Liqaye

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  1. Democratic Devolution of Powers In Somalia: Administrative Decentralization or Federalism for Self-Destruction Introduction: The Somali Republic, also known as Somalia, was born in 1960 with the unification of the former British and Italian Somalilands. It was a unitary state, with a unicameral legislature and a centralized administration. Blessed with a population homogeneous in language, religion, culture and ethnicity, Somalia appeared to be destinied for a tranquil political future, untramelled by the kind of ethnic conflict bedeviling most other African states of the 1960s. Nomadic wandering, unfettered by the restrictions of governmental authority, bred in the Somalis the qualities of self-reliance and love of freedom coming close to contempt for authority of any kind. Everybody, therefore, assumed that democracy was the natural choice of governance for the Somalis. And for a number of years, Somalia was indeed a shining example of a well-governed nation state. Failure of Democratic Governance: Democracy’s term of life in Somalia was very short indeed. The concentration of powers in the hands of officials at the national capital was the culprit causing this childhood mortality of democracy. Elected officials showed no accountability to the electorate and civil servants, answerable only to superiors in Mogadishu, acted with insular detachment, arrogantly bossing, and lording their authority over, the local citizens instead of serving them with humility. The politicians and the bureaucrats were concerned about how to personally enrich themselves, and nothing else. These shortcomings of a centralized rule made for an uncaring and inefficient administration corrupt to the core that did nothing to help improve the life of the people. Under these circumstances, the national economy stagnated and decayed, causing a generalized disaffection in the country, specially within neglected locaties far removed from the national capital. This unhappy situation paved the way for military officers led by the commander of the defence force to effortlessly stage a coup, illegally bringing an end to the life of democratic governance and the rule of democratically elected authorities in Somalia. Military Reign and and its Tragic Legacy: But military rule, depending on regimented and mechanical obedience to authority, did not correct the fatal weaknesses of centralization but only amplified them. Though realizing creditable achievements during the early years of its reign domestically and scoring a few equally laudable diplomatic successes in the international arena as well, the military regime enjoyed only a very short-lived popularity. The reasons for the brevity of the soldiers’ popularity are not hard to find. Consumed by a strong sense of guilt and paranoia, the coup makers created with Soviet technical assistance a very powerful secret security service to vigilantly guard against, and quickly root out, all domestic oopposition to the regime. On account of the professional efficiency of this instrument of suppression, the soldiers could now afford to be totally negligent and unconcerned about any adverse consequences of their political behavior. The upshot of this effective silencing of all voices critical of the governement was an increasing estrangement between the people and the regime, the government growing ever more more totalitarian until it finally became a bona fide one-man absolute dictatorship. Most Somalis, a people most particularly noted for their exceptional love of freedom and uniquely anti-authoritarian disposition, could not imagine anything worse than the tyrannical suppression of their basic human and civil rights that they endured under the soldiers’ despotic rule. But all hopes of a better future that the Somalis might have entertained quickly evaporated into thin air with the unfolding of awfully calamitous events shortly after the soldiers were defeated and ousted from office. To the Somalis’ utmost surprise, a most shocking tragedy, greater than anything they thought possible, soon engulfed their country. The inevitable consequence of military misrule was a dramatic political implosion, which brought about the collapse of the state and the outbreak of a disastrous civil war that has ceaselessly raged for more than a decade. Centralization Blamed: From 1960 to 1990, the Somalis experimented with two radically different systems of governance, namely, the rule of civilian, democratically elected governments and then with the dominion of a military autocracy. Sadly, however, both experiments failed and disappointed the Somalis, with the failure of the civilian authorities making easy the illegal seizure of power by the military while the despotic military reign, from the stressful coercions of which the citizens stoically agonized so painfully while it lasted, brought about the ultimate tragedy--destruction of the Somali state and the subsequent outbreak of an incredibly barbarous civil conflict in which Somalis perished by the hundreds of thousands, and millions more either suffered internal displacement or fled abroad to seek protection as forlorn, wretched and reviled refugees. Most deplorably also, the civil war caused the destruction of the country’s modest inrastructure that was patiently built up over the past 100 years or so. One demon on which the manifest malfunctioning of the two systems can legitimately be blamed, in part at least, was the country’s constitutional centralization of authority and of both system’s oblivion to the need for prearranged corrective