Ethiopia blames Somali leadership for peace failures Ethiopian Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin NAIROBI (AFP) — Ethiopia, whose forces toppled an Islamist regime in Mogadishu two years ago, on Tuesday blamed the failure to restore stability in Somalia on the transitional rulers it helped bring to power. "Somalia's problems are not security, but political," said Foreign Minister Seyoum Mesfin at a meeting of governments in the region focused on Somalia. Seyoum said President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and his successive prime ministers had "not managed to create any institutions of governance to speak of" since they came to power in December 2006. "The continuing feud within the leadership ... had contributed to the paralysis of the TFG," he added in reference to the transitional federal government. The TFG, headed by the one-time warlord Yusuf, was formally established in 2004 but its remit never extended beyond the backwater of Baidoa until the Ethiopian army invaded Somalia nearly two years ago. The toppling of an Islamist group that had taken control of large parts of the country and started to impose a tough form of Sharia law brought Yusuf to power but did little to restore calm to a country that has been wracked by violence since the 1991 ouster of strongman Mohamed Siad Barre. Somalia's transitional federal charter expires next year when a new constitution is to be drafted and elections held although there is widespread scepticism over whether polls can take place amid the rampant insecurity. Despite pledges from some African governments, only Uganda has contributed significant numbers to a peacekeeping force which has failed to halt a campaign of guerrilla warfare being waged by an even more radical Islamist faction. "In all honesty, the international community can hardly be proud of its record in Somalia," Seyoum said. "But this is no excuse for the kind of egregious lack of responsible behaviour that we continue to witness on the part of all those in positions of authority in Somalia." Yusuf was in open disagreement with Ali Mohamed Gedi, the TFG's first prime minister who eventually had to resign exactly a year ago. Gedi's successor Nur Hassan Hussein has also had his differences with the president and survived a no-confidence vote last month. On Sunday, a UN-sponsored peace process in Djibouti announced that a deal had been signed by the transitional government and the main Islamist-dominated political opposition group. The agreement provides for a ceasefire and an Ethiopian troop pullback to begin next month, with security responsibilities gradually handed over to Somali police until a UN peacekeeping force is deployed. The main Islamist insurgent group, which now controls most of southern and central Somalia, rejected the announcement and vowed to continue its armed struggle. The Shebab, the main insurgent group, accuse the conservative Christian regime in Addis Ababa of being engaged in a crusade against Muslim Somalia and have refused to negotiate before a full withdrawal is completed. In recent weeks, Ethiopian troops have been less visible on the streets of Mogadishu and Addis Ababa has been sending mixed signals on the future of its presence in the country. Experts say Ethiopia is mulling its exit strategy from the Somali quagmire and argue that a pullback has effectively already started. "The Ethiopians have definitely been planning some form of military pullback. We just don't know exactly on what scale," said one expert, who did not wish to be named to ensure his security when he travels to Somalia. The expert believes the pullback announced on Sunday could entail a redeployment to a handful of locations in Somalia, with a handover of security duties in Mogadishu to the African peacekeeping force and Somali police. "Of course no one could assume that, speaking now on behalf of my country, Ethiopia will continue to keep its troops in Somalia," Seyoum said in Nairobi. Yet Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who is not attending the Nairobi summit, said earlier this month that he would not hesitate to send his army back in if the Islamists took power. Source: AFP, Oct 28, 2008

Igad to meet over instability in Somalia as Yusuf’s term ends Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf (left) with Kenya’s Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula at Panari Hotel, Nairobi on Monday. GAD heads of states and governments converge in Nairobi on Wednesday to consult with Somalia MPs over the country’s stability. Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetangula said there was concern over the future of Somalia, with only six months to the expiry of the term for the Transitional Federal Government headed by President Abdullahi Yusuf. Moments after holding talks with Yusuf, Wetangula told The Standard at Panari Hotel, Nairobi, the Transitional government had failed to execute its mandate four years and six months down the line. The minister said the Intergovernmental Authority on Development summit would discuss how to streamline governance in Somalia. The Transitional Government, Wetangula said, should have put in place a new constitution, legislations to create internal boundaries in Somalia and conduct national census were it not for instability. "The IGAD heads of states will be here for two days to conduct an audit on the performance of the Somali Government and what can be done to stabilise the country," he said. Yesterday, MPs from Somalia jetted into the country in readiness for the meeting, which Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Ethiopian premier will grace. Burundi and Djibouti are among countries expected to be represented at the meeting, which Sudan has said it will give a wide berth. Sudan boycotts President Omar al Bashir is said to be planning to boycott the meeting. Sudan Tribune wrote: "Top Sudanese government officials have said they will not attend an Inter-Government Authority on Development meeting slated for Kenya, which is seen as an escalation of the controversy on the hijacked Ukrainian ship. Sudan will be represented at the IGAD summit at the level of state minister for foreign affairs... no any high raking official will attend the summit..." Wetangula said IGAD would also discuss security in Somali waters. Meanwhile, Kenya will go ahead with its plans to train Somali police and immigration officials despite threats by insurgents to attack. Wetangula said: "We are not going to shy away just because of threats, this is a serious issue". Wetangula said the training of the officers would be funded by the American and South African governments while Kenya would offer training facilities. Source VIDEO

