Here i can't relocate the pictures Of Merka Somalia. visit Marka, Lower Shabeele Region.

Thanks Farxan. I got somehow into your index site number and retrieved these pictures. Aerial view of old LasQorey. Frankincense growing on top of the big mountain, clouds passing under it. Livestock export

Madaxweynaha Puntland oo durbaba bilaabay koox kooxaysi iyo isagoo xilkii ka xayuubiyey Taliyihii Ciidanka Asluubta ee Puntland Col. Maxamed Jaamac (IndhoYare ) 2/2/05 Boosaaso: (dhahar.com) Warar xog ogaal ah oo aanu ka helnay Ilo ku dhow dhow Madaxtooyada Puntland ayaa sheegaya inuu Jeneraal Cadde Muuse Xirsi ka xayuubiyey Xilkii Taliyihii Ciidanka Asluuubta Puntland Gaashaanle Sare Indho Yare , iyadoo la sheegayo inuu Jeneralaaku Xilkaasi u magacaabi doono Gaashaanle Sare Xirsi Gaataa oo horay u ahaan jiray Taliye Ciidan Boolis oo Maamulka Puntland ah . Wararkaasi waxay intaas ku darayaan in Jeneraalku uu wado ka sifayn uu Maamulkiisa kaga sifaynayo Dadka ka soo jeeda Gobolka Sanaag , gaar ahaan kuwa uu ku tuhmayey inay horey ula soo shaqeeyeen Xukuumaddii C/laahi Yuusuf xilligii uu dib usoo celineyey Puntland kala danbaynteeda , isla markaasina kasoo horjeeday Xukuumaddii Jaamac Cali Jaamac iyo Isbahaysigii Beesha Cismaan Maxamuud ee uu Cadde Muuse Hogaamiyaha uu ahaa ee la magac baxday Golaha Badbaadada Puntland (GBP). Arrinku siduu doonaba ha noqdaa waxaan la gadhanayn collaada weyn ee uu Madaxweynaha Puntland ee dhawaan la doortay u qabo Dadka kasoo jeeda Deegaanka Gobolka Sanaag iyadoo laga eegayey in dadku isku mid u noqdaan,oo uu madaxweyne u wada yahay dadkoo idil isagoo aan u eegin Ciddii kasoo horjeeday iyo cid kale . Waxaan shaki ku jirin in Qalinka Gen Cadde aanuba marnaba qori karin Cid Macne leh oo Gobolkaasi ka soo jeeda iyo weliba inuu ku tiiqtiiqsanayo Xumayntooda iyo isagoo aanba ku darin Guddiyada Maamul ee loo xilsaaray Masiibooyinka Tsnami iyo Ilaha Dhaqaale iyo Ciidan toona . Qaybo dadka kamid ah ayaa ku tilmaamaya in uu Madaxweynuhu waa Jeneraaal Cadde 'e Aargoosi ugu jiro Dhamaan Dadkii ku lidka ahaa xilligii uu Jabhadaynayey iyo weliba Dadka uu is leeyahay waxay aqoon dheer u leeyihiin Siyaasadda iyo Maamulka , iyadoo uu Madaxweyne Cadde hayo sida ay sheegayaan Tubtii lagu riday Maamulkii Jaamac Cali Jaamac ee Beel la tashiga , sedbursiga iyo Jilicsanaaanta ku caanka ahaa . Dhanka kale waxaa jira awoodo is kaashanaya oo kasoo jeeda Gobolka Sanaag oo wada dedaal ay ku doonayaan inay ka goostaan Maamulka Puntland maadaama uu Gen. Cadde wado Colaad lid ku ah Gobolka Sanaag iyo Siyaasiyiintiisa mar hadiiba uu ku gaadhay Kursigii uu Waqtiga badan usoo halgamayey oo uu ku waayey inuu qori ku qabsado balse loogu hiiliyey in Cod lagu gaadhsiiyo halkaasi . Sedbursiga Cadde Muuse iyo koox jeclaysigiisa ka dhanka ah Mas'uuliyiinta kasoo jeeda Gobolka Sanaag ma ahan oo qura tan uu wado ee waxaa jirta sida ay noo sheegeen Xildhibaano ka tirsan Beesha Warsan**** in uu qaabili waayey oo uu ka baxay Heshiis uu la galay oo ahaa inuu Siin doono Waxay xaq u leeyihiin iyo Awood Qaybsi Cadaalad ku salaysan , iyo weliba Wasaarado Mug leh iyo Jagooyinkii ay horay u hayeen kadib markii ay u codeeyeen oo la xaqiijiyey in codadka uu kaga guulaystay Maxamed Cabdi Xaashi ay ahaayeen kuwa uu ka helay 9 Xildhibaan oo ka soo jeeda Gobolka Sanaag . Isku soo xooriyoo waxa Arrinku isugu biyo shubanayaa in ay Puntland noqotay Maanta mid gacanta ugu jirta Jeneraal Reer Koonfureed ah oo aaminsin Digtaatooriyad ku salaysan Boqortooyo doon ahna Nin usoo halgamey oo aargaaso doon ah isla markaasina aan marnaba dheg u jalqin doonin cid kasta oo ka hadasha Demoqraadiyada , Awood qaybsi iyo xaqsoor intaba . Maxamed Cabdi Ibraahim moha_abdi@dhahar.com

