NASSIR

Nomads
  • Content Count

    4,857
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by NASSIR

  1. Tranlated from an Italian Mag. Polveriera Somalia Khatar dagaal oo Qarbiga ku lug yeelan karo SOOMAALIYA OO U QARXAN KARTA SIDA GOOBAHA LAGU KEEYDIYO BAARUUDDA By Luciano Scalettari Dagaalka u dhexeeya Dowladda fadhigeedu yahay Baydhabo iyo Maxaakiimta Islaamiga ah, oo ay Itoobiya, Ereteriya iyo waddamo kale gacanta kula jiraan wuxuu dab ka hurin karaa gobolka oo dhan iyo degaanno kale. Hadda ka hor khatarta waxa ay ku koobneyd dagaal sokeeye oo Soomaaliyeed oo dib u qarxa. Markan marxaladdu way ka duwan tahay: wuxuu isu beddeli karaa dagaal goboleed, ama aag saddexaad oo ay isaga horyimaadaan Qarbiga iyo kooxaha Islaamiga ah, marka laga tago Ciraaq iyo Afqaanistan. Maalinba maalinta ka dambaysa marxaladaha siyaasadeed iyo milatari ee Soomaaliya ka jiraa way sii adkaanayaan. Labo bilood ka hor iska horimaadku wuxuu u dhexeeyey Dawladda ku meel gaarka ah ee rasmiga (ee hoggamiyo Madaxweyne Cabdullahi Yusuf Axmed ee ka dhalatey Shirweynihii Nabadda ee labo sano ka hor lagu qabtey Nairoobi) iyo Maxaakiimta Islaamiga oo bilihii la soo dhaafay gacanta ku dhigay Muqdisho. Maanta marxaladdu aad bay isu beddeshey. Marka hore labada dhinac waxa ay u “xuubsiibteen”: Xukuumadda iyo Baarlamaanka kmg ah oo u qaybsan koox doonaysa in heshiis lala galo Maxaakiimta iyo kooxda kale oo qiyaaseysa in ay adagtay sidii looga fursan lahaa dagaal. Dhinaca kale, kooxda mayalka adag ee xag-jirayaasha muslimiinta – oo ay ka mid yihin rag xiriir dhow la leh argagixisada caalamka iyo Al Qaacida – Kooxda mayalka adagi waxay awoodda kala wareegtey kooxda qunyar socodka ah. Waxaa intaas dheer, in madaxda Maxaakiimtu ay u eg yihiin kuwo ku dhaqmaya istaraatejiyo isu dheell tiran. Taas oo ah dhinacna waxa ay soo saaraan bayaanno dabacsan oo loogu talo galey Beesha Caalamka laguna taageerayo wada-hadalka. Dhinaca kale waxa ay ku hawlan yihiin dhul ballaarsi aan kala har laheeyn kuna salaysan weerar milatari oo ay si isdaba joog ah ay kula wareegayaan degaanno konfurta Soomaaliya ah oo leh ahmiyad istarateejiyadeed. Khatarta waxa ay ka socotaa dibedda Hasa yeshee, khatarta dhabta ah ee hurin karta dagaalka ma aha mid salka ku haysa is-beddelkaan gudaha Soomaaliya. Waxa ay ka socotaa dibedda oo ay xaqiiqaddeeduna sii caddaneyso. Haddii la eego caambaareeynta ay labada dhinac isweeydaarsanayaan, Itoobiya waxa ay Dawladda kmg ah si joogta ah ugu daabuleeysaa hub, qalab, ciidaan iyo taageero kala duwan (Maxaakiimta waxa ay gaareen heer in ay ku tilmaamaan tiro 35.000 nin oo ciidamada Itoobiya ahi in ay ku sugan Soomaaliya iyo 500 oo ah gawaarida qafilan). Ereteriya waxa ay caawisaa Maxkamadaha Islaamiga ah: wararka laga helayo Muqdisho waxa ay tibaaxayaan in ay si isdaba joog ah isaga gooshaan garoonka diyaaradaha Fujeeyra (Imaaradka Carabta) iyo Muqdisho diyaaradaha xamuulka qaada ee Antonov. Kuwaas oo caasimadda Ereteriya ka soo daadgureeya hub milatari iyo tababarayaal ciidaan. Waxaa kale oo sii dheer in ay Muqdisho ku sii qulqulayaan dagaal yahaniin iyo tababarayaal u dhashay dalalka Afganistaan, Bakistaan, Iiraan. Dalkan dambe, waxa uu danaynayaa khayraad ka mid ah kuwa ay Soomaaliya qaniga ku tahay sida yuraaniyamka. Sida la soo tabiyey saddex jeer bay khubaro ka socota Iiraan kormeer ku tageen Soomaaliya. Kuwaas oo ay ujeedadoodu ahayd in ay heshiis la galaan Maxaakiimta kuna gurtaan yuraaniyamka laga helo gobboladda dhexe ee Soomaaliya. Isku soo wada duuboo, durbaanadda dagaalkan intiisa badan waxaa laga tumayaa goobo ka baxsan xuduudaha Soomaaliya. Ifafaalaha soo shaac baxaya waxa ay noqon karaan kuwa mucjiso xambaarsan. Kenya waxa ay kordhisey cidanka u fadhiya soohdinta ay la wadaagto Soomaaliya oo dhan. Taas oo ay sabab u tahay cabsida ay qabaan in ay ku soo xadgudbaan maliishiyada Maxaakiimta, khaasatan ka dib markii ay Maxaakiimta Islaamiga ahi la wareegeen gacan ku haynta magaalada istarateejiga ah ee Kismaayo. Kismaayo waa magaalo daked leh kuna taal meel aad ugu dhow soohdinta Kenya. Tallaabo tan la mid ah waxa ku dhaqaaqeey Maamul Goboleedka Puntland, oo ka taliya dhulka baaxadda weyn ee Gobolada Waqooyi Bari ee Soomaaliya oo illaa iyo haddeer xasilloon, horeyna aanay saameyn ugu yeelan xasillooni darrada ka aloosan koonfurta waddankan Afrikaanka ah. Xasillooni darradani waa ay fideysaa. Waxa ay saameyn ku yeelatey Jabuuti, waddanka yar oo ku yaal Badda Cas una dhaxeeya Soomaaliya, Itoobiya iyo Ereteriya.;Waxa ay saamayn ku yeelatey koonfurta Itoobiya. Halkaas oo ay mucaaradka qowmiyadda Oromo – oo ku kacsan Dawladda Itoobiya – uu gacan saar la sameysatey Maxaakimta. Waxa ay walwal ku haysaa Somaliland; waa gobolka ay Ingiriisku ka talin jireen. Waxa halkaas ka socda abaabul ay hormuud ka yihiin kooxo Muslimiin mayal adag ah oo doonaya in ay la jaan qaadaan ilma adeeradooda Muqdisho. Baaxadda uu walwalkani la eg yahay wuxuu sababey in Wasiirka Arrimaha Dibedda Somaaliland – oo ah gobol oo sannadahaan dambe sameeystey maamul iskiis u taagan uu dhowaan booqasho ku tago Addis Ababa, kana codsado taageero iyo in uu si aad qarsoodi u ah ula kulmo Madaweynaha Dawladda Soomaaliyeed Cabdullahi Yusuf. Isku soo wada xooriyoo, qolooyin