Originally posted by dhulQarnayn: Funny how a fake keyboard "mujaahid" such as Abyan tries to talk tough and call other folks in here, keyboard commandos.. Why do you refer girls name to guys you want to respond to their post. Does it make you some sort of 'macho' to do that? Let me tell you it doesnt - it portrays you as mannerless, ill-conceived charecter who has not had the basic tools required to interact with his peers - and I blame those who were supposed to prepare you for this task. I use to have an appropriate response for gits like you - but thank the 'baby-face' assasin for restraining me. Ciyaalsuq foqaal ciyaal suq

Originally posted by xiinfaniin: Juje, an arab poet once rhetorically asked what evidence would you permit as a proof for the existence of the shimmering sun? Likewise if the people are still arguing the possibility of peace after the terms of Jabbuuti agreement so clearly spell out the dates of Ethiopian withdrawal, I don’t know what these people are on about adeer! Indeed, neither do I adeer, but lets focus on their misunderstanding.

Originally posted by xiinfaniin: Waryee Oodweyne, why are you so tight-lipped about the current goings of the land of your father ? Are you ready for another Riyaale admin? Xiin halkas hala adin hadalka otherwise you will sound like you are trying to divert attention - though you have a logical and solid stance.

Originally posted by dhulQarnayn: ^^^ Juje, the GENIUS has spoken....(sike). I strongly urge you not to laugh all the way to the bank just quite yet....LOL. Your entire argument hinges on me "confirming" a negative, which is slightly impossible. However, I'll give it a shot...so READ MY LIPS here: I, dhulQarnayn, DO CONFIRM that Juje's hogwash about the TFG (including its parliament) being recalled to Nairobi IS a bag full of [ho(cus-pocus) + (bun)kum] , ergo hocum ! To Ngonge: Sheekadaan ninkaan uu wado waxba ka ma jiraan saaxiib. dhulQarnayn :cool: Republic Of California Ehem...! Mantey kuwa Nairobi layskugu wacay ma ahan miya xubnihi Barlamaanka.

Nayroobi: Shirka DFKMGS & Urur Gobaleedaka IGAD oo beri furmaya. Nayroobi(AllPuntland)- Waxaa maalinta berita ah si rasmi ah uga furmaya Magaalada Nayroobi shir ay iskugu imaan doonaan dawladda faderaalka ee Soomaaliyeed & Urur Gobaleedka IGAD, kaasoo aan la aqoon waxyaabaha lugu falanqeyn doono. Shirka oo la filayay in uu maanta furmo ayaa maanta la dhigay maalintii ay isdiwaangalin lahaayeen baarlamaanka Faderaalka ee Soomaaliya, waxaana waqtigan ku soo xirantay Magaalada Nayroobi isdiwaangalintii, sida uu soo sheegayo Wariyaha AllPuntland ee Magaalada Nayroobi oo hada la socda dhaqdhaqaaqyada Shirkaasi. Maalinta beri ah oo lafilayo in shirkan si rasmi ah ufurmo ayaa lafilayaa in ay kulmayaan Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya, Wasiirka koowaad & Afhayeenka baarlamaanka Soomaaliya oo dhinac ah & Hogaamiyaasha IGAD oo dhinac ah oo ka wada hadli doonaa xaaladaha ka taagan gudaha dalka Soomaaliya. Wariyaha AllPuntland ayaa sheegaya in aan cidna faahfaahin badan ka bixin karin waxyaabaha looga hadlayo shirarka dawladda Faderaaliga ah & Urur gobaleedka IGAD, waxa ayna wararku sheegayaan in ay qodobo door ah ka wada hadli doonaan dhinacyadan. 08:00Subaxnimo ee berito ayaa laquuldareynayaa in uu furmo Shirweynaha, waxa ayna sheegayaan Warar Madax banaan in isla berito ay kulmayaan Madaxda dawladda faderaalka ee Soomaaliya & labada Gole ee kale ayagoo markaasi ka wada hadlaya xaaladaha Soomaaliya. Waxa ugu badan ee la hadal-hayo ayaa ah in waqtiga loo kordhiyo dawladda Faderaalka ee Soomaaliya, markii ay qodobo badan guul ka gaartay halka ugu badana ay wali ku guuleysan la'adahay sida Maamul dhisida gobalada dalka Soomaaliya, inkastoo dawladda Soomaaliya soo martay dagaaladii ugu adkaa ee ka dhacay gudaha dalka Soomaaliya, marka xataa loo fiiriyo dagaaladii Sokeeye ee ka dhacay gudaha Soomaaliya markii ay Jamhada hubeysan Muqdisho ka saareen Dawladdii Dhexe ee Soomaaliya. Shabakada Wararka ee AllPuntland oo utaagan in ay Umada Soomaaliyeed usoo bandhigto xaqiiqada & warar faahfaahsan oo ku saabsan Xaaladaha Soomaaliya, waxaad saacad kasta & Daqiiqad walba kala soconeysaa Wararka hadba ugu dambeeya ee Shirka Magaalada Nayroobi, waxaana halkaasi jooga Wariyaal ka socda AllPuntland. F. C. Geylan I quoted All-Puntland so DQ could apologise to me

Originally posted by Abtigiis &Tolka: Adeer way kaa qaldantee, the legitimate recipient of that salvo should have been General Duke. When have you seen me cheering the Ethiopian occupation, by the way? Or is this some kind of primitive generalisation drived from my percieved association with an identity bequeath to me from someone who legend has it he crossed from the sea sometime ago? Shame on you! Shame on me indeed! My apologies Sir - for whatever it is worth.

