Will Somalis Abandon the Blame Game? January 04, 2007 The cat is said to have nine lives. That symbolic high number of lives represents finely tuned instinct for survival on the part of the seemingly lowly creature. The only other life form known to man that surpasses the cat in beating the odds is the Somali nation. For this nation had weathered decades of ceaseless turmoil and simply refused to go into the night, as predicted by countless self-styled prognosticators. Yet this will to survive though critically important is not enough; the country must find a way to thrive—and soon. To this end, Somalia needs to face up to several bewildering characteristics that are unique to her society. None more so than the contradiction that sets the country apart as being simultaneously one of the few culturally and ethnically homogeneous societies on earth and one of the most politically dysfunctional. That is why after two republics, a savage civil war and 16 major “peace” conferences later, Somalis are still having a hard time trying to come to grips with the restoration of their national government. This when all acknowledge the urgent need, to say nothing of the obligation, to once again to reconstitute the society in accordance with internationally recognized norms. Consider the fact that the Transitional Federal Government that was created by the Transitional Parliament nearly two years is just now in the process of establishing its authority in Mogadishu and throughout the country. This is because until recently the TFG’s efforts were stymied by notorious Mogadishu-based warlords. Fortunately, that group was vanquished in June 2006 by a collection of clan-based Islamic courts in and around the capital city (that later coalesced to form the Union of Islamic Courts). Shortly thereafter, UIC began to unceremoniously challenge the TFG’s authority, setting the stage for the military showdown that has just ended in the Courts own downfall. During the long period (1991-2006) of Somalia’s political wilderness, an entire generation had grown up without the benefit of formal education, health care, fully functional economy. Meanwhile, catastrophic environmental degradation at home, lack of international representation, and, above all, inadequate safety and security for both people and property became a features commonly identified with Somali nationality. For great many individual Somalis at home and abroad the picture was becoming ever so bleak. In deed, the society seemed to be precariously hanging at the edge of an abyss. This is the story of the real, unmitigated national disgrace of Somalia’s recent past that can longer be swept under the mat. There is no way to spin it other than to acknowledge what it actually is: the source of an abiding shame that robs human beings of dignity and diminishes their self-worth. And, it was caused and perpetuated by none other than Somalis! Ignoring such travesty and the attendant crimes against innocent fellow Somalis, by pointing accusatory figure at others is no solution. To establish the root causes one must ask: who, in Allah’s green earth, is responsible for the clan-cleansing sprees in which tens of thousands of innocents perished the exploitation of the most defenseless communities, the expropriation of private property, the destruction of forests, the permitting of international syndicates to dump toxic waste in the country’s territorial waters? Were these atrocities overseen by the ubiquitous Western imperialists? Was it engineered by the Amharas—as most Somalis refer to all things Ethiopian? Or, was it iblisi, Somalis that committed these dastardly crimes? What foreign power had imposed the Mogadishu-based warlords that wreaked havoc in the nation’s capital for more than a dozen years? Who sabotaged the solutions that were devised in all the perennial Somali conferences, including the 2004 confab in which the current Transitional Federal Government was formed? There are those Somalis who, having placed their heads in the clouds, seek to employ empty rhetoric and emotionalism in an effort to bring the rest of us to their never-never-land perch—a place built on ‘bricks and mortar’ from an alternative reality—in fantasy land. It is too easy to blame Ethiopia for what had been called an “utter failure” on the part of Somalis to remake their society up to the current TFG campaign. Perhaps it appears to them crafty and wise to play the role of ‘prophet(s) of doom’, a human traits that requires hedging of bets and playing safe. Such characters are ready to assume the mantle of super nationalist when things go their way. If all else fails there is always the perennial fallback: claim to farsightedness and vague concern for future generations. One can dismiss their musings as exercise in “freedom of speech”, which is a very good thing. But, God forbid, it would not be proper to ask such folks to consider (just for once) the necessity for a workable solution for the long-suffering society. I am all for freedom of expression. But real courage lies with exercising the freedom to tell the truth! And, truth be told, Somalia, after have squandered at least 16 well-planned opportunities to restore the nation’s central authority in 16 years was undeniably at the cusp of disintegration from which there would probably be no return. So, let us give credit where credit is due, namely the TFG for turning what surely akin to borrowed time into a real chance upon which the nation can build the future she deserves. No one I know would consonant the preclusion of Islam from playing a role in the new Somali political dispensation. In deed, as Muslims Somalis would do well to follow the Islamic precepts closely and base the countries moral code on the injections of the faith. However, collective fear and herd mentality are not Islamic values. Nor can hatred masquerading as patriotism be made to look respectable. As for Ethiopia, I would argue that she is neither inherently a friend nor foe. The country is a neighbor with which the Somali nation had adversarial relations for a good many years. But it is important to understand which Ethiopia is coming to the aid of the TFG. The Ethiopia of today is not the 7th Century CE, Abyssinia of yore that welcomed the first Hijrah at the behest of the Prophet Mohamad (PBUH). Nor does it necessarily represent the world view of Somali’s arc-enemy monarchs from that country, namely Menelik and Haile Selassie. It is even a far cry from Somalia’s recent nemesis Mengisto Haile Mariam. The current Ethiopian government came into power with substantial help from the Somali nation. It is not out of the ordinary for them to return the favor. Further more, there seem to be quite a bit of fear mongering regarding Ethiopian hidden agenda to occupy Somalia for the foreseeable future. This simply does not make sense. Ethiopia is a desperately poor country of some 70 million people that is not able to feed its people made up of highly diverse ethnic populations and tribes. But it is a neighbor of Somalia that has within its borders a huge Somali region. Granted, there are geopolitical issues that the two countries need to workout. But the time has come for cooperation between the two sister-countries for the mutual benefit of both nations. Ethiopia can not occupy or dominate Somalia by force of arms. The Somali people will not allow it. However, if a determined segment of the Somali society remains hell bent on perpetuating the civil war under false pretexts such as “The Ethiopians are coming, the Ethiopians are coming”, then there is no need for anyone to invade Somalia—the nation will tear itself down, from within. For these reasons, the TFG’s, as the sole, legitimate Somali national authority, request for Ethiopian assistance should, by any objective criterion, be preferable to total disintegration of the country into mutually hostile fiefdoms. It is also important to remember that this is a lawful act sanctioned by the UN charter and countless other international agreements. Ali A. Fatah Washington, DC Chief of DC GIS Staff AMakhiri@aol.com

