G 1.Who cares which clan you are or not. However if you'd like bring that up as your trump card, well done and good for you. I'm sure you tried very hard for the positionand, and everybody must be very proud of you for the achievement. You mention Dirir iyo dhaadhaanka indha-cade so much, did you forget the hordes of hyennas is your closet. You are telling us that if we give them a title, they care about our well being and collective future. ... I dont think you are nieve enough to beleive that. The only difference between them and the retards that led the ICU to war is that they sold their ar$es to ethiopia in exchange for forming an obidient power. As i write this i'm waiting for your famous sovereignty argument. And if i havent forgetten is goes along the lines of: "balh blah blah blah, some idiotic remark, blah blah blah, ethiopia recognises somalia" Unless you have come up with a better a paragraph, please spare me the tripe - i know how to use the search function on SOL. So, before you start throwing your clan line 'jihad' agenda- which if i remember correctly, i told you to never use the word in correspondence with me. Please tell us why these genocidal kleptomaniacs you tout so much should not be standing in front of a tribunal for crimes against humanity.

Fiiq fiiq Your many arguments in vain and tears are loud and clear to hear but what do you propose for Somalia may I ask? We propose that: 1. current ragime be tried in a war crimes tribunal for systematically organising 17 years of of pillaging, rape, murder, and ethnic cleansing against the somali population. 2. The somali community to put forth new men and women (for govermencance) that were not involved in the travesty against the very sense of morality that these beasts orchestrated.

Juuje Saaxiib, how many lives do you calculate each american grievence to be worth?

G I'd really like to know where they taught you 'how make friends and influence people'. Which bravado and myth-making are you reffering to. Did you mean the war hero, nation builder that sacrificed himself on behalf of all of us. Or was it the Yeey.

G It is ok, So long as the yeey gains from it, am i wrong?

sophist I've just read a telegraph article which ended with America can afford this indiscriminate approach because southern Somalia is so dangerous that journalists or aid workers are unlikely to be able to reach the target area and count the bodies. Now if the foremost bastion of the british right wing press is writing that, and declaring our protectors from an "indiscriminate approach" to be Journalists and Aid workers, what the h ell does it matter. Or, what hope can any one place in the Theives Feudalists and Gangsters

sophist^ what's the alternative ?

Tuez les tous, Dieu reconnaîtra les siens.

this is sadly predictable, lets hope the "We're going to turn this place into another Iraq," doesnt happen. The sooner the ethiopians leave and the Theives actually do diplomacy, the better.

Duke Please dont throw the *clanist* line, as a counter argument to why a goverment based on a clan system should be put in power, it contradicts its self. Warmoog how many guns do you carry in Toronto and when will you be martyred in moqadishu. I tell you what, you can do a version of "sponsor a child". Lets call it "sponsor a militia-man". This is how it works, you give your passport, appartment, pc and your monthly cheque to a militia man in muqdishi and in return, you get his AK47 and take his place in the front line. There is no argument about the yeey in muqdisho. The point is (1). We need a state, they have a chance of setting one up. (2) A gun held by a shop keeper is nothig, the real weapons are held by militia men that represent clans -- they are ones that you need to disarm, They will not and cannot fight the ethiopians (something called self perservation and being out gunned) - but they can fight teh somalis. The militias represent parallel power structure and nothing can be done when there are as many armies as clans fighting for power.

