By Alisha Ryu Nairobi 22 June 2007 In another major setback for international efforts to bring peace to Somalia, a violent power struggle between two sub-clans in the port city of Kismayo is fueling fear that an all-out clan war could erupt at any time and destabilize a key region of southern Somalia. VOA Correspondent Alisha Ryu reports from our East Africa Bureau in Nairobi. After days of skirmishes between ******* and ********* sub-clan militias in the country's third-largest city, residents of Kismayo say heavy fighting erupted on Friday, killing and wounding dozens of people. The ******* and the ********* belong to the larger ***** clan, recognized as one of the four major clans in Somalia. A Somali aid worker in Kismayo, Ali Bashi, tells VOA that the militiamen of both sub-clans are technically Somali government troops and government supporters, who are nevertheless bitterly divided along clan lines. Bashi says Friday's clash in Kismayo between the ******* and the ********* follows a battle the two sides fought on April 23. After the battle, ********* soldiers withdrew from Kismayo to the town of Bulo Gadud, 35 kilometers away, leaving the city and its strategic port in the hands of the *******. In recent days, ********* troops have been seen moving closer to Kismayo. On Thursday, at least four people were wounded when one group of clan militiamen attacked another. The *******'s grip on Kismayo appears now to have tightened. VOA has learned that ******* troops entered Bulo Gadud on Friday and declared victory over the ********* sub-clan. Since the 1990s, Kismayo has been the center of various ***** sub-clan power struggles. But the latest fighting has many Somalis concerned that interim President Abdullahi Yusuf, who is a ********* and kinsman to the soldiers defeated by the *******, could launch a retaliatory strike against the ******* and start a major clan war. Since capturing the Somali capital, Mogadishu, from Islamist forces in late December, President Yusuf's Ethiopian and western-backed government has promised to end clan politics and unify the country after 16 years of civil war. But many Somalis in the capital and elsewhere say clan divisions recently have become sharper than ever, and they accuse top government leaders of manipulating those divisions to benefit their own clans and sub-clans. Meanwhile, a government-imposed nighttime curfew in Mogadishu went into effect on Friday. The government says the curfew is necessary to curb attacks by insurgents who have targeted government officials, Somali police, and Ethiopian troops. In recent weeks, Ethiopian and Somali troops have searched businesses and houses throughout the capital, confiscating several truckloads of munitions and weapons, including land mines, mortars, rockets, and missiles. VOA

JBiyow, if only you could see what Xiin is trying to show you. Perhaps one day.

Originally posted by N/AA: Duke, you are wasting site bandwidth sxb. Si raganimo leh meesha u dood amaba iska gabal dhacso. Kismaayo is a done deal adeer. Horn, perhaps you or the poster of the topic could explain how the "Gedo boys" are also Kismaayo "locals". Aren't you a little too giddy and celebrating way too early? Any official word from Yey and his junta? What about the Ethiopians? Do you really think they'll let a bunch of "boys" ruin their escapade in southern Somalia? Come on atheer. Don't uncork that (xalaal) Champagne just yet. Ciyaartu waa gelin dambe. Edit: Now would be a good time for a reconciliation conference. LOL.

^^^ He'd like to say the government lost but that would mean labeling his kinsmen as terrorists. A rock and a hard place really.

So who won? The "government" or the "terrorists"?

^^^^ I hear ya saaxib but don't be fooled by the public pronouncements of disagreement between the US and its allies. These statements are being made for the consumption of the gullible public. When push comes to shove, the US, Europe, Canada and Australia are one regardless what they say in public. From where I stand, the biggest fools seem to be us, the Arabs and Muslims.

by Haroon Siddiqui There is panic in Ottawa, Washington, Jerusalem and European capitals over Hamas’s stunning military rout of Fatah in the Gaza Strip. The 18-month-long Western policy – which the Stephen Harper Tories took pride in, having been first to announce it – of starving Hamas into submission is in ruins. Yet Canada and others will try more of the same, only on a grander scale – showering greater favours on Fatah and strangling Hamas and the Gazans some more. The new policy is no more likely to succeed than the old. Where we are today is a function of where we have been. Starting in the 1980s, Israel reportedly encouraged the Islamists in order to weaken the secularist resistance. Having done so, it and the U.S. said that Mahmoud Abbas was too weak to negotiate peace with. Now, they are going to prop him up. This attempt at dividing and conquering an occupied people will continue to fail. Palestinians are one people, even if they are killing one another at this time, giving rise to glee in some quarters that they are a warped lot who fail to behave rationally after 40 years of a brutal occupation. The West used to complain, correctly, that Yasser Arafat was corrupt to the core, and also dictatorial. But we colluded with such corrupt and autocratic Fatah operatives as Mohammed Dahlan, the security chief, so he could crack down on Hamas. That only helped Hamas win the January 2006 election, a result we refused to accept, even while paying lip serv ice to democracy. And it was Dahlan’s attempts at undermining the Palestinian government that prompted Hamas last week to finish off the Fatah militias, trash his villa and take over the Fatah security building where kidnapped Hamas operatives used to be held and tortured. Make no mistake about it. Hamas is a terrorist group. It does not recognize Israel and won’t forswear violence against the Jewish state. But Fatah’s hands are also drenched in blood. Its Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has been involved in terrorism, including suicide bombings. Having egged on Abbas to dismiss the elected government and appoint a new prime minister, we are calling him “the legitimate president of all Palestinians.” But in many Palestinian eyes, Ismail Haniyeh remains the legitimate prime minister of all Palestinians. Hamas has been successful not so much because it is “Islamist” but because it fights corruption, provides social services and offers resistance to the occupation. Yet we are being fed a new line: peace can come sans Hamas. As Alexa McDonough, the NDP’s foreign affairs critic, said Tuesday: “Peace cannot be achieved without Hamas at the table. It is a fraud to pretend otherwise.” Listen also to Daniel Levy. He is a former peace negotiator for Israel and is now a senior fellow at the New America Foundation, a public policy institute in Washington, where I reached him by phone. Hamas is “the new reality,” he said. Ignoring it is to risk “a further radicalization of Gaza, whose young, unemployed, angry and armed people could prove a fertile ground for Al Qaeda.” Would boosting Abbas work? “That may have worked in 2003 when he was prime minister and in 2005 after the death of Arafat. We are two years too late, at least.” What to do? “Prevent a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Curtail the daily inconveniences in the West Bank. Pursue a two-state solution. But do it by bringing the Palestinians from both sides together, rather than trying the opposite.” Toronto Star

Originally posted by xiinfaniin: When every thing else fails, they resort shutting the city down miyyaa? Actually, many if not most of the attacks on the occupiers and their dabadhilifs happen in broad daylight. Having a curfew won't change a thing. And how did they go from having a reconciliation conference one week ago to a curfew now? LOL.