badan ayaa hurinaya dabkan, oo si ay halisi ku dheehan tahay ku ugu siqaya goobta ay baarruuddu taal (waxaa laga wadaa Soomaaliya). Dilkii loo geystey Soora Leonella Sgorbati iyo sawir qaadihii Sweden, iyo falkii dhicisoobeey usbuucyadii la soo dhaafey ee la doonayey in lagu dilo Madaxweynuhu waxa ay muujinayaan in iska horimaadku uu sare u kacey: laba nin oo sarnaa gaari baaruud ka buxdo baa is-miidaamiyey ayagoo doonayey in ay dilaan Cabdullahi Yusuf. Arrintaan waamid aan hore uga dhicin Soomaaliya. Waxaa la yaab leh in aanu joogsan wada hadalka tooska ah ee u dhexeeya Dowladda iyo Maxaakiimta, inkastoo ay dhacayaan falalkaan. Laba jeer bay illaa hadda ku kulmeen Khartuum, waddanka Suudaan, wada hadalkuna wuu socdaa: labada dhinac waxa ay caddeeyeen in 30 Oktoobar ay ka qayb geli doonaan wareegga saddexaad ee wada haddalada. Taa awgeed, inta ay nabaddu jirto bay rajaduna taagan tahay. “Illaa iyo haddeer af ka hadalku isuma beddelin gacan ka hadal”, buu yiri Mudane Mario Raffaelli, Ergeyga Gaarka ah ee Dawladda Talyaaniga u qaabilsan Soomaaliya. “Waxaan u arkaa arrin wanaagsan, waayo waxa ay ila tahay in labada dhinac aanay si dhab ah u dooneeyn dagaal. Ama waxa la dhihi karaa ma wada doonayaan dagaal. Waxaa jira xoogaag culays saaraya in heshiis la gaaro. Kuwaas oo ogsoon in uu dagaalka ku dhammaan karo dhiig badan oo daata”. “Dhowaan waxaan booqday fariisinka Dawladda ee Baydhabo iyo madaxda Maxaakiimta ee Muqdisho” ayuu raaciyey Raffaelli. “Waxaan aaminsanahay in ay jirto fursad lagu heshiin karo. Shirka soo socda ee Khartuum waxaa looga wada hadli doonaa sidii loo dejin lahaa qorshe wada jir ah oo ku aaddan amniga Dalka. Taasi waa sidii ay Maleeshyada Maxaakiimtu ugu biiri lahaayeen Ciidamadda Xoogga Dalka, iyo sidii Dawladda loogu soo dari lahaa madaxda Maxaakiimta. Beesha Caalamku waxa ay ku adkeeysan doontaa sidii loo joojin lahaa fara gelinta ay wadaan waddamada u dhow Soomaaliya. Waa qodobbo xasaasi ah, horeyna loogu qaadi karo tallaabo lagu baajin karo dagaalka”. Hasa yeeshee, usbuucyada la soo dhaafeey, bayaanadda ka soo yeeraya labada dhinac waay sii kululaanayaan. Madaxa Maxaakiimta Sheekh Shariif Axmed – oo lagu tiriyo qun-yar-socod – wuxuu iclaamiyey Jihaad ka dhan ah “ciidamadda Itoobiya oo soo weerarey, lana wareegey qeeybo ka mid gayyiga Soomaaliyeed”. Harka Taalibaanka Madaxweynaha Soomaaliya, Cabdullahi Yusuf, maalmihii la soo dhaafey wuxuu si cad ugu eedeeyey Maxaakiimta in ay ka shidaal qaataan Taalibaanka iyo in ay la joogaan argagixiso ajnabi ah aad u fara badan. Gaar ahaan wuxuu Maxaakiimtu ku eedeeyey shirqoolkii ismiidaaminta ahaa ee lala beegsadey Baydhabo. “Waa sidaas. Baaritaanka falkaas ka dambeeyey wuxuu si cad u muujiyey in shirqoolkan lagu soo abaabuley Muqdisho” waa sida uu noo xaqiijiyey Yusuf Maxamed Ismaaciil Bari-Bari, Ergeyga gaarka ah ee Dawladda Soomaaliyeed u qaabilsan Midowga Yurub. “Waxaan innaba muran ku jirin in ay Maxaakiimtu jabiyeen ballan qaadkii dhigayey in labada dhinac midna aanu dagaal qaadin: qabsashada Kismaayo waa arrin aad halis u ah. Waana habdhaqan aan xilkas ahayn in dhanna nabadda la hadal hayo, dhinaca kalena lagu dhaqaaqo ficillo dhul ballaarsi milatari ah. Ummadda Soomaaliyeed si aad iyo aad u ba’an bay ugu dhibtootey dagaalka sookeeye ee 15 sano la soo dhaafeey ka socday dalka. Waxa ayna u baahan yihiin nabad iyo xasillooni. Inkastoo ay ku hadaaqaan Maxaakiimtu in ay doonyaan wanaagga, haddana waxa ay muujinayaan in ayan rabin wanaagga Ummadda Soomaaliyeed”. “Waxaanu jeclaan lahayn in uu muuqalka nabadda ay la yimaadeen Khartuum uu dhab yahay” buu ku soo gabagabeeyey Ismaaciil hadalkiisa. “Hasa yeeshee waxaa muuqata in dhowr ka mid ah Madaxda Maxaakimtu ay doonayaan, ayagoo ka faa’ideeysanaya shabakadda caalamiga ee xag jirka, in ay la wareegaan dekedaha, garoonadda diyaaradaha, kheeyraadka dabiiciga iyo goobaha istarateejiga ah, iyo in ay waddanka ku beeraan xukun argagax ku saleeysan: bisha Barakaysan ee Ramadaan bay xabbad la dhaceen shacab aan hubeeysneyn oo ku mudaaharaadayey Kismaayo”. Luciano Scalettari Wargeyska Todobaadlaha ah ee Famiglia Cristiana Waxa maqaalka iyo tarjumaddiisaba noo soo diray Yuusuf M. Ismaaciil Nuqulka maqaalka asalka ah ee laga tarjumay qoraalkan oo af Talyaani ku qoran: Polveriera Somalia (1) Polveriera Somalia (2) Credit to WardheerNews
  2. "it has slowly but sure become just another section of the heavily baised and loaded tool amongs somali media.. indeed i would say it has even overtaken certain new and amuetarish media, in its obsessive reporting and manupilation of different somali conflicts." nicel put, but bottom line is the BBC Somali service is serving the Brtish interest in Somalia. Ever since, we voted for Italy and the subsequent unification of the North and South, followed by the aggressive position of our leaders of the then new Somali state to cut off diplomatic relationship with Britain, Britain has been loath of Somalia's existance. If BBC is now working to further distintegrate our society by causing more confusion and choas, that is their aim. Somalidu horey u ogeyd in BBCdu aysan aheen media u adeegta ummada Soomaliyeed, "Been been I sii" bilaash looguma bixin. Waa wax iska cad.
