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Everything posted by Che -Guevara
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This is interesting How Workneh is using IGAD for his political ambition Exclusive: How Workneh is using IGAD for his political ambition WWW.GAROWEONLINE.COM Exclusive: How Workneh is using IGAD for his political ambition
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I, once, told our old buddy Oodweyne Somaligalbeed will become an independent country before Sland. Looking at the situation in Ethiopia now, thatlook likes a real possibility. This begs the question will Muse be willing to give 20 km coast and a naval base to Somaligalbeed for ictiraaf
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Is Ethiopia’s disintegration an inevitable and necessary evil? Source: Ethiopia Insight By: Hambisa Belina Ethiopia is a failing state rapidly rushing toward disintegration. Whether violently or through a carefully managed breakaway, the disintegration of Ethiopia appears to be inevitable. The real question is not if Ethiopia will disintegrate, but when and how. This reality traps Ethiopia between a rock and a hard place. There is a real possibility of either the status quo or disintegration leading to all-out civil war with unimaginably devastating consequences for Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Viewed more optimistically, nations within Ethiopia may avert the violent bloodshed by opting for an orderly, negotiated breakaway to form independent nation-states. If done properly, it might lead to a better outcome than what has transpired in Ethiopia over the last century and a half. So far, the international community has operated under the assumption that Ethiopia is too big to fail. The focus should instead be on ensuring the country’s inevitable disintegration transpires in a manner that averts the looming volcano of violence in favor of a smooth and orderly birthing of new democratic states. Such a move would require Western powers to abandon their commitment to holding states together in places like Ethiopia, no matter the cost. A better approach would be to support and broker an all-inclusive dialogue to avert undue bloodshed and bring about an orderly coming apart of the empire. EXISTING OBSTACLES The challenges of breaking apart a country must nonetheless be recognized and include the potential to trigger mass migration across the newly drawn borders, the eruption of conflict within and between the divided states, and quarrels over the division of land and assets between the leaders of these states. Also, because no ethnic group lives in homogenous and contiguous territory, any state that emerges from the rubble of the Abyssinian empire would need to ensure that minority rights are protected. However, such challenges pale in comparison to a violent process of disintegration that resembles Yugoslavia during the 1990s. There, after much bloodshed, promising new nation states have at least emerged. The barriers to ensuring this disintegration happens peacefully, though, include Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who would stop at nothing to try and hold Ethiopia together, and quarrelsome ethnic elites, such as the Amhara who lay claim to territories that rightfully belong to Tigray, Oromia, and Benishangul-Gumuz. The status of Addis Ababa, known as Finfinnee in Afaan Oromoo, is another particularly intractable sticking point. Oromo nationalists claim it as the center of their traditional Gadaa institutions and envision it as the capital of a federated, confederated, or independent Oromia state. Amhara nationalists also make claims to ownership of the capital. The reality is that no colonizer willingly gives up its claim on the colonized unless they are forced to. Another reality is that, although Oromo nationalists claim Finfinnee as the center of their indigenous homeland, it has since become a multiethnic capital that is the political, administrative, diplomatic, social, and economic hub of Ethiopia, and so convincing any central government to relinquish power over it would be a tall order. CYCLE OF WAR The main argument in favor of striving for an orderly disintegration relates to the cycle of war created by constant efforts to hold Ethiopia together. Ethiopia was created as a dependent colonial empire with the assistance of European imperial powers in multipronged wars of conquest waged by Emperor Menelik II in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. During the wars of conquest, the fragmented Abyssinian states were centralized, came to wield state power, and settled their people in the territories of Oromia, Somali, Wolaita, Sidama, and other southern nations. The settlers were given land taken from the colonized nations, while the religion, language, culture, political systems, and way of life of the settlers were promoted and those of the colonized nations were suppressed. The colonization of southern nations also involved creating a system of quasi-serfdom where the land of the conquered peoples was converted into the property of the settler colonialists. The aftereffects of these wars of conquest remain simmering, sometimes in the dark, hidden from plain view, and other times in the open for anyone to see. The conflicts never end, nor are their ills addressed. The grievances remain active, continuous, and uninterrupted. In this system of shifting alliances, friends become enemies as quickly as enemies become friends, and one community’s legitimate grievances are often used to justify inflicting harm on others. Ethiopia’s leaders, from Menelik II, to Haile Selassie I, Mengistu Hailemariam, Meles Zenawi, Hailemariam Desalegn, and Abiy Ahmed, have all confronted the seeming impossibility of holding Ethiopia together without resorting to brute force. As in the past, Abiy’s attempts to use state power to pummel recalcitrant nations into submission have produced disastrous conflicts, this time in Oromia, Tigray, and Amhara. Nevertheless, international backers – notably the EU and U.S. – have worked with successive Ethiopian regimes, providing diplomatic credence along with massive amounts of bilateral, security, and humanitarian aid. This unholy alliance between national and international actors has enabled Ethiopia’s repressive system and undermined the