^^^ A remarkable display of lucidity, nay clairvoyance, by Horn. Unfortunately, you mention Barre Hiirale and my friend's otherwise sharp intellect is suddenly reduced to that of a raisin muffin at Tim Horton's. Originally posted by xiinfaniin: quote:Originally posted by Jacaylbaro: Does it hurt to say we have a good relationship with Ethiopia ??? Depends who’s saying it. Somaliland, as many Somali regions are, is squarely in Ethiopia’s sphere of influence. Thusly the relationship between the two can’t be characterized as friendly or mutual for they are no equals. To say Somaliland is Ethiopia’s friend, though not a crime unto itself, comes across as a bit gullible---to say the least. Don’t be so naïve saaxiib in believing a few desperate secessionist activists will use Ethiopia to attain their independence goal. Ouch!

US Needs to Exit Iraq by Mikhail Gorbachev Clashes between U.S. troops and insurgents throughout Iraq, political maneuvering in the United States over its presence there and the repercussions of that presence around the world leave no doubt that the Bush administration’s hopes for a turnaround have been frustrated. The recent American troop “surge” has only increased the grim statistics of military casualties, civilian deaths and overall devastation. The U.S Congress reluctantly approved funding for the continued troop presence without requiring a date for withdrawal. But despite claims of victory, media reports suggest that the Bush team understands its current Iraq policies have run their course. The administration is reportedly considering a 50 per cent reduction of troops in Iraq next year, as well as changing their mandate from combat missions to support and training. There’s renewed interest in the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group, brushed aside only a few months ago. The administration has begun consulting Iraq’s neighbours, Iran and Syria. So even those who like to persist in their mistakes and illusions are being forced to rethink or, at least repackage, their policies. But is this a real change for the better? Is there a light at the end of the tunnel? No. The key to understanding the situation - as it appears today and as it appeared one, two or three years ago, indeed as it appeared from Day One of the invasion - is simple. Iraq is occupied by U.S. forces. That fact hasn’t been changed by Iraq’s creation of a parliament, the election of a new government or the establishment of relative quiet in some parts of the country. Millions of Iraqis perceive the occupation as a national humiliation. That fuels sectarian conflicts, civil strife and continuing instability. President Bush blames the terrorists (who, incidentally, had no foothold in Iraq before the invasion) and urges Iraq’s neighbours and the international community to co-operate in stabilizing the country. In fact, most of the United States’ international partners - not only members of the so-called “coalition of the willing,” but also those who condemned the invasion - are ready to co-operate. A conference recently held in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, agreed to write off $30 billion of Iraqi debt. This decision was supported by China, Saudi Arabia, Spain and a number of other countries. Russia agreed to forgive much of Iraq’s debt even earlier. There is therefore no reason to accuse members of the world community of failing to understand the importance of a stable Iraq. The Bush administration, however, seems to be using this apparently constructive attitude for self-serving ends. While asking its partners to help Iraq, it refuses to do the one thing that would really aid that country: develop a strategy for withdrawal. Americans will put increasing pressure on the administration to do exactly that. Keeping a certain number of U.S. troops in Iraq for a reasonable period would be acceptable to most Iraqis, as well as to the international community. But only if it’s recognized that the occupation has ended. Such recognition can be achieved only if normalization of Iraq becomes a true international initiative, with the United States ceasing to only hand off certain aspects when it is in its own self-interest. U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is inevitable. But is it not better to withdraw when the major players inside and outside of Iraq agree on key issues? Those don’t merely include how to withdraw without too much pain, but also how to move toward national reconciliation and how to ensure peace and security in the region. At first, to secure order it could conceivably be necessary to replace U.S. troops with soldiers from other countries whose presence would not be resented by most Iraqis. Any such troops would have to be approved by the UN Security Council. The international community’s help might also be needed to advance the political process in Iraq, which is currently stalled to the point of creating a real risk of the country breaking up. No one should fear internationalizing the Iraqi problem; in the end, it would benefit all parties. In 1985, it took a change of leadership in the Soviet Union to recognize the mistake of entangling the USSR in the Afghan conflict. That new Soviet leadership - with me as its president - set the goal of withdrawing from Afghanistan while urging other countries to help in securing peace and stability. Regrettably, the U.S. government chose to forget its own assurances, as it had on other occasions. Instead of co-operating with all responsible Afghan forces, including President Mohammad Najibullah, the United States favoured the proxies of certain elements in Pakistan. We had warned our American partners about the long-term dangers of playing this game, but they seemed unaware of those consequences. Finally, when Russia backed out of Afghan affairs, the road to extremism was left wide open. The “blowback” from those fateful decisions came on a September morning in 2001, in New York and in Washington. Some would object that historical analogies, whether with Vietnam or Afghanistan, only go so far. It is true that every conflict has some unique features. But many of their lessons are the same. Think long and hard before trying to solve any problem militarily. Talk of all other peaceful means as exhausted is often baseless: An alternative is always available. If, however, a great power makes the mistake of entangling itself in an armed conflict, it shouldn’t make things worse by arrogantly refusing to heed warnings of dire consequences. Finally, and most importantly, it should be understood from the start that ultimately there must be a political solution to these conflicts. Seek it honestly, thinking not just of your own self-interest, and look years, not just months, ahead. Mikhail Gorbachev served as the leader of the former Soviet Union from 1985 until its collapse in 1991. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1990, he is currently president of the International Foundation for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (The Gorbachev Foundation). Toronto Star

By issuing an official rebuttal press release, this foreign ministry is unwittingly giving Gettleman and his article the very credibility they claim he lacks. This knee jerk reaction is a pathetic attempt at distorting the truth, something the Tigray government has been doing for years. Now we know what school of public relations TFG'ers have graduated from: The Seyoum Mesfin School of (Disastrous) Public Relations.

