Halganka Ayaan Oo Ka Dheerayay Kacaankii Kirishtaamaynta. Sida uu qoray warsidaha Liberal-Christian Daily ee kasoo baxa dalka Holland, xisbiga Duch Liberal VVD ee ay ka mid tahay Ayan Xirsi-Magan Cali oo beryahan dambe weerar ku ahayd diinta Islaamka, ayuu xisibigaasi u shegay in ay cagaha dhigto oo ay joojiso talaabo dheerida ay uga hormartay siyaasadii xisbiga. Sida uu sheegay hogaamiyaha xisbigaas VVD ahna wasiirka Maaliyada Mr. Gerrit Zalm wuxu yiri “Runtii Waan jeclaan lahaa inaan arko iyadoo la hakiyay iskoolo cusub oo Islami ah oo laga furo Holland” Lakin wuxu ku eedeeyay Ayan inay ka hor dhacayso siyaasada xisbiga isla markaasna ay ku hadlayso hadalo aysan ansixin madaxda xisbigu. Waxa mararka qaar dhacday in madaxda xisbigu ay ka hadlaan warbaahinta Holland iyagoo sheegaya inaysan raali ka ahayn habka ay u dhaqmayso Ayan. Xoghayaha xisbiga VVD ee arimaha Baarlamaanka Mr. Jan Rijpstra isla markaasna ah gudoomiyaha gudi cusub oo xisbigiisu sameeyay hadaladii ka dhacay Ayaan ka dib, gudigaas oo loo bixiyay gudiga soo galootiga iyo is dhex-galka (Immigration and Integration Commission) wuxuu sheegay in Xisbigiisu uu ku soo rogi doona Ayan sharci ka mamnuucaya in ay siiso warbaahinta hadalo aysan soo ansixin gudigiisu. Isla markaasna waxaa kor kala socondoona dhaqdhaqaaqa Ayaan kormereyaal siyaasadeed (Political Commentators) Waxa ka mid wararka ay Gaaladu la cajabtay oo ay ku tilmaameen talaabo dheeri ay ku kacday Ayan Xirsi-Magan • Diinta Islaamku waa diin haraadi ah (Backward) • Nabi Max’ed waa diktatoor xun, oo madax adag (Perverse tyrant) Marka aan maqlana waxan soo xasuustaa, diktatoorada Bariga Dhexe sida Usama Bin Laden, Ayatulah Qumayni, iyo Sadam Xusen. • Waa in iskuulada Islaamka laga joojiyaa taagerada, maadaama ay baran arday dib usocodnimo. • Waa in qoyskii Islaam ah ee dhala laba ilmood ka badan laga joojiyaa lacagta ilmaha. • Mar ay tagtay iskuul Islaami ah waxay waydiisay ardayda qaar “Ii sheega Ilaahay ma naagbaa mise waa nin. Ka fiiriya eedaynta xisbigeedu u soo jeediyay Ayan Xirsi-Magan, cinwaanka hoose. Source:Hobyonet web page

Lenin said, once a society is ripe for a revolution, if the agents who can carryout this revolution successfully are not there or if they miss the opportunity to do so, such society can enter into a process of social decay (Martin Doornbos, 1992, p.219). There are enormous literature and information, from different sources, about the crisis in Somalia since 1990 which all give different assumptions, theories and hypotheses. Some of them have gone even far saying the problem is international or external. For instance, Ankie Hoogvelt says, as many others also believe, in many African countries, the imposition of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, including privatization of the state apparatus and the insistence on electoral reform, has directly contributed to the descent into anarchy and civil wars. As I always say and believe, it will be short enough to find a lasting solution to the crisis and the human terror in Somalia –our country- if we must not be careful to distinguish the real crisis from the assumptions. To establish an strategy we need to find out and distinguish the causes from the symptoms. I totally agree with all above arguments from my nomad friends. But to my view, the problem of Somalia has very little to do with ethnicity, Ideology or even faith. First, when we look the crisis in Somalia, the whole focus of the problem is the STATE. Any clan or clan-family or individuals who are in a position to dominate the state are the target. Secondly, for the decade of the civil war in Somalia there had never been an ethnic cleansing and genocide compared to what has happened in Rwanda, Bosnia and some other places in the world. The clan or clanism in Somalia is only a tool used for to dominate and have access to the national wealth and resources as there is no other political philosophy. Clanism is an easy way to mobilize the Somali society in which the war-lords learned from the colonial administrations and the two post-colonial-administrations. Thus, the crisis in Somalia is, therefore, not a problem of ethnicity –see the ever changing alliance of the clans and war-lords- nor a political ideology or faith; but it is a problem of resources resulted when the vast majority of the population lost their endowments (property resources) and entitlements (means to survive) due to bad government polices compounded with recurrent draughts and natural disasters. For the three decades Somalia was sovereign independent country, the state of Somalia had failed the fundamentals of getting right the tasks lie at the core of every government's duty that is: a) Establishing a foundation of law; b) Maintaining macroeconomic stability; c) Investing in basic social services and infrastructure; d) Protecting the civil society and environment. The state of Somalia was a source of income and wealth which is polarized along the ethnic and clan lines. This is the only reason that clanism and kinships are dominant in every aspect of the crises in Somalia; because every clan –QABIIL- strives to attain this dynasty – the national wealth. . As this is typical not to only Somalia but most of the LDCs, government policies towards the economic and social development was characterized three features that undermined the capacity of the state to maintain sustainability and provide the basic needs of human life for the society. First, very poor and ill fated domestic economic development which resulted an inefficient public sector which expanded faster than the economic growth. Secondly, huge capital movement “foreign aid” not related to domestic production growth which caused a severe hyper stagflation lashing down the real wages of the public sector that have affected the living standard of the civil society as a whole. Thirdly, developmental programmes that have been fully funded by external sources that substituted, instead supplementing, the domestic production. The consequences are, an accelerated rural/urban migration, public sector that are less productive and less efficient, civil services larger than the capacity of the real economy to support. All these have led to long periods of chronic hunger and political isolation of the population; long periods of living in scarcity at times of huge inflow of external capital and financial aid that, hence, produced an impoverished society which in turn developed into a society who are morally and physically deprived. A civil society of chronic moral bankruptcy that had virtually impaired the physical and intellectual motivation of the population. The outcome is a loyalty that is not exceeded beyond the clan borders which may also figure in any future administrations to a very fragile point if that government fail to distribute the national wealth equally. The clanism and kinship took the advantage of the weak STATE that failed to deliver the human basic needs of life; but it is not the root cause of the crisis.

I would like to thank all Nomads, particularly the Horn Afrique, Ayoub ,Liqaaye, Illmatic, Che-Guevara, Baashi for the time they give my article - Ethiopian Deception- and their valuable views and comments. To come to my point, we the Somalis, not all of us, but many that I am one of them, always come short about to describe a problem and understand before we jump to find a solution. For this reason I am attempting today with your contribution and your help to change that and try to research the real problem of Somalia. The title I would like to put on the table is : Is The crisis in Somalia one stemmed from external? Is it a problem of ethnicity? Is it a problem of faith and ideology? Or is it an economic problem “survival”. Saying to understand the problem before we seek a solution, I do believe if the international community and we the Somalis would have complete understanding about the crisis in Somalia I am sure we would find a lasting solution. But if we don’t know what the problem is how can we reach conclusion and make decisions. It is the same as a medical doctor trying to cure a patient while he hasn’t got any idea of the disease. You can not cure a disease that you can not diagnose. thanks to all nomads who love and die for their country.

I would like to thank all Nomads, particularly the Horn Afrique, Ayoub ,Liqaaye, Illmatic, Che-Guevara, Baashi for the time they give this article and their valuable views and comments. On the other hand, to come to my point, we the Somalis, not all of us, but many that I am one of them, we always short about to describe a problem and understand before we jump to find a solution. For this reason I am attempting today with your contribution and your help to change that and try to research the real problem of Somalia. The title I would like to put on the table is : Is The crisis in Somalia one stemmed from external? Is it a problem of ethnicity? Is it a problem of faith and ideology? Or is it an economic problem “survival”. Saying to understand the problem before we seek a solution, I do believe if the international community and we the Somalis would have complete understanding about the crisis in Somalia I am sure we would find a lasting solution. But if we don’t know what the problem is how can we reach conclusion and make decisions. It is the same as a medical doctor trying to cure a patient while he hasn’t got any idea of the disease. You can not cure a disease that you can not diagnose. thanks to all nomads who love and die for their country.

Thanks Mr Lander for the comment; but I doubted you fully understood my article. I dont see anywhere in this article I mentioned the unity of the Somaliland and Southern Somalia. Let me try to shed a light if you willing to grasp the taste of this article. All my intention was to find a solution in our part of Somalia and not the Landers. However, the focus of this article is deeply concerned the Kenya Peace conference in which the Somaliland is not takeing part.