Originally posted by OG_Girl: Oooops, why I am defending him!! The guy isn't from my clan, but I am sure Qurac could find connection between Samatar and I Salam Disregard my last comment sis. I didn't read your complete story. lol

OG_Girl, don't be deceived by the tribal jargon. This man affiliates not to the larger clans of Somalia. He is from a minority clan.

I have heard that Nationalist was banned who was more reasonable and decent than this man known As Qudhac. I wonder why they haven't banned him instead of the good man Natinoalist who contributed so much to this net. Why? because people would think this is a biased. Look a moderator deleted simple thread calling an alleged former minister "Criminal" Not even the court that arraigned this man calls him "Criminal" let alone a public forum like this.

Alxamdulilaahi Rabil Caalimiin Alshukrililaah. May Allah reward her Janna for the pain she suffered. God Bless her with good husband and children.

What about Dahir Riyale whom i heard was a member of National Secret Service of Somalia for Siyad Barre. In my view, everyone who served for that government has to be blamed and alleged for any criminal acts that took place. According to most common laws, you don't have to be directly involved a criminal activity. It is every person's civic responsibility to speak out of atrocity when you are a prominent member of the organs of government or else resign from any active duty. Carrying out atrocity against humanity in your knowledge and assisstance, i believe you are part of it. Hence, Dahir Riyale, the elected president of Somaliland has to be arraigned for criminal charges, but the fact remains that he is breathing in a lawless country.

Oh Beautiful pictures but i would love to see an aerial view of Las Qorey the same as Baraawe (Brava) and Merka. It seems the report is students on Seminar traversing different cities not necessarily limited to one city. Thanks Bari_Nomad and others.

Thanks for openning this topic. This could be my place to request the lyrics of some of the songs i had often searched. I liked the lyrics of Mohammed Mooge though it has political implications. "naftan walaneysaa waanu kaama maqashee haddi aad manta wacan tahey maku waari doontaa? But again who is more classic Mohammed Nuur Giriig and Mohammed Mooge. Anyone who can contribute his lyrics, i would appreciate.

