Is there a difference between Knowledge and Education?

[Paragon]

[A]person must have justified true belief, the justification is understood partly as having access to the reasons that ground the belief in question..... accessibility to the internalist is necessary condition for knowledge..

Zaylici, I know I'm going off-topic here, but, are the Internalists implying that accessibility to logical reasons emenating from 'one's true belief' can dictate the creation of reliable knowledge? Could this not mean that, in accordance with what the internalists' believe, the existance of knowledge, however widely recognised, depends on how strong one's belief of it is?

 

The following paper was written for a class( Epistimology) two years ago, it discusses about the nature of knowledge, please enjoy reading it.

I enjoyed it sxb... Nice piece. Insha-Allaah ... Maybe we can sometime move to the ontological side of the subject in question. I am interested in Logical Positivism.

 

Thankx for sharing sxb....

[Zaylici]

I have written this paper for phinominology class, it deals with basic ontological question with regard to human institutions, I did not have any other ontological papers, see perhabs if you enjoy this one, good lack, I have written while I had Somali state failure in mind

Account on human institutions

Cooperative behavior is significant for the survival of human species. Surely, we observe that there are living organisms that cooperate to carry out particular work such a forging together on daily basis to secure living. It is very reasonable thing then, to say variety of living organisms cooperate to sustain life. Early ‘primitive’ human societies in this regard used to cooperate to meet the demands of life. I suspect that this fundamental need to secure the essentials of life necessitates the tendencies of cooperative behavior. It also appears to me that human species have more capacities than cooperating collectively to sustain life.

Searle offers a definition of intentionality that seems convincing to me because this way of thinking about intentionality is liberal one, because it covers variety of possible states that I experience and think other people experience too, and here is what he has to say about intentionality( in P 85, Mind, Language and Society)

Whenever I use the word ‘intentionality’ in this paper I am referring to the sense specified above.

“My subjective states relate me to the rest of the world and the general name of that relationship is intentionality” he proceeds further to give a general outline to what the word intentionality covers and says (P85) “Intentionality to repeat is the general term for all the various forms by which the mind can be directed at, or be about, or of, objects and states of affairs in the world”

My aim of this paper is essentially to give general account with regard to human institutions. So, if you think that other people experience and imagine sort of things you imagine and suffer the problems that you suffer from. It is not surprising to believe that you may coordinate your efforts to insure the problems are dealt with. It is reasonable to assume that this world that we live in is full of problems that cannot be eliminated on individual basis, cooperation then is pragmatic way to insure the welfare of communities or groups that engage in cooperative behavior.

Searle thinks that by virtue of making ontological claim with regard to the existence of things and introducing three explanatory tools he can account for variety of human institutions and social activities.

Here is his account of social universe.

There are things that exist but their existence is independent of our (humans) existence. That is to say the mode of existence of things varies. For instance, the mode of existence of oceans is different than the mode of existence of say state as political organization. The latter’ existence is not independent of human existence in the manner that the former is independent of human existence. State has both objective and subjective existence. Surely, state has epistemic objectivity, that is, state is sort of things that you can verify by your self whether it is true that there is state or not. There is nothing mysterious about it. On the other hand, state has subjective existence in the sense that state cannot exist without there being people who represent the state, regardless whether the agents of the state are elected. Of course, there would be house or symbol that stands for the state, but there is nothing as state in the natural world that has independent existence of its own.

Those sorts of things that depend their existence on our belief or attitudes towards them are sorts of things that Searle calls observer dependent. Whereas, the sorts of things that exist independent of our intentionality are sort of things that he calls observer independent. I think the distinction made in the preceding statement is useful one, because it provides clear and convincing ontological basis for social and institutional reality. It is not difficult to believe that there are things that exist whether we exist or not exist. In other words it is not difficult to imagine that Mount Himalaya (In Southeast Asia) exists independent of the cultures and people that flourish or vanish in its surroundings.

Now, the question I have is how could we account for and explain social entities and process that are epistemically objective and yet contain some elements that are ontologically subjective entities or process. It might be worthwhile to mention that when Searle uses the word ‘epistemic’ he refers to some statement or propositions that can be verified independent of prejudices and beliefs, whereas ontology is used to refer to mode of existence(p44).