measures to fall back on when things go wrong. The civilian governments failed to even recognize this congenital flaw of the system and failed, while the military rulers purposely exploited this weakness to prolong the duration of their term in office, unaware of, or possibly unconcerned about, the evil consequences of their malgovernance. Groping in the Dark: Arta and Embakathi Conferences opt for Federalism: Mindful of the systemic shortcomings of centralized authority and of the oppressive nature of military regimes’ up-down command systems, the Somalis gathered at the 2000 A.D. Arta reconciliation conference made a decision to restore their state on the principles of democratic devolution of powers that would legally require all elected officials and the bureaucrats to be accountable to the electorate. Their intention was to return sovereignty to the citizens and to bring the government close enough for the electorate to exercise supervisory control over its activities. To that end, Article 39 of Arta’s Transitional Charter instructed the Transitional National Government (TNG) to prepare a Federal Constitution for the future 3rd Republic of Somalia. Therefore, the TNG created a Ministry responsible for Constitutional and Federal Affairs to prepare this constitution that the Charter mandated. This Ministry’s work on the constitution was, however, cut short with the calling for yet another Somali national reconciliation conference, to be held this time in Kenya. This conference, organized for the purpose of facilitating dialogue between the TNG and its political opponents so as to complete the reconciliation process begun at Arta, was first convened in Eldoret, Kenya, on 15 October, 2002 A.D., but was subsequently moved to Embakathi in early 2003 A.D. Like the participants of the Arta conference, the delegates attending the Embakathi gathering quickly declared, with no hesitation whatsoever, that a federal system of rule was their favorite. In fact the Interim Charter that the Kenya conference produced is a lot more emphatic than the Arta document on making the administrative structure of the Somali state federal. Incidentally, the desire to stress their steadfast devotion to federalism has made the delegates of the Kenya conference to commit a number of elemental mistakes. For instance, the 1st and 2nd paragraphs of Article One of this Interim Charter, adamantly insist that, even during the transitional period and prior to the drafting of a federal constitution to be presented to the people for approval, the Somali state will be federal in structure and the official name of the government in office during this interim period will be the “Transitional Federal Government”. This is absurd and bit enigmatic too because the Charter does not designate the constitutent political or administrative units of which this Somali federation is to consist. Be that as it may, the 9 paragraphs of Article 11 provide a detailed description of the process through which federalism is to be made operational in Somalia, the governmental bodies to be be responsible for the implementation of the tasks that the process entails and of the exact time frame set for the completion of the process, as well. Though all 9 paragraphs of this Article deal with the tasks of making Somalia’s administration federal, three that are of particular interest to us here are: (1) The 6th, which expressly requires the government to set up a Ministry for Federal and Constitutional Affairs; Paragraph 4, which calls for the making of an autonomous Constitutional Commission within 90 days of the government’s installation in office; and finally, (3) Paragraph 7, which instructs the government to ensure that the institutionalization of federalism is effected within the first 21/2 years of the transitional government’s tenure. Federalism Rationally Considered: To be sure, the Somalis have time and again been altogether consistent in their call for a federal system, as evidenced by the Charters that came out of the 2000 A.D. Arta conference and of the 2002- A.D. Eldoret-Embakathi conference, still in session at the latter city. It appears, however, that many Somalis, who appanently do not have an adequate grasp of what a federal system entails, are using this political concept rather loosely, to simply mean a form of administrative decentralization only. In fact, though both of the Arta and Embakathi Charters speak of the need for a federal constitution for the country, it is more likely than not that the real intent of their authors was the decentralization of powers in the 3rd Republic of Somalia and not the adoption of a bona fide federal system. It is public knowledge that neither at Arta nor at Embakathi has a rational evaluation of federalism preceeded its adoption by the delegates, with acclamation. On both occasions, the delegates sadly approved the proposal to adopt fedralism unthinkingly and rather precipitately, without first properly considering, as they should have, this system’s practicability in Somalia. By these decisions the Somalis, perhaps with memories of the civil war’s attrocities clouding their sense of judgement and blunting the sharpness of their rational faculties, merely expressed, like an unthinking herd, their intuitive aversion to centralized systems of rule, without thoughtfully examining the suitability of federalism to their situation. Needless-to-say, the Somali’s rejection of administrative centralization does not justify their adoption of a federal system and the Somalis’ deslike for a centralized rule does not necessarily make federalism the only, or a