By Karen DeYoung Washington Post Staff Writer Saturday, January 6, 2007; Page A13 Western and African diplomats meeting yesterday in Nairobi urged the quick deployment of an African peacekeeping force in Somalia, as the United States pledged $40 million to assist the mission and provide humanitarian aid. In a communique peppered with references to the urgency of the situation, the Somalia Contact Group called for "immediate support for the stabilization of Somalia," noted an imperative to launch a political reconciliation process "without delay" and cited the need for "immediate concrete assistance." "The group clearly felt it was important that there not be a security vacuum," Jendayi E. Frazer, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, who chaired the meeting, told reporters in Nairobi. Ethiopia has said its military force, which drove out the Islamic movement that controlled the southern part of the country and installed a weak, internationally backed transitional government, would stay only a short time. If money were the only problem, Somalia would be on its way to stability, noted a diplomat from one of the countries involved in the group, whose membership includes the United States and several European countries as well as the European Union, Kenya and Tanzania, with participation from the United Nations and the African Union. So far, only one African country has agreed to contribute troops to the force. Uganda has offered a 1,200-member contingent that Frazer said she hoped would be deployed by the end of January but that is only about a tenth of what is seen as necessary. The contact group communique said that Kenya's foreign minister would begin a mission to "explore additional troop contributions." Of the $40 million pledged by the United States, $16 million is designated for peacekeeping support. The E.U. has pledged $47 million, of which $19.5 million is to go to the force. U.S. Gen. William Ward, the deputy commander of the U.S. European Command who is traveling with Frazer, told reporters in Nairobi that there were no plans to deploy U.S. military personnel. U.S. assistance would include airlift, logistical and intelligence support. The Europeans are similarly loath to send troops to Somalia, where a U.N. humanitarian force was withdrawn in 1995 following the deaths of numerous soldiers, including 18 Americans killed in a single battle. Equally problematic is the reconciliation of Somali clans whose loyalty is distributed among the transitional government, a divided Islamic leadership and myriad other warlords. Western aid pledges are contingent on the warring groups -- with the exception of the Islamic leaders the United States says are harboring al-Qaeda suspects -- agreeing to a political accommodation. If an international force were to enter the country before a political deal is made, the European diplomat said, it would be seen as supporting only one faction.

^ So Soo Maal is taking Bashir's statement out of context?

Originally posted by Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar: Folks, relax. Mareykanka do not recognize this treason-prone, dowlad ku sheegaan burburtay, a mouthpiece of Sanaawi before the eyes of the vast majority of Soomaalis. It is better to deal the real enemy, Sanaawi, than kuwa dhabta u saaran xaaqin u eh. Miskiin, aduunkaan waa interest , nin yahoo at least maskaxda ka shaqaysii. Maxaakimta waxaa looga adkaadey siyaasada maanta aduunka ka jirta. Waxaan aaminsanahey boqolkiiba boqol, Zenawi iyo dowladiisaba waxaa adeegsadey Mareykanka like "mercenaries" to assit the secular TFG and depose the radical Islamist. Marka Iyagoo qaladaad baddan muujiyey markii horeba ayey hadana garan waayeen U.S's alarm on their rise to power. I know you are nationalist but Ethiopia won't remain in Somalia. They would have probably remained in Bay and Bakool when the RRA used them over Hussein Aideed's occupation there. Let Zenawi collect his checks as a reward for the work from the U.S treasury department.