We have people like him as MP's and you wonder why the Theiving Feudal Gangrenous b a s t a r d s are hated by the people! The armed escorts should surround the normal people, to stop the yeey like him from savaging them and feasting on their blood at the tarmac. Anyhow the US must be happy, the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism" is back in action..

wallaalo, 1st, lordh there are so many points there i dont know where to begin .. so i'll randomly try. n-syl The Voluntry disarmament, was more complex than that and ivolved many issues, not least clan related. I dont discredit the achievement, on the contrary, the current lot need to learn a lot from diplomacy, and end their triumphalist, up their own back end talk. But you must admit that process was far more complex than just, 'people were happy to comply'. - The next thing is the point of a state. By definition, a state has monopoly on violence , and in any reasonable state, these instituations are the police and military. Otherwise, individuals within the state are able to contest it for power, and we have somalia - the architpe *failed state* - a phrase that more than anything else is attributed with somalis and i hate more than you can imagine. Anyhow, i think it is worth building a state, otherwise a nation only serves the intersts of individuals not the populous.. Now i dont claim that the Traitorous Feudal Gangsters are any such thing, but we need to start somewhere, and they are currently in a possition to do something... The point of setting up a state is that you ave institutions. If the work, then a government is more than a set of figure heads, i am nieve/****** enough to believe/hope that institutions can replaced without loss of blood. However, private armies are something else all together, they serve no one except their pay master and are the cancers of africa. The sweet irony may be that the TFG's dowfall may even be its hope of wanting to get away from being Zenawi's private army to being a government. Because as soon as instutions are in place, they either follow the rules, or take back to uncivil war. -- hence as a population, we can be no more worse off. (TFG for example) however but this Also, lets not forget that we are talking about people here. Behind virtually every AK47 is some flee bitten, war ravagged, bitter somali, many no more teenage kids - the ethiopians have Migs and tanks. And, yes a government of Theiving Feudal Gangsters is far from ideal, but, *right now* as things stand on the ground what is the alternative - without some other war. Guerilla warfare is not a viable alternative, if you want evidence, look at the number of Iraqi citizens that die as a direct result of "the strugle". Violent revolutions dont last, historically they are short and brutish. And, as I write this, i cant think of any state born out of such a fire that does not conform to that description. So, as i write this, on my flashy flat screen monitor, I cannnot and will not advocate/suppport a violent struggle, that will only result in killing more somali people and further stregthening our hyena neighbours and their stoogs. The only kind of struggle that makes sense and will have any hope of lasting is the intellectual kind. We can undermine this regime, we can hold it accountable for its actions, and we can use intergrity, honesty and the institutions it aims to set up to beat them off. Remember, they only have power while the Ethiopian ragime is around, and most Ethiopians i know hate that regime. Once that is gone, they have to face us, and we've faced ugly cannibals like them before. This may not be out usual *somali* course of action, but now is as good a time as any to start. -- (sorry for the rant)

That is sad news to read. We need people to disarm so that we can move forward. A puppet government is better than a series of warring fiefdoms.

Caamir I think you are mistaking the private sector (profitable enterprises) which the public sector - with by definition eat the profit. Private businesses are more succesful unilateraly, so long as businesses marginal profits are greater than the cost in provisioning their own private security, there is profit to be made. Couple that with an open evironment for competition, and you have a recipe for a market - whose in which the success and failiture of entrats will be determined by how well they fare with the competion. And this is what the author is talking about. Untill there is profit to be had for road building or immunising children, such success will not be translated to the public sector. Therefore this is the function of the state, i.e. to generate the wealth by nurturing markets, and collect reasonable tax for its husbandry in order to support the public sector. However, as Benjamin's aricle quotes in its conclusion: The revival of a state is viewed in Somali quarters as a zero-sum game, creating winners and losers in a game with potentially very high stakes. Groups which gain control over a central government will use it to appropriate economic resources at the expense of others, and will use the law, patronage, and the monopoly of legitimate use of violence to protect this advantage. This is the only experience Somalis have had with centralised authority, and it tends to produces risk-aversion and to instigate conflict rather than promote compromise, whenever efforts are made to establish a national government Given our past experience, and trak record of this coming adminstration. this i think is only too true. The reference to a "zero sum game" in the quote is intersting, because it is demonstrated in the recent calls for disarmament. No one will disarm because every one knows if they disarm, they are at the mercy of their rivals -and loose their prestige. Since every knows this, they can colclude that no one will disarm regarless of what they do, so in the end, no one gives up their arms. Not giving your arms is the only *rational* conclusion -- hence Qaranye's remarks a few days ago that the only way he will disarm is via a simmultanious disarmament. Anyhow, why do you believe that the TFG will actually play the role of a government -when it attains a monopoly on violence (a requirement on any central goverment), in anything other than a name- unlike all its predecessors and african counterparts.

