Nur, An interesting video indeed! The whole globalization exercise was designed to align world's interests (economic, political and military) with that of the US. US sneezes, the joke goes, and the rest of the world catches cold. This comes handy when you need the world to fund your addictions and criminal wars: even if the world opposes these wars, the bill will be presented one way or the other. How fitting that Paul Kugman, a preacher of the gospel of globalization, should receive the Nobel prize. Personally I believe that this financial crisis has been triggered by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as was the global food crises of this summer. It is rather unfortunate that with all the discussions that are taking place do more to confuse people than inform and suppresses the true nature the crises. If laws of unintended consequences ever existed, watch out for many desperate acts and disastrous things to follow suit!

May 13, 2008 SOMALIA - HIDDEN CATASTROPHE HIDDEN AGENDA somaliaOn May 1, the BBC website reported an attack on Somalia with the words: “Air raid kills Somali militants.” One might think the BBC’s headline would identify the agency responsible for the bombing, but the first few sentences also shed no light: “The leader of the military wing of an Islamist insurgent organisation in Somalia has been killed in an overnight air strike. “Aden Hashi Ayro, al-Shabab's military commander, died when his home in the central town of Dusamareb was bombed. “Ten other people, including a senior militant, are also reported dead.” (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7376760.stm) Only in the fourth sentence, was responsibility ascribed: “A US military spokesman told the BBC that it had attacked what he called a known al-Qaeda target in Somalia.” English teachers often illustrate use of the passive form with the sentence: ‘A man has been arrested.’ The passive is preferable, students are told, because the active form, ‘The police have arrested a man,’ contains a redundancy - the agent is already indicated by the action. There’s no need to actually mention ‘the police’. Likewise, the BBC takes for granted that the US is the world’s policeman; no need to mention it by name. The action of bombing an impoverished Third World country already indicates the agent. This also helps explain why no mention was made of the illegality of this act of aggression. On the rare occasions when the media mention the conflict in Somalia at all, the focus tends to fall on US attempts to hunt down al Qaeda, or on the West’s alleged humanitarian motives. Other priorities were indicated in 1992 when the US political weekly The Nation referred to Somalia as "one of the most strategically sensitive spots in the world today: astride the Horn of Africa, where oil, Islamic fundamentalism and Israeli, Iranian and Arab ambitions and arms are apt to crash and collide." (December 21, 1992) In December 2006, the US backed the invasion of Somalia by its close Ethiopian ally to overthrow the Islamist government, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Christian Ethiopia is a historic enemy of Somalia, which is made up entirely of Sunni Muslims. On December 4 of that year, General John Abizaid, the commander of US forces from the Middle East through Afghanistan, travelled to Addis Ababa to meet the Ethiopian prime minister, Meles Zenawi. Three weeks later, Ethiopian forces crossed into Somalia and Washington launched a series of supportive air strikes. The Guardian quoted a former intelligence officer familiar with the region: "The meeting was just the final handshake.” (Xan Rice and Suzanne Goldenberg, 'The American connection: How US forged an alliance with Ethiopia over invasion,' The Guardian, January 13, 2007) Political analyst James Petras commented: “Somalia... was invaded by mercenaries by Ethiopia, trained, financed, armed and directed by US military advisers.” (Petras, ‘The Imperial System: Hierarchy, Networks and Clients - The Case of Somalia,’ Dissident Voice, February 18, 2007; http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Feb07/Petras18.htm) USA Today reported in January 2007 that the US had “quietly poured weapons and military advisers into Ethiopia,” which had received nearly $20 million in US military aid since late 2002. The report added: “The [somalia] intervention is controversial in Ethiopia, where the Meles government has become increasingly repressive, said Chris Albin-Lackey, an African researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Meles government has limited the power of the opposition in parliament and arrested thousands. A government inquiry concluded that security forces fatally shot, beat or strangled 193 people who protested election fraud in 2005.” (http://www.usatoday.com/news/ world/2007-01-07-ethiopia_x.htm) Petras noted that, having driven the last of the warlords from Mogadishu and most of the countryside, the ICU had established a government which was welcomed by the great majority of Somalis and covered over 90% of the population: “The ICU was a relatively honest administration, which ended warlord corruption and extortion. Personal safety and property were protected, ending arbitrary seizures and kidnappings by warlords and their armed thugs. The ICU is a broad multi-tendency movement that includes moderates and radical Islamists, civilian politicians and armed fighters, liberals and populists, electoralists and authoritarians. Most important, the Courts succeeded in unifying the country and creating some semblance of nationhood, overcoming clan fragmentation.” (Petras, op. cit) Martin Fletcher wrote in the Times of the ICU: “I am no apologist for the courts. Their leadership included extremists with dangerous intentions and connections. But for six months they achieved the near-impossible feat of restoring order to a country that appeared ungovernable... "The courts were less repressive than our Saudi Arabian friends. They publicly executed two murderers (a fraction of the 24 executions in Texas last year), and discouraged Western dancing, music and films, but at least people could walk the streets without being robbed or killed. That trumps most other considerations. Ask any Iraqi. “The Islamists have now been replaced - with Washington's connivance - by a weak, fragile Government that was created long before the courts won power, that includes the very warlords they defeated and relies for survival on Somalia's worst enemy.” (Fletcher, ‘The Islamists were the one hope for Somalia,’ The Times, January 8, 2007) It was clear to many commentators that the Ethiopian invasion would prove disastrous. Three months later, the Daily Telegraph reported: “A new humanitarian crisis is rapidly taking shape in the Horn of Africa where eight days of heavy fighting in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, has forced about 350,000 people to flee. “Artillery fire has devastated large areas of the city, forcing about one third of its population to leave. Yesterday Mogadishu's main hospital was shelled. “The plains around Mogadishu are filled with refugees enduring desperate conditions with little food or shelter. The fighting began when Somalia's internationally recognised government, supported by Ethiopian troops, launched an offensive against insurgents.” (Mike Pflanz, ‘Fighting brings fresh misery to Somalia,’ Telegraph, April 26, 2007) The Telegraph cited a British aid worker: "They are bombing anything that moves.” Catherine Weibel, from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees was also quoted: "Everyone we are talking to says this is the worst situation they have seen in 16 years since the last government fell.” The War On Terror... And The Real Concern The preferred media framework for making sense of US actions closely parallels cold war mythology. We are to believe the US is passionately, even blindly, battling ideological enemies in an effort to protect itself and the West. Guardian columnist Jonathan Freedland could be relied upon to paint this picture of events: “A fortnight ago the Ethiopians entered Somalia to topple the Islamist forces who had just taken Mogadishu. Americans dislike that Islamist movement, fearing it has the makings of an African Taliban, so they backed the Ethiopians to take it out. According to Patrick Smith, the editor of Africa Confidential, the war on terror is fast becoming a cold war for the 21st century, with the US finding proxy allies to fight proxy enemies in faraway places.” (Freedland, ‘Like a deluded compulsive gambler, Bush is fuelling a new cold war,’ The Guardian, January 10, 2007) If this sounds curiously simplistic, even childish, it is. In fact, the cold war, like the “war on terror”, was far less ideological, far more prosaic, than journalists like Freedland claim. Historian Howard Zinn has, for example, commented on the Vietnam war, which the BBC would have us believe “was America's attempt to stop Communists from toppling one country after another in South East Asia” (http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/ documentaries/2008/04/080327_mylai_partone.shtml): “When I read the hundreds of pages of the Pentagon Papers entrusted to me by [military analyst] Daniel Ellsberg, what jumped out at me were the secret memos from the National Security Council. Explaining the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia, they spoke bluntly of the country's motives as a quest for ‘tin, rubber, oil.’” (http://www.zcommunications.org/znet/viewArticle/17049) Ethiopia’s invasion coincided with the Pentagon's goal of creating a new ‘Africa Command’ to deal with what the Christian Science Monitor described as: “Strife, oil, and Al Qaeda.” Richard Whittle wrote: “The creation of the new command will be more than an exercise in shuffling bureaucratic boxes, experts say. The US government's motives include countering Al Qaeda's known presence in Africa, safeguarding future oil supplies, and competing with China, which has been courting African governments in its own quest for petroleum, they suggest.” (Richard Whittle, ‘Pentagon to train a sharper eye on Africa,’ January 5, 2007; http://www.csmonitor.com /2007/0105/p02s01-usmi.html) As Andy Rowell and James Marriott have noted, the key fact is that “some 30 per cent of America's oil will come from Africa in the next ten years". (Rowell and Marriott, A Game as Old as Empire - The Secret World of Economic Hit Men and the Web of Global Corruption, edited by Steven Hiatt, Berrett-Koehler, 2007, p.118) The US has plans for nearly two-thirds of Somalia's oil fields to be allocated to the US oil companies Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips. The US hopes Somalia will line up as an ally alongside Ethiopia and Djibouti, where the US has a military base. This alliance would give America powerful leverage close to the major energy-producing regions. Chatham House, a British think tank of the independent Royal Institute of International Affairs, commented on US and Ethiopian intervention last year: "In an uncomfortably familiar pattern, genuine multilateral concern to support the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Somalia has been hijacked by unilateral actions of other international actors - especially Ethiopia and the United States - following their own foreign policy agendas.” (http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/15545) Catastrophic Crisis This ‘hijacking’ has had truly appalling consequences. More than one million people have been made internal refugees, and the UN food security unit warned last week that 3.5 million people, half of Somalia's population, are facing famine. Fighting has turned Mogadishu into a ghost town. About 700,000 people have fled – out of a population of up to 1.5 million. The International Committee of the Red Cross describes Somalia’s crisis as “catastrophic.” (http://www.democracynow.org/2008/5 /5/thousands_of_somalis_protest_deadly_us) Soaring food prices have driven thousands of protestors onto the streets of the capital, Mogadishu. On May 5, Professor Abdi Samatar, a professor of geography and global studies at the University of Minnesota, told the US website Democracy Now: “Well, what you see in Mogadishu over the last year and a half or so, since the Ethiopian invasion, which was sanctioned by the US government, has destroyed virtually all the life-sustaining economic systems which the population have built without the government for the last fifteen, sixteen years.” (http://www.democracynow.org/2008/5/ 5/thousands_of_somalis_protest_deadly_us) A kilo of rice, which previously sold at around seventy US cents, now costs as much as $2.50. The average day’s income for anyone fortunate enough to have a job is less than a dollar a day. The gap between incomes and the cost of food primarily imported from overseas means that millions of people cannot afford to eat. Last week, Amnesty International reported that it had obtained scores of accounts of killings by Ethiopian troops that Somalis have described as "slaughtering [somalis] like goats." In one case, "a young child's throat was slit by Ethiopian soldiers in front of the child's mother.” (http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR52/006/2008/en/1162a792-186e-11dd-92b4-6b0c2ef9d02f/afr5 20062008eng.pdf) Amnesty reported that during sweeps through neighbourhoods, Ethiopian forces placed snipers on roofs, and civilians were unable to move about for fear of being shot: “While some sniper fire appeared to be directed at suspected members of anti-TFG [Transitional Federal Government] armed groups, reports indicate that civilians were also frequently caught in indiscriminate fire. In many cases families were forced to carry their wounded to medical care in wheelbarrows and on donkeys because ambulance drivers would not operate their vehicles due to general insecurity, including sniper fire. As a result, it has become very difficult for civilians to access medical care.” The British government has consistently downplayed both the gravity of the crisis and the murderous behaviour of Ethiopian forces. In the Foreign Office's latest annual human rights assessment of Somalia there was no mention of Ethiopia, let alone the conduct of its troops. No surprise - Ethiopia is one of the largest recipients of UK aid in Africa and, as discussed, is an important regional ally. The Media Follow The Government Lead Predictably, the government’s strategic silence is reflected in press reporting. In the last year, the words ‘Somalia’ and ‘famine’ have appeared in a grand total of seven British broadsheet newspaper articles discussing the topic. Of the few references to the latest US attack in the British press over the last week, only the Independent and the Sunday Times made briefs references to Somalia’s humanitarian crisis. The Independent noted that life for Somalia's nine million residents has become “unbearable”. The Guardian merely quoted Reuters: “Western security services have long seen Somalia as a haven for militants. Warlords overthrew dictator Siad Barre in 1991, casting the country into chaos.” (Reuters, ‘US airstrike kills head of al-Qaida in Somalia,’ Guardian International, May 2, 2008) The Amnesty report was mentioned in three broadsheet newspapers. Of these, the Guardian failed to mention the US role at all. Ian Black commented: “Ethiopia sent in troops in December 2006 and ejected them. Since then, Mogadishu has been caught up in a guerrilla war between the government and its Ethiopian allies and the Islamist insurgents. Up to 1 million Somalians are internally displaced.” (Ian Black, ‘Somali refugees speak of horrific war crimes,’ The Guardian, May 7, 2008) By contrast, a short Independent piece led with the US role: “Amnesty International has called for the role of the United States in Somalia to be investigated, following publication of a report accusing its allies of committing war crimes.” (http://www.independent.co.uk/news /world/politics/call-for-inquiry-into-us -role-in-somalia-822166.html) Amnesty's Dave Copeman was cited: "There are major countries that have significant influence. The US, EU and European countries need to exert that influence to stop these attacks." This is the sole reference to Copeman’s comments in the entire national UK press. Professor Samatar commented on the latest US attack: “t’s quite befuddling to Somalis and many other peace-loving people around the world as to why the United States has chosen to bomb people who are desperate for assistance and food, and who have been dislocated and traumatised by an Ethiopian invasion, a country that has its own people under tyranny in itself.” The Truth Of ‘Our Leaders‘ With our shared responsibility for the catastrophe in Somalia buried out of sight, the Telegraph reported this week: “Gordon Brown urged the Burmese authorities to give ‘unfettered access’ to humanitarian agencies. ‘We now estimate that two million people face famine or disease as a result of the lack of co-operation of the Burmese authorities. This is completely unacceptable,’ he said.” (Alan Brown, ‘Burmese officials “are seizing emergency aid and selling it for profit”,’ Daily Telegraph, May 13, 2008) The great lie is that we are represented by people like Gordon Brown, described as ‘our leaders’. Because they represent us and we are not monsters, we are to believe that ‘our leaders’ are seeking to resolve problems afflicting humanity in general, while working more specifically to protect us from terrorism and other threats. In other words, we are to believe that ‘our leaders’, like us, are rational, compassionate and well-intentioned. The truth is very different. In fact we are free to chose from parties and leaders who all represent the same interests of concentrated state-corporate power - the tiny fraction of the population that owns much of the country and runs its business. Crucially, ’our leaders’ front a political system that has an overwhelming advantage in high-tech military power. They are all too willing to use this power to convulse countries with bloodshed when doing so supports their lucrative version of economic ’order’. Iraq is the obvious example - Somalia is another. ’Our leaders’ rule in the name of democracy, but they act in the interests of a narrow, extremely violent kleptocracy. SUGGESTED ACTION The goal of Media Lens is to promote rationality, compassion and respect for others. If you do write to journalists, we strongly urge you to maintain a polite, non-aggressive and non-abusive tone. Ask the following journalists why they are not doing more to expose Western responsibility for the catastrophe in Somalia. Write to Ian Black Email: ian.black@guardian.co.uk Write to Simon Kelner, editor of the Independent Email: s.kelner@independent.co.uk Write to Alan Rusbridger, editor of the Guardian Email: alan.rusbridger@guardian.co.uk Please send a copy of your emails to us Email: editor@medialens.org --------------------------- SOURCE: http://www.medialens.org/alerts/index.php

