But it was not only military success that secured Nasiib Buunda’s reputation. He was an acknowledged master of the mystical arts, combining Islamic and African practices in exercising his leadership. His reputed ability to command animals in defending Goshaland has already been mentioned. Rather less popular was his supposed power over the crocodiles of the Juba, which he used against Gosha rivals; and he threatened family heads with gory death if they refused to give him their daughters in marriage. This is a story i have heard when i was young and it became a real custom for the river-dwelling folks. I have even heard of an incident where a man of Gosha flirted with a good looking Somali woman. She turned him down and he was said to have used his mystical power over the crocodiles to bait the woman. So, one day she magically came to the river by her late model car. She was then snatched by a crocodile and took her to the man. I have always thought of the story as an imaginary tale from Gosha. What is so true about it?

Mr. Patrick Mizimhaka unlike Mat Bryden is a man with vision. Except that if his vision is NOT blurred by a house wife from Somali Lander just like Mat Bryden got his from Hargeisa, He would be a true AU official and African uniter.

It is hard to predict the attitude and loyalty of Somalis, which change like the climate of Ceerigabo, cool, cold, and warm. The social system of Somalis has been impaired ever since we extricated our nation from the yoke of colonialism. There is no reason and morality that can combine the missing components of the failed system of Somalis, hence turning the majority of its people into pessimists, opportunists and dictatorial beasts.

Strategic Security Challenges: The Special Case of the Horn of Africa Ruth Iyob & Edmond J. Keller June 28, 2005 Editor's Note: Following is part I of a 3 parts on Somalia and the Horn of Africa region. Dr. Ruth Iyob is an Eriterian Scholar and a Political Scientis at the University of Misouri . Dr. Edomon Keller is former Director of the African Studies at UCLA and current chair person of the center for Global Studies. We will be featuring the contribution of Dr. Keller towards understanding Somalia-US relations as well as the whole question of the Horn of Africa region. The purpose of this chapter is to critically assess the respective security challenges of the United States , the countries of the Horn of Africa, and the sometimes inter-connected, contradictory policies that have emerged in the era of globalization. Although such challenges are present in all parts of the continent, the greater Horn region has been singled out for special attention in this volume because of the high priority accorded it in the U.S. global war on terror. Globalization in the Horn is a multidimensional process with differentiated impacts on the region and the wider international state-system. This region is both linked and fragmented by its history and geo-strategic location as the bridge between Africa and the Middle East . Its contemporary hybrid nature—made more visible in the conflicts over identity, ideology, and resources—demonstrates the effects of long-term globalization with far-reaching regional and international repercussions. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States has selectively engaged with and disengaged from the countries of the Horn, all of which are also involved in intra-state and intra-regional conflicts. These relationships tend to be conducted mainly on the basis of considerations of real politik , rather than on an appreciation of the interface of their respective national interests with those of the United States . In the post–Cold War period, U.S. policymakers have adjusted their former focus on combating communism largely to accommodating the new threat of international terrorism. The older focus in the United States ' policymaking process failed to pay adequate attention to “the interplay of the regional, social forces at work at a given moment of history.†The collapse of the Somali state triggered the global dispersal of its people. The multiple crises in the Sudan , the unraveling of the Ethiopia-Eritrea alliance, and the insertion of Djibouti into the “war on terrorism†all indicate the need for a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the impact of globalization in the Horn. This chapter examines how the Cold War militarized both the states and societies of the Horn, and seeks to shed light on the complexity of the security challenges that characterize U.S.-African relations not only in the particular case of the Horn region, but also with the other regions of the continent in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The Horn of Africa and the United States : An Introduction Although the United States never had close relations with any African country (Liberia excepted), the onset of the Cold War and the strategic location of Eritrea and Ethiopia astride the Red Sea led to U.S. development of a strategic alliance with Ethiopia that lasted for twenty-five years. In fact, after the Second World War, Ethiopia became the cornerstone of U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa. Following the Italian fascist occupation of Ethiopia , which lasted from 1936 to 1941, the British reinstated Emperor Haile Selassie and assisted him in administering part of modern-day Ethiopia until 1952. However, after 1943 British influence and involvement in Ethiopia declined rapidly. The Emperor systematically cultivated a relationship with the United States , and when the last vestiges of a British presence in Ethiopia disappeared, the United States stepped in as Ethiopia 's main superpower patron. Beginning with the inclusion of Ethiopia in President Harry Truman's Four Point Program, a reciprocal relationship developed between the two countries. The United States was interested in gaining a strategic presence in the Horn, and Ethiopia allowed it to establish a naval base and radio tracking station at Asmara in Eritrea . The presence of the Asmara tracking station enabled the United States to improve its ability to monitor the telegraphic traffic in the emerging Communist Bloc countries to the northeast. Ethiopia in turn received economic and military assistance from the United States . In May 1953, two diplomatic agreements were signed formalizing the relationship between the two countries: The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and the Agreement for the Utilization of Defense Installations within the Ethiopian Empire. A significant by-product of this new relationship was the political support Ethiopia received from the United States for its claims to Eritrea in the aftermath of the War. The United States ' desire to maintain its access and presence in the region of the Horn led to its becoming more deeply involved in Ethiopia 's domestic affairs than strategic planners had ever imagined. Thus, American policy concentrated on keeping Haile Selassie in power and on keeping the Horn relatively stable and free from communism. In this way, the strategic interests of the United States came to intersect historically with Haile Selassie's domestic and regional interests. A series of secret agreements between the two governments between 1960 and 1964 resulted in the modernization and dramatic expansion of the Ethiopian military. The stated purpose of this venture was to prepare Ethiopia to be able to respond successfully to whatever military challenge might come from independent Somalia , which claimed the ****** and Haud regions of southeastern Ethiopia . The U.S. presence in the Horn has to be considered against the backdrop of the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union , particularly in the aftermath of the USSR 's pronouncement in the mid-1970s of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which established the Kremlin's commitment to support fledgling socialist states. Earlier, the United States and Ethiopia had held the balance of power in the Horn when the extent of armed conflict there involved armed militants in Eritrea and Somali irredentists, the latter aided by the Government of Somalia. In the mid-1970s, the USSR drew close to Somalia when the new regime of General Siad Barre proclaimed its commitment to governing on the basis of scientific socialism. Despite the United States' displeasure with the military junta that overthrew Emperor Haile Salassie in 1974 because of its gross violations of human rights, the United States felt compelled to “draw a line in the sand†against the expansion of communism in the Horn. The United States continued to maintain a relationship with Ethiopia despite its turn to the left under its new ruling military junta, the Derg. However, this changed with the election of Jimmy Carter to the American presidency in 1976. On assuming office, Carter did withhold military sales and grants to Ethiopia because of its human rights record. This in turn led to a severing of relationships between the two countries in April 1977. In the process the door was left open for the USSR to step in as Ethiopia 's main superpower patron. The United States countered by increasing its efforts to woo Somalia away from the Soviets. From this point on, the United States saw its vital national interest as broadening its access and presence in the Horn. It actively considered direct military assistance to Somalia , though this assistance never became significant. What did become significant was the indirect military aid the United States provided via friendly third-party countries in the region (for example, Egypt , Saudi Arabia , and Sudan ). Also of significance was Carter's decision to pursue an encirclement strategy with regard to Ethiopia . This strategy was designed to provide countries surrounding Ethiopia with economic and military assistance, and thereby to hold communism at bay in the Horn. The United States asked Kenya, Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and Oman to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), which could be used to project U.S. military might into the Middle East and Persian Gulf. In the process of pursuing what they perceived to be their own vital interests, the superpowers contributed to the escalation of a regional arms race in the Horn. While the United States and the Soviets competed for clients, the Ethiopians and Somalis stepped up their hostilities toward one another. Consequently, the military capacities of all the countries in the region, except for Djibouti , increased significantly between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s. What was also significant by the mid-1980s was the growth in strength and activity of the armed nationalists in Eritrea , the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), and armed opposition groups inside of Ethiopia and Somalia . This created a widespread sense of physical insecurity in the Horn, with devastating effects on human security in the region. Border tensions, civil wars, and the natural catastrophe of drought compounded the problems of Ethiopia , Sudan , and Somalia . The collapse of the Somali state demonstrated the multiple and deleterious effects of both the irredentist campaigns against Ethiopia and the civil war. Shifting Terrains: The End of the Cold War and Political Islam in the Horn The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the escalation of intra-state conflicts and an upsurge of environmental and humanitarian crises in the Horn. The events of the mid- 1980s and early 1990s amply demonstrated the political, economic, and social repercussions of the end of the Cold War on intra-state and intra-regional relations. In Sudan , the post-Numeiri regime signaled the death knell of the prospects for pluralist democracy and secularist government. Numeiri's successors, Suwar al Dahab and Sadiq al-Mahdi, cemented the coalition of traditional and radical Islamists, and they embarked on a foreign-policy path that relegated the United States to a secondary position vis à vis Sudan's new patrons in North Africa and the Middle East, Libya and Iraq, respectively. This course marked a defiant articulation of anti-Americanism that gradually culminated in 1996 in a break of diplomatic relations. The regime of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986–1989) was beset by the traditional rivalry between the two major sectarian parties and a civil-military coalition comprised of militant Islamists who until this period had been kept on the periphery of the political arena. Political assassinations and acts of terror became almost commonplace in Khartoum . Also, unrest raged in Darfur and the civil war in the South continued unabated in the absence of a real commitment to a just peace. It was during this period, 1986–88, that the tribal militias of the Baggara of the west-central part of the country—precursors of the now infamous Janjaweed militia who operate in the Darfur region—were formed at the initiative of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The multiple crises that have engulfed contemporary Sudan —from the western borderlands of Darfur to the eastern Red Sea Hills and the war-ravaged southern regions —can be understood as the regionalization and internationalization of domestic problems long left unaddressed. A coup d'etat that took place in 1989 led to the establishment of a theocratic Sudanese state. On the one hand, the theocracy was a culmination of the long struggle of Islamists against local communists and liberal capitalists, and on the other hand, it indicated the opening of a new chapter of open animosity against the West in general and the United States in particular. An escalation of violence in the late 1980s in Somalia between armed rebels and the government forces operating from inside as well as outside the country led to the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. As a result of treaties with the regime, the government forces as well as the various rebels groups all had access to arms from both the United States and the USSR . More than any other country of the Horn, Somalia demonstrates the negative impact of the Cold War's simultaneous militarization and globalization of local and regional conflicts. The post-1969 modernizing Somali state under Siad Barre “banned†ethnic and clan-based affiliations as ways of mobilizing political support. It introduced “scientific socialism†20 as the only official ideology, which led to resentment on the part of the majority of inhabitants who continued to practice traditional forms of eclectic, Sufi Islam. The dominance of the country's strongman, Siad Barre, stultified the fluid socioeconomic and political modes of organization and resulted in the alienation of Somalis, except, of course, those enjoying the favors of the ruling elite. A result of this societal disengagement was the economic and political exodus of Somalis to the Middle East and Italy. 21 The growth of the Somali diaspora and the community's exposure to the outside world led to the creation of expanded links between Somalis in the homeland and in the rest of the world, and in the process integrated all Somalis into the escalating process of globalization. This was done not only through remittances of foreign currency but also utilized modern communication technologies new ideologies and concepts of political alignment. In fact, the large-scale migration of Somali workers to the Middle East and elsewhere from the 1970s until the early 1980s led to the growth of a remittance economy (much like that of the Sudan during the same period) and the emergence of a diasporic community with political clout. 22 However, the decline in the Middle East's oil boom led to a shrinking of remittances that had enabled many communities to survive while avoiding confrontation with the state. It was at this juncture that new converts to Wahabbi Islam through the Somali Diaspora clashed with the indigenous Ahmadiyya and Quadriyya tariqas (religious brotherhoods) to be later expressed as inter-clan conflicts. The north, historically linked to the Wahabbists because of the preponderance of adherents of the Salihyya (one of three Sufi orders that dominate Somali Islam and personified by the anti-colonial hero Muhammad Abdille Hassan who had studied in Saudi Arabia under Wahabbi tutelage) proved more amenable to the gradual Islamization of its society. Meanwhile, southerners viewed this revival of faith-centered conflict as a continuation of internal differences among Somalis. 23 The growth of Islamic charities, established by adherents to local tariqas as well as new Somali converts to Wahabbism , 24 loosened the hold of state institutions on both urban and rural communities. These Islamic charities proved adept at evading the reach of the state 25 and competed with Western NGOs, whose links with corrupt governmental institutions rendered them useless to the majority of impoverished Somalis struggling to survive on the margins of the state. Such factors created a new political space that linked Somalis to the outside world and highlighted their subaltern relationship to the West. They also displayed the potential for political renewal and religious redemption in the revival of Islam. In an environment where the boundaries of the Somali body politic had been shattered by violence, chaos, famine, and the ineffective yet disturbing presence of foreign troops, Somalis divided along clan lines, ideologies, and religious tariqas throughout the 1990s. They were plunged into a Hobbesian world, where communities were turned against each other in the pursuit of power, resources, and legitimacy. Submerged historical conflicts, which had been subordinated to the larger goals of Pan-Somalism and nationalism, re-emerged with the collapse of state institutions and superpower patronage. Such forces had held the country together for three decades. The north-south divide—between the former British Somaliland and Italian Somalia—exploded into full force, bringing with it the religious-cum-clan cleavages that had characterized the two regions' relationship in the colonial and postcolonial period. 26 Thus the “globalization†of Somali political and ethno-regional conflicts was therefore accelerated by the UN-sponsored and U.S.-led humanitarian intervention in 1992. This resulted in numerous new security challenges for the Somali state, the region, and the international state-system. 27 By the turn of this century, thousands of Somalis had fled to neighboring countries, spilling over the country's borders and presenting numerous security and economic challenges to the host countries. 28 Inside the country Somalis did not fare better, as they were victimized by the arbitrary violence meted out by warlord-directed youth gangs known as Moryan , 29 which, like the Sudanese Janjaweed , vied for control of territory and resources. As the Somalis became ungovernable, their traditional modes of consensus no longer functioned, so too did the universalizing ethos of Islam prove unable to unify the nation. Islamists continued to succeed in communal reconstruction projects, but they did not attract international attention until the events of September 11, 2001 . Following this event, it was common for U.S. policymakers to consider all radical Islamists as security threats. On September 26, 2001, Al Itihaad al Islami (The Islamic Union), which had been in existence since the 1980s, was put on the United States' list of terrorist organizations as well as the Somali company al Barakaat, a financial clearing house for diaspora remittances to the homeland using the age-old network of disbursement known as hawala. 30 It appears that policymakers lumped the Islamists together without regard to their objectives or actions as a “terrorist threat.†They proved unable to decipher the factors that would result in either the “fusion†or “fission†of Somali communities. 31 Somalia, lacking a political center and beset by vying warlords supported by their regional and international supporters, demonstrates a key feature of a highly globalized society where “political space and political community are no longer coterminous with national territory, and national governments can no longer be regarded as the sole masters of their own or their citizens' fate.†32 If Somalis cannot effectively lead their country out of this morass and if the United States and the international community remain unwilling to contemplate a new role other than a watered down version of encirclement by neighboring allies, they risk alienating Somali citizens inside and outside the country. In doing this, they lend credence to the call from militant Islamists for an Islamic alternative to Somalians' Hobbesian existence. It remains apparent that the key to reducing the multiple security challenges posed by an unstable Somalia lies within the Somali nation. American relations with other states in the Horn—notably Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Eritrea—also need to be conducted with an awareness of regional dynamics , particularly in light of the practice of incumbent regimes in arming dissidents from neighboring countries. 33 In Ethiopia , the reduction of Soviet aid to the Marxist regime in the late 1980s had gradually weakened the regime's capacity to win the war against the coalition of Ethiopian and Eritrean armed opposition groups. The regime took harsh reprisals against the Ethiopian officers who launched an abortive coup in 1989. The brutality against the coup makers had the unintended effect of turning the usually stalwart Ethiopian society against the regime's heavy-handed approach and fueled the wars in Eritrea and the central part of the country that had dramatically escalated in 1988–1989. The rural majority, from whose ranks were drawn the soldiery of the Ethiopian Armed Forces, quietly withdrew its support from the regime's unitary policies. Desertions became more frequent in the army as well as defections to one of the guerrilla groups with bases in the northern, central, and southern parts of the country. The U.S. involvement in negotiations between the warring parties provided much coveted legitimacy for the Ethiopian and Eritrean guerrilla groups and altered the balance of power relations between the Menghistu government and its opponents. A number of factors contributed to the establishment of new regimes in both areas, and in the case of Eritrea , a new state. These included: (a) the demise of the Soviet Union and its attendant consequences for client states; (b) the guerrilla groups' abandonment of their anti-American ideologies; and © rebel success in holding on to territorial gains from which the Ethiopian army was evicted. Key agreements were reached between the Ethiopian government and its main adversaries, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF)/Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in numerous negotiations held in the United States , the Middle East , and Europe . In May 1991, the victorious armies of the EPLF and EPRDF marched into the capitals of Eritrea and Ethiopia , respectively, after having secured an agreement for post-war reconstruction U.S. assistance. The guerrillas' long experience in dealing with international aid agencies as well as with the representatives of both the United States and the USSR had provided them with knowledge of how to parlay their position as former so-called secessionists and terrorists to the laudable category of a “new breed of African leaders†now gaining influence on the continent. 34 Past recipients of Soviet largesse, they were now showered with praise as the saviors of their respective countries from both the old threat of communism and the new threat of Islamist terrorism emanating from neighboring Sudan. By 1991, it appeared that the lessons of the past, especially those learned from the cycles of U.S. engagement and disengagement, had been understood and applied to their respective “national†interests by the Islamists of the Sudan , the warlords of Somalia , and the guerrillas-turned-statesmen of Ethiopia and Eritrea . Source: Wardheernews.com