Abwaan do you remember at times All-Puntland used to describe Salaad Cale Jeele and Maxamed Dhere as 'halyeey'

Originally posted by Abtigiis &Tolka: Maybe I have an inside knowledge to the thinking of the Ethiopian regime! And their plans? Have that thought ever occured to you? Yes it has, it is the same thought as the one who initially seeked their assistance and cant gather their support now.

Originally posted by Abtigiis &Tolka: No one hates peace, but people have reason to oppose shady deals that will only stretch the days of suffering for the Somali people. Meesha waxba kama soo naasa cada! Saying that isn't opposing peace! Saying that without any substantial and logic is truly opposing purely on the basis of just opposing. Abtigiis the designers of this peace accord have in mind bringing an end to the apathy and suffering of the Somali people and are trying to do something about it - tell me or illustrate to me what will you suggest other than this and to support the senseless violence advocated by mindless Shabaab.

What specifics are you looking for?

Guys give peace a chance - those suffering violence in Mogadishu are not those that are fighting amid each other but innocent civilians who are caught in between. How long do you intend to measure the successes of the struggle on the number of dead innocent civilians. This deal which you are skeptical about calls for , primarily, the withdrawal of the Xabashi forces and the unifying of the Islamic Courts militias and that of the TFG - and if you were looking for anything other than that then you certainly were not sincere in your heart. Yes there are those who are armed and will resist this agreement but at the end of the day what matters and what will win is the interest of the people not the need and desire of few. Give peace a chance please

I call my witness Xaaji Ngonge....the said meeting is taking place in Nairobi...that was denied by DQ (Shameless git)...hence I seek the apology I requested before hand ..like writing 1000 lines of ,...... Thank You. Afar afar Fataxo isku so dara bal in odeyga Alla ka badbadsho isbedelka so socda.

Priceless

Originally posted by NGONGE: DQ, bila adab bad eska tahay ninyaho. Xaasaska maxa luuqyadood ku geeyaay? Waryaaaaaa! Wallahi wad horumartey... Oktobaaaar wa tee wa tumaaaaaa waa tayadiiiiiiiii! Hadeysey tahey maxaa lagu tilmama...? .......anyone...!

....