We are Muslims because... Allah CALLED and we ANSWERED Allah STATED and we AFFIRMED Allah DEMANDED and we COMPLIED How? We have always believed and followed His Books and Prophets (pbut) with absolute conviction and complete certainty in all ages of human existence. What about you?

A/c all, Muslims don't always realise the importance of conducting all their commercial interests in the strict sense of Islamic ethical and moral sphere. If all or most financial/banking institutions of the Muslim world adhered to Islamic principles (especially in the current globalised capital markets) irrespective of their economic status globally, we can only speculate the possibilities of past historical actions and consequences following such course of event repeating itself at whatever rate... As long as initiatives continue to come fro non-muslims rather than Muslims, I see no reasons for optimism yet. No rational (capitalist) banking institutions would give up the right to "create" money out of nothing. As for the Muslim world, we can only pray to Allah to ease our way - and how long the way! W/S.

A/C, I ope you're all in good spirit; we ask Allah forgiveness for all our shortcomings. Brother Nur, don't leave out of the second part, insha'Allah, the slave (pbuh) who remained within the "coverge area" against all odds when the angels asked Allah about a signal that they detected. Specially the reasons Allah gave for answering that signal is related to this topic. I've been away for few months for very good reasons, but am very glad to see tht you're all doing very well; maasha'Allah! W/S, S.O.S

Yaa sh. Nur, Good and evil are two opposites whose contradictions become apparent when they both seek to manifest –in the case of Somalia, the world shall find no harm as log evil prevails, but daring to contradict in favour of the good equals invoking shock and awe bombardments from land, sea or sky, on woman, children, animals, trees, you name it! Allah Almighty did say in His glorious Qur'an "wakaan-al-kaafiru calaa Rabbihii thahiiraa." Therefore it's the nature evil to oppose the good, in fact, their Lord as the above verse indicates. So I ask myself: I know Islam opposes evil, but do we Muslims oppose evil too? For if we indeed did, it would mean more HAQ (i.e. good) manifesting in the world, hence challenging current hegemony of evil in the world, meaning less suffering for Muslims everywhere, etc..