Ethiopian Deception and The Ignorance of the Somali Leaders. Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta-alaa Said: "Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged: and Allah is indeed able to give them victory" Surah Al-HAJ, Verse 39. (Udina Li Ladiina Yuqaataluuna Bi'annahum Dulimuu Wa'inna Allah Calaa Nasrihim La Qadiiran ). "Truly, Allâh defends those who believe. Verily! Allâh likes not any treacherous ingrate to Allâh [those who disobey Allâh but obey Shaitân (Satan)" Surah AL-HAJ, Verse 38. Amen. (Inna Allaha Yudaafico Canilladiina Aamanuu; Inna Allah Laa Yuxibbu Kulla Khawaanin Kafuurin.) Unless and until there is a greater understanding of the Ethiopian policy by the Somalia leaders, the Horn of Africa will continue to be riven by strife with resulting suffering of our people, loss of life and exodus of refugees. Louis Fitzgibbon (1982)- a firm believer in the concept of justice and in the causes of oppressed or forgotten people- said: many of those who think about Somalia at all consider it a free country, for they recall that the Europeans left over years ago, they forget that there was an African co-colonialist -Abyssinia. This means those who think Somalia at all is a free independent country they forget that Ethiopia still colonize Somali people and occupy their land with the help of foreign powers. For a considerable time the western powers had taken a keen interest in the affairs of the Horn, which they regarded Ethiopia as a Christian Island in a sea of Pagans, and for centuries Ethiopia had exploited this claim to Christianity for political reasons. She capitalized fully on the religious factor in order to obtain the active support of Europe and further her colonialist plans against Somalis and other peoples. This psychological deception worked the Ethiopians as they sought to separate themselves from Africa and place themselves firmly in the European camp to take its share of the European colonialism in Africa. Ethiopia had never been slow to use this chance to bolster their various claims over the years and now is trying again, unsurprisingly, to position herself in the American camp taking advantage of the purely American crusade in the name of the global terrorism. It was along this artery of communication that Ethiopia was able to mask its deceptions and mislead the international views to request for aid, and most particularly, arms to dominate and slave the Somali people and other nations in the Horn. Ethiopia has already colonize Somali people and not only remained on what rightly Somali soil but they have bolstered their occupation with the help of Europeans in the 19th century and Russians, Cubans, Yemenis and Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. Ethiopia subjected all kinds of inhuman treatment to the Somali people. Constantly, Ethiopian police and the military have been driven off their animals, the boys and girls taken as slaves and elder people killed or mutilated. The deception and atrocities against Somali people by Abyssinia is not something new. For instance, Dr Donaldson Smith, an American, who visited the Horn of Africa in 1894 exclaimed: We earnestly wish the Abyssinians as savages bearing arms against other poor defenceless Africans, should have such a drubbing that they could not forget it and try to extend their sway further. Let these good people who take an interest in uncivilised nations cast a thought on the black neighbours of the Abyssinians who are in the worst plight. Also, Sir Alfred Pease, who visited Somalia in 1897 said: We (British) have prevented Somalis from acquiring arms and ammunitions and having deprived them of all means of self-defence. We have left the Somalis at the mercy of raiding Abyssinians who have no other employment than that of making raids on Gallas and Somalis. Nevertheless, the question we have to ask ourselves is why Ethiopia has this enormous appetite to the Somali affairs?. It is very simple to answer; let us see briefly the history of the region. The People of Somalia and Their Land. . The Somaliland was controlled and ruled by the Somalis as many of ancient Greek and Roman chronicles describe. The best known work being The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea written about the year AD40 which attests to the independence of the cities visited by its author, and the democratic nature of Somali institutions. A century later Ptolemy (Egyptian astronomer and geographer who died 170AD) supported those views in his Geography. The Arab scholars such as the Al-Masudi (AD935), Al-Bakri (AD1067), Al-Idrissi (AD1154), Ibna-Batuta (AD1331) and Ibna-Khaldum (Late fourteenth century) all gave witness to a vigorous Somali culture; in particular Ibna Said (AD 1344), Ibna Batuta and Al- Idrissi all stressed that the Somalis were completely independent of foreign rule, and described their country as extending throughout the length of the Horn of Africa. The Annals of Oman, the Chronicles of Lamu and Pate, the anonymous authors of the Book of Zanj (Kitab al Zanji) and the Portuguese writer Joao de Barros had also mentioned the land and the independence of the Somali people. The effective rule of the Abyssinian kings was limited, ages up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, to the highlands areas of central Ethiopia, that is to say Amhara, Gojam, Northern Shoa and Southern Tigre. Thus before the 1880s, Shoa was the southern most province of Abyssinia- the now Ethiopia-, and illustration of this is contained in a letter dated 17 December 1878 from Johannes Meyer and Jacob Greiner, two German missionaries asked by King Menilik to solicit support for him amongst European Heads of States. The Betrayal and the Partition. The Berlin conference in 1884 known as the "Scramble for Africa" was the beginning of the Ethiopian deception and the betrayal of the Somalis. The scramble is generally thought of as being entirely European operation; but Ethiopia joined in the rush to create larger empires signing an alliance treaty with Britain. In 1886, the Britain entered into treaties with the Somali clans to protect their land. This treaty which is later been betrayed by the British Government, contained of three supplementary articles of the previous 1884-5 treaties. The treaty was signed for the Somalis by the Somali Clan elders and Major Frederick Mercer Hunter- the political agent for the Somali coast- representing the British Government. Unfortunately, the British Government did not keep its promise to protect the Somaliland, but it has rather betrayed and gave away our land to our Ethiopian enemy. The British negotiations were carried out by Mr Rodd (later Lord Rennel of Rodd) as head of the British Mission to Menelik. On 14 May 1897 Britain concluded an agreement with Ethiopia, despite the treaties of protection of the Somaliland signed in 1884-5 and 1886, giving away parts of Somalia which had never hitherto been under Abyssinia control. But not everyone at the time agreed with what was going on, and Sir Alfred Pease, who visited Somalia in 1896-1897 commented on the agreement between Mr Rodd and Menilik …..to the consternation of all interested in Somaliland, Mr Rodd handed over to Abyssinia a large area of Somaliland including some of the tribes with whom we had entered into solemn obligation for their protection. Again in 1904, Mr H. R. Fox Bourne, author of Civilization of Congoland, in a pamphlet entitled: The Story Of Somaliland referred to the 1897 Britain-Abyssinian treaty as: The scandalous betrayal of the Somalis who, having accepted British protection, were left the mercilessly dealt with by their Abyssinian enemies. In February 1955 the British Minister of State for the Colonies admitted in the House of Commons, London: I think that in many ways the 1897 Treaty with Ethiopia was unfortunate, but it suffered from our limited knowledge of the Somaliland at the time and we must see it against a background of that knowledge and the expansionist tendencies of Ethiopia in 1897. Thus, no wonder that history repeating itself as Ethiopia hijacked the Somali affairs in the peace conference in Kenya imposing its will and deceptions using Somali leaders loyal to her and benefiting the current situation of Somalia in the light of the campaign against international terrorism. Once again, the plight of Somalia and its people were left at the mercy of Abyssinia. It is not doubtful that Ethiopian survival depends on the Somalia's destruction because this is the only means that Ethiopia can have access and control our resources such as: our ports, minerals and livestock. Furthermore, Ethiopia has seen itself as the master of the Eastern and Central African countries in the New World Order Policy. As a representative of this policy in the region, Ethiopia can not accept a strong Somalia in fear of a challenge. It is not only Ethiopia will lose all that privileges, but as well she will lose the land, the Somali people and the other nations they seized and colonize if there is a strong united Somalia. This is abundantly clear in our minds and it is very obvious that a weak Somalia is the only shield that protects Ethiopian empire from a disintegration and major disasters. We have already seen the periodic famines, starvation and the upheavals inside the Ethiopian empire -the last and the only empire in this cotemporary world-. It is therefore nothing else can inspire Ethiopia's policies other than rotten imperial mentality, based on divide and rule, in order to survive, What is the Solution. There is only one solution of our problem and can save our land and its people. To unite against evils. To unite against all those, internal and external, who benefit and prosper under the destruction of our country. To go back to our minds and revive our senses to understand deeply the deceptions and the betrayals we have been subjected since the Scramble of Africa by different countries. There are already signs of hope and understanding in between some of our the Somali leaders. It seems they have been awakened up by the ever changing agendas, the disagreement and the different interests of those hosting or involved the peace conference, particularly the Ethiopians. In one hand Ethiopia is acting as an active member of IGAD who is honest about the Somali affairs, and the other hand supplying weapons and mines to some power-hungry murders to kill and maim our children, our fathers and mothers everyday. Mohamed Ali-Nur Hagi MSc Development Studies.