MEETING OF US ALLIES IN THE HORN REGION – An inventory and observation Venue: New York, USA Date of the meeting: September 24, 2008 Participants: 1. President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and his Foreign Minister - Sam Kutesa 2. Premier Ato Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and his foreign minister - Ato Seyoum Mesfin 3. Jendayi Fraser – US assistant Secretary of State for Africa 4. Antoinette Batumubwira - Foreign Minister of Burundi 5. Ali Ahmed Jama Jangeli - Minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation - TFG 6. Jeng Ping - Chairperson of the AU Commissions I. Summary of the proceedings This was a close door session and has lasted for 2 hours with most of the time reportedly taken by PM Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. A source in attendance reported that PM Zenawi was overtaken by anger directed at the TFI leadership and in particular their failure to meet Addis expectations. In some cases the PM has made a personal attack on the TFG leadership noting serious gaps on their capacity, competence, commitment and willingness to deliver. Below is an inventory of the notable areas of the proceedings: - President Museveni (Uganda): · Escalations in Somalia and attacks on AMISOM and other targets on increase. · Need for timely international engagements to boost the capability of the boots on the ground to expand the interventions and contain reigning chaos. The situation on the ground is deteriorating and calls for both commitment of the Somalis as well as sustained engagement of the international community. PM Zenawi (Ethiopia): · First and foremost, a brief advice to President Museveni over the situation in Somalia and value of engagements; no hope in Somalia and hence no need to waste your precious time and resources. · Not happy with the situation in Somalia because breakthrough is unforeseeable unless there is change of leadership. The leaderships have failed even on recruitment of the security forces that are fundamental to short and long-term stabilisation of Somalia. Their recruitment drive has targeted those serving in the late Barre regime that are in retirement age and cannot undertake challenges of the moment. In contrary, the insurgents force power is drawn from the young generation and this is the reason for its advantage over the TFG forces. The challenges on the ground are continuous and exhaustive and would only allow those in their youthful ages to remain actively engaged and on a regular basis. That is why the insurgents overrun the TFG forces in combat operations. · We have trained good number of the TFG forces with an aim to boost their capability. However, the president has insisted for transfer of the units to the TFG while the PM Nuur Adde preferred the troops to remain under our control. Thereafter, we handed-over the units to the TFG and most have dispersed and joined the insurgents. There is a serious leadership problem in Somalia that threatens any sort of progress. ENDF were sent to Somalia in order to support the TFG, but not as they insisted to be hostage for their personal agendas. The problem in Somalia is exclusively caused by the ****** and the ****** clans. The ****** had their lesson in the course of our engagement and we would obviously withdraw ENDF to positions within our border with Somalia. That will not restrict us from carrying out operations to neutralise terrorist threats within Somalia. If Islamist leadership is appointed we would obviously return to crush. · TFG is responsible for fall of Kismayo town to the Al-Shabab. It is through their willingness that this has happened and is unacceptable. We cannot remain engaged with the current leadership whose only contribution is failure. We would withdraw our forces and no need to wait for such leadership anymore. We would position our forces into our border areas but with effective response for an offensive in any area within Somalia where the terrorist are engaged in reorganisation or plans to launch threats. · The international community has also failed to meet its part of the obligation. The widening scale of the burden in Somalia deserves not underestimation or to be treated as an assignment for few. The danger posed by the situation in Somalia is clear and self explanatory today than ever. Now the magnitude of the crisis is felt by everybody, and if not on the mainland through pirates operating both in the Somali and the international waters. Mushrooming of piracy is a sign of the threat's spill over beyond Somalia. · We have remained at the disposal of the TFG and hailed our advice from time to time. We have recommended actions on several fronts to promote reconciliation: inter-****** dialogue, removal of the Banadir mayor and his replacement constituted through election. We invested and negotiated towards institutionalised approach in overcoming recurrent intra-TFG leadership's dispute. This was adopted by the TFI leaders in form of a roadmap in Addis on 26th August, 2008. The leaders committed themselves for an immediate implementation. However, the same leaders failed to implement the deal as agreed. Therefore, the problem within the TFI is about the leaders and this must come to an end in order to resolve the challenges once and for all. The mandate of the TFG is on its verge, and success is likely, if the transition is well managed, and above all carryout within set timeframe tasks as stipulated on the TF charter. · Successful transition is unlikely in the current situation and settings. The leadership must be challenged with a strong message including serious loopholes in their conduct and resultant frustration of all stakeholders. The best opportunity is to invite the TFI leaderships and the Parliament to the IGAD Summit in the 1st Week of October 2008. This opportunity must be used to revisit the current realities for an informed decision on the way forward. President Museveni (Uganda): · May be my experiences of guerrilla movements would be relevant; the best approach to put in place an effective security force is not just joint operations in the background of incompatible standard of trainings. If there is capability gap between the TFG security apparatus and the other allied forces, then it is unlikely to be successful. Attachments of TFG units to the allied forces would sharpen their skills and empower ultimately to take control of their future. On another note, the magnitude of the happenings on the ground calls for integrated international community engagement; military and political fronts among others. Madame Fraser (USA): · Why is AU failing to lobby for more troops engagement in Somalia. What is the difference between Somalia and other hotspots? I think it is the time for the AU to seriously advocate and convince member states for timely deployment in Somalia. II. Related events In another movement, the Ethiopian leaders met the UK minister for Africa and briefed him on their planned events to strengthen the TFG, including meetings with the TFI leaders and the parliament in Kenya during the IGAD Summit slated for the 1st week of October 2008. The UK minister later met Somalia delegation and enquired about the logic of relocating the entire parliament for a meeting in Kenya. Additional reporting indicated that the Ethiopian leaders have informed some of the IGAD member state officials involved in the separate meeting on Somalia over their success for funding to the initiative. Ethiopian leaders reportedly noted breakthrough in a meeting with Commissioner Louis Michel of the EC over IGAD's project aiming relocation of the entire TFI members for consultations in Kenya. III. Observation Anger by the Ethiopian leadership centralised on frustration has seemingly dominated this meeting that is exclusively by design for US allies in the region. Though message by the PM was not sinking well with Madame Fraser, in the bottom-line Ethiopia is both a liability and an asset. Both continued engagements in Somalia and its withdrawal without a replacement is a liability to the US foreign policy in the region. Addis engagement at least in the remaining days of the Bush administration would be an added value. An abrupt withdrawal without deployment of significant forces would endanger both the existence of the TFG and presence of AMISOM. In practical terms, AMISOM is there by virtue of the Ethiopian force-power. Resultant deterioration and further desperations in case of Ethiopian troops pullout in the absence of effective replacement would be a slap in the face of the Republican bid for presidency in addition to the unpopularity harnessed by the financial crisis. May be that is why Fraser has shifted blame to a soft target, namely the AU. The statement by Zenawi suggests recognition of their failure in Somalia and manoeuvre on options for damage limitations. Its leadership of IGAD gives an opportunity to explore agendas without minimal explanation to the entire regional body members. The blame on the TFI leaderships may hold water, but Ethiopia is not the one to make such claims. Ethiopia has played a key role in the selection of TFI members and election of the leaderships, except for the PM to some extent. Ethiopia has made a hasty decision in the original onslaught in Somalia whose ramification to Addis may be emerging day by day, but worst would unfold if it pursues indecisive withdrawal. Predictably, the initial incursion was a strategic error and same may be true for a withdrawal that leaves a vacuum. Tactical error could be repairable not double strategic errors and in particular for the case of a third world country with progressive intra and interstate conflicts. Ethiopian military movements were reported in Gedo and the Bakool region in the last few days. The convoy in the Gedo region were spotted in Bohola-Garas area (near Luuq) on 5th October 2008. The offensive through Gedo region is reportedly headed towards Lower and Middle Juba regions. Though reports indicate Kismayo, i suspect it to be tactical pressure to deescalate mounting insurgents' offensive in Mogadishu. Insurgents groups responsible for the recent attacks in Mogadishu are coming from Lower Juba region including Kismayo. It is rainy season and offensive to Kismayo without intelligence and logistical support of a third party with technological advancement may be suicidal to the ENDF at this point in time. Again, we cannot underestimate hawkish nature of the ENDF and preoccupation to the strategic settings of Kismayo to its internal opposition movements. However, of importance in operations of this nature apart from knowledge of the enemy capability is whether there is structure in place to take over and sustain the gains. Clan is not a predictable force to go for such a gamble but state does. Is TFG capable of mobilising for such an assignment? At this point in time, TFG is unlikely to assume assignment of this nature. Lastly, Yussuf is unaware of the details pertaining to the IGAD initiative and would be reportedly unwilling to attend. The Speaker is faced with a fear factor over the initiative and is unlikely to resist an agenda pushed by Ethiopia. An official from the TFG foreign ministry has reported over the media (5th October) that the IGAD meeting is rescheduled for 26th October 2008. The challenge on the Somali political environment is not limited to the TFG. Despite covet at this stage, bubbles of dispute is in the making within the ARS (D). Some key elements within the ARS are displeased with the mix-up on roles of the Central Committee and the Executive body. Both Sharifs are together most of the time and manage business of day without clear lines on who is what? The Central Committee Chair - Sharif Hassan is engaged on the role of the Executive organ. There are no internal regulations and procedures to govern how members or officials should conduct themselves in business. Some members attributed the challenge that led to the deadlock in the 2nd session of the High Level and Joint Security Committees in Djibouti between 17th to 22 September 2008 to misinformation by 3 members of the ARS. Lack of clear policy or agreed plan on how to proceed on the dialogue with the TFG remains another grey area exploited by rejectionists. Source