So, generally, what does it mean to give an account or to give reason as to why something is the way it is? One obvious benefit of giving an account of something is that such an account gives us an understanding of the phenomenon. Thus, we could use the understanding of the phenomenon for variety of reasons depending on the situation that we find our selves. However, Searle has some other reason in addition to helping us understand these complex phenomena; he is aiming at giving comprehensive view of the mind, language and society. Thus, by giving an account of social and institutional reality (reality in this paper I mean whatever that is either ontologically or epistimacally subjective or objective) he is completing his wider aim of offering an account that fits together.

Collective intentionality is one of the tools according to Searle that would allow us to account for social and institutional reality. Searle thinks that (P120) there is collective intentionality whenever there is cooperative activity. Similarly, whenever there is shared thought or feeling or any other thing of that nature, then there is collective intentionality. So in this scenario living organisms that cooperate for particular activity such as searching for food, are considered to have collective intentionality.

All agents that have collective intentionality are called social facts( P120). But we observe that human individuals and societies do execute variety of activities and thus create institutions such as armies; states and these are what Searle calls institutional facts ( P120).

But how do they create institutional facts, what is it that allows them to have these institutions. One thing that allows human agents to have complex institutions is their capacity to assign functions to objects. That is people assign things to particular functions. For instance, you may use a branch of a tree to defend your self from predator or use an oxen for a cultivation of agriculture. There is noting that would prevent one from using the same objects for variety of other purposes or not using them at all.

Finally, the last apparatus that will allow us to explain institutional and social realities is constitutive rule. There are two kinds of rules. First one is regulative rule these are the sort of rules that regulate behavior that exists prior to the introduction of rules. There is also other sort of rules, these are the sort of rules that create the behavior that they regulate and these are called constitutive rules.

It is very interesting to note that Searle says that constitutive rules have logical form that has the following format ‘X counts as Y in the context of C’. I have some concerns with regard to constitutive rules. Before I express my concern let me make another point that Searle makes with regard to the statues functions.

It is seems to me reasonable to assume that people have the capacity individually and collectively to assign functions to certain things. That is the capacity to change and impose form on natural objects, such as taking a wood and making a bed out of it.

Suppose, we have manufactured big knife to slaughter animals as sacrifice for gods, but suppose we have not used the knife for years and for that reason the knife is no longer capable of executing its assigned functions, that is the knife is no longer capable of slaughtering animals. However, we still believe that the knife can do the thing that it was assigned for. It is worthwhile to note that our collective belief does not match with the physical capability of the knife. That is the knife cannot slaughter animals, although we believe it can.

As you can see there is mismatch between what we believe is the case and what is the case in the physical world. So, the assigned functions have now become what Searle calls statues functions. That is the function that exists as result of our collective intentionality. In other words people believe or think that the knife can do its job while the knife cannot do what it was assigned for. Searle thinks that this is very important concept because it allows us to believe or have an idea that has no physical basis. Searle uses this idea to partly explain the evolution of money in Western Europe.

Now you could say the knife at this moment cannot slaughter animals (let us say this stands for X), however, it counts as knife that can slaughter animals (Y) within the context of these people who collectively believe that the knife is capable of doing what it was assigned for (this is the context C).

Now, is it the case that whatever conforms to this logical form of constitutive rule is sort of things that constitutive rule creates as an institutional reality. Searle is not very clear about this. But if you assume that this logical form is kind of mechanism that allows one to account for the creation of institutional reality, then it make sense to say that the constitutive rule is sort of rules that create the realties that they regulate.

For instance the treasury department produces dollar bills that count as money or something that counts as medium of exchange of services and commodities within the context of United States. Thus, the treasury department creates reality and at the same time it regulates (says this is one bill and that is ten bills) the same reality it produces. You could naturally ask what the word rule is meant here, Although Searle is not clear about what he means by rules, but it seems to me rule is sort of things that specify something and this understanding is in harmony with logical form of the constitutive rules we have previously specified.

My concern with constitutive rules is that they are not clear when compared to the regulative rules. Searle says that constitutive rules create realities whereas the regulative rules do not. But regulative rules too establish realities. When you say to a pedestrian walking on the road that is new rule ‘walk on the right side’, haven’t you created this new phenomenon of people walking on the right side? Thus, the distinction between the two rules appear to me to be are ambiguous to the least.