Liqaye Fundamentally, i agree with your point on the somali state of mind. And i think this is what your argument boils down to. An attitude that dictates, "if we can't, no one can". This is a subject that i personally find hard to remain objective about. If nothing else, the ICU factions that organised the clean up of mogadishu gave some hope and showed themselves to be capable of implementing a real change. Polically i am secularist, in todays world, i believe that mixing the state with the religion is a recipe for of inequality and short cut to abuse - since the interpertation of divine law is left to humans, all too easily our failability are exposed and excersised. At least with 'man-law' we can question it and change it -- anyhow that aside. For the ICU with their 'fire and brimstone' politics to appeal to me, they did something spectacular. And, i was not the only person. Therefore, even if the havent managed to convince Kismaayo of their intention, they showed an alternative, ideology based path - that was sadly beaten by the morons in the end. This is a step as somalis, we not yet accustomed to - and the reason that i think your analysis is too harsh. Lets just hope, the ICU wont be the last movement that at some point engades a brain.

What the hyper free market paper thinks ------ By dawn the Islamists were gone Jan 4th 2007 | NAIROBI From The Economist print edition After a stunning victory over its Islamist enemies, the government has to act quickly if the country is not to slip back into its usual civil strife ETHIOPIAN military jets flew low over the hot, blue-black waters of Ras Kamboni on January 1st. They were looking for retreating Somali Islamist fighters. Anywhere between 500 and 1,000 hardliners, including foreign fighters and possibly al-Qaeda operatives, had abandoned their defence of Kismayo, a fishing town 150km (93 miles) up the Somali coast from the Kenyan border. Ras Kamboni, a thickly forested tropical island near the border, was a known training camp for the Islamists. The retreat from Kismayo the day before had been sudden. Locals said the fighters had abandoned the front-line after nightfall and “melted into the darkness”. By dawn, they were gone. Islamist field commanders had promised to defend the town against the combined advancing forces of the Somali transitional government and Ethiopia, its main backer. Despite having been almost driven into the sea by 12 days of bludgeoning one-sided engagements, the Islamists promised to turn Kismayo into an Ethiopian cemetery. In reality the landmines, trenches and press-ganged boy fighters were used only to buy time for the most committed Islamists to slip away. They seem to have gone in several directions, some towards Ras Kamboni, others into the salty mangrove swamps or the trackless malaria-infested bush along the Juba river. Ethiopian tanks, which had torn through the Islamist front-lines in the flatlands of central Somalia, could not follow them. The military commander of the Islamists, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, may have travelled to Mecca for the haj (morbidly, some thought, given that he might well be killed before the next pilgrimage). America's Fifth Fleet is patrolling the coast between Mogadishu and Ras Kamboni to prevent Islamists escaping, and special forces may have been landed to track them through the swamps. Kenya has tightened security at its border crossings, though that means little on such a porous border, populated by ethnic Somalis on the Kenyan side. The Kenyans did make a few arrests of fleeing combatants, apparently including a commander from an Ethiopian separatist group and an Eritrean army colonel, each carrying wodges of cash. Ethiopian military helicopters flew low over the hills, but their limited range made it difficult to flush out the Islamists. Their intelligence was also faulty; one helicopter accidentally strafed a Kenyan border post. It has been an extraordinary fortnight in Somalia. From being holed up in Baidoa, surrounded by Islamist forces, the internationally backed transitional government has achieved an astonishingly quick victory over its foes, albeit with Ethiopian tanks, planes and artillery. Having roared of a holy war on Ethiopia in October, the Islamists were shown to be a paper tiger. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the hardliners over-reached themselves, making some serious miscalculations. The first was to make a deal with Eritrea, the local pariah state, for arms and military trainers—some of the arms coming from third parties in the Middle East. That caused Ethiopia, Eritrea's greatest enemy, to step up its support for the weak Somali transitional government in Baidoa. Ethiopia has one of Africa's biggest armies, and, more importantly, an air force that proved to be highly effective in the brief campaign. Eritrean and other Arab meddling was also a factor in tacit American support for the Ethiopian intervention. The second and more serious miscalculation of the hardliners was to dismiss a deal that moderate Islamists were close to making with the transitional government: many moderates thus refused to fight. The third mistake was to attack the transitional government and Ethiopian positions in front of Baidoa on December 19th. That gave Ethiopia the pretext it needed for a full-blooded assault on the Islamists. Their fighters were literally shredded on the battlefield. The bulk of the Islamists retreated to Mogadishu. Street-to-street fighting seemed inevitable when Ethiopia strafed its airport on December 25th. But the Islamists left soon after, saying they wanted to spare the city. The prime minister of the transitional government, Mohamed Gedi, now wants to capture or kill the fleeing hardliners “at any cost”. Although the Islamist collapse was quicker than expected, the danger is that this convincing conventional victory for the Ethiopians may be followed by an Islamist insurgency, drawing in support from militant Muslims around the world. Indeed, it would be hard to find a better recruiting poster for would-be jihadists than the Russian-built tanks of “Christian” Ethiopia bogged down in a Muslim tropical paradise. In a Taliban-like phone call from the bush, an Islamist commander promised that the movement would “rise from the ashes”. It may well. Already there have been several unexplained bomb blasts in Mogadishu, one of them directed at a hotel where Ethiopian army officers are billeted. Two Ethiopian soldiers were shot dead on January 2nd, probably by Islamists. There is a real possibility that what army types call “asymmetrical warfare” will include suicide-bombings, in Kenya as well as in Somalia and Ethiopia. One aim would be to stir up hatred between Christians and Muslims in the region. Among the key commanders now on the run is Aden Hashi Farah Ayro. His network has grown in the last months to perhaps 200 fighters. Mr Ayro is young, around 30, and is thought to have trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. He is wanted for his suspected involvement in the killings of several foreigners in Somalia and Somaliland. He is one of those in charge of the sleeper-cells that are likely to have stayed in Mogadishu and elsewhere, waiting to strike. Ethiopia claims to have killed 3,000 Islamists and wounded a further 5,000. The International Red Cross put the number of wounded at 850, with several hundred dead. The routing of Islamists on the battlefield by secular-minded Somalis backed by Ethiopia is certainly a major embarrassment for al-Qaeda: when faced with a chance to be a martyr in a jihad, nearly all Somalis shied away. But as in Iraq, everything depends on what comes next. The dangers of returning to normal he early signs are not promising. For a start, the warlords are back in town. The single greatest achievement of the Islamic courts was to provide a reasonably peaceful alternative to the chieftains who ruled Mogadishu and other towns, greedily and often demonically, following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, the last time that Somalia had anything resembling a normal government. This is the main reason why the Islamists were able to gather the popular support that they did. Although the Islamists were austere, they delivered security, orderliness and even a sense of pride to many in Mogadishu. Where the warlords had roadblocks, the Islamists had street-cleaners. The outside world's focus on the hardliners and their possible links with al-Qaeda often missed the influence of the moderates, particularly the large traditionalist Sufi organisations. They are among the biggest educators in a largely illiterate country, helping run Mogadishu University, where many of the classes are taught in English. The nominal leader of the Islamists, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, was himself once a school geography teacher. By contrast, feelings about the warlords are unequivocal. “They are absolute b a s t a r d s,” says one Somali watcher, “illiterate, syphilitic, irrational killers.” Some are a little better than others, and several hold ministerial positions in the transitional government, but for the most part they remain motivated solely by money, including