Ethiopian Deception & The Ignorance of The Somali Leaders Allah Subhanahu Wa Ta-alaa Said: "Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged: and Allah is indeed able to give them victory" Surah Al-HAJ, Verse 39. (Udina Li Ladiina Yuqaataluuna Bi'annahum Dulimuu Wa'inna Allah Calaa Nasrihim La Qadiiran ). "Truly, Allâh defends those who believe. Verily! Allâh likes not any treacherous ingrate to Allâh [those who disobey Allâh but obey Shaitân (Satan)" Surah AL-HAJ, Verse 38. Amen. (Inna Allaha Yudaafico Canilladiina Aamanuu; Inna Allah Laa Yuxibbu Kulla Khawaanin Kafuurin.) Unless and until there is a greater understanding of the Ethiopian policy by the Somalia leaders, the Horn of Africa will continue to be riven by strife with resulting suffering of our people, loss of life and exodus of refugees. Louis Fitzgibbon (1982)- a firm believer in the concept of justice and in the causes of oppressed or forgotten people- said: many of those who think about Somalia at all consider it a free country, for they recall that the Europeans left over years ago, they forget that there was an African co-colonialist -Abyssinia. This means those who think Somalia at all is a free independent country they forget that Ethiopia still colonize Somali people and occupy their land with the help of foreign powers. For a considerable time the western powers had taken a keen interest in the affairs of Abyssinia, which they regarded as a Christian Island in a sea of Pagans, and for centuries Ethiopia had exploited this claim to Christianity for political reasons. She capitalized fully on the religious factor in order to obtain the active support of Europe and further her colonialist plans against Somalis and other peoples. This psychological deception worked the Ethiopians as they sought to separate themselves from Africa and place themselves firmly in the European camp to take its share of the European colonialism in Africa. Ethiopia had never been slow to use this chance to bolster their various claims over the years and now is trying again, unsurprisingly, to position herself in the American camp taking advantage of the purely American crusade in the name of the global terrorism. It was along this artery of communication that Ethiopia was able to mask its deceptions and mislead the international views to request for aid, and most particularly, arms to dominate and slave the Somali people and other nations in the Horn. Ethiopia has already colonize Somali people and not only remained on what rightly Somali soil but they have bolstered their occupation with the help of Europeans in the 19th century and Russians, Cubans, Yemenis and Libya in the 1970s and 1980s. Ethiopia subjected all kinds of inhuman treatment to the Somali people. Constantly, Ethiopian police and the military have been driven off their animals, the boys and girls taken as slaves and elder people killed or mutilated. The deception and atrocities against Somali people by Abyssinia is not something new. For instance, Dr Donaldson Smith, an American, who visited the Horn of Africa in 1894 exclaimed: We earnestly wish the Abyssinians as savages bearing arms against other poor defenceless Africans, should have such a drubbing that they could not forget it and try to extend their sway further. Let these good people who take an interest in uncivilised nations cast a thought on the black neighbours of the Abyssinians who are in the worst plight. Also, Sir Alfred Pease, who visited Somalia in 1897 said: We (British) have prevented Somalis from acquiring arms and ammunitions and having deprived them of all means of self-defence. We have left the Somalis at the mercy of raiding Abyssinians who have no other employment than that of making raids on Gallas and Somalis. Nevertheless, the question we have to ask ourselves is why Ethiopia has this enormous appetite to the Somali affairs?. It is very simple to answer; let us see briefly the history of the region. The People of Somalia and Their Land. The Land of Somalia was controlled and ruled by the Somalis as many of ancient Greek and Roman chronicles describe. The best known work being The Periplus of the Erythrean Sea written about the year AD40 which attests to the independence of the cities visited by its author, and the democratic nature of Somali institutions. A century later Ptolemy (Egyptian astronomer and geographer who died 170AD) supported those views in his Geography. The Arab scholars such as the Al-Masudi (AD935), Al-Bakri (AD1067), Al-Idrissi (AD1154), Ibna-Batuta (AD1331) and Ibna-Khaldum (Late fourteenth century) all gave witness to a vigorous Somali culture; in particular Ibna Said (AD 1344), Ibna Batuta and Al- Idrissi all stressed that the Somalis were completely independent of foreign rule, and described their country as extending throughout the length of the Horn of Africa. The Annals of Oman, the Chronicles of Lamu and Pate, the anonymous authors of the Book of Zanj (Kitab al Zanji) and the Portuguese writer Joao de Barros had also mentioned the land and the independence of the Somali people. The effective rule of the Abyssinian kings was limited, ages up to the latter part of the nineteenth century, to the highlands areas of central Ethiopia, that is to say Amhara, Gojam, Northern Shoa and Southern Tigre. Thus before the 1880s, Shoa was the southern most province of Abyssinia- the now Ethiopia-, and illustration of this is contained in a letter dated 17 December 1878 from Johannes Meyer and Jacob Greiner, two German missionaries asked by King Menilik to solicit support for him amongst European Heads of States. The Betrayal and the Partition. The Berlin conference in 1884 known as the "Scramble for Africa" was the beginning of the Ethiopian deception and the betrayal of the Somalis. The scramble is generally thought of as being entirely European operation; but Ethiopia joined in the rush to create larger empires signing an alliance treaty with Britain. In 1886, the Britain entered into treaties with the Somali clans to protect their land. This treaty which is later been betrayed by the British Government, contained of three supplementary articles of the previous 1884-5 treaties. The treaty was signed for the Somalis by the Somali Clan elders and Major Frederick Mercer Hunter- the political agent for the Somali coast- representing the British Government. Unfortunately, the British Government did not keep its promise to protect the Somaliland, but it has rather betrayed and gave away our land to our Ethiopian enemy. The British negotiations were carried out by Mr Rodd (later Lord Rennel of Rodd) as head of the British Mission to Menelik. On 14 May 1897 Britain concluded an agreement with Ethiopia, despite the treaties of protection of the Somaliland signed in 1884-5 and 1886, giving away parts of Somalia which had never hitherto been under Abyssinia control. But not everyone at the time agreed with what was going on, and Sir Alfred Pease, who visited Somalia in 1896-1897 commented on the agreement between Mr Rodd and Menilik …..to the consternation of all interested in Somaliland, Mr Rodd handed over to Abyssinia a large area of Somaliland including some of the tribes with whom we had entered into solemn obligation for their protection. Again in 1904, Mr H. R. Fox Bourne, author of Civilization of Congoland, in a pamphlet entitled: The Story Of Somaliland referred to the 1897 Britain-Abyssinian treaty as: The scandalous betrayal of the Somalis who, having accepted British protection, were left the mercilessly dealt with by their Abyssinian enemies. In February 1955 the British Minister of State for the Colonies admitted in the House of Commons, London: I think that in many ways the 1897 Treaty with Ethiopia was unfortunate, but it suffered from our limited knowledge of the Somaliland at the time and we must see it against a background of that knowledge and the expansionist tendencies of Ethiopia in 1897. Thus, no wonder that history repeating itself as Ethiopia hijacked the Somali affairs in the peace conference in Kenya imposing its will and deceptions using Somali leaders loyal to her and benefiting the current situation of Somalia in the light of the campaign against international terrorism. Once again, the plight of Somalia and its people were left at the mercy of Abyssinia. It is not doubtful that Ethiopian survival depends on the Somalia's destruction because this is the only means that Ethiopia can have access and control our resources such as: our ports, minerals and livestock. Furthermore, Ethiopia has seen itself as the master of the Eastern and Central African countries in the New World Order Policy. As a representative of this policy in the region, Ethiopia can not accept a strong Somalia in fear of a challenge. It is not only Ethiopia will lose all that privileges, but as well she will lose the land, the Somali people and the other nations they seized and colonize if there is a strong united Somalia. This is abundantly clear in our minds and it is very obvious that a weak Somalia is the only shield that protects Ethiopian empire from a disintegration and major disasters. We have already seen the periodic famines, starvation and the upheavals inside the Ethiopian empire -the last and the only empire in this cotemporary world-. It is therefore nothing else can inspire Ethiopia's policies other than rotten imperial mentality, based on divide and rule, in order to survive, What is the Solution There is only one solution of our problem and can save our land and its people. To unite against evils. To unite against all those, internal and external, who benefit and prosper under the destruction of our country. To go back to our minds and revive our senses to understand deeply the deceptions and the betrayals we have been subjected since the Scramble of Africa by different countries. There are already signs of hope and understanding in between some of our leaders in Eldoret, Kenya. It seems they have been awakened up by the ever changing agendas, the disagreement and the different interests of those hosting or involved the peace conference, particularly the Ethiopians. In one hand Ethiopia is acting as an active member of IGAD who is honest about the Somali affairs, and the other hand supplying weapons and mines to some power-hungry murders to kill and maim our children, our fathers and mothers everyday. To know more about the causes and solutions of the Somali crisis, please read my other article "Alternative Development In Somalia". In request I can e-mail to you. Mohamed Ali-Nur Hagi MSc Development Studies. e-mail: mohamedhagi@hotmail.com

A lot has been written about the tragedy inflicting Somalia. Unfortunately, the current problems are not unique. Many countries currently or over the centuries suffered a similar fate. The solution is relatively easy to formulate but difficult to implement. Often, many scholars misinterpret the lessons of history and successful countries by focusing on "colonialism," "tribalism" or the mythical "civil society." A successful solution to the current Somali crisis must depend on creating a government structure that uses the inherent strengths of Somalis: (1) a deep devotion to Islam, (2) a fierce sense of individual liberty and (3) the clan system of providing social services. A system of government based on the rule of law is necessary for a success resolution of the crisis. The rule of law requires all Somalis, whether Majerteen or Midgan, rich or poor, must be treated equally before the law. The rule of law is in the Koran which requires equal treatment of all Muslims and even honest dealings with nonbelievers. Somalis’ deep devotion to Islam should be used to help in the acceptance of the rule of law and can be a force for development. Basing a legal system on religion is not new and, actually, forms the basis of legal systems in the West. The swearing to tell the truth on the Bible is a relic from an earlier time, as is having twelve people sit on a jury that represents the twelve apostles or twelve tribes of Israel. Furthermore, Islam is compatible with Capitalism. Capitalism depends on the enforcement of contracts. The last section of the "cow" contains the basis of modern contract law. To allege Islam is compatible with Capitalism suggests the person has not read the Koran. Unfortunately, the rule of law also requires an independent judiciary. Judges must be independent of the mosque and independent within the government. This will be hard because people like power, even Imams and Mullahs. While more important, helping troubled marriages or families in crisis is less glamorous than sitting in judgment over people or disputes. So, it is understandable why religious leaders would desire a role in politics or government. Yet, the proper role of religious leaders is tending to the basic needs of the family and community. When religious leaders enter politics or government, the mass killings start. The mass murders committed in Iran, Sudan and Afghanistan occurred because the mullahs left the mosque. The Christian Inquisition in Medieval Spain, which resulted in the slaughter of many Muslims and Jews, occurred because the priests became involved in political and government affairs. Somalia should not fall into the trap of believing someone who studies the Koran can implement proper or just policies or judgments. The Somali sense of individual liberty also promotes the rule of law, since none feel that someone is entitled by birth to better treatment. This sense of individual liberty also promotes the growth of democratic institutions because the general population believes they should have a say in how they are being governed. Furthermore, individual liberty is compatible with development since people believe they are entitled to what they earn or create. By believing they, and no one else, is entitled to the fruits of their labor, people are encouraged to produce more and create more wealth for the benefit of society. This means socialist programs or solutions that depend on the failed models of "one-party states" or a "civil society" will fail and cause more misery. For proof, look at the rest of Africa where one-party states and "civil societies" benefit the European-educated elite and crush the rest. Those who complain about the clan-system do not understand why it exists. The clan-system provides insurance against accidents or death, social services such as unemployment and welfare benefits and police services against attack by others. This is not unique. For example, until the Great Depression, social services in the United States were generally provided by the extended family, or clan. Moreover, the United States has seen clan warfare, the most famous being the Hatfield-McCoy feud at the end of the 19th century. In the West, family-based social services began to decline when government-sponsored systems were enacted. In Somalia, destroying the clan-system without providing an alternative would cause severe suffering for the general population. Instead, the negative aspects of the clan-system can be minimized by the form a government adopted. Toward this end, a system based on geographic areas, rather than clan membership, should be implemented. There are many advantages. To ensure election and political support, politicians will be forced to appeal outside their clans. This will prevent the reinforcement of tribalism that would result by choosing officials based on clan membership. Also, this will reinforce the interdependence of those living in the same geographic area. Obviously, the political interests of a Majeeteen farmer in the Lower Shebelle are closer to those of his Tunni neighbor than a Majeerteen nomad in Puntland. Also, a federal system instead of a parliamentary system of government should be adopted. This will allow for local control over education, police and other services. A relatively weak central government will be responsible for national defense, foreign affairs and ensuring the individual rights of minority clans within the geographic political divisions. Such a system prevents the rise of dictators or domination of one clan over another via control of the central government. Such a system builds on the Somalis need for individual liberty by giving local communities vast amounts of control over how their children are educated, how they are policed and how they live their lives. Coupled with an independent judiciary, the constant political fighting between the central government, the local governments and the judiciary means no one power can oppress the people. Instead, each branch of government has the incentive to offer more freedom to the people to gain their support in that branch’s political fights with the other branches of government. This is not possible in a parliamentary system based on clan membership that forms the TNG. To further split political power, a bicameral legislative branch should be adopted. The power of the purse will belong to the directly elected lower house since the people should have the most say in how their money is spent. Instead of directly elected, the upper house should be composed of elders selected by the legislatures or governors of the geographic political divisions. This ensures that the federal government listens to the concerns of the geographic political divisions since part of the federal government is chosen by these political divisions. Also, this type of selection allows traditional clan elders, like the Ugasyada , Sultanyada and Malaaqyada, a role in the government. There are reasons that traditional clan leaderships survive, in particular, because they work and people trust them. Therefore, traditional clan elders should be used and not discarded under the misguided view that they are backward or impediments to development. In conclusion, Somalis should adopt a federal system that has three horizontal divisions: a bicameral legislature further divided into a directly elected lower house and a selected upper house, an executive or president and an independent judiciary, as well as the vertical divisions between a national government responsible for national defense, foreign policy and preserving individual rights, and the local government responsible for the rest. These government institutions will be based on Islam and the rule of law where all are treated as equals. Complex government solutions that discard or ignore Somali culture, religion or traditional methods of settling disputes and providing social services will only cause more suffering and death.