Rethinking the Somali State Ali A. Fatah June 24,2005 The task of reconstituting a viable Somali state is proving to be a bridge too far. To appreciate the complexity of the underlying problem consider the backdrop of the past fourteen (14) years of statelessness during which fifteen (15) successive “peace and reconciliation†conferences have all ended up in abject failure. The monumental cost in lives lost, squandered national treasure—in the midst of mind-numbing, man-made ecological disasters—has not even been calculated. The one saving grace, in all of these, has been the Somali people's willingness to stay the course in their earnest quest to set the nation aright. Through abiding faith and sheer determination, they have able to see the 16 th and, most probably, the last such conference to fruition. To the relief of many, the Intergovernmental Association for Development (IGAD) sponsored, two-year conference ended on a buoyant note. With the election of an interim national assembly (Transitional Parliament) and a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the long-dormant national spirit was rekindled and with it a promise for better governance. Suddenly a number of unexpected snags gathered momentum and began to pour cascading cold shower on the new government's parade. Before long, the Somali people's mood shifted from one of anticipation to apprehension. Thus the elation that greeted the new government was short-lived. Still the TFG seemed a wee bit too self-assured though events were not necessarily breaking their way. Moreover, when it came to action, they waffled. For awhile, the TFG's standard operating procedure was basically to express annoyance at the warlord-led opposition's audacity to challenge the Government (at every turn). So the opposition out foxed the TFG by exploiting the interim Government's miss-steps, of which there were a few. Consequently, their otherwise mulish campaign threatened to all but derail the TFG's agenda, several months before the Government's maiden journey home. The opposition's main complaints centered around two highly contentious demands: 1) exclusion of Ethiopian troops from “peace keeping†duties in Mogadishu , and 2) insistence on relocating the Government to Mogadishu in spite of the City's notorious reputation for lawlessness. The TFG too was not interested in backing down in the face threats posed by an opposition coalition a good number of whom are also counted as members of the Government. After many months of fits and starts, there was much consternation all around. Thus, the polite but stern eviction of the TFG and Transitional Parliament from their cozy accommodations in Nairobi hotels has imposed certain drive on the otherwise lackluster Somali body politic. Fortuitously, this action was a good thing for the TFG. It enabled them to implement the Government's long planned move to Somalia . The extent to which the move will help restore the dwindling reservoir of goodwill that Somalis initially expressed towards the new Government or enhance its somewhat sagging overall credibility remains to be seen. At any rate, the TFG has probably realized, and rightly so, that the move home will more than likely strengthen its hand. Because, from this point forward, they have to work around real socio-political and economic issues as they relate to the existing reality on the ground. The decision to select Jowhar, a stable town that is about an hour's drive from Mogadishu—even on temporary basis—as the principal seat of government was a masterful stroke of planning on the part of the Executive Branch. Governor Mohammed Omaer Habeb deserves much credit for stabilizing the Middle Shebelle region and for hosting a sizable TFG entourage, until the Government stands on its feet, in the coming weeks. Taken together, these events should waft beneficial winds beneath the TFG's sails. The necessities for navigating the chubby political waters ahead would, however, require a fresh approach to governance in the Somali peninsula. Chaos Theory and the Historic Capital— Mogadishu Lately, lots of ink has been spilled on the lack of basic security in Mogadishu with discussions centering on the patently obvious: that the city is frighteningly chaotic. Yet there is more to the situation than meets the eye. That is, there exists a definite order underneath the apparent disarray. As a direct consequence, a new social relation is dividing the population into mutually antagonistic camps of winners and losers, by degree. Those who control the illicit trade of kat importation, the drug trade and the Isbaaro , extortion centers, through wild-eyed militias have been, thus far, winners. The hundreds of thousands of peace-loving innocent residents of Xamar, who are being held hostage by the occupying warlords, are the real losers in this new, troubling dispensation. Meanwhile, the rest of Somalis who want the nation made whole again are in a holding pattern, hoping that the TFG will be able to restore the rule of law. The foregoing is Chaos Theory personified. Unless this skewed social relation is altered, the prevailing unhealthy scheme will continue to fester. There are other important groups in Mogadishu . The legitimate business community is one such group. They often exert influence to maintain a semblance of peaceful co-existence within the City. Beyond that they seem to have opted out of the limelight, particularly in regard to the on-going feud between the local warlords and the TFG. They are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. They do not like what is going on in Mogadishu under the tutelage of the Warlords but they dislike an all-out war even more. Along with the Courts, they wisely counsel peace and bide their time. The Subsidiarity Paradigm The Somali civil war and its bloody aftermath hinged on few negative impulses including fear, mistrust and greed, among others. This resulted from the ravages of rampant mismanagement that left the society poor and quite destitute, and the clans virtually on each other's throats. Thus factions of the urban elite, who tasted few imported creature comforts, decided to fight to the finish (with other peoples' kids as their private militias) in pursuit of political power and ill-gotten wealth. Their tool of choice in this misguided struggle has been neo-clanism (which is distinctly an urban phenomenon that has little to do with the Xeer-centered clan system as practiced in country side). So, it stands to reason that the new federalism is implemented in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the articles of federation that have been promulgated by the interim authorities less than a year ago. In particular, the TFG should abide by the imperative for Subsidiarity: to allow that social, economic and political decisions are made at the lowest sensible levels in society (without sacrificing sovereignty or weakening national consciousness). The principle of Subsidiarity is not new concept. The successful, early Islamic administrations have flourished by using decentralized system of government (akin to Subsidiaity). The Catholic Church has adopted it long ago as did the European Union. All have benefited from it, because it fosters the free movement of goods, services and above all information. It allows appropriate decisions to be made by citizens at the places where they live and conduct business. In Somalia such an approach will usher a new paradigm of governance that would expand the economy, enhance freedom, while markedly reducing the ill-effects of bureaucratic inertia (and its corollary: rabid neo-clanism). For if the federal authorities fail to read the governing documents there is the danger of reverting to that which is familiar, namely the failed practices of the past. And, debilitating corruption will not be far behind. Should that unfortunate scenario come to pass, any social progress in the country will be spotty at best and it will be hardly sustainable. Finally, in dealing with hardened warlords, the TFG should consider using carrots and sticks. Some faction leaders will probably be willing to work with interim Government if their concerns are dealt with forthrightly. Others may be set on their ways and would rather continue with their attempts to foil the new administration. To them politics may very well be something of a zero sum game. If so they will probably keeping goading the TFG into playing ball in their own way! Equally important is the imperative for the TFG to abide by the articles of federation concerning the Subsidiarity principle. Positive action in this regard (or lack thereof) can make or break the new federal Republic that is being re-established in Somalia today. Lets hope that the federal authorities would rethink anew the role of the state with respect to the need for a free and dynamic society that would be able to uplift the beaten but unbowed Somalis throughout the country. Ali A. Fatah Washington, DC E-Mail: amakhiri@aol.com Source: Wardheernews