This was between Nassir and his friend in the living room. Nassir: You don't believe what i saw today, the most beautiful somali girl on earth. Camir: Ooh really, how does she look like and what type of outfit she was wearing at the time. Nassir: (harbouring some secret thing), well i can't describe her outfit she was overall the best looking woman on earth, man she had me thinking for five minutes. Camir: Did you approach her? If so, was she more receptive to your intense affection drooling from your eyes? Nassir: Unfortunately no, she was too good to be approached. Allah steeped her in such a grace that i thought she spiritually had divine entourage. Something indeed distracted my transfixed-eyes and by the moment i returned my glance, she faded in the air. Camir: (pondering her as devil) you must be really insane. How could she disappear so abruptly? Continues.... lool

One of the relatives of Gen. Sarinle is reported to have said that Gen. Galaal was the masterminder behind Gen. Sarinle's assassination. Here is the news. Galkacyo: Mid ka mid ah Ehelada Gen. Sareenle oo Sheegay in Gen. Galaal uu ka Dambeeyey Dilki Gen. Sareenle - Friday, January 28, 2005 at 16:28 Galkacyo, 28.01.05 (AllPuntland) - Mid ka mid ah eheladii Gen. Yuusuf Axmed Sareenle oo maalmo kahor lagu dilay magaalada Muqdisho ayaa shaaca ka qaaday in ay si cad u garanayaan ciddii ka danbaysay dilka Gen. Sareenle. Cali Xaashi Abshir (Canshuur) oo ka mid ah ehelada Gen. Yuusuf Axmed Sarreenle kuna sugan magaalada Gaalkacyo oo u waramayay Radio Daljir ayaa sheegay in uu caddaynayo in dilkii Gen. Sareenle uu ka danbeeyay Gen. Maxamed Nuur Galaal. Waxaa uu sheegay inuu taasi ku caddayn ugu hayo in ilaalada Gaarka ah ee Gen. Galaal ay labo casho ka hor dhimashada Sareenle ay yimaadeen gurigiisa dabadeedna ay kawaayeen. Waxaa kale oo uu sheegay Cali Xaashi Abshir isagoo hadalkiisa sii wata “ Waxaa dilka Gen. Sareenle lagu fuliyay gaariga sida gaarka ah u waardiyeeya Gen. Galaal, Xilli walba iyo waqti walba caddayn rasmi ah ayaan u haynaa inaan soo gudbinno ciddii ka danbaysay dilka Gen. Sareenle" ayuu yiri Cali Xaashi Abshir. Dhinaca kale wuxuu sheegay Cali Xaashi in maamulka Puntland iyo cid allaale iyo ciddii ay khusayso arinta Gen. Sareenle ay sidaasi ula socdaan isaguna uu mar alla markii la doono uu caddayn doono dilkaasi ciddii ka danbaysay. Si kastaba arintu ha ahaatee, Gen. Sareenle oo ka mid ahaa saraakiishii sida xoogga leh ugu ololaynayay in ciidamo Shisheeye oo ka qayb qaata hub ka dhigista dablayda hubaysa dalka la keeno ayaa maalmo ka hor dablay hubaysani ay toogasho ku dileen bartamaha xaafaddiisa. Waxaa dilka Gen. Sareenle dhaleecayn u soo jeediyay xukuumadda Soomaaliyeed oo uu ugu horeeyo Ra’iisal Wasaare Prof Cali Maxamed Geeddi, iyo Golayaasha Xukuumadda iyo Wakiilada. Waa sarkaalkii afraad ee lagu dilo Muqdisho dhawrkii bilood ee la soo dhaafay. CCC Farayaamo AllPuntland Source

'Wafdi uu hoggaaminayo sii hayaha xilka wasaaradda ganacsiga iyo warshadaha ee maamul goboleedka Puntland Cabdinuur Cilmi Maxamuuduud ayaa dhowaan ka soo laabtay dalka Itoobiya, kaas oo heshiisyo ganacsi la soo galay dawladda Itoobiya, heshiiskan wuxuu isugu jiraa isdhaafsiga badeecado kala duwan iyo dawladda Itoobiya oo isticmaali doonta dekedaha magaalooyinka Boosasao iyo Garacad.' Source My question, does Garacad has port? This is a good sign for residents in Galkacyo, Wardheer, and Garoowe because they don't have to commute all the way to Boosaaso.