better, alternative to the systems that had failed them in the past. Surprisingly, many vital issues, such as whether there are present in Somalia any of the economic, cultural, ethnic and geographical imperatives that would make a federal system an efficacious prescription for Somalia’s political ills, clearly eluded the attention of the delegates at the Arta and Embakathi peace conferences. The decision to select for the future 3rd Somali Republic of a particular brand from among the array of extant constitutional options relating to democratic devolution of powers, namely, a federal system, a decentralized union or even a hybrid type, should have been based strictly on the basis of its appropriateness for Somalia’s economic and environmental realities and as well for the Somali people’s religious and cultural sensibilities. Regrettably, the Somalis at these two conferences failed to perform the necessary knowledgeable scrutiny of all existing constitutional options that would have enabled them to select the most appropriate constitutional option. Among the many factors that necessitate the adoption of federalism by any country are the presence in it of unbridgeable ethnic, cultural and or religious cleavages, that resolutely defy attempts at integration . Federalsim would also suit a country that has an enormous territory with geographical variations, ie physical barriers, that inhibit inter-regional communication and contacts, thus consistuting one very important factor underpining the development of cultural divergences. The resultant cultural differences, usually expressed most readily in mutual exclusiveness of the different cultural units, inevitably translate into centrifugal tendencies that militate against political cohesion. For a federal system to work, it is also preferable, but not entirely necessary, that the said country’s different geographical and political units are economically self-sufficent. Alas!, non of these factors are present in Somalia. As we have briefly stated earlier, the Somalis are a single ethnic group, culturally and religiously homogeneous, notwithstanding the scattering among them of partially somalized minorities who have been domiciled in Somalia for centuries and who, for all practical purposes, currently do not claim any identity other than being Somali. Territorially, Somalia, with only about 640,000 Sq Kms, is not big. Better yet, there are no geopgraphical obstacles that effectively hinder communication between different groups or impede their cultural interaction. Cultural and economic variations are minimal. A majority of Somalis, possibly reduced to the status of a minority in recent decades, have always depended for their livelihood on the rearing of livestock and by practising seasonal transhumance to secure sufficient supplies of water and fresh fodder for their herds. There were two other groups of Somalis, that together formed a minority in the past but that have lately grown enormously in numerical strength at the expense of the nomads to the point of possibly becoming the majority, have opted for a settled life style, practicing either agricultural production or trade to earn a living and dwelling in permanent rural settlements or in coastal trade centers. However, the cultural cleavage between the nomadic animal hearder and the settled agricultralist or trader is really not as great as it might appear to the outsider. Like the pastoralist the tiller of the soil and the trader also keep smaller numbers of animals. Significantly also, the herder engages in trade with the other two by bartering animals and animal by-products for their agricultural crops and/or manufactured merchandise. This constant rubbing of shoulders among the three makes for a cultural homogeneity rarely found elsewhere in Africa. The Maay-Maxaa dialectical divide is an insignificant issue that can be settled with relative ease by mandating compulsory teaching of both dialects in school throughout the country. Concluding Remarks The Somalis insist on the adoption of a federal system of rule for their country, but by all apparent evidences, there is nothing that logically lends support to this proposition. On the contrary, the odds are enormously stacked up against the practical applicability of federalism in Somalia. The proposal is really indefensible because Somalia is not a multicultural country with critical cultural and religious antagonisms and is not home to mutually exclusive ethnic or racial groups that earnestly desire to be separate from each other and would, therefore, require constitutional guarantees for their continued existence in separation in a secure multicultural political environment. Even before the latest destructive civil war, Somalia was one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world. It has never been really viable, having depended quite heavily throughout its existence as an independent state on loans and charitable donations from abroad. Furthermore, as we have mentioned earlier, the modest infrastructive slowly built up over the past century or so has been literally wiped out in the civil war. There is hardly any part of this country that can stand by itself as a viable federal unit. Most likely, the only thing that will result from the plan to make Somalia federal is the break up the country into several clan-based, exclsive and economically non-viable units, and the creation of these clan enclaves will in all likelihood only exacerbate the clan hostilities that the civil was has generated. With the creation of these clan cantonements the trend towards national integration will be reversed and clan identities will begin to cast a menacing shadow over Somali ethnic identity, which under the circumstances is bound soon be gone with the wind. Federalism, therefore, is not the right choice for Somalia. It is not a cure-all for the country’s political difficulties. On the contrary, federalism will, if instituted, most likely only prove to be Somalia’s undoing. By their repeated call of a federal system of rule, the Somalis at the peace conferences have been, perhaps unwittingly, digging a grave for the Somali state that they purportedly have been trying to revive. Without doubt a federal system of rule is the ultimate, ie the most effective, prescription for Somalia’s NATIONAL SELF-DESTRUCTION. Dr. Ali A. Hersi Nairobi, Kenya