Long and brilliant piece --------------------------- The TFG’s Victory over the UIC in Somalia: Triumph or New Menace for the Nation? A Critique on Professor Samatar’s Interview with the BBC By: Abdalla A. Hirad Thursday, January 04, 2007 In a rather lengthy interview with the BBC, Somali Service’s Yonis Ali Nur—on January 1, 2007—Professor Ahmed Ismail Samatar, Dean of the prestigious Macalister College of Saint Paul, Minnesota, predicted 2007 to be “a very difficult year for Somalia”. Asked what makes him come to this conclusion, the Professor simply cited that Ethiopia’s “occupation” of Somalia and its installation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been a recipe for disaster. “It is not as if two persons [nationals] have jockeyed for power, so that one of them finally won”, Samatar said in words to the effect. He further asserted that the Islamists ouster by the TFG, backed by Ethiopian forces, was not yet a forgone conclusion, and that there would be a resistance to what he called the “Ethiopian invasion/occupation” of Somalia. What is not clear still is whether the Professor had recorded his interview before the fall of Kismayo into the TFG flank, which might partly explain the genesis and rationale of his daring conclusion. But Professor Samatar is not alone in this view. Many highly educated Somalis share, and have, indeed, maintained this point of view. Those include Professor Ali Abdurahman Hersi, Dr. Ali Khalif Galaydh, Professor Abdi Ismail Samatar, Ahmed’s brother, and many other scholars, academia, politicians and, naturally, clerics of the new Islamist breed. They all share this view because of their unwavering support for the Islamists who controlled Mogadishu for the last six months. Yes, indeed—I hasten to add—voices such as that of Professor Samatar and similar ones may have some merit to them from a nationalistic point of view, just in case Ethiopia has something up its sleeve, beyond just installing the internationally recognized TFG into power. But the view of Professor Samatar, et al, is strange in that it does not elucidate why they support the Islamists in a rational sense; or explain why the installation of the TFG is such a dangerous eventuality in their doom view of the world. That is, anything beyond the traditional Somali hostility and bias towards Ethiopia; and, yes, their obvious hate for the “warlords”. Are they consumed by so much hate that they cannot stand those other Somalis—so-called warlords—to hold power in the country? In the case of the Samatar brothers, one might wish to read their article[ii], “Somalia’s worrisome leadership: what is next?” of October 20, 2004, written immediately after the election of President Yusuf by the Transitional Federal Parliament, in Nairobi, the Capital of Kenya, in which the two brothers may have registered their deep-rooted dislike—to say the least—of Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, the man. Dr. Ali Abdurahman Hersi had also called him a dictator in an article he had written at the time. Dr. Ali Khalif Galaydh had campaigned so much against him and later helped organized a caucus of opposition, including Colonel Yusuf’s former rival in Puntland—Jama Ali Jama—and many others. Those interventions and criticism were anything but constructive in that very embryonic juncture of the TFG—the result of which might have given voice to the opposition from within the Cabinet, the Parliament and from without, all within the first month of the TFG’s inception. Still, other educated Somalis have taken a different look of the current situation. Speaking of the triumph of the TFG and its efforts to gain control, backed by Ethiopian forces, Omarfaruk Osman[iii], in his article, “Ethiopia’s incursion of Somalia; a blessing in disguise”, says: “For Somalia, it could potentially be the end of an era and the beginning of another. A quick change of direction and realism has just unfolded before the eyes of the nation’s many stakeholders.” One might also wish to read: “Somalia’s Horrific Saga Acquires New Actors”, by Abdurahman Waberi[iv], posted in Hiiraan.com. However, the mood of the average Somali has best captured in the catchy title of a poem written, on the occasion, by Mahamud Siad Togane[v] a nationally renowned poet (in the English Language), a professor and an intellectual, carried in his article, “Liberation, yes! Occupation, no!” dated, December 31, 2006, posted in WardheerNews.com. But, for a most balanced analysis, including the pros and cons of both sides of the argument of these recent events as they unfold into the annals of history, one may wish to read Musa Yuusuf’s[vi] article, “tactical retreat or the demise of the UIC?” dated, January 02, 2007, posted in WardheerNews.com. It would appear to most critics that the BBC Somali Service, traditionally ever so unfair towards the TFG, had given a free ride to the Professor by having not invited anyone with the opposite view; but the broadcaster, Yonis Ali Nur, gave the professor a challenge so intense that should deserve the admiration of all. The Professor, though, like most of the people in his camp, has failed to see the other side of the coin in the conflict. The question this raises for me is: although one would except such a one-sided view of the situation from politicians and their supporters in this camp, which I will discuss a little later, one feels that it was unbecoming of the Professor(s) to have totally shut himself to reason and objective analysis and has failed to consider, at least, likely scenarios, if there were any he might have contemplated, before he concluded his argument, upfront, by blaming the TFG and the Ethiopians in all eventualities—lock, barrel and stock. One question I ask in this paper is, therefore, why? Is there not another point of view? Generally speaking, Muse Yusuf (ibid) has summed up the line of thinking of the Professor’s camp, which is basically what any man in the Somali street would argue to justify the objectives of the onslaught of the Islamists. Muse, among other things, captures the Islamists argument as follows: “With their rise to power, supporters of the UIC heralded a new era for Somalis, “kacdoon” a popular revolution, which will unify all Somalis through the application of Shari’a to save Somalis from self-destruction that they had been inflicting on themselves for a long time. It was a new chapter in the Somali history, in which a new national identity based on Islam would be created thus eradicating the divisive clan identity and its politics of divide and rule.” Or, is it? I ask! Not only is this a very idealistic view of the reality; but it fails to respond to the situation of realpolitik in which the Somali nation finds itself engulfed at this juncture, in both domestic and international terms; mainly because of its own making, first; and because of the strategic interests of regional and international powers that be, second. And, compared to Somalia under the current circumstances, even tiny, winy, next door Djibouti has been a power—let alone Ethiopia and the United States. Hence, the paper will dig beyond the rhetoric we heard from the Professor and attempt to answer the above question by providing a perspective of conflict analysis and the history of the political contention between the two main groups of clan elite who have been jockeying for power in the country throughout the post Barre period as this has related to the chronology of efforts at resolving the Somali crisis by the international community together with their reliant Somali political elite. In the process, the paper will highlight how the two major political groupings have been faring in response to the initiatives of the international community and, in effect, the political interaction between the two groups. In the end, the paper will also explain how both the TFG and the Islamists in the contention between them have been but a product of those processes. Also, the paper will hopefully highlight how individuals like the Samatar brothers and other highly