Originally posted by nuune: quote: Yusuf completes 4 years as leader of Somalia Classic stuff!

Quitting Time in Somalia The situation in Somalia has turned Code Red. Things are deteriorating very fast for Zenawi’s troops. The Al-Shabaab “jihadists” have taken over southern Somalia, and are ravenously eyeing Mogadishu. It is no longer “hit-and-run” guerrilla warfare. It is capture-and-stay. They have captured Kisimayo, a southern port town. They are staying. They are being “flooded with money” from supporters and backers throughout the Middle East. They have shut down the Mogadishu airport. Now they are vowing to do the same with the sea ports. The 2500 or so African Union peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi are holed up in their garrisons in Mogadishu as the insurgents rain rocket-propelled grenades on them at will. Bombings, assassinations, piracy, kidnappings and hostage-taking are a daily fact of life in Somalia. There are no viable political solutions. The cost of the war both in terms of human lives and resources has become unbearable for Ethiopia, and Somalia. Zenawi’s forces are in full “strategic retreat” to Mogadishu. After nearly two years of intervention and occupation of Somalia, there are no signs of success; and an anniversary of total failure in the quicksand of Somalia awaits Zenawi this coming December. Could this be the end of Pax Zenawi in Somalia? Zenawi realizes the jig is up in Somalia. For the past several weeks, he and his officials have been consistently dropping hints and insinuations of withdrawal. In his Ethiopian “new year” video interview last month, Zenawi declared triumphantly that he had fully achieved his primary objective of destroying and neutralizing the “jihadist” threat to Ethiopia. Success in stabilizing the Somali transitional government and bringing some measure of peace and reconciliation was “not 100 percent”. But Somalia is ready to host international peacekeepers, and he is ready to take out his troops. For Zenawi, the question is not whether to withdraw from Somalia, but “whether keeping Ethiopian forces in Somalia in the longer term would make a difference”? In other words, Zenawi wants out ASAP, but he needs to save face. He wants the U.N., the African Union or some other peacekeeping body to take over so that he can say he stabilized and brought peace to Somalia and is now withdrawing victoriously and honorably. That is unlikely to happen because there is no one out there willing to help him cover up the folly of his quixotic, imperial and hubristic misadventures in Somalia. Zenawi has no place to run but face the music. The Way It Was… Back in mid-December 2006, Zenawi denied any direct military involvement in Somalia. In an interview with the Washington Post, Zenawi explained that he had sent a few hundred soldiers into Somalia to provide training. “It is true we have troops in Baidoa, the capital, who are there to train forces of the transitional federal government, who are an internationally recognized government and who have officially asked for support from Ethiopia. . . . Now, if the transitional government does not want our trainers, we’d be happy to withdraw them. . .” He warned that “There is a group in the Islamic Movement in Mogadishu that is not interested in democratic secular government in Somalia, that is hell-bent on establishing a Taliban regime in Somalia. Now, you can facilitate the Talibanization of Somalia through dialogue. If that is the intention, it perhaps makes sense….” In early January, 2007, a triumphant Zenawi declared that his forces would remain in Somalia “for a few weeks” while the transitional government stabilizes the situation. “It is up to the international community to deploy a peacekeeping force in Somalia without delay to avoid a vacuum and a resurgence of extremists and terrorists.” In May, 2007, Zenawi told Al Jazeera that he was not only providing training in Somalia, he had been invited by the transitional government to assist in fighting terrorists. “I think we should get the facts straight first. We did not invade Somalia. We were invited by the duly constituted government of Somalia, internationally recognized government of Somalia to assist them in averting the threat of terrorism. We did so.” Even though he had argued at the outset of the invasion that Somalia was the central front in the battle against Al Queida and international terrorism in the Horn of Africa, he denied any U.S. role in the invasion: “We did not fight a proxy war on behalf of the United States. Indeed, the United States was very ambivalent about our intervention, once we intervened of course the United States and much of the international community was supportive but in the initial phase before we intervened, everybody, including the United States was warning us that we might walk into a trap and a quagmire and that we should think twice before taking steps.” In October, 2007, he told his parliament: “So, rushing to pull out the army immediately would have entailed a situation for the already dismantled forces of terror in Somalia to regroup, and thereby to render void the sacrifices already made by the Ethiopian army.” The Way it Is Now…. Today, things are going downhill in Somalia, and getting worse by the day. The Somali jihadist-talibanist-terrorists refuse to be vanquished. They have launched an Iraq-style insurgency. The civilian war casualty continues to increase by the day. An estimated 20,000 Somalis have died, mostly civilians, since the invasion. Over 1 million Somalis have been displaced. Upwards of 5 thousand of Zenawi’s troops are estimated to have been killed or severely injured in the Somali war. Amnesty International has documented massive human rights violations by Zenawi’s troops in Somalia including extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, beatings, arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances and collective punishments. Zenawi says it is all a “total fabrication”. There is no accountability for what Zenawi does in Somalia. As one opposition leader recently complained, “The government has irresponsibly refused to account on these two pertinent issues relating to the Ethiopian army’s deployment to Somalia. Every country’s parliament, even the public at large, has a right to know what its involvement is costing in terms of life and resources. We have been kept in the dark.” Under Zenawi’s watch, the “jhihadists” and “terrorists” in Somalia have not only grown stronger militarily, they have also expanded into new fields of terroristic operations. The Somali coast has become Piracy Central. Carrying cell phones, RPGs, speedboats and assorted small arms, the high tech Somali pirates are making it hazardous for commercial navigation on the Indian Ocean. Last week Zenawi complained: “We are very concerned