The fractured memory of Somali Independence anniversaries Bashir Goth June 25, 2005 Maanta maanta maanta waa maalin weyne maanta Maanta maanta maanta madaxeen bannaane maanta With these majestic and unforgettable words, at least for those who lived during the glorious first decade after independence, the Somali nation used to wake up on the anniversary days of 26 June and 1st July. These were great years to grow up, the years of African independence, African renaissance and African political consciousness. It was the decade that the most powerful nation of the day, the Empire on whose flag the sun never set, took note of the rumblings shaking the ground underneath its feet in Africa as confessed by British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in his Wind of Change Speech to the South African Parliament in 1960: " The wind of change is blowing through this [African] continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it. " It was a decade of great hopes, lofty dreams, grandeur ambitions and indefatigable enthusiasm to rekindle the African spirit and reclaim the great heritage of the African pre-colonial empires, kingdoms and city states as well as African savage cultures, natural religions and ancestral veneration; the decade of re-writing African fables and history. It was indeed the decade of re-Africanizing Africa after it was deAfricanized since the start of the slave trade in mid 16th century. Obviously the complete emancipation of Africa had to wait several more decades with the Angola and Mozambique gaining independence in 1975, Djibouti 1977, Zimbabwe 1980, Namibia 1990 and South Africa 1994, not to mention the Western Sahara which is still groaning under Moroccan Arab domination and the Somalis in the fifth region of Ethiopia still deprived of basic human rights including internationally observed referendum to express their will for self determination. As part of this avalanche of nationalism and popular uprising against foreign usurpation of the continent's will and wealth, the Somali people were doubly blessed by celebrating the African Independence Year, 1960, with the independence and unification of two of its five dismembered parts. The unprecedented outpour of emotion and the deluge of patriotic literature evoked by Maandeeq, the allegorical she-camel representation of the Somali independence, underlined the enormity of the tragedy that befell on the Somali nation whose geographical pastoral land was carved into five parts by European colonizers. This historical trauma in the psyche of the Somali people which resulted from the division of their territory was also the reason behind the hasty and miscalculated union between the British Somaliland Protectorate and the Italian colonized Somalia on 1st July 1960 . The urge and the need for the union was so strong that northern politicians led by Mohammed Ibrahim Egal couldn't muster the courage to explain to the people their fears about the long-term consequences of the unconditional union. They had no option but to ride the popular tide rather than commit political suicide. The people in the Italian colonized south were likewise overwhelmingly consumed by the idea of Somali unity and couldn't have forgiven their leaders if they had in anyway hampered the unification process. The paramount and understandably obsessive goal of the Somali people was the need to bring the first two parts of the dismembered Somali body together under one flag. Everything else came secondary to that noble goal. For the Somali people, like elsewhere in Africa , lifting the yoke of colonialism was like rubbing Aladdin's magic lamp. They nursed the hope that the moment their blue flag was raised all their ills would melt away and all their wishes would become real. The flag was the rain that would come after a long drought and the sun that would disperse the darkness. This was so eloquently expressed in Timacadde's poem: "...Seermaweydo hillaacdayow Sagal maanta darroorayoo Siigadii naga maydhayow Saq dhexaannu ahayne Kii soo saaray cadceeddow..." The general feeling was that with the advent of independence all social, economic and political ills would cease. Even hunger will not hurt anymore as the air of independence would have a balsamic effect to assuage one's physical suffering. Again Timacadde emphatically brings this home with his powerful imagery: "...Saddex wiig iyo maalmo Haddaan Soor cuni waayo Safrad laygama yaaboo Sarina mayso naftayda e..." Riding this dream of bringing all the Somali speaking pastoralists living in the Horn of African region under the banner of greater Somalia , the Somali people had celebrated every independence anniversary with such pomposity and fanfare in the first post independence decade. The popular mantra of freedom being the mother of all medicine's still held supreme. " Way buktaaye bandhigga geeya(... she is sick, take her to the independence festival) was the motto of the masses that used to head to Hargeisa in long motorcades from all towns, villages and rural areas on the independence anniversary day to watch the parades and commemoration festivities. Mogadishu and southern towns also saw similar celebrations on the days of 26 June and 1st July. The unlucky multitudes that couldn't attend the parades in big towns used to live the memories of the two days through the nationalistic music and lyrics beamed constantly from Radio Hargeisa and Radio Mogadishu. It was the giddiness resulting from such onrush of patriotic adrenalin, which ran through the veins of every Somali who lived in that golden decade that fashioned them to stay supine and tolerate decades of physical and mental abuse of Siyad Barre's tyrannical regime. It was doubly painful, however, for the elderly people who witnessed the independence struggle and lived through the glorious dream of greater Somalia to see the socialist government's slogans taking over the airwaves and the glory and collective memory of the independence days eroded by personal adulation and panegyric lyrics written for the glorification of Siyad Barre and his revolution. All allegiance and splendor were bequeathed to October 21, the day that Siyad Barre came to power through military coup d'etat, while the 26 th of June and 1 st July were almost wiped from the national calendar. Instead of the blue flag with the white five-pointed star, which Timacadde had so adoringly praised its magical powers, it was October that brought rain and prosperity to all Somalis "...Oktoober waa daruur hillaacdayoo, Soomaali u da'doo lagu diirsadee....OKTOOBAR ...". Being a wily old soldier and himself experiencing the thick of Somali nationalism, Siyad Barre realized that the only way he could extend his rule and enjoy more years of glory was to rekindle that old dream of greater Somalia and ride the ebbless tide of patriotism for a few more years. He remolded himself as a modern day Sayyid Mohammed Abdullah Hassan and Ahmed Ibrahim Gran (Gurey) , two fabled Somali heroes, all incarnated in one. He even framed himself as being the invisible hand behind the 13 Somali men who founded the pro-independence Somali Youth League (SYL). His picture appeared in the background of the 13 founders' portrait like a rising sun. With this reinvention of history paving the way, Siyad Barre launched his self-aggrandizing war against Ethiopia in 1977 under the pretext of re-igniting Somali irredentism and liberating Somali inhabited areas (or ****** region) in Ethiopia from Abyssinia 's black colonialism. As Djibouti which had then gained its independence opted to stay away from the Somali union to avoid its territory being a battle ground between Somalia with its ethnic and historical claims on Djibouti and Ethiopia which relied on its port as lifeline, Siyad Barre calculations were built on the presumption that once he snatched the ****** from Ethiopia then Djibouti would fall like a ripen fruit and his dream of being the unifier of all Somalis would be realized. Though October hymns still reigned supreme, the government propaganda machine had doped the people with a new wave of patriotic music. With lyrics such as Minigistow war li'idaa, Waa la isku haystaa wixii madaxda kaa dhigay, Ololiyaay, Erya Erya Erya, Sandulaanu kugu bixin, Ceesaantii mas iyo good madax shabeel leefta, Soomaalida Galbeedeey.. .and a deluge of other skillfully crafted emotional songs, the Somali people were drugged to forget not only the grinding economic hardships and social degradation of the day but also the last memories of the independence music and poetry which were being overwritten by a new and more grandeur genre of propaganda literature. The final curtain, however, came down on the soul and spirit of Somali nationalism with the Somali opposition forces seeking help and shelter from Ethiopia , a country on whose enmity millions of Somali children had slept and woken up over the centuries. With clan militia led by former officers of the Somali national army for which Baxsan had sung "Garabkiinaan taaganahee, Geeshkayagyow Guuleysta..." attacking their former comrade-in-arms and brothers from bases in the traditional enemy territory and with the heroic Somali military poisoning water wells in *********iya and carpet bombing the town of Hargeisa where the first Somali flag was raised and Timacadde enthralled millions of Somalis to tears with his sonorous poem of "Kaana Siib kana saaroo..." and with Radio Hargeisa from where Baxsan's heart-wrenching "Geeshkayagow Guuleysta . .'' was first aired being burned to ashes by the same Somali air force; people seemed to have woken up from a long dementia and every memory of the independence days, independence anniversaries and Somali nationalism appeared to have been nothing but illusions of delirium. Suddenly, people found themselves in a real life irony where the conventional Christian enemy had become a brother and a protector and the Muslim brother had become a tormentor and an erstwhile enemy. This was a true reflection of Sayyid Mohammed Abdulla Hassan's prophetic words: Muslinnimo ninkaan kuula socon, muumminnimo khaasa,Gaal maxasta kuu dhawra ood, magansataa dhaama. Seeing the symbols of Somalism demolished and demonized in a little over than 30 years (1960 - 1991), another 30 years may not be a long time for one to live in the hope of witnessing again the fervor of Somali nationalism swing back to its old youthful vigor and the independence days regain their glory and their prestige. In another 30 years I may still be around writing another elegy for the diverted trajectory of another lost dream or a tribute to a revived culture and reincarnated spirit of a great nation. Bashir Goth Abu Dhabi , UAE. E-mail: bsogoth@yahoo.com Source: Wardheernews