educated Somalis have become stuck with one side of the conflict; therefore, currently defending the Islamists to the teeth. Ever since Barre’s junta toppled the postcolonial government of the sixties on October 21, 1969, there have been two major clan elite grouping jockeying for national power and control in Somalia. I call the one group the Assemblists because of their reliance on assembling clan elite as their main methodology for gaining power and as a source of political legitimacy, in addition to seeking international recognition and exploiting clan differences. They were later coined and have been more commonly known as the “Manifesto” group among the Somali populace. Traditionally, they have less often resorted to seeking power through the barrel of the gun than their rivals—the militarists, which is the other group. Indeed, the era of militarism in Somalia started with Barre’s coup. As Barre’s regime tightened its dictatorial grip on the nation, already, in the early seventies, the former civilian politicians had been planning a resistance against the regime. Over the years, through the seventies and the eighties, those politicians organized clan based military fronts in the hope that those would finally unite to topple Barre’s regime to bring them (the civilians) back to power. Clan after clan, or subclans thereof, had trickled to form their fronts, so that by 1989 there was little support for the regime beyond the Marreehan subclan of the ******s, the sub-lineage of President Barre, if at all. However, to the surprise of the civilian politicians, power was not returning into their hands. In many cases, those leaders of the military fronts left their clan politicians high and dry and sought to organize a militarist coalition to take the power into their hands rather than return it into the hands of the civilians. Several attempts were made at forging such a coalition between these military fronts over the years, while Barre was still in power. The latest attempt was the so-called “Mustaxiil Pact” of October 1989—Mustaxiil, a location in Ethiopia—between General Aideed’s USC front, Gess’-Gabyow’s SPM front, and the SNM of the North, which although lead by civilians from the beginning had been using military methods to topple Barre’s regime and gain power as part of that coalition. The fact that the SSDF (Abdullahi Yusuf’s military front of the day) had already crumbled and its leader already in Jail in Ethiopia had not helped and might have been one reason why the Mustaxiil Pact never materialized for all practical purposes. In the meantime, the civilian politicians worried that they might miss the opportunity of regaining power to the militarists, attempted to organize themselves into a domestic movement pressuring the already week Barre’s regime by applying international diplomatic and economic pressure, by producing a political “Manifesto” taking Barre to task and calling for his resignation so as to effect a peaceful transfer of power, in their thinking, ahead of the then imminent approach of the military fronts. And that is how the name “Manifesto” was coined to them. President Barre, though, the wizard he was, double-crossed them and let the ball rolling at his own pace, hoping that he would play these civilians against their militarist off-shoots. By the time Barre’s regime fell in January 1991, the country fell into the hands of the military fronts—the south into the hands of the USC and the SPM, the current Puntland regions into the hand of the SSDF and the North West (“Somaliland”) into the hands of the then SNM. Barre’s forces, though, continued to struggle within each of those areas for a few more months. The political contention bared open between the two sides when, towards the last week before his flight, Barre tried to share the power with the “Manifesto” by asking Omar Arteh Ghalib of the North to form a government, which he hoped would also probably give him and the members of his regime a safe passage. But the Militarist wing of the USC (under General Aideed’s leadership) refused to endorse the plan. Then the “Manifesto” wing of the USC declared Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a former member of the civilian parliament, as the President of the Republic, immediately after the flight of Barre from the Capital—in fact on the same day. Ali Mahdi again asked Omar Arteh to form the government, as his Prime Minister. Again, the Militarist wing of the USC had opposed the scheme. Then, later, the Government of Djibouti, assisted by Egypt and Italy, held the first two reconciliation Conferences—so-called Djibouti I and Djibouti II—in June and July, 1991, and, again, declared Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Omar Arteh Ghalib, both of them former politicians from the sixties, as President and prime Minister, successively. One might wish to learn, though that, immediately after Barre’s ouster, the Italian government had already commissioned some of the members of this group of former civilian politicians, led by Omar Moallin, as I was told, including Abdurizaq Hagi Hussein, Osman Ahmed Roble, Abdulqadir Mohamed Adan (Zoppe), Osman Ahmed Roble and Yusuf Mohamed (Muro)—a total of six of them—to intervene as wise men and peace makers, according to my source[vii] in early 1991.What is more, present at the Djibouti Conferences were a former President of the Republic, Adan Abdulla Osman, two former Prime Ministers, the late Mohamed Ibrahim Egal and Abdurizak Haji Hussein, as well as others including, Sh. Mukhtar, the Last Speaker to the House of Parliament before Barre’s Coup. However, the militarists, feeling the sting, repudiated the arrangement. Aideed’s faction of the USC, the SNM controlling the North at the time (which had already declared the secession), Abdullahi Yusuf’s military wing of the SSDF (he released from Ethiopian prison a year or so later) and Barre’s forces, to some extent (still active in the South) all opposed Ali Mahidi-Omar Arteh’s government of 1991. This resulted in a military confrontation between the forces of the two groups, and in some cases, within each grouping. The military contention was laid bare, in earnest, in the fight for the Capital between Ali Mahdi’s forces and Aideed’s forces in the fall of 1991, among other fights, which had brought about the launching of Operation Restore Hope by the US government in the winter of 1991. It remained so for a while that the country was divided into pockets of clan territories, the greater part, in effect, controlled by the militarists. In the meantime, the “Manifesto” launched a diplomatic offensive in an attempt to install its government from the top, and the militarists went about trying to forge an alliance between them, like the “Manifesto”, to be able to countervail their claim of international recognition. The “Manifesto” would later organize into what was, at some point called, the Group of 12. With the militarists still in control of the land, but failing to forge their alliance, and the “Manifesto” failing to impose a government from the top to shake the militarists out of power domestically, many reconciliation Conferences by Ethiopia, Egypt, the Yemen Republic had also failed to produce results whereby there remained a political impasse between the two groups for a while—that is until 2000, when the government of Djibouti intervened, again, to single handedly install the National Transitional Government (TNG) of Abdiqassim-Galaydh, which essentially was a “Manifesto” government—the fruits of a new attempt by the Djibouti government to pick it up from where it had failed in 1991. Although cleverly masterminded by the government of Djibouti—an account of this and the contention between the groupings was discussed by this author in an earlier article[viii], to produce the TNG—the scheme had several pitfalls and impediments to it. (1) The militarist leaders, “the warlords”, who still controlled all the regions in the south and, of course “Somaliland” had declined to attend the Conferences, probably, a