Hibo Posted May 21, 2002 “Those who criticise Athenian Democracy because of its exclusions fail to realise that democracy depends on exclusions.” Democracy is a contested term and is not singular in form or definition. A standard method of distinguishing between democracies and non-democracies is the methods by which political leaders are chosen within a polity (Held 1996). It is in this regard that the principle of political equality is considered a key democratic institution. The manner in which political equality is conceived of or interpreted has caused conflicting accounts of what democracy “is”. Current proponents of substantive democracy argue that social and economic inequality must be reduced in order to achieve political equality. They argue that a Nautonomy- a system with asymmetrical life chances is not a democracy (Held 1996) However political equality must be separated from equality and political equality may be understood more coherently strictly within the sphere of political arrangements. The extent to which an extended franchise exists within a polity and other social dimensions have become embedded into the democratic discourse. This can be viewed either as circumstances in which liberalism have informed democracy or developing from the logic of democracy itself, the former appears more congenial. The logic of democracy necessary entails relations of inclusion and exclusion. Defining the “demos” involves the exclusions of those who are not the “people”. These processes are an inherent requirement for democracy; political equality can only exist in substance when there is risk of inequality. There must be some mirror to manifest its meaning. “Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally” (Schmitt 1985, first published 1926 :9). It is this exclusion, which epitomizes democracy. Those who criticise Athenian democracy can in theory do so in reference to the criteria exclusions are based on and the degree extent and kind of its exclusions, however this inevitably collapses into criticisms based on exclusion per se. Schmitt (1985, first published 1926) argues that democracy is dependent on homogeneity and that exclusion through the political equality of some and not others creates this. The nature of the exclusions will be related to the environment, however the need for exclusion is fundamental. Schmitt (1985, first published 1926) contends that democracy consists of an identity between the rulers and the ruled, for the unity of the demos there must be an “us” and a “them”. Those who criticise Athenian democracy may depict the rulers of sharing an identity with the ruling class rather than the “people”, what could be seen as being offered here is not an alternative to exclusionary democracy, rather an alternative exclusionary democracy with a reconfiguration of who the people are and who the people are not. Normative ideas about the virtues of Athenian democracy, may serve a purpose, however the democratic principle of exclusion must be recognised as a consistent and durable factor existing in the modern era These exclusions can be viewed as a feature of the democratic method in any era. In examining modern democracies Weber (1948) points to the introduction of the mass franchise, highlighting its role in transforming the political arena but not the exclusionary nature of democracy itself. As more people fell under the pale of the constitution, modern democracy is removed from the Parliament and the political party becomes central. The result is “Plebiscitarian democracy” which occurs because of the "necessity to woo and organise the masses" (Weber1948: 102). From this necessity develops a managerial pattern, which requires "a division of citizens with a right to vote into politically active and politically passive elements (Weber 1948: 99). Thus democracy again depends on exclusion, at least of a certain kind. For the election of the leader, a passive electorate of followers is required. Participation in elections should not be considered only in terms of who can vote and who votes but as an analysis of the organisers and the organised. The idea that the political boundaries are by their very nature exclusionary registers tension in the relationship between democratic and liberal traditions. Liberal thought rests on more universal principles. To adopt a Wittgensteinian approach there is tension between their corresponding “grammars”. The appeal for criticisms of Athenian democracy can be found in liberal traditions, which now inhabit the democratic domain. The liberal conception of equality is based on humanity, as opposed to a political community; the liberal position does not present a formula for political institutions its concept of equality is based on the individual and is universal, although ideas regarding cosmopolitan citizenship espoused by authors such as David Held and the deliberative democracy of the kind of Habermas have sought to negotiate with democratic principles. Schmitt argues that there can never be a democracy of mankind only of the people in contrast to any ideas of cosmopolitan citizenship. On the other hand Habermas (1996) for example has suggested that unity or homogeneity be based on constitutions and laws rather than a national “people”, that the demos need not be the object of a democracy the tension between liberalism and democracy is most heightened in relation to political equality. In the current context in which most democracies exist within a liberal framework, the understanding of what democracy “is” has evolved from critics of liberal democracies Much of the debate concerning substantive democracy although developed from criticism of western liberal democracies has drawn strength from stark contrast between the form and substance of democracies in the Third World often the result of the osmosis of liberal economics and politics through dominant paradigms of development. Political equality conceived of as a fundamental democratic right is impinged on heavily by economic inequality. MacPherson (1977) argued that while democratic government increased freedoms within a society capitalism gnawed at democracy because it forced individuals to transfer “their powers of self development” to economic overlords this “net transfer” of power results in social inequalities and political domination. Equality is seen from this perspective as logic of democracy and a social dimension is added to an understanding of democracy. Can you be politically included while economically and socially excluded? Freedom of speech and association it is argued presuppose the means of exercising them. In South Africa a study into the attitudes of black citizens conceptions of democracy showed that material improvement was crucial to their understanding of democracy (Hearn 1999) Intriguingly the idea that inequality leads to injustice is shared by democratic and liberal traditions, although it can manifest itself very differently. Those involved in Athenian democracy were an example of this. If someone within the people was perceived to be particularly charismatic or influential then he was ostracised for “counting for more than one”. However from a democratic position, evident from Athenian democracy this can simply mean that the political boundary can be drawn more narrowly as in the case of the ostracised influential man. From a liberal perspective it can only be extended more widely, with a case for action in economic and social spheres, which is a logical extension of their position. Those who criticise Athenian democracy are by definition modern democrats. These democrats have an articulation derived from both the liberal and democratic traditions. Empirical and normative observations of Athenian democracy if not contextualised would unfairly discriminate against Athenian democracy for lacking liberal tendencies and for therefore being “undemocratic” from this perspective. It is through the 19th and 20th century through the merging of these two positions that liberalism was democratised and democracy liberalised. It is also important to note that criticism and the ideas of social progress and social evolutionism are honoured western traditions. Democracy is subject to the idea of progress. The French social critic Jean Baudrillard has suggested that the idea of progress maybe a illusion, however despite the nature of western progress democracy may in the future no longer depend on exclusion References Barker, R (2001) Legitimating Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Habermas (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Oxford: Polity Press Hearn, Julie (2000), 'Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,' Third World Quarterly 21(5 Held D (1996) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press MacPherson C, B (1977) The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press Mouffe S (2000) The Democratic Paradox. New York. Verso Schmitt C (1985) The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. London: MIT Press Weber (1948) “Politics as a vocation” in Mills C.W and Gerth HC (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge Bibliography Barker, R (2001) Legitimating Identities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Dahl R A (1956) A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: Chicago University Press Hearn, Julie (2000), 'Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa,' Third World Quarterly 21(5 Held D (1996) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press Lijphart, Arend (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Governmental; Forms and Performance in 36 countries MacPherson C, B (1977) The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press Mouffe S (2000) The Democratic Paradox. New York. Verso Schumpeter J (1987) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London :Unwin Weber (1948) “Politics as a vocation” in Mills C.W and Gerth HC (eds) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 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