  2. When will the British stop betraying the Somalis? It seems that the British are back with yet one more aggression against the unity and well being of the Somali nation. Early this year, members of the British Parliament’s Select Committee on International Development visited Hargeisa, the seat currently of the secessionist rebel administration of “Somaliland” and capital during the colonial era of the former British Somaliland Protectorate. The declared, albeit hypocritically, intention of this British Parliamentary delegation was to study the humanitarian and development needs of this relatively peaceful portion of Somalia, to determine how, according to the delegation’s report, the British Government can best realize “…the millennium development goals for the poor people of Somaliland…” On their way home, back from Hargeisa, the British Parliamentarians stopped in Nairobi and told Somalis at the Embakathi Conference that their visit related solely to development, flatly denying any intent on their part to sponsor the extension of recognition by the Government of the United Kingdom to the breakaway territory. This unfortunately was an unabashed falsehood but it served the purpose of allaying the suspicions of the credulous Somalis, if only fleetingly. As before, the Somalis fell for the deceitful words of the delegation largely because the British Government’s envoy to the Embakathi peace conference was playing at that time a very prominent role in fresh IPF-IGAD mediation efforts among Somali faction leaders that they had brought together for a retreat at a hotel in Nairobi, Kenya. The “honorable” Parliamentarians have finally revealed their true intention with talks full of misrepresentations that they have delivered in Parliament—which was to lobby on behalf of the secessionists in Hargeisa,. The “honorable” Parliamentarians’ passionate appeal for recognition by the British Government of the treasonous act of secession effected in the northern regions of Somalia, essentially seeks, purposely or unwittingly, to harm the Somali people. The Parliamentarians’ presentations at the House of Commons provide fairly accurate descriptions of the poor conditions of the territory’s economy and the lack of badly needed health, education, water and sanitation services. Also, the Parliamentarians ought to be commended for what they said about how Somalis in the Diaspora are contributing to their country’s reconstruction and the need for expanded international participation in the country’s revival. Needless-to-say, the reports also contain several misrepresentations, largely of political nature, that cry for correction. Among these three in particular stand out: (a) Mr. Worthington alleges that the southerners made a conscious effort in 1988 to commit “genocide against the dominant **** clan…” of the north. The government’s savage reaction to the SNM’s attack on Burao and Hargeisa is indefensible but no one who is truly knowledgeable about Somalia would in all honesty characterize it as a southerner attack on northern Somalis. Mohamed Siyad Barre was a southerner, but the government leadership was quite representative of all Somalis. The military and civilian elite that should be blamed, and possibly ought to be tried, for the military regime’s misrule and, most particularly, for the grisly reprisals that ensued on the SNM’s desperate attacks on Burao and Hargeisa included many northerners too. For instance, out of the 5 members of the ruling Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party’s Political Bureau, 2 were always from the north. Many of the current administrative and political leadership in Hargeisa, indeed including most prominently Mr. Riyale who was in the late 1880s the commanding officer of the feared National Security Service in Berbera where, according to a report by a more knowledgeable African Rights Watch source, massive violations of human rights such as summary killings were perpetrated, are personally responsible for the atrocities committed during 1988-90. In fact, much of the bombing that northerners were subjected to were not carried out by Somalis but were the work of aliens said to have been South African pilots, but who in actual fact were British mercenaries from the former segregationist rebel entity that called itself Rhodesia! (b) One other utterly false statement included in Mr. Worthington’s report is the claim that “the demand for independence was supported by 90 per cent of the population”. For one thing, nobody knows the actual size of the population in the northern regions of which the rebel entity is comprised. For another, the so-called referendum exercise was not undertaken in Sool and Eastern Sanaag Regions or in the Buhotle district of Togdheer. How can one then speak of a referendum in which 90% voted for one thing or the other? Where has the “honorable” Member of