priori, doubting Djibouti fairness and sincerity. (2) As if to confirm the militarist’s suspicions, the new government was manned by too many Barre’s former technocrats, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the President, and Ali Khalif Galaydh, among others, and was supported by members of the former civilian politicians, most of whom had participated in the initial planning of the Conference, and a large community of supporting Islamists and businessmen allied to Abdiqassim Salad Hassan. One should note that these militarists had initially fought Barres regime. So, a government comprising Barre’s technocrats in addition to the civilians of old and the Islamists was a disaster in their thinking. (3) Because of the Islamists’ influence, Ethiopia and the West, led by the US government of the day, were naturally averted to support the new arrangement. (4) Perhaps most drastic among the impediments was the fact that the government of Djibouti alienated all the governments of the region (the IGAD countries, under whose mandate it was holding the Conference, included) and interested others from elsewhere, not even sparing its old allies, in this case—Egypt and Italy—by not allowing them to even help fund the Conference, let alone contribute in any other substantive way. Even, some high officials of the UN’s Political Department, in New York, were complaining that Djibouti was keeping them in dark. That position of the government of Djibouti might have heightened the suspicions of many and propelled the rampant rumors of those days that Al-Qaeda could have been helping the fledgling and poor government of tiny Djibouti to single-handedly shoulder the exorbitant expenses of a 5-month-long Conference It was only after the installation of the TNG, that the militarists succeeded to forge their first ever alliance, when they took Baidoa as their capital and started a diplomatic and propaganda offensive by literally creating a dissident shadow government from the distance, until the international community finally intervened again—by the Secretary General of the United Nations declaring that there was need for the resumption of reconciliation efforts in Somalia in early September of 2001—when all of a sudden the Representative of the Secretary General visited the dissident warlords in Baidoa to register their grievances on behalf of the international community for the first time, since the culmination of the third Djibouti-sponsored Conference. The result was the IGAD sponsored Conference (2002 -2004), hosted by the government of Kenya in Eldoret, later culminating in Embagathi, and supported by the UN and all the concerned regional Groups of the world. It took two years to conclude the Conference, mainly because of a rift between a “Manifesto” alliance—led by Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the former President of the TNG, and supported by Djibouti, Egypt and Eritrea—and the militarist alliance, led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the main remnant of the older militarists, also openly supported by Ethiopia among others from the region and the wider world. As we know now, the militarists turned out to be victors after two years of intense deliberations contrived only by the patience of the international community—a processes in which a Djibouti-Eritrea-Egypt alliance and its Somali client the “Manifesto”—now including the Islamists— fought to the teeth against Ethiopia and its client, the militarists, a.k.a., the “warlords”. But then, no sooner than Abdullahi Yusuf was elected and the Cabinet nominated, even endorsed by the Parliament, that the opposition within declared the arrangement unacceptable and even already called for the impeachment of Abdullahi Yusuf. The threat was made by no less than the person of the Speaker to the Parliament himself, and even before the government moved back into Somalia The Mogadishu warlords, allies of Yusuf until then, one would expect, perhaps afraid to lose their feudal spoils in Mogadishu and partly clannish in their agenda, gave a political fulcrum to the opposition in Mogadishu, denying the new government to take seat in the Capital. It is note worthy that the Samatars, ever so close to the Djibouti initiative of 2000, as consultants mainly because of their close kin relations with the President of Djibouti—Ismail Omar Ghelleh, being a close cousin—now had a stake in what has happened to Abdiqasim’s TNG and had probably a hatchet to bury with the opposition, i.e., the “warlords”. Like wise Dr. Ali Khalif Galaydh and Dr. Ali Abdurahman Hersi, who have both openly supported the Islamists; had been members of the TNG’s Cabinet, a product of the Djibouti initiative of 2000. The “Manifesto”, including many more dignitaries, from the previous civilian governments, now close to the Samatar’s under the tutelage of the government of Djibouti, and many who relate to the cause of the “Manifesto” through kin and kith affiliation, support the Islamists. Whether by design or by default, the “Manifesto” , ever so weak, fortunately, when it comes to the use of military muscle, seem to have relied on the Islamists as their foot soldiers in their new contention to oust the TFG, this time around. The idea may not have been to support the Islamists to rise to power, but support them good enough to force a new process of reconciliation convened by the international community, once again, in the hope they might take their chance again. It is not surprising that some quarters are calling for resumed reconciliations in a situation where the other party to the current conflict (the Islamists) exists no more! Hence, a picture is depicted whereby the “Manifesto” is using an old form of demagoguery in their rhetoric against Ethiopia to bring down the TFG which had replaced their TNG the last time around. For those who doubt the theory that the Group has been manipulating the Islamists, may wish to consider the following facts. Abdiqassim is definitely the self-styled leader of the “Manifesto”. His connection with the Mogadishu’s UIC is undoubted and is definitely telling if not confirming of this theory. Even the heightened propaganda against Ethiopia was resumed under Abdiqassim and Ali Galaydh’s TNG, long after the tension had cooled between the two peoples, and ever since PM Zenawi took office in Ethiopia in 1991—and since there was no government in Somalia, any way. It was unfortunate that the first ever government of Somalia had exploited history of negative relations between the two countries like the previous governments before them. It is not as if the Islamists had suddenly started exploiting the old hostilities between the two nations on their own. Rather, it has been a “Manifesto” trade mark ever since Abdiqassim took its leadership with support from the government of Djibouti, mainly to signify the then political rift between Ethiopia and the Government of Djibouti, widened by Djibouti’s masterminding of the Arta Conference and alienating Ethiopia and the rest of the international community. Whether that was a demand made by the Islamists of the TNG in exchange for support has not been clear. That is why Ethiopia cannot, rightly or wrongly, afford to let it go for the TFG to fail, to be replaced by the Islamists and their cohorts—the “Manifesto” agents. But, here again, the Islamists which the “Manifesto” have, more recently, so much relied upon domestically, have become their major impediment on the international front In terms of motto, the “Manifesto” has departed from a naive assumption that the militarists, having caused political and social havoc during the years of President Barre, resulting in the current break-down, had no right or the clout to run the State, any more. On the contrary, the militarists were departing from a perspective that Barre’s corrupt and clannish system had spoiled the military rule in Somalia, and that the new situation was an opportunity for them to regroup after their ouster of Barre’s regime to show the better side of the great institution—the military—so much loved and adored by the masses, before Barre’s coup. But then, at that point, save for some political differences, most of them were trying to rally behind General Aideed. