Xudeedi

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  1. You missed the concept of Maakhirian shift, erring on the side of cursory skim. From this, it does not do justice to the argument of the article. The concept is not based on a calculated fear but urging Somali peoples, wherever they are, to heed on to the pitfalls of political allegiance with another in the absence of centralized government. I notice the points that this Editorial puts forth are all valid with concrete results available to substantiate them. When things don't work the way it was supposed or intended, contingencies and uncertainties arise, therefore, and people who are equipped with the right knowledge to detect have moral imperatives to correct and respond to, such shortcomings of utter failure, the only avenue being the combination of exercising monopoly over violence in your own territory plus engaging in public relations to seek support and make your case convincing to those who may be swayed by such parties that see and exploit your vulnerabilities. For instance, just look at the German Abduction, how it was manipulated by self-interested entity, and its long-term implication on the region. The Concept of Maakhirian Shift applies as well to the region of Sool and Buhotleh district.
  2. The Maakhirian Shift: Pre-empting a Melian Fate Dhahar Online EDITORIAL 13 February 2008 Melians: … However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and if you will, the discussion may proceed in the way you propose. Athenians: … You know as well as we do that in this world, justice is a subject for debate only between those who are equals in power. Those who are stronger do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. (Emphasis by the Board) -Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue. The above is an excerpt from the Melian Dialogue as narrated by the ancient Greek historian, Thucydides. The Melian Dialogue took place, moments before the Peloponnesian War (in 416 BC), between the army generals of the expanding Athenian empire and the leaders of the weak Melos Island. The leaders of Melos Island, stating their ‘neutrality’ in that epoch’s imperial geopolitics, which revolved around the powerful Athens and Sparta states, hoped that the advance of their moral argument would, somehow, persuade the Athenians to halt their advance to conquer their island. The Melian leaders even warned the Athenians that their advance would animate the Spartans, wanting to maintain geopolitical balance of power, to come to their aid. But alas, the Melians’ arguments were made in vain. As it was narrated by Thucydides, their island was eventually, albeit a short-lived resistance, conquered by the Athenians, as a result killing all men of military age, and selling all women to slavery. If you are asking yourself why we should go through the trouble of quoting an ancient dialogue of a war that took place in 416 BC, or the reason why I cite so drastic a tale in which a whole country’s population had either been annihilated or enslaved, then perhaps I owe you an explanation. The explanation I give you here is one which tackles the complacency and precariousness of ‘political neutrality’ in an era of anarchy and naked, expansionist civil conflict. In equal terms, my explanation intends to deplore the negligence of a people in their failure to seek all avenues that gives them the opportunity to lay control over their own affairs and interests, whilst not making the mistake of entrusting their lives to others. When such becomes of a peoples’ political fate, then, their fate becomes similar to that of the Melos Island. AS THE TITLE OF this writing implies, which bids itself to avert the possibility of a Melian fate recurring to any region in our country, I strongly believe that Somali peoples, who inhabit regions that fall between/under or outside the borders of the self-interested administrations currently existing, that they should be well advised to promptly device plans to gain sole control over their affairs. If not, they may probably face the bleak prospects of prolonged economic and political marginalization, or outright, forceful occupation and eventual population displacement. This is the alarm I sound for now, with the hope of pre-empting consequences of an unending protracted tribal conflict over territorial claims and counter-claims of irreverent regional administrations. The decision of a people to become masters of their own affairs is what I would like to call ‘The Maakhirian Shift’. The Maakhirian Shift The concept of a Maakhirian Shift is not, as some might wrongly think, tantamount to the idea of secession from Somali union, as is the case with Somaliland, nor is it the formation of a state that purports to be part and parcel of Somalia but yet, for all intents and purposes, formulates laws that contravene, or blatantly disregard the articles of the national charter, as is now the case with the State of Puntland. In total contrast, ‘The Maakhirian Shift’ does not necessarily denote a divergence from, but conformity to, the article of the federal constitution when a unanimously accepted national state comes to pass. Thus, the formation of Maakhir State of Somalia is not principally concerned with such political intimations of total autonomy. Rather, the pressing concern that has motivated its emergence pertains to the simple fact that the region Maakhirians inhabit, was gradually becoming metamorphosed, with detrimental effects, into Somalia’s own Kashmir, by competing administrations. This was the major concern behind ‘The Maakhirian Shift’, so to speak, but certainly there are other related concerns, which I shall expound in the remainder of my writing. Firstly, when the politics of clientele becomes dominant in the circles of self-interested opportunists, representation becomes a social whore. Opportunists prostitute peoples’ interests, and exchange allegiance for nickels and dim. In such a context, disputed regions like Sool, Sanaag and Cayn, conflicting arguments marginalize and endangers the security of the peoples. It is in this situation that Maakhirians have found themselves of late, and the problems emanating from this situation drove them to a debilitating confusion. Secondly, in security terms, administrations with territorial claims have, for a while now, been endangering the fragile stability the region has so far maintained. The salient question to ask is: what becomes of the area now called Maakhir, were these two administrations to engage in an all out war but a battleground? Who suffers in such a war but Maakhirians? In any event, since they previously had any military and weaponry of their own, how could they have protected themselves from the prospect of bitter forceful occupation by one admin or another? Maakhirians knew full well that what is currently happening in Laas-Caano was impending in their territory too, and thus had to act quickly for prevention. This was the only option open to pursue, for if not, the awaiting fate would have been that exemplified by the Melos Island: fait accompli occupation. Thirdly, there is the irresponsible issue of Puntland and Somaliland administrations undertaking province re-demarcation projects. These province re-demarcations involved the curving up of Maakhirian territories into even small areas, and as a result dividing peoples along new imaginary provinces. The impacts of these projects is not only the division of peoples, but more seriously, the lumping up of Maakhirian lands with altogether a different region, such as misleadingly bring all these lands under disputed "Sool, Sanaag and Cayn". Fourthly, in financial terms, as a result of a plethora of opportunist siding with the said administrations, the share of development and humanitarian funds destined for Maakhirians, has for a long term become stagnated and misappropriated in Hargeysa and Garowe, by self-appointed, out of touch representatives. The consequences of such misappropriation have led Makhir to declare autonomy and place itself under the authority of TFG. For instance, according to the Joint Needs Assessment, 'Somaliland' still has jurisdiction over the regions of Sool and Sanaag, which indeed further inflame the conflict and hostility in the region. If majority of the inhabitants from these regions are opposed to the clannish-driven secession, is it a viable developmental policy that these communities’ needs and political survival be enforced alongside with those whom they perceive as regional rivals, encroaching on their territories. This is the root cause of the conflict in the North and the reason why these two regions still remain volatile and in conflict. Exploiting the unfair policy system the U.N. has unilaterally put in place and the lack of understandable guidance for the overall benefits of its implementation, any tribal organization/entity that emerged out of the wreckage of the Somali Republic and which has maintained a monopoly over the ongoing process of acquiring illegally the country’s Economic Infrastructure, in the absence of a functioning Somali state, has been imposing its not shared political ambitions and aspirations on other tribes, thereby exposing zones that were considered as “recovery” into crisis situation. A reevaluation of the ‘business as usual “ approach as called by the U.N. Special Representative for Somalia, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, is needed, dealing with the regions of Makhir State independent from “Somaliland” under the program of the U.N. Transition Plan for Somalia 2008-9. Send your Comments to: Dhahar@Dhahar.com
  3. We should support our Somali brothers in their struggle to free themselves and so do we in Mogadisho. All the regions in Somalia must come to each others' aid. We are no different to Habesh/Tigrinya as they are the traditional enemy of our desire to live peacefully and pursue happiness.