  3. "Ethiopia is the nr 1 aid recipient in africa" Equilibrium. Wrong, Egypt is. Only the aid given to Egypt is more than all the aid given to African nations combined. Why? don't ask me, could be The Israel-Arab issue! Somalis are good business-oriented people everywhere they are. At least, something we can all be proud of.
  4. The BBC Reputation and the British Tax Payers Money Become Means to Promote and Convey Islamist Radicals Agenda Jama A. Yacub October 29, 2006 Since the Islamist hardliners took the control of the Somalia capital, Mogadishu, in June, 2006, the Somali Service of the BBC has become the solely western country radio, which has been promoting the hardliner’s agenda. The BBC Somali Service airs Islamists’ propaganda. It is well known that some foreign journalists were lynched in Mogadishu from late year 2004 to mid 2006, and the reason they were murdered was because the Islamist hardliners did not want any journalists who might unveil their real agenda and their linkage with Al-Qaeda to the World. The BBC Somali Service collaborates with the Islamists and employs related journalists to the hardliners. The BBC Somali Service correspondents in Mogadishu include: Hassan Barise, Farhiyo Ali Qajo and Yussuf Hassan Mursal; Yussuf Garad Omar, the editor of the BBC Somali Service, visits Mogadishu occasionally and produces some programs favorable to the Islamists and luring Somalis to rally around the hardliners. All those journalists belong to the same clan as the Mogadishu hardliners “******”. October 20, 2006, Hassan Barise was interviewing Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the chairman of the executive committee of the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC). Sheikh Sharif presented two papers, which he said were identification cards that belonged to two Ethiopian officers which Sheikh Sharif claimed were captured in Mogadishu; Hassan Barise failed to ask Sheikh Shafir if the UIC officials could show the media those captured Ethiopian officers. Instead, Hassan elaborated Sheikh Sharif’s words as if he was the presenter of the case. Finally, on Friday, October 27, 2006, at 14:00 GMT, the BBC Somali Service aired one hour program, from Mogadishu and hosted by Yussuf Garad, which intended to get Islamists’ agenda across and earn for the UIC the hearts the minds of the Somalis. The program was about university students, in Mogadishu, questioning Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The majority of the students were pre-selected group dancing to the jihadists. The means used for spreading that, throughout the Somali speakers, was the BBC reputation and the British people tax money. By Eng. Jama A Yacub San Diego, CA E-Mail: jyacub@sbcglobal.net Source: Wardheernews
  5. waaayo-aragnimo = practical wisdom horaan u sheegey in hadalka bilaa micnaha layska yareeyo.
  6. "if u live in london, i dare you to cross over, go to a member of abdiqaim's sub-clan, chitchat with him and raise issues about the courts, Somalia, puntland and the future. I will guarentee it will heal you and have a positive impact on your whole thinking." What a good advice. lol Ololow ma qof walboo ka soo jeeda qoloda Cabdiqaasim miyaa ah "morally and politically correct". sidee u fikireysaa.
  7. 'That is, tribalism has to be destroyed if the Somali people are to be saved from perpetual internecine war, misery, abject poverty and the possible take-over of their country by more powerful, hostile neighboring countries." DR. M. Yahye Suldan , I think it is something that is very obvious to every Somali person, but we seem to have retired our cognizance of this fact based on political insecurity we hold amongst each other, thereby eroding our confidence and trust fr. and within our most capable leaders. Our neighbors, Kenya and Ethiopia, have come to know also a long time ago of our weakest spot through the works of cultural anthropologists like Enrico Cerulli and Lewis. Cerruli was the first to recognize of our lineage segmentation and its destructive nature whereas Lewis further expanded the subject. This painful spot is where neighbors thrust obtrusively to prevent a powerful Somalia standing on its own feet for their strategic goal--a long term plan for their survival. It doesn't matter "Somaliland" "Puntland" or whatever because we are all the same and internal pressure might induce a potential, recognized state to take a stand on the border issue. Granting "Somaliland" independence , for instance, could also engage in border dispute with the neighboring cuontries, according to their own belief. The people of the North West and North East in Pre-Somaliland have tribal distributions within the Somali region of Ethiopia. So, what precludes "a powerful somaliland" from interfering in the politics of Ethiopia when its own Somali-Ethiopian tend to measure their lives in days? However, we can emphasize this problem and prohibit its identification just like the Dervish and SYL did.
  8. "May be I shouldn't be so hasty in condemning these parliamentarians collectively." That is what I have been preaching. There are many more MPs in league with Asha. But they are lumped together with the few, incompetent ones. The Somali Reconciliation Commission recently set up in Baidabo should be able to cement a working relationship btw the two opposing groups for the welfare of the general society.
  9. "I repeat it is a new brand Image for the same product with the usual functionalities." Duke nicely put!
