Wikileaks Snippets

[Che -Guevara]

WikiLeaked Cable Confirms U.S.’ Secret Somalia Op

 

It was an off-hand compliment during a January 2007 dinner meeting between Abu Dhabi crown prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, plus staff, and then-U.S. Central Commander boss General John Abizaid. But Al Nayhan’s jocular praise, as reported in WikiLeaks’ trove of leaked diplomatic cables, is a rare admission that the United States played a central role in the disastrous December 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, a move that ultimately emboldened the very Islamic extremists the U.S. and Ethiopia had hoped to squash.

 

“The Somalia job was fantastic,” Al Nahyan interjected between discussions of Iran, Saudi Arabia and the prince’s desire to buy Reaper drones for his air force. At the time of Al Nahyan’s comment, the dust was just settling from Ethiopia’s Blitzkrieg-style assault toward Mogadishu. Some 50,000 Ethiopian troops, supported by T-55 tanks, Hind helicopters and Su-27 jet fighters, had cut a bloody swath through the lightly-armed forces of the Islamic Courts Union, an alliance of mostly nationalist Islamic fighters that prior to the invasion had controlled much of Somalia.

 

The Somali attack had surprised outside observers. Ethiopia and Somalia had been rivals a long time, but no one had expected such brutal fighting, and so suddenly. It was fairly obvious that Ethiopia had received significant help — even urging — for its invasion. For one, Ethiopia’s air force did not appear capable of coordinated air strikes in support of on-the-move ground troops; it seemed likely that the Su-27s were piloted by Russian or Ukrainian mercenaries — a time-honored tradition in Africa. What’s more, Ethiopia’s army didn’t possess the intelligence or logistical skill for long-range operations. Those, not coincidentally, are particular American strengths.

 

Washington certainly had a motive to get involved in Somalia. There was growing concern in the White House and the Pentagon that Somalia’s Islamists might ally themselves with Al Qaeda and turn to international terrorism. Already with two escalating wars on its own plate, the U.S. was in no position to openly lead its own large-scale attack on Somalia. It’d have been far simpler to simply sponsor somebody else to do the dirty work. Enter Ethiopia.

 

In early January following the invasion, USA Today’s Barbara Slavin reported on Washington’s extensive behind-the-scenes support for Ethiopian troops. “The ties include intelligence sharing, arms aid and training,” Slavin noted. A couple days later, The Washington Post’s Pauline Jelinek, citing anonymous sources, described U.S. Special Forces accompanying Ethiopian troops. CBS news revealed that U.S. Air Force gunships were active over southern Somalia during the Ethiopian blitz. Through all the reporting, U.S. officials remained vague or silent on the subject of Washington’s involvement. All the same, evidence was mounting that the U.S. had played a leading role in the Ethiopian invasion. Journalists only strongly suspected it, but Abu Dhabi prince Al Nayhan apparently knew it for certain, if his praise of “the Somalia job” was any indication.

 

Three years later, it’s clear the Ethiopian invasion was a bad idea. The attack rallied Somalis of all stripes and politics against the invaders, ultimately boosting support for fringe Islamic groups that now had a clear enemy in the Ethiopians and their suspected American puppet-masters. Violence mounted as the Ethiopians settled in for a bloody, two-year occupation.

 

When the Ethiopians withdrew in 2009, the Islamists rushed to fill the vacuum. A year later, the Al Shabab Islamic group, successor to the Islamic Courts, conducted its first international terror attack. Last month, a Somali-born American teen plotted to explode a bomb in Portland. Today, U.S. Special Forces continue to target terrorists in Somalia. There are arguably more of them than ever, thanks in part to the botched Ethiopian invasion. “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea,” U.S. diplomat Donald Yamamoto said in March.

 

Fantastic job, indeed.

[Polanyi]

Djibouti cleared Blackwater to kill pirates

 

Djiboutian navy officers training onboard the US vessel 'Germantown'. The US have a major military basis in Djibouti

 

© Darrell Dean/AFRICOM/afrol News

afrol News, 1 December - The government of Djibouti permitted the controversial private US security firm Blackwater "to operate an armed ship from the port of Djibouti" and to "use lethal force against pirates."

 

The permission was given in February 2009, it is revealed in a cable from the US Embassy in Djibouti, published by WikiLeaks today. Blackwater was to launch its private armed pirate hunt in March 2009, it was reported.

 

US Ambassador James Swan, residing in the key US allied country Djibouti since October 2008, was informed about the Blackwater-Djibouti agreement by Robert Emmett Downey, Blackwater Worldwide's Development Manager for Africa. Mr Downey said he had received the permission to operate an armed ship by Djibouti's head of national security and intelligence services Hassan Said Khaireh.

 

"This is the only such arrangement so far that Blackwater has made with a host government in the region, but Blackwater will likely engage Oman and Kenya in the future," Ambassador Swan was told.

 

Blackwater, which has been involved in power abuse scandals in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the world's largest private security company, often described as "mercenaries acting above the law" by human rights groups opposing to a privatisation of military operations.

 

Little has until now been known about Blackwater's engagement in Africa in general and in the fight against Somali pirates in particular. The WikiLeaks revelation about Djibouti's willingness to engage the company is expected to create strong reactions in East Africa.

 

According to the information Mr Downey gave to the US embassy in Djibouti last year, the company had received permission to operate the US-flagged 183-foot ex-research vessel 'McArthur', which has landing space for two helicopters. "The ship will be armed with .50-caliber machine guns, and is able to protect a 3-ship convoy," Ambassador Swan was told. A staff of 33 US citizens would operate the vessel.