just demands of the colonized nations. One common refrain of both Ethiopian and Western leaders involves highlighting the ills associated with Ethiopia’s potential disintegration. These parties keep reminding us that the disintegration of Ethiopia is an evil that should be avoided, even if millions perish to avert it. STATUS QUO Since Abiy came to power in 2018, multipronged wars have once again erupted between the Ethiopian state and its constituent nations, namely Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara, even with the help of a foreign, bloodthirsty antagonist, Eritrea, in Tigray. The ongoing hidden war in Oromia was reenergized in 2018 within months of Abiy being named prime minister by the then-ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), as the senior party in the EPRDF coalition, was forced to accept a new prime minister from a junior member, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization (OPDO), due to the unrelenting struggle of the Oromo youth—known as Qeerroo/Qarree. The new government quickly turned against the Oromo popular movement and denied the protesters’ demands. It adopted mass killing and imprisonment while systematically dismantling their peaceful struggle, effectively forcing many of them to join the armed resistance led by the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA). When its attempts to obliterate the OLA failed, the Abiy regime turned to a state-sanctioned policy of “drying the pond to kill the fish.” It deployed the federal and regional security forces, Amhara and Oromo militias, and local settler Amhara groups in Oromia to loot, rape, and kill at will. In the meantime, Abiy demolished the ruling party and formed a new party in 2019, the Prosperity Party, to promote his imperial ambition in the mold of emperors Menelik II and Haile Selassie I.
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Good summary of the situation so far Consultations on the Situation between Ethiopia and Somalia under the “Peace and Security in Africa” Agenda Item Tomorrow afternoon (29 January), Security Council members will convene for closed consultations to consider the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia under the “Peace and security in Africa” agenda item. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa Hanna Serwaa Tetteh is expected to brief. France, January’s Council President, scheduled the consultations after Somalia requested an urgent meeting in a 23 January letter to the Council. The letter cites Article 35 of the UN Charter, which states that any UN member state “may bring any dispute, or any situation referred to in Article 34 [that is, one that may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute] to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly”. It appears that before scheduling the meeting, France engaged extensively with the members of the “A3 plus one” grouping (Algeria, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Guyana). At the same time, the “A3 plus one” members apparently engaged bilaterally with Ethiopia and Somalia. At the time of writing, no outcome was expected in connection with the meeting. Somalia’s request for a Council meeting comes against the backdrop of rising tensions in the Horn of Africa after the signing on 1 January of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland, a self-proclaimed republic in the northern region of Somalia. While the exact details of the MoU have not been made public by either side, Somaliland announced that, “n exchange for 20-kilometer sea access for the Ethiopian naval forces, leased for a period of 50 years, Ethiopia will formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland”. On the other hand, Ethiopia said in a 3 January statement that the MoU allows it to “obtain a permanent and reliable naval base and commercial maritime service in the Gulf of Aden through a lease agreement”. Regarding recognition for Somaliland, the statement notes that the MoU only includes “provisions for the Ethiopian government to make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition”. In its 23 January letter to the Council, Somalia said that the MoU “constitutes an unlawful transgression” of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia, of which Somaliland “is a constituent part”. Somalia first brought the matter to the Council’s attention in a letter that was circulated to Council members on 4 January, in which Somalia’s Acting Foreign Minister Ali Omar stated that the MoU was “entered into without the consent or endorsement of the Federal Government of Somalia and effectively violates the country’s constitution”. Omar further said that this development significantly endangers regional and international peace and security, and urged the Council to “swiftly condemn Ethiopia’s flagrant violations” and ensure its compliance with international law. In the preceding weeks, several regional, sub-regional, and inter-governmental organisations have voiced concerns about the situation. On 9 January, Mauritania, in its capacity as Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), sent a letter to the Council, which stressed the need to respect Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to safeguard security, peace, and stability in the region. On 12 January, Bahrain, Chair of the Group of Arab States at the UN, also sent a letter to the Council (S/2024/57) conveying the position of the League of Arab States (LAS) on the matter. The LAS rejected the MoU and stated that such actions “violate international law and jeopardise the overall territorial integrity of the Somali state”. On 17 January, the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) held a meeting to discuss the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia. In a press statement released following the meeting, the AUPSC expressed deep concern about the situation and reaffirmed its strong commitment and support for preserving the unity, territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of all member states, including Ethiopia and Somalia. The statement called on the parties to exercise restraint, de-escalate the situation, and engage in meaningful dialogue to find a peaceful resolution. Furthermore, it requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission (the organisation’s