Hi nomads, i like to share with you this article which i think is very analytical one on Iran's pursuit for regional power. Iran's Bid for Regional Power: Assets and Liabilities Tensions between Iran and the United States have recently heated up to the point that some analysts, particularly in the Arab world, surmise that the struggle between the Iraqi transitional government and the Shi'a resistance led by Moqtada al-Sadr is essentially a proxy war between the two countries. Iran has been the instigator of the present surge in tensions, taking advantage of the military and diplomatic vulnerabilities of the United States that were revealed by Washington's campaign for regime change in Iraq. Despite deep internal divisions in Iran over the vision of its future (Western or Islamic), all of its significant political forces are nationalist, uniting on the premise that any foreign attempts to change the Iranian regime and forfeit the revolution (however its meaning is interpreted) are unwelcome, indeed intolerable, and are to be firmly resisted. Political forces in Iran are also at one in the belief that the country should pursue a policy of enhancing its military machine to make it an effective deterrent against external attack, and expanding its influence as a regional power in all directions. Tehran's bid to alter the regional balance of power in its favor is evidenced by its increasing defiance of international controls over its nuclear program and its financial and probable military support of a wide spectrum of Shi'a movements and factions in southern Iraq. Iran's actions have sparked a strong reaction from the United States, which has made it clear, through National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, that the United States will not tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran. Rice's threat was answered by Iranian Defense Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani with the comment that there were established political circles in Iran recommending preemptive military "replies" against any entity that "decides to inflict harm" on the country. Despite the bellicose rhetoric from both sides, there is no direct war between the two adversaries in the immediate works. The rhetoric is an indicator of Iran's push for power and America's attempts to resist that push. Iran's Strategic Scenarios That Iran is the protagonist and the United States the antagonist in the current tensions means that the Iranian regime senses the opportunity to enhance its power position. Several strategic scenarios dominate Iranian thinking, reflecting the possibilities that policymakers perceive in the current situation. The best-case scenario for Iran is that the U.S. military is forced to withdraw from Iraq, leaving Iran with a dominant sphere of influence over a Shi'a-dominated Iraq or a breakaway Shi'a mini-state in the south, and that Iran is able to achieve nuclear weapons capability. Were this outcome to occur, Iran would be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf, displacing the United States. The worst-case scenario is that the United States or Israel launches a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear complex, possibly associated with American military efforts at regime change. In between the two extreme cases is a gamut of more realistic scenarios. On the favorable side, Iran would exhaust the United States in southern Iraq through its support of resistance and would drag out negotiations on its nuclear program by exploiting divisions among external powers working through international agencies. On the unfavorable side, Iran would be excluded from influence in Iraq by an American-oriented regime, would suffer economic sanctions for failing to submit its nuclear program to international supervision or would feel constrained to give up that program, and would be diplomatically isolated. The recent assertive behavior of Iran suggests that it is determined to resist any concessions on its perceived vital interests, risking the worst-case and other unfavorable scenarios in order to realize as many of its ambitions as possible. Iran's Strategic Situation The scenarios projected by Iranian policymakers are relative to Iran's strategic situation. That situation is marked by threats to and opportunities for Iran's vital interests, giving rise to the range of possibilities from best-case to worst-case scenarios. In seeking to ward off threats and exploit opportunities, policymakers are constrained to play a hand that has assets and liabilities. Liabilities The most important obstacle to Iran's drive for regional power is the presence of U.S. ground forces in its eastern neighbor Afghanistan and its western neighbor Iraq, and U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf. Iran is partially encircled by the United States, whose explicit best-case scenario is Iranian regime change. The immediate proximity of American military forces results in a bias among policymakers towards building up military security above any other priority. Iran's nuclear program, which it insists is only for peaceful purposes, but is likely for weapons capability, is only one part of an ongoing Iranian program for military self-dependence in the face of sanctions. Iran recently successfully tested a new version of its Shahab-3 missile with a range of 810 miles and a capability of striking Israel. Iran also produces tanks, armored personnel carriers and a fighter plane. Yet, Iran would still be no match for a full-scale American attack -- its only effective deterrent would be nuclear weapons. Iranian policymakers are aware that the American threat is ever present, even if it has receded for the moment. Iran also faces a military threat from Israel, which might launch a preemptive strike against Iran's Bushehr reactor and is reportedly working with Iraqi Kurds to destabilize the Iranian regime. Iran has recently threatened to bomb Israel's nuclear complex at Dimona if Israel attacks Bushehr. As the country that feels most threatened by Iran, Israel has a vital interest in eliminating Iran's nuclear program or at least setting it back seriously. Iranian policymakers can do very little about the Israeli threat and have begun a program to install technologies and procedures to minimize the effects of the release of radiation that would follow a successful strike on Bushehr. Iranian ambitions to create a sphere of influence in Iraq are not only checked by the American military presence, but also by divisions in Iraq's Shi'a population and leadership, a large proportion of which are nursing the prospect of Shi'a dominance over Iraq following scheduled elections in January of 2005. At present, they are not seeking Iranian protection, although they are willing to accept Iranian aid. Internally, Iran is socially divided by the familiar split between Westernizers and traditionalists that has marked countries on the borders of the West, such as Russia and Turkey. In Iran's complex post-revolutionary political institutions, the executive is currently controlled by the reformists, and the parliament, judiciary and supreme religious authorities by the theocrats. Outside the state institutions, the increasingly youthful population generally favors a loosening of theocratic rule and a more Western lifestyle. With the successful suppression