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf may have naturally inherited this position among the military ranks, or so he wishes. By way of solutions, the assumption has been that, after the failure of the initial attempts of the international community to implement the romantic “bottom-up” approach, the world had succumbed to the Somali elite’s “top-down” approach. That change in approach has given way to a more practical maxim that reconciliation can only come by a truce and an agreement between those who control the “land(s)”—in all cases, the “warlords”—as the regional fiefdoms have come to be sarcastically called. That particular framework of thinking and the fact that the militarists have had the natural loyalty of their respective clans as strongmen—who were able to protect them against other hostile clans, as it were—have given the warlords the upper hand throughout, latest in the Emabagathi Conference and in all the previous encounters. Except—that is, one must admit—in those couple of occasions when the government of Djibouti had deviously intervened on their behalf of the “Manifesto”. The government of Djibouti has been trying to outsmart all the odds despite the facts in principle and in practice. For me, both the “Manifesto” and the militarists have been faces of the same coin. Neither of them makes the material to save Somalia from its misery or have had homegrown solutions to the Somali crisis—both being a product of the same postcolonial political elite. If one of them has excelled in using military muscle and the other in masterminding clan differences they seem to have, lately, been interchanging, sometimes swapping, skills and capacities in a process of shifting alliances. They both have been seeking solutions from without Somalia. Both have been using clan differences. Both have been seeking international sponsorship to help them each win against the other side and attain the power in the country, at any cost. It is just that the “Manifesto” has lost the game in this latest round, and, to the militarists, again, and have currently been supporting or using the support of the Islamists to regain power. In the process they happen to have the support of the Arab and, to some extent, the Islamic world, which basically see things through the prism of Egypt who has traditionally fought for influence with Somalia against Ethiopia because of its Nile related interest. To a lesser extent, the government of Djibouti who has business interests in Mogadishu, as deserved by the few corrupt tycoons who run the show in the tiny country, has also been very active in supporting the alliance of the “Manifesto” and the Islamists. What should be perplexing to most people is that the “Manifesto” which had often demagogically emphasized the maxim “A bad State is better than the lack of a State” when the TNG was in place, have now been ever so adamantly criticizing the TFG for being a “week government”, as did Professor Samatar continually repeat throughout the interview over the BBC, where he repeatedly used the Somali word, “fadhiid”. It is also my considered view that there is no alternative force to come to the rescue of Somalia—at least not yet. I can understand that some have—I regret to say: perhaps, naively—come to believe that the advent of Islamism represented a new breed of politicians carrying a new solution for Somalia. It is note worthy also—perhaps, to my shame, the view being very scantily held—that any such new breed, hoped to emerge from the “civil society” has also been in part obliterated, if not totally emasculated by the two groupings of the political elite. The militarists have done so more openly than the “Manifesto” which has incorporated them into their flank. Imagine those many new emerging so-called “civil society Groups”, all of them having members coalescing with the current “Manifesto” or unwittingly affiliated to them—including one, the National Civic Forum (NCF), based in Nairobi, members of which include the Samatars, General Jama Mohamed Ghalib (definitely a former member of the Islamist delegation to Khartoum)—all of them supported by Djibouti, Egypt or by the European Union, which extends its arm of support through the government of Italy—a former colonial master—desperately fumbling for reinstating its old influence with Somalia, regardless of the type of leadership, to pacify its phantom pains. Thus, one continues to hear the cries for reconciliation from the EU, even after the defeat of the Islamists. Does not that, for all practical purposes, mean “reconciliation” to accommodate the “Manifesto’s” demands, a cause already lost for them both on the ground and in the international diplomatic corridors; in as far as the Embagathi process was concerned? Do not they know the “Manifesto” already has enough representation in the TFG? But, if the word “Civic” in the name of the National Civic Forum” is any indication, then, there may have been a political organization of civilians in the making, to replace the “Manifesto” in its transitional sense—someday. It has been also interesting that NCF was christened at the same time as the commencement of the Eldoret Conference in Nairobi, not far away from the venue of the Conference. The inception of the organization in itself has been a good initiative, if to inherit the waning legacy of civilian politics in Somalia. But the crocodile tears spilt over an attenuated nation by delaying the effectiveness of the little semblance of authority that has been forged by the whole wide world is mystifying! Therefore, the decries of those otherwise respectable gentry of knowledge, wisdom and high places in Somali society has neither been about Islam, nor about respect for the sovereignty of Somalia--not even about the Islamist ideology, as they are claiming. It has been and remains to be about power for their camp—the “Manifesto”. The question I raise is: cannot they wait until the end of the 5-year mandate, which will end in two years, any way? Can’t they wait for the expected elections, at the end of this term as demanded by the Charter upon which the federal arrangement is based? Why can’t they wait to prove the influence of the Islamists, which they often champion in their rhetoric, on the ballot, which will—I pray to God--come in less than two years into the future? Don’t they respect what other countries call due process, which is the result of what they exhaustively negotiated during the Emabagathi process? Regarding the Ethiopian intervention, the author had predicted something similar to what happened in the last two weeks, in one of the future scenarios in a previous article[ix]--within a rather longer timeframe (two years)—but had feared the worse than what has so far transpired. In terms of the results of a likely war scenario between the two sides—which has already happened between the TFG and the Islamists—the author had put forth his prediction and preference, in an earlier article[x], entitled, “Somalia: the Penultimate Contention for Power”, dated October 10, 2006, as follows: “It is either that Mogadishu falls or that Baidoa falls for either of the two sides to win. If Baidoa falls it means that the people of the south of Somalia and especially those of Baidoa prefer the Islamists to the TFG. If, however, Mogadishu falls—which, again, is more unlikely than the opposite—the people of Somalia, and especially the ******, prefer the TFG to the CIC. But the two results are also significantly different in one other way. If Mogadishu falls, there is a shred of a chance that Somalia may pull out of the civil war sooner, God and the ****** populace permitting! If, however, Baidoa falls, Somalia can only sink deeper into a more drastic civil war than ever before, without hope for reconciliation anytime soon, if at all.” By: Abdalla A. Hirad MHirad@aol.com