  10. Somalia At A Critical Juncture, A Status Report From Inside The Somali Parliament Where were we yesterday? 1 Transitional Federal Institutions were established (TFI) in Kenya in 2004. A) Despite well known deficiencies in the system in which the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was created, most Somalis embraced it as a first step in the right direction toward a beginning of a long reconciliation process for our nation and for our people. One needs not to dwell on how the TFG was created in Nairobi. History has already recorded who, what, when, why and how the TFG was established. B Political wrangles began inside the TFG soon after its inception. TGF failed to take advantage of the “short lived momentum” it had enjoyed at its inception. The introduction of controversial policies divided the Parliament. Soon afterwards, the Parliament relocated in two different cities. 2. Badio was chosen as the temporary seat for the TFG to begin the reconciliation process. A) In February, 2006, the Parliament Speaker and the President -in Aden declaration- agreed to reconvene the entire parliament in one location for the first time. Many Somalis again became hopeful that some sort of progress could be achieved as result of this agreement. B International recognition poured in to support the existence of TFG. Arab league, AU and EU have all expressed and provided political, economic and diplomatic support to the TFG and hailed the reconvening of the parliament for the first time in Somali soil as a success. C) The TFG failed to deliver on its promises. One of the possible reasons for this failure is lack of vision. A nation is as good as the vision of its leadership. Lack of a clear vision could lead to chaos and confusion. One other possible reason for this failure is the lack of government priorities; one cannot start building a home from the roof. One must first lay down the foundation. The missing foundation was the reconciliation process which was the only mandate the TFG carried as its name “transitional” had indicated. You cannot transition from the first phase without building a broad consensus and harmony in order to move to the second phase. The greatest TFG setback occurred when the TFG failed to gain the confidence of Somali people whom it claimed to represent. Where are we now? 3. The end of an era for Somali Warlordism. A) To the surprise of everybody, all warlords disappeared from the streets of Mogadishu. Jowhar, Kismaio and Beletwein and their surroundings areas after confrontations with a new entity which became known as Union of Islamic courts (UIC). The UIC overpowered all the warlords and immediately restored long awaited law and order to all of the territories under its control in matter of days. This brought sigh of relief with simultaneous celebrations and greetings across Somalia, from Hargesa, to Bossos, from Beletwein to Kismaio. The Somali people have exchanged congratulatory notes in support for the UIC which they have rightfully termed as “unexpected miracle from God”. B) TFG was caught off guard by the overwhelming support of the Somali people for UIC. TFG first jubilantly supported the UIC as “a Public Uprising” organized to uproot what it called “the long standing obstacles of peace” in the capital Mogadishu. The TFG reiterated that it was these warlords who prevented it to permanently relocate to Mogadishu in the first place. The “Public Uprising” view is still widely shared by many Somalis across the globe. C) It is in this period, while war was still raging in Mogadishu; the Parliament passed a controversial resolution with a narrow margin allowing foreign peace keeping force to enter the country. D) Then the TFG, to the surprise of many Parliamentarians, made 180 degree turn and called the UIC international terrorists designed to destabilize not only Somalia but the entire region. The UIC vehemently denies this accusation stating that the government had it right the first time when it referred the UIC as “Public uprising”. 4- UIC succeeded in restoring law and order in Mogadishu and other areas under its control. A) Mogadishu International Airport became operational for the first time in 11 years. B) Mogadishu Port became operational for the first time in 11 years. C) Safety, sense of normalcy and security has returned to the entire population of Mogadishu. Women and children can go around the city while conducting their daily businesses without fear of rape, killing, kidnapping and roadblocks. These roadblocks were manned by roaming gangs and ruthless militia who exhorted money from the poor, the powerless and ordinary citizens. D) UIC had called for dialogue with the Transitional Federal Government and recognized its existence and held peace negotiations with TFG twice so far and had promised more dialogue with TFG in the future. Where should we be tomorrow? - Federal Parliament should consider the venue of dialogue and reconciliation as its guiding force and the means to re-establish trust and respect among Somali people. A) It is paramount that the negotiation process started in Khartoum between the TFG and UIC be continued. The Federal Parliament should serve as neutral catalyst to pull the parties together. The Parliament’s insistence to move forward with the August 31 2006 meeting, led to the last successful face-to-face peace negotiation between TFG and UIC. The Parliament needs to continue to facilitate the negotiation between the TFG and UIC. B) As the civil conflict between Warlords and UIC has now ceased, the presence of international peace keeping force is no longer needed. Federal Parliament ought to reconsider the presence of International peacekeeping in Somalia. C) The Federal Parliament should establish an independent Commission to investigate assassination attempt against the President. The Somali people need to know who truly is behind the assignation attempt without resorting to any unsubstantiated rumors, agenda driven innuendos and politically motivated finger pointing. D) The Federal Parliament must conduct all of its constitutionally mandated activities in transparent manner. Every important issue impacting our nation must genuinely be debated and voted in a crystal clear manner. The interest of Somali people should be our primary concern, everything else must be considered as secondary. In order to safe guard already shaky public trust in this institution; there must be concrete system of accountibity. The Federal Parliament should investigate and expel from the chamber any member who is caught violating the anti corruption laws. E) The Federal Parliament should appeal to the international community (AL, AU, EU, UN and Somali Contact Group) to facilitate genuine dialogue and peace settlement negotiations between UIC and TFG. The International Community should engage directly with Somali intellectuals both inside and outside the government who know and understand the needs of their country and people better than their neighbors. The International Community must be careful not to repeat the Congo Democratic Republic (CDR) syndrome on Somali soil whereby multiple neighbors fought proxy wars for years in which thousands of Congolese citizens perished. F) Members of Federal Parliament must take their mandates very seriously. - The mandate to bring the Somali people together through peaceful dialogue and reconciliation and not through the threat of gun. - The mandate to check and balance the actions of the TFG vs. Federal Charter. - The mandate to uphold and defend the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Somali Republic as stipulated in Federal Charter. -The mandate to look after our nation’s long term interest instead of short term personal/tribal gains. - And the mandate of our oath to assist our beloved Somalia come out of this long and tragic civil war with its heads high, with its dignity and pride still intact, with peace within itself and with its neighbors. Better days are yet to come and keep hope alive. Asha Ahmed Abdalla Member of Transitional Federal Somali Parliament of Somali Republic Badioa, Somalia E-mail: Asha_Somali_Parliament@yahoo.com Source: hiiraan.com
  11. Mansow, waxaad ogaataa haddaan doonayo inaan wax baddan post gareeyo , waxaan tegi lahaa meesha ay ka daldalmaan dadka intiisa baddan sida Generalka. Laba sano iyo bar baan halkaan ka ahey member, postigayga ma gaarsiisaneyn .7% a day. 700posts/ 2.5 x 365 days/ . Qofku waa inuu xisaabtamaa markuu wax sheegayo.
  12. Mansa, dhibaatada jirta waxa weeye dadbaaba si aadan garaneyn u fikira. Waa dad xanuunsan.
  13. A carefully well-thought out argument. The Way Forward By Abdullahi Dool October 28, 2006 http://wardheernews.com/Articles_06/October/28_The_way_forward_Dool.html
  14. "ego boosting iga dheh" Aqoon yari miyaa ku haysa. What we post here can be used as a backup references in the future. It is not the number of posts that matter. I would have posted so many If I didn't note time constraints, but I value the ideas contained in my articles as well as the articles I posted which might reflect my own opinion.
