking to Channel 4 News, Mr Sands said:

 

"I think no one would be surprised at the idea that the use of spy-planes to review what is going on would be considered. What is surprising is the idea that they would be used painted in the colours of the United Nations in order to provoke an attack which could then be used to justify material breach. Now that plainly looks as if it is deception, and it raises some fundamental questions of legality, both in terms of domestic law and international law."

 

Also present at the meeting were President Bush's National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice and her deputy Dan Fried, and the Presidents Chief of Staff, Andrew Card. The Prime Minister took with him his then security adviser Sir David Manning, his Foreign Policy aide Matthew Rycroft, and and his chief of staff, Jonathan Powell.

 

Those present, as documented in Mr Sands' book, also discussed what might happen in Iraq after liberation.

 

President Bush said that he: "thought it unlikely that there would be internecine warfare between the different religious and ethnic groups."

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