  4. My Brush with Islamic Justice Martin Fletcher February 9, 2008 As one who has been hauled in front of a Sharia court I would like to risk having my hand — or head — chopped off a second time by suggesting that the Archbishop of Canterbury just might have a point. My brush with Islamic justice occurred in December 2006 in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. A popular movement called the Islamic Courts Council (ICC) had recently seized control of the country, expelling feuding warlords who had made it a byword for terror over the previous 15 years. One afternoon Richard Mills, The Times photographer, and I were driving away from the infamous Bakara arms market. In a narrow, rutted sidestreet our way was blocked by an approaching vehicle. Neither driver would give way. A furious argument flared up, and our bodyguards drew their guns. Happily, ICC policemen arrived in the nick of time and escorted us all to the nearest Sharia court. We waited in the yard of an old police station. An alleged drug dealer lay on the ground on his stomach, his hands and legs bound together behind his back. Several wretched faces stared out from the dark interiors of cells with barred windows. A bunch of women engaged in some sort of domestic dispute arrived and waited patiently behind us. Finally the drivers, still arguing furiously, were each told to make their case to a couple of religious elders. They had barely begun before the court adjourned to a nearby carpet for sunset prayers. When it resumed, and both drivers had had their say, the court pronounced. The two men were ordered to apologise to each other and we were all dismissed. The court performed its duty with admirable dispatch and minimal fuss and everyone went away happy. It was quicker, cheaper and just as effective as a British magistrates’ court. The ICC is no more. Washington accused it of turning Somalia into a terrorist haven. It was replaced by a deeply unpopular Government of former warlords. Source: Times Online
  5. SOMALIA: Shukri Gamadiid: "This is not a life" SHALAAMBOD, 13 February 2008 (IRIN) - Shukri Gamadiid, 27, is displaced in Somalia's Lower Shabelle region. She fled the capital, Mogadishu, in September 2007 due to fighting between government troops and insurgents and now lives in a camp for the displaced in the small town of Shalaambod, 90km south of Mogadishu. Shalaambod is home to thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) who have fled Mogadishu and those who were turned back from Kenya. Gamadiid left Mogadishu with her husband and their five children, aged between two and 12 years, travelling more than 700km to the Kenyan border before returning to Shalaambod. She spoke to IRIN on 13 February: "We used to live in Towfiq [north Mogadishu]. It became the centre of fighting; every day someone's house was hit by a shell or someone was killed. "My husband and I decided to leave when it got so bad that we could not even get an hour of peace to go to the market. We decided that we should seek refuge in Kenya and we went with two other families to share the burden of the long journey. "We hoped that our nightmare would be over once we reached Kenya. But we were wrong; on the way I lost one of my sons, a four-year-old. "The militias we ran into on the way raped women and robbed us of all our belongings. By the time we reached Dobley [on the Kenyan-Somali border], we were exhausted, frightened and had nothing. "We tried to cross into Kenya but they refused to let us in. People told us to wait, that we would eventually get in. For two months we waited and survived on help from the community. Finally, we decided to return. We found a truck driver who said he could take us up to Brawe [110km south of Shalaambod]. "Here [in the camp] we have safety but nothing else; I live in a hut with my family. It gives us shade from the sun but when it rains we get wet. We depend on the kindness of other people who have been here before us. Some days my children go hungry and the only thing they get is tea. "I worry a lot about my children. The oldest used to go school. Now he does not and if this continues none of us will have any future. I hope and pray that this will be over soon so we can go back to our lives. "This is not a life for any one." Source:IRIN
  6. The last Call for "Jihad" was on December 2006 but you will be suprised to learn the first one was on December 1996 when Ethiopia made repeated forays into our territories in direct violation of our sovereignty. What difference in both accounts of the recent and past history is important for us to notice and glean from this archived news from Reuters? This time, America has bankrolled and physically aided this brutal occupation of Somalia and its after-effect of mass displacement that created this slow Darfur-type of a genocide. Ethiopia knows that it can't sustain a long hard battle with Somalis as it is evident in the occupied territory inside artificial Ethiopia. Somali Moslem leaders call for "jihad" on Ethiopia. By Mohamed Guled 27 December 1996 MOGADISHU, Dec 27 (Reuter) - Somali Moslem clerics called on Friday for "jihad" or holy war against Ethiopia and young men in the capital volunteered to fight Ethiopian forces in southwest Somalia. "This (invasion) is the latest step in the plan by Christian fundamentalists to destroy Islam in Somalia," said Sheikh Mohamed Oromo in south Mogadishu's the al-Salama (Peace) mosque. Oromo, like several other clerics at Mogadishu mosques during Friday prayers, called for holy war against Ethiopia for sending its troops into southwest Somalia last week. In Sheikh Muhsin mosque in north Mogadishu, Sheikh Ali Dhere said the Ethiopian army would destroy mosques in Somali towns unless they were stopped and wanted to secede parts of Somalia. In Sheikh Ali Sufi mosque, the largest in the southern part of the city, clerics called on young men to take up arms and said those who could should pay money for the warriors. Moslem fundamentalist supporters drove around Mogadishu urging people to volunteer to sacrifice their lives for Islam. In the busy Bakara market, the largest in the capital, youths lined up -- some paying donations and others volunteering to head to the front as Moslem fighters. A security source in western Somalia reached by radio from Mogadishu on Friday said some 50 Ethiopian troops had entered a small border village near the village of Bulo Hawo and fought with Somali militiamen of al-Ittihad al-Islami (Islamic Union). South Mogadishu faction leader Hussein Aideed on Thursday urged Ethiopian to withdraw its forces but stopped short of expressing support for the Moslem fundamentalist al-Ittihad. It is the second time in five months Ethiopia sent troops into Somalia to strike at al-Ittihad. Last August Ethiopia said its forces killed more than 230 fighters and destroyed three bases. Ethiopia said then it might have to return to hit again at what it called a "multinational terrorist group" in Somalia. In its first comment on the latest incursion, Ethiopia said on Wednesday its defence forces killed or wounded more than 100 Moslem fundamentalists who had tried to attack the border town of Dollo. The Ethiopian statement said those killed included Arabs from a number of countries. It gave no indication of Ethiopian casualties and did not say how far Ethiopian forces pushed into Somalia. Somalia has had no central government since the fall of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 at the start of civil war. © Reuters Limited 1996
  7. This zeal for intervention is imperialism in new clothes The foreign secretary speaks as part of a political generation with no experience of war and little sense of history Simon Jenkins. The Guardian. London (UK): Feb 13, 2008. David Miliband loves democracy. We all love democracy. We also love capitalism, social welfare, child health, book learning and leatherback turtles. We would like the whole world to love them too, and we stand ready to persuade it so. But do we shoot anyone who refuses? It is hardly credible that two centuries since Immanuel Kant wrestled with this oldest of ethical conundrums, a British government still cannot tell the difference between espousing a moral imperative and enforcing one. Yesterday in Oxford the foreign secretary decided to update the 1998 Chicago speech of his then mentor, Tony Blair, in which Blair tore up the UN's sovereignty provisions in favour of the new "liberal interventionism". He proposed a doctrine of international community, which he claimed, like St Teresa, to have "witnessed". This required Britain to attack sovereign states unprovoked if this would end a violation of human rights. Blair qualified his zeal with reference to military feasibility, a "readiness for long-term commitment" and "our national interest truly engaged". Like any interference in the lives of others, the motives were soon mixed and the language confused. How feasible is feasible? How long is long term? What is an "engaged" national interest: a moral crusade or an arms deal? Nonetheless, as Kosovo and Sierra Leone were to show, Blair was right to acknowledge a humanitarian instinct beyond relieving the starving, as in Biafra or Ethiopia. In 1993 the liberal Washington Post was goading the US to invade Somalia, since states that "treat their peoples badly" should lose the protection of the UN charter's protection. Such unilateral rewriting ended in tears, but this did nothing to halt the exhilarating "virtues imperialism" of many on the left and right. Miliband brushes aside the blundering into Iraq and Afghanistan as errors of implementation rather than principle and takes the Blair doctrine into new territory. He wants his pan-democratic world to be achieved by peaceful means, by trade, multilateral action and - his new soundbite - a "civilian