Clan Politics: a Solitary Journey to an Empty and Solitude Pride WardheerNews Editorial June 24,2005 One of the most sacred phrases in the Somali language was uttered on the Eve of June 26, 1960 – the now-famous and indomitable phrases of Cabdillaahi Suldan "Tima Cadde". At the center of what was then known as “Beerta Xoriyada,†or “Freedom Plaza,†in Hargeysa, Tima Cadde's words, reinforced by his unique and melancholic voice, resonated and overwhelmed anyone who had listened them either that day or since then on radio: Saahidiinta lslaamka e Subcisaa Jimcayaashiyo Sibyaanta iyo haweenku Calankay Saadinayeenow Cidina kaanay na Siine Saatir noogu yaboohayow Saaxirkii kala guurraye Sarreeyow ma-nusqaamow Aan siduu yahay eegno e Kaana siib kanna saar Sallaankii istiqaalkow Sedadu kay ku xidhnaydow Sayruukhii Afrikaadow Saaxirkii kala guurraye Sarreeyow ma-nusqaamow An siduu yahay eegno e Kaana siib kanna saar These simple, yet unforgettable phrases were in praise and in commemoration of the hoisting of the first Somalia flag ever, the memorable deep blue flag accented in the middle by the milk-white and bright 5-star. The beauty of this flag, locally known as “Buluugle,†promoted another prominent poet, the late Cabdillaahi "Qarshe", to distinctively liken and link it to the cosmos, and spoke about it as if it were a unique gift to the Somalis: Qolaba Calankeedu Waa Caynee Innagaa Keenu Waa Cirka oo Kala e Aan Caadna Lahayn Een Caashaqayee Xidigyahay Cadi waad noo Ciidamisee Both Tima Cadde and Qarshe who sang these deeply-felt emotion-laden, powerfully and purposefully poetic phrases were the children of Somaliland. In a normal society, both the words and the subject mater that prompts any poet(s) to compose these types of stanza would be a treasure that would remain cherished for generations and beyond. The phrases and the originators would indeed be considered a national relic that it would be beyond the reaches of revisionists. Unfortunately, that is not what is going to happen in Los Angeles, California on the eve of June 26, 2005, when a group of Somalilanders gather and assemble negative energy to denounce that very national heritage left to all of us by Tima Cadde and Qarshe. Even if so, what is there, composed in the form of poetry or designed in the form of an alternative flag to “Buluugle†and the words of Tima Cadde and Qarshe? Apart from the shahaada, a non-descript green,white and red flag, with a black star sharing its center, is touted as the alternative to the flag that is so unique to Somalis. Unfortunately, the new flag that is called Somaliland flag does not capture anyone's imagination. Neither is it poetic enough to engage the imagination of WardheerNews's editorial staff. Worst of all, the themes of green/red colors and the black star publicized by the back-to-Africa movement of Marcus Garvey in the 1900s, which since then dominated post independent African flags, were originally borrowed from Ethiopia's flag. Unbeknown to Somalilanders, these colors and their original meaning have roots in the Ethiopian Orthodox church. Ironically the red stands for defending Ethiopia's Orthodox Christian religion with the blood of its highland sons. As a runner-up to this piece, WardheerNews has interviewed a prominent American scholar who is invited to the Los Angeles Somaliland Convention that would take place on June 26, 2005. Dr. Edmond Keller of UCLA's Political Science department has told WardheerNews that clan politics is a sure way of steering a society to destruction, lawlessness and retardation of development. When asked what his talk would be at the convention, he told us that, although he has not given much thought to this issue, his talk, if asked, would surely be some thing akin to the prospects and problems of federalism. But, Dr. Keller leaves the task of designing their government to Somalis themselves (We will post the entire interview with Dr. Keller in the coming days). What interests our readers most about said convention, which is taking place in our backyard, is some of the personalities that are participating in this sectarian convention. Cumar Carte Qaalib! How did someone of his stature with national and international prominence succumb to such parochial clan politics? Where does such an individual hide and then burry the plethora of experience and the national ethos that he so deservedly accumulated for so many years? And then, Somalia's most known diplomat who symbolized Somalism (Somalinimo) at the corridors of world powerhouses and international headquarters suddenly puts on a tribal hood and tosses away his global national identity! Here, of course, we are lamenting the loss of Cabdi Raxiim Caabbi Farax to the jackals of clan purity and sub nationalism. Clan is indeed a terrible thing to substitute to nationhood. Is there really any doubt in the minds of the participants of this convention - only given the obscure title of Somaliland Convention - that it is largely a convention of one clan? The greater Los Angeles-Sand Diego area has one of the highest concentrations of people who originally hail from Las Caanod, Buhoodle and Las Qoray regions (Sool & Sanaag ). On the eve of June 26, 2005, there would be only one individual worthy our mention from these regions who is expected to participate in the Los Angeles Somaliland convention. As could easily be predicted, that person is Mohamed Saalax Nuur "Fagadhe". That night, confined in the glittering walls of LAX Hilton Hotel, he would be a very lonely individual for he would be the only one from his numerous communities. If things were normal, he would have had the largest constituency at the convention since his community makes up the second largest immigrant community in the greater Los Angeles-San Diego area (only second to immigrants from the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia.) Another lonely participant would have been Mohammed Said Gees. But he decided not to come, probably sensing the lop-sidedness of the convention. For the time being, he has, at least, been saved from the embarrassment of being a token in a convention that is so disoriented to denouncing its own heritage. Its also worthy to mention that Human rights groups that tirelessly work to bring issues of human rights in Hargeysa to light are missing from the scene and were not invited. The debate on secession notwithstanding, it is not common in human society for a community to stamp a disclaimer on its own heritage. The Blue flag, the emotions and the poetry that surrounds it are more the product of Northern Somalia (Somaliland) than any other region of Somalia. Why would someone decide to fold up and trash away the words of Cabdulahi Qarshe's struggle days to midwife the blue flag in his underground song of “Wiilooy?†Why did Somalilanders decide to throw away part of their fantastic history so nonchalant? This act of narcissism and defeatist politics is leading its practitioners to a solitary journey with the expected result of destruction, retardation and political stalemate. Are there seriously any sane minds left among the radical Diaspora community to put a halt to the craze around the myopic revisionist approach to the Somali flag, the literature that ornaments it so well, and the personalities that died for it? Are the forces of revisionism content with replacing the history of Sheekh Bashiir, Faarax Omar and Balaayocas, who have put up unparalleled fight for the defense of Somali nationhood, with that of the neo-fascistic rhetoric of Faysal Ali Waraabe who has taken the mental of leadership in the North just as the likes of Yalaxow did in the South? The culture cultivated among the so-called Somalilanders in the Diaspora and their poor public relation is bent to foster a never-seen-before radicalism that is destroying the fabric and rich history of cohabitation and coexistence in Somaliland. As to the groups who hail from Sool and Sanaag, wardheerNews challenges them with the question of where does their heritage and loyalty stand visa-a-vi June 26 th? What prevented them from organizing their own inclusive forum to celebrate and commemorate the birth of their nation on that eventful day of June 26? If they did that, then this sectarian convention would have had tough competition. “Buluugle†is a national treasure and is larger and more important to be left alone to the forces of revisionism and adherents of clan politics. Source: Wardheernews.com

Originally posted by Mutakallim: كل يدعي وصلا بليلى***وليلى لا تقر لهم بذاك Yeeynaan runta ka sineysan . It is an exercise in duplicity to allude to sayings of scholars without adequate substantiation and explication. The arguments that I have penned have not been addressed much less confuted. At the risk of sounding dogmatically certain, I do not expect to read any counter-arguments. Now, why do I waste my time penning polemical posts with the knowledge that the audience is ill equipped to apprehend it? Well, good Nomads, the rationale behind these posts is to force the ignorant but intelligent persons of these fora to ruminate, read, and ratiocinate about the validity and legitimacy of their most cherished axioms and beliefs. With Salaams PK Mutakalim, You raised thought-provoking questions and points and resigned from further explications. Finally, you said that you aren't here to engage in a polemical debate with Nomads who aren't extensively knowledgeable in Islamic teachings. Are you trying to galvanize the nomads into fact-finding research of what we believe? I find your topic murky. As Ngonge replied, i would also ask if you continue explaining in detail the arguments and counter-arguments of this topic.

We have to be aware of what sets us different than the rest of ethnic Africans. We can't simply regard ourselves racially Africans because majority of the racial stocks that settle in the African(colonial term) continent are of Bantu origin. Are Arabs in Morocco and Algeria ethnically Africans though their countries situate inside the continent? Living also in the west where people are racially categorized shouldn’t change our minds in questioning of who we are. (Remember, the race boxes in which you have to mark while signing an application have only one box for dark-complexioned folks—“African American†at least in U.S.A) The European anthropologist, who went to Somalia in the pre-colonial era, discovered the unique nature of Somalis. He described Somalis as people who are haughty, culturally conservative, and purely nomadic. He took couple of occasions he was involved as an example and which extremely affected his thinking of Somalis in comparison with the rest of Africans he had contacted them. He said that one day, he and his translator got so thirsty and hungry. They both came to a nomadic woman. They asked her something to drink and eat. They promised her plenty of money in exchange of her help. Defiant, she replied that it was below her dignity to give food and water in exchange of money. She was so surprised of the white man's insist on giving her money for food and water. She told them that it is our cultural imperative to invite guests for certain period of time. She then grabbed a wooden jar and poured with camel milk. She first gave it to his Somali translator and demanded him to drink before him. She thought of the anthropologist as discomfited and dirty infidel. After drinking, she replenished the jar and asked him to drink until he is completely satisfied. She then gave the jar full of milk to the anthropologist at his turn and asked him if he wanted to be replenished. After the anthropologist finished drinking, she washed the wooden jar with soap and sand and threw it on high top of an acacia tree. The anthropologist labeled the Somalis as the most haughtiest people on earth. He writes of how the Africans, by contrast, would bend and bow for reverence upon seeing his sight. I personally believe that Somalis in the past were very tenacious in their culture and race. What surprises me is why so many of us in today’s' world have become so vulnerable to Western influence, including the race relations? Allow Somalidii hore sidoodii oo kale naga dhig. walee waa lunney.

I know Eeyle people. They are purely Bantu. I.M Lewish, stated clearly the origin , culture of these people, and how they have been mistreated by the rest of Somalis. I have heard of other Bantu groups. Ooji Mushunguli. The latter lives under the Ooji clan around Juba and Kismayo. They have had inter-clan conflicts and some family feuds. The Mushunguli have kept their language (Twisted Swahili) and they consider themselves Tanzanians. The Ooji, on the other hand, is a large clan. They populate around Jilib, Jamaame, Kismaayo, Buulo Golweyn and BuulaMareer, Up to Qoryooley.