Dear Og-Moti, Well, first I would like to thank you for the reply; Secondly, it is devine or muqaddas to go for Jihad to protect our religion, properties and our lives. but we have to remember our prophet Mohamed (CSW) took Jihad when it came the right time -means strategically, when the muslimiin feel strong enough to do so. I believe before we commit suicidal we have to build our strength and "Aqiida" then we can defeat all aggressions. :confused: maca salaama

Dear Og-Moti,

Neither blindness nor ignorance corrupts people and governments. They soon realize where the path they have taken is leading them. But there is an impulse within them, favoured by their natures and reinforced by their habits, which they do not resist; it continues to propel them forward as long as they have a remnant of strength. He who overcomes himself is divine. Most see their ruin before their eyes; but they go on into it. Leopold von Ranke, 1973. However,The clan system and tribal divisions in Somalia is a symbolic social entity whose widespread members are tied together by the sense of being the descendants of a common ancestor. In that sense, one way or the other of looking at the social and political organisation of the Somali people, clan ideology has a great a significance on the socio-economic and political system of Somalia. Therefore, to my view it is not an easy task to eliminate tribalism or clanism is Somalia; but what we can do about it is to transform and modernize the clan system in a way that prevailed in civilized countries like the one in the United Kingdom- Scottish, English, Walsh Irish and so on.

Alex de Waal US War Crimes in Somalia New Left Review, 230, 1998, 131-144 In his foreword to Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy, Ross Perot wrote: ‘Read this book carefully. Never forget its contents as you watch the TV docu-dramas of smart bombs going down airshafts, where war is presented in a sterile, sanitized environment. Remember, war is fighting and dying.’1 Notable by its absence from the final sentence is the verb ‘killing’. Careful readers will find, for example, that US helicopters fired off no fewer than 50,000 Alpha 165 and 63 rockets on 3 October 1993 in the course of the battle near the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu, in which eighteen US soldiers died and one was captured. The book lauds ‘the world’s most highly trained and effective military “extraction unit”’, that gained more decorations than any other American flying unit in US military history for a comparable size of operation.2 But there are only hints at the carnage among the Somali civilians who lived--and all too commonly died-in this closely packed residential quarter of the city. The importance of this inglorious episode in American military history lies not only in the as-yet-undocumented carnage among the residents of Somalia’s capital city, but also in what it tells us about US military doctrine. It also casts light on some of the reasons behind the US Administration’s efforts to block the creation of an independent International Criminal Court with universal jurisdiction to investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity. The US’s stated objection, voiced in the negotiations leading up to the vote in Rome to create the Court on 17 July this year, was that universal jurisdiction would open the door to malicious prosecutions against American peacekeepers. An analysis of the evidence from the Mogadishu war suggests that the reasons may be rather deeper. Operation Restore Hope was launched in December 1992 amid shocking-and carefully orchestrated-images of anarchy and starvation in Somalia, with the mandate of ‘creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief.’ Eight months later it turned into the greatest US military humiliation since Vietnam. In three months of urban counter-guerrilla warfare against the unpaid, irregular but resourceful militia of General Mohamed Farah Aidid in Mogadishu city, US military doctrines of overwhelming force and near-zero American casualties came unstuck. The culmination was the 3 October battle, after which pictures of a dead US pilot being dragged through the streets by a jeering crowd and the plight of another taken prisoner of war-‘hostage’ in the White House’s preferred terminology-forced a truce and US withdrawal. The humanitarian garb of Operation Restore Hope was superficial from the start. Launched in December 1992 just as the famine was waning, the dispatch of troops had more to do with testing the newly emerging doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’ than saving Somalis. An independent review by the US Refugee Policy Group concluded that the operation saved between 10,000 and 25,000 lives rather than the two million initially advertised.3 This sober reality was noted at the time, though few chose to listen amidst the hype generated among the media, the UN and the Pentagon. Much more modest forms of relief aid could have achieved exactly the same result. The relief specialist, Fred Cuny, had proposed a smaller, more flexible and better-targeted operation in the ‘famine triangle’ which would have avoided the perilous vortex of Mogadishu. The plan was the subject of serious discussion in Washington. But, in the words of the then assistant deputy secretary for defence for American Affairs, this option ‘died because it failed to meet the US military’s new insistence on the application of massive, overwhelming force’.4 So a huge logistical operation was mounted through Mogadishu, and the US had to grapple with the political ambitions of General Aidid, the faction leader who controlled the airport, the main routes out of the city, and most of the heavy weapons. Lost Opportunities In the early days, given the prestige and sheer number of the US forces, they could have begun the hard work of disarming the Somali factions and negotiating an inclusive peace deal, but the prime task of US Special Envoy Robert Oakley was to get the boys back home safely—and that entailed leaving the tough issues for later. So Oakley cosied up to General Aidid. For example, Oakley chose to rent his house from Aidid’s chief financier, Osman ‘ Ato’, use Aidid’s moneychangers for the lucrative business of converting US dollars to Somali shillings, and gave the General a series of public relations coups by heralding ‘breakthroughs’ in peace talks that had in fact been negotiated by UN diplomats some months earlier.5 Worse, when the intervention faced its first major challenge in mid February 1993, the US decided on the soft course of doing nothing. Militia forces loyal to faction leader General Mohamed Hersi Morgan attacked and overran the city of Kismayo, until then controlled by Aidid’s Somali National Alliance (SNA) forces.6 The UN forces supposedly controlling the city, mostly US and Belgian troops, sat in their sandbagged emplacements, doing nothing. True, intervention would have meant killing or wounding Somali fighters and taking casualties, but US inaction was hardly an encouraging precedent. When the attack was announced on the BBC, crowds in Mogadishu spontaneously demonstrated against the US and UN, and peacekeepers opened fire, inflicting some casualties. Oakley stayed in his headquarters, making no attempt to reassure the crowds who interpreted US inaction as support for Morgan.7 Just as it became more urgent to take hard decisions about intervention, and the militias had learned that they could continue to fight without provoking action from the international forces, the US handed over the operation to a less well-equipped and poorly coordinated UN force. Security Council Resolution 814, passed on 26 March, was drafted by the US and gave the UN far-reaching powers under Chapter VII of the UN Chatter to rebuild the nation of Somalia. It was an experiment in pushing the limits of UN action. An American-indeed a former national security adviser, retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, was put in overall control, while a US Quick Reaction Force (QRF) under Major General Thomas Montgomery remained in reserve in Mogadishu. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was mandated in May 1993. At exactly the same time, a new political strategy emerged: to marginalize Aidid, rather than appease him. But Aidid had seen the US and UN fail their first tests of courage, and was not to be deterred by political posturing by a weaker UN force. On 5 June, confrontation duly occurred, after a UN raid on a designated weapons storage site at Radio Mogadishu, which resulted in an ambush in which twenty-three Pakistani troops were killed. The next day the UN Security Council hastily-but almost certainly correctly ascribed blame to General Aidid, and resolved to punish him. The Security Council passed a resolution {Resolution 837) authorizing ‘all necessary measures’ to apprehend those responsible for the attack on the Pakistanis. On the Carrollian principle of ‘sentence first, verdict later’, the investigation—carried out by a US professor Tom Farer-did not take place until July. It consisted almost entirely of interviews with UNOSOM personnel, and failed to address the central, sensitive question of the UN’s political intelligence, which had led it to try to search the radio station. Attempts to capture this same station had twice been the spark for major conflict in Mogadishu in 1991, and in the weeks before the UN action in which the UN had become increasingly and openly exasperated with Aidid’s (fairly mild) anti-UN broadcasts.8 Conflict was almost inevitable once the intention to search the radio station was announced, and indeed the aide who received that notification, Abdi Kabdiid, told the UNOSOM officers so. There then followed three months of urban warfare, described by Somalis as ‘high-tech search, low-tech hide’ as the US brought all its resources to bear on locating the fugitive general and destroying his militia. This operation, in which humanitarian principles were wholly jettisoned, had more to do with upholding the status of the UN in a world where its credibility was severely compromised-notably because of events in Bosnia and Cambodia-than with seeking solutions to the problems of Somalia. Having set out to prove that it could rebuild the nation, the UN was now testing the limits of Chapter VII, which also authorizes the use of force. At times the operations descended into farce. After a month of failure, the US army brought in its renowned special operations units, including the Rangers. But rather than striking fear into the hearts of Somalis, at first they only brought black humour: one of their earliest operations involved descending from helicopters to raid an’ Aidid stronghold’ that turned out to be a house rented by the UN Development Programme, where they held UN staff at gunpoint and forced an Egyptian diplomat, in her negligee, to lie down on shards of broken glass. The Showdown The full story of the skirmishes, ambushes, raids, killings, demolitions and battles of this period is too long to attempt here. Four US personnel were killed by a landmine in August. A military disaster was narrowly averted on 9 September when a tank was ambushed. A US helicopter was downed on 26 September and three of its crew killed-though this incident was hushed up at the time. Thus casualties mounted. The showdown came on 3 October, with an attempt by US Rangers and Special Forces to snatch two senior Aidid aides near the Olympic Hotel. Resistance was fierce. Two US helicopters were shot down; a third just made it back to base before crashing. An armoured rescue column was ambushed and partly destroyed. Eighteen US soldiers died in the worst single day’s combat losses by the US army since Vietnam. The battle was described in DeLong and Tuckey’s book Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy and recently in Mark Bowden’s articles ‘Black