about the level of piracy on the seas. It is related to the instability in Somalia. They could be used to destabilize the region and the whole situation on the high seas is a matter of great concern for all of us. We very much hope the international community will respond.” His foreign minister last week called upon the U.N. to deploy peacekeepers in Somalia “as soon as possible” or provide resources to strengthen the current African Union mission. The Somali war has never been popular in Ethiopia. Unlike the war in Iraq, there was no one in Ethiopia who was for the Somali war before they were against it. Everybody was against it. Now there is even talk that “Ethiopia’s fractious political opposition is planning a unified parliamentary campaign to demand a complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia.” VOA reported recently that “opposition parties” have sent a letter to Zenawi “saying the sacrifice of lives and scarce financial resources had become unbearable.” Bulcha Demeksa stated matter-of-factly that the Somalis “resolved to fight against us, and they are fighting, and in my opinion they are winning.” But Zenawi’s official policy remains: “We can get out any time. We will not. We are not in a quagmire. But we cannot abandon the transitional government and Somali people. We have to see progress in reconciliation so we do not want to abandon them in middle of crisis in Somalia.” Pax Zenawi (Zenawi’s Peace) Zenawi’s invasion of Somalia was reckless and irresponsible. He glibly assured the world at the beginning of the invasion, “we will be out in a few weeks.” Now he realizes that the business of war is unpredictable, expensive and uncertain. After nearly two years, he has found that the Somali war has sapped the strength of his troops and depleted the limited resources of the country; and he has no diplomatic leverage over the various warring Somali elements to impose his quixotic vision of a Pax Zenawi on the Somali people which he can manipulate through a puppet client regime. It is really hard to imagine what Zenawi had in mind where he decided to invade Somalia. From his public statements, one can infer that he must have had visions of a mini-empire in the Horn. He certainly had megalomaniacal visions of bringing peace, freedom and stability to Somalia (something he has been unable to bring to his own country over the past 17 years). He seems to have envisioned himself as a “Supercop” with the self-appointed responsibility of keeping law and order in the Horn. In December, 2006, he asserted a unilateral right to act as a Horn policeman and contain terrorism, and casually invited the world to join him after he kicked the rear ends of the “jihadists” in “a few weeks”. The potential implications of a Pax Zenawi in Somalia are as dangerous as they are laughable. Today Zenawi finds himself in Somalia like the frontier marshal portrayed by Gary Cooper in “High Noon” facing some nasty and wicked outlaws without help from the townsfolk. He stands alone against a vicious phantom “jihadist” enemy; and none of the Somali townsfolk, the Ethiopian people or the international community wants to help him fight them. The fact of the matter is that Somalis are not interested in any peace imposed upon them by Zenawi. The gift of secular government Zenawi wants to offer the Somalis has few takers. For the last 17 years, the Somalis have been unable to come to terms with the basic facts of their national life. Maybe they prefer tribal and clan associations over an elected democratic national government. Maybe they’d rather have a theocratic state than a secular transitional government whose authority is more widely denied and held in contempt than recognized. They regard the members of the transitional government as collaborators. It’s up to them what they want. It is not up to Zenawi to impose upon them. Yet in his recent statements, Zenawi is implicitly threatening the international community that if they don’t send troops and/or provide resources, he may just quit and walk out. That would presumably embolden the Al-Shabaab and the local and foreign Islamist extremists; and Somalia would be swiftly consumed in a civil war and become an incubator for terrorists. That was the same plea he made back in December 2006. It is falling on deaf ears now. For nearly two years, he has been begging for more African Union for troops, and with the exception of Uganda and Burundi, none of the estimated 6,000 AU troops are likely to show up. The lame duck Bush Administration is bogged down with its own problems. Nobody seems to care much about the anticipated consequences Zenawi’s withdrawal from Somalia. Zenawi’s dilemma in getting out of Somalia revolves around several issues: First, he believes that if he withdraws “precipitously” there will be civil war in Somalia. That is not convincing as Somalis have been in a state of clan wars, virtual civil wars, since the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. Second, an immediate or even a phased withdrawal will encourage and embolden the “jihadists” terrorist. The “jihadists” are already emboldened by the fact that they now virtually control most of southern Somalia. The only thing the continued occupation will do is increase their determination to get rid of the occupation forces. Third, the security and military capability of the transitional government must be strengthened or it will be overrun by Islamist forces. The problem with that argument is that it will take years to enhance the military capability and combat readiness of the transitional government forces. There are issues of clan loyalty, shifting clan alliances and resources that make such a thing nearly impossible. Fourth, an unscheduled withdrawal will undermine “Ethiopia’s credibility” and expose “our supporters in Somalia” to extreme danger, and damage the morale of Zenawi’s troops. Those supporters are in extreme danger now as attempts are being made almost daily to assassinate and attack them. The war has no popular support and morale has been down from the beginning. If Zenawi’s troops were given a choice between staying in Somalia and fighting a losing war or risking damage to their morale, they would take the latter, as would the Ethiopian people. The painful fact is that invasion of Somalia was not in the national interest of Ethiopia. The invasion was illegal under international law and a colossal political mistake. It was morally wrong to invade a country and cause so much civilian death and displacement. At the time of the invasion, Somalia was in no position to militarily threaten Ethiopia. Today, the counterinsurgency is getting tougher by the day and is recruiting more fighters. It seems increasingly clear that it is well-funded and well-equipped to inflict maximum damage and sustain the insurgency for a very long