Originally posted by NGONGE: ^^ Looking at other news (though it has not been confirmed yet) it sounds like the TFG is already leaking Ministers. Do you think Cadiid and Buuba are undesirables now and would this amnesty apply to them? Anyone who's not toeing the line of the puppet regime (and its master) is a persona non grata. Neither its earlier cries of terrorism nor this current offer of amnesty are credible as the TFG is doing what is often referred to as "grasping at foam when swept by flood waters." This ideologically bankrupt, criminally indictable and morally reprehensible assembly of warlords and druglords will do and say anything to save their own skin. Fortunately, however, due to its sheer incompetence and lack of leadership or vision, it is rapidly falling apart, as it should.

Somalia's government has given an amnesty to both the leaders and fighters of the Islamist movement ousted from power last December. President Abdullahi Yusuf, however, said those with links to "international terrorist" groups were excluded. The offer is seen as an attempt to persuade members of the Union of Islamic Courts to attend a national reconciliation conference next month. The Islamists, however, insist that Ethiopian troops leave the country. "All of them have been pardoned. Leaders and others, officers and those who took up arms or those who supported them financially have been pardoned," said Justice Minister Hasan Bedel Warsame. Assassination attempt Meanwhile, violence continues in the capital, Mogadishu. A lone gunman tried to assassinate presidential spokesman Hussein Mohamoud Mohamud, Ugandan peacekeepers say. He sustained a neck injury but has been transferred to Nairobi, where he has left hospital, said Ugandan commander Peter Elwelu. There have been several assassination attempts on leading government officials. In north Mogadishu, gunmen attacked a police station, killing an officer, while in the central Bakara market, two security officials were shot dead by masked gunmen, police say. Both Islamists and members of Mogadishu's dominant ****** clan are believed to be behind the violence. They strongly oppose the presence of Ethiopian troops, who helped oust the UIC. UIC leader Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has welcomed the amnesty but still refuses to attend the talks, which were postponed from last week. He said they must be held in an independent location, and not run by the government. The US has urged the government to hold talks with Mr Ahmed, seen as a moderate Islamist. The UIC has always denied reports that it has links to al-Qaeda militants. Some 1,600 Ugandan troops are in Mogadishu, the first contingent of a proposed 8,000-strong AU force, intended to replace the Ethiopians. Somalia has been without a functioning government since 1991. BBC

How you found this windbaggery that ridicules your people to be interesting or funny is beyond me. I suppose it is fair to say your Somaliland induced stupor is to blame.

Originally posted by N/AA: Kashafa, the ICU is the cause of Ethiopia occupying Somalia.

June 14, 2007 Haroon Siddiqui JAKARTA–Barack Hussein Obama Jr. spent part of his youth here in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim nation. The entrance foyer to his elementary school has a photograph, 2 metres by 1.3 metres, of the hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. Ten steps into the crowded rectangular courtyard and you can see his old homeroom, adjacent to the stairway leading to the second floor mosque, where he studied Islam. He had a different name then, Barry Soetoro, after his stepfather. His mother, the Kansas-born Ann Dunham, first married a Kenyan, Barack Hussein Obama. Her second husband was the Indonesian Lolo Soetoro, with whom she moved here in 1967. Obama was enrolled in a Catholic primary school, and then for his Grades 3 and 4 in what is now called the Model Primary School, a much-sought after public school in an elite leafy neighbourhood. Three of his teachers have said he was enrolled as a Muslim. In his autobiography, Dreams From My Father, he mentions his Qur'an studies here. A classmate of his in Jakarta has said that Obama used to wear a sarong and accompany his father to the neighbourhood mosque, but that his mother used to go to church. All of which sounds about right for a mixed marriage. But in post-9/11 America, any association with Islam can be toxic for a presidential candidate. So his detractors are emphasizing it and he is running from it. When Fox Television claimed in January that he had attended a "madrassa," his office said: "Senator Obama has never been a Muslim, was not raised a Muslim and is a committed Christian who attends church in Chicago." But in a later statement, it hedged, saying that he has "never been a practising Muslim." And his stepsister, Maya Soetoro, felt compelled to say: "My father never went to prayer services except for big communal events. I am absolutely certain that he did not go to services every Friday." How observant Obama himself was, or if he was a Muslim at all, is murky. With the school records missing, eaten by bugs, one has to rely on people's shifting memories. Tine Hahiyari, a retired teacher – who told Los Angeles Times correspondent Paul Watson that Obama was registered as a Muslim – tells my interpreter that she can no longer recall what he was. Ahmad Solichin, a teacher, tells me that another retired teacher told him that Obama was enrolled as a Christian. Headmaster Kuwadiyanto (he has only one name) and vice-principal Hardi Priyono are amused by the controversy and the parade of Americans to the school – three members of the U.S. embassy here and nine visiting reporters, so far. The school is not a madrassa. But the majority of its 475 students being Muslim, the biggest religion class is in the mosque. The day of my visit being a Friday, the girls are wearing the hijab and the boys the kufi skull cap, and both attend the noon prayers. The 70 Christian kids go down the corridor to a chapel, and the lone Hindu boy is taken to a temple. Rather than obfuscating his past, this is what Obama should be saying: "I am a proud Christian, as is my wife, Michelle Robinson. Both my father and stepfather were Muslims, and I myself had a brush with Islam in the Far East. That's no crime. In fact, it'll be a huge asset for the next president, who'll have to clean up the mess left behind by George W. Bush." Toronto Star