surge". Should soft power fail, Miliband wants to use sanctions and send in troops, for instance through offering security guarantees to regimes that "abide by democratic rules". Such measures would need to embrace internal and external security, and be of universal application if, as Kant warned, they are to go beyond opportunism and carry moral force. They would have guaranteed Dubcek's Czechoslovakia against the Soviet Union, and Allende's Chile against America. The regimes in Baghdad and Kabul would need guarantees indefinitely, as would an elected regime in Pakistan - guaranteeing it against insurgent Taliban and lurking generals. Miliband calls any scepticism "a retreat into a world of realpolitik". Such point scoring may do for an Oxford debate but not for bereaved army mothers taking him to the high court, or the thousands of victims of his doctrine who see hard power interventionism as a menace to life and order. The professor of political science at Baghdad University said yesterday that the imprisonments under Saddam were more tolerable than the weekly murders, kidnappings, militia censorship and female repression his department is suffering. Is Miliband saying, from the comfort of his office, that this man is deluded? Few would quarrel with the platitude that democracy is the least worst way of governing a freedom-loving state. But history shows that democracy takes centuries to bed down in any culture (including Europe's). This generation of western politicians has no experience of war and little sense of history. The new interventionism may differ from the old imperialism in not seeking to settle or rule countries. But it is the same in believing that western values can (and should) be imposed on often reluctant states through military occupation. I regard the way I am governed as superior to most. But I am not so arrogant or naive as to believe I can change other states by persuasion or war. The latter is an infringement of self-determination and has proved starkly counterproductive. The greatest boost to the overrated Islamist threat is from just the power projection Miliband supports. In the non-interventionist 1990s, the thinktank Freedom House charted a steady growth in democracy worldwide. With the advent of the democracy crusaders Blair and George Bush this trend has probably gone into reverse. The cynical appeasement of China and aggressive treatment of Russia and the Muslim world has done no service to democracy. Indeed the cause has fared better in south-east Asia and Latin America, where outside pressure has been least in evidence. There is no text in international law that justifies ramming a system of government down the throats of others. Self-determination, warts and all, has been the defining essence of the nation-state throughout history, which is why the UN charter qualified it only in cases of cross-border aggression and humanitarian relief. The robustness of this doctrine is shown in half a century of relative peace worldwide. Collapsing it has been disastrous. Democracy everywhere has emerged when individuals give or withhold consent and rulers are confident enough to accept their verdict. Besides western Europe in 1945 (when democracy was not created but restored), there is almost no example of democracy imposed by external force. Russia, with no experience of it, appears to be rejecting it. The concept of consent in countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and Iran is hesitant, but western pressure, soft or hard, aids the reactionaries. There is one simple way of honouring Britain's pride in its chosen system: prove it works at home better than any other. That means working tirelessly to refresh it. This is not easy, as Miliband should know in his failed bid to regenerate civic democracy. It may seem small beer, but how can he preach reform to others when he cannot achieve the tiniest reform himself? The west can invite the world to witness the virtues of democracy. It can deploy the soft power of education, exchange, publicity and aid. But a true democrat cannot abandon Voltaire's respect for the autonomy of disagreement, let alone seek to crush it. Britain can shine its beacon abroad but it cannot impose its values on the world. It has tried too often, and has failed. This is not isolationism. It is fact. simon.jenkins@guardian.co.uk
  8. His articles in regards to the overlapping disputes that result in the widespread conflagration of the Horn crisis are often fair, well calculated and thoroughly capture the political reality in particular areas. He is well versed in our current affairs from the ruthless Ethiopian intervention he speaks out so against to overall the geopolitics in the Horn as well as in the Middle East. He is a well-established populist scholar in many different perspectives more than the many self-styled Somali pundits.
  9. With friends like these who needs enemies By Mohsin Mahad Sunday, February 10, 2008 US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer on arrival at Hargeysa airport The past fortnight has undoubtedly been glorious days for Somaliland and hence bad times for Somalia’s unity. Of course, Somalis had become so inured to bad news over the years that nothing short of an earthquake will shake them from their moribund and down in the dumps state. As for those who refer to themselves as “Somalilanders” rather than fellow Somalis, they have every reason to be more than pleased with themselves. Their tireless efforts to leave no stone unturned in order to advance their recognition has finally borne fruits. But their efforts would have been doomed were it not for the absence of a true Somali government in the 1990s or the impotence or indifference of the current Transitional Federal Government. The past two weeks demonstrate more than anything else the contrasting performances and fortunes of the Somali government and the renegade enclave in Hargeisa when it comes to their respective score for maintaining or destroying Somali unity. Two succeeding and significant events took place in the last two weeks or so. The first was the visit of Mr. Riyale, the self-styled “President” of the secessionist enclave to Washington for talks. It is true that as one claiming to be head of a state, he did not meet President Bush in conformity with established diplomatic practices. But for an isolated enclave, starved of official contacts let alone recognition, for over 17 years, meeting even a junior desk officer in any USA Department would have been beyond their wildest expectation. For them, meeting Ms. Frazier as they did is as good as meeting President Bush. The second was the return visit of Ms. Frazier to Hargaisa. If the first visit of Riyale to Washington could have been dismissed as an isolated flash in the pan, the visit of Ms. Frazier to Hargeisa, so soon after Riyale’s trip to Washington, has definitely sent an unmistakable signal signifying the importance the USA attaches to its budding relation with the rebel entity. Her subsequent explanation that her visit to Hargeisa was merely aimed at assisting the renegade enclave on fostering democracy and organising free and fair elections is meant to calm possible negative fallout from her trip. No one in their right mind will fall for her incredulous explanations and nothing she said can conceal the wider political significance of her trip. Providing technical assistance on democracy and elections could have been undertaken by junior technocrats from her Department and not someone of her political stature. If her visit does not have political implications, nothing else does. Although overzealous “Somalilanders” tend to read too much into token empty gestures by outsiders and magnify their significance out of all proportions, they have good reason this time to sniff that things are at last going their way-slowly but surely. Even if no one on their side realistically expects recognition to be granted so soon after two exchanged visits, yet the writing is unmistakably on the wall, and nothing the USA government had said excludes that possibility. Given recognition from some African countries within the framework of the AU - a condition apparently required by the UAS and Britain among others- and barring strong counter reaction in Somalia, from the government, parliament and the public, in particular those from other regions in the North Western Region of Somalia (former British Somaliland), the way could be open for Somaliland’s recognition. And if and when recognition happens, it is a goal as much earned by them as ceded by the Somali government and its people by default. The USA administration has dealt Somalia two successive blows within a short time. First, was its decision to invite the head of the rebel, one-clan-based entity in North Western Somalia to Washington for talks over the head of the internationally recognised government of Somalia. The second, and even more amazing action, was the decision of Ms Frazier to go to Hargeisa after attending the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa where she met Somalia’s Prime Minister, Nur Adde, and his entourage. She could not have been under any illusion that her visit would signify not only a major shift of USA policy towards Somalia but that its timing would be seen by independent observers as a an insensitive provocative action that was bound to publicly humiliate the PM, and antagonise willy-nilly his government, his country and people. All the same, one can only ask as to what has prompted the USA government along this perilous road, bearing in mind its past policy plunders towards Somalia: from Operation Restore Hope, to supporting the warlords against the Union of Islamic Courts, to bankrolling, aiding and abetting Ethiopia’s intervention in Somalia? Has the USA discounted similar pitfalls might lie