YEMEN: ON THE BRINK OF SECTARIAN WAR Shi'ite Insurgency in Washington's Strategic Red Sea Ally by Mohamed Al-Azaki, WW4 REPORT He heard the military helicopters coming, Dr. Ali al-Wadiee told reporters in Al-Ruzamat, a small village situated amid the volcanic mountains of Yemen's remote north, near the border with Saudi Arabia. "There were several loud explosions," he said, but the doctor wasn't aware of how many helicopters dropped their payloads in al-Naqa'ah, just on the Yemeni side of the border. In Saada province, 240 kilometers north of the capital Sana'a, nearly 700 people have been killed as fighting re-ignited in late January between Yemen's army and Zaidi Shiite insurgents. Formed by tribal chief and Zaidi cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, killed in combat with government forces in 2004, the rebel group is known as al-Shabab al-Moumin (the Youthful Believers). Their rebellion has flared even as the government has started to pacify the Sunni insurgency elsewhere in the country. Earlier this year they threatened to kill members of the small Jewish community in Saada if they did not leave the country within 10 days. Al-Wadiee was present in a small government medical center with four health workers, when more than 100 dead were received in a period of three days March 5-7. "About 90 of the dead were in the Yemeni army, and the others were in the Shiite insurgents," he said. At the outskirts of al-Ruzamat, some 10 kilometers south of al-Naqa'ah, in this same region of northern Yemen, a metal sign hanging from a shiny new chain reads: "Warning: Access to this area is forbidden for security reasons. The Yemeni Army." The current conflict represents the third government crackdown in Saada province since 2004, where the Shiite rebellion started out as a small protest movement. Rebel clerics have denounced the government's ties with the United States and demanded an end to its gradual shift to Western-style social and democratic reforms. Government forces seem to have emerged victorious from the latest fighting, having crushed the main rebel strongholds in the Razih and Al-Shagaf areas of Al-Naqa'ah. But Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the new leader of the Shiite insurgency and brother of the slain founder, threatens to widen the circle of armed confrontations to areas outside of Saada. He is said to have hundreds of armed rebels under his command, and pledges to continue fighting the government if it doesn't cut its alliance with America. Just across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia and astride the Red Sea's strategic Bab-el-Mandeb choke-point, Yemen has received strong US military support for counter-terrorism programs in recent years. Al-Thawra, the government newspaper in Sana'a, reported on Sept. 26, 2006 that US Ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski declared Washington's support for the Yemeni government in its confrontation with al-Houthi's insurgency. The rebel group was formed three years ago, when Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi took up arms under the slogan: "God the Greatest... Death to America and Israel...Victory for Islam and Muslims." The government is determined to crush the uprising. But observers fear it may not be able to overcome al-Houthi's group, which aims to install an Iranian-style Islamic theocracy and many compare to Lebanon's Hezbollah. "They refused all offers by the government to disarm and form a political party to live in peace," says Abdullah al-Faqih, a professor at Sana'a University. "I think the rebels have this time lost all grounds for negotiations with the government." To isolate the rebels, says al-Faqih, Yemeni authorities have blocked communications including mobile phone services in the restive northern province. There are also fears of renewed targeting of Western interests in the country. In March, the Interior Ministry temporarily tightened security around foreign embassies against possible terror attacks. "Here in Yemen, tribe, religion and weapons are the most dangerous things in the hands of tribesmen against the government," said Abdul-Elah Haidar, a researcher on terrorism issues at the Saba News Agency and a regular columnist for the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi. "And when a group combines the three, it can easily become a substantial political force." Iran Seeking Proxies? This escalation of violence has been a frightening setback for the Yemeni government, which had beat back the threats from al Qaeda and was beginning to benefit from the cautious return of tourists and foreign investors. Lacking large oil reserves or any modern manufacturing facilities, Yemen has nonetheless drawn terrorist attacks: the September 2006 bombing of American- and French-owned oil facilities in the eastern provinces of Marib and Hadarmout; the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Aden; and the October 2002 bombing of the French supertanker Limburg. These have cost the government millions as insurance premiums for ship owners have soared, causing many of them to refuse to dock at Yemen's ports. The attacks have also frightened off thousands of mainly European tourists who come to admire the country's unique ancient mud-brick cities and amazing landscape. Most Yemenis believe that Iran backs the Shiite Muslim rebels in the north of the Sunni-dominated country. The Zaidi sect makes up about a fifth of the Yemen's population. Also known as "Fiver Shia," it is actually a small offshoot of the Ismaili schism. The Zaidis recognize only five imams from Imam Ali, Prophet Mohammed's grandson, while the mainline Shia of Iran's mullahs recognizes 12. President Ali Abdullah Saleh said in January that some countries were supplying al-Houthi's group with weapons and financial support, but did not name them. Tariq al-Shami, spokesman for President Saleh's ruling party, the General People's Congress (GPC), says Iranian security officials have told Yemen that some Iranian religious institutions were supporting the rebels, but they added that al-Houthi's group was not backed by the Tehran government. "There are Iranian religious institutions which are providing support to the Shiite insurgency in Yemen," Shami recently posited on the GPC's Web site. In March 2006, Yemen freed more than 600 Zaidi rebels as part of an amnesty to end two years of clashes that had killed several hundred soldiers and rebels alike. But "the Houthis have used a period of truce with the state to buy heavy weapons using foreign support money," Shami charges. The clashes in Saada are causing great hardship for the local inhabitants. "Many houses have already been destroyed, students no longer go to school, agricultural farms have been damaged and work has come to a standstill," said Khalid al-Anesi, director of Yemen's non-governmental National Organization for Defending Freedoms and Rights. Military sources say that al-Houthi's three-year fight against the government has cost the country an estimated $800 million, with extensive damage to property. But the greatest threat is that the Shi'ite revolt could re-ignite conflicts among other sectors of the populace. Many in Yemen refuse to operate within a political system that they see as invalid, says Haidar, leaving the potential for factional warfare. "Al-Houthi's group is trying to copy Iraq's sectarian strife in Yemen," he warns. Jihad Materials Thrive in Markets Sunni Muslims are a majority in Yemen, a nation of 19 million, and it is the ancestral homeland of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. It is radical Sunnis who are circulating gruesome videos depicting murdering and mutilating "infidels" as part of a recruiting drive. At one roadside stand, a video salesman hawked jihadi movies as radical songs blared out from speakers, with such lyrics as: "We will make jihad against the pigs"—meaning Jews. The long-bearded buyers thronging his stall on the sidelines of a sunset prayer's sermon in the Yemeni capital Sana'a were part of a gathering organized by the radical Sunni wing of the Yemen Reform Group, also known as Islah, a powerful opposition party. "Here is the latest movie of the beheadings," the salesman told his customers, as they peered into titles including "Slaughter of American Soldiers in Iraq," "Al Qaeda Victories in Fallujah in Iraq" and "Killing of Traitors in Afghanistan." In Yemen, compelled to join the US-led global war on terrorism after 9-11, anger has risen over what many clerics see as an attempt by the America and the West to repress Muslims in Iraq, Afghanistan and around the world. But that is only part of the story. Yemen also faces a battle with its own demons, as militant attacks and sectarian violence have killed thousands since 9-11. On March 26, four people were injured in a riot in the Yemeni port city of Belhaf, allegedly after a French engineer from the Total oil company desecrated a copy of the Koran by throwing it on the floor. That same day, at the other north end of the country in restive Saada, a French and a British student, both Muslims, were killed and several others wounded in an attack by Shi'ite rebels on a Sunni religious school. Yemen has come under increasing pressure from the US to take harsher action against the illicit trade in weapons, with experts warning the country is becoming a key transfer point for militant groups throughout the Middle East and Horn of Africa. Mohammed Kuhaly, political analyst and lead researcher of the local NGO Political Development Program, says there is "no haze or cloudiness" about who the figures are behind the booming arms traffic. "They are al-Qaeda's sympathizers of the political Islamist Islah party." President Saleh has banned several radical religious schools linked to Islah. But militant literature—even how-to manuals on guerilla war—continue to be widely available. One Islamist bookshop owner in Sana'a said such material could always be arranged to trusted customers. It is certainly not difficult to find the words of one of Yemen's most radical voices. His message of extremist Islam can be heard outside a number of well-known mosques. Sheikh Hazza Al-Maswary, a key representative of the Islah party, has kept a low profile recently because of pressure from Yemen's security apparatus, despite having a seat in the national parliament. But outside Mujahid mosque in Sana'a, his recorded voice blares out from speakers among the shops selling perfumes, head caps, religious books, cassettes and films after Friday prayers. "Curse on the Christian Americans and Jews... They are killers, and we will make jihad against them, we will rob them of their peace," legislator Al-Maswary thunders. "Muslims must not follow the Christians and Jews, as God says he will not accept anyone but Muslims." Not all Yemeni preachers are spreading messages of jihad. Some are actively opposing radicalism among their followers. Many exert efforts to bring a negotiated end to armed tribal conflicts, and help to bring a measure of peace to restive areas. Yemen's Sunni insurgency in the remote interior provinces of Abyan and Marib opened in late 2001, when tribal leaders refused to hand al-Qaeda suspects over to the government. President Bush subsequently ordered some 200 military advisors to the country, and in November 2002 a CIA drone-launched missile attack killed six al-Qaeda suspects traveling in a car in Marib. Since then the insurgency has died out, but observers now fear the new Shi'ite militancy may upset the fragile political balance, and bring sectarian war to this mountainous and strategic Arab country. -- Mohamed Al-Azaki is an independent Yemeni journalist and researcher at the SABA Center for Strategic Studies, based in Sana'a.

Indeed, Ethiopia's notoriety when it comes to dungeons and underground torture rooms predate the infamous Guantanamo by many decades. Even pregnant women and children are being detained, and for some time now, friends and family members of Bashir Makhtal have been trying to secure his release. However, there are hundreds of people suffering the same fate for many years and with no western passports, they're even worse off! May Allah ease their pain.

It looks like that "Government Forces" losing ground to " Islamic Militia" while the US Ambassador in Nairobi is " Concerned" that the "Job" by the "Government Forces" was not wrapped up in two days as expected. Nur, you probably know more than anyone else that this "concerned" US Ambassador in Nairobi is de facto president of Somalia. I personally think that he's frustrated to witness his plans derail towards a point of no return. Welcome back btw, your insightful analysis has greatly been missed by many.

SOMALIA - A TRIP DOWN MEMORY HOLE LANE Following recent American airstrikes in Somalia, the words ‘Black Hawk Down’ have been mentioned dozens of times across the UK national press, and more than 100 times in the US press, over the last month. The words refer, of course, to the Hollywood film based on the October 3, 1993 raid by US forces on Mogadishu, the Somali capital. Press coverage has focused on two aspects of that raid: the claim that it was part of a humanitarian mission motivated to relieve famine, and the fact that 18 US rangers lost their lives. With near-perfect consistency across both the US and UK press, other facts and claims have simply been ignored. Noam Chomsky has reported the body count from US fire in Somalia in 1993: "The official estimate was 6-10,000 Somali casualties in the summer of 1993 alone, two-thirds women and children." (Chomsky, The New Military Humanism - Lessons From Kosovo, Pluto Press, 1999, p.68) Charles Maynes, the editor of Foreign Policy, wrote in 1995: “CIA officials privately conceded that the US military may have killed from 7,000 to 10,000 Somalis.” (Maynes, Foreign Policy, Spring 1995) In one of two sentences on the subject we have found in the entire English language press this year, the Independent on Sunday last weekend described how the Black Hawk Down raid resulted in “the deaths of an estimated 1,000 Somalis that day”. (Steve Bloomfield, ‘Black Hawk Down: the untold story,’ The Independent on Sunday, January 21, 2007) Estimates were vague, the New York Times reported in 1993, as ”Somali casualties have been overlooked by reporters”. (Eric Schmitt, 'Somali war casualties may be 10,000,' New York Times, December 8, 1993) Lt. Gen. Anthony Zinni, who commanded the operation, declared: “I'm not counting bodies... I'm not interested.” (Chomsky, op. cit) Following recent US airstrikes, the Independent reported a local MP in Somalia who said there had been many large-scale killings of civilians by the Americans and their Ethiopian allies: "The number of the dead we have confirmed until now is 150 dead. But, every day, new reports are coming in and that number is expected to rise.” (Kim Sengupta, 'US strikes on Somalia "missed target",' The Independent, January 12, 2007) Burying The Background With The Bodies The United States had previously backed the Siad Barre dictatorship in Somalia (1969-1991) which bore direct responsibility for the famine the US was ostensibly intervening to relieve. Jim Naureckas of Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting noted in 1993 that the Somali clan hardest hit by the famine, the *********, was the group living adjacent to the lands of Siad Barre's clan, the *******, and consequently had much of its fertile land stolen during the dictatorship: “It was this political conflict, not natural disaster, that created the desperate condition of many of the starvation victims seen on TV,“ Naureckas wrote. (Naureckas, ‘Media on the Somalia Intervention - Tragedy Made Simple,’ FAIR, March 1993, www.fair.org/index.php?page=1211)[/url] ABC's Peter Jennings reported that Siad Barre had received "almost $200 million in military aid and almost half a billion in economic aid". (July 12, 1992) Jennings explained why the US ignored Siad Barre's corruption and human rights abuses: "To Washington's satisfaction, he was more than willing to keep [soviet-allied] Ethiopia tied down in a debilitating war... Millions of innocent civilians paid the price." On the MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (February 12, 1992), Holly Burkhalter of Human Rights Watch noted that at the same time that Washington was claiming it was trying to moderate Siad Barre with $50 million in "security related assistance," the dictator "engaged in a counterinsurgency effort against the North that by our calculations left about 50,000 Somali civilians dead, [and] forced a half million... Somali civilians across the borders into the desert of Ethiopia." In 1992, The Nation referred to Somalia as "one of the most strategically sensitive spots in the world today: astride the Horn of Africa, where oil, Islamic fundamentalism and Israeli, Iranian and Arab ambitions and arms are apt to crash and collide." (December 21, 1992) Indeed Somalia contains mineral deposits and potential oil reserves and had been the site of oil exploration by companies such as Amoco, Chevron and Conoco. Naureckas found that not until six weeks into the 1993 US intervention (Operation Restore Hope) did a journalist for a major media outlet report on the close relationship between Conoco and the US intervention force. This was Mark Fineman of the Los Angeles Times, who wrote: “Far beneath the surface of the tragic drama of Somalia, four major U.S. oil companies are quietly sitting on a prospective fortune in exclusive concessions to explore and exploit tens of millions of acres of the Somali countryside. “That land, in the opinion of geologists and industry sources, could yield significant amounts of oil and natural gas if the U.S.-led military mission can restore peace to the impoverished East African nation.” (Fineman, Los Angeles Times, ’The oil factor in Somalia,’ January 18, 1993) Fineman added: “Conoco, whose tireless exploration efforts in north-central Somalia reportedly had yielded the most encouraging prospects just before Siad Barre's fall, permitted its Mogadishu corporate compound to be transformed into a de facto American embassy a few days before the U.S. Marines landed in the capital, with Bush's special envoy using it as his temporary headquarters. In addition, the president of the company's subsidiary in Somalia won high official praise for serving as the government's volunteer ‘facilitator’ during the months before and during the U.S. intervention.” Fineman noted that the close relationship between Conoco and the US military had led many Somalis and foreign development experts to compare the Somalia operation to a smaller version of Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 US-led assault to drive Iraq from Kuwait and to protect Kuwaiti oil reserves: "‘They sent all the wrong signals when Oakley [the US envoy] moved into the Conoco compound,’ said one expert on Somalia who worked with one of the four major companies as they intensified their exploration efforts in the country in the late 1980s. ‘It's left everyone thinking the big question here isn't famine relief but oil - whether the oil concessions granted under Siad Barre will be transferred if and when peace is restored,’ the expert said. ‘It's potentially worth billions of dollars, and believe me, that's what the whole game is starting to look like.’" Below we sample major US and British media outlets to give an idea of how journalists across the US-UK spectrum are burying the truth of US motives and killing in Somalia. Where we have not cited mention of Somali casualties it is because they were not discussed. Prostrate Propagandists Associated Press: “It was the first overt military action by the U.S. in Somalia since it led a U.N. force that intervened in the 1990s in an effort to fight famine. The mission led to clashes between U.N. forces and Somali warlords, including the battle, chronicled in the book and movie ‘Black Hawk Down,’ that killed 18 U.S. soldiers. (January 10, 2007) The Times: “This was America's first overt operation in the Horn of Africa since 1993, when it was part of the ill-fated United Nations mission to relieve famine. That venture led to clashes with Somali warlords, including the infamous Black Hawk Down incident that left 18 US servicemen dead.” (January 10, 2007) Sunday Times: “America led a United Nations force into Somalia in an effort to fight famine. The mission saw clashes between UN forces and Somali warlords, including the humiliating Black Hawk Down battle of 1993 that killed 18 US soldiers.” (January 14, 2007) Daily Telegraph: “After the disastrous ‘Black Hawk Down’ intervention in 1992-93, when a mob killed 18 US Rangers in Somalia's capital Mogadishu, no administration would consider sending troops to the anarchic country.” (January 10, 2007) The Guardian: “The US airstrikes... were the first overt military action Washington has taken in the country since 1994, the year after bloody clashes between UN forces and warlords and the grim Black Hawk Down battle which left 18 US servicemen dead.” (January 10, 2007) The Independent: “It was the first known direct US military intervention in Somalia since the disastrous ‘Black Hawk Down’ incident in 1993 in which 18 American Rangers died while on a mission to capture aides of Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed in Mogadishu.” (January 10, 2007) Washington Times: “It was the first overt U.S. military strike in Somalia since 1994, shortly after Army Rangers and Delta Force commandos battled Islamist militants and clans in a 1993 street battle immortalized in the book and movie ‘Black Hawk Down.’ The battle cost 18 American lives and prompted President Clinton to withdraw all U.S. forces.” (January 10, 2007) Washington Post: “It was the first acknowledged U.S. military action inside Somalia since 1994, when President Bill Clinton withdrew U.S. troops after a failed operation in Mogadishu that led to the deaths of 18 Army Rangers and Delta Force special operations soldiers.” (January 9, 2007) New York Times: “’They're just trying to get revenge for what we did to them in 1993,’ said Deeq Salad Mursel, a taxi driver, referring to the infamous ‘Black Hawk Down’ episode in which Somali gunmen killed 18 American soldiers and brought down two American helicopters during an intense battle in Mogadishu.” (January 10, 2007) Corporate greed is not allowed to be a key factor explaining US-UK policy in the Third World. The lethal consequences for ordinary people are also downplayed to the point of invisibility. It is worth repeatedly mentioning the 18 US soldiers who died on October 3, 1993, but not the 1,000 Somalis, including many civilians, who lost their lives. Recognition of the truth would inflame public opinion and risk generating resistance to the goals of the corporate system of which the mainstream media is such an integral part. http://www.medialens.org/alerts/07/070123_memory_hole_lane.php