latimes.com : World June 24, 2005 COLUMN ONE Somalia's Welcome Warlord A desperate town invited a businessman to be its military chief. It is now an oasis of stability in the country, which he'd one day like to lead. By Edmund Sanders, Times Staff Writer JAWHAR, Somalia — For years, residents of this sugarcane-farming town watched as their lives were torn apart by Somalia's descent into anarchy. Looters in the 1990s burned the mammoth sugar factory, which once provided 1,500 jobs, and peddled the remains as scrap metal. Irrigation canal gates along the muddy Shabelle River rusted shut, flooding thousands of acres of crops and desiccating thousands more. Shootings and rapes were an everyday occurrence as marauding local militias extorted money from drivers, business owners and even the hospital. Fed up with the bloodshed and tired of waiting for a federal government, town leaders made a bold decision in 2001. They invited a rich businessman from Mogadishu, the capital, to move the 60 miles north to Jawhar and become their warlord. "We had no choice," said Hassan Dhisow, 30, who joined the new warlord's forces and now commands a 950-man militia. "No miracle was going to fall from the sky and save us." In the 14 years since the collapse of the government of Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, Somalia has fractured into a patchwork of feuding fiefdoms, which, like Jawhar, are ruled by warlords and machine-gun-toting militias. Mogadishu remains a no-go zone for even the interim president and interim prime minister, who serve in a provisional government formed last year in neighboring Kenya. When Interim Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi briefly visited Mogadishu last month, a grenade attack killed eight people during his speech. In October 1993, 18 U.S. troops were killed in the capital during an aborted mission to capture one of Mogadishu's most notorious warlords. It's little wonder that Somalian government leaders have spent most of their time this year in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital. But for the people of Jawhar, the deal they made to install a warlord appears to be paying off. Today the town is an oasis of stability in war-torn south-central Somalia, and the region is seen by some as a possible model for rebuilding the collapsed state. Unlike Mogadishu, where gunfire echoes regularly through abandoned downtown streets and bystanders are killed in the cross-fire of rival militias, residents in Jawhar are again free to stroll at night without fear. Illegal road checkpoints disappeared. The hospital director says he hasn't treated a local gunshot wound in two years, thanks to a ban on civilians carrying weapons. "One of the most impressive things in Jawhar is the peace and humanitarianism," UNICEF's outgoing Somalia representative, Jasper Morch, recently told a gathering in the village. "It's precious. I hope the rest of the country does what you're doing right now." The rest of Somalia has taken notice. Some leaders in the interim government are proposing Jawhar as a temporary capital. And Jawhar's new warlord is hoping to prove that even an unelected militia leader can transform into a respected politician. It's too soon to know whether he'll succeed. But it's a burning question in a country where the majority of the new parliament consists of warlords and former military commanders who have spent most of the last decade attacking one another. "We feel there is a national responsibility on our shoulders," said Mohammed Omar Habeb, the 55-year-old warlord of Jawhar, who calls himself chairman of the Middle Shabelle Authority, a body he set up to govern the area. "I want this region to be an example for all of Somalia." Habeb, better known as Mohammed Dheere, or Mohammed the Big Man, is a burly, 6-foot-2 importer who grew up in Middle Shabelle, but moved away during the Siad Barre regime and grew rich trading agricultural goods. When Jawhar leaders approached him about returning, he was looking for a platform to enter national politics and expand his business interests. Habeb had no previous experience as a warlord. But in the absence of a central government, it appeared the quickest route to political prominence, particularly for someone with enough money to form an army. Habeb did not hesitate. "I decided only I could end their suffering," he said. "I dream about being prime minister one day." With rumored backing from the Ethiopian government, Habeb built an army, entered Jawhar and took over nearly everything in town, including the statehouse, where he set up residence. Not everyone welcomed him. Scores died in the fighting that ensued. Some residents mined the roads to kill his soldiers. Local journalists accused him of arresting those who questioned his power. But after crushing rivals and securing the peace, Habeb today wins praise from many residents for restoring order, even if he had to do it at gunpoint. "He is our liberator," said Ibrahim Mohammed, 80, elder of a farming village just outside town. Mohammed said his hamlet was nearly destroyed during clashes before Habeb arrived. Their tiny school and mosque burned down. "We have been forgotten," he said. "We can't ask the government for help because there is no government. Now we ask Dheere." latimes.com: World

Jamal, you have made excellent points and i fully understood the gist of your points. They are very powerful indeed if only some of us can understand what you are saying.

The author paints for us an atmosphere of typical gathering and discourse of an educated Africans in an environment where the majority of the population are hardly literate: lots of humor. ---------------------------- The “Intellectuals†of Qudhac Weyn Mohamoud Ali Gaildon June 19,2005 Editor's Note: Somalia's upcoming finest fiction writer, Mohammed Gaildon, treats us with a powerful parable, yet penetrating parody about Somali intellectuals. Almost every night, “The Men from America,†as they were called, met at the most popular café in the town of Qudhac Weyn. They chatted and discussed various matters, which they deemed too complicated for folks without college degrees. English was their main language of discourse. To others, the seeming ease with which the "intellectuals" spoke English was awesome. Particularly fascinated were the younger members of the audience, who dreamed of one day becoming like “those men from America.†There was Guutaale, who arrived always neatly dressed, wearing a tie even in the middle of summer. On most days, he would walk in early in the evening with firm and deliberate strides, pull a chair and sit at a table under a tree. Then he would slowly turn around in the direction of the waiter who would by now be ready for the call, "Coffee, please!" Looking as if he had the burden of the entire world on his shoulders, Guutaale seldom spoke to anyone outside the "intellectuals." When approached by anyone outside the Group, he would turn slowly and take a quizzical look at the intruder. A condescending word or two would effectively end the brief interaction. Invariably, Guutaale's reticence would be broken by the arrival of other members of the Group. Guutaale was the most notorious when it came to favoring English over Somali. Unquestionably articulate, he spoke with pomp and flair. But frequent references to obscure historical occurrences in Europe or North America, quotations from great Western thinkers, and a proclivity for archaic and literary words denuded his narratives and arguments of much needed lucidity and focus. There was Dr. Mohamed, the most competent physician in town. Short, bald and very humble, he approached his work in a professional and methodical manner. An excellent student in college and before, he was a graduate of one of the most prestigious schools of medicine in America. But he never flaunted his excellent training. In discussions, he tended to talk only about practical matters that affected people's lives like health, hygiene, education, jobs, and the daily worries of the average man and the average woman. Never venturing into high-sounding complicated philosophical, political, or economic discourses, he spoke softly and unassumingly and presented his views succinctly. He preferred Somali to English. His views, however, did not seem to carry much weight among members of the Group, most likely because his presentation was not pedantic enough. Whether he sensed this slight or not, he didn't seem to care. At any rate, he didn't frequent the café as much as other members of the Group. Qawdhan, on the other hand, was an engineer who liked to be seen as a political scientist. He, like Dr. Mohamed, was known to have done well at school. He could speak both Somali and English quite eloquently. To his credit, though, he used Somali as much as he used English to express his views. On the surface, he was the most genial member of the Group; but upon close scrutiny a troubled character emerged. Like Guutaale, he genuinely believed that he was of a rare intellectual breed. But, whereas Guutaale showed great erudition, Qawdhan claimed originality. He took obvious pains to convince others of the validity of his points. Those opposed to his viewpoints he either dismissed as intellectual inferiors or blacklisted as enemies. A little sound argument against his position on a political subject was enough to turn his geniality into alarm and, then, a hard cold stare. His prolix discourses, ultimately lacking focus and cohesion, were punctuated by allusions to or outright claims of realized predictions he had made and vindicated positions he had taken. In the end, he was a truly wasted talent, hampered by a delusion of greatness. The Group was quite an attraction. Often joined by government officials, businessmen, and teachers, they thrived as the center of attention. Every night, ordinary customers of the café looked forward to the arrival of members of the Group and the interesting discussions that followed. Sitting a few yards from them and ready to take their orders, the waiters too enjoyed the Group's conversations. The discussions typically started with a reference to something heard or seen that day. Then, even though the issue might be deeply rooted in Somali life, culture and society, it would invariably lead to a topic barely related to the one at hand. Most non-members of the Group would nod their heads in submission. And the few intellectually curious and courageous enough to put their own ideas forth would find their voices drowned by torrents of English vocabulary. Quoting a Somali sage or reciting a Somali poem to buttress arguments elicited only cursory notices and deprecatory tosses of the head which seemed to be saying, "This is not what we came here for." Most college graduates from Italy, the Soviet Union and Arab countries felt intimidated by the flamboyant display of English. They too had to be docile, or else cease to participate in the discussions. Expressions like "ABSOLUTELY", "IT IS QUITE SIMPLE", "IT IS MORE COMPLICATAED THAN THAT" and "HAVE YOU EVER READ…" dominated the discussions and variously entertained, intimidated, and irritated the audience. Then one night, Dr. Mohamed showed up in an agitated state of mind. He sat down and ordered coffee. After a single sip he started to talk. The doctor explained how tuberculosis was ravaging the population and how the hospital had great difficulty coping with it. The x-ray machine was rather unreliable. There were few films left. The TB ward was too small. There was a need for new mattresses and new utensils. Still, a more urgent problem loomed large: the hospital had only a two weeks' supply of TB medicine. By his most optimistic estimation, he explained, it would take the government at least four months to deliver new supplies of medicine. "I cannot face my TB patients knowing that I will soon have no medicine to give to them," lamented the doctor. He paused and looked around him with pleading eyes. Then he continued. "Can we collect money from the business community and government workers? We need a minimum of $3,000, and the sooner the better. With the help of charity organizations and, hopefully, the approval of our government, we can obtain a good supply of medicine at discount prices from Italy. But we really need to act fast." Again, he looked around anxiously. Everyone gasped at the looming horror recounted by the doctor. Everyone that is, except Guutaale and Engineer Qawdhan. "We must do something," "good idea," and "count me in" reverberated among the small crowd. Guutaale and Engineer Qawdhan, though, as if by prior agreement, waited for emotions to ebb. Then, "Gentlemen," said Qawdhan in an assertive manner, "Had my paper of two years ago been followed, we would not have found ourselves in this mess. We need to have vision and look at the big picture. If we widen our scope, scientifically identify the main problems, draw a plan to tackle them and, then, systematically and assiduously implement the plan, we will not need to worry about the minor problems because, naturally, they will be taken care of. Stopgap measures will not work." The engineer paused for effect before he added, "Read my paper. It is all there.†To drive the point home, he finished by raising his chin, looking sharply straight ahead, clasping his lips tightly, and then nodding in agreement with himself. Attention shifted to Guutaale. All turned to him for his opinion. Engineer Qawdhan's position was clear: he was not going to help the doctor go around hat in hand for the soon-to-be-stranded TB patients. Guutaale's opinion on the matter could tip the scales in favor of the good doctor. But, savoring the moment, Guutaale took his time. Then finally, after what seemed to be an eternity, Guutaale took a few puffs on his pipe and spoke. "Education, education, education,†He said, gesturing with his pipe. “Education is the key. We have to give priority to education, for it is the only thing that can take us out of the benighted age we are in. We need to build more schools, train more teachers and send our best high school graduates to Britain and America for college. We need to motivate our people to read and understand how the developed world has come to be. If we take care of education, sooner or later the rest will take care of itself." Clearly, no less amused with his delivery than Engineer Qawdhan was with his, Guutaale reached for his coffee and took what must have been a particularly tasteful sip. There were murmurs and whispers. Stunned, Dr. Mohamed turned toward the audience. Uncertainty had displaced the initial enthusiasm among the audience. Sensing the tide had turned against him, the good doctor smiled sheepishly and rose, grabbing his loose pants by the waist and hiking them up. He never returned to the café. Mohamoud Ali Gaildon Source: Wardheernews

SOMALIA-TANZANIA: Government grants Somali refugees citizenship 20 Jun 2005 09:56:10 GMT Source: IRIN DAR ES SALAAM, 20 June (IRIN) - As part of activities to mark the World Refugee Day, the government of Tanzania is due to grant citizenship on Monday to the first 182 of 1,320 Somali refugees, a UN official said. The representative of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Tanzania, Chrysantus Ache, said on Friday that a naturalisation ceremony would be held at a refugee camp in Chogo village, in the northeastern Tanga region, which is home to 472 Somali refugee families. Those to receive citizenship are from 44 families, Ache added. He said the UNHCR and the Tanzanian government authorities were considering the applications for citizenship from a total of 1,320 Somali refugees. The refugees, referred to as Somali Bantus, number about 3,000 in total and are said to be descendants of slaves who were captured from Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania by a ruler of Zanzibar and other slave traders and sold into Somalia. Their forefathers were from the Zigua and Zaramo ethnic communities, who live in Tanga region and, in the early 19th Century, were taken by slavers to work on plantations and industries in Somalia. After slavery officially ended at the turn of the century, the Somali Bantu remained in Somalia. Due to the physical landscape and the attitudes of other ethnic groups, the environment made for a difficult return home. Instead, they worked on plantations as labourers, some settled in cities and others were conscripted into the army. According to Tanzanian government officials, the first group of about 1,000 Somali Bantus arrived in the country in 1992 after they fled Somalia when Mohammed Siad Barre's presidency ended in 1991. A majority of Somalis are of Cushitic stock and are mainly tall, with sharp facial features while Bantus are mainly of a shorter and stockier build. The Somali Bantu, clearly distinguishable because of their features, were excluded from the traditional Somali clan network and, as a result, were often treated as second-class citizens. Meanwhile, the Tanzanian government has renewed its call for international cooperation in shouldering the burden of refugees in host countries, saying people who flee from persecution and war in their homes need compassion and support. "It is unfortunate international cooperation, particularly in the level of resources being made to refugees, is continually dwindling as the number of refugees keeps on rising," Omar Ramadhani Mapuri, the minister for home affairs said on the eve of the World Refugees Day. "It is important, therefore, that while the world is reflecting on the lasting and sustainable solution to the refugee problem more resources should be made available to the displaced people, rather than leaving the burden to cripple host nations," he said. Tanzania hosts about 500,000 refugees under the UNHCR, mostly from neighbouring Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are also hundreds of refugees from Somalia and other African countries and at least 200,000 others living in villages not under the UN refugee agency.