  15. Red Sea, I agree with Mansa that covering up the situation is worse than our protest. The admin can come out and explain to us technically the problem whether it's a system failure for its database management system or not and how it happened and if there is a solution to it. We could be satisfied and even project our own solutions.
  16. I just listened and people have deeper concerns for the push of Jihaad whether there would be forced recruitment or voluntary. But people are weary of the war and most of their questions appeared to be suggestions to look for other practical solution instead of resorting to war. Shariif sounds honest to me when it comes to our neighboring countries and their direct destabilization of Somalia altho he is rushing to a bad decision. He answered the "Somaliland" question in contravention of the reckless declaration of war By Hassan Turki
  17. He is moderate thinker but his views sometimes don't coincide with Aweis. It seems both leaders contradict in their strategic goal, which spurs my suspicion. In his inteview with Hassan Barise @ Hiiraan, he makes crystal clear that his organization is not a threat to Ethiopia and has never pressed Somalis to engage in war. He argues he expects the same from Adis Ababa and is willing to negotiate for any differences and suspicions of fear between the two. He claims he has no affiliation with ONLF or OLF and won't interfere in their affairs. Don't you think these contradicts the views of Aweeis and pro-court nomads who hail from that Somali region?
  18. " The battle for Baidoa is not the ultimate prize, though. To achieve their goals, the Islamists must hold Mogadishu and eject the secular government and its allies from Baidoa. For their part, the interim government and its Ethiopian and Ugandan allies have to hold Baidoa and eject the Islamists from Mogadishu. Neither of these goals is realistically achievable, however. The Islamists cannot project force to take Baidoa from the already-entrenched interim government and its Ethiopian backers. And the Ethiopians would be foolish to try fighting their way into Mogadishu." The Somali Reconciliation Commission SRC now set up in Baidabo could shake the stalemate btw the two opposing groups. War is not the solution. I hope this commission heed a close attention to these recommedations of Ahmed A. Hassan. http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_06/October/23_Somalia_Peace_Process_AHassan.htm
  19. A little glimpse of history Africa and the War on Terrorism: The Case of Somalia Theodros Dagne Al Ittihad Al Ittihad is perhaps the most active and was, at one point, the most successful of all the Islamic groups. Indeed, al Ittihad is an Islamic fundamentalist group whose principal ideology and objective is to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. Founded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, al Ittihad unsuccessfully sought to replace clan and warlord politics with an Islamic state. In the early 1990s, it had modest successes; it administered territories under its control in the south, but it never emerged as a major military or political force in Somalia. The clan-based groups and factions led by warlords in Mogadishu are secular and have been at odds with al Ittihad, even though some of these groups maintained tactical alliances from time to time with the group. Al Ittihad’s failure to maintain control over territories and spread its ideology led to a shift in strategy in the mid-1990s, when it abandoned its ambition to spread its ideology through military means and began to concentrate on providing social services to communities through Islamic schools and health care centers. Al Ittihad’s Somalian social activities and religious objectives seem inconsistent with its activities in the Somali region of Ethiopia. In Ethiopia, al Ittihad is actively engaged in military activities in support of ethnic Somalis. It closely coordinates its activities with elements in the ****** region that are at war with the Ethiopian government. Several anti-Ethiopian groups are active in the Somali region, and al Ittihad operates with these groups in carrying out attacks against Ethiopian targets. In 1999, the ****** Islamic Union, under the leadership of Muhammad Muallem Omar Abdi; the Somali People’s Liberation Front, under the leadership of Ahmed Ali Ismail; and the Western Somali Liberation Front, under the leadership of Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Hussein, formed a coalition called the United Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, their term for the Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia.4 The ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) also claims to be engaged in military activities in the region and had in the past formed alliances with other Ethiopian opposition groups. Many Somali watchers believe that al Ittihad’s strength is highly exaggerated and that information about its alleged links with international terrorist organizations is unreliable. There is no reliable information or pattern of behavior to suggest that al Ittihad has an international agenda, as has been the case with the National Islamic Front (NIF) government of Sudan. Some observers note that if al Ittihad had a clear internationally oriented agenda, its obvious ally in the region would be the NIF regime in Sudan or the Sudanese-backed Eritrean Islamic Jihad. The Sudanese regime did back regional extremist groups and international terrorist organizations, but there was no apparent relationship between the NIF and al Ittihad. Others accuse al Ittihad of being a secretive group that coordinates its activities with terrorist organizations. Some observers contend that al Ittihad and al Qaeda were behind the killings of the eighteen U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu in 1993.5 Al Ittihad is also accused of receiving funds from al Qaeda. Since President Bush placed al Ittihad on the list of terrorism-related entities in September 2001, press reports and information about this group have increased.6 Somali warlords, especially those backed by Ethiopia, such as the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), headquartered in Baidoa, and vehemently opposed to the TNG, have been actively engaged in a public relations campaign to portray their political enemies as terrorists. The government of Ethiopia has also been very vocal in portraying al Ittihad and TNG as terrorist groups.7 Information from these sources is generally vague and lacks clear evidence. Moreover, neither the Ethiopian government nor others have been able to provide information about locations of training camps, links between TNG and al Ittihad and al Qaeda, or the identity of members of al Qaeda or their activities in Somalia. Nor have they offered clear evidence on acts of terrorism against U.S. targets by al Ittihad. Somali observers note that al Ittihad does not have territories under its control and does not have the military capabilities to wrest control from any of the well-entrenched warlords. In December 2001, however, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that “some bin Laden followers are holed up there [somalia], taking advantage of the absence of a functioning government.”8 Moreover, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers, stated late in the same month that the United States has “strong indications Somalia is linked to Osama bin Laden.”9 In January 2002, U.S. and allied forces reportedly expanded their military presence in East Africa. According to press reports, the United States and its European allies have increased military reconnaissance flights and other surveillance activities in Somalia. Regional Actors and Concern over Terrorism Ethiopia Over the years, al Ittihad’s principal target has been the government of Ethiopia. Ethiopian officials have consistently accused al Ittihad of having links with Middle Eastern terrorist organizations and have portrayed al Ittihad as a threat to regional peace and stability. Al Ittihad has carried out a number of terrorist attacks against Ethiopian targets, and Ethiopian security forces have violently retaliated against the group and its supporters. The fighting with al Ittihad was triggered in the early 1990s when Ethiopian security forces brutally cracked down on the ONLF, a member of the first Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The ONLF joined the TGE in part because the Transitional Charter provided nations and nationalities the right to self-determination. The ONLF push for self-determination created tension between the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the ONLF. In the early 1990s, Ethiopian security forces assassinated a number of ONLF leaders, cracked down on the organization, and moved the Ethiopian Somali Region capital from Gode to Jijiga, a central government stronghold. Members of the ONLF fled to Somalia and joined al Ittihad, a