time. The only real option is getting out of Somalia immediately and without preconditions. No Exit Strategy There are no good options left for Zenawi. His dream of creating a stable, pluralist, democratic, unitary state with strong constitutional protections in Somalia is as real as the mirages in the Somali desert. He has not been able to create a pluralist democratic society in Ethiopia in 17 years; it is unlikely he could do so in Somalia in 2 years. He also seems to have overplayed his hand in Somalia in trying to use the same old divide-and-rule strategy that has worked for him so well in Ethiopia. He found out that Somali history and the history of Ethiopian-Somali relationship can not be undone by a wave of the magic wand of divide-and-rule. At this late stage in the game, Zenawi’s choices are limited. First, he can withdraw immediately, a strategy less affectionately known as “cut and run”. That would be the most rational thing to do. In other words, cut your losses in a lost war and run for the border. Zenawi says that would plunge Somalia into civil war and expose the transitional government to certain doom. But what he needs to realize is that much of the violence, insecurity and instability in Somalia today is a direct reaction to his occupation forces and his support for the transitional regime. Somalia has also been in a state of anarchy since 1991. Immediate withdrawal will more likely result in a decline in violence than a spike in it. The way things are shaping now, Zenawi will be forced to cut and run from Somalia. Analysis of his recent public statements seem to suggest that he is slowly building up courage to do just that. A phased withdrawal may also be an option. Perhaps a reassurance that occupying forces will leave Somalia might bring the warring factions together to hammer out a working arrangement. His second option is to continue the occupation, that is an open-ended anti-jihadist counter-terrorism mission that will prove to be increasingly bloody, costly, and counterproductive. But even that is becoming more difficult as the “jhihadists” retake and control more territory and tighten the noose on Mogadishu. There are few occupied areas in Somalia where Zenawi’s forces or the transitional government can enforce their political rule, exercise civil authority and/or maintain law and order. If there exists any “government” in Somalia at all, it seems to exist in the form of non-political traditional social institutions such as clan elders, tribal militias, religious clerics, etc. Generally, the anecdotal data from composite news and published intelligence sources shows that Zenawi’s troops can no longer operate as an effective occupation force. They have been forced to abandon towns and strategic locations and go into virtual “force protection mode”. They remain in their fortified bases and are making little effort to go out and aggressively pursue the “jihadist terrorists”. They have been effectively neutralized by the “jihadists”. Third, Zenawi can work to intensify regional/international diplomatic offensives. The problem is that no one seems to be interested. The AU has been unable to deliver on the promised peacekeepers and the U.N. has not been able to provide much more than moral support. So far he has only been able to engage in a diplomatic parlor game accusing opponents, “jihadists” and others of distorting his intentions and aims. He has not been able to get real commitment for a power sharing arrangement among the various factions. For whatever reasons, the Somalis do not appear interested in diplomatic solutions engineered by Zenawi. Fourth, dump the transitional government and work with the “jihadists”. The fact of the matter is that the transitional government exists in name only. It can not provide the most basic functions and services. It has few units with any capability for sustained combat operations. It is unlikely that the government’s troops can be trained and equipped in such large numbers to become an effective fighting force in their own right in the foreseeable future. There is not much evidence to suggest that the forces of the transitional government are contributing significantly to the fight against the insurgents. It is also unlikely that Somali clan and militia leaders will make difficult compromises so long as there are foreign troops on their soil. Religious and nationalist opposition is on the rise and there is no support for the occupation forces and very little for the transitional government. After nearly two years of fighting in Somalia, it is clear that the insurgents are at least as strong now as they ever have been, and most likely much stronger as they now control large swaths of the country. Maybe it’s time to talk to them and cut a deal; perhaps cobble together a basis for a very loose “national” government and carve out territories for the various clan leaders to administer on their own. Then leave Somalia! Fifth, Zenawi can maintain a prolonged strategic stalemate with the “jihadists”. Obviously, this is a very risky strategy. The presence of foreign troops in Somalia will always provoke resistance; and at best Zenawi can expect a bloody stalemate that will result in more civilian deaths, military casualties and incur huge costs. But it may be possible to continue to mount selective operations to keep pressure on the insurgents. End Game: Time to Get the Hell Out of Dodge The questions Zenawi needs to face are clear: Is Ethiopia or the international community safer from the threats of terrorism today than in December 2006? If he disengages, will Somalia be plunged into its former state of clan warfare (civil war) and politics? In as much as Zenawi has tried to fan the flames of terrorism in the Horn to get international support for his interventionary actions, support for his dictatorship in Ethiopia and avert sanctions for his massive human rights violations, his strategy for war and peace in Somalia has failed completely. As the old saying goes, “You can start a war whenever you want, but you can not stop it whenever you want.” That is Zenawi’s problem: How can he stop the war and get out of Somalia? The ultimate question is how to help Zenawi withdraw from Somalia without losing face, not how many Ethiopians or Somalis are dying or displaced. It is unlikely that he will admit defeat and error and pull the troops out. That is just not going to happen. The invasion of Somalia was a colossal misadventure. There will be no peace with honor to exit out of Somalia. Zenawi will leave Somalia in disgrace in six months, one year or however long it takes. That is the price of arrogance and hubris. As Scriptures teach: “When pride comes, then comes disgrace.” And “pride goes before destruction, and haughtiness before a fall.” (Proverbs 11:2, 16:18.) By Alemayehu G. Mariam Source