secretariat) to deploy the AU High Representative for the Horn of Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo, to foster dialogue between the parties and to provide regular updates to the AUPSC. On 17 January, the LAS also convened a ministerial-level emergency session on the matter at Somalia’s request. The decision adopted at the end of the meeting, among other things: reaffirmed that Somaliland is an integral part of Somalia and rejected the 1 January MoU, declaring it void, unacceptable, and a violation of international law; said that this development threatened the national security of Arab states and navigation in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden; and requested Algeria, as the only Arab member of the Security Council, “to mobilise necessary support to issue necessary resolutions affirming the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia”. On 18 January, the 42nd extraordinary summit of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Heads of State and Government was held in Entebbe, Uganda. The communiqué adopted following the meeting expressed deep concern about recent developments in the relationship between Ethiopia and Somalia. The communiqué reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Somalia while noting that any agreement entered into should be with the consent of Somalia. It called on both parties to de-escalate tensions and engage in constructive dialogue. In response to Somalia’s request for an urgent Council meeting, Ethiopia sent a letter to the Council on 26 January (S/2024/102), which outlined Addis Ababa’s position about the 1 January MoU, without delving into the aspects of recognition for Somaliland. The letter said that the MoU “paves the way for Ethiopia to secure access to a sea outlet based on commercial bases and mutually acceptable terms in line with international norms”. It expressed Ethiopia’s readiness to engage with Obasanjo, while arguing that the UN Security Council should not discuss the issue since it is being considered by the AUPSC. Security Council members have been following the developments closely. On 18 January, after the closed consultations on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ambassador Nicolas de Rivière (France) raised the issue under “any other business”. In his remarks, Rivière apparently apprised the members about the letters sent to the Council about the matter and France’s engagement with the relevant stakeholders, including the members of the Arab Troika (Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia) and the Permanent Representative of the LAS to the UN, Maged Abdelaziz. (The Arab Summit Troika is a group of three rotating countries that monitors the implementation of resolutions and commitments adopted by the LAS, which consists of the outgoing, current, and incoming Arab Summit chairs.) Tomorrow’s meeting will provide an opportunity for Council members to exchange views on recent developments and have a frank conversation about the way forward that preserves regional peace, stability, and security. Tetteh may echo the messages contained in a readout of a 10 January telephone call between UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Guterres recalled that the Security Council has repeatedly affirmed its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and unity of Somalia. He further expressed hope that all parties will engage in a peaceful and constructive dialogue and refrain from any actions that could further escalate the situation. Members may ask her views on the potential impact of the MoU on the political and security dynamics in the region. Several Council members—including China, the UK, and the US—as well as the EU have expressed concern about the rising tensions between the two sides, while stressing the importance of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia. In a similar vein, at tomorrow’s meeting, several members are expected to express concern about the deteriorating situation, call on both sides to exercise restraint, and underline the importance of dialogue, cooperation, and de-escalation. In addition, some Council members may raise concerns about the security implications of this development for Somalia and the region. The signing of the MoU comes at a critical juncture when Somalia is confronting the challenges from its security transition and ongoing offensive operations against Al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda. In his remarks at the 18 January IGAD Summit, US Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa Mike Hammer said that “the MOU threatens to disrupt the fight that Somalis, along with Africans and regional and international partners–including the US–are waging against Al-Shabaab”, while noting reports about Al-Shabaab using the MoU to generate recruits. He urged both sides to “avoid precipitous actions, including related to existing Ethiopian force deployments in Somalia, that could create opportunities for Al-Shabaab to expand its reach within Somalia and into Ethiopia”. Some members, including the “A3 plus one”, are likely to call for support for the regional and sub-regional initiatives and welcome Obasanjo’s engagement in this regard. In an explanatory note to the 17 January LAS decision, Algeria rejected any foreign interference in the affairs of Somalia, while emphasising the need to respect the sovereignty and independence of all member states. Algeria also stressed the importance of refraining from any act that undermined the integration of, and strategic cooperation between, Arab and African member states. It highlighted the significance of dialogue and negotiations in resolving any dispute, while taking note of the measures undertaken by the AU and the IGAD in this regard.
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In this instance, he is not that different from most of the other Somalis. We support leaders cuz of clan or cuz we benefit from their admin. It is safe to assume Xaaji and Bihi might be from Gebiley clan wise
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Xaaji knows this 'MoU' stinks to high heaven, but he would like to convince himself otherwise. I have never seen anyone willing to give away what their ancestors fought so hard to keep.
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