by Ira Chernus It’s so obvious that Fatah and Hamas should work together to achieve an independent Palestine. Not long ago, they were proclaiming their unity. So why are they now destroying each other? If you get your news from the mainstream U.S. media, you might well think that they are just two irrational factions, driven crazy by lust for power. But if you know how to read between the lines, even our mainstream media tell a much more complicated story, one that implicates Israel and the U.S. government too. All the quotes that follow are from reporting on the crisis in the mainstream’s flagship newspapers, the New York Times and the Washington Post. “An Israeli analyst of Palestinian affairs, Danny Rubinstein, said the ‘primary reason for the break-up is the fact that Fatah has refused to fully share the Palestinian Authority’s mechanism of power with its rival Hamas, despite Hamas’s decisive victory in the January 2006 general elections.’” “Fatah leaders failed to heed warnings that the party’s corruption and arrogance were alienating voters.” “Fatah ‘was forced to overrule Palestinian voters because the entire world demanded it do so,’ Mr. Rubinstein added. ‘Matters have come to the point where Hamas attempted to take by force what they believe they rightfully deserve.’” The U.S. and Israel have led the world in forcing Fatah to resist Hamas’ democractically-won power. In a just-released document, “the United Nations’ former top Middle East envoy has sharply criticized U.S. and Israeli efforts to isolate the Hamas-led Palestinian government, saying the policy has further radicalized Palestinian opinion and undercut long-term efforts to establish a viable Palestinian state. The broadside by Alvaro de Soto was contained in a confidential 52-page report he filed before resigning from the United Nations last month. Starting in May 2005, de Soto directed U.N. efforts to ease the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” “With all the focus on the failings of Hamas,” De Soto observed, “the Israeli settlement enterprise and barrier construction has continued unabated.” But Hamas’ complaint is more specific. “Hamas wants a restored unity government where the security forces would all report to the interior minister.” Why is that so important? The security forces have been controlled by Fatah and its security chief Mohammed Dahlan. “During 12 years in power, Fatah had repeatedly cracked down on the [Hamas] Islamists, including in 1996 when the Preventive Security Service, then led by Dahlan, arrested Hamas leaders.” “Many of those who were imprisoned remember the treatment they received as cruel and humiliating.” Now “Hamas spokesmen said the movement had no political goal except to defend itself from a group within Fatah collaborating with Israel and the United States. They said they wanted to bring the security forces under the control of the unity government.” “A Hamas spokesman said the movement was defending itself, not reaching for unalloyed power. He said Hamas ‘is doing the work that Fatah failed to do, to control these [security] groups,’ whom he accused of crimes, chaos and collaboration with Israel and the United States.” Indeed, Israel “has made no bones about backing Fatah and attacking only Hamas targets.” And the U.S. has funded and supported the Israeli efforts. “Since the election victory of Hamas in January 2006, the United States and Israel have worked to isolate and damage Hamas and build up Fatah with recognition and weaponry.” The weapons go to Fatah’s security forces, led by Dahlan. CIA operatives have long worked closely with Dahlan’s security apparatus. According to De Soto, “U.S. officials ‘clearly pushed for a confrontation’ between Hamas and Fatah. … A U.S. [diplomatic] representative, he recalled, said: ‘I like this violence . . . it means that other Palestinians are resisting Hamas.’” In the midst of the current crisis, the Bush administration continues to take sides and stir up the conflict. “Administration officials were pushing Mr. Abbas to dissolve the power-sharing agreement between Fatah and Hamas [and] dismiss the entire government.” When Abbas did just that, “Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice expressed support for Mr. Abbas’s decrees.” Also, “administration officials were weighing the possibility of … pressuring Egypt to seal the tunnels leading from its territory into Gaza; American and Israeli officials say the tunnels are often used to smuggle weapons to Hamas. One administration official suggested Wednesday that the United States might then try to prod Israel into taking down Israeli settlements in the West Bank as a way to shore up Mr. Abbas.” Of course this strategy is likely to turn the Palestinian public even further against Abbas and Fatah. But that seems to be what Israel wants. The Times and Post omitted a key passage from De Soto’s report charging that Israeli policies seem “perversely designed to encourage the continued action by Palestinian militants.” Israel has always tried to keep the Palestinians divided. It played a central role in creating Hamas to prevent Fatah from consolidating its political power. But now Israel seems to have a new reason for fanning the Fatah-Hamas feud into a civil war. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert “is expected to tell Mr. Bush that Israel favored sealing off the West Bank from the turmoil in Gaza, continuing to prevent contact between the two territories.” “Some Israeli security officials say Israel wants to see the West Bank isolated from Gaza.” Why? “A Hamas-run Gaza would likely seal the coastal strip’s pariah status and Israel could well block the borders.” “One official suggested that Hamas’s show of strength in Gaza would make it more likely that the Israeli military would intervene there this summer to cut back Hamas’s military power.” “Israel would be forced to retaliate harshly to protect its civilians, despite the fact that previous military incursions into the densely populated territory have failed to halt the rocket fire.” If military action is likely to be fruitless again, why would Israel still pursue this strategy? There are several reasons. “Israel would like to seal off Gaza from the West Bank as much as possible to prevent the spread of Hamas military power there [in the West Bank], where Israeli troops still occupy the territory. Israel would also like to confront Hamas with the responsibility for governing Gaza - providing jobs and food and security to people.” Meanwhile, “Israeli officials suggested that Israel would work with Mr. Abbas and a Fatah government in the West Bank.” There is also the political benefit any Israeli government reaps by taking a tough stand against the enemy, especially after last summer’s fiasco in Lebanon. Most importantly, perhaps, “rival governments in the West Bank and Gaza would finalize that split, and push prospects of a Palestinian state even further away. Efforts to revive Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, including a recent push by moderate Arab states, would be dealt a big blow because Abbas could no longer claim to represent all Palestinians and would lose his credibility as negotiating partner.” “Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said Hamas control of Gaza would limit Israel’s ability to negotiate with Mr. Abbas.” There are still plenty of Israelis who can see that this is self-defeating, that eventually their government must make peace. “Some in Israel are beginning to ask whether it might make sense to have indirect discussions with Hamas, which is clearly not going away.” But doesn’t Hamas refuse to negotiate? Isn’t it sworn to Israel’s destruction? In fact, “there is debate within Hamas about how far to go in meeting Israeli and American demands. Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh says Hamas’s goal is the creation of a Palestinian state in the pre-1967 borders of West Bank and Gaza. The group’s military wing, based in Syria, says it will only consider a long-term truce when Israel withdraws from the West Bank.” “The offensive in Gaza is driven by Hamas hard-liners. It’s not clear, however, how much direction they are getting from Hamas’ exiled supreme leader, Khaled Mashaal. The movement’s pragmatists, including Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, have been largely silent in recent days.” The pragmatists have been silenced by a civil war abetted, if not fomented, by Israel. It’s hardly the first time. At least twice last year, when the pragmatists prevailed and Hamas united with Fatah to promote a plan for peace, Israel used violence to provoke Hamas hard-liners and block the peace process, as I have reported here before. Why would the Bush administration support this Israeli policy? Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution describes the fears that haunt our foreign policy elite: “‘Gaza will be a full terrorist state, right on the fault line of the Western world. … a haven for all the bad guys - Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad.’” “Hamas is seen as a terrorist organization by the United States, Israel, and much of the West.” “A Hamas victory in Gaza would put an Iranian-backed militia not just on Israel’s northern border, but also its southern one” — or at least a supposedly Iranian-backed militia, since “it’s not clear how much direction they are getting from Iran.” “Equally alarming to Bush administration officials is the prospect that if Hamas does not take over control of Gaza, and the fighting there continues, more of Gaza’s young and increasingly frustrated population might be driven into the embrace of Al Qaeda, a rival of Hamas that, until now, had largely been shunned in Gaza.” Perhaps this is all overheated imagining. If it is accurate, though, it may not really be so alarming to the administration’s hawks. Perhaps it would help them create the radically polarized world they have warned about, the only kind of world that can sustain the policies they still so ardently promote. Whether they want it or not, that’s the kind of world they may be helping to create as they fan the flames of Palestinian civil war. Ira Chernus is Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Colorado at Boulder and author of Monsters To Destroy: The Neoconservative War on Terror and Sin. Email: chernus@colorado.edu CD