fairly new group at that time. Hence, some observers view al Ittihad as a group largely concerned with domestic issues, although some within the leadership might have links with outside groups. Ethiopia’s principal interest appears to be to ensure that a united Somalia does not pose a threat to Ethiopia and that the Somali-inhibited region of Ethiopia remains stable. Successive Ethiopian governments had to deal with Somali irredentism. In the late 1970s, Somali rebels backed by the Barre government overran Ethiopian forces and captured a large swath of territory. Ethiopian forces ejected the Somali forces with the help of troops from Cuba and Yemen. In the 1980s, Ethiopian dictator Mengitsu Haile Mariam began to arm and train Somali dissidents. Several Somali groups were created with the help of Ethiopian military and intelligence and were given training camps inside Ethiopia. The Barre government in Somalia, on the other hand, provided financial and political support to Ethiopian opposition groups, including to the current ruling party, the EPRDF. Somali rebels succeeded in 1991 in ousting the Barre regime, while the EPRDF forces overthrew the Mengistu regime in May 1991. Some of the armed factions in Somalia today are the same ones that were allied with the Mengistu regime in the 1980s. It did not take long, however, for the EPRDF-led government and some of the factions to forge a new alliance. Ethiopia was an active participant in efforts to bring an end to the civil war in Somalia in the mid-1990s. Ethiopia organized a number of peace conferences over the years, but none succeeded in bringing an end to factional fighting. In recent years, however, Ethiopia has contributed to the unrest in Somalia, supplying warlords with arms and at times sending its troops into Somalia to fight faction leaders. Ethiopia appears determined to establish a friendly, proxy government in Mogadishu. Al Ittihad is seen as a major obstacle in achieving that objective. Regional actors such as Kenya and Djibouti express fear that Ethiopia’s military activities and support for warlords may cause an increase in regional instability and may lead to more refugees fleeing to neighboring countries. Ethiopian officials by contrast point to al Ittihad and the TNG as a threat to Ethiopia and regional stability. Since the war with Eritrea in 1998, Ethiopia’s interest in ensuring stability and eliminating potential threats coming from Somalia has increased, in part because of concerns of fighting two wars simultaneously. If the perceived threat from Somalia and the Somali region is not dealt with decisively, Ethiopia could be forced to maintain robust forces in both the north and the southeast. But a friendly government in Mogadishu or Hargeisa could relieve Ethiopia of the burden of maintaining a large force along the Somali border, saving Ethiopia scarce resources and helping concentrate its forces along the Eritrean border. Ethiopian officials are also concerned about alliances being formed between Somali groups and non-Somali Ethiopian opposition groups. Somalia: U.S. Concerns and Policy Options In late September 2001, the Bush administration added al Ittihad to a list of terrorism-related entities whose assets were ordered frozen by a presidential executive order. Bush administration officials accused al Ittihad of links with al Qaeda. The administration did not offer evidence to prove its allegations, but some officials asserted that links between the two organizations dated back to the U.S. presence in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope (1992 to 1994). According to a Washington Post article, “An interagency working group involving analysts from the State Department, Pentagon, CIA, and the National Security Council has been meeting for the past three weeks to discuss where and how al Qaeda operates in the East Africa country.”11 Some observers are skeptical that al Ittihad is an international terrorist organization or that there is a strong link between al Qaeda and al Ittihad. They argue that there are no credible reports that al Ittihad ever targeted U.S. interests in Somalia or Africa. Some observers assert that al Ittihad does not have a regional reach let alone a global reach. Moreover, some Somalis credit al Ittihad for its social services and for restoring law and order in areas where it has maintained presence. The focus on Somalia and Somali groups is expanding in Washington, nonetheless. In early November 2001, federal authorities raided several Somali-owned money transfer businesses in the United States operated by al Barakaat companies. The Bush administration ordered the assets of al Barakaat frozen because of its alleged links to al Qaeda. Al Barakaat was reportedly founded in 1989 by a Somali banker and currently has several dozen affiliates in Somalia, other parts of Africa, the Middle East, and North America. After the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991, the banking system crumbled. As a result, al Barakaat and other small companies became key players in the money-transfer business and other financial transactions for many Somalis inside Somalia and overseas. In early December 2001, American officials reportedly visited Baidoa, Somalia, and met with faction leaders and Ethiopian military officers. Washington did not reveal the purpose of the one-day visit, but reporters in the region stated that these officials had asked about terrorist networks in Somalia. Bush administration officials have repeatedly stated that Somalia supports terrorism and that al Qaeda has used Somalia as a base of operations to attack U.S. targets. Bush administration officials are concerned that al Qaeda members may flee to Somalia from Afghanistan. According to Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner, Washington has three policy objectives. First, the United States will work with neighboring countries to make Somalia “inhospitable” to terrorist groups. Second, the United States will ensure that any activities in Somalia would not affect its neighboring countries. Third, the United States will work toward a lasting peace and economic development in Somalia. U.S. officials have not yet presented evidence linking al Ittihad and the TNG with al Qaeda. In the absence of a central government and with numerous armed groups scattered throughout the country, it would be difficult to hold anyone accountable for past deeds or current activities. Al Ittihad is the only Somali group identified by the Bush administration as a terrorist organization, but al Ittihad does not control a single administrative area in Somalia and does not have fixed assets that Washington could go after. Nonetheless, the United States has several options to consider. Washington could seek to apprehend individuals in Somalia suspected of terrorist activities and bring them to justice. Another option is to infiltrate Somali groups suspected of terrorist links in order to monitor, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks. A long-term and a potentially complicated policy option, in the view of some analysts, is to address the root causes of the problem. A stable Somalia under a democratic authority is perhaps the only guarantee of a terrorist-free Somalia. But establishing a representative government is a major undertaking. Some observers are convinced, however, that after ten years of instability and bloodshed, Somalis might be ready to resolve their differences with the help of the international community. Another contributing factor to the problem in Somalia has been the interference of regional actors in the country, driven largely by their own national interests. The United States can play a pivotal role in forging a strong regional alliance that can play a constructive role in bringing about an end to the instability in Somalia. Simply monitoring events in the country is also a policy option, but some see this cautious approach as one that would allow the terrorist threat to increase. On the other hand, a heavy-handed approach in the absence of clear evidence could be seen as targeting a weak and defenseless country. U.S. military measures could also be seen as settling old scores. Some Somalis believe that they will be targeted by the United States not to deter terrorism but to avenge the killings of the eighteen U.S. Rangers killed in battle in Mogadishu in 1993. Many observers contend that Somalia may be a safe haven for Somali warlords but not for foreign terrorists. Somalis are notoriously independent; foreign terrorist groups would have a difficult time establishing a strong presence in Somalia because, experts contend, it is difficult to hide in Somalia due to the nonsecretive nature of Somali society. Somali experts further believe that, even if a foreign terrorist organization manages to establish a presence, the group is likely to be betrayed by potential allies because there are no permanent loyalties in the Somalia of today.