Parliament, who claims to have expert familiarity with the territory’s affairs, been when the inhabitants of those three eastern parts of “Somaliland” refused to participate in the referendum or in the recent so-called Presidential elections that he refers to? © Mr. Worthington claims that in his several trips to the territory he has “met absolutely no one who believes that an enduring state will emerge from the peace talks,” implying that none in the northern Somali regions would want to participate in these “hopeless” talks. Well, he is dead wrong again. Many northerners are already at Embakathi and many more would have gladly attended the conference had invitations been extended to them. The absence of northern clan elders from Nairobi is not due to their unwillingness to attend the conference but it is due to IGAD secretariat’s refusal to invite them. Another reason is the secessionist clique, which has made criminal for anybody from the north to attend the conference and instructed airlines not to carry northerners to the venue of the peace talks. Events that have recently occurred in the north oblige us to be more careful. They afford us interesting, albeit disparaging, comment on the democratic governance in the north that the “honorable” members of the British Parliament speak of so much. To cite but a few of such incidents that strongly contradict the “honorable” Parliamentarians are: (i) The incarceration of Boqor Osman Mohamoud, AKA Buur Madow, for disagreeing with aspects of the “government’s policies”; (ii) The so-called government’s inexplicable refusal to allow traditional leaders of northern clans to oblige a request from southern Somali elders to mediate in clan conflicts raging in the south, as honor, traditional culture and Islam all require them to do; and finally, (iii) Refusing Sultan Mohamed Suldaan Abdulqadir, the traditional leader of one of the most important clans in the north, from going to Islam’s two Holy Sanctuaries for pilgrimage as member of this year’s official Somali delegation, composed mostly of traditional elders, that the Transitional National Government has nominated for this rare honor. (d) One of the “honorable” Parliamentarians, whose sense of judgment was evidently impaired by his enthusiasm for Somaliland, made an outrageously unfair statement. He said he expected things in Somaliland to be “…unstable, insecure and chaotic, where the atmosphere was volatile…. However, although all those epithets apply, I think, to neighboring Somalia, none of them applies to the Somaliland that we saw”. The “honorable” Parliamentarian erred because he has unjustly condemned other parts of Somalia that he has not visited and about which he, therefore, is not qualified to opine. Otherwise he would have known that what he said about Somaliland is true also of much of the country. Immaterial of whether Britain recognizes Somaliland or not, the reports of the Parliamentary delegation will be seen by the Somalis as one more mean spirited British attack against them. Happily for the Somalis and also for the future of Anglo-Somali relations, it appears that members of this Parliamentary delegation have not convinced the British Government with their strong appeals for the recognition of Somaliland. The response of the Secretary of State for International Development, Hilary Penn, to these presentations might have saved the situation. After carefully weighing the arguments presented in favor of recognition for the breakaway territory, the Secretary responded with a much more perceptive analysis of the situation and in the end wisely counseled caution because “the people in the rest of Somalia have just as much need of peace and stability, and just as much of a right to a better life, as the people of Somaliland. It is indeed very clear from this exchange why the Secretary of State is a minister and these Parliamentarians are not! Be that as it may, the British indeed seem to harbor inexplicable hostility toward the Somali people. In fact one can trace the roots of the current Somali crisis to their origins in less than honest protection treaties that the British had signed in the 1880s with unsuspecting elders of Somali clans. The treaties were simply unfavorable to the Somalis. The Somali elders who were not schooled in the intrigues of European diplomacy could not comprehend the political implications of the treaties, which were hidden from them in European diplomatic lingo with which they were not familiar. They, therefore, unknowingly signed away their sovereignty. Because of their truly inauspicious founding on treaties that the British apparently never intended to honor, Anglo-Somali relations never bode well for the Somalis. As it turned out, British enterprise in the Horn of Africa, which began with these infamous treaties, has been persistently harmful to the Somalis. This chapter of modern Somali history makes a dreary narrative of cruel British guile and repeated machinations against Somali interests, flagrantly violating in spirit and letter the treaties on which Anglo-Somali relations were based. A few of the many incidents of betrayal that the Somalis suffered at the hands of the British will suffice to clearly illustrate this point: (1) In a series of treaties they signed with the traditional leaders of Somali clans during 1884-1886, the British promised to protect the territories belonging to these clans from external aggression in exchange for the privilege, solely granted to British citizens, of freely carrying on trade in the respective territories of the contracting clans. Additionally, the Somali clans also