I agree with Searle that collective acceptant with regard to the institutional reality is the base that sustains institutional reality. I contend that it is very hard to sustain any social institutions (such as government, marriage, university) without having collective acceptance or collective belief or any other form of collective intentionality that is pertinent to the institutions in question.

This simple mechanism ‘X counts as Y in the context C’ seem to have the capacity to account for variety of institutional realities.

What follows is an attempt to explain the University of Minnesota based on the tools that we have discussed. Let us see if we can explain or account for the University of Minnesota using the tools and the ontology that we have specified.

It easy to imagine that ideas of institutions of high learning come from an individual who have some how recognized the benefit of having high educational institutions in the state of Minnesota. However, it is unlikely that he himself alone can create a functioning university without there being some form of collective intentionally. Even if he has all the necessary resources to invest this high institution of learning, however, he still needs students, instructors and employers that believe that this is ‘an institution of high learning’.

More importantly, people who run the university must collectively accept that this is a university. You could also say all people who cooperate to insure this university is functions have collective intentionally of some form. After all people who clean the building make the place suitable for learning, whereas the administrators facilitate smooth functioning of the University. Similarly, administrators and secretaries keep records of the student performance and administer also other relevant services such as salary payments and collection of payments. All these people cooperate to insure the university function so as to produce graduates and generate knowledge through research and teaching. Since there is cooperation there is also collective intentionally.

We could also think that the university was started with one or few departments and the rest of the departments ware later introduced. How could we account for this? The logical form of the constitutive rules can help us account for this. We can think that the first person or people who decided the creation of University must have said this ‘building’ counts as institution of higher learning in this situation. Thus, you could use the same logical form to generate variety of departments and schools. A constitutive rule in this scenario then, not only creates new institutions but also regulates the new institutions created. There is also assignment of functions; the building has been assigned for particular purpose that is, building is an institution of higher learning. Thus, this building is not a parliament it is a house where learning is facilitated.

It is true that I f the new institutions are going be created or the existing ones are to function there must be group of people who run the institution. Of course, you can think that they had been assigned to this function, that is the function of administrating the institution. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume that workers, students and faculties also accept the legitimacy of this administrating body. Thus, there is collective intentionality with regard to the administration. so, this administrating body is the body that generates new departments and the regulations of these departments. This (creation of new institutions and their regulations) could be explained by the logical form of constitutive rules.

Finally, in order for some one to create institutions one needs cooperation of others to assign functions to certain things and to insure that things do the work that they are assigned for. It may be the case that one can attain the essentials of life by her self-alone, but to really maximize the chances of survival one must cooperate with others to insure the basic needs of life are satisfied.

Similarly, if one wants to create institutions of greater complexity like university, one needs the cooperation of others, thus, whenever people cooperate there is collective intentionality. Cooperation is minimum requirement for collective intentionality. Cooperation alone is not enough (because there are species in the animal kingdom who did not developed complex institutions like university partly because of their inability to use things for particular purposes that may not necessarily be inherent to the things) to facilitate development (creation and maintenance of complex institutions such as university) unless there is capacity of assigning functions to the things so as to facilitate realization of particular end.

It appears to me that the assignment of functions and constitutive rules are saying the same thing. Both of them essentially say this ‘thing’ counts or this ‘thing’ is used as this ‘thing’. In this regard assignment of function and constitutive rules are saying the same thing. Although, Constitutive rules do more than this, that is they regulate in addition to saying ‘this’ counts as that. Thus, the capacity to assign functions to things as the circumstances demands and creation of rules to facilitate cooperation (which is the basis for collective intentionality) could essentially account for almost all institutional realties.

In the case of creating a University people have to assign functions to buildings (While building itself is product of assigned functions (stones and other construction materials are assigned for particular tasks in order to build) and cooperation of the people) and cooperate (collective intentionality) to insure the departments of the University do there work. Finally, there has to be rules to make the cooperation among involved people more effective and thus make the University a functioning institution.

[Paragon]

"It is very reasonable thing then, to say variety of living organisms cooperate to sustain life. Early ‘primitive’ human societies in this regard used to cooperate to meet the demands of life. "

 

 

Indeed Indeed sxb. Your pieces are good brother, I mean it. Very reasonable. I havent finished reading this one but Insha-Allaah.. I will be back to finish reading it.

 

Thank you