  20. Have you read the rebuttal by Edward Said
  21. I don't have the figures but I can reseach. There is a book I read a long time ago about the Oromo population and their culture. Some of them are Pagan but majority is Muslim.
  22. Duke , majority of Oromo are Muslim. Your source is a distortion of the facts about Oromo demography. The minority Oromo Christian were the ones educated in overseas. The ruling class hails from this segment and the most wealthiest.
  23. TRIBALISM: THE CANCER IN OUR MIDST PART I By Dr. Mahamud M. Yahye April 16, 2006 Introduction In the past, the conventional wisdom has been that Somalia’s population would not face serious inter-communal problems because it has one of the most homogeneous peoples in the world, in general, and in Africa, in particular. This is so, because they belong to the same ethnicity, share the same faith (Islam), speak the same language and share the same culture and history. (I heard the arrogant Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, talking about this topic in a very sarcastic manner some time ago). However, these assumptions have been dealt very serious blows by the outbreak of the devastating, cut-throat civil war that has, for all intents and purposes, been going on for the past 15 years. This senseless civil strife, together with the widespread famine that accompanied it in the early 1990s, is estimated to have killed at least 500,000 Somalis, the overwhelming majority of them being innocent civilians; and hundreds of thousands, if not millions, more were displaced both internally and externally. The question that imposes itself immediately is: What is the root cause of this terrible tragedy? In my view and in the view of many observers of Somalia’s recent history, both nationals and foreigners, tribalism and the relapse of the Somali nation into the old, primitive ways of the distant past is what brought about this catastrophe. It is what has destroyed our State, caused us all kinds of misery in the last 15 years, and made us a laughing stock in front of the other nations of the world. Whenever a foreign friend puts to me a question as simple as: “Why are you killing each other?” or “Why did you destroy your country?” I fail to give a coherent, plausible answer. But deep down, I know that the root cause of our present crisis – and that of other critical stages in our history – could be summarized in one word: tribalism; and unless we eradicate or find a proper remedy to this cancer in our midst, our people will be immensely suffering for many years to come. Lineage Segmentation This is the very bleak situation of today. But almost 80 years ago, a British colonial officer by the name of H. B. Kittermaster, who worked in our country, wrote the following about the Somalis: “Why do the Somalis occupy today their present position in the scale of civilization and development? This is a question which perhaps demands a passing thought. They are undoubtedly still primitive, having reached only a system of loose tribal organization in which even the tribal elders and herdsmen exercise but small control.” Eighty years later, the situation seems to be equally dismal, if not even worse, despite the fact that we had first hand contacts with the civilized world; thousands of our nationals have gone to universities, at home and abroad; and we have experienced more than 45 years of independence and self-rule. Still, Somalia now passes through one of the most painful chapters of its history which has culminated with the onslaught of a very deleterious civil war that seems to be quite intractable and never ending. Consequently, at present it seems that, as a US Library of Congress publication put it “… Somali society has retrogressed to a collection of warring clans reminiscent of pre-industrial times.” As I indicated earlier, the root cause of this utterly ruinous upheaval that destroyed the country’s national government, and all the essential state institutions as well as services, could be attributed to the fact that we have gone back to the pernicious system of tribalism. That is why we had to go through 14 conferences of peace and national reconciliation conferences, none of them has so far borne out real fruits. The fact that everything has now to be allocated or shared on tribal basis is the most glaring mistake that our so-called leaders, and their well-intentioned foreign supporters, have been committing. This is clearly exemplified by the notorious 4.5 formula, whereby Somalis are divided into four major clans, plus all the minor ones lumped together into half a clan, also referred to at times as: Others. As a result, in the last reconciliation attempt in Nairobi (Kenya), for instance, a cabinet of over 90 positions had to be set up in order to satisfy every clan and sub-clan. (Here, no rational criteria like education, adequate experience in government work and other relevant qualifications were ever given due consideration). Compare this with the situation in USA where the most powerful country on the planet, economically speaking, currently has a federal cabinet of 15 ministers only! What the current so-called Somali politicians and warlords don’t understand is that tribalism is the most divisive and destructive element in the our nation’s social fabric. Its resurgence creates unnecessary hatred, hostility and the flouting of the rule of law. It encourages you to take a certain position, whether positive or negative, towards another Somali simply on the basis of his clan affiliation and without even knowing that person and without, at times, being acquainted with his/her opinion or political stand. When a Somali asks you: “Yuu yahay?” (Who is he?), he expects you to tell him the third person’s clan; and on the basis of your answer, the enquirer will immediately regard this other person as a friend or an enemy. As such, a person will blindly support, say, a corrupt and murderous politician/warlord simply because the latter belongs to his tribe as if he is saying: “My tribe, right or wrong.” At the state level, it is this irrational tribal identification and allegiance, and lack of personal accountability, that has led to all kinds of nepotism, favoritism and corruption – and ultimately to the destruction of the state itself. Another negative aspect of tribalism is that it is susceptible to external manipulation because of the constantly shifting, opportunistic clannish alliances. Look how our quintessential enemy, Ethiopia, was able to meddle in our internal politics, because we allowed them to play Somali clans against each other. This pernicious social order in Somalia has been identified and amply analyzed by such luminous scholars as Enrico Cerulli, I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar. As these insightful men have pointed out, this primitive social system is based on what is known as “segmentary lineage” whereby each tribe is further divided into innumerable clans, sub-clans, sections and families which only unite in order to face a common danger. The most negative symptom of this lineage segmentation is that it leads to constant instability and chaos, since it does not, literally, have a permanent friend – not even a Muslim one – or a permanent foe; there is only a permanent context and a permanent competition – or rather a constant fight over the very scare resource in Somalia harsh, semi-desert environment . This tribal system could aptly be illustrated by the famous Arab Bedouin saying: “Anaa wa akhi calaa ibnu cammi, wa anaa wa ibnu cammi calaa algariib”. [My brother and I against my cousin, and my cousin and I against the stranger]. As a perceptive foreign commentator succinctly put it, this segmentation goes down to the household level with the children of a man’s two wives [laba bahood] sometimes turning on one another on the basis of maternal line. In other words, it is extremely difficult to satisfy Somalis on a clan basis. The system is very fluid and the ephemeral alliances between the clans are constantly changing for no apparent reason. This point is amply illustrated by the recent terrible fighting in Mogadishu between militias loyal to the local warlords/businessmen, on the one