Allah u naxaristo...amiin!

Originally posted by Malika: ^What is the alternative?, we seem to be going in circles just creating more and more impossibilities rather then possibilities. Allaha ha u naxaristo. Dont follow the circle - reverse the circle.

Originally posted by dhulQarnayn: For better or worse, you Somalis must realize the success of the TFG(however imperfect) is the best solution to our problem. TFG is not imperfect it is shambles, inappropriate, unethical,non-representative, not mandated, and above all utterly worthless - and ofcourse Al-Shabab is not an alternative.

Yesterdaqy this same man( Allah uu naxaristo marxumka) said in a public place that Al-shabaab should stop targeting aid agencies working in Hiiraan, and today he was assasinated by unknown assailants. God help us. WAR DEG DEG AH: Guddoomiyihii Odayaasha Dhaqanka Gobolka Hiiraan oo daqiiqado ka hor lagu dilay Magaalada Beledweyne Talaado, October 07, 2008(HOL): War deg deg ah oo naga soo gaaray magaalada Beledweyne ee Gobolka Hiiraan ayaa wuxuu sheegayaa in daqiiqado ka hor magaaladaas lagu dilay Guddoomiyihii Odayaasha dhaqanka Gobolka Hiiraan Dacar Xirsi Xooshow. Seddex Nin oo bastoolado ku hubeysan ayaa la sheegay in ay marxuumka ku dileen gudaha Magaalada Beledweyne, kuwaasi oo baxsaday markii ay dilka geysteen kadib. Dad goob-joogayaal ah oo arkayay markii la dilayay Guddoomiyaha ayaa waxay sheegeen in qadar daqiiqado ah la qaadi waayay meydka marxuumka sabab la xiriirta dadka oo baqay in ay qaadaan. Guddoomiyihii Odayaasha Dhaqanka Gobolka Hiiraan Dacar Xirsi Xooshow ayaa wuxuu ka mid ahaa Odayaal Dhaqameedyo dhawaanahan shirar la lahaa Ciidamo Itoobiyaan ah oo ku sugnaa gudaha iyo duleedka Magaalada Beledweyne, kuwaasi oo ay kala hadlayeen sidii aaney Ciidamada Itoobiyaanka dhibaato ugu geysan lahayd dadka shacabka ah. Shalay oo ugu dambeysayna wuxuu marxuumka ka hadlay digniin loo jeediyay Hay’ado samafal ah oo ka howlgala Gobolka Hiiraan, kuwaasi oo kala ah Care International iyo IMC, isagoo sheegay in ujeedada Hay’adahaas loogu hanjabay ay tahay in la cunaqabateeyo Dadka ku dhibaateysan gudaha Gobolka Hiiraan. Salaad Iidow Xasan (Xiis), Hiiraan Online sxiis@hiiraan.com Mogadishu, Somalia