of reformists in the last parliamentary elections, the theocrats have engineered a short-term victory at the cost of intensifying social polarization. Washington's strategy towards Iran makes the division between Westernizers and traditionalists the centerpiece of plans for regime change. Iranian exile groups and American neo-conservatives argue that an aggressive policy of weakening the Iranian regime, if not an invasion of the country, would unleash the forces of Westernization and bring Iran into the circle of American-led, capitalist globalization. Iranian policymakers, increasingly dominated by the traditionalists, have responded to the social and political divide by appealing to the need to defend the country's integrity above any other interest. Assets Counterbalancing the negatives in Iran's strategic environment are a number of assets that give it the room to maneuver necessary for pursuit of its ambitions. Most importantly, the U.S. military is overextended from its Iraq and Afghanistan missions, and its continuing needs and commitments to maintain Asian and European presences. It is unlikely at present that the United States is militarily ready or politically capable of mounting an operation against Iran similar to the one that it undertook in Iraq. Iran is also a much more formidable adversary than was Ba'athist Iraq. Its population of 70 million dwarfs Iraq's 26 million and, unlike Iraq, Iran is not a construction of colonial rule combining diverse ethnic and religious groups without a common history, but an ethnically and religiously homogeneous society with a long history of independence and a strong sense of nationalism. Iran's military is also more capable than Iraq's was, and it is a center of post-revolutionary nationalism. In its war with Iraq in the 1980s, Iran absorbed heavy losses and eventually repelled an aggressor that had the backing of the United States. If the United States attempted to occupy Iran, it could not use the divide-and-rule strategy that it has employed in Iraq. The Iranian regime banks on the expectation that in the case of external attack, nationalism will override the rift between Westernizers and traditionalists. Analysts in the Middle East generally agree that the regime's judgment is correct. Iran's trump card is the geopolitical fact that it is a major oil producer bordering other major oil producers. A large-scale war undertaken by the United States would almost surely lead to a disruption of world oil supplies and the danger that Iran would use its missiles to attack Saudi or Gulf state oil complexes. Iran also has a strategic ally in Syria, which shares with it the same security interests and borders Iraq on the west. The Iranian and Syrian regimes have been conferring closely since the American occupation of Iraq and have a common line that the United States should withdraw from the region. Russia is a benevolent neutral, perhaps ally, providing help with Iran's nuclear program and interested in diminishing American power in the region. The European powers are ambivalent, subject to American pressure to bring the issue of Iran's nuclear program to the United Nations Security Council where sanctions could be imposed, and desirous of pursuing economic interests in Iran. Thus far, Iran's policy of "commercializing" relations with Europe has been a relative success, leading to reluctance by the Europeans to follow the American hard line. Instead, they have followed an independent, diplomatic path to resolve the nuclear question. Recently, as Iran has taken a harder line toward the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Europeans have begun to tilt toward the United States, but it is still not certain that they will back a sanctions regime. Finally, it is possible that Iran can turn the presence of American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to its advantage. Historically, Iran has had close contact with, and political and cultural influence in, the regions on its eastern and western borders. Longstanding economic and cultural interchange gives Iran footholds in the west of Afghanistan and the southeast of Iraq, which it is presently using to back political forces that favor its strategic interests. In a wide ranging interview with al-Jazeera television on August 19, Iranian Defense Minister Shamkhani observed that the American military presence in its neighbors "is not power for the United States because this power may under certain circumstances become a hostage in our hands." When the positives and negatives of Iran's strategic situation are weighed, it becomes clear that the complex balance of opportunities and threats provides the opportunity for Iran to try to expand its regional power at considerable risk. The reasoning of the hardliners, who are gaining increasing control over Iranian foreign and security policy, is that Iran has little choice but to attempt to strengthen itself by militarizing and pressing for spheres of influence, since the alternative is acceptance of American hegemony in the Persian Gulf. Their posture is primarily defensive, but they believe that the best defense at the present time is an assertive one. They will act with the best-case scenario in mind as they maneuver to avoid the worst case, resorting to brinkmanship and tactical retreats. Conclusion Iran plays its hand through one of the most complex sets of political institutions in the contemporary world. Not only are clerical institutions overlaid on the conventional executive, legislature and judiciary, but different factions have vested influence and authority within each of them. Iran does not speak with one voice or act with one hand. Indian political analyst Hamid Ansari observes that Iran's shifting stances of conciliation and defiance, and its elliptical and contradictory policy statements, are "fully reflective of the multiplicity of centers that characterize the decision-making mechanism of the Islamic Republic." Unlike Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Iran has polycentric politics, in which decisions on security and foreign policy are the result of shifting alliances and independent initiatives. This complexity leads to the simultaneous pursuit of seemingly opposed policies, but it would be a mistake to interpret it as a sign of weakness, since all participants are committed to Iranian independence and integrity. Iran's polycentric decision-making system is, in fact, a source of strength in its current situation, since it leads structurally, rather than by design, to a multi-pronged strategy that hits all possible vulnerabilities of its adversaries, confuses them and allows for flexibility. If one policy fails, it will be deemphasized in favor of another. If one faction is discredited, another is ready to take its place. If all possible proxies in Iraq and Afghanistan are backed by one Iranian faction or another, downside risk is minimized and opportunity is enhanced. If reformists pursue commercialization of foreign relations and hard line traditionalists pursue militarization, Iran potentially gets the benefit of both tracks. It is impossible to predict whether Iran will succeed or fail in its bid for security and regional power, but its regime has impressive and surprising assets that work in its favor. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein

Wind talker, you raised a good point but the undeniable fact is that Sanaag and Mudug are two big regions, probably reserving the second and third spot of the largest regions of Somalia. Sool is also another region that are shared by multi clans the same as Sanaag and Mudug, but the majority rules and who owns the vast land. For instance, the representives from Bari region are dominated by the largest clan so as Sanaag, Sool and Mudug, but there are still representives in Bari from the people of Sanaag,Mudug from people of Goldogob and Wardheer.

I have heard from other sources that he was part of public discussion to welcome FTG in Mogadisho. Allaha u naxariisto. I do not know him but he was said to be a true patriot who had never left Somalia since the collapse of the last regime.

Allaha ha u naxariisto well-educated, well-trained firm general was shot dead by four gunmen. It is not clear why Gen Yusuf Ahmed Sarinle was targeted, but correspondents suggest it may be because he backed the deployment of foreign peacekeepers. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4200083.stm To listen more of his backgournd, go to Dayniile.com

Qudhac, Somaliland has a history of detaining journalists, so would you think that Amin Amir would have enough freedom to exercise his artistic talents if it were against the 'status quo' of Somaliland's administration? It is obvious that Somaliland has entered ugly phase of unprecedented corruption and moral decline.

Very immaculate and painful artistic expression of Samsam's ordeal.

Good point there warsam.

Yasmiin, In a nutshel, Samsam's case reflect the quest for resolution of rape issues from specifics to the general, while your point of argument revolves from general to the specifics as you would want the rape of Samsam be treated as part of the past unnoticed and irremedied rape cases of Somalia, which is not altogether a flaccid vision. However, there is no place to seek justice for the wrongs that were done against our innocent sisters. Samsam was exposed to cruel punishment and unforseen circumstance. She shall set precedent for future cases in Puntland and Somaliland where semblance of order and democracy seems to be flourishing in comparison to the rest of Somalia. Theoretically, rape is rampant on areas of high crimes, corruption, and poverty. For instance, recent report in which a number of United Nations troops were relieved from their duty after rape allegations in Darfur reinforced my beliefs. One soldier was said to have lured a little 10 yearl girl a piece of pastry caked cookie. Only addressing the nature and cause of rape issues, as you inferred, can there be a solution. The asnwer is no but just pursuit of legal corrections and actions have proved the closest effect on the reduction of rape cases positively.

As i flipped over the pages of LA times, i came across an Editorial commentary on the deterioration of Los Angeles's fabric life on the forgetten parts of LA. Mogadisho, in this case, is targetted for passionate scorn and subordination. I felt I should share it with you. -------------------------------------------------- LA's Budding Mogadishus By Constance L. Rice, Constance L. Rice is a civil rights attorney in Los Angeles. In Brazil's favelas, murder is the leading cause of death for 10-year-olds. In these urban hyper-barrios, police patrol in helicopter gunships. Any delusion of crime prevention gave way to containment and suppression long ago. At night, black children hide from both rogue cops and gang members; the rich venture from their fortress homes nearby only in armored vehicles or private planes. In the midst of Rio de Janeiro's splendor, favelas are at a tipping point — on the way to joining Mogadishu as wholly failed "feral" cities, engulfed by gangs, black markets, rapacious crime and dysfunction. Could Los Angeles be headed down this road? No, not anytime soon, at least for the vast majority of the city. But the hot spots of underclass Los Angeles are well on the way. If ignored, they will metastasize, and eventually pose a real danger to the larger region. L.A.'s hot zones are tiny, intensely dangerous areas where nothing works, where law has broken down and mainstream institutions simply fail. Places where mail carriers and meter readers balk when the bullets fly. Where paramedics and firefighters are hesitant to enter because of the crossfire. Where police officers go in only heavily reinforced or with helicopters; in the LAPD's South Bureau there was an 80% increase in sniper fire on police