Originally posted by nuune: “Anigu ma diidani in hubka la uruuriyo, balse waxaan aad u diidanahay oo sharaf dhacna ah, in haddii la baarayoba gurigeyna inay baaraan ciidamo Soomaali ah, ee ma aheyn in ciidan shisheeye in aanu isku adeegsano, waana waxa dadka Soomaaliyeed diidan yihiin, anigu gurigeyga markii la galay xittaa Boorsooyinkii waa la jejebshay, oo Boorsooyinkii waa la jeex jeexay wixii nacfiga lahaana waa la qaatay. They should have sodomized him as well before they accidentally shoot him in the head.

Double standard for Canadians in trouble abroad June 14, 2007 Thomas Walkom Governments like to say there is only one class of Canadian citizen – that no matter whether we were born here or naturalized, no matter our religion, ethnicity or political views, we receive equal treatment from the state. That is what governments like to say. Unfortunately, this is not true – particularly when citizens find themselves in trouble abroad. If a middle-class Canadian tourist is killed in Mexico, the story is front-page news. The minister of foreign affairs makes statements; the Mexicans are asked to explain. Similarly, if a Canadian is mistreated by a country we disapprove of – like Iran or even China – Ottawa is happy to talk tough. The former Liberal government roasted Iran over the jailing and murder of Zahra Kazemi. Stephen Harper, the current prime minister, is taking China to task over its imprisonment of Huseyin Celil. But if a Canadian is unlucky enough to run into trouble with a country that Ottawa does not wish to offend, it is a different story. In those cases, the government says little and does less. If the Canadian is unpopular or lacks media-savvy supporters, the government pays even less attention. So it was with software engineer Maher Arar at the beginning of his torture-imprisonment ordeal. So it is still with Omar Khadr, the 20-year-old Canadian imprisoned for five years by the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay. The Canadian government finally moved on the Arar file, in large part because his wife cut a sympathetic figure with the public. The government is able to stall on the Khadr file, in large part because his family does not. Bashir Makhtal is one of the latest to fall victim to this cruel double standard. Born in the rebellious ****** province of Ethiopia, raised in Somalia, a Canadian citizen since 1994, Makhtal – like many others in the Somali diaspora – returned to Mogadishu to do business. In his case, business consisted of importing used clothing. In December, when Ethiopian troops invaded Somalia to oust the government of the day, he fled to the Kenyan border What he didn't know, however, was that the geopolitics of the region had shifted. With a new military command based in Ethiopia, the U.S. quietly helped its client state unseat an Islamic government in Somalia that Washington didn't much like. Kenya was also onside with the Americans. Makhtal was caught in the middle. Along with 84 others, he was illegally transferred by Kenya to Ethiopia via Somalia for interrogation and imprisonment. A letter received by his relatives in Hamilton says he was threatened with torture and forced to make a false confession. Consular officials have not been allowed to see him. Ottawa's response has been spectacularly anemic. Makhtal's name been raised only once in the Commons. Foreign Affairs Minister Peter MacKay has said his usual little. He has not taken Kenya to task for deporting a Canadian to a country with a dodgy human rights record. Nor has he pressured Ethiopia to release Makhtal. The reason, it seems, is America. Amnesty International says U.S. agents have been involved in the interrogation of the Kenyan deportees. And when Washington is involved, the Canadian government stays mum. Makhtal's relatives and friends continue to push for action. It is an uphill battle. They hold demonstrations that no one reports on. They receive only minimal attention from politicians. As someone who is neither famous nor beautiful, Makhtal does not lead the newscasts. In this very brutal version of Canadian Idol, he does not get many audience votes. Toronto Star