ahead in its flirtations with Somaliland or does it consider them if they occur to be of no consequence or manageable? Does it assume that it policy towards the secessionist enclave is cost free in terms of its relations with Somalia? Has it persuaded itself that its recognition of Somaliland would not spark conflagration that could engulf the whole country, pitting Somalia and unionists on one side against the secessionists and, worse, one clan against another in the North West region, an outcome that would render Somaliland’s existence unsustainable and its recognition misguided and counterproductive? Last but not least, is the USA aware of the irony of its surreptitious diplomatic and financial backing to the secessionists against the unionists in Somalia as flagrant betrayal of the USA raison d’être as a country symbolising the victory of the unionists over the separatists or does think realpolitik trumps over anything else? Only the Americans can answer the above questions but it does not stop us from seeking plausible explanations for their recent actions: first and foremost is the de facto separation of the secessionist enclave from the rest of Somalia for over 17 years; secondly, the current Somali government has given every impression that the North Western Region and Somali unity are of little or no concern to them; and thirdly, Meles Zenewa, counting on the concurrence or indifference of the Somali government, have routinely meddled in Somali affairs and summons Riyale and Adde Muse to Addis Ababa for talks as if their respective fiefdoms, Somaliland and Puntland, were administered from his capital. If the wily midget Meles Zenewi can do as he pleases in Somalia and get away with it, there is even less reason for the mighty USA, pursuing its naked national interest, and unfettered by respect for international law regarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member nations of the United Nations, to have any hesitation to fish in troubled Somali waters. The fact that neither Prime Minister Nur Adde nor his Foreign Minister Jangeli issued a statement or some token protest against Riyale’s vist to Washington or Ms Frazier’s trip to Hargeisa only confirms a view held among increasing sections of the international community that Somali unity may still be breathing but otherwise as good as dead; an assessment based on Somalia recent history as a stateless country torn apart by warring warlords and clans and bereft of national leaders safeguarding national unity and interest. Ms Frazier counted on this assessment and was proved right. You have to scratch your head to remember any time Messrs Yusuf, Gedi, Nur Adde et al, ever defended Somali unity when doing so was of the utmost importance. If anything, their actions have been characterised by either support to the secession or otherwise incomprehensible silence. Remember former Prime Minister Gedi’s famous indiscretion at an unguarded moment when he practically endorsed Somaliland’s secession? As for President Yussuf, he misses no opportunity to attack the enemies of his government in Mogadishu but rarely ever a word against those who have done worse by tearing Somali unity asunder. The jury is out in the case of Nur Adde but his deafening silence is not reassuring. As a typical Benadiri, his vision for Somalia, like his processor Gedi, may not extend beyond the confines of his native home ground. Equally lamentable is the collective disgrace of our so-called Parliamentarians who did not bother to air their protest against Riyale’s visit to the USA and Ms. Frazier’s trip to Hargeisa. The lure of financial handouts by the international community and the trappings of sham power seem what weigh heavily with most leaders of the TFG and Parliament. With friends like these who needs enemies? Much as Somaliland had good grounds for rejoicing, yet one swallow does not make summer and the prospects for its cherished recognition, even if it dangles in the distant horizon, may turn out to be no more than a mirage. The little gains they had made have to be set against insurmountable hurdles on their way. Even if they are right to discount the impotent TFT as nothing more than a straw man, they still have to reckon with Sool, Sanaag and Cayn (SSC) regions and the Puntland administration to which they belong. If the SSC regions wee voluntarily part of Somaliland and not under occupation or coercion, Somaliland could have made a convincing case that it was in control of the whole NW region of Somalia- an import ant prerequisite for recognition. That however is not the case. Somaliland is disingenuously claiming these regions on the dubious ground that they were once together under the defunct British colonial rule. So what? The British left and no one clan has right to replace the British and claim suzerainty rights over other clans. It was the need to impress upon the international community that it was in control over the anti-secession SSC regions in NW Somalia that prompted Somaliland to invade Lascanod, capital of Sool, in October 2007. But in this day and age in the 21 Century, the occupation of a people and their forced incorporation into an illegal secessionist one-clan entity will be seen by the international community as a violation of their right to self determination and the exercise of their free will to be part of Somalia. The present deceptive calm in the SSC regions is only the prelude to the gathering war clouds as Puntland unleashes its long-awaited counter offensive aimed at liberating Lascanod from the invaders. The outcome of the looming clash would make Somaliland’s position untenable militarily and politically. An outright defeat of Somaliland’s militia is the worst scenario from its perspective. It would not only have lost Sool, but the tremors that defeat triggers could bring down the whole secessionist edifice. Even if Somaliland is not evicted from Sool in the first offensive, the inevitable continued bloody struggle will wear down the invaders more than those who are on their soil and feel they are defending their region and Somali unity. The longer that struggle lasts, the higher the cost to Somaliland in terms of human and financial losses and foregone international sympathy and support. Somaliland had invested so much over the years to promote itself as an oasis of peace in contrast to the turmoil in Southern Somalia. That meticulously acquired image has earned it much praise from the international community and did much to bolster its claim for recognition. All that good work would be in tatters once the flames Somaliland ignited in Sool engulf the whole region. No country, least of all the EU and USA, would want to reward Somaliland at a time when it is seen as a trouble maker destabilising the whole region. This sacred land of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn was the battle ground for 21 years, over hundred years ago, between the Darwiishes and another foreign invader, the mighty British, who wanted to impose their will on the proud and freedom-loving inhabitants of those regions. Sadly, the colonisers were at the time aided as mercenaries by the same people who today, in the manner of their former colonial masters, are bent to occupy SSC regions and bring them under their tutelage. Invaders are invariably defeated and Somaliland is no exception. When that happens, the curtain will be drawn on Somaliland and the secession, and will be remembered in future as another failed African secession following the footsteps of Biafra and Katanga. It is no thanks to our self-absorbed Somali leaders but to the fearless Darwiishes in SSC regions and their allies in Puntland for once again defending their territory from invaders and preserving Somali unity. Sayed Mohame Abdalla Hassan would have been very proud of them. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mohsin Mahad E-mail: mohsinmahad@yahoo.co.uk
  10. US intelligence: Kenya unrest could undermine anti-terror cooperation By DESMOND BUTLER Associated Press Writer WASHINGTON (AP) - The U.S. intelligence chief said Kenya's leader is likely to try to cling to power and that recent unrest after a disputed election could undermine the country's cooperation on counterterrorism. Mike McConnell, director of national intelligence, also told U.S. lawmakers that Somalia's transitional government would likely collapse if Ethiopian troops pulled out of the country. McConnell said that ethnic violence in Kenya "has damaged, perhaps for the long-term, public trust in political institutions and the democratization process." He said that President Mwai Kibaki and rival Raila Odinga, both of whom claim to have won the Dec. 27 presidential elections, have show little willingness to compromise. "Kibaki probably will do everything he can to hold on to power," McConnell said in his annual testimony to Congress on global threats to U.S. interests. Violence sparked by a dispute over who won the elections has killed more than 1,000 people and made 300,000 homeless. "Kenya is likely to enter a period of increased social tention and instability, which could affect its willingness and ability to cooperate with the U.S. on regional diplomatic and counterterrorist matters," he said. On Somalia, McConnell told the lawmakers that Ethiopia's Dec. 2006 invervention has provoked insurgency, stoked divisions and made it very difficult for the transitional government to govern. "The Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Governement is incapable of administering Somalia and probably would flee Mogadishu or collapse if the Ethiopians withdrew," he said. Mogadishu has been plagued by fighting since government troops and their Ethiopian allies chased out the Council of Islamic Courts. Remnants of the Islamic group have vowed to fight an Iraq-style insurgency.