in 2004, according to a report by LAPD Chief William Bratton. These zones are often found in and near public housing projects, although the worst privately owned slums — like the gang-ridden apartment complex at 69th and Main that was recently ordered evacuated by the city — mirror the conditions. In Jordan Downs, for instance, one of three gang-dominated housing projects in Watts, the predominantly African American Grape Street Crips routinely beat Latinos (among others), engage in regular home-invasion robberies and have been known to murder residents who dare report their activities. When the LAPD set up a police kiosk in Jordan to quell rising crime, the gangs blew it up; the LAPD left and did not return for more than a decade. In the Ramona Gardens housing project, the last three black families didn't survive long enough to suffer the perpetual abuse that residents of Jordan have endured: Latino gangsters firebombed them out of their units. Schools near these complexes boast 70% dropout rates, violence-related lockdowns and children with post-traumatic stress disorder levels as high as those seen in civil wars. The neighborhoods host hundreds of prison-brutalized men wed to cults of destruction and the hyper-masculinity of the powerless. Ex-cons who try to change must defy a dehumanizing dragnet that draws 70% of them back into prison. All face relentless search-and-destroy policing. With job prospects virtually nonexistent and few other exit ramps from the prison-parole hamster wheel, escape is rare. Years ago I asked gang members what happened to kids who "just said no" to the Bloods or V-18s. They brought me a videotape other gang members had made for a 14-year-old boy who had refused to join them. The tape showed gang members raping his 13-year-old sister. The boy joined the gang so that its members wouldn't return to kill her. Is there no one in this city to protect these children? A city that leaves its children to predators is on the road to Mogadishu. But what is to be done? Though violence and gangs pose a terrible menace to residents and cops, it is deadly error to confuse them with the root cause. They are merely the toxic byproducts of malignant poverty and deprivation that we apparently do not have the will to end. Until recently, our leaders either ignored this uglier L.A. — the City Council, for example, focused last year not on Jordan or Ramona but on forcing the LAPD to waste time responding to thousands of false home alarms in middle-class neighborhoods — or enacted small and isolated test programs. That's the equivalent of flossing when a root canal is needed instead. Lately, a few L.A. leaders appear to have recognized that smarter solutions are way overdue. Councilman Martin Ludlow has proposed an urban affairs department to coordinate and elevate the city's scattershot programs into more sophisticated and aggressive gang intervention strategies. Bratton and county Sheriff Lee Baca are calling for more cops — but they also agree that cops must switch to problem-solving policing, and they champion restoration of the $1 billion a year in prevention funds lost since Proposition 13 passed in 1978. Equally critical, Rob Reiner led voters to back universal preschool, and all-day kindergarten is now on the drawing board. On a more controversial track, City Atty. Rocky Delgadillo has stepped up the use of collective neighborhood strategies like injunctions and mass evictions. Last week, a judge ordered the eviction of all the tenants from a complex that gang members had used as a headquarters for 20 years. Though eviction of the innocent is rarely defensible, the instinct to check virulent violence with vigorous remedies is right. Eviction, if it is done, must be a last resort, and it must include full compensation, including money for relocation to an available apartment in the same neighborhood for all evictees. But these smarter strategies, however welcome, will not be enough. L.A.'s danger zones require radical vision, scaled-up remedies, sustained and strategic investment, and a level of leadership and will that currently do not exist. In the end, remedies that attack symptoms but leave root causes intact do nothing but create future blowback. We must build a city where gangs can't get near a single kid under 16 and where any gang member who wants out can exit la vida loca — and live. Then let's get really radical and actually end the malignant poverty that drives the violent dysfunction. Choose this road or join Rio's trajectory toward Mogadishu.