pledged not to ever offer their territories for occupation, or protection, to any other power. The trusting and politically rather naïve Somalis were by and large faithful to the terms of the contractual agreements they had entered into with the British authorities who, unhappily for the Somalis, acted with cavalier disregard for what they had promised the Somalis. With characteristic duplicity, the British secretly agreed, through a series of bilateral agreements with France, Italy and Ethiopia during 1888-1897, to illegally cede portions of the territories they had covenanted with the Somali clans to protect. This cruel British perfidy became known to the Somalis when work on the demarcation lines separating the five colonial territories to which the land of the Somalis was divided, was begun on the ground in the 1930s; (2) During the 2nd World War, all of the Somali territories, with the exception of the French enclave known as French Somaliland came under the control of British Military Administration. The Somalis, seeing in the rule of the British Military Administration a golden opportunity for them to get back together the dismembered Somali people and their land, began to vigorously agitate for national reunification. The British, however, lulled the Somalis to sleep with the Bevin Plan, which they put forth in 1946 with less than sincere effort and subsequently abandoned, to the Somalis’ utmost disappointment. Instead of making amends for the damage that their secret agreements with other powers caused the treaties they had entered into with the Somalis, the British simply ignored the Somalis’ call for national reunification and once more gave installments of Somali territory to Ethiopia in 1942, 1948 and 1954; (3) When the Somalis of the Northern Frontiers District demanded union with the Somali Republic in the early 1960s, the British once more cruelly pretended to be paying attention to the Somalis’ cry for justice. The then Colonial Secretary appointed an independent commission that was asked to determine the wishes of the people in the NFD by conducting a plebiscite in the territory, to see if the Somali inhabitants of the NFD desired to be reunited with their kith and kin in the Somali Republic or preferred to remain in the future independent Republic of Kenya. The inhabitants of the NFD voted with an overwhelmingly majority of 86% in favor of cession from Kenya. Astonishingly, however, the British Government acted with an utterly cruel disregard for the result of the plebiscite and simply decreed that the NFD would remain in Kenya. In case this is of comfort to them, the Somalis should know that they are not the first, or the only people, to have been hurt by Britain’s diplomatic double-dealing. In all likelihood though, the Somalis, because of their lack of familiarity with diplomatic trickery, suffered from British perfidy more than any other nation on earth. At a time when truthfulness was considered the cornerstone of successful diplomatic relations, a British statesman, whose name eludes me now, made a remark that shocked most of his contemporaries, possibly signaling the dawning of a new era in diplomatic history, an era in which hardnosed realism and struggle for power would replace the idealistic notions of truthfulness and morality in international relations. When he was possibly confronted with proof of British dishonesty toward one ally or the other, this British politician instantly shot back with the famous rejoinder that Britain had ‘permanent interests and no permanent friends’. This politician’s remark, in effect admitting that deception figured in Britain’s diplomatic practice, reinforced other European powers’ conviction that the British could not be trusted, and earned the United Kingdom the unflattering nickname of ‘The Perfidious Albion’. According to this British politician credited with coining the above quote, the benefits accruing to Great Britain from her relations with other countries, rather than devotion to the observation of any general rule of morality, would determine how friendly or unfriendly Britain was to be to any particular country. If that is the case, why has Britain’s attitude to the Somalis been so consistently hostile? What have the Somalis done to deserve Britain’s eternal enmity? What is the pleasure that the British get from purposely hurting the Somalis? Dr. Ali A. Hersi Nairobi, Kenya. Home I.M LEWIS will be dead one day and his "definitive" books on somali culture forgotten but somalia will survive, survive him and his nonsense"
  3. Maqaalada: Former prime minister favored dictatorship over democracy Former Prime Minister Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein Favored Dictatorship over Democracy in 1969. “In 2004, supports minority rule over Democracy & Federalism” I cannot say whether he changed over the recent years, but we can compare his past and present political growth. The former Prime Minister Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien has been one of the youngest active members of the SYL during the struggle for Somalia’s independence. Without an immense educational background, Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien had achieved in becoming Prime Minister of Somalia in 1964. He was known to be extremely divisive, stubborn, arrogant, and ambitious. In-addition Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein lacked ability to unite and solve conflicts in and out of Somalia’s political spectrum. President Aden Abdulle have straggle so hard even threaten to dismiss the parliament and used this infamous quotation “If I nominate Habar Kuuley to become my prime minister you must approve her” After endorsing Mr. Hussein several times more he was finally able to get Mr. Hussein approved to become his next Prime Minister. As Prime Minister, Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien in his revengeful nature continue to adopt divisive policies the so called “Pusto Rose” firing or lay off over 100’s of senior government employees without proper cause and replace them with his political partners. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein’s disapproval ratings in his own party (SYL) led to President Aden Abdulle to lose his second term bid in office by landslide majority to the slain President Abdulrashiid Ali Sharmarke in 1967. Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein is a man who is known to hold grudges against his political opponents even after their death. Recent example is his blunt statement against the president of Somaliland Mr. Mohamed Ibrahim Igal at his interview of the BBC Somali Section. Immediately after his own party (SYL) voted him out of office, as a form of retaliation Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein opens his own party called Dabka. In his revengeful nature, he began to undermine the leadership of the new democratically elected president Abdulrashiid Ali Sharmaarke and Prime Minister Mohamed Ibrahim Igal; some critics still blame him for the death of President Abdulrashiid Ali Sharmaarke, which subsequently encourage the military to overthrow the democratically elected government. Later, Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien has refused to lead or join the pro-democratic movements that began early 1970’s rather Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein accepted to be on the payroll of the oppressive dictator. While all his pro-democratic colleagues have being executed or sent to long-term imprisonment. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien continued to represent Siad Bare Regime as an ambassador to the United Nation and worked very diligently to support the dictator’s regime. Now, Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien is hired as a free agent advocate and political consultant for the TNG leader Abdulqasim Salad Hassan. The aping former prime minister Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein began to attack in his articles our neighboring country Ethiopia in-order to assist the TNG leader to receive financial concessions from Arab counties. In my conclusion, the aping former prime minister Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussien and his latest ill written articles over the Internet demonstrates his divisiveness. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein in his divisive nature continued to proposed minority rule as a solution to the Somalia’s political problem In-addition to his views of being anti federalism and in favor of totalitarianism. I am concerned Mr. Abdulrasaaq Haji Hussein’s narrow scope of his views, will doomed our country in to more destruction. I am convinced it will be a grave mistake on my part if I do not urge you to oppose minority rule in Somalia. We must work together toward uniting the Somali people in-order to achieve our common objectives such as Justice for all and Democratic values, which are majority rule. Shirwac Jama Shirwac12@hotmail.com
  4. YES SOMALIA Email: YES_Somalia @hotmail. Com YES ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE Name of the organisation: YES Somalia CN (Somali Youth Employment Summit) Country Network Date of establishment: Oct 12th 002 Area of intervention 1. Youth empowerment Development 2. Advocacy for Employment/education creation for Youth 3. Demobilization of militia 4. Environmental Sustainable 5. Social Awareness peace promotion, HIV/Aids, FGM and other social activities 6. Gender Issue and Human rights Area of Operation: All Somalia Regions Structure: - • Team • Adviser Committee. • Steering Committee • Executive Team NANES OF YES SOMALIA COORDINATION TEAM • Abdikhayr Sheekh Ahmed • Faiza Abdinor Jama NAMES OF YES SOMALIA ADVIKSORY BODY 1. Ali Isse Puntland 2. Salado Ismail Mirod Puntland 3. Maryan Aden Samatar South Somalia 4. Hawa Ali Jama Puntland 5. Asha Gelle Dirie Puntland 6. Abdirizaq Mohamud Puntland 7. Abdijibar Diini Puntland 8. Mohamud Food Cade Puntland 9. Samsam Mahamed Somaliland 10. Fatima Jama Jibril Puntland 11. Isse Mohamud Dholawaa Puntland 12. Abdulahi Abdi Jama South Somalia 13. Seynab Haji Ayan Puntland 14. Ibrahim Gure Puntland 15. Hawa Aden Amay Puntland 16. Mahamed Sheekh Mahamoud South Somalia 17. Abdiwali Hassan Ow Ali South Somalia 18. Farah Omar Puntland 19. Hussein Jama Somaliland 20. Hawa Esse Dhere Puntland 21. Muumin Aweil Somaliland 22. Ismaham Abdisalaan Somaliland 23. Su’aad Ahmed Saciid Somaliland 24. Lufdi Mahamed Somaliland YES STEERING COMMITTEE MEMBERS 1. Sharmaarke Muse Puntland 2. Ahmed Ali Noah Puntland 3. Yasmin Yusuf Farah Puntland 4. Omar Awed Ali Puntland 5. Asad Adaane Puntland 6. A/Futah A/lahi South Somalia 7. Mahamed Abdinor South Somalia 8. Mahamed Ali South Somalia 9. Nasteex Mahamed South Somalia 10. Samiiro Jama Elmi Somaliland 11. Ahmed Yusuf Hirsi Somaliland 12. Ahmed A/rahman Weyso Somaliland 13, C/Qadir Jibriil Tukaale Somaliland YES member organisations: - see the attachment list YES Somali Network Somali YES Country Network emerged with the result of Youth Employment Summit Held in Alexandria in September 2001 where world leader placed youth concerns on their top priorities by developing a frame work of action to support youth increasing youth