what they can make from moving arms and qat, the addictive narcotic leaf on which many Somalis waste their meagre daily salaries. If the transitional government does not stand up to warlordism quickly—and there are few signs that it will—it might be that Mogadishu's few months under “terrorist” Islamist rule will come to be viewed as a golden moment. The return of the warlords may also presage a return to the clan violence that ruined Somalia. To avert this, Mr Gedi has called for three months of martial law in Mogadishu, presumably to be enforced by Ethiopian troops. But his insistence on voluntary disarmament looks optimistic. Most of Somali politics takes place at the sub-clan level, opaque to all but a few insiders, but the broad outlines are clear. The Islamic courts gained their initial support from the H a w i y e clan, which controls Mogadishu. H a w i y e elders feel under-represented in the transitional government. Mr Gedi is a H a w i y e, but despised by his kinsmen. Any national reconciliation has to involve the H a w i y e, so that may mean removing Mr Gedi from office, something that the transitional government and its backers oppose. Mr Gedi—with Ethiopian transport The presence of the Ethiopians gives Somalia a chance to rebuild, but it is a big problem too. Ethiopia deserves credit for the efficiency of its military campaign, which was partly conducted out of self-defence; its victories have eased the threat of an Islamist advance into Ethiopia and across the rest of the Horn. Even so, Somalis object to Ethiopians on their soil in much the same way that Irish citizens might object to a British military advance on Dublin, the more so since the Ethiopians are taken by many Somalis to be doing the bidding of America. A temporary stability guaranteed by the presence of Ethiopian troops offers no prospect of a lasting solution to the country's problems. For all its careful presentation, Ethiopia's involvement could already have fatally undermined the transitional government. At the very least it looks bad for Somali ministers to be ferried around in Ethiopian military helicopters, and to be receiving instructions from the Ethiopian foreign minister. Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, is adamant that his troops will be out of Somalia within weeks. But the timing of such a withdrawal has assumed critical importance. A hasty exit could precipitate clan fighting in Mogadishu. A lengthy stay will give cause to an Islamist insurgency—and provide the insurgents with targets. For now, Mr Zenawi will press home his advantage. Slaughtering Islamists in the mangroves may earn Ethiopia the enmity of global jihadists, but it will win the widely unpopular Mr Zenawi much-needed political support at home and cash from a grateful America. Putting the country back together again But killing the hardline Islamists will not make Somalia any more peaceful. Only a few of those on the run are proper terrorists. Some could return to play a useful role in a government of national unity—perhaps the best chance of preventing Somalia from slipping back into its customary civil strife. Mr Ahmed, a H a w i y e, has useful connections with clerics, clan elders and the young. He might be an asset to a government of national unity, even if, in the first flush of victory, the transitional government might not see the need for that kind of concession. It will also be important to bring in the businessmen who backed the Islamists in return for protection from warlord militias. A few weeks ago an international peacekeeping force seemed an unnecessary provocation. Now it looks like an imperative; it will take months for the transitional government to raise a proper national army to replace the Ethiopians. An intense diplomatic effort is under way in Nairobi and elsewhere to put a force on the ground within weeks. A UN-mandated force drawn from Muslim countries (Indonesia and Malaysia are popular choices among Somalis) could allow Ethiopian troops to leave gracefully. An African Union force may be less effective, given its seeming bias towards Ethiopia, where the organisation has its headquarters. The question is whether such a force can be deployed before clan fighting and an Islamist insurgency take hold. source ----- Admins (miskiin ), i have left in references to a clan by name since this is said in context of the story and is revelent in the bigger picture and is not in anyway used to agitate anyone. I hope this will be seen in the context of the story and no more. Readers - I've resisted highlighting sections, you make up your own mind....