Indeed, the article is an inspiring and illuminating one. I thank the author for his endeavor to raise such questions of monumental importance. I think also, I should credit him for the term, "Oralism", I haven't heard of it before this article though i knew that Somalis are considered to be an oral society. As he said, there is a big gap of misunderstanding and distortions of historic knowledge between the generations of Somalis, particularly the current generation vs. the old one. Writing our history is one of the remedial sources we can make a difference and salvation.

Such a great article _________________________________________-_____ Warlordism, Oralism, CLanism and The Murky Waters of Somali History Ismail Ali Ismail (Geeldoon) June 7, 2005 “Prejudice is the ink with which we write history†Mark Twain Wherefore Art Thou History? Those Somali Anglophiles who must have read Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet will find a familiar ring about this subtitle. I feel much the same way about our history as Juliet did about Romeo when she cried, “Wherefore art thou Romeoâ€, and I am always bothered whenever I recall the belligerent harangue of a certain Debela Dinsa who, as a member of the Dergue, had been put in charge of mobilizing the Ethiopian masses against our country in the 1977/78 war. In war one can understand the incendiary role of the propaganda machine, but what bothered me most was his well-publicized and so frequently repeated assertion that the war was “between people who have history and people who have no historyâ€. On reflection, however, I find his assertion plausible and I ask myself: ‘Where is our history?' The Ethiopians claim a history of three thousand years even though we know that Abyssinia , the previous name of Ethiopia , was established by Menelik only in the 19 th century. Menelik claimed that Ethiopia extended from Khartoum in the North to Lake Victoria in the South and many Ethiopians believe that to be true. Similarly, Haile Sellassie claimed at one time that Somalia was part of Ethiopia prior to the advent of European colonialism which, as he said, carved up Somalia out of Ethiopian territory. This claim, fictitious though it was, was supported by Sylvia Pankhurst, not only in her book, Somalia, but also in a number of her campaigns in promoting that claim. We would have probably become Ethiopians had it not been for the SYL which at that crucial time awakened Somali nationalism in all Somali-inhabited areas – including what is now the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia . The British Labor Government had also a different idea – a plan for the formation of a Greater Somalia. That plan was killed at infancy by the Soviet Union . But, the Governor of Somaliland, Sir Gerald Reece (known to the Somalis as Kama Kame) was also fiercely opposed to Ms. Pankhurst and served as her antidote. Prior to his appointment as Governor of Somaliland Sir Gerald was the Provincial Commissioner of the NFD where his pro-Somali leanings were very well-known; for he was an admirer of Lord Delamere, the founder of Kenya, who owed his life to a Somali, called Abdalla Ashour, who saved him from the grip of the lion that was mauling him. Lord Delamere was so grateful that he used to say (and this is documented, by the way) that any colonial officer who disliked Somalis was one who hated him. Sadly, all that happened in that era is recorded in scattered bits and pieces and in books which have long been out of print. But, we Somalis have been independent and sovereign for nearly half a century. We may dismiss the last fifteen years as sheer wastes, but they are none the less part of our unrecorded historical record. We have been making history all along; for the wheel of history can neither be stopped nor slowed down. But no one can tell the likes of Debela Dinsa when our history began or where they can read about it. The Makers of Somali History. Our history is made by us but recorded by others piecemeal with all their prejudices, distortions, misconceptions and misunderstanding. World historians showed no interest because in their eyes Somalia , unlike Egypt for example, was never fertile or rich in history. To my knowledge there are no Somali historians, excepting Professor Sa'id Samatar, though there are quite a few Somalis who specialized in history as a subject. It is my view that to read history is quite different from becoming a historian, but I do appreciate the enormous difficulties that discourage our history specialists from rising to the challenge of writing our history. The dearth of historical material comes readily to mind. Even whatever little we had of colonial records have been permanently locked away and allowed to be devoured and reduced to dust by the termites. Those records were, of course, of no value to our policymakers who were largely uneducated and some of whom were even barely literate. And those very few administrators who were literate enough to make use of those files, surveys, studies and other documents merely succumbed to the oral tradition which made them averse to reading and researching. It has been alleged that Bile Rafle incinerated, when he was a military governor of Hargeisa, the “entire collection of the library†which the British bequeathed to the new State because, being, as charged, an “ignorant†person ( jaahil ) who could not understand that he was setting a national treasure – something of a heritage – on fire. The truth is that the British did not leave anything of value for us. First, they burnt, with some justification, all the important, sensitive and therefore confidential files which would have given us some valuable insights into their designs and policies. Secondly, they left some open and confidential files which gave no inkling as to their secrets. Thirdly, they also left behind few journals and books of a general nature and stocked them in a very small room which they called “Secretariat Libraryâ€. Scarcely anyone made use of that room since the British left. I even doubt that it was ever opened – except on rare occasions - when somebody would venture inside to see what was available. I first saw this library in 1960 when I started my service with the Somali government in Hargeisa upon graduation from a Secondary School in Aden . It was then in a very good shape. I also saw the ‘library' on a number of occasions when I was District Commissioner of Hargeisa in the mid 60s and found it to be in a sorry state. But when I approached Bile in 1975 to let me borrow some of the reports or documents he told me “that place is a stinking garbage; what can you get from it?†I insisted and managed to get two reports on salary surveys and a dilapidated and torn copy each of the Local Authority Ordinance of 1952 and the Indian Law of Evidence which I have kept since then. Bile and I have been on the best of terms since the days we served together in Burao – he as the military governor and I (a civilian) as his deputy. Those were the days when the top positions in the field administration were the exclusive preserve of military officers. This story, however, does not only exonerate Bile but it also demonstrates, like so many other stories, which are without any foundation whatsoever, but also how events are misconstrued or distorted by people who neither witnessed them nor heard them from authentic sources. I sometimes wonder in total amazements how young people write distorted versions of our history in the websites, and I have seen contradictory accounts being portrayed as authentic historical events. I do not blame those people, for the fault lies, first and foremost with those who themselves made history but left nothing in terms of written memoirs or even oral recordings for posterity. I have in mind people like Abdullahi Isse, Mohammed Haji Hussein, Adan Abdulle Osman, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, Abdurazak Haji Hussein, Abdurasheed Ali Sharmarke, Ahmed Haji Du'ale, Michael Mariano, Jama Abdullahi Ghalib and others who made history and have not left anything for us. Some of them are still with us in fact and can be and should be persuaded to leave something of a heritage for the country. I remember having a post-prandial conversation with the late Michael Mariano in my home in Addis Ababa some decades ago in the course of which I earnestly asked him to pass on his rich historical experience to the younger generations but he complained about the government putting obstacles in his way. I had a similar discussion with Jama Abdullahi Ghalib (first Speaker of our National Assembly) who now lives in Lusaka ( Zambia ). Jama and I became good friends, although we belong to two different generations, when I took up residence in Zambia upon transfer from Addis Ababa in 1998. He has a lot of history to tell, but he was not also in the mood of leaving anything behind. I understand that the late Mr. Egal left behind so many historical documents which are now in the possession of his widow. Someone, perhaps his children, should weave the various parts together and give us a coherent historical record from the perspective of the late Mr. Egal. Luckily we also have living historical repositories in Abdurazak Haji Hussein and Ahmed Haji Du'ale. Both live in the United States and have the facilities to enable them give us their versions of history. But I think it is safe to assume that because of his advanced age former President Adan Abdulle Osman is not in a position to write or even dictate his contribution. Maybe his sons are in a position to write about their father just the same way Margaret Truman wrote about her father- President Harry S. Truman. But twenty-one years of military rule must have their place of history. The primary source for this period is, without question, those members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council who are still alive. We need someone who can tell us objectively how the revolution was planned and executed and the role, if any, of the Soviet Union in it. A key figure is, of course, Gen. Mohammed Ali Samatar who was as instrumental in changing the direction of the country as in the military buildup. He also directed the war with Ethiopia and entered into negotiations to reassure and neutralize the Soviet Union. That was a time when the West was also keen to extricate Somalia from the Soviet block and was believed by to have made some overtures to the Somali regime which the latter was not quick enough to grasp. Ali Samatar was privy to and a key player in all that happened behind the curtain in that crucial period when huge and more powerful forces were arrayed against us comprising Soviet generals and materiel as well as South Yemeni and Cuban forces beside the Ethiopians. After our defeat – we prefer to call it withdrawal – an Ethiopian colleague said to me jokingly, “ Ismail, we taught you Somalis a lesson†and I replied to him, also jokingly, “Yes, but the lesson was in Russian, not in Amharicâ€. He looked at me and simply walked away. Today, all I read about that war was that the Ethiopians routed the Somalis. Ethiopian academics spread that lie every day. We never see a Somali version of that bit of our history anywhere; even Somali writers echo the same lies. Ali Samatar can put the record straight by providing a written and authoritative account of what actually happened. We also need to know – and posterity will need to know – his answer to the serious accusations that have been laid to his account, particularly in so far as the strafing from the air of women and children fleeing from the fighting in Hargeisa were concerned. The public have heard from the accusing side and it is only fair to hear also from Ali Samatar. He is gifted with cogent reasoning and lucidity of presentation, and he can surely make a great contribution in filling the yawning gap in our history. It cannot be gainsaid that our leaders – military and civilians alike – have put a lid on our history and by so doing have kept us in the dark. We badly need explanations and clarifications; otherwise, rumors will establish themselves as history. An example of this is a story which