Abyssinian Invasion: Reminder of a Seven Century-Old Animosity Said Alinuri 17 Jan, 2007 When some concerned Ethiopians are asked why do they have a problem with political developments in Somalia, usually they refer to security issues or the political events in the Horn of Africa over the last four decades. Most of the analysts of the problem in Somalo-Ethiopian relations, however, consider over a century-old antagonism. But some others go beyond that and point out older events. This paper is a humble attempt to provide a picture for the roots of an age-old conflict between Christian Abyssinia and Muslim Somalia at general, and the ongoing invasion at particular. But before I plunge into the subject, let me give some background the Islam in Somalia. The Spread of the Islam in Somalia Within a few decades of its birth, Islam reached Somalia. Documents from Zayla’a (Awdal) and Banadir, both ancient centers of civilization, indicate that migrants from western Arabia settled in these regions in the period of khalifa Umar bin Khattab (A.D. 634-644) and khalifa AbdulMalik bin Marwan (A.D. 688-708). Moreover, Arabic inscriptions from Muqdisho (Mogadishu) refer to the death of four Muslims from A.D. 719 to 767, at least two of whom had immigrated from Hijaz. After this initial advent, Islam became stronger in the coastal centers and gained substantial footholds in the interior during the period of 850-1000 A.D. The Jabarti community, a Muslim Somali, expanded from the northern coastal regions of Zayla’a and Sanāg around the middle of 9th century. Zayla’a became a well known place by outside Muslims after 850, a sign of Muslim presence in the city. In fact, the Awdali document, written around 1290, states that descendents of one of those settlers in the period of khalifa Umar founded the Emirate of Shawa in A.D. 896. The Emirate of Shawa appears to have been an offshoot of the Empire of Awdal, variously known as Jabarti or Zayla’a. Few decades later, however, Al-Masâudi wrote that there was a Muslim community in Zaylaâ, albeit of a minority status. The regions of Zaylaâ, Sanāg and later Harar, were the centers of dispersal for the founders of many Muslim communities to further reach out to outlying provinces. As a result, the indigenous populations of the vast land between Ras Aseyr (Guardafui) in the east and Shawa and Bali in the west embraced Islam as their religion. A chain of political units by ethnically related communities evolved in this belt throughout the first quarter of the second millennium. As regards the regions of Shawa and its eastern neighbor, Awfāt, accounts recorded from the 12th century onwards show that, besides the Jabarti sub-clans of Harla, Gidaya-Geri, and Walasmaâ, the indigenous Awdali clans of Warjeh, Wargar, Gabal, Hagar, Shawa, Hargay and Argobba had been converted to Islam. In the south west, many Arabic inscriptions commemorating the deaths of individual Muslims from A.D. 1000 to 1267 make clear the early existence of Islam in the area between Harar and Hadiya. In addition to the linguistic evidence, the tradition of the region adequately corroborates these historical accounts. A sizable section of the current population of Hadiya, Gurage, and Arusa regions of southern Ethiopia, are descendents of Somali settlers. In fact, many of the inhabitants of these regions trace their ancestry to sub-clans of Guardafui-Harar prominent in the early period of the Awdali Empire. The Somalis, along with the two small Semitic-speaking communities of Adari and Argobba, constituted the Awdali population. Bali, the southernmost province of greater Awdal, was a meeting point of the northern and the southern strongholds of ever-growing Islam. Besides the Awdali substratum of present-day population in that historical province, the 12th century coming of legendary Sheikh Nur Hussein of Bali from a Muslim family in the Banadiri city of Marka serves as a testament to Bali’s role as the cultural link between Awdal and Banadir. In fact, genealogical traditions connects this family to the founders of the state in Muslim Awdal, and relatives of the founders of Shawa sultanate are also found in Banadir region, as a further indication of connections in the North-South developments at that time. Early Islam in the southern coast, had been reinforced by gradual local conversion and waves of migration, leading to the evolution of Muslim city-states in Banadir. In the 8th and 9th centuries, about five of these of migrations swept from both sides of the Arabian/Persian Gulf and settled in Somalia, particularly Banadir. Still further south, a mosque was built in A.D 1050/75 in a settlement of historically Somali-inhabited Lamo archipelago, now the SE coast of Kenya. The century between 1150 and 1250 marked a decisive turn in the role of Islam in Somali history. Al-Hamawi and, later, ibn Said note that the Berber (Somalis) were a Muslim nation during that period. In the north, Awdal proper (Zayla-Hawash-Shabelle region) now is a center of commercial empire from Ras Aseyr to Hadiya. In the south, similarly, the powerful commercial city-state of Hamar (Muqdisho) took the lead. Townsmen from this Somali coast spread Islam along the East African coast and laid the foundations of the Sawahili civilization. As a source of civilization, Islam developed the state formation, trade activities, and coexistence among different communities. Within this difficult process of cultural transformation, Islam spread in the Horn of Africa through peaceful means: trade, migration, intermarriage, etc. There is no sign of violence associated with this process of Islamization except for isolated incidents in few places. Even different communities of Sunnis and Shiites co-existed in peace in the regions of Awdal and Banadir. A new Threat, the Amhara Expansion (C. 1270) That golden era of Islam in the region, particularly in Awdal, had been disturbed by the expansion of Amhara in the last quarter of 13th century. The Amhara dynasty was founded in 1270 in the present-day region of Wallo, north-central Ethiopia. The Amhara dynasty’s establishment coincided with a period that the Muslim communities in Shawa and Awfat had been undergoing an internal conflict. A time-to-time regular struggle for power among the leaders of Shawa sultanate, finally developed into a civil war in 1262 in Shawa and related parts of Awfat. Awfat was a powerful city and province that was even claiming the political leadership of greater Awdal at those times. In efforts to end the conflict, the Awfat-based Umar Wali-asmaâ Dunyahur Jabarti began to interfere it militarily in 1276, removed most of the contending amirs from the power in 1285, and fully integrated the area in 1289. But before he did so, Amhara authorities had already been taking advantage from this prolonged civil war. The new leadership of Amhara, had immediately started an expansion towards Muslim-inhabited Shawa. There is no doubt that these southward Amhara movements had finally touched the sense of security and sovereignty of these Muslims. As an introduction for protracted conflict between the Amhara-led Abyssinia and Awdal-led Somalia, some confrontations had been reported from 1280 onwards and about 1298. A further sign for the growing tension and the anger among the frontier Muslims, a local leader organized Awdali communities in Northern Shawa for a jihadic campaign against Amhara in 1299, but an actual encounter was just avoided by concluding uneasy truce between the two sides. The forty-five years after the advent of Amhara dynasty was, however, the beginning of a period of retreat and shrinkage for the Somalis. Never again will Somali enjoy peace at his interior borderlands. The happy period of conducting the long-distance trade and procuring the well-demanded African products from vast inland to the international merchants through the Somali ports, was finally disrupted and replaced by a troubled period of conflict with an ever-expanding power. Break out of the Big War The hostility between the Christians and Muslims took an escalating direction after Amda-siyon (1314-44) acceded to the powers of Abyssinia. This negus (king) adopted an aggressive policy of territorial expansion towards all neighbors of Amhara and prepared his people for continuous crusading campaigns. Of all these invaded or endangered lands, Awdal was the only relatively organized state that could potentially challenge the newly reorganized Abyssinian kingdom. The struggle between the two had a unique nature in the region, as shown by its scale and span. Before 1322, Amda-siyon conquered Hadiya and Damut, the source of gold and slave trade for the Awdalis, and he continued to expand over Muslim districts of northern Shawa. Besides this comprehensive frontal assault, Hadiya appealed for help to Awdal. Convincing himself that the Awdal is the only power obstacle to his empire-building program, and expecting a reaction from the awakened state, Amda-Siyon pillaged in a surprise attack the lands of Shawa and Awfat. As a sample of his typical raids at the time, Amda-siyon was himself reported to say: “… my army arrived, and it destroyed utterly the land which is called Ifat. And I took from it gold and silver and bronze and lead … and many garments. Then I sent my army into all the lands of Muslims … into all the land of Shawa. And they made war on them with the point of the sword. They burned also their great and strong cities; they took much livestock as booty, and countless prisoners”. The Awfat-led parts of Awdal, which was headed at that time by Haquddin Walasma’i, grandson of Umar Dunyahur, decisively counteracted and overrun the Amhara-conquered districts in northern Shawa as far as the eastern side of Blue Nile around 1325. Throughout the next few years, however, Amda-Siyon managed to consolidate his power in the previously acquired territories and penetrate deep into frontier or vassal states of Awdal. Responding to this continuous Abyssinian menace, the successor and brother of Haquddin, sultan Sabruddin, retook the neighboring Amhara bases and converted to the Islam the Christian settlers. Yet, he declared a jihad on Amhara and set up an ambitious plan to conquer it, according to Abyssinian chronicle which is the only source for this war. But before any further Muslim action, Amda-siyon pre-empted whatever plan they had in mind, and he once again attacked Awfat, sacked the city and even crossed over Hawash river. Having alarmed by this serious development, reinforcements from other provinces of Awdal, including the remote ones such as Zayla’, Mille, Jinasane, Harar, Nogob and Bali, had haphazardly rushed to the battlefields in Awfat. But, the Awdalis were defeated in a difficult war that lasted for 10 months because of the weakness of their internal organization. As a result, Awdal lost the provinces of western Awfat, Shawa, Fatagar, Dawaro, and later western Bali; and its interests in Hadiya and Damut. Consequently, the morale of the frontier Muslims was seriously damaged. Amda-siyon and his successor exploited the situation and applied a policy of ‘divide and rule’ towards these shaken Muslims. The political organization of Awdal provided an opportunity for the warrior kings of Abyssinia to interfere the internal affairs of these frontier areas. Although the authority of Walasma’i sultan was generally recognized by the different provinces and sheikhdoms, these local entities were also largely operating independently. Amhara kings also made use of individual Muslims who had been doing a profitable business with them. The intervention was particularly directed to the ruling families to divide them into contending members and to support those could be used as Abyssinian agents at the expense of more legitimate ones. Even the Walasma’i ruling house had faced this family feud. Some members crossed the line and looked for their interests at the Abyssinian court, while others were in a firm determination to resist. The sultan of this era, Ali Sabruddin (1332-62) attempted to wage war against Amhara, but he was undermined by the disunity of his people. Individual interests had dealt had blow to the Muslim unity and Western Awdal faced a sad condition of subordination in the invasion and resultant intervention. Those 30 years of Ali’s reign, had