Hawk Down’ for the Philadelphia Inquirer. The losses were too great for the US forces—or more precisely, US public opinion—to take, and General Aidid had won this exercise in politics conducted by other means. Hard-headed US commanders considered the Olympic Hotel operation a success: they had apprehended two senior Aidid aides and inflicted far greater losses on the SNA militia than they had sustained themselves. With more time, more weaponry, and more stomach for losses, they argued, the US could have persisted and won. The US tried to blame the UN and other contingents for the failure of the mission. The usual mantra was that the early, ‘humanitarian’ stage of Operation Restore Hope had been successful under US leadership, but when the UN took over in May 1993 things had gone wrong. This is wholly unconvincing. No less an authority than Jonathan Howe emphasized that ‘The QRF and the Rangers were under total US control ... No American unit commander was asked by the UN to do anything he felt was inappropriate.’9 The US was in charge all along. It was Ambassador Oakley who appeased Aidid in the early months, and Admiral Howe who decided on a policy of confrontation. US officers made all the major decisions during the battles that took place between June and October, including the ill-fated weapons search at Radio Mogadishu, the attempt to destroy Aidid’s headquarters twelve days later, and subsequent helicopter operations. In fact, the US insisted on retaining control of all major military operations. The 3 October battle was a solely US affair, undertaken without even informing other UN contingents-Malaysian and Pakistani troops who later had to be called upon to rescue the stranded US aircrews and Rangers. The collapse of the UN-US intervention can only be understood when it is realized just how deeply the UN forces had antagonized a wide swathe of Somali society. When the Marines landed on Mogadishu beach on 9 December 1992, hopes were high that they would solve the problems of Somalia. But not only had they disappointed on that front-particularly on the issue of disarming the militiamen—but the behaviour of a large number of the troops was deplorable. Many countries had sent hardened paratroopers and other combat troops on a mission in which police training and civil engineering skills were needed. In many cases the operations quickly degenerated into routine brutality against Somali civilians. War Crimes The Belgian troops stationed in Kismayo were a case in point. Without provocation, they harassed, beat and killed many Somalis, many of whom were unarmed.10 Speaking anonymously, Belgian soldiers were frank, ‘You know, if someone had been killed, you just left him there. In the end, all you thought about was the red tape it would cause [to report it] ... At the very end, we would shoot at them, straight away.’11 Another soldier described how inflicting pain had become part of their everyday life: ‘There were some really funny things. I saw a guy putting a metal “necklace” around the neck of a kid. It wasn’t hurting him but he couldn’t get out of it. And then six of them, six Somalis, tried to pull him out of it, and they couldn’t. They simply couldn’t pull him out. So yes, then, we did laugh. This kid wasn’t really in pain, because of that piece of metal, but he wasn’t thrilled at the idea that he would have to run around for the rest of his life with this piece of metal around his neck.’ Other cases included locking children in metal containers—one boy died from heat exhaustion and suffocation—or dragging people behind tanks, throwing children into the Jubba River, and other incidents too disgusting to recount. The sexual aggression of the paratroopers also caused concern in Kismayo. When the abuses were first publicized by African Rights, the Belgian army and government denied them outright: Commander Van de Weghe said ‘The [African Rights] report is scandalous. The facts have been exaggerated, taken out of context or simply invented.’ Medecins Sans Frontières-Belgium, which was running the hospital in Kismayo, also went out of its way to deny the allegations. But when Belgian soldiers began admitting to torture and killing, and photographs of blindfolded Somalis being tied to radio antennae and beaten were published, the truth had to be recognized. In fact, the troops’ activities were more scandalous than African Rights’ report had intimated, and an inquiry was belatedly set up. The first report was superficial, with a few remarks on just seven incidents.12 But the allegations would not go away. A further 268 incidents were then submitted for investigation, including 58 cases of killing or serious injury. On the numbers killed, one of the paratroopers interviewed on Belgian radio commented, ‘You can multiply the official figure by four or five. At the minimum.’ One case came to court in which three paratroopers were acquitted of manslaughter. A second case of aggravated assault was also brought but thrown out. Later, in 1997, another case obtained publicity because part of the evidence was a photograph of two Belgian paratroopers holding a Somali boy over a burning brazier. These two were also acquitted, on the technicality that the Somali boy had not come forward with a complaint. In May 1998, the Belgian courts belatedly showed some resolution when the sentence on a paratrooper accused of forcing a Somali girl to perform a stripshow was increased from three months to one year, after an appeal from the prosecution. He had ‘offered’ the girl to one of his colleagues as a birthday present. The judge accepted that Sergeant Dirk Nassel had been motivated by racism but could not convict him of torture and sexual abuse because the victims had not come forward to testify.13 Prosecutors are also investigating the case of another paratrooper photographed urinating on the corpse of a Somali boy inside the battalion’s base camp. The abuses by the Canadian force became far better known. Two Somalis were killed, and the Canadian army tried to conceal their murder. A Commission of Inquiry reported in 1997, finding much evidence for maneuvering by the Department of National Defence to keep the inquiry from discovering the truth. They concluded: Perhaps the most troubling consequence of the fragmented, dilatory and incomplete documentary record furnished by DND is that, when this activity is coupled with the incontrovertible evidence of documentary destruction, tampering and alteration, there is a natural and inevitable heightening of suspicion of a cover up that extends into the highest reaches of the Department of National Defense and the Canadian Forces. 14 In this case, as with the Belgians, the abuses appear to have been caused by front-line troops acting in a brutal and ill-disciplined manner. They were in a foreign country, without translators and often poorly led. Higher-level involvement in their atrocities were chiefly to do with the cover-up of abuses committed by the lower ranks. A similar pattern is evident with Italian troops responsible for abuses including looting camps for displaced people, dangerous destruction of munitions, rape and assault. The Malaysians beat up hospital staff and looted houses; the Pakistanis and Nigerians indiscriminately fired on protesting crowds; the Tunisians shot down civilians in the former university compound and later described them as ‘bandits’; the French opened fire on a truck at a checkpoint and then falsely claimed that the truck was carrying arms and a gunman had opened fire. The cases are too numerous to detail. (The Irish, Botswanan and Australian troops came away with good reputations however.) The Canadian abuses became most infamous. This is ironic: the Canadians deserve credit for thoroughly investigating every case that came to light. According to Somalis, the Canadians were some of the best behaved of the peacekeeping forces. A total of four cases of killing by the Canadians led to two cases of criminal charges. By contrast, several hundred cases of killing by the Belgian troops have yet to lead to a single conviction. Ironically, given their high-level leaders’ disregard for civilian life, the US troops also had a relatively good record of everyday behaviour. Two early cases of wounding and killing by US troops in February led to court martial cases though the result was one acquittal and one very light sentence.15 The US was the only contingent in Mogadishu to have an office that entertained complaints from the Somali public and made compensation payments, chiefly to the victims of traffic accidents; only the Canadians and Australians (outside Mogadishu) had similar arrangements. Otherwise, Somalis had to suffer abuses without any official course of redress—a dangerous matter in a heavily armed society where people have a strong sense of honour and a universal readiness to defend themselves. They were often ready to voice their complaints with bullets. The Policy of Excessive Force Abuses by the US forces in Somalia were not the out-of-control excesses of frustrated front-line troops. They were the direct and inevitable outcome of decisions taken high up in the military command. Probably for this reason, the US has been conspicuously unwilling to open any sort of inquiry into the conduct of its forces, comparable to the efforts in Canada, or even the half-hearted attempts in Belgium and Italy. On the contrary, the US soldiers have been portrayed as the victims of Mogadishu. In a sense, they were—but some of them were also responsible for gross abuses, either on their own account or in carrying out orders. Enormous attention has been paid to the US Rangers and other service people who fought and died in Somalia. And there has been a process of ‘lesson learning’ and accountability—of sorts. The lesson learned was that the US should not intervene unless its national interests were at stake; that better military coordination was required; and that the US should not entrust command to other nationalities within a UN structure—despite the dominant US role in the UN structure in Somalia. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin took the blame for not sending armored vehicles and C130 aircraft with precision bombing capabilities, which had been requested by the commander in Mogadishu in August 1993, in anticipation of events such as those of 3 October. He resigned in 1994. The ground force commander also took responsibility for the operation going wrong. He left the army in 1996. But who will take responsibility for the violations of international humanitarian law committed during the Somali operation? The first indication of a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions by US forces—in lay language, a war crime—was on 17 June.16 On this day, twelve days after the ambush in which twenty-three Pakistanis had died, a combined UN force—US helicopters, Moroccan, French, Italian and other ground forces-tried to overrun Aidid’s headquarters in South Mogadishu. They ran into much fiercer resistance than they had expected and the Moroccans in particular suffered heavy losses. For a while, the UN force commanders suspected that General Aidid had taken refuge in Digfer Hospital, Mogadishu’s largest hospital, which is about half a mile from his headquarters. No evidence was ever produced to support this, but some snipers certainly took up positions on the roof of the building for a while. In response, the hospital was attacked by UN forces.17 There were approximately 380 patients in the hospital, plus about 230 hospital staff including 19 doctors. Dr Aweys Abdi Omar was operating on a woman admitted with a bullet wound in her abdomen, when the entire building shook with the force of explosions: I was conducting an exploratory laparotomy on one of the patients who had been brought in overnight. She had a bullet wound. I heard someone say that the Moroccans were coming