sophist The king is dead, long live the king.. ey

libaax clean up your inbox man....

Liqaye There is something that you are ignoring .. The ICU was defeated militarily via complete incopetence, but their opposition lacks support and the wide spread credibility in the somali community they once enjoyed. The "pacification of mogadishu" cannot be treated as a footnote on wider subject. The UN failed to accomplish it, the USA failed, the TNG failed, the various warlord alliangces failed. .. inshort sofar everybody failed for 16 years, except them. This says one two things: a) they provided something the people needed/wanted and were welcomed to facilitate it, or b) they conquered for it and where the strongest faction and subjugated people to their vision. The reality is that there isnt much truth to the second proposition, since clearly they were maryooley, with gar gaduudan - however, if their conquering meant peace, it seemed a worthwhile sacrifice and people tooks it, hence their rapid spread. Now what all this means is that though their army of ill equiped teenagers may be defeated, they have planted a seed in the somali conciousness. A seed of hope. So i think you are wrong to claim incompetence, they over stretched, believed their own rhetoric and failed, taking down the good that they created. But they left behind (1) a hope that things can change, (2) somalis can be united under more than just the ubiquitous *clan* but an ideology and (3) power can change without blood shed* - this is a tentative point, but a sizable number of their acquisitions were negotiated. These are lessons that have the capacity to change the path of any future somali state. Showing that military might does not always work and that it needs to be tempred with diplomacy was their initial strength, it is also what they forgot. But we haven't forgotten, and that is a much more respectible legacy than any of its predecessors -- one that we should use to hold the current regime accountable

^^ happens to the best of us and its not much of a reflection on his character ... but the point still remains, on what basis was he selected and who would he of competed against for such a post

It is indeed very strange. Considering that some of the brightest Somali talent resides on the US shores, a man with no formal qualifications is chosen to represent us to the worlds largest superpower.

LIQAYE I believe the point goes well and beyond any policy justification. Regardless of what self-serving memory the SL authorities likes to retain, the principle still stands. The aim of posting the picture was to provoke, taunt and humiliate *the people* not to reflect on the policies, the rights or wrongs of the SL regime. As such, it was unjustified, uncalled for and wrong. Further, by entitling it "Somaliland", he was implicitly marking a non-exsiting barrier in which our brethren in the waqooyi are somehow a significant and different other [as marked by their occupation]- that their occupation was somehow dettached from that of the rest of the population, and in some way their humiliation was not reflected in all of us. He did not even have the capacity to understand he was fostering hate and propagating the twisted and evil form of regional stereo-typing and colonial segregation within his people, that he so often proclaims to stand against. caamir Your message is some what confused. If you are saying that: "[..] because other sites have posted it before" so its ok. Then you are advocating morallity by consensus - even in the extreme and this case is extre and wrong. If you are saying the men were working,then if anything deserves respect, it is the wage a man earns for his sweat. But you and I know that the post was not intended to say "look how hard people will work for a living". It aimed to humiliate people for being colonised by the British and mark them as such. Therefore, trying to cover him with a *plausible* explanation scenario does not stand. If as you say, "[you] don't see any measure of satisfaction that we can gain from such depictions", then stand up and tell the man. Dont try to provide him with a possible alibi

Originally posted by General Duke: Somaliland Duke At the point where you justified to yourself that it was acceptable to post a picture of Somali men in serfage, in order to humiliate your Somali brethren, YOU lost the least common trace of dignity we would expect from any Somali. You have shown yourself to have no sense of humility, not a trace of apathy nor an incling of understanding. Your awareness of history, context or irony have long been lost to a sickness of ancestor worship and deaf, dumb and blind faith. I hope the irony of Melez's waraabe will never bare that same ugly fruit you have shown your self so willing to taunt with. To hell with your bull$hit

che lol, start an 'alt -AKA- thread and i'll contribute, everybody usually (and possibly with uncanny insight) ignores the ones i start

G Poiting out that some one thinks you shoudn't have to loose your right a fair life because you are gay, when *you* are cheering mass murderers doesn't quite cut it man.... So put down your shovel and walk away from the shallow grave