  11. Waxaan aad ula yaabaa, damiir xumida, arxandara, Islaan darida,iyo cadowtoyinimada Illaahaya ku dhex abuurey Soomaali dhexdeedooda. Maalinwalba waxa ii cadaanaaya waxa ***** u doorbidey inuu ka dhx baxo Soomaali.
  12. His leadership is still inimitable. Allaha ha u naxariisto
  13. Obama, my Family and I By Faisal A. Roble Jan 31 , 2008 Despite this past weekend’s enviably nice weather in Los Angeles - sunny, clear and unusually blue skies with a comfortable temp. - my entire family sat in front of the TV all day, including my 3-year-old son, Samatar, who can now name Obama with ease. While listening to CNN pundits’ round-the-clock reportage with unending suspense, the wait for the final tally of the South Carolina Democratic primary was nerve-wracking. For a family that averages not more than mere-7-hours -a week TV time, this was unprecedented. The Obama fever first infected me. But once the bug bit my 8-year-old son, Heban, the Obama phenomenon became a family obsession. Time was Obama’s conspirator; His campaign came into the family conversation, mainly because the South Carolina primary coincided with the holiday of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., the nation’s father of inclusion and civil rights, as well as a true translator of the forefathers’ E Pluribus Unum “out of many, one.” With our local schools taking time every year to inculcate the civil rights leader’s positive ideals, my son’s sense of inter-group dynamics is more acute, that is in a positive way. He equates Obama with King and Kennedy. “What will happen,” he asks, “if Obama gets elected?” More poor people would get access to education and housing, I would reply. “Dad,” he would say, every now and then, “Obama looks like me.” Sure, he does. You know his father came from Africa, Kenya, I would emphasise. “Does that mean his family’s heritage is similar to ours; that we both have roots in Africa?” Yes, that is right, I would emphatically respond. The Obama factor seems to fill void for myself and for my son. We rarely talk about African politics, and I purposely avoid some of the painful news reports coming from home. But we revel on the nightly news accounting successful stories about Obama’s campaign; we exchange views on tolerance, inter-faith and inter-racial relationship in this mosaic cultural melting pot. As a first generation Somali American, the issues of inclusion and exclusion are always with me. To be Black, Muslim, and Somali raising children in America’s suburbs could in difficult times invite what Said Samatar of Rutgers University calls a “Dostoyevsky self-hating Somali syndrome.” As a father, though, I am constantly guarding those feelings from creeping into the psyche of my children. In a country where a black man is, in the words of Ralph Alison, “invisible” and teenage black boys are an “endangered species,” the Obama candidacy is a reprieve. Obama’s candidacy is one that undoubtedly represents to my 8-year-old son, who is just beginning to have a grasp of inter-group dynamism, a new beginning with a bright and promising future. The exhilaration in his eyes after CNN declared Obama the winner of the South Carolina primary will remain a moment I will cherish for many years to come. The Obama candidacy signifies inclusion. Although Hillary Clinton does not represent forces of exclusion, an African American president would represent more: it brings the ultimate reckoning and atonement about race relations, or what Gundder Myrdal called “the American Dilemma” to a closure. But it also brings us close to reality what Ali Mazrui, the Kenyan born scholar, has been preaching; that Africa’s hope of greatness lies in Africa’s Diaspora children, primarily those in America and Brazil. Mazrui has postulated that where the West exports technology and knowhow to Africa, Africa exports to the West its short-supply of highly educated immigrants. Obama’s father was incidentally from Kenya who came to America to do a Doctorate degree in Economics. With its multi-layered message to blacks, white women and young white adults, immigrants, and to those of us who are Africa’s first generation immigrants, the Obama candidacy has a huge symbolic import beyond politics; To everyone, though, it is telling of the globalization of the world’s children. More importantly, it represents a milestone for America’s bumpy journey towards multi-culturalism, where my 8-year-old son would dream big both for America, his adopted home, and for his home of origin, Africa, where his kith and kin are still toiling for survival. The Obama candidacy pushes America forth towards the dream of J. F Kennedy, exonerates multiculturalism, and authenticates the idea that Africa’s export of its best and brightest is not in vain. Despite the many hours that I have uncharacteristically committed the family to watching news and pundits’ analysis of every twist and turn of vote counting - by region, race and gender - this past Saturday of January 26, 2008 is nonetheless historic. Win or no win, unlike the establishment of the Black leadership in this country, my family and I have been deeply impacted by the Obama candidacy. Faisla A. Roble Email: fabroble@aol.com
  14. "With the English and Italians now occupying a few towns on the Somali Coast and the Abyssinians far away in the north busy with internal affairs, Haji Muhammad Abdullah apparently has a great unencumbered future before him. A study of his past and of the conditions which sustain his present foreshadows a future of infinite variety and charm. He has 70,000 men, all of whom are either well trained to modern magazine rifle. He has 10,000 cavalry; he manufactures his own powder and bullets, and is burdened with no commissariat. Fifty-five thousand square miles containing 800,000 Mohammedans are apparently at his disposal. In a word, his possibilities are almost infinite."....... Access from the above link.