up the road from Benadir, and the militia were at the crossroads in front of Digfer. Just after that I heard the first missile explosion ...The staff started to run, to flee to the basement. I continued my operation. I had to stay with the patient, but I could do nothing without the other staff. I was crying. I don’t know where that missile hit, but I could feel the vibrations. Windows were breaking, a light fell from the ceiling. Then there were some explosions, and staff came and said that three patients in the recovery room had been killed. People were running. I finished the operation and stitched up the woman and put her in the ward. But there was no one to take care of her.18 Dr Aweys then sought safety in the basement, along with most of the staff and those patients who could move. Those who could not move were not so fortunate. In all, eleven artillery shells and helicopter rockets struck the hospital. One missile hit the operating theatre, passing over the head of a doctor as a patient was being prepared for an operation. Four missiles hit the orthopaedic ward, killing at least two people. The total number of casualties is unknown, as most people fled as the attack began. Later in the day, French troops stormed the by then largely deserted building, searched it, breaking down doors and ransacking offices. A depressing but common feature of the search was the theft of money and other valuables by the foreign troops. An inspection of the building and careful analysis of the impacts which shows that some of the missiles were travelling downwards when they struck the building-demonstrates that at least some of the missiles were fired from helicopters-which means TOW anti-tank missiles from US Cobra helicopters, since no other contingent possessed attack helicopters. However, this was denied by a US military spokesman the following day. Lt-Col Trevor Jones told reporters, ‘I can assure you that no TOW missiles were fired at Digfer hospital and there was no artillery used by UN forces at all.’ Declining to say what types of weapons were used, Major Frank Fountain, a US military attorney, told the author that the US, Moroccan and French troops had fired solely in self-defence and had used minimum force and the most accurate weaponry available.19 But the official accounts of the battle are so contradictory and at variance with the evidence that they cannot be taken seriously. The physical evidence from the hospital, Somali eyewitness accounts, and the statement by the Italian General Bruno Loi that a major assault on the hospital was planned,20 all contradict the official claim of restraint and self-defence. One US officer admitted to me in confidence that artillery and helicopter missiles had been fired at the building. It later transpired that US helicopters had fired eleven TOW missiles during the battle of 17 June, of which five had malfunctioned or missed their targets. Most of the impacts were also several stories below the roof where the snipers were stationed-the term ‘more accurate weaponry’ is a relative one. Under the Geneva Conventions, a hospital should be protected. If one belligerent party violates the neutrality of a hospital by, for example, stationing snipers there, the other party cannot simply attack; it must give warning and provide some protection for civilians. The UN forces did not do that: they just attacked, almost certainly with excessive force. The presence of a few snipers on the roof of a crowded hospital is no justification for firing heavy artillery and anti-tank missiles into the fabric of the building without warning. Dr Mohamed Fuji, the medical director of Digfer, who had been working—like all his staff—as an unpaid volunteer for almost three years, noted that during this time they had received no assistance from the UN. The first UN materiel that arrived in Mogadishu’s largest hospital were the rockets. ‘This was not the reward we were expecting for our work’, he commented.21 Whatever the truth of the matter, the incident required investigation. When on 10 July I questioned a US military attorney about the legality of the attack, his first response was that the UN is not a signatory to the Geneva Conventions and hence not bound by them.22 I objected to this obvious dodge, and he quickly added that the US forces felt themselves morally bound by them. He asked me to return the next day. But the next day, the UN issued instructions for my arrest and detention.23 In the event, the atmosphere of Mogadishu had turned so ugly that I left town that same day. And with regard to the Digfer attack, a UN officer stated that ‘the normal rules of engagement do not apply in this situation’.24 Helicopter Attacks on Civilians On 12 July, US helicopters fired ten TOW rockets into a building where members of Aidid’s political movement were holding a meeting. At least fifty-four people, including clan elders and religious leaders, died in the house of Abdi Kabdiid, one of Aidid’s aides. When journalists arrived to cover the event, an angry crowd turned on them and four were killed. There is no doubt that the US helicopters attacked a chiefly civilian meeting.25 Admiral Howe defiantly defended his decision to authorize the attack, which killed some intermediaries with whom he himself had been speaking a few days earlier. ‘We knew what we were hitting. It was well-planned.’26 In a familiar ploy, the Admiral attacked the media’s representation of events and argued that ‘the main reason for UNOSOM’S negative image was its poor media strategies’.27 Howe claimed that only twenty people had been killed, as against the Red Cross which said fifty four had died, and Aidid’s SNA which produced a list of seventy-three people who they claimed had been killed. But Howe could not produce I any evidence to back up his claim because, he said, the camera on the US helicopter had jammed. This was the first official admission that US military technology might occasionally malfunction. Ann Wright, a legal advisor to UNOSOM, sent a memorandum to Admiral Howe the following day. The prose style cannot obscure the seriousness of the charge: This UNOSOM military operation raises important legal and human rights issues from a UN perspective. The issue boils down to whether the Security Council Resolution’s directive [following the killing of the Pakistanis] authorizing UNOSOM to ‘take all necessary measures’ against those responsible for attacks on UNOSOM forces meant for UNOSOM to use lethal force against all persons without possibility of surrender in any building suspected or known to be SNA/Aidid facilities or did the Security Council allow that persons suspected to be responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces would have an opportunity to be detained by UNOSOM forces and explain their presence in an SNA/Aidid facility and then be judged in a neutral court of law to determined if they were responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces or were mere occupants (temporary or permanent) of a building, suspected or known to be an SNA/Aidid facility.28 It seems that UNOSOM, and in particular its US leadership, had decided that the UN Security Council resolution had indeed authorized it to disregard international humanitarian law and take wholly arbitrary and disproportionate measures. My questions about the Geneva Conventions of two days earlier had struck a sensitive note. An operation such as this was a wholly US affair. General Montgomery, commander of the QRF, would have consulted with Admiral Howe and almost certainly obtained authorization from CENTCOM in the United States. It needs to be asked how far up the chain of command, which leads ultimately to the White House, such consultation went. The US position—and that of the increasingly client-like UN—was made clear by two subsequent incidents. In the first, the UN detained fifty-five Somalis without charge, alleging they were key supporters of General Aidid (most of them were). David Ijayala, legal advisor to UNOSOM, said only that the prisoners were being held for security reasons and ‘the authority is under Chapter Seven [of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force], no other legal code’.29 The second occurred on 9 September when an SNA ambush disabled a US tank, and the QRF was sent in with helicopters to rescue stranded US soldiers and engineers. One of these helicopters opened fire on a crowd, killing an estimated sixty people-armed and unarmed. The UN spokesman, Major David Stockwell, said ‘There are no sidelines or spectator seats-the people on the ground are considered combatants.’30 In truth, it is often difficult to differentiate between a combatant and a civilian in a counter-guerrilla war-which is one reason why the US has refused to sign the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which extend legal protection to all civilians, making no distinction between, for example, infants and nursing mothers and workers in munitions factories. But the very foundation of international humanitarian law is the idea that some restraint must be exercised to minimize the danger to civilians, or in legalese, that ‘the methods used in combat are not unlimited’. US helicopter actions disregarded this foundation of the laws of war. The problem is that the US doctrine of overwhelming force ensuring minimal US casualties is almost wholly inapplicable in a situation of urban warfare where restraint is essential; almost by definition it involved breaches of the Geneva Conventions. The limits of US technology were shown up on almost the first day of the battle, when US military spokesmen proudly announced that bombing by a C130 airplane had destroyed Aidid’s headquarters. In fact, in a remarkable display of precision bombing, the neighbouring house belonging to a businessman named Hassan Hashi had been comprehensively leveled. One stray missile had made a neat hole in Aidid’s roof terrace. In this context, the tragedy on 3 October, when several hundred people, eighteen of them American, died in a series of battles near the Olympic Hotel, appears as a tragic inevitability. The numbers killed in this battle are a matter for dispute and speculation. Initial estimates of the fatalities among Somalis were 200 dead. One leading Somali businessman in the area considered this number exaggerated, saying that he could only account for sixty dead in the vicinity of the Olympic Hotel.31 But the fighting covered a large area and many of those who died did so in their own compounds, where they were buried. Others came up with higher figures: Bowden’s estimate runs to nearly 500 dead, which is less than some Somali elders’ figures—though some of those estimates may have included earlier battles as well. Doctors in the city’s main hospitals were overwhelmed with hundreds of casualties, and with the poor emergency facilities available—despite the surgical expertise of Mogadishu doctors, who have unparalleled experience with gunshot and shrapnel wounds, the ratio of fatalities to casualties must have been high. Brutality and Resistance The death toll is tragic. But the reasons for it, and the total lack of accountability on the part of the US military command, are just as significant. The accounts by DeLong and Tuckey, and Bowden are full of glimpses into the savagery of the fighting, and the readiness of the US forces to use excessive force. The US soldiers did not always use excessive force, it is true—there are many clear examples of restraint and the careful targeting of gunmen amid crowds of civilians. But there are just as many cases in which soldiers fired without identifying their targets, or loosed off great barrages of missiles, or even shot down people in cold blood who presented no threat to them at all. There were times when they shot at everything that moved, took hostages, gunned their way through crowds of men and women, finished off any