been branded as an era of differences, weakness and humiliation. The First Revolution Encouraged by eastern parts of Awdal apparently, the Awfatis had finally run out of patience and exploded to the situation. Their immediate problem was the unpatriotic stand of their own incumbent leaders. Eventually, a civil war broke out between the Amhara-blessed ruling group and a nationalist opposition group. Ironically, the nationalist movement had been led by two grandsons of sultan Ali, who once lived at the Abyssinian court because their father was a good friend of the negus. A faction-fighting flared up amongst the ruling family around 1362. The two young brothers, Haquddin and Sa’duddiin who were not previously in politics but busy in education, considered the ruling relatives as an Amhara puppet. Because of their uncompromising nationalistic spirit in a critical moment and their charismatic leadership, the new leaders easily obtained the public support. The Abyssinians supported the incumbents and reportedly reinforced them by an army of 30,000 men. However, the two brothers and their followers had finally defeated the alliance. Their uncle, Malasfah, who was an assistant of his father, sultan Ali, was killed at the battle; and their father, Ahmad-harbi, was previously killed by his subjects. They assumed the powers of the state, but left their grandfather as a titular sultan. After this internal victory, they could not avoid to conduct a jihadic campaign against the Abyssinians to restore fully the sovereignty of western Awdal. The Past events and the continued threat, turned out the Awdal leaders to be intransigent militants and led Awdal to a period of bloody struggle with Abyssinia. As revolutionary leaders, Haquddin and Sa’duddin revitalized the power of Awdal. According to Awdali chronicle, Haqquddin ‘was the one who established the way of jihad’. Maqrizi added that Sa’duddin had improved the army and administration built by his brother. However, the primary factor that strengthened the political and military position of the new leadership was relocation of their traditional political center to a more secured place. Awfat was forfeited and the center was transferred, probably by Sa’duddin, from this vulnerable province to Harar plateau, the very heart of Awdal Somali, and eventually a source of inexhaustible manpower. In their continuous expeditions against Amhara, it is not clear if the strategy of the Awdal leaders was to recover the lost territories or to stop any further Abyssinian expansion towards Awdal proper. However, they failed the first option but achieved the second one. Although Awdali forces was persistently disturbing and occasionally destroying the Abyssinian military garrisons in eastern Shawa or western Awfat, Fatagar, Dawaro and western Bali, these garrisons were carefully deployed in these provinces on parallel defensive outposts. Thus, on one hand, it was difficult for Awdalis to take all of these provinces at one time or to keep one of them at all times. On the other hand, Awdalis deprived the Abyssinians to relax in these Muslim territories and forced them to remain under state of emergency. More importantly, a risk of Amhara conquest from any part of the predominantly Somali-inhabited Awdal proper was eliminated, and from now on, Abyssinia should stay mostly in a defensive position. More over, Awdal maintained to exercise power and influence within the occupied provinces, and “the kings of Adal were in regular contact with these frontier areas and they always encouraged the spirit of independence of the Muslim inhabitants.” According to Maqrizi, Haqquddin had been attacking Amhara more than twice a year before he was killed in 1373 at a battle in Shawa. However, Amhara response to the Muslim resistance, before and after the raise of Haqquddin, was cruel and catastrophic. The Awdali Somalis, describing the situation of the affected Muslims to the sultan of Egypt, told him: “The king (Sayfa-ar’ad, 1344-71) of Habasha destroyed the Muslims: Some of them he killed, and some he made Christians.’ Even so, Awdal was militarily victorious at that time and Sa’duddin continued same kind of incursions for thirty years. But, Abyssinians finally afforded to reverse the military superiority of Awdal. In a desperate encounter, at unknown site, the Awdalis were considerably defeated and Sa’duddin was killed in action in 1403. Seemingly, the Abyssinians prioritized to kill the sultan at any cost. Traitors, or God’s disobedient, in the Maqrizi’s expression, took advantage from this national loss. They assisted Abyssinians to pursue the sultan as far as Zayla and finally showed them his last refuge, a barren island, where he was executed. Disappointed by this atmosphere, ten sons of Sa’duddin left for the Yemeni city of Zabid, across Zayla, where a strong community of Somali Awdal origin had been living in. Soon afterwards, the Awdali public managed to control the effects of the panic situation. The 10 sons of Sa’duddin returned to Awdal through Siyaro, a local outlet near Berbera, and they were welcomed to replace their father and to lead the country. Sabruddin II (1413-22), Mansur (1422-25), Jamaluddin (1425-32) and Ahmad (1432-45) had followed-up the successes of their father and uncle. But the Abyssinian counteractions were also decisive. Sultan Mansur, for instance, and one of his brothers were taken in 1425 as prisoners at a battle in western Awfat. This was the very same time that negus Ishaq claimed that he subdued the ‘Somali’, and Abul-Mahasin reported that Ishaq “massacred the Muslims, destroyed their mosques and invaded the land of Jabarti.” But after five years, he himself was killed in action in a period that Jamaluddin had been exporting thousands of captured prisoners as slaves to the Arab countries, Persia and India. The political center of Awdal at the time was Dakar, near Harar, specifically for Ahmad (Shihabuddin) who recovered western Bali and resettled a thousand Muslim families around 1434. It was this sultan that the Abyssinians considered him that he brought support as far as from Muqdisho for his intensions to conquer whole Amhara before he was killed by negus Zara’a Ya’qub (1434-1468) at the battle of Ay Faras, in Dawaro province, about 80 miles SE of mount Entotto (modern Addis Ababa). It seems that, in the next 25 years the hostility was slowed down and even sultan Kheyruddin (1445-71) concluded a temporary truce with negus Bayda-Maryam (1468-78), who was busy a war with Afar-Saho. But, at the beginning of the reign of sultan Shamsuddin (1472-88), another round of bitter conflict began, at a time that the Awdali clans in Awfat were still in striking position to the Amhara bases in Shawa. Up to 1480, the two sides were exchanging disastrous raids within which one of them Dakar was burnt dawn. The invaders were themselves routed and defeated. After this operation the Abyssinians could not invade any more. But, there was no more difficult one with Abyssinia than the able general of Awdal, garad Mahfud, who even overshadowed his sultan. In a series of far-reaching forays, he put the Abyssinians under desperate defensive position. Besides the traditional targets of Awdal, he shook Hadiya and southern Amhara from 1491 to 1517. Negus Na’ud (1494-1508) was killed at one of the hopeless battles to defend his empire, while thousands of its defenders were taken into slavery. It was necessary to take these defenders violently always. In fact, Awdal was not only helped by relations with the occupied provinces, but also by its ability to affect “even the Christian military colonies stationed along these frontiers.” Although “…unlike most other non-Christian provinces, Ifat, Dawaro and Bali were placed under the direct rule of the court [and] governors of these areas were carefully recruited from among the most loyal warriors, and they were often closely related to the royal family … there were many cases of defection to Adal, and, sometimes whole units of the Christian frontier troops deserted en masse.” As usual turn, Awdal was badly defeated in 1517 at the battle of Dalmida, near Ay Faras, because of differences among the Muslim army leadership. The popular general, Mahfud, was killed at there, but sultan Muhammad (1488-1518) managed to escape from the battle. It seems that the sultan got blamed for the battles’ failure, and divergences between the supporters of the two leaders had developed. The sultan was himself assassinated in 1518. Renewing the State The country entered a period of confusion, and civil war sparked off between two contending factions. Walasma’i ruling family, supported by most of the clans, led a conservative traditional faction; while the warrior garads and young amirs in the army, which had been called many names like Askar-bahar, Malasay, Heegan and Geesi, led a new revolutionary faction. Three sons of sultan Muhammad struggled for the power one after another with the leaders of the opposition. Besides undermining the authority of young sultans, these leaders first fought among themselves until garad Abun (1520-25) took the leadership. He reconciled and shared the power with sultan Abubakar, deal that helped to stabilize the country. Together, they transferred the political center to Harar in 1520 by unknown reason. Arab-faqih reports that, the country was in chaotic situation of corruption, highway robbery and other evil deeds; but whenever the reformists took over the authority, they had been restoring the law and order, and the prosperity. The respected elements in the society arranged reconciliation at several times, but the mistrust between the two factions wrecked their agreements. After many leaders, a teenage called Ahmad Ibrahim from west of Harar assumed the leadership of the revolutionary group in 1526. And after many battles with the sultan and his supporters, this group finally won in 1527. Their target was not the sultan’s post but to gain the second position. A powerful premier-like position was created by Mahfud for the hawkish wing in the state to deal the Abyssinian threat seriously. Even after Ahmad defeated and killed sultan Abubakar, he accepted his brother, Umar-din, as a head of state, but Ahmad had assumed full powers of the country. (Ahmad, a son in-law of garad Mahfuzh, was not a member of Walasma’i sub-clan but a distant relative of them.) Abyssinians has been watching this political strife and did not miss to exploit it. They surprised the internally embattled Muslims with two attacks, devastating and looting the districts west of Harar. Once again, a civil war and a new Abyssinian threat made the Awdalis ready to welcome a new uniting and uncompromising revolutionary leadership. Ahmad was a right person at a right moment. Despite his young age, his unique and charismatic personality let him to lead. He united the people, reformed the army and administration of the state. Differences were forgotten. Even his many former opponents, were wisely turned out to be his remarkable supporters. He surrounded himself by able lieutenants, generals, garads and well trained knights. Comparing to the Abyssinian forces, his army was very small. But their motto was ‘a victory or paradise’. Equipped with these improvements, he started in 1527 unparalleled jihad to defeat Abyssinia once and for all. Whilst Suleyman of Istanbul was retreating from Vienna, a miracle move that helped the survival of Christian Europe, Ahmad of Harar broke the backbone of Abyssinian military power in March 1529 in the battle of Shimbira Kore, about 40 miles SE of Etotto. In a more unprecedented bloodshed, he completed the conquest of all regions controlled by Abyssinians in 1535. He ruled Habasha until the Portuguese machine guns had killed him at the eastern shore of lake Tana, the watershed of the Blue Nile. Contrary to current Christian beliefs, the jihad of Ahmad was not inspired by a religious motive or a territorial expansion. Obviously, it was a self-defense that was forced to go. Apart from the traditional hostility, Ahmad witnessed a fresh Abyssinian offence while his country was in a civil war. Meanwhile, Abyssinia was conspiring with Portuguese to destroy Awdal. (In fact, the Portuguese destroyed Zayla’ in the same days that the battle of Dalmida took place.) The fact