From late May through mid-June, Somalia remained frozen in its state of political collapse described by PINR in its May 3 and May 24 reports on the country. Somalia's weak and internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) continues to be a severely impaired participant in the country's multiple conflicts, facing a chronic insurgency in its official capital Mogadishu; unrest, lawlessness and failing control in the country's regions; and inadequate funding from international donors, on which it depends for its financial survival. Ethiopia, on which the T.F.G. depends for military protection, has been over-strained financially and is anxious to withdraw its forces, yet their replacement by an 8,000 member African Union (A.U.) peacekeeping mission (AMISOM) has yet to materialize, except for a contingent of 1,500 Ugandan troops, which have withdrawn to guard duty at Mogadishu's airport and seaport, and at government facilities, after one of its convoys was attacked on May 16. Despite efforts by the T.F.G. to gain control of Mogadishu through a crackdown on armed opposition, closure of independent media outlets and arrests of leaders of the ****** clan, which is distrustful of the *****-dominated T.F.G., the city remains insecure. Although donor states and international organizations have edged toward providing the T.F.G. with greater financial support, the transitional authority still lacks the resources to govern. The missing link in the efforts by the T.F.G. and its uneasy and reluctant allies to stabilize Somalia is the elusive process of reconciliation -- power-sharing between the T.F.G. and its opposition groups, including disaffected sub-clans, local leaders, nationalists and the political wing of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.), which had controlled most of Somalia south of the semi-autonomous sub-state of Puntland until it was defeated militarily in December 2006 by the Ethiopian intervention. Thus far, the T.F.G. and its adversaries have remained opposed and uncompromising on the issue of reconciliation, with the transitional executive counting on a clan-based National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) which had been scheduled to begin on June 14, but was delayed on June 13 -- for the third time -- until July 15; and the opposition factions, which have begun to coalesce, refusing to participate in talks until Ethiopian forces withdraw from Somalia and demanding a conference based on political rather than clan representation. International donors agree that a power-sharing deal is essential to achieving stability in Somalia, but their diplomatic backing of the T.F.G. has deprived them of leverage over the opposition groups, and they have not been able to convince the T.F.G. to undertake "inclusive" reconciliation. The lack of political will to compromise of domestic actors has been responsible for the tentative support of the T.F.G. by the donors -- the United States, Western European states, the European Union and the United Nations, with Washington being the T.F.G.'s most enthusiastic backer and the others holding a more reserved position. The donors' viewpoint was expressed succinctly by Chris Lovelace, the World Bank's country manager for Somalia, at a meeting on reconstruction aid for the country on June 1 in Uganda: "The [N.R.C.] must ensure that representation for all stakeholders is respected; if it is not, there will not be any desired outcome for peace." As PINR has stated repeatedly, Somalia will continue to devolve and fragment into regional, local and clan-based power centers unless domestic actors are able to devise a unifying political formula. The prospects for reconciliation remain dim. The Security Struggle Mogadishu, the T.F.G.'s major battleground in its struggle to secure Somalia, remains turbulent. During the last week of May and into early June, the insurgency spiked up with nearly daily multiple attacks on T.F.G. officials and forces, and Ethiopian troops and installations, including targeted assassinations of local officials and regional officials visiting Mogadishu, roadside bombings, suicide bombings, and grenade and small-arms assaults. The attacks culminated on June 3 with the suicide bombing of Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi's residence, in which seven people were killed and for which the militant jihadist al-Shabaab movement took responsibility. Mogadishu's mayor, ex-warlord Mohamed Dheere, who had responded to the wave of violence by promising a crackdown and had said on May 31 that he would "hold the city in a hard fist," moved to mount a counter-insurgency on June 5 with the aid of Ethiopian forces and heavy armor that included a proliferation of checkpoints, intensive house-to-house weapons searches, arrests of suspected militants and destruction of buildings that harbored suspects and their arms. In addition to the military measures, the T.F.G. shut down the two major independent media outlets in Mogadishu -- the Shabelle and HornAfrik radio stations -- and arrested several prominent ****** leaders, including Haji Abdi Omar, the chair of the newly formed ****** Elders Congress. These actions sparked criticism from donor powers. The T.F.G. justified the station closures by claiming that the outlets had incited violence, supported "terrorists," "confused" the public and "violated freedom of expression." On June 9, the T.F.G.'s deputy information minister, Yusuf Gele Ugas, announced that the government would bring the stations' administrators to court and would train journalists to "enhance their skills." The arrests of the ****** leaders followed repeated charges by Dheere that they had failed to keep promises to suppress the insurgents and, indeed, that they were behind the violence. He also criticized the commissioners of Mogadishu's districts -- four of whom have been assassinated -- for laxity in imposing security. The T.F.G.'s repressive measures prompted U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer to warn the T.F.G. that "the U.S. government feels those actions risk undermining national reconciliation." Although the crackdown suppressed insurgent attacks for several days, they resumed again on June 10 and have continued since then. By June 7, the ****** leaders had been released from custody and on June 10 Shabelle and HornAfrik were back on the air, according to Shabelle representative Muhamad Asim, without conditions. Shabelle's chairman, Abdi Maalik Yusuf, credited Washington with reversing the closures: "We do believe that the free media could not operate in Somalia without Washington's involvement." U.S. ambassador to Kenya, Michael Ranneberger, reported that he had contacted Gedi and the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, remarking that "the media in Somalia are very essential to the national reconciliation conference." The T.F.G.'s abortive counter-insurgency measures resulted in some seizures of arms caches and the arrests of 16 suspected al-Shabaab fighters, but they have not broken the armed opposition and they have increased hostility in the ****** community. At present, Mogadishu appears to have returned to the condition of insecurity that prevailed before the crackdown. As the T.F.G.'s struggle to secure Mogadishu met with at best mixed success, the other regions of Somalia proper continued to experience instability, conflict, devolution and fragmentation. In the Lower Shabelle region, which lacks an effective governing authority, the major town of Merca remains in the control of clan militias, which extort money from and rob travelers at illegal checkpoints. On June 9, militias loyal to the region's former warlord Yusuf Indha Ade, who was the I.C.C.'s defense chief, took control of the towns of Bulo-Marer and Qoryoley from the forces of the T.F.G.-appointed governor, Abdulkadir Sheikh Mohamed, who blamed the seizures on I.C.C. remnants and foreign fighters, including Arabs and Eritreans. The charges were denied by local militia commander, Ali Garney, who said that the new governor had yet to present his credentials. Further fragmentation, recalling Somalia's decentralized condition before the rise of the I.C.C., was reported on June 13, when the self-appointed commissioner of the Barawe district, Abdullahi Hassan Dhuhulow, declared that he would not recognize Sheikh Mohamed's authority, claiming that he was elected by "local people" and would rule the district "until Somalia has a government." Dhuhulow owes his position to Indha Ade, and his defiance of the T.F.G. evidences Indha Ade's ability to construct an independent power center in Lower Shabelle. In the Lower Jubba region, the key port city of Kismayo remained under control of the militias of the ******* clan, which had expelled the forces of the T.F.G.-appointed *********-dominated administration. At the end of May, militias guarding Kismayo's port closed the facility down, demanding payment of back wages. Clan elders persuaded the guards to reopen the port after promising them money if they left. On June 2, Col. Makhtal Farah Gagaab, commander of national security forces in Kismayo, was assassinated. On June 4, inter-clan fighting erupted between ******* and Galje'el militias in the settlement of Berhano on the outskirts of Kismayo, with the Galje'el accusing the ******* of attempting to drive them from the area. After a cease-fire prevailed for several days, fighting resumed on June 12, leaving six dead. In the Hiraan region bordering Ethiopia, a crime wave continued with an uptick in robberies and extortion at illegal checkpoints. On May 30, in the major town of Beledweyne, an Ethiopian convoy was bombed. On June 7, the T.F.G.'s ambassador to the A.U., Abdikarin Lahanyo, who is a native of Hiraan, arrived in Beledweyne to appeal to clan elders to cooperate with the Ethiopians, promising that he would "take responsibility" for misconduct by the occupiers, who had been increasing their presence in the town. On June 9, T.F.G. forces began a withdrawal from Beledweyne, after complaints of robberies and assaults by men wearing military fatigues. Local officials noted that T.F.G. forces still have not been issued new uniforms and that common criminals often adopt military dress, which is a problem throughout Somalia's regions. The T.F.G.'s withdrawal leaves security in Beledweyne in the hands of local police and Ethiopian troops. In the Bay region, where the T.F.G.'s parliament is based in the town of Baidoa, a crime wave was reported, accompanied by illegal roadblocks. In the Mudug region, inter-clan fighting erupted over pasturage and water wells near the town of Gelinsor on May 30, leaving three dead. In the Gedo region, Ethiopian officials summoned clan elders to warn them against harboring "al-Qaeda-linked groups." The preceding incomplete report of instances of instability in Somalia's regions evidences the continued devolution of the country to local power centers and the persistence of local conflicts. PINR sees no reason to change its January forecast that Somalia's political future is likely to be its pre-Courts past. Beyond Somalia proper, Puntland experienced its first brush with the insurgency to the south when, on May 31, a party of raiders on two speedboats entered the fishing village of Bargar. Puntland authorities claimed that the raiders were "remnants" of the jihadist movement fleeing Somalia's deep south and included foreign fighters as well as I.C.C. militants. Puntland security forces engaged the party and chased them