  15. WHAT A GREAT LEADER WE HAD. "Who is this Mad Mullah, who for eleven years has kept Downing Street on the jump, has sent cold shivers creeping down spines of successive Italian foreign Ministers, and has even caused the Negus at Addis Ababa to turn pale under his pigment? The Mad Mullah is a sort of African Washington and Napoleon rolled in one. With a temperamental veneer of Peter the Hermit. Like Washington, he wins his victories by defeats; like Napoleon, he dominates the imagination of his followers. His eleven years war has been like a conflict between a lion and a hawk, in which the lion has finally turned tail and fled.......... That was not a satisfactory situation from a financial point of view, nor was it satisfactory from a military point of view. The Mad Mullah became a subject of heated debate in the House of Commons, and it was suggested by a member that $10,000, or even 15,000, a year might be offered the Mad Mullah on condition that he kept quiet. Indeed, Col Swayne was authorized by the Foreign Office to make such an offer. The Mad Mullah declined to accept the stipend, but he intimated that he would not object to place himself under the Italian protectorate. This was in the Spring of 1902. Italy, however, was loth to harbor such a troublesome guest, so the Mad Mullah went on the warpath again. In 1903-4, first Col. Cobb and then Gen. Sir. Charles Egerton with 8,000 men, including four white regiments, operated against the Mad Mullah. With the exception of a severe thrashing which the Mad Mullah gave Col Cobb’s column Abdullah was always defeated, and in the early part of 1904 Sir Charles had this gratifying news for the Foreign Office: READ with highlights THIS ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 1910 BY NEW YORK TIMES, AND A LETTER OF APPEAL SENT BY VARIOUS SOMALI TRIBES IN JUBALAND TO THE ENGLISH CROWN. History repeats itself. Source
  16. Ethiopia Detains US, European Citizens in Oggaden By Peter Heinlein Gode, Ethiopia 18 January 2008 Ethiopia says it has detained some American and European citizens on suspicion of terrorist activities in the restive Southeastern region known as the ******. VOA's Peter Heinlein has details from the southeastern Ethiopian town of Gode. The leader of Ethiopia's Somali region, also known as the ******, told visiting international journalists that his government is holding an unspecified number of American and European passport holders. Regional President Abdullahi Hassan did not say when they were detained. He said they were being held at a camp near the Eastern Ethiopian city of Gigia. He said the journalists could meet some of the detainees in the coming days. Abdullahi Hassan indicated that those being held are ethnic Somalis working with a regional insurgent group known as the ****** National Liberation Front. "Those destroying this country are living in Europe, are living in America, they are collecting money, they have passports, originally they from here, but they are over there, they are living there, so they are buying this money, weapons, mines, explosive are destroying us, this is truth whether you believe it or not," said Abdullahi. Abdullahi Hassan described the detainees as members of what he called "anti-peace" elements and international terrorist organizations and suggested they would be held in similar circumstances to detainees at the U.S. facility at Guantanamo Bay. He said Ethiopian authorities had not formally notified U.S. and European authorities of the detentions, but he said they probably know. "We didn't......I hope they know," he said. A spokesman for the U.S. Embassy in Addas Ababa said they have no information about Americans being detained but they are following up the issue with Ethiopia. The ****** National Liberation Front has been fighting to achieve greater autonomy from Ethiopia, and accuses the government of human rights abuses against ethnic Somalis who are part of Ethiopia's Muslim minority. The government accuses its arch rival Eritrea of funding and providing refuge to the ONLF. The Somali region is the largest of Ethiopia's administrative areas but is sparsely populated, mostly by pastoralists. The Somali region is in southeastern Ethiopia, bordering Eritrea, Kenya and Somalia. As the Horn of Africa heats up, police in neighboring Kenya arrested two foreigners of suspicion of terrorist activities during continuing protests aimed at overturning the December 27 election that returned President Mwai Kibaki to power. The two, German and Dutch nationals, said the were journalists. They were arrested earlier this week at Nairobi airport as they prepared to leave the country. E-mail This Article
  17. Somaliland: Another African Biafra? Jan 24, 2008 Introduction As most readers remember about the short-lived secessionist Republic of Biafra in southern Nigeria (1967- 1970), small separatist states have a rather shaky trajectory of existence. When Nigeria, which like Somalia became an independent nation in 1960, its borders were arbitrarily made up by its British colonial power. This made one “nation” by combining several feudal states into one. After independence, in the mid-1960s, the military took over; the economy of Nigeria went southward, ethnic tensions flared. This resulted in many thousands of the Ibo tribe to be killed in fighting with Hausas, while more than a million refugees fled to their Ibo clan homeland in the Eastern Nigeria. Consequently, on May 30, 1967, the leader of the Eastern Region, Colonel Emeka Ojukwu, unilaterally declared the independent Republic of Biafra. The new nation of Biafra initially attracted several African governments’ support, including Tanzania, Gabon, and Zambia, while it had also enjoyed the military and economic support of several developed nations, such as France, Israel, and South Africa. Finally, the breakaway state of Biafra descended into a raging civil war that eventually saw its catastrophic downfall after only three years its conception as an independent nation-state. Might Somaliland be heading for a repeat of Biafra? Those who champion Somaliland’s independence would like to draw a parallel between their renegade state and that of neighboring country Eritrea, which earned its independence from Ethiopia almost at the same time (circa. 1991) that Somaliland declared its secession from the Somali Republic proper. Most political analysts, however, would rather liken Somaliland to that of the failed state of Biafra. Most important of all, critics point out to how little progress Somaliland made in regards to economic development, political stability, and genuine democratic values during its “independent” existence. Recently, Somaliland has been engaged in destructive skirmishes with its neighboring state, Puntland, which is a clear indication of how direly unstable Somaliland is. In addition, despite extraordinary support from northern Somalis in the Diaspora, the state’s economy is still in shambles, while the infrastructure is despicably in tatters. Equally worrying is the recent expulsion of Somali journalists expelled from Mogadiscio and seeking asylum in Hargeisa. This is another example of how intolerant Somaliland is to outside media, lest they serendipitously stumble on undemocratic practices in their government. The more likely explanation is that the timing and the manner of their choosing to declare their secession was deeply flawed and opportunistic, it’s bound to fail – for reasons explained below. It’s no wonder that President Riyale and his henchmen are stoking fears within their constituents that their state is reveling in democracy and stability while the rest of the Somalia is going into flames in order to dampen any further questions about their failure to lead and achieve tangible developments or recognition of their “independence” for the past two decades. Background Now, few people would put their bets on the idea that the so called Somaliland state would ever achieve any international recognition as an independent country. Almost two decades after its secession from the rest of Somalia, Somaliland’s leaders are struggling to find a sympathetic audience among the international community. In fact, the recent setbacks or snubs encountered by President Riyale during his recent trips in the US and Great Britain underscore the reality on the ground http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-01-17-voa69.cfm. Despite the ferocious campaign of the separatist leadership of Somaliland to attain recognition for their small state for the past 17 years, there were few results to show for it. Conventional wisdom has it that Somaliland has failed to achieve its independence, in part because it’s either too fractious in clan composition to stand on it own, or it sets a dangerous precedent for other disgruntled states in the African continent. I am of the opinion that this is the case because there has been a failure of leadership to make the case that Somaliland is a state worthy to stand independently on its own. Moreover, there are indications that such a “premature” secession from the rest of Somalia, while not stable and only such a concession, might lead to future conflicts in the region. Winning international recognition is crucial, and not just for the sake of recognition, per se, but rather vital for a small, poor “country” like that of Somaliland. That’s not to say, however, that Somaliland cannot continue to exist for a long time and prosper as a renegade state like that of Taiwan. But the question is what compelled Somaliland in the first place to secede unilaterally from the rest of the union – the Somali Republic? In looking back at some of the rationalization put forth over the years by many of the separatist leaders in Somaliland, can be broken down into three main premises: first, when Somalia and Somaliland merged as the Somali Republic, shortly after the two states achieved their independence, respectively from Italy and Britain in 1960, it was the northerners in