wounded who were showing signs of life. Many people died in their homes, their tin roofs ripped to shreds by high-velocity bullets and rockets. Accounts of the fighting frequently contain such statements as this: ‘One moment there was a crowd, and the next instant it was just a bleeding heap of dead and injured.’32 Even with a degree of restraint on the part of the gunners, the technology deployed by the US Army was such that carnage was inevitable. One thing that the US and UN never appreciated was that, as they escalated the level of murder and mayhem, they increased the determination of Somalis to resist and fight back. By the time of the 3 October battle, literally every inhabitant of large areas of Mogadishu considered the UN and US as enemies, and were ready to take up arms against them. People who ten months before had welcomed the US Marines with open arms were now ready to risk death to drive them out. The Americans’ inability to tolerate casualties, especially when televised, and their even greater inability to tolerate captive American soldiers, meant that the Somalis had leverage over the US disproportionate to their military capabilities. When pilot Michael Durant was captured, General Aidid turned the tables on his adversaries. The US forces called a truce, and called Ambassador Robert Oakley, whose policy had been to appease Aidid, back to Somalia. He told the cautiously triumphant General what would happen if Michael Durant was not released: This is not a threat. I have no plan for this and I’ll do everything I can to prevent it, but what will happen if a few weeks go by and Mr Durant is not released? Not only will you lose any credit you may get now, but we will decide that we have to rescue him. I guarantee you that we are not going to pay or trade for him in any way, shape or form. ... So what well decide is we have to rescue him, and whether we have the right place or the wrong place, there’s going to be fight with your people. The minute the guns start again, all restraint on the US side goes. Just look at the stuff coming in here now. An aircraft carrier, tanks, gunships... This whole part of the city will be destroyed, men, women, children, camels, cats, dogs, goats, donkeys, everything... That would be really tragic for all of us, but that’s what will happen.33 What the US forces did on 3 October is an interesting example of ‘restraint’, and it is truly alarming to think about what lack of ‘restraint’ might entail. Justifying why the US would send troops to Somalia but not Bosnia, General Colin Powell said, ‘We do deserts, we don’t do mountains’. Responding to the launch of Operation Restore Hope, the US Ambassador to Kenya, Smith Hempstone, remarked, ‘If you liked Beirut, you’ll love Mogadishu’.34 His was the more prescient remark. The US army doesn’t ‘do cities’ either. The US military operations in Mogadishu raise questions about US military ethos and doctrine that are not only unanswered but rarely aired at all. Who is to be called to account for clear breaches of the Geneva Conventions? Some individual soldiers are doubtless guilty of excesses, but it would be a shame if they were scapegoated: it was senior commanders who made the key decisions. A serious inquiry into US military conduct in Somalia comparable to the Canadian investigation-might well lead rapidly to the Pentagon and the White House. This possibility was no doubt in the minds of the US negotiators to the Rome conference on the creation of the International Criminal Court. ‘Malicious prosecutions’ against a few front-line Marine privates is probably something the US Administration could live with. Following the chain of command to its zenith is not. Mogadishu also compels US to ask, is US military doctrine itself compatible with fighting a determined enemy without inflicting wholly disproportionate casualties on the surrounding population? It appears that the US Army may have become so dedicated to the myth of a painless victory that it cannot cope with adversity, and at the same time retain the essential minimum of humanity in warfare. Or, to put the matter more bluntly, does the US Army no longer fight but rather massacre? 1 Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey, Mogadishu! Heroism and Tragedy, Westport, Conn. 1994, p. x. 2 Ibid., pp. 90, 93, 99-100. 3 Refugee Policy Group, ‘Hope Restored? Humanitarian Aid in Somalia 1990-1994’, Washington, DC 1994, p. 118. Since most of the deaths between December 1992 and February 1993 were caused by malaria, and since the US troops and international relief agencies had no anti-malaria programmes, even the lower figures may be an over-estimate. 4 James L. Woods, ‘US Decision Making During Humanitarian Operations in Somalia’, in W. Clarke and J. Herbst, eds., Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Intervention, Boulder 1997, p. 157. 5 The currency exchanges continued during the war against Aidid, so that the US-UN forces were bankrolling their opponent. 6 General Morgan, known as the ‘butcher of Hargeisa’ for his destruction of that city in 1988 when serving as a senior commander for his father-in-law, President Mohamed Siad Barre, was trained in the US and in 1992-93 received many arms from Kenya. 7 This episode is markedly absent from Oakley’s own account of his role in Somalia. See Robert Oakley and John Hirsch, Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacekeeping and Peacemaking, US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC 1995. 8 See John Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders, London 1994, pp. 170-9. 9 Dealing with Somalia’, in Clarke and Herbst, Learning from Somalia. 10 African Rights, ‘Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the UN Forces’, London, July 1993. II Interview on BRT, Belgian Radio, 25 August 1995. 12 Commission d’enquete Somalie, ‘Rapport’, Brussels, 4 November 1993. 13 AFP, ‘UN Para has Sentence Increased for Somalia Stripshow’, 7 May 1998 14 Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report’, 3 July 1997, p. 20. 15 On 6 April 1993, Gunnery Sergeanr Harry Conde was convicted of using excessive force in an incident on 2 February when he shot and killed a Somali youth who tried to steal his sunglasses. Conde was demoted in rank and fined one month’s pay. 16 However, on 12 and 13 June Pakistani troops had fired into demonstrating crowds in Mogadishu, killing civilians. 17 African Rights, ‘UN Abuses’, pp. 7-10. 18 Interview with the author, 9 July 1993. 19 Interview, 10 July 1993. 20 Reuters, ‘Italian Commander says Attack on Hospital Imminent’, 17 June 1993. 21 Interview with the author, 8 July 1993. 22 Major Frank Fountain, interviewed by the author. 23 UNOSOM Military Information Office, UNOSOM FHQ Morning Briefing Notes for 11 July 1993, p. 2. 24 Liz Sly, ‘UN Raises the Ante in Somalia Attacks’, Chicago Tribune, 20 June 1993. 25 Drysdale, Whatever Happened to Somalia?, pp. 203-4. 26 Keith Richburg, ‘US Raid Reportedly Killed Aidid Aides’, The Washington Post, 16 July 1993. 27 UNOSOM, Second informal consultation with donor representatives on Somalia’s relief and rehabilitation programme, summary report, Nairobi, 27 July 1993, pp. 9-10. 28 Ann Wright, ‘Legal and Human Rights Aspects of UNOSOM Military Operations’, Memorandum to the Special Representative of the Sectetary General from UNOSOM Justice Division, 13 July 1993. 29 Mark Huband, ‘UN Forces Deny Somali Detainees Legal Rights’, The Guardian, 25 September 1993. 30 Keith Richburg, ‘UN Defends Firing on Somali Crowd’, The Washington Post, 11 September 1993. 31 Interview with the author, 5 March 1994. 32 Mark Bowden, ‘Helicopter Provides Support’, The Arizona Republic, 24 December 1997. 33 Mark Bowden, ‘Plans Laid for Dignified Withdrawal’, The Seattle Times, 8 February 1998. 34 US News & World Report, 14 December.

Through the Ages. From a strategic trading zone on ancient Arab trading routes through the turbulence of colonialism and Cold War rivalries and post-colonial political collapse, Somalia has had an eventful, if troubled, history. Here is a chronology of key events in Somali history. 1500 - 1600: Portuguese traders land on the east coast of Africa and start intermittent power struggles with the Sultanate of Zanzibar for control of port cities and surrounding towns. 1840: The British East India Company signs treaties with the Sultan of Tajura for unrestricted trading rights. 1887: Britain reaches a final agreement with the local King Menelik and various tribal chiefs and draws a boundary with neighbouring Ethiopia to form British Somaliland. Besides trading interests, the British protectorate serves as a counterweight to the growing Italian influence in the key port city of neighbouring Zanzibar. 1897 - 1907: Italy makes several agreements with tribal chiefs and the British to finally mark out the boundaries of a separate Italian protectorate of Somaliland. 1908: The Italian Government assumes direct administration of Italian Somaliland, giving the territory a colonial status. 1936: Following decades of expansionism, Italy captures Addis Ababa and Ethiopia to form the province of Italian East Africa. 1940, June: Italian troops drive out the British garrison and capture British Somaliland. 1941: British recapture British Somaliland and most of Italian Somaliland. 1947: Following Italy's defeat in World War II, Italy renounces all rights and titles to Italian Somaliland. 1950: The U.N. General Assembly adopts a resolution making Italian Somaliland a U.N. trust territory under Italian administrative control. 1941- 1959: Meanwhile, British Somaliland sees a period of colonial development as the territory moves towards a gradual development of local institutions and self-government. 1960: British and Italian Somaliland gain independence and merge to form the United Republic of Somalia. 1960 - 1969: Two successive democratically elected governments attempt to balance the expansionist interests of pro-Arab, pan-Somali factions with interests in Somali-inhabited areas of Ethiopia and Kenya, and "modernist" factions whose priorities include economic and social development. 1969, October: Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre seizes power in a coup. Democratically elected President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke is assassinated. 1970: Siad declares Somalia a socialist nation and undertakes literacy programs and planned economic development under the principles of "scientific socialism." 1972 - 1977: A period of persistent border clashes with Ethiopia for control of Ethiopia's Ogaden region, which also sees a severe drought in the region that leads to widespread starvation. 1974: Somalia and the Soviet Union sign a treaty of friendship. Somalia also joins the Arab League. 1977: Somalia invades the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. 1978: Following a gradual shifting of Soviet favour from Somalia to Ethiopia and the infusions of Soviet arms and Cuban troops to Ethiopia, Somali troops are pushed out of Ethiopian territory. 1978 - 1990: A period of growing cooperation and strategic alliance between Somalia and the West begins. The United States becomes Somalia's chief partner in defense and several Somali military officers are trained in U.S. military schools. 1991: At the end of a period of growing domestic factionalism, insurgency and an open war with clans in northwest Somalia that have left the country in economic shambles and forced thousands of Somalis to flee their homes, Siad is ousted by opposition clans and forced to flee to Nigeria, where he ultimately dies. 1992, December: U.S. troops lead a U.N. peacekeeping mission to Somalia, under Operation Restore Hope, which begins with the arrival of 1,800 U.S. Marines landing at night on a Mogadishu beach. The peacekeeping mission included providing humanitarian assistance to Somalis and bringing peace to the troubled country. But while the humanitarian mission is quickly achieved, the peacekeeping force finds itself dragged into Somalia's internecine battles. 