into the surrounding mountains, prompting shelling by a U.S. warship and a deployment of a small detachment of U.S. special forces to search for suspected terrorists. The purposes of the raid remain clouded, with some Puntland officials claiming that the party was attempting to escape to Yemen and others that it was bound for Eritrea. Some local clan leaders disputed the entire story, charging that Puntland forces had attacked the local population. More importantly, tensions mounted in Ethiopia's ethnic-Somali ****** region (Somali Regional State) when, on May 29, a grenade attack on a ceremony marking the overthrow of Ethiopia's former dictator Mengitsu Haile Mariam wounded S.R.S. president, Abdullahi Hassan. Return fire caused a stampede, with the entire incident leaving at least 16 people dead, including two police officers. Another attack on the same day reportedly killed ten people and wounded 16. Ethiopian authorities blamed the ****** National Liberation Front (O.N.L.F.), which has mounted a decades-long low-level insurgency in the S.R.S. aimed at forcing a vote on separation of the ****** region from Ethiopia. The O.N.L.F. denied that it was behind the attack, claiming that it was engineered by the Ethiopian military, which supposedly wants to replace Hassan with S.R.S. security bureau chief Abdi Ileeye, who is more favorable to an ongoing crackdown against opposition in the region. Afrol News reported on June 10 that popular support for the O.N.L.F. is rising and that it currently poses "the strongest military challenge" to the Ethiopian army. Whether or not the O.N.L.F. mounted the attack on Hassan, the spike in violence in the S.R.S. probably reflects a spillover of instability from Somalia proper and places Addis Ababa in straitened circumstances. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, has been clear that the financial strains of the occupation cannot be sustained, and intensifying instability in the S.R.S. adds a greater incentive for him to pull out of Somalia proper. Zenawi repeatedly appeals for adequate international support for AMISOM, which has not been forthcoming, yet Western powers, particularly the United States, have reportedly pressured Addis Ababa, which depends on foreign aid, to continue the occupation, pending the full deployment of AMISOM. With African states that had pledged troops to AMISOM -- Burundi, Ghana and Nigeria -- reluctant to participate as long as Somalia remains unstable and progress on reconciliation is absent, Addis Ababa is trapped in a deteriorating situation that could eventually destabilize its regime. Ethiopia would be satisfied to leave Somalia -- one of its regional rivals -- in a fragmented state, but has been blocked from pursuing that interest and is beginning to pay dearly for its decision -- backed by Washington -- to overthrow the I.C.C. Political Deadlock With the outcome of the T.F.G.'s struggle to secure Somalia at best problematic, the vital missing link in achieving stability in the country is political reconciliation -- a euphemism for power-sharing. All the external actors with interests in Somalia, except for Ethiopia, agree on desiring a reconciliation conference that includes all the political forces in the country, with the exception of the militant jihadists; and they have pressured the T.F.G. to initiate such a process. The sticking point has been that the presently constituted T.F.G. -- as would be expected -- wants to preserve its power and privilege, and has resisted the external actors' demands. Soon after the I.C.C. was routed, the T.F.G. finessed the donor powers, regional states and international organizations by planning the N.R.C., which is based on clan representation and excludes direct representation of political forces. The external actors were dissatisfied with the N.R.C., but were unwilling to force another formula on the T.F.G. because they had recognized it as Somalia's lawful government and were ambivalent about including conciliatory elements of the I.C.C. directly in negotiations. That ambivalence is based on their interest in isolating the militant jihadists, which works for inclusion of I.C.C. moderates directly in the process; and their persistent fears of a role for the I.C.C. in power-sharing, which works for its exclusion. The result of the ambivalence has been repeated pleas for the N.R.C. to be "inclusive" and tentative and half-hearted support for the project, which depends for its success on their financing. The external actors understand that the N.R.C. is deeply flawed because the political oppositions to the T.F.G. have thus far refused to participate in it and have begun to form a coalition. With no leverage over the oppositions -- due to their backing of the T.F.G. -- the external actors have put themselves in the position of observing political deadlock take hold. The oppositions are comprised of the political forces in Somalia that have been marginalized by the T.F.G. in its alliance with Addis Ababa. They include disparate groups and individuals with followings that share the aim of resisting T.F.G. control and the Ethiopian occupation -- the conciliatory wing of the I.C.C. led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed; the dissident faction of the T.F.G.'s parliament led by its ex-speaker, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan; large sectors of the Somali diaspora sharing a generally democratic nationalist perspective; disaffected warlords and politicians, most notably T.F.G. deputy prime minister, Hussein Aideed; local warlords and leaders seeking to carve out clan-based fiefdoms; and large sectors of the ****** clan family, which dominates Mogadishu and fears control by the rival ***** clan. From the end of May through mid-June, some of the oppositions, which had been relatively separate, began to coalesce into an organized movement and political bloc that for the first time since the Ethiopian intervention threatens the T.F.G.'s monopoly on national political organization. On May 24, the nascent movement defined its goals in a joint communique issued by Ahmed and Adan from their base in Eritrea. They urged Somalis to boycott the N.R.C., scoring it as "an agent of the colonizers" and an effort to "legalize" the Ethiopian occupation, and they asserted that no reconciliation talks should take place before the occupation had ended. Having defined their rejectionist position, the opposition groups moved to organize a political bloc, meeting in Qatar and bringing diaspora groups and dissident politicians into the discussions. On June 14, the resistance movement issued a communique stating that it would not recognize the N.R.C., which it deemed "a new chapter of fragmenting the Somali society with the hands of its arch-enemy and cementing the occupation." The new bloc pledged to organize a resistance conference within 45 days that local analysts believe is meant to be a competitor to the N.R.C. The ****** clan family, which has too many cross-cutting interests to league with the political opposition bloc and is essential to even the most minimal reconciliation process, joined the rejectionists on June 12. The chair of the newly formed ****** Elders Congress, Haji Abdi Omar, stated that the ****** were united in opposing participation in the N.R.C., on the grounds that they had not been invited to participate, that the conference had no agenda, that its selection process was not transparent, and that N.R.C. organizers had not responded to their demands for a withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and militias loyal to Yusuf from Mogadishu. The rejection of the N.R.C. by the ****** placed its organizing committee in an untenable position, because were the conference to proceed, it would have no pretense of being inclusive. On June 13, the N.R.C. committee chair, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, announced that the conference had been delayed until July 15, citing requests from clans for more time to choose delegates and unfinished construction work on the meeting's venue, both of which are true. Mahdi did not mention funding problems, although on June 10, after he had met with donors in Nairobi, he said that they had provided only a fraction of the funds necessary to hold the N.R.C. Mahdi rejected the claim that the security situation in Mogadishu was a stumbling block to holding the N.R.C. As late as June 7, Mahdi had assured that the N.R.C. would not be postponed. As political deadlock and polarization set in, the external actors were powerless to stop it. In their only major diplomatic intervention, they met in London on June 6 under the auspices of the Washington-inspired Contact Group (C.G.), which includes the United States, Western European states, Tanzania, and the A.U., E.U., Arab League and U.N. In a communique issued after their meeting, the C.G. "welcomed assurances" by the T.F.G. that the N.R.C. would be "fully inclusive" and that no one who renounced violence would be denied participation if they were selected by their clan. The C.G. members promised to fund the N.R.C., which the T.F.G. estimates will cost US$42 million and the donor powers estimate will cost $8.5 million. Washington announced at the meeting that it had contributed $1.2 million for the N.R.C. The disconnect between the deliberations of the external powers and the facts on the ground is due to their ambivalence, the fact that Somalia is not one of their top priorities and their decision to legitimize the N.R.C., which they have to claim could be viable. With political oppositions coalescing into a bloc, the ****** finding unity in rejectionism and the insurgency persisting, the disconnect threatens to become a chasm. Conclusion Developments in Somalia through mid-June confirm PINR's basic forecast that the country will remain in a devolutionary political cycle, which has only become more pronounced. At present, an insurgency with a militant jihadist component persists in Mogadishu, the T.F.G. is losing even a semblance of control over key regions, oppositions are organizing into blocs, Addis Ababa is over-strained, troop contributions to AMISOM are not forthcoming, and donor powers are paralyzed and reluctant to support the T.F.G. wholeheartedly. The T.F.G. executive remains determined to pursue its clan-based formula for reconciliation, which appears to have lost the scant viability it might have had. Simultaneous processes of polarization and fragmentation are likely to have critically damaged the T.F.G.'s ability to prevail in the struggle for security and to carry through a clan-based reconciliation program, leading to political collapse. The only possibility for breaking the devolutionary cycle is presented by the coalescing of opposition forces into a bloc. If the T.F.G. can be pressured by external powers to enter power-sharing negotiations with a relatively coherent political opposition, there is a small probability of a national accord. For the moment, the T.F.G. and the nascent opposition are polarized on the issue of the Ethiopian occupation. The opposition is united by its resistance to the occupation and the T.F.G. depends on it for survival. At some point the occupation will end -- with or without sufficient peacekeepers to replace it -- and Somalia will either sink back into chronic statelessness or serious power-sharing discussions will begin. The former eventuality -- devolution -- remains by far the most likely outcome. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein PINR