Tolstey, i will in shallah respond to your request. For now, legal loopholes about the irrationality of parliamentarians is the false accusation that the Prime minister violated Article 49.0 of the Transitional Federal Charter of Somali Republic. Read here. Article 49.0 states that the P.M must 1-possess political leadership and experience, 2- be citizen of Somalia, 3-be 40 years of age. Access the link for Transitional Federal Charter of Somali Republic

Make necessary brain adjustment and reread the content of that brief outline to grasp my point. I and Sophist are on the same path in terms of the legality of parliamentarians to "sack" the prime minister. You said, if i understood your point, the parliamentarians were within the legal right to dismiss the P.M, which nullifies his authority as P.M, whereas I and sophist disagreed with such grave confusion on the legality of dismissing the Prime minister. Thus, i thought, the above explicit outline might help clarify your confussion and others as well.

^^ I haven't completely understood your point on legal parlance. However, i think the following explicit summary will help clear the ambiguity of our disagreements. I also agree with Sophist. Summoning and dissolving the legislature A head of state is often empowered to summon and dissolve the legislature. In most parliamentary systems, this is done on the advice of the prime minister or cabinet. In some parliamentary systems, and in some presidential systems, the head of state may on their own initiative do so. Some states, however, have fixed term parliaments, with no option of bringing forward elections. In other systems there are fixed terms, but the head of state retains authority to dissolve the legislature in certain circumstances (e.g. Article II, Section 3, of the US Constitution). Where a prime minister has lost the confidence of parliament, some states allow the head of state to refuse a parliamentary dissolution, where one is requested, forcing the prime minister's resignation.