that he limited his campaign only to the areas ruled by Abyssinia, adequately proves that his preoccupation was merely the Christian threat. After he conquered the southern colonies inhabited by Muslims, he was not interested to go beyond and reach out the eastern Cushites of south of Bali; and vulnerable peoples of the Omo region, west of Gojam and west of Tigrey; while he spent a great amount of time and lives to subdue a powerful Amhara and Tigrey, the Abyssinia proper. After the crisis caused by the death of imam Ahmd, Awdalis attempted to hold on the frontier provinces of Awfat, Dawaro, fatagar and Bali. But negus Glawdiwos (1540-59), with some technical Portuguese support, strove to make sure that Awdal will never come back and devastated the frontier Muslims. This challenge re-energized the Awdalis and united them around Nur Mujahid Suhe (1551-1567), a nephew of Ahmad. Nur reorganized the state, defeated and killed Glawdiwos in Fatagar. But, he was distracted from pursuing more victories revitalization by an Oromo attack who from this period onwards had been invading Awdal after they started to emigrate from the south of Bali around 1520. Amir Nur deceased in 1567 while he was fighting against both Amhara and Oromo. Awdal fall down and After Nur was succeeded by his Abyssinian slave, Usman Habashi. Usman was blamed in misconduct and corruption. Eventually, he was opposed by a group led by garad Jibril Geri and garad Magan, his lieutenants, who first recognized Usman’s legitimacy as a sultan. A brother in-law of amir Nur and distant relative of both Nur and Ahmad, Jibril attracted many followers including the relatives of imam Ahmad. But these efforts to correct the sultan only divided the Awdal community into warring factions. It is not clear if Awdal has already been in a process of decline or if this disagreement was a beginning of the political crises. But what is clear is, after Jibril’s move, the country underwent a devastating civil war. And it was this civil war and the Oromo invasion that caused the final collapse of once powerful Awdal in 1585. Before this historical breakdown that affected most of Somalia, Awdal-led Muslim Somalia and Amhara-led Christian Abyssinia fought one of the bloodiest wars in the medieval world, as we have considered above. The two centuries between 1363 and 1563, the peak time of the conflict and prior Oromo raise, five out of twelve effectively Awdali sultans and five out of twelve of their Amhara counterparts, lost their lives on a battle. In fact both paid much more price by the corrosive confrontation for they later succumbed under the expansion of a new conquering nation, the Oromo. Oromo did not only supersede the two decimated nations but separated one from the other from 1578 to 1886. At the end of this period, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia has had a central authority. But, the advent of the European colonists was the turning point of tilting the balance of power in the Horn of Africa in favor of Ethiopia. Ethiopia that we know today was formed in the last quarter of 19th century onwards by inspiration of old events and by a substantial assistance of Britain, France, Russia and Italy at the expense of unity of Somali nation (and others). Once again Somalis, and other Muslims in the Horn of Africa, were seen an obstacle for a program of building a Christian empire in the region, and they were victimized by this ideological misconception. The period of 1886-1927 was probably the worst chapter in the Somali history. In those 40 years, and again in 1948-54, the Somaliland was partitioned in unacceptable form and the Somalis were defeated and humiliated by a Christian coalition consist of Britain, Ethiopia, Italy and France. Ethiopia even openly opposed the independence of both Somali republic and Jabuti (Djibouti). So, many problems awaited the after-colonial new state of Somalia, and the bloody confrontations between Ethiopia and Somalia over the last four decades reflect that. (Ironically, some claim that the Ethiopian government supports the restoration of Somali statehood, although in the last 28 years, Ethiopia was the most generous distributor of weapons to the cursed rebellions and warlords that have been responsible the destruction of the Somali.). In conclusion, it has been rightly noted that the differences among the Somalis is the primary factor of their problem, and, in fact, it is clear that the worst enemy of the nation is within it. On the other hand, there seems to be no doubt that most of the Somalis are not interested to day to recall the past grievances and they would like to see a new era of quiet relations between the two countries. It is also understandable and appreciable that many Ethiopians oppose their government’s decision to invade Somalia. But, as the Somalis themselves say, ‘If homicide occurs (in a community), quarrel about other things ends at there.’ This invasion is homicide, reminding the old animosity and retrieving the painful memories from their mental records. There is no option left for the Somalis but a struggle to free their country from the invaders. Reference: Enrico Cerulli, 1941, Il Sultanato dello Scioa, p. 1. Enrico Cerulli, 1965, Somalia, p. 236 (Kitabuz-Zunuj). Ali A. Hersi, 1977, The Arab factor in Somali History, p. 113; Cerulli, Somalia, 25-6. Sanāg or Makhir Coast is another historical region between Berbera and Bosāso. Al-Yaâqubi mentions Zayla’a in a text he completed in 872 without any reference to the presence of Islam. Cerulli, 1941, Il Sultanato dello Scioa. Awdal, probably the Awalit of Periplus around 60 A.D., means, in the classic Somali, ‘island’ or closed area, referring to the ancient port or its island on the present locality of Zayla’a. But the rise of Muslim Awdal state could be traced back to the mid 9th century. Al-Mas’udi, Muruj ad-dhahab wa Ma’ādin al-jawhar, ed. 1982, V. I, P. 340. Cerulli, 1941; Huntingford, 1965, The Glorious Victories of Amda Seyon. Huntingford, 1989, The Historical Geography of Ethiopia, pp. 76, 77. Ulrich Braukamper, 1980, Geschichte der Hadiya, Sud-Athiopiens, pp. 59, 60. Some people confused Awdal with Awsa or Southern Dankali, but Awdal and Dankali were always two different entities for two different communities. Most of the time, Afars were in a separate struggle with the Abyssinians, (Beckingham & Huntingford, 1961, The Prester John of Indies, pp. V. I, 178-80, V. ii, 452-3; Punkhurast, 1997, pp. 248, 254, 328, 297 (maps). However, Awsa was partially awdalized after 1578 when some of the forces and leaders of Awdal, disappointed by civil war in Awdal, moved to Awsa. These Awdalis, which were included by the relatives of imam Ahmad, became part of the rule in Awsa until 1672, (Cerulli, 1941). Braukamper, 1992, The Sanctuary of Sheykh Hussein and the Oromo-Somali connections in Bale, 156-7. Cerulli, 1967, pp. 235-9; Hersi, 1977, pp. 84-90; Strandes, 1968, The Portuguese Period in East Africa, p. 73; Freeman-Grenville, 1975, The east African Coast, pp. 83-4. Allen, James, 1993, Sawahili Origins, pp. 22-30, 130; Allen, 1984, Shungwaya, the Segeju and Somali History. Yaqut Al-Hamawi, Mu’jam al-Buldan, ed. 1956, V. ii, 369-70, V. iv, pp. 109, 173; Abul-Hassan Ali, Ibn Said, kitāb al-Jughrafiya, ed. 1970, pp. 81-3. The existence of that kind of empire was indicated in different medieval Muslim and Christian documents. For Awdal-Hadiya connections, see (Al-Umari, Maqrizi and Huntingford, 1965); and Awdal-Ras aseyr connections see (F. Alvares, tar. Beckingham and Huntingford, 1961, V. ii, pp. 408, 453; O. Crawford, 1958, Ethiopian Etineraries, p. 95; Cerulli, Somalia, P. 113; Beckingham and Huntingford, 1954, Some Records of Ethiopia, p. 195). The rich traditions and linguistic/cultural links throughout the area accords well these isolated references. Amhara nation is a result of fusion of two elements: Semitic-speaking Abyssinian from Tigrey and indigenous Cushitic-speaking Agaw with the former is dominant by culture. The first known confrontation between Awdal and Amhara took place in 1128. The Awdali document reports that Amhara invaded the land of Warjeh and they defeated the invaders. Although this is an indication for the direction of eventual expansion, nothing else was heard from Amhara until 1270, another indication that there was no notable Abyssinian political or military activity in Shawa during that period. Muhammad H. Ismai’il, Śafahatun min Tarikhi Miśra: As-Suldtan Al-Manśur Qalawun, 1993, 99; The book of Ser Marco Polo, tar. Henry Yule, 1929, V. ii, pp. 427-31; R. Pankhurast, The Ethiopian Borderlands, 1997, p. 54. Enrico Cerulli, 1943, L’Etiopia Medievale in Alcuni Brani di Scrittori Arabi, pp. 281-2. Although mainly a pastoralist, Somalia was historically a mercantile nation also. From pre-historic times, civilizations of the known world could not avoid to have commercial links with the Somalis: Egyptians, Summer-Akkadians, Arabs; Phoenicians, Israelites and Sudanese probably; Persians, Greeks, Romans, Indians and finally the China, Bengal, Ceylon, Maldive, Sumatra and Malay all sent their ships to Somalia; and most of them noted the products and trade activities of the country, and some other aspects of its culture. Hadiya, which covered the territory between upper waters of Hawash and Shabelle, and river Omo, is inhabited by Highland Eastern Cushites and, in less number, by Semitic-speaking Gurage people. As a vassal state of Awdal before Amda-Siyon conquests, its population was mainly Muslim. Damut, which was the south of Blue Nile was probably inhabited by the same stock. Although it had commercial relations with Awdal, its population was not converted to Islam. Huntingford, 1965, p. 56. Huntingford, 1965, The Glorious Victories of Amda Seyon, pp. 56-108. Ahmad Yahya Al-Umari, Masalik al-Absar fi Mamalik al-Amsar, Ed. Musdafa Abu Deyf, 1988; Taddasse Tamrat, 1972, Church and State in Ethiopia. Ahmad Ali Al-Maqrizi, Rasa’il al-Maqrizi, chapter: Ilmaam, ed. 1998. Cerulli, 1931, p. 41. Tamrat, 1972, p. 300. In that century some Somali students and scholars went to Cairo. They learned that the bishop (Abuna) of the religion of Habasha is always picked up and sent out by Coptic-Egyptian patriarch through endorsement of Egyptian sultan in exchange of huge gifts from Abyssinian kings. Eventually, they approached the sultan and argued him to make use of these relations and take an action against his clients, the Abyssinians, in their cruel measures against the Muslims in the occupied territories. Tamrat, 1972, p. 149. Al-Maqriizi, 237-39; Ahmad Ali al-Qalqashandi, śubh al-a’asha fi śana’ati al-insha, V. 5, pp. 320-21; Tamrat, 1972, p. 151. Maqrizi, pp. 239-40. Awdalis did not only name the island after Sa’duddin but whole Awdal was renamed ‘the land of Sa’duddin’. Maqrizi, 233, 241. Cerulli, 1967, Somalia, pp. 111-2. Trimingham, 1965, Islam in Ethiopia, p. 75, n. 4. Maqrizi, 233, 241. Tamrat, 1976, Ethiopia, Red Sea and The Horn, in Cambridge History of Africa, p. 155 (v. iii); Tamrat, 1972, 263. One of the notable developments in this period was the upraising of the Hadiyan people. Encouraged by Awdal, Hadiya rebelled at large against the Amhara over lordship in Zara’a-Ya’qub’s reign. The freedom fighters were massacred by Amhara-supported local chief reinforced by huge colonial army. Dawaro and W Bali were prepared to be part of the rebellion (Perruchon, 1893, 59-64). Budge, 1966, History of Ethiopia, p. 314. J. Perruchon, 1893, Les Chroniques de Zar’a Ya’eqob et de Ba’eda Maryam, rois d’Ethiopie de 1434 a 1478, pp. 142-9, 150-3, 166, 180-81. Tamrat, 1972, pp. 299-300; for this, see also: Maqrizi, Alvares and Arab-faqih. Beckingham and Huntingford, 1961, V. ii, pp. 410-12. As a title, garad or amir means a head of district, army or clan. Beckingham & Huntingford, 1961, V. II, 410-12; Elaine sanceau, 1944, The Land of Prester John; Budge, History of Ethiopia, 1966, 314, 318, 321. Shihabuddin Ahmad Abdul-Qadir (Arab-faqih), Futuhal-Habasha, ed. Fahim Shaltut, 1974. Oromo is lawland Eastern Cushitic people, closely relates to the Somali. Louis FitzGibbon, 1982, The Betrayal of the Somalis; FitzGibbon, 1985, The Evaded Duty; J.G.S. Drysdale, 1964, The Somali Disbute. Madan Sauldie, 1987, Super Powers in the Horn of Africa, pp. 16, 71. link