Somaliland who took the initiative to unite with their southern Somali brethren and subsequently proposed an Act of Union that was afterward passed in unison with the south. Despite their selfless act to realize the dream of a “Greater Somalia,” leaders from the North found themselves to be rather underappreciated and constantly shunted to the sidelines when the first National Government was formed and throughout the civilian government rule (1960–1969) before the Siyad Barre regime came and consolidated its power under dictatorship. The second, accusatory claim, is that they (Somaliland) were also single handedly targeted and had committed against them a “genocide” by the Siyad Barre regime, while the rest of the Southern clans either stood by or in some cases colluded with the dictator in his ferocious “ethnic cleansing” of the Isaaqs in northern Somalia. And thirdly, there’s the naïve argument that Somaliland was “pushed” to declare its unilateral decision to secede from the Union when the southern leaders formed a national government without consulting with their counterpart leaders in the SNM leadership in the north, after the successful overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime in 1991. In fact, no one can argue honestly against the claim that the leaders of Somaliland at the time of independence were at the forefront of advocating the creation of the union between the south and north of Somalia. To take that laudable historic step back, however, the current Somaliland leaders need to come up with a reasonable justification of annulling such a commendable act of uniting the country. Despite the chaotic democratic elections in the country during the 1960s, the relatively minority northern sub-clans held enough parliament seats and presidency of the National Assembly, in addition to the Prime Minister’s position in the last civilian government (1967-1969) – PM M. Hajji Ibrahim Egal. Because in any fledgling democracy, there are always the trappings of one ethnic or clan group being sidelined or underrepresented – not a viable reason to break a union because of past grievances to rule. The second claim and most pernicious allegation that the southern Somali clans colluded with the callous Siyad Barre in their darkest hour of “elimination” could not be further from the truth. This is a baseless claim to incite hatred and probably drive a wedge between the northern and southern Somali peoples. In other words, it is malicious propaganda used by some separatist leaders in order to unite the historically “conflict-prone” northern ***** sub-clans. Thus, to set the record straight for posterity’s sake, the Somali National Movement (SNM), which valiantly fought against the Siyad Barre dictatorial regime in the north, were many times on the receiving end of both the moral and military support of their counterpart southern opposition groups (e.g. USC) during their struggle for freedom. In a gripping book* by Jama M. Ghalib who originally hails from the north and a prominent supporter of the SNM (an ex-minister of the Siyad Barre regime), details in his book, for instance, how the late human rights activist, honorable Dr. Ismail Jimale Osoble, the first chairman of the United Somali Congress (USC) graciously protested in the international arena about the “genocide” of the northern sub-clans by the ruthless Siyad Barre army, led by General Gani and General Morgan. In his efforts to stop the massacre in the north, Dr. Ismail Jimale also convinced many of his ****** clan elders in the south to extend their support to southern army officers posted in the north in order to mutiny against the Siyad Barre regime and join forces with SNM. As Mr. Ghalib attests in his book, several patriotic southern army officers later “joined the SNM attack on Hargeisa on December 1989.” In his book, Mr. Ghalib also discusses how initially some of the SNM leadership officers declined the selfless support of their counterpart southern officers in getting rid of the country the weakened dictator. The author alludes that there were already secessionist elements rife within the SNM commanding officers and their leadership who had no desire whatsoever to associate themselves with anyone else from the south, lest they would thwart their long-term goal – to secede from the rest of Somalia. On the third premise, that Somaliland was “pushed” to declare a unilateral independence from the rest of the Somali Republic proper was due to the “rushed” and one-sided decision to form a government in part of the USC leadership after the successful overthrow of the Siyad Barre regime is groundless. This theory is more compelling than convincing as history shows differently. In reality, this is another erroneous theory concocted and propagated once again by some of the separatist, mean-spirited leadership of the former SNM faction who among themselves couldn’t agree who would hold important ministerial cabinets of the “short-lived” Somali government led by president Ali Mahdi and Omar Arte Ghalib as its prime minister. In fact, it was only after an incestuous conflict flared within the USC leadership - between Ali Mahdi and General M. Farah Aideed in which the SNM leadership agreed unanimously to secede and form its own government in the north. Thus, this is a clear indication that most northerners were bamboozled into secession by some of their manipulative leaders who decided to jump ship when things took a downward slope in the south, instead of correcting their erred brothers and working towards a better resolution for a stronger Somalia. Conclusion It seems that Somaliland has benefited from the ever escalating violence and chaos in the rest of Somalia in regards of making their case to the rest of the world and rebuilding their war-ravaged lives. But it remains to be seen if they stay the course of being cohesive and progressive once the warring factions in the south come to their senses and work towards peace and justice. Perhaps, the only certain thing about Somaliland is this: without a genuine and honest dialogue with the rest of the Somalia proper, its chances for a successful independence are doomed. Even the most ardent separatist champions in Somaliland are aware of this fact, but they claim that at the current volatile situation in the south of Somalia, there’s no viable partner of peace to conduct with such negotiations. Though the chances of bridging the gap between the self-righteous south and the dubious northerners seem implausible, there’s a hope for better days to come in the Horn of Africa. It’s too soon to say what will ultimately become the fate of the Somali union. It may all depend on how the leaderships from the two sides of the union behave in order to save the “marriage.” But I am sure every one will agree with me that neither the current leadership in the north nor in the south is posed to tackle such delicate matters in the union of the state. Instead, both presidents, Mr. Riyale and Mr. Yusuf are deeply entangled in the brawl of territorial feud involved in their clan homelands. Their past history also lends them little credibility in engaging peaceful negotiations any time soon. Heikal I. Kenneded Washington D.C. Email: heikalk@yahoo.com
  18. It is good that they donated through the World Health Organization and not through the corrupt government which might derail the money to capitalize on its gains and commit atrocities.
  19. Dabshid, we are capable of governing ourselves and creating a stable and popular government if partisan intervention is out of the political equation but we aren't left alone. Therefore, an imposed and illegitimate regime shall never inspire the hope to stabilize our country.
  20. It used to be called Somalileen. I used to hear this word in a long time. The Somalilander is rather weird. Somalileen is a popular etymology from the people of that region. War waa Somalileen ninkaasi. Oday Somalileen ah baa halkaa yimid, to write few examples.
  21. Ethiopia's Dirty war Somalis living in Ethiopia are caught in the crossfire between the government and rebels Hungry: A mother with two malnourished children at Gode Hospital in Ethiopia's Somali region By Jason McLure | Newsweek Web Exclusive It was early one morning in July when 400 Ethiopian soldiers came to Ridwan Hassan Zahid's village of Qorile, 120 miles southeast of Degehebur, Ethiopia, a dusty market town. The small settlement of ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia was suspected of supporting separatist rebels from the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the government troops were out to exact revenge. They took Zahid, another woman, and eight men to the nearby village of Babase, where, she says, the soldiers chased away residents and burned the village to the ground. "I became like plastic," she says. "I couldn't feel a thing." On the third day after her capture, the soldiers divided the prisoners into groups. As the other captives looked on, soldiers hung one man from one of the parched region's few trees; another was taken out of sight. Soon it was Zahid's turn. A small group of soldiers dug a hole in the sandy ground. They forced her into it and pinned her down by pressing the barrel of an AK-47 to her throat. As she tried to choke out the words to a final Muslim prayer, she heard two other captives screaming for mercy nearby as a noose was slipped over her head. Two soldiers jerked up on the rope, lifting her out of the hole by her neck, and she lost consciousness. In Ethiopia's Somali region, a long-simmering rebellion by the ONLF, a separatist group seeking an independent state for Ethiopia's Somalis, is boiling over. Rebels, taking advantage of chaos in neighboring Somalia, attacked a Chinese-run oil exploration site in April, killing 74 people and triggering a massive crackdown by Ethiopia's ethnic-Tigray-dominated government. Government forces have since burned villages, blocked trade routes and carried out summary executions in an effort to