I read that before, but thanks

Jacayl, you are little too harsh. ICU did so many good things and they deserve to be remembered for what they did for us. They should have been on the pursuit to reconcile Somalis and unite them by making their courts proportional and inclusive of all the clans. They appointed themselves and gave jobs to those whom they were closer in both blood and political relationship and then saught to use naked power to control large swaths of land by discrediting the roots of our conflict, justifying their occupation under the banner of Islam.

The picture was posted by several websites and I don't see any problem with it since these delegates were on a mission. Money makes the world go around. Although some sites posted the picture to humiliate our brothers in the north, I don't see any measure of satisfaction that we can gain from such depictions. Indeed, it will lead to their further isolation. For the topic, I agree with Duke there is deep fear that once Mogadishu stabalizes and foreign investment and money start following in, the dream to be recognized will evaporate and disappear. "Somaliland"’s absence from our reconciliation adds complexity to our problem because “Somaliland” is not politically independent (has yet to achieve international recognition) economically not viable (The region is desolate tract and lacks resources, case in point is how its former colony neglected it), and not socially cohesive entity ( Sool and Sanaag populace are predominantly opposed to secession, a population that is 50% of this former geographical protectorate).

Still, now that we are in it we have to stay true to our words (your words), akhi. We have to fight. I have instructed a couple of our known leaders to go to the pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia and pray for our swift victory. It seems that we are on our own now, akhi. Isaias phoned me yesterday and regretted to inform me that the Americans threatened him. He said that he’ll have to lay low for a while but promised to help us again in due time! Now, only Allah is on our side, akhi. How could we ever lose with Allah on our side? Thanks , the thread is a respite from the heated debates. Ngonge, I warned long ago that Aweis and his likes would blame other people for their mistakes and swift decision. There was a widely held perception that Mogadishu warlords once faced U.S rangers and defeated them in a matter of 18 hours hence bypassing the fact that it was Clinton's decision to pull out American troops following public pressure and that the rangers were caught in wading crossfire in a foiled pursuit to capture the late warlord, Aideed. I personally hold responsible the Islamic courts who rushed into unnecessary war based on false perceptions that they commanded unprecedented public support, their swift victories over weary and morally corrupt warlords, and the long-held perception that residents withstood the only super power in the world. After issuing ultimatum, I commented on how the Islamist contradicted themselves by indeed recognizing the borders of Ethiopia, a crime they always accuse of Abdullahi Yusuf. Is the ICU too disingenuous to its core principle and faith, are they truly nationalist

Raising my palms in the air, I wish the best luck for us Somalis.

Rudy, Ghedi is suspect to many people. However, I have listened to people's voices, voices with deep convictions that the president is essentially a true patriot despite his mistakes in the past. He was said to have run into counter with one of the generals who partially led this war against the Islamist behind the tacit support of United States, so Abdullahi got slapped in the face until Zenawi was called to intervene and ordered his General to be at Abdullahi's command.(Their disagreement whether to kill POW or not) I do harbor this acute presage that Abdullahi would probably be assassinated to facilitate Ghedi to assume Somalia once and for all. It is my firm conviction just as many people I have met that Abdullahi is a legitimate and honest leader and may be the last drop of our nationalist blood running in our veins and we should fully support him stay the course and lead the TFG to the end. I knew Aweis and Sharif were truly honest leaders and I even commented their quality of leadership but they had dishonest elements in their Islamic courts that frankly used Islam as a political tool, esp the man who uttered he would reach Addis Ababa within days.

Adding Maxaa la yiri inside into this development, Abdiqasim, after meeting Gedi and his president, asked that disarmament should be not a priority and if the government nevertheless pursues to disarm, it should first start with Puntland. He argued, according to circulating rumors, that his clan would not disarm and allow to be marginalized while Puntland and Somaliland team with the latest weapons to defend their dominions from supposed rivals. Ghedi has already started giving important positions to clansmen in Mogadisho and he is in full mission to empower them to the disadvantage of those they consider, "planted succulent cactus following the weeding out of "dates" thought previously as fungus". It is the president's moral obligation to not abdicate the responsibility of his job to reconcile and end the clan hostility in Mogadisho and make sure that everyone's fears and distrust be alleviated.

You wlc. I expect the Gov disclaim the gaffe of Aideed Jr within 24 hrs.

Ethiopia plans to pull troops from Somalia JEFFREY GETTLEMAN Published: January 2, 2007 ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia: The prime minister of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, said today that his country, one of the poorest in the world, could not afford to keep its troops in neighboring Somalia much longer, and that Somalia's stability depended on the quick injection of foreign peacekeepers. In a speech to parliament, in which his tone alternated between humble and triumphant, Mr. Meles said that Ethiopia had accomplished its mission to wipe out Somalia's Islamist forces, which just two weeks ago controlled a large chunk of the country and were regarded as a regional menace. "We will now leave as soon as possible - it could be weeks, it could be months," he said. "We don't have the money to take this burden individually."Mr. Meles said his soldiers were not peacekeepers. They already seem to be paying the price for stepping in to Somalia's messy, violent internal politics. Several residents in Jilib, a town in southern Somalia, said today that two Ethiopian soldiers were killed there in an ambush. Diplomats in the region are now hurrying to cobble together an African peacekeeping force to take the place of the Ethiopian forces. But despite murmurs of commitment from several countries, including Uganda, South Africa and Nigeria, no force has yet materialized. Somalia is far from stable now, with many heavy weapons still in the hands of warlords and anti-government forces, and the country's reliable level of turmoil is likely to dissuade many nations from volunteering to send troops. Ali Mohammed Gedi, Somalia's transitional prime minister, repeated his plea today for all weapons to be turned in to his government, but it seemed that very few people were heeding him. The collection points set up across Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, remained empty, and many young men in the city vowed to keep their guns. Meanwhile, Islamist fighters continued to flee south from Kismayo, the port city near the Kenyan border that had been their last stronghold before Monday, when the Islamist movement collapsed and its remaining followers scattered into the marshy coastland. Kenyan authorities said that 10 fighters were apprehended on Monday trying to slip across the border into Kenya disguised as refugees. Eight had Eritrean passports, while two had Canadian passports, said Alfred Mutua, a spokesman for the Kenyan government; all 10 were carrying briefcases packed with cash. "They definitely didn't look like refugees," Mr. Mutua said. Mr. Mutua said the 10 suspects remained in Kenyan custody, and most likely would be returned to Somalia to face charges under the transitional government. But that government has yet to set up a justice system. The Islamists had tried to improve their military prospects by calling for a jihad against Ethiopia, a country with a long Christian history, and by opening Somalia's doors to foreign fighters. United Nations intelligence officials estimated that several thousand fighters traveled to Somalia from Pakistan, Libya, Syria and Yemen, as well as from Eritrea, Ethiopia's arch-enemy. American officials said that far fewer answered the call, but that their ranks included several wanted terrorists whom the United States was eager to capture. In recent days, ships from the United States Fifth Fleet, based in Bahrain, have increased patrols off Somalia's coast to prevent any suspects from escaping. "We want to deter terrorists from using the sea for illegal activity," said Lt. Denise Garcia, a spokeswoman for the Fifth Fleet. So far, though, no suspects have been apprehended. Somalia continues to be a work in progress. The country's transitional president has yet to set foot in the capital; only a handful of officials have gone to Mogadishu so far. That said, though, normal life - or whatever passes for normal in a country that hasn't had a central government for 15 years - has begun to creep back to Somalia. Mr. Gedi, the transitional prime minister, announced today that the main international airport has been re-opened, though no major airlines have resumed flying there. The airport was strafed by Ethiopian jets last week. Mohammed Ibrahim and Yuusuf Maxamuud contributed reporting from Mogadishu.