9. The Fracture of a Nation, Somalia's unseen deep fault lines. The most interesting topic by far!

I had to dig for this Emad Hajjaj's cartoon from a year ago. Normally I don't like his cartoons, but sometimes they illustrate the reality of world politics brilliantly. For those who're not familiar with Emad Hajjaj, he's a Palestinian cartoonist residing in Jordan. This one is titled lion king.

Olmert 'planned Lebanon war before soldiers' kidnap' By Donald Macintyre in Jerusalem Published: 09 March 2007 Ehud Olmert's decision to go to war in Lebanon in response to abductions of soldiers was taken as early as March 2006, according to a leak of his evidence to the commission investigating the war. The report means that the military strategy was decided more than three months before it was triggered by Hizbollah's abductions of two soldiers on Israel's northern border in July. Israeli officials said this was broadly in line with what the Prime Minister has already told the cabinet. Mr Olmert partly used his appearance two weeks ago before the Winograd Commission to defend himself against charges that the government stumbled unprepared into the five-week war. But the report will fuel claims by some international critics of the operation that Israel, and perhaps the US, had for some time decided in favour of a military confrontation with the Lebanese group. The report, in Haaretz, also suggests that Mr Olmert was told in May that Lebanon was ready to enforce UN resolution 1559, which prescribed the disarming of Hizbollah in return for withdrawal from Shaba Farms, the border zone occupied by Israel which is projected as a casus belli by Hizbollah, but which is also claimed by Syria. It says he passed the message to President Bush, Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac. According to the paper, Mr Olmert told the commission that he had held a series of meetings after becoming Prime Minister and had decided that in the event of abductions there should be air attacks, accompanied by a limited ground operation. He told the military that he wanted to decide ahead of any such event rather than make a snap decision at the time. He also defended the much criticised expansion of the ground invasion in the last 48 hours of the war after the UN had agreed on a ceasefire-an operation, which cost the lives of 33 Israeli soldiers. He said the objective had been to influence the draft UN resolution, which he regarded as too unfavourable to Israel. http://news.independent.co.uk/world/middle_east/article2341366.ece

Wuxuu ku tilmaamay wararka sheegaya in ciidamada Puntland duullaan ku yihiin Muqdisho mid dano gaar ah ay ka leeyihiin dadka qiilka ka dhiganaya arimahaasi. Afqurac wuxuu sheegay in Puntland ay taageersan tahay dawladda federaalka Soomaliya , dadka arimahaasi ku doodayana ay doonayaan inay majaxaabiyaan dawladda waqtiga badan lagu soo lumiyay ee federaalka. Shacabka Puntland ayuu ugu baaqay inay arimaha dhacaya ka feejignaadaan, ayadoo ay jiraan dad doonaya inay ammaan daro dhaliyaan. Despite the general misconception prevailing, the people of Puntland will (continue to) be one of the worst victims of these puppets, their lies, and the lying liars who sell it cheaply. Not only did they and especially their master come to prominence by sowing death, fear and oppression to their clans/sub-clans whose interest they supposedly champion, they're also carrying out a wholesale robberies by taking over/away most lucrative sources of income (per requirement of the real masters), more than 80% of customs and taxes levied in Puntland goes in the pockets of these individuals to fund personal ambitions; their young men are pressurised into taking arms and fighting side-by-side with the Ethiopians for an ignoble cause for which they pay sometimes with their lives in this world, and a many times higher price in the next. Considering that the old colonel is liable of dying any moment, for an old and sick man with a transplant organ, I'd think sooner rather than later, means that there'll be no tangible benefits for the people of Puntland after his death. If any, mach capital will be gone, many lives will be gone, the old colonel will be gone, but the hatred and animosity created now with other clans/sub-clans and regions will remain for many years to come. That's not what I call value for money, and precisely, that's why it's not in the interest of the people of Puntland to support Dowladdan Fadarada ah! Marka sidaa darteed, Xiinoow, shacabka reer Puntland maxaa u' dan ah?

Unfortunately, the images I sought to show failed me to appear for some reason I cannot comprehend, but will come back later to try it agin.

*******images Supposedly appearing here******** “To Allah belong the east and the west, so wherever you turn, there is the presence of Allah. Surely! Allah is All-Sufficient, All-Knowing” (2:115) “Whosoever is in the heavens and on earth begs of Him (its needs from Him). Every day He is engaged in some affair” (55:29) “O mankind! It is you who stand need of Allah. But Allah is the One Free of all wants, the Worthy of all praise” (35:15) “But if any turn away, truly Allah is Free of all Wants, Worthy of all Praise” (60:6)

Assalamu alaykum, I’m requesting only few seconds from all the nomads here to sign this petition (directed at the negligent Canadian government) for Bashir Makhtal, whom I suppose many of you are aware of his situation, his detention in Kenya, abduction from prison and subsequent rendition to Ethiopia. I hope many of you sign this petition.