Originally posted by Grant: I taught English at the government school in Jilib in 1966-67, and was cut off from my friends in 1969. Unfortunately, Somalia, for all intents and purposes, was cut off from the world that same year, 1969. Those whom you befriended during those years are likely to have become bitter refugees scattered around the world.

^^^^ LOL. And just in case you missed it yesterday: Originally posted by Castro: I don't love him I tried to tell myself But you can see it in my eyes So don't deny I can't fool no one else The truth is in the tears I cry Cause if it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside If it isn't love I told him I'd never fall in love But now I know better How does it feel I can't describe this feelin' That came when I saw him last night He got to me, I'll let you know the reason I saw him with another guy So if it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside I took my heart To shatter in a thousand pieces Before I'd ever drop my pride Losing love worrying about my image Really helped me realize If it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside If it isn't love With apologies to New Edition and Shabelle News

"The National Reconciliation Committee has decided to postpone the conference due to unforeseen circumstances, " committee chairman Ali Mahdi Mohamed told reporters. Unforeseen? Are these people blind? A 5 year old could have told them there will be no "reconciliation" conference. There's nothing to reconcile. The occupation and it's puppet regime must go. Period. Waxaasaa isku sheegaya dowlad. Uff!

I don't love him I tried to tell myself But you can see it in my eyes So don't deny I can't fool no one else The truth is in the tears I cry Cause if it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside If it isn't love I told him I'd never fall in love But now I know better How does it feel I can't describe this feelin' That came when I saw him last night He got to me, I'll let you know the reason I saw him with another guy So if it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside I took my heart To shatter in a thousand pieces Before I'd ever drop my pride Losing love worrying about my image Really helped me realize If it isn't love Why do I feel this way Why does he stay on my mind And if it isn't love Why does it hurt so bad Make me feel so sad inside If it isn't love With apologies to New Edition

^^^^ It will be a circus no doubt and I wouldn't want to miss the clowns perform.