If any country can impose itself on another country and redraw its border, major powers could have done it, but it is the people who decide their destiny. In the Soamlia's civil war, two countries benefited from it and two countries were worsened. Ethiopoia and Somalia deteriorated and degenerated into the worse disintegration. People who are dying on the sea seeking better life in the Gulf of Aden are none but Somalis and Ethiopians. Kenya and Djibtouti benefited from Somalia's war.

I wonder Duke why our people predict the worse for Somalia?

Thanks Xiin, I never thought he was testing our intellect.

This is what Power and Interest News Report drafted recently. Addis Ababa would like to withdraw its troops and armor from Somalia as quickly as possible to avoid an armed backlash against its presence and to stop the drain on its resources; Gedi wants the Ethiopians to stay for at least a month longer to secure his position. Disarmament is unlikely to occur as the sub-clans adopt a self-protective posture, the warlords return to reclaim their former positions, and Ethiopia stays out of the picture, leaving insufficient T.F.G. forces to carry out the mission. After a day of calm in Mogadishu, gun fire has resumed, although there are no signs of insurrection. Sooner, when Gov finds its firm hold on the Republic, Ethiopia will withdraw its troops. Please folks, do not fall to the trap of the scaremongers either in the Gov's cabinet or policitians who often demonize their adversaries' success

Hussein aideed as an Interior minister should know his specific job. He is responsible of the police, District commisioners, regional governors, city mayors and all other domestic issues. He should focus on making some progress on these tasks or else he should step down.

Originally posted by Castro: quote: Originally posted by General Duke: The priority should be to bring Somaliland, Djibouti back into the union Let me boil your blood a bit: Not even your uncle can dream that big. LOL.I am surprised you two learned individual would compare the republic of Djibouti to the break away region of "Somaliland". "Somaliland" is a region under the federal system of Somalia and in no way can you put it in the same status as that of Djibouti, a republic that does not need to unite with Somalia and invoking the Greater Somalia would only make things worse. We have to sort out things within the Republic of Somalia. Former British Protectorate is united with former Italian Protectorate forever, according to the Act of Union signed right after we took independence. As a matter of fact, the union was spearheaded prior to independence. For Hussein Aideed's faux pas, we have too many uneducated incompetent politicians in the government's cabinet. Long and ardous task awaits the transitional government to either reshuffle its cabinet or sack those who consistently undermine its national goals and policy advisory notes.

Horn, with the country standing on its own feet, everything will be in the right sport and every region should get its share of resource distribution. Let us pray that this government works before its seeds of discord resurface and kills it in its infancy. I guess I am the only honest man here.

^Besides the drafted report relies on more Dr. Jowhar's article "The War of Miscalculation" in which he predicts the return of warlordism, anarchy and disorder. Dr. Johwar is a pro-secessionist, a narrowly held belief I find ludicrously fascinating to grasp its origin. He has exact, unquestioning obedience to "Somalland" and will make everyone toe the mark to convincing that it is a different state. But how are we going to buy his ideas that a portion of Somalia should secede however arbitrary or tyrannical. Those pro-secessionists that he so much caters to their vanity and flatters their ego are very few, divisive entity squeezed to the corner of Somalia. Dr. Jowhar's interest in the development of the south is driven by unceasing adulation that spring from his own clannish interest to dismember Somalia. However, the government will come over these ferocious verbal attacks it was made to bear by restoring law and order and continue building national institutions. Time should tell

KAMPALA, Uganda: A battalion of Ugandan troops could be ready to deploy as peacekeepers to Somalia within a few days, a military spokesman said Monday. Somalia's prime minister has called for an African peacekeeping force to help his government take control of the country. Maj. Felix Kulayigye, a spokesman for Uganda's army, said 1,000 troops were ready. "We have one battalion prepared to go to Somalia immediately after they are cleared by the ministry of foreign affairs," he said. A group of seven regional countries, known as IGAD, proposed a peacekeeping force for Somalia two years ago, but fighting inside the country prevented a deployment. The United Nations endorsed the peacekeeping plans last month, but fighting between the transitional government and a rival Islamic movement made any deployment impossible. Ugandan officials have said in the past they would be willing to contribute a force for Somalia, but said they would need funds to help pay for it. From government headquarters in Baidoa, Somalia, government spokesman Abdirahman Dinari told The Associated Press that Uganda and Nigeria have both agreed to send a total of 8,000 troops soon, without giving an exact time. Kulayigye said that before the troops deploy, their mission must be approved by the Ugandan ministry of foreign affairs and the parliament, which he said could take place very quickly.

If it makes any difference to you but it appears your likes can't rationalize issues of immense importance. Instead, you poised to discomfit your readers with trivial things which renders your thoughts jumbled and tangled enough to form noncommital grunt or impatient silence. If Geedi were to be president and he has both the lustre and drive to walk his country to centralized adminstration, I will support. I don't blindly give my aid and support to men whom I tacitly understand to be closer than others.

Pictures too big for the windows, so see it anyway. Banaanbax Lagu Taageerayo Dowlada Soomaaliya oo ka dhacay Minnesota Minneapolis: (Dhahar.com) Waxa ka dhacay Minnesota gaar ahaan labada magaalo ee mataanaha ah banaanbax weyn oo lagu taageerayo Dowlada ku meelgaarka ah, oo iyadu hada hanatay nabada Soomaaliya. Banaabaxaas ayaa dadkii isugu yimid ay ku muujiyeen taageerada weyn ee ay u hayaan dowlada ku meelgaarka ah.