was circulated in the sixties within the informed circles of our society to the effect that when the late Abdullahi Isse was in Rome in late 1962 or early 63 negotiating as foreign minister with his British interlocutor on the NFD the British offered us three instead of the six districts to join Somalia. It is said that Abdullahi was inclined to accept the proposed compromise but that the late Abdurasheed Ali Sharmarke who was Prime Minister then flew all the way from China where he was visiting to Rome where he joined the talks and took the position of ‘all or nothing'. The talks broke down as a result and we ended up with nothing. I have also been told that Kenneth Kaunda in his later efforts to mediate between Somalia and Kenya managed to convince Mr. Kenyatta to give away the three purely Somali districts in Northern Kenya to Somalia . But, I am told, when the two sides (the Somali side and the Kenyan) met in Arusha Mr. Egal forestalled the process of negotiation by making a hasty declaration that Somalia had no claim against Kenya . I am told Kenyatta was so ecstatic that he jumped to his feet and embraced Mr. Egal calling him “My Brotherâ€, that and one could see Kenyatta shedding tears of joy. The Arusha Memorandum of Understanding of 1967 actually states that the dispute between the two countries would be solved amicably. I am not sure if the two leaders met again, but if the story is true (and the person who told me says he heard it from Kaunda himself) it would mean that the same opportunity presented itself once more and was bungled by a Prime Minister. I cannot say whether any of these two stories is authentic or apocryphal but they underscore the fact that we have no factual accounts to go by. Another group that can shed some light on the happenings of those two decades of military rule are those civilians who served as ministers in that era. None of them – with the sole and single exception of Jama Mohammed Ghalib – wrote anything about that period. It has been said that “History is nothing more than the defamation of the dead†and this is more true about where dictators are concerned. It is safe now to write anything about that period but if a writer elicits some bitterness the intelligent reader will still be able to see the wood from the trees. Bitterness, like lavish praise, will, without doubt, detract from the quality of the work and should be avoided. In any case we need this group to give us and the future generations the benefit of their experience. The Collaborators of the History Makers This group comprises the higher civil servants such as permanent secretaries, ambassadors, legal experts, advisers and in some instances party functionaries. Here is a class of old fogies who can help us narrow our historical gap. They did not only help the politicians to make history but they also have what many of the politicians lacked: the ability to write and analyze. They are better educated and many have coupled solid experience with their university education and/or professional qualifications. Nor were they constrained by an official secrets act as are British civil servants. Sadly, again, none of them gave us the benefit of his or her experience. Here in the United States we all know that officials give their own versions of history; Harry Hopkins, Sorenson, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Brezezinski and so many others all wrote about the historical events they were a party to or they witnessed. In our case, I think Ambassador Ahmed Mohammed Adan (Qaybe) was privy to many negotiations with the Soviet Union and he was our ambassador to Washington, ambassador to the U.N. and U.K., permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and last Foreign Minister of the Said Bare regime. I feel sure that he has a lot to tell us. I know he can write and he writes beautifully. He is now making history in Hargeisa and I think he should consider it a national duty to write his memoirs before his pen and his memory run dry. I can also think of Ambassador Abdullahi Sa'id Osman who was privy to many occurrences and has that lawyerly ability to write lucidly and put things into their proper perspective. Ambassador Abdullahi Addo (twice a presidential candidate) was our man in Washington at the crucial time we needed the United States to be on our side – a time when the Carter Administration was divided between helping us and throwing us to the wolves. He too can illuminate many of the dark crevices for us. What Can We Do? I think we should take our history seriously. It is important. I know we have destroyed whatever records we had, but at least we have the people who know much about methods and means of historical research and how to get the necessary funding for it. Such peoplecan start the nucleus of a Somali Historical Society. I am thinking about Prof. Sa'id Samatar and Dr. Ali Abdurahman Hersi who can no doubt go into some research and chronicle our history. But there must be many other qualified compatriots who will also consider it a national duty to retrieve and save our history. However, I do not know whether there are any Somali archeologists, but I will be surprised if there are any. Archeology is not a field, I suppose, which can attract Somalis. But if there is sufficient funding and a government that will invite and encourage archeological surveys and excavations we should able to find new discoveries which can put our country on the maps showing the loci of old human civilizations. Alas, it is not likely for many years or decades to have a Somali government which will take due interest in such matters. Our oral tradition has cost us a great deal, and the writing of the Somali language in 1972 did not transform us after thirty-three years into a truly literate society. We are just beginning to have newspapers and even books in Somali. But still we are oralists to the bone. I remember visiting a friend in the Presidential Quadrangle in Mogadishu in 1987 and I was petrified by the fact that no typewriters were clicking, no papers were shuffled , no one was drafting anything and no files were visible – things which we usually associate with bureaucrats. The desks were clean and clear of pens, pencils, ink etc. and the “bureaucrats†sitting immobile behind them were sipping tea or coffee or else talking on the telephone. They were the most unbureaucratic bureaucrats I have seen in my long public service. The oral tradition has relegated the mechanics of administration to the past and I knew that that was yet another sign that our State was taking a downward spiral. The other factor which has a fatal effect on writing our history objectively is clannism. Clan sensibilities are observed at the cost of the facts or else a clear clan bias is exhibited. And there is always the danger of dismissing objective accounts as expressions of clan prejudice. Our educated men and women are, unfortunately, blindly loyal to their respective clans. It seems that their education was not strong enough to liberate them from the shackles of the clan system and to open their minds to the unlimited opportunities we could all have if we widen our horizons and work in unison. It is not possible to write our history without the mention of clans and even when we write a critical essay about a national figure his clansmen and clanswomen will be offended. Clanism continues to cloud our judgment. Those who praise Sayid Mohammed Abdalle Hassan to the sky are blind to his faults; conversely, those who see him as a villain are blind to his virtues. What is interesting is that the division is along clan lines – and so it is with other persons of stature as well. Can we then objectively write our history? My answer is ‘yes'. The History Society can play a role in this by vetting submissions, by seeing to it that claims and counterclaims are fully substantiated and by arranging scholarly debates. I think this is one way of getting around the clan bias. But the Historical Society itself must enjoy a reputation for fairness and scholarly search for the truth. The warlords are a new and hopefully transient phenomenon. But I think the less said about them the better. Warlords will themselves pass into history soon but it will not be easy to write objectively about them by the present generation of Somalis because objective writing requires some degree of detachment. Similarly, we are unable to write dispassionately about Siad Barre and his regime even though we have welcomed to our midst and accommodated those closest collaborators of his who belong to our respective clans. Time will see to it that passions dissipate and cool heads prevail and future historians will give their generations and the generations that follow them unsanitised accounts of our history. Finally, one of the main reasons that impelled me to write this article is the failure to respect our time-honored tradition of passing our experience from generation to generation. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the contributions some of our young people send to the websites. It is as if these young people have not been told anything at all about how and why things happened. There are those who contend that the North in its entirety rejected the constitution in the referendum of 1961. I served as the chairman of one of two polling stations in Las Anod (now Sool) at that time and the vote for the constitution was truly overwhelmingly. The constitution was similarly approved by Borama/Zeila (now the Awdal Region) and by what is now Eastern Sanaag . Only the rest of the North overwhelmingly rejected the constitution. The voting laid bare the clan divisions in the North and was revealing of the political alliances that existed then. But the constitutional referendum itself had nothing to do with the union between the North and the South. Furthermore, it was contended by one of the contributors that the late Ian MacLeod, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies wisely advised the Somaliland delegation not to enter into a hasty union with Somalia. I have no doubt that this is true, but the Italians too were giving the same advice to their friends in Somalia. These machinations were known to the public as a concerted ploy to forestall the union and if Egal and his ministers had heeded the advice of the British Colonial Secretary they would have been stoned at the airport in Hargeisa upon arrival; for such was the mood of the public. The British, perhaps feeling guilty about having neglected the Cinderella of the British Empire (as Somaliland was nicknamed then), had asked earlier to stay on for eight more years in order to build the country and prepare it for the challenges of independence. This was turned down because the British had been perfidious as evidenced by their transfer of the ‘Haud and Reserved Area' to Ethiopia. They had also asked in a similar fashion about a decade earlier for an extension in India on the same grounds to which Nehru replied, ‘I have never heard of a vegetarian tiger'. I am not talking here about the merits or demerits of secession; that is a different issue altogether, but we have a responsibility to set the record straight for our younger generations. But, if the generation that led us to independence and those who came after them did not leave any records behind, they did not proffer their experience and wisdom to the rest of us orally either. I therefore sense that there is a gap in the communication between the generations, which I think is wrong and dangerous. I think further that the websites can play a significant role in facilitating the dialogue between generations. The break in communication is partly due to the older generations' feeling that the articles published on the websites are merely idle talk which some of them, incidentally, are. Others may think that it is below their dignity to argue with the age cohorts of their children or their grand children. They could not be more wrong. I recommend that the websites should rise to the challenge and promote a dialogue between the generations. Ismail Ali Ismail Virginia, U.S.A E-mail: geeldoonia@gmail.com Source: Wardheernews.com