quell the rebellion. Nine months later Ethiopia's government appears to have gained the upper hand, but only by essentially declaring war on virtually the entire ******i clan of Somalis—a group that makes up the about half of the region's 4.5 million people. Hundreds of civilians have died in the fighting (the ONLF estimates 2,000 killed by the government in the past year, though one independent estimate suggests the figure is less than half that), and 1.8 million more may be at risk, as an Ethiopian blockade has cut off commercial food shipments from neighboring Somalia and prevented the region's nomadic people from selling their livestock. ******i clan elders who have tracked the fighting say people from more than 250 villages have been forced to flee the violence. Amid a sea of crises in neighboring Sudan, Somalia, and Kenya, the plight of Ethiopia's vast Somali region—an area twice the size of England with just 30 miles of paved highway—has been largely ignored in the West. After barring the foreign press from the region for months, the Ethiopian government recently took NEWSWEEK and a group of other foreign reporters on a tightly controlled tour of parts of the region. Amid scenes of malnourished children and whispered stories of government atrocities, the defining impression was of a population gripped by fear. One 30-year-old man selling clothes in the marketplace in Degehebur says he came to the dusty town five months ago after Ethiopian troops burned his village of Leby, 18 miles southwest of the town. Fifty civilians were killed, he says. "At the time I had a shop, a good house," he says, refusing to give his name out of fear of government reprisal. "We are in trouble. We are caught between the Ethiopian government and the ONLF … between two guns." Such stories, of course, are almost impossible to verify. Ethiopia has firmly denied reports of atrocities and has placed the blame on the ONLF, which it considers a terrorist organization backed by archfoe Eritrea and Islamist militias in nearby Somalia. In his last public remarks on the subject, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi told reporters in late November that he was "absolutely confident that there hasn't been any widespread violation of human rights" in the region. Reports of army atrocities amount to "baseless allegation and a smear campaign against our government," says Abdullahi Hassan, the regional president of Ethiopia's Somali region. "This is our people, and we cannot abuse human rights. That has never happened and this can never happen." Speaking to reporters in the town of Gode in one of the region's more stable districts, Hassan says development in the area is on the rise, trade routes to Somalia are open, and "the situation is completely calm now." The government has "completely destroyed" the ONLF. Most residents—interviewed in the presence of government translators—voice a similar assessment. But not all do. In a village west of Gode, at a development project where the government is trying to settle nomads on irrigated farmland, a 35-year-old man says violence in the region is continuing. "The Ethiopian government, after they fight the rebels, they often turn on us and kill women and children," he says. "We're very scared. I'm afraid speaking to you now. There's lots of spies. They're everywhere." He estimates that more than two dozen civilians are killed monthly in the area around Gode, before abruptly cutting off the interview as a crowd gathers. A blockage of commercial traffic with neighboring Somalia has also contributed to malnutrition. The embargo, together with locusts and drought, have forced grain prices up—many Somalis say prices have doubled in the past year. The one doctor in the hospital in Gode, Zilalim Eschetu, estimates that 75 percent of the children who visit the hospital are malnourished. "It's a visible crisis," he says. Among the patients in Eschetu's malnutrition ward is two-year-old Sugah Hash, whose emaciated legs curl helplessly on her mother's lap. "We had no food for a few months, so we had to run to this hospital," says Mariam Ali, her mother. Ethiopian government officials say the embargo was imposed to keep arms and supplies from reaching the rebels and insist that Ethiopia has lifted most trade restrictions. Human Rights Watch, however, suspects that the government has been deliberately targeting its Somali population. "There is no question that in the last eight months the Ethiopian military went on a very intensive scorched-earth campaign," says Leslie Lefkow, a researcher at Human Rights Watch who has tracked the crisis. To be sure, the ONLF has also committed atrocities in the region. Somali clan elders in the regional capital of Jijiga say the rebels have mined roads, launched grenade attacks on civilians, and stolen livestock from herders. However, analysts say the government has committed the lion's share of abuses. Western governments don't seem to have put much pressure on Ethiopia to ease the situation. Ethiopia has been a key U.S. ally in the war on terrorism. Zenawi's government has allowed the CIA and FBI to interrogate foreign terror suspects flushed out of Somalia in secret prisons in Ethiopia, as the Associated Press first reported in April. The U.S. military has also trained Ethiopia's army and in 2006 sold $6 million in weapons to Ethiopia, according to the U.S. defense department—more than any other African country. In December, with U.S. intelligence and logistical support, Ethiopia invaded Somalia to oust an Islamist government that briefly controlled southern Somalia. Somalia has been in chaos ever since, as supporters of the former Union of Islamic Courts government have joined clan militias in battling Ethiopian troops and forces loyal to the U.N.-backed transitional government. One Ethiopian security official says Somalia's Al Qaeda-linked Islamic militias have played a key role in fueling the ONLF insurgency in Ethiopia, providing funding and arms to the rebels. A spokesman for the ONLF denies any such connection, and Western diplomats say it's unclear whether the two insurgencies are connected. Via the United Nations, the United States been providing food aid for the Somali region, but privately international aid officials say the assistance isn't reaching the worst-affected areas. They have good reason to be discreet: earlier this year Ethiopia expelled the International Committee of the Red Cross from the Somali region, accusing both the country's expatriate and Ethiopian staff of funneling support to the ONLF. The U.N. has also been tight-lipped about troubles in the Oggaden. In September it sent a secret assessment of the human rights situation in the region to the Ethiopian government and called for a wider probe of alleged atrocities. Nearly five months later, says Frej Fenniche, a spokesman for the U.N.'s High Commission on Human Rights, "we are waiting for the answer from the government." Meanwhile, the ONLF, fuelled by money from Ethiopian Somalis living in the United States and Britain, vows to continue its guerrilla fight by launching surprise attacks on Ethiopian troops and then melting back in to the region's nomadic communities. "It's a cat-and-mouse game," says Abdi Rahman Mahdi, a rebel spokesman. As recently as last week, Mahdi says, Ethiopian forces burned a village southeast of Degehebur. Verification of his claim is difficult given the region's scant communication links and travel restrictions. But in Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, hundreds of miles to the west of the fighting, Ethiopia's dirty war is barely visible. The lone state-run television agency shows only Potemkin-like pictures of development projects in the Somali region, and the country's tightly restricted private newspapers are effectively prevented from reporting on the situation. The conflict has been visible enough for Ridwan Hassan Zahid, who miraculously survived her would-be executioners. Left for dead, she was found the next day by Somalis from a nearby village who came to bury the corpses. The other nine were not so lucky. Some had been hung from trees, others hung over holes in the ground like Zahid. Some of the men had been stripped naked and their tongues had been cut out. Zahid hid in the countryside for three days, but eventually she was told the army had learned she was still alive and was searching for her. Then began a two-week odyssey on foot, camel, and finally by truck to safety in a neighboring country, which she asked NEWSWEEK not to disclose. She complains that her neck still pains her and she can't use her right hand. "We never had links to the ONLF," she says of her fellow captives. "I am worrying still," Zahid says. "When I sleep at nights I have dreams." For those caught in the middle of Ethiopia's dirty war, even sleep, it seems, is no respite. © 2008 Newsweek, Inc.
  22. Clashes kill 5 Somali troops Jan 22, 2008 Five Somali government soldiers have been shot dead after clashes erupted between the troops and a wanted man who has also been killed. Some 40 soldiers attacked the man whom they were searching for a long time. He killed 5 soldiers and wounded 12 others inside his house in Howl Wadaag District and finally was shot dead by other troops, a press TV correspondent reported on Tuesday. Meanwhile hundreds of armed Puntland soldiers with military vehicles and anti aircraft missiles moved to the Sool region to fight with Somaliland soldiers. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991; however, it was not recognized by any other country or international organization. Control over eastern borders of Somaliland is unclear, due to disputes with Puntland and separatist movements. Somaliland continues to claim the entire area of the former British Somaliland. It is currently under the control of the western half of the former British Somaliland, with northeastern Maakhir having declared a separate, unrecognized autonomous state within Somalia on July 1, 2007. Press TV