 

The Blackwater vessel was to participate in the international efforts to stop Somali piracy in the western Indian Ocean. These efforts have been jeopardised by limited resources and few nations being willing to send their navy vessels on longer assignments. Repeated calls for more resources have gone unanswered, leaving much space for Somali piracy operations.

 

In this power vacuum, Blackwater had found a "business concept," Mr Downey explained. Blackwater's business concept was described as "having its armed ship escort other ships requiring protection," according to the embassy report.

 

"Blackwater's counter-piracy operation does not have any clients yet, but Blackwater expects business to develop following a public launch in Djibouti in March [2009] with government of Djibouti officials," Ambassador Swan reported.

 

This planned "public launch" however never materialised. According to research by the 'New York Times', the new Obama government reacted negatively to Blackwater's anti-piracy plans and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made sure the controversial company cancelled its Djibouti plans.

 

Washington probably reacted especially negatively to the Blackwater plans, cleared by Djibouti, as the company announced it would take no prisoners. "Blackwater has no intention of taking any pirates into custody," Ambassador Swan reported. "While the French have previously put pirates ashore in Puntland, Downey said Blackwater had no plans to do so, either in Somalia or Kenya," his report added.

 

Mr Downey had emphasised that "international maritime law allows the use of lethal force against pirates" and that this was part of Blackwater's business plan. He also admitted that there was "no precedent for a paramilitary operation in a purely commercial environment."

 

Djibouti intelligence chief Khaireh had agreed to these terms. The only demand by Mr Khaireh for Blackwater to operate its armed ship from Djibouti was the Djiboutian Navy would secure Blackwater's weapons "while ashore in Djibouti."

 

Ambassador Swan commented that Djibouti authorities probably had approved of the controversial deal mainly due to commercial reasons. "Blackwater's presence in Djibouti would make it one of the largest US businesses operating in the country," Mr Swan commented.

 

But the Ambassador also made it clear he was sceptical about the Blackwater announcement, saying he would "appreciate [the State] Department's guidance on the appropriate level of engagement with Blackwater." Ms Clinton reportedly advised against the embassy's engagement.

[The Zack]

US cable: Ethiopia govt terrified by ONLF rebels

 

afrol News, 16 February -

 

The low-level conflict in Ethiopia's Oga'den region is far more dangerous to the government's survival than earlier assumed, a secret US report reveals. Government fears for its future.

 

In a diplomatic cable, sent by US Ambassador Donald Yamamoto in Addis Ababa in November 2007 and recently leaked by Wikileaks, it is made clear that the insurgency by the Oga'den National Liberation Front (ONLF) is strongly worrying the Ethiopian government.

 

 

"Because, the government of Ethiopia's core Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) sees in the ONLF an image of itself two decades ago when it overthrew the brutal communist Derg regime, Prime Minister Meles [Zenawi] and his Chief of Defence Force, General Samora Yonus, consider it vital to eliminate the ONLF before this insurgent group gains wider support," Ambassador Yamamoto sums up.

 

"It is our assessment that Prime Minister Meles and the government of Ethiopia leadership likely view the ONLF as a long term threat to the survival of the EPRDF government," the Ambassador details, mentioning similarities between the ONLF and Mr Meles' TPLF.

 

The US Ambassador reveals that this assessment is not his own, but comes from the Ethiopian government itself. "It is apparent from our conversations that the Prime Minister, General Samora and other TPLF/EPRDF members view the military defeat of the ONLF now as critical to prevent it from posing a threat to the government in the future," he wrote.

 

The assessment of Prime Minister Meles' fear of the ONLF comes a few months after an ONLF attack on a Chinese oil exploration site and the following brutal counter-attack by the Ethiopian army. Even the US Ambassador - a close ally to the Meles regime - admits the counter-attack had been "extreme, visceral" and "brutal".

 

 

The US cable also confirms earlier reports by human rights groups, strongly rejected by the Ethiopian government, that the army made "use of extreme force trapping the civilian population b

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

 

Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

� Eskinder Debebe/UN Photo/afrol News

etween the insurgents and the government forces."

 

Ambassador Yamamoto also reveals why the ONLF "shockingly successful" attack on the Chinese oil explorers caused so much fear among the Ethiopian leadership. "The attack was an embarrassment for the ENDF, its failure to protect the oil project site and respond immediately against the attackers," he writes.

 

But, apart from prestige, the most important reason was the economy, which is the Meles government's largest success and its main legitimacy to stay in power. The ONLF attack had threatened government's "vision for economic development" by indicating foreign investments in Ethiopia could be insecure. This "posed a fundamental threat to the government of Ethiopia's authority."

 

The US Ambassador finally casts doubts over Ethiopian statements that had defended the brutal counter-attack in ****** with a need to stop "foreign insurgents and extremists." No convincing evidence had been presented to government claims of Eritrean support for the ONLF or a Somali infiltration in Ethiopia.

 

Ethiopia is pressuring the US and African neighbours to list the ONLF as a terrorist group - which so far only has been done by Kenya. Ambassador Yamamoto in 2007 said he did not agree and had "explained to the government of Ethiopia that while the ONLF is not a terrorist group, we recognise the probability that there are some individuals within the ONLF that may be supportive of extremist groups."

 

Ambassador Yamamoto advised government in Washington push Prime Minister Meles towards a less confrontational strategy in ******, where "military action alone will not bring a lasting resolution." More humanitarian aid to the "already underdeveloped and historically marginalised region" needed to be provided, he advised.

Source..