side, and the so-called Islamic courts, on the other. The members of the these two camps used to boast about belonging to the same clan-family that owns the Somali capital. A similar ruinous fratricide war has recently taken place, and still continues to do so, between four sub-clans of two closely related clan-families in Central Somalia, i.e., Mudug-Galgudud regions, as well as the Somali Region of Ethiopia. Besides, as the British writer Douglas Jardine (author of the famous book “The Mad Mullah” about the Somali historical figure and freedom fighter, Sayyid Mohamed Abdille Hassan) pointed out, Somali clans are highly polarized and are “…usually ready for a fight if they think that thereby they may increase their live-stock at the expense of their neighbors.” Or they engage in what Prof. Said Samatar calls “a permanent attention to the availability of self-improving opportunities.” In other words, human ethics, basic morality and religious precepts have no meaning, whatsoever, for them. In fact, in the traditional Somali pastoral environment, it seems to be quite natural and acceptable that a stronger clan could raid a weaker clan, slaughter its people, loot its property, particularly camels, and even boast about it in oral poetry! We should not have gone back to this awful, discredited social order. In the opinion of many observers of Somalia’s political scene, two generals were instrumental in the revival of tribalism in its most naked, highly destructive form: namely, ex-military dictator, President Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, who had kept manipulating Somali clans, rewarding handsomely some of them and severely punishing some others, in order to perpetuate his rule which lasted overt 21 years; and General Mohamed Farah Aideed who resorted to tribal warfare in the 1990s so as to assume absolute power in Somalia for his personal benefit and for the benefit of his own clan. Lessons From Recent History Somalia’s older generation of leaders knew the inherent, destructive nature of tribalism. They also knew that it can not be compatible with running a modern state. That is why when they started preparing for the struggle to rid the country of colonialism, they established in 1943 a national party that united all Somalis under the aegis of Somali Youth League (SYL). One of the basic tenets of that political movement was the renunciation of tribalism and clan affiliations all together. In fact, unlike the situation in Somalia 60 years later, it was at that time very shameful, or even punishable, to utter a clan name openly. That is how our people was to able to get united and constitute a formidable force to win their cherished independence, their dignity and their national pride; and that how they managed to get rid of the powerful colonial powers who had oppressing them for decades through the use of their infamous mechanism of divide and rule by penetrating though our soft spot: tribalism. At the time of gaining independence in 1960, and despite the fact that Somalia had no many highly educated nationals, and had a very few university graduates, it was able to establish a functioning democratic state, though not a perfect one, for nearly the first decade of its existence. It was able to do so, because it had a more dedicated, honest and patriotic leadership who knew the history and culture of their people very well. That is how, arguably the best President that Somalia has so far had, Mr. Adan Abdulle Osman, who hails from one of the smallest clans in the country, could be anointed as the country’s first head of state (1960/1967). At that time, these visionary leaders did not say let us distribute ministerial positions on purely clan and sub-clan basis, but chose the best and fittest among their prominent men to lead the country and serve its people (though the country’s reality dictated that an all inclusive political system be normally observed). And it is this very good model that we should have followed today. But it was only after the arrival of the military/socialist dictatorial regime in 1969, that initially appeared to be fighting against tribalism, but used it later as an essential instrument for keeping power forever, that the country started unraveling. Naturally, it was with the arrival in 1991 of the notorious, unpatriotic and unscrupulous warlords, who openly promoted and relied on tribalism so heavily, that the country really went down the drain and experienced total collapse in every aspect. But one of the main lessons of the ensuing devastating civil war is that no single Somali clan is strong enough to wipe out or even subjugate the rest of the clans and, thus, rule the country alone. So, it is now in the best interest of all to try to live together in peace and harmony, if we wish to remain as a nation. Conclusion & Remedy In conclusion, the only way to address Somalia’s thorny problems is to tackle this cancer called tribalism which has been wreaking havoc on our nation, especially its body politic, for the past 15 years and find an appropriate remedy for it. The only way to accomplish this will be to minimize the role of tribalism and cleanse it, as much as possible, form our modern state apparatus, thus relegating it to its proper place, i.e., our countryside (or baadiye) where it belongs. Here, it may be worth quoting, once again, Mr. Kittermaster who said, when he was talking about the Somalis and their future almost 80 years ago: “But these people are by no means unintelligent or decadent. It is probable that they must be regarded as among the most virile and intelligent of any African peoples.” He then concluded by affirming: “Their intelligence and their keen ability as traders mark them out as capable of development, but there appears to be little hope of a radical change in them unless it is possible to destroy the camel complex [emphasis added].” That is, tribalism has to be destroyed if the Somali people are to be saved from perpetual internecine war, misery, abject poverty and the possible take-over of their country by more powerful, hostile neighboring countries. In the long run, tribalism could be fought against by making modern education available to as many Somalis as possible. Educating the Somali masses, especially the warring young men, will equip them with skills that would enable them to get decent, lawful jobs. This would, in turn, make them economically independent and would, thus, prevent them from being recruited for illegal and dangerous tribal warfare. On the political front, we could start right away by replacing the destructive tribal associations and their armed militias by forming a few political parties, based on ideology and political agendas, in which each Somali adult can be a member, irrespective of his or her clan affiliation. Preferably, the first step in this regard could be the revival of the historic SLY party which has always united Somalis and mitigated against their anarchic, tribal tendencies. References Casanelli, Lee V. The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982) Cousin, Tracey. “Somalia: The fallen Country” in ICE Studies (Case No. 75), to be accessed in the internet through Google. Jardine, Douglas. “Somaliland: the Cinderella of the Empire.” African Society Journal, Vol. XXV (1924/25), accessed through Somali Online Magazine, vol. 4, in the internet. Kittermaster, H. B. “British Somaliland.” African Society Journal. Vol. 27 (1927), accessed through Somali Online Magazine, vol. 4, in the internet. Latin, David and Samatar, Said. Somalia: A Nation in Search of a State (Boulder, Col., USA: Westview Press, 1987) Lewis, I. M. Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1997) Samatar, Ahmed.. Ed. The Somali Challenge From Catastrophe to Renewal. (London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1994) Samatar, Said. “Unhappy Masses and the Challenge of Political Islam in the Horn of Africa”. Wardheernews Website, 9/3/2005 (to be accessed in the internet through Google) “Country Study: Somalia.” US Congress Library. [To be accessed in the internet through Google]. Mahamud M. Yahye, Ph.D. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia E-mail: mm2yahya@yahoo.com