1993, October: For the United States, Operation Restore Hope reaches its nadir when members of the U.S. Army's elite Delta Force and the Army Rangers are used to raid warlord headquarters and abduct them. In one such raid, the U.S. forces are dropped into a Mogadishu neighbourhood to snatch two lieutenants of warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. While the snatch and grab operation is successfully accomplished, trouble starts when two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters are shot down by rocket-propelled grenades. As U.S. Army Rangers attempt to rescue the crews of the downed helicopters, a mob of armed militiamen and angry Somalis descend on the site. A horrific carnage follows that ends only 15 hours later when a combined U.S./U.N. armoured convoy manages to reach the trapped Rangers and Delta operators. But for the world, the mission in Somalia would forever be gruesomely remembered for the 18 U.S. Army Rangers killed and footage of the exultant crowds dragging naked, mutilated bodies through the streets of Mogadishu. Despite domestic outrage, the U.S. continues to play a major role in the mission until 1994. 1994: President Bill Clinton orders the withdrawal of the 30,000 U.S. troops on Somali soil. 1995: Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, the vanguard of the 21-nation Operation Restore Hope, the U.N. peacekeepers leave after an unsuccessful operation amidst charges of cruelty and even the murder of Somalis. By the end of the operation, dozens of U.N. peacekeepers were killed and hundreds of Somalis died at the hands of U.S. and U.N. forces. 1997: Following a complete administrative collapse, chiefs of some rival clans meet in the Egyptian capital of Cairo and agree to convene a conference to look into rival claims to Somalia. 2000, August: In the 13th such attempt to form a government, Somali warlords and militiamen meet in neighbouring Djibouti for peace talks organized by Djibouti President Omar Guellah. They elect Abdulkassim Salat Hassan president of Somalia. Hassan appoints Ali Khalif Gelayadh as his prime minister. But even as the new government attempts to start the parliamentary process in exile in Djibouti, some powerful warlords, notably Hossein Mohammed Aideed and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal do not recognize Hassan's election. But Mogadishu's most powerful clan leader, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, promises his support. 2000, October: Hassan arrives in Mogadishu to a hero's welcome and tight security. Gelayadh puts together a Cabinet of ministers, Somalia's first government in 10 years. But Hassan's administration has difficulty establishing control outside Mogadishu. 2001, March: Aideed announces that he has patched up his differences with clan leaders Muse Sudi Yalahow and Osman Hassan Ali Atto and calls for a replacement of Hassan's transitional government following a meeting between the leaders in the Kenyan capital of Nairobi. Meanwhile, opposition to Hassan has seen fighting rage on in the southern parts of the country as drought, security concerns and the criminalization of refugee camps along the Somali-Kenyan border periodically compels Kenya to halt cross-border trade, thereby further crippling the economically crumbling East African country.

Subject: Did You Know?... ADD YOUR VOICE Did You Know? Did you know the United States awards Israel $5 billion in aid each year? Did you know that yearly US aid to Israel exceeds the aid the US grants to the whole African continent? Did you know that Israel is the only country in the Middle East that has nuclear weapons? Did you know that Israel is the only country in the Middle East that refuses to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and bars international inspections from its sites? Did you know that Israel currently occupies territories of sovereign nations in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions? Did you know that Israel has for decades routinely sent assassins in to other countries to kill its political enemies? Did you know that high-ranking military officers in the Israeli Defense Forces have admitted publicly that unarmed prisoners of war were Executed by the IDF? Did you know that Israel refuses to prosecute its soldiers who have acknowledged executing prisoners of war? Did you know that Israel routinely confiscates bank accounts, businesses, and land and refuses to pay compensation to those who suffer the confiscation? Did you know that Israel blew up an American diplomatic facility in Egypt (1954) and attacked a U.S. ship (1967) in international waters, killing 33 and wounding 177 American sailors? Did you know that the second most powerful lobby in the United States, according to a recent Fortune magazine survey of Washington insiders, is the Israeli AIPAC? Did you know that Israel stands in defiance of 69 United Nations Security Council Resolutions? Did you know that non-Jewish Israelis cannot buy or lease land in Israel? Did you know that Palestinian license plates in Israel are color coded to distinguish Jews from non-Jews? Did you know that Jerusalem, both East and West, is considered by the entire world community, including the United States, to be occupied territory and NOT part of Israel? Did you know that Israel allots 85% of the water resources for Jews and the remaining 15% is divided among all Palestinians in the territories? For example in Hebron, 85% of the water is given to about 400 settlers,while 15% must be divided among Hebron's 120,000 Palestinians? Did you know that today's Israel sits on the former sites of more than 400 now-vanished Palestinian villages, and that the Israeli's re-named almost every physical site in the country to cover up the traces? Did you know that it was not until 1988 that Israelis were barred from running "Jews Only" job ads? Did you know that four prime ministers of Israel (Begin, Shamir, Rabin, and Sharon) have taken part in either bomb attacks on civilians, massacres of civilians, or forced expulsions of civilians from their villages? Did you know that the Israeli Foreign Ministry pays two American public relations firms to promote Israel to Americans? Did you know that Sharon's coalition government includes a party Molodet: which advocates expelling all Palestinians from the occupied territories? Did you know that Israel's settlement-building increased in the eight years since Oslo? Did you know that settlement building under Barak doubled compared to settlement building under Netanyahu? Did you know that the Palestinians have already accepted Israel's existence on 78% of what was Palestine. Bible: God said to Abraham, "Unto thy seed, I will give thy land." Abraham had two sons. Ismael-the Arab son, and Isaac-the Jewish son. So even if one wants to go to the Bible, the land would belong to both. Did you know that Palestinian Christians are considered the "living stones" of Christianity because they are the direct descendants of the disciples of Jesus Christ? Did you know that despite a ban on torture by Israel's High Court of Justice, torture has continued by Shin Bet interrogators on Palestinian prisoners? Did you know that Palestinian refugees make up the largest portion of the refugee population in the world?

Posted on Mon, May. 06, 2002 Diabetes is on rise among U.S. Somalis BY TOM MAJESKI Pioneer Press Somali immigrants who fled their war-ravaged homeland and settled in Minnesota are quickly discovering that the land of plenty — plenty of food, plenty of leisure time — can bring on a health problem that was rare in the Somali community: diabetes. Dr. Mehmood Khan, a consultant in the Mayo Clinic's Division of Endocrinology, says a growing number of Somali immigrants are developing diabetes, many within five years and some as quickly as six months after their arrival in this country. "Something happens,'' Khan said. "The question is, what is it?" No one has scientifically studied the phenomenon, but Khan is convinced he knows the answer: lack of exercise and a dramatic increase in caloric intake, especially fat. "No mechanisms are in place to track it and monitor this,'' Khan said of the diabetes trend among Somali immigrants. "But it needs to be done.' Type II diabetes occurs when the body loses its ability to utilize insulin, a hormone secreted by the pancreas and used to metabolize sugar and fats. If not treated, the disease causes a variety of serious health problems, including heart disease, blindness, kidney failure, and foot and leg ulcers that can lead to amputations. Experts say diabetes rates in the United States are skyrocketing to alarming levels among both adults and children. They blame the increase on rising obesity rates and lack of exercise. Studies also show that losing weight and increasing exercise significantly reduces the risk of developing diabetes. Researchers also have documented increased diabetes rates among other immigrant populations that have adopted the American lifestyle, Khan said. "Many minorities are genetically predisposed to developing diabetes. The changing environment triggers (the onset of the disease)," he said. In their homeland, Somalis walk and ride bicycles, have far fewer labor-saving appliances and eat food containing little fat. But once they reach America, their physical activity drops precipitously and their diets shift toward high-fat, high-calorie American diets. "It's McDonald's, KFC and pizza,'' Khan said. Surprisingly, Somali immigrants don't have to gain a lot of weight — only 10 to 20 extra pounds — to develop diabetes, Khan said. But that may be because the definition of obesity was based on the American model. "Our definition of obesity may not apply to these people,'' he said. Khan cautions that he and his Mayo Clinic colleagues don't have solid data on the Somali diabetes phenomenon. "It's all observational; this population is not well-studied," he said. Consequently, he thinks a study should be conducted because it would help researchers understand why and how the dramatic increase in diabetes is happening and, more important, help them figure out how to lower the risk. If what holds true for whites and African-Americans holds true for Somalis, they will be able to lower their diabetes risk by increasing their exercise and keeping their weight down, Khan said. "It's been proven that when you change, the rate (for diabetes) goes down,'' Khan said. DIABETES SYMPTOMS • Excessive thirst and appetite. • Frequent urination, sometimes as often as every hour. • Weight loss. • Fatigue. • Nausea and perhaps vomiting. • Blurred vision. • In women, frequent vaginal infections and perhaps the cessation of menstruation. • In men, impotence. • In men and women, yeast infections. WHEN TO CALL YOUR DOCTOR • You feel nauseated, weak and excessively thirsty; are urinating very frequently; have abdominal pain; and are breathing more deeply and rapidly than normal — perhaps with sweet breath that smells like nail polish remover. You may need immediate medical attention for ketoacidosis. • You feel weak or faint; are experiencing a rapid heartbeat, trembling, and excessive sweating; and feel irritable, hungry or suddenly drowsy. You could be developing hypoglycemia and may be at risk of more serious complications. TO LEARN MORE • Information on all forms of diabetes can be found at http://www.diabetes.org/, the American Diabetes Association Web site. • Information on juvenile diabetes can be found at http://www.jdrf.org/. Information on the Juvenile Diabetes Research Foundation's Twin Cities research fund raiser is available at (952) 851-0770. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Tom Majeski, who covers medical news, can be reached at tmajeski@pioneerpress.com or (651) 228-5583.