My dear brother Xiinfaniin, we're on the same boat amidst doom and gloom, yet I sense that our discourse is echoing hope and victory in the heavenly horizons, so much so, that I consider it to be well within our reach. All we have to do is work out which course of action we're obliged to follow in balancing on a fragile boat, where failure is not an option. I accept that we have an inherent societal problems, I also accept that collective problems requires a collective problem-solving efforts. You proposed a political paradigm shift and I owe you –let alone the future of our nation- to listen to your ideas very carefully and take them on board. If we can't work it out between ourselves, then what hope is there left for the million others? If we share the same platform regarding the possible and the impossible, we can also share the impossibility of undoing problems which were in the making for decades in just six months! Do we blame the courts for not bringing even more miraculous social transformation in that short period of time than they achieved? They had their Badr to start with and now they’re having their Uxud, it's always what we make of it. I'm fairly confident that once we agree upon the sources of their most serious problems, we can accomplish something and perhaps realise the true nature of these problems as externally engineered, rather than the consequences of courts' policies in origin. You're absolute right in the ways you've formulated the generic roots of many problems faced by "any genuine movement that aims high in its political outlook" as you put it. I tried many times to understand the systemic methodological manifestation of many clannish ills that I've come across, rather than accept the general attribution to mysterious tribal mechanisms that are exasperating conflict prone conditions, wherefrom primitive impulses and devilish tricks take away all moral/ethical and religious senses. I also refuse to accept the western quasi-academic reference to simplistic game theories whereby scare resources (i.e. wells, grazing land, etc.) is the only necessary condition for conflicts to escalate in pastoralist societies. I don't have to prove to anyone that our present clannish mayhem has nothing to do with grazing land; I've seen these problems in all over Europe with neither animals or wells in sight However, I was frustrated by the lack of serious studies with historic-timescale analysis into past tribal conflicts of late starting from midway 1980's. So I conducted my own mini survey on collective channelling of behavioural motives in which tribal opinions are mobilised, but also before/after of such situations as to get an insight about the nature of the conflict (imagine any problem) who's benefiting/losing out or has benefited/lost out and in what way. More importantly, who runs the tribes that unknowingly run us (my true intentions for conducting such enquiry in the first place); in short, who's in charge? Eventually the task was a lot easier than I had imagined since even the most extreme propagators of tribalism are mere deluded supporters (Mohamed Habeens' "The New Breed of Pen-warlords" come to mind), all I had to do was go after the so called qab-qablayaal in the tribal affairs who effortlessly have hijacked their respective clans/sub-clans for purposes seemingly privy to a select few, because all else equates now to loss from cost-benefit perspective. I'll not make the conclusive claims to have an exclusive right to truth after everyone else failed to recognise, but I'm willing to engage whoever says that Ethiopians are not the REAL tribal chieftains of Somalia's orchestrated tribalism-attributed behavioural mischief! They succeeded to impose their men over every single clan/sub-clan as de facto rulers by any means without an exception. Obviously I was despaired a little on that realisation, but then realised too, that it wasn't a very difficult thing to achieve. Another homework that I did was on the systematic infiltration of agents in Ethiopian servitude in every social movement – be it political, military or even religiously natured for the last 75 years. I did that because of the apparently incredible number of hypocrites who infiltrated in the ranks of the Islamic Courts, as to find out their effects on the movement and whether it had a detrimental impact on their course of events. You'll not be surprised to find out that it wasn't unique to the courts alone, rather, it started with the SYL movement which is still very highly regarded by many of our intelligentsia (and rightly so), but harboured the first enemy agents as well (think of how Makhtal Dahir was betrayed back in 1949). Nasrullah had its share deal of moles, as was the case with WSLF and with the current ONLF (some members were thrown out for suspicion only recently). Al-Ittixaad suffered the worst fate because of infiltration in a time when all of this was less understood compared to the situation of the courts now. Al-Islaax has become a hotbed of the more sophisticated spies who target the intellectual elite in general and important institutions in particular. Everyone knows the record Tablighis and Sufis especially in pre 2006 Ethiopian occupied territories, we now have the record of the Salafis as well. If you and I were to start a new movement now, our first members will be attracted by what the French intellectuals who collaborated with the Nazis termed as "cold collaboration" as suppose to warm, where the former denotes collaboration out of opportunism whereas the latter is out of ideological conviction. It's something we have to learn how to live with and at the same time learn how to resist short-sighted tribal bigots who are tempting us to throw out the baby with the bathwater. Alas, with the current hardship, now started the purification process. If you must assign blame, then blame our collective sins from which this has resulted. Therefore we should look the blame in ourselves instead of blaming the courts.

Born in the 23th of Ramadan on a Friday Too many people for my liking are born Fridays

Dikr is good, in fact Dikr is an obligation and that's why we constantly ask Allah for a lisaanan daakaraa. Rather, we should determine first what's Dirk within the prophetic tradition in ethos and Qur'anic context in meaning. Allah refers to the Qur'an as Dikr when He says: "Verily, We, it is We Who have sent down the Dikr (the Qur'an) and surely, We will guard it." Therefore reading the Qur'an is a form of Dikr. The general meaning in the Qur'anic context is that of rememberance, rememberance of ALLAH (swt) as there are various verses insructing us to do so in the Qur'an, but NOT for our Prophet (pbuh)! So we need to get its meaning correct in the first place in order to derive its functional application, as to determine what's acceptable and what's not. The problem arises when we don’t understand the meaning of Dikr and we start putting aside the remembrance Allah and His Qur’an, and replace it with remembrance of the Prophet through made up lyrics and music. Music is NOT Dikr!!!

My maternal grandfather (rahimahullah) was one of the great revivalists in the area before the 60s who fiercely opposed and took strong measures against the innovators and, alhamdulilah, succeeded in eradicating some of their tendencies. He also started the same mission in Xamar when he migrated there in the mid-60s. I know that man's history, and believe me he was the key to a great share of Islamic revivalism not only in Harar, Dhagaxbuur and Muqdisho, but whole of East Africa by the spread of his students. I might attempt to post a consice biography of him if time permits in the near future IA.

Absolute madness! Who are these preposterous criminals? There can be no excuse whatsoever :confused:

Brother Xiinfaniin, let's not yet mix the actual battles that took place with the events that lead to the war. The examples cited in your post only refer to the war, its technicalities and deliverance, and not dare I say, the prelude thereof! You ask "how could it be a sensible choice to go to a war in four different fronts given Courts logistical reach?" Again let me repeat the central presupposition referring to the inevitably of the war irrespective of whatever sensible choices made by the courts. It was simply not their choice. Accordingly I opine that they tried by all means to prevent a full war from happening. They made long nights on many flights trying to reason with mindless puppets who don't think for themselves, presenting only the shameless dictums of their of their masters. I don't have to tell how no efforts were spared to invest time and energy in the public relations exercise, both domestically and diplomatically. Even "cut out the middleman" strategy was adopted and tested with Ethiopia (United States played deaf and then produced a dodgy dossier through the UN), and it became clear they were intend upon stifling any productive attempts to settle the issue peacefully vide the presupposition. If any, the courts were guilty of wasting too much valuable time with preventing an inevitable war. What rational choice did they fail to make, I ask you!? Of course the option of unconditional surrender was on table as demanded by Ethiopia in their last face-to-face meeting, which included full denunciation of all our irredentist historical rights to occupied territories, distancing from the central religious ambition to self-determination per rule by the Qur'an and Sunnah, full disarmament and acceptance of Ethiopia troops occupying Somalia. That was the only other alternative choice available, and I really mean it when I say death is a more honourable rational choice. As Shakespeare ones wrote: If we are mark'd to die, we are enow To do our country loss; and if to live, The fewer men, the greater share of honour. God's will! I pray thee, wish not one man more. I have no doubt that you "wanted them to win" but winning is costly in terms of lives, time and material; let's not judge in haste without paying the price and conclude that all is lost. given your insightful trip to the land of the muqaawamah what would you say the learned lessons are yaa Shamsi? Where should we go from here? What were the missing ingredients for a full success to have been attained? You're aware of more than anyone else that the courts rose on the back of oppression and proxy wars initiated by external powers which made life near impossible, and as a reaction, provoked a social/popular movement which grew into previously unimaginable magnitude. Similarly, the Ittixaad movement of the 90's was born out of necessity after the Americans and others under the guise of UN flags were occupying Somalia. Many people erroneously assume that it was Caydiid and his intoxicated militia who heroically fought the Americans single-handedly. In fact, the men who fought most fiercely were not under narcotics and later became the heartbeat of the before mentioned movement; again a necessary reaction to an oppression which lead to events that's history now. Soon there'll be an even bigger movement than the two previous movements, as each is improved by a factor of porportionate increase in experience and lessons learned which's going to thrive on the next reactionary conditions. One thing is for sure, it's a mater of time; another thing is for sure too, the so-called TFG will never succeed! The Ethiopians can't even rule the ****** region where in many parts that I've been to, the ONLF was ruling during the night and the "Wayano" only seemed to rule during the day by fear. The MJXSG was growing and the number of ONLF resistance fighters doubled in the short period that I was there. I cannot think of a situation where Ethiopia is still together as a country in its current form and shape, and with its current policies towards Somalia for many years to come. Provided of course, that we get our acts together very soon (we should discuss that from now on).

Brother Xinfaniin, first of all let me apologise for not replying sooner, I'm at the moment preoccupied with too many things. Also, I sincerely hope that this is not going to be one of those "let's agree not to agree" scenarios again as was the case last time we discussed the course of the Islamic Courts! Again I failed to read your comments, but found the title you gave this thread more than qualified, in relation to my statement, to conduct a serious challenge (unqualified admittedly with reference to my answer) on the presupposition of your question (i.e. something went wrong). Now let me present you first with the rationale of my thinking in relation to this cause célèbre ensue the military setback of the courts and you be the judge afterwards. There are three options that can be derived from the title of this thread, knowing you , there's only one option for me to answer and dismiss the other two with ease. One thing you cannot possibly be saying is that they didn't win, therefore something went wrong (option 1). I think that your analytical mind leaves you with many doubts as to the necessity of the war that had occurred and induces you to suspect that it might have been avoidable all together, was it not for the ill-advised ranks among the leadership of the courts (option 2). I will come back to that shortly in detail, as I assume to be the only option fitting of your intelligence, but on the list of "logic" options deductible from the title, one more suggestion remains: namely, the uberhaupt existence of the Islamic Courts with their ideological standing and ambition was a provocation for a war in essence (option 3). To answer option 2, we need to ask ourselves this question: Were the Islamic Courts ever in a negotiating position to avert the war from happening? If the answer to that is yes, then we can conclude that something went wrong. However, I do not accept that to be the case. The full-scale invasion of Ethiopian army was planned in the first month after the birth of the Islamic Courts while they were still confined within Muqdisho, let alone their subsequent assuming of power in many places outside the capital. Numerous mainstream media sources in the UK (who also directly participated in that war and indeed continue to do so along with many other European countries for that matter) have already reported that the United States masterminded and planned with Ethiopia the war in Somalia as far back as July/August 2006 on the back of then a humiliating defeat of US backed warlords by the courts. That's an open secret reported in The Independent and the Guardian newspapers, Channel 4 did a better job by obtaining the minutes taken at that meeting outlining the agreement between the two countries. The delay in the execution was the result of Allah opening the sky with heavy rains which flooded many parts of the country (to what purpose will become clear shortly). In fact, I was in Ethiopia in July 2006 travelling on land for more than 1000 km by bus and sometimes even by foot, and I can attest to the fact that Ethiopia went to war back in July 2006 judging by the movement of huge numbers military personnel and equipment towards the border of Somalia. I remember one morning walking from Jigjiga to Qabribayax just after praying Salatul-Fajr, when I saw more than 100 cargo and army personnel trucks full of soldiers, equipments and heavy artillery headed towards Somalia. I managed to get a lift from Qabribayax and arrived in Dhagaxbuur later that day where the convoy also passed through; I knew then that Ethiopia was preparing for war. If I knew in my private capacity, the Islamic Courts must have known that too in their organisational capacity, and all indicates that they knew very well. Many things will become irrelevant with that presupposition, but let me give you another one. Ethiopia was planning for many years to invade and occupy Somalia even before the rise of the courts, it only happened ahead of their agenda. They showed a lot of patience, perseverance and painful determination in their efforts to fertilise the soil before they could sow anything. They succeeded in the creation of chaos, killing and mayhem among the less receptive regions of their domination by funding warlords. Imagine that the Islamic Courts had never been there, how do you think people would have reacted upon the sight of Ethiopian troops arriving on their tanks in Muqdisho, claiming to be bringing peace, stability and security to Somalia; how many people would have believed and supported them? Instead Allah (swt) in His Mercy decreed to ruin their evil plans by showing THE solution, an alternative path to salvation and justice, to purity and tranquillity, in short, to Allah (swt) and His Messenger (saw). In light to my latter presupposition of stretching the timescale in order to increase the significance value of my answer to your question, far from concluding that something went wrong; I choose to conclude the opposite Before I go any further, I'll give you the chance to challenge and dismiss all of the above...