Good News.

In this world, you hear and see horrifying incidents and stories so long you live.

Disseminating Somalia news through Web site is brothers' mission By Peter Rowe UNION-TRIBUNE May 22, 2005 ENCINITAS – For a moment, let's pretend we're somewhere else. Distance provides perspective; for this tale, a better perspective might be gained if you imagine yourself floating through space, midway to the moon. To fully grasp the Hassan brothers' mission, let's glimpse Planet Earth in its entirety for just one moment. That moment? It occurs on May 3, 2005, when the time is: 10:40 a.m. in Encinitas. Abdel Hassan, 39, focuses on his day job as Ecke Ranch project manager. By night, he's publisher of Wardheer News. 10:40 a.m. in Kearny Mesa. Ahmed Hassan, 44, examines San Diego County welfare applications. That's his day job. His night job: managing director of Wardheer News. 6:40 p.m. in London. Ismail Hassan, 42, is at his night job: newsroom chief for Wardheer News. He scours the BBC and other media for details on a big story. That day, an explosion had killed seven spectators at a Mogadishu rally for Somalia's new prime minister. 8:40 p.m. near the Somali-Kenya border. A reader who identifies himself as "Bashir" e-mails a fan letter to Wardheer News. "I currently live in the Hagrdheere camp in Kenya, and I consider myself an upcoming journalist," Bashir writes. "I will encourage you to continue expanding your news coverage and finally let me thank you and please continue your excellent work." Fourteen years of civil war have destroyed Somalia as a nation; within its borders is no peace, no law, no order, and few professionals. A generation of educated Somalis has been scattered across the globe. They are isolated, unable to build the relationships that undergird most civil societies. Or such would be their fate without the Internet. Cyberspace, the Hassan brothers and their readers have discovered, is an ideal place to meet, debate and organize. Since 1991, Somalia has spiraled into chaos, with rival clans engaged in violent and seemingly endless struggles for power. A recently elected transitional federal government, headed by Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, remains in Kenya. The bloodshed that accompanied Gedi's brief visit to Mogadishu this month indicated that Somalia remains ungovernable, a patchwork of fiefdoms ruled by warlords. Refugees from this civil war hunger for accurate, trustworthy news from eastern Africa. For the past six months, the Hassans have tried to meet the demand. They are not alone. On the Internet, there's no shortage of media outlets peddling news from Mogadishu, Hargeysa, Berbera and other cities and villages on the Horn of Africa. "But a number of these Web sites are clan-based, so they're tilted to one side," said Abdullah Said Osman, Somalia's last ambassador to the United Nations (1984-1991) and now diplomat-in-residence at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va. "In my opinion, Wardheer News gives an unbiased, reliable reporting of events. That's what makes it popular." Morally corrupt 'elephants' Wardheer is the name of a village that has produced a surprisingly large number of Somali poets. But the word has two other meanings: "news from afar" and "news that goes far." The Hassans have traveled far, too, although none of them expected that the journey would deliver them to the world of online journalism. Part of a large, tightly knit family of seven brothers and two sisters, they grew up in Berbera. Their father, Abdirahman Hassan, was a Muslim leader in this port city on the Gulf of Aden; he died of natural causes in 1986. Their mother, Amina Hashi, now lives in Hargeysa, less than 100 miles southwest from their home town. "I still call her every weekend," said Abdel, the dutiful son. Ahmed came to the U.S. in 1987, to earn a master's degree in agriculture at Iowa State University. Abdel followed in 1992, to pursue his education – he's now enrolled in a business administration program at SDSU – and to escape the dangers of life in Mogadishu. After two years of planning, the brothers christened www.wardheernews.com on Nov. 23, 2004. Their all-volunteer team includes brothers No. 4 and 5 – Yusuf Hassan, 49, the site's webmaster, and 37-year-old Abdirashid Hassan, an occasional correspondent. Another key staffer, Faisal Roble, is a family friend and a Los Angeles city planner. Roble is a former contributing editor at the Ethiopian Review, and he may have been the first to sense the potential of Wardheer News. While San Diego County is home to 10,000 Somalis, one of the largest concentrations of East African immigrants in the U.S., Roble realized that this San Diego-based Web publication could speak to Somalis across the globe. "Because of the power of the diaspora in Somali politics, we can be exerting some influence," he said. "We intend to play a role." "We don't just write stories," Abdel Hassan said. "We take positions." Abdel and Ahmed insist that Wardheer News does not back any political party. But they are pro-law and order, pro-human rights, pro-environment. A recent editorial backed a proposed ban on plastic bags in Somaliland, Somalia's semi-autonomous northern region. Wardheer News is also anti-warlord, with a vengeance. Abdel's March 5 editorial, "The Elephant in the Room," accused the warring factions of being "thuggish looters," a pack of "morally corrupt" "career politicians" who "hold hostage the fate of the Somali nation." In person, the brothers can be just as impassioned. Judging by the way they complete each other's sentences, on this matter at least, they are of one mind. Abdel: "Mogadishu is the most important city in the country. There, some of the key warlords are against any solution." Ahmed: "Any solution at all." Abdel: "Because they are destroying ..." Ahmed: "They are using ..." Abdel: "The airport, the port ... Ahmed: "The national infrastructure ..." Abdel: "The national assets for their own private use." Well beyond 'Wow!' Like many Somali refugees, Ahmed and Abdel Hassan are well-educated and well-spoken. Their English is rapid, fluent, lightly-accented. Emotion sweeps across their faces with the speed of a desert storm: anger, humor, contemplation. They also exude a gentle humility. Journalism isn't their game, and their low expectations for Wardheer News initially seemed justified. At first, the site averaged less than 90,000 hits a month. "And that was 'Wow!'" Abdel said of his team's reaction. These days, Wardheer News is well beyond "Wow!" By April, traffic had increased 10-fold. This month, they were on track to draw more than 1 million visitors. Readers say they appreciate the site's even-handed treatment of Somalia's tangled politics and the reasonable tone of its op-ed columns and "Talk of the Town" articles by freelancers. "This is a site where intellectuals can debate issues," said Abdiweli Heibeh, a San Diego police officer and an occasional Wardheer News contributor. The site's news stories are supplied by an eclectic array of sources, from Al-Jazeera to the Pentagon, from London's Daily Telegraph to Agence France-Presse. This comprehensive, open-minded approach appeals to Mohamed M. Garad, a retired diplomat whose career included stints as Somalia's ambassador to Nigeria, Uganda and Qatar. "Wardheer is a Web site of high quality for objective and balanced news," Garad said from his home in Maryland. "It is run by young, educated, highly dedicated Somalis." Already a hit with readers, Wardheer News is starting to attract advertisers. The Web site is sprinkled with classified notices: "Meet Somali Guys & Girls," "Somalia Music News." And the brothers Hassan were approached by a potential advertiser, a company that wires money from the U.S. to Somalia. Like media moguls everywhere, they continue to re-examine and refine their product. Lately, they've been mulling over a new feature, a column on health and medicine. They've already lined up a well-qualified author, an M.D. at the University of Minnesota Medical School. "Our brother is a doctor," Ahmed Hassan said. "Dr. Mohamed Hassan." ALL IN THE FAMILY Wardheer News, a San Diego-based Internet outfit that reports on the Somali region, is run by Somalis on three continents – Africa, Europe and North America. Most of the volunteer staff is composed of the Hassan brothers. They are: ABDIKARIM "ABDEL" HASSAN Age: 39 Wardheer News position: Publisher Day job: Project manager, Ecke Ranch, Encinitas AHMED HASSAN Age: 44 Wardheer News position: Managing director Day job: Human services specialist, County of San Diego DR. MOHAMED HASSAN Age: 47 Wardheer News position: Under negotiation; possible health and medicine columnist Day job: Physician, University of Minnesota Medical School YUSUF HASSAN Age: 49 Wardheer News position: Webmaster Day job: Salesman, Frye's Electronics, San Marcos ISMAIL HASSAN Age: 42 Wardheer News position: Newsroom chief Day job: Economist, London ABDIRASHID HASSAN Age: 37 Wardheer News position: Contributing editor Day job: Co-owner, Hargeysa Spring Water, Somalia San Diego Union Tribune

Taleexijr, my friend from SD. I just posted the same article two days ago. You haven't scrolled the General threads down perhaps. By the way, let us sense your active participation around here.

Very sad..............

Disseminating Somalia news through Web site is brothers' mission SD Tribune

A Touching Gilimpse of History and the Reunion of a Somali Royalty WardheerNews May 22,2005 Introduction Amb. Garad, sister, daughter, son & grandson Few people know that the British exiled the most illustrious and influential Sultan of the former British Protectorate of Somaliland, Sultan Mohamoud Ali Shireh, in 1920, soon after the defeat of Sayid Mohamed Abdullah Hassan. Sultan Mohamoud Ali Shireh was exiled to the Seychelles – the islands to which many prominent anti-colonial leaders used to be exiled. Although the Sultan fought against the Sayid, the British thought that he would be their next source of trouble because he was vehemently and actively opposed to British rule of Somaliland. Moreover, having just emerged from debilitating wars, not only with the Sayid but also with some European powers (WWI), the British viewed with awe the prospect of another twenty years of costly and protracted conflict against yet another local potentate. The Sultan – it is worth mentioning – was the brother in law of the Sayid but the two could not see eye to eye on many political, religious and social issues, and the Sultan fiercely defended the independence of his Sultanate against the incursions of the Dervish Movement. In a similar view, he never allowed the British Administration to establish itself in his Sultanate and even after his return from exile, the Administration never intefered in the internal affairs of his Sultanate. As a matter of fact, there is ample documentary evidence to show that the British Administration was so careful to avoid his alienation that it sought out his support for any major policy changes before they were introduced. To that end, the Sultan continued to play a prominent role in the affairs of the country until his death a few months after independence. To begin a long term and cruel exile, the Sultan of British Somaliland protectorate, Sultan Mohamoud Ali Shireh arrived in Seychelles from Bombay (India) on May 3 rd, 1920 on board HMS Odin. At the time when the Sultan began to serve his exile in Seychelles, two African Kings, King prempeh of Ashanti (Ghana) and king Kabarego of Bunyoro (Uganda), and a former Prime Minister of Egypt, Sa'ad Zaghlul Pasha, as well as other luminaries of leaders in the wars of African resistance to the British colonialism were also there as exiles. It is related that the Sa'ad Zaghlul Pasha told the Sultan “your father had spoiled your chances by not educating you; otherwise you would have been a king.†Of course, this was true because his lack of education severely circumscribed the development of his area in to a properly organized and haphazardly administered Sultanate over which his suzerainty would be recognized. But, mind you, there were nonetheless, the rudiments of organized administration which comprised a protocol and decorum (which included a certain manner of addressing the Sultan), a council of elders which he summoned from time to time and presided over; their subsidiary commanders; extensive animal wealth which included more than a hundred, if not more, thoroughbred Arabian horses which both British teams from England and the Italian used to buy from him. The Sultan also maintained a fortress, which is now, dilapidated but still remains a historical landmark and a huge two-story building (which was his palace) in Las Qoray. The Sultan also maintained files, which contained correspondence, not only with the British but also with the Sultans of South Arabia. The Sultan, apart from his strong and charismatic personality, was after all, the product of a six-hundred-year-old tradition, which saw a long succession of Sultans of which he was the twenty-fourth. From Fiction to Fact – Stumbling across a lost blood ties Now, here is what might look like a fairy tale but happens to be a true family tale. On a particularly auspicious day in far away Tokyo, Japan, a Djiboutian diplomat (the late Fuad Awaleh) saw, while walking along a main street, a slender Somali-looking who was going the other way. He turned around and dogged her until she stopped at the crossroads and he confidently greeted her in Somali, which she could not understand. Mr. Awaleh told that he had thought she was a Somali woman. On hearing that her face lightened up and she told him that she was from Seychelles but that her paternal grandfather was the “Sultan of Somaliland†(as he was then known in those Islands) that his name was Sultan Ina Ali Shire,†as she put it. He told her that he knows a Somali family in Tokyo and he would ask them if they knew about him but that he would need to know first what clan the Sultan came from. The young lady, who was a senior officer in the Ministry of Tourism and Transport in Seychelles, called her office and asked them to look in to the files and fax her the name of her grandfather's clan. That was done immediately, and she told Mr. Awaleh of Djibouti that her grandfather was from the Warsengali clan of Somalia. The Somali family in Tokyo happened to be that of Ibrahim Meygaag Samatar, former Somali ambassador in Germany and a resident of Somaliland. To Ibrahim a prominent Somali and some one with a broad knowledge of the history of Somaliland had no doubt whom Ambassador Awale was talking about. Ibrahim's wife, Amina Cadhoole, equally an educated Somali woman from the region where the Sultan hails from, took the job of finding members of the lost tribe. She quickly got hold of the telephone number of Ambassador Mohammed Garad (better known as “Garadâ€), the best known of the many surviving sons of the Sultan Mohamoud Ali Shireh. Garad thereafter quickly moved on to help establish, for the first time ever, the long-sought linkage of blood ties between the two branches of the Sulatan Mohamoud Ali Shire family. That was in 2000 and after so many telephone conversations, Ambassador Garad was able to answer a long-standing invitation to visit his brother, sister as well as his many nephews, nieces (and the children of the children of Sultan Ali Shire) in 2004 in Seychelles. Postscript: As is often the case with decendents of great leaders, Amb. Garad has the natural traits of his father's leadership. A resident of Maryland, U.S.A. and now a well respected elder, Amb. Mohamed Garad is the patriarch of a large family that has roots in many countries and continents, including North America, Europe, Middle East and Africa. The Garad received his education in many countries including England (Pitman College, London, 1962), Sudan (Omdurman Commercial College, 1952 and Bakht Er. Ruda Institute of Education, 1949) and Somalia (Sheikh, 1947 and Hargaisa elementary school, 1943). Amb. Garad's work experience is extremely impressive and speaks to his leadership both among his community and the Somali nation at large. He has a long career in foreign affairs and has held numerous diplomatic positions: Somalia Ambassador to the State of Qatar, Republic of Uganda, Federal Republic of Nigeria and political Counselor, Somalia Embassy in Bonn, Germany. Amb. Garad had participated in many bilateral talks on behalf of Somalia involving various interlocutors from Africa, Asia and Europe. He is the recipient of “meritorious Medal of the State of Qatar†in January 1988 by the Emir of Qatar. WardheerNews

wind talker, sometimes accepting the truth is an alternative solution to our inner problems.

Through consent the individual can curtail the entire political and economic mess we’re swimming in. Things such as clanism or tribalism are myth. They are scapegoats upon which one uses to gloss over his/her own failure or insecurity. Jamaal Brother, An independent identity can be created only when the individual who wants to create such an identity is freed from an outside influence. Our identities had been shaped in the past during our formative/childhood years. Hence, refraining from propitiating to the wishes. wants, and needs of your culture and clan, albeit so unconventional and disadvantageous at times to dissociate yourself from your common identity in an effort to criticially assume new identity, which then creates new affiliations, most people would interpret such transformation as having inherent purpose whether greed or rejection. I believe it would be difficult for individuals under the tutelage of culture as societal constraint to reassert his/her identity. To model such a distinct manner of identity requires the protection of liberty from institutional safeguard and help.