populations in the world. Other outputs in this meeting which more than 80 world leaders and international organizations attended included establishment advocacy, information sharing and networking aimed to support youth groups. In the establishment of Somali YES Country Network in 2002 by YES team delegates with the technical guidance of YES Secretariat in Boston moved forward into the implementation of Alexandria YES Summit plan of action by briefing youth groups and other potential stakeholders (CSO, International Organizations and Government representatives through a workshop held in June 2002. following wider collective commitment towards Youth empowerment, YES Somalia found institutional support (WAWA Network) through provision of office and communications facilities (internet), Steering Committee to support effective establishment of YES CN and undertake essential steps for extending and advocating, and designing YES CN plan of action were appointed. To receive wider support from other potential youth stakeholders YES Advisory Board consisting of influential people, local government and international organizations to support YES CN was appointed. YES Somali Vision /Mission To improve the living conditions of the youth Somalia population through education/skill empowerment, employment creation and raising systematic advocacy to influence government, Community, international Organization policy to support Youth groups attain above mission. 1. YES Somali Goals • Improved Youth Organizational Structure, networking, coordination, information sharing and among the youth groups in Somalia with the support of YES Somalia by the year of 2003 • To highlight and advocate for youth concerns with the involvement of Youth stakeholders (CSO, CBOs, Government, International Organizations an the Private sector by the year 2003 • To advocate and lobby funds for YES Somalia operationally through improved linkage among youth stakeholders by the 2003 • To identify existing youth organizations status and develop training packages empowering youth groups by 2004 • To support youth organizations improve their organizational structure by reviewing their goals, mandate, strategies and participate on going social activities by 2005 • To improve and empower youth groups capacity and skills to achieve their gaols through capacity building programmes by the year 2004 • To establish better coordination, collaboration among youth groups, CSOs, CBOs and International Organizations by the year 2004 Objectives of YES Somali • Empowerment of youth organizations and individual youth members through advocacy and initiation of capacity building, skills development and employment programs. • Promotion of effective coordination and networking mechanism for youth development programs/activities at national community, private sector, governmental] and global levels. • Develop employment and income generation opportunities for member youth organization. YES Somali Country Network Strategies • Initiating and raising public awareness programmes to the existing challenges against the development of young people. • Advocacy and lobbying for youth activities. • Effective resource mobilization and fund raising strategy. • Self-supporting and voluntary based development programmes. • Skill development and training programmes. • Outreach programme and involvement of larger number of stakeholders. • Coordination and networking of youth programmes ADDRESSS HEAD QUARTER Bosaso, Puntland State of Somalia Tel: 00252-523-5546 Email: YES_Somalia @ Hotmail.com Contact Person Faiza Jama YES Coordinator Email: fiaza_abdi@hotmail.com Ahmed Ali Noah YES Somali Information Officer Email: axmednuux@hotmail.com Nairobi Contact Person Abdikheyr Ahmed Advocacy for fundraising Tel: 254-722788377 Email: abajano@yahoo.com GLOBAL YES NETWORKS HEADQUARTER BOSTON, USA Communications manager Fred Clark Email: Fclark@edc.org
  5. There is an arab saying that spying is the arab disease illustrated by sayings like when 4 arabs sit at a table 3 are informants and the 4 is being approached. The only way hamas and other organizations can reduce the supply of informants to the israelis is by following the ANC root and necklacing proven informants, when the informants realise that the price of giving information to the israelis is death, the gush of information will decrease to a trickle just as it did for the apartheid forces. I feel so terrible, i somehow expected more from Ranttisi but i made a mistake to think in all ********* the israelis would allow him to manouver. Rantissi and Marwan Barghouti were the hope of palestine one is dead the other in jail and the palestinians are no where.
  6. It is unfortunate but during my formative years i remeber djibouti becoming absolutley inundated when ever a few drops of rain fell, due to the rock hard nature of the dried out soil, hopefully the deaths of so many people will not be in vain and Djibouti will actually BENEFIT from their land rent to the americans by getting them to build some drainage systems.
  7. Impressive i hope for all of us that it will last for a long time to come, and that treaties signed under the shade of acacia is not forgotten in the din of battle. Amiin
  8. Walaahi, that was one of the most wretched periods in somalia the educated youngsters were arrested for no other reason than their desire to serve their people without fear or favour. There is a very moving account of one of the survivors contained in the appendix of Jamac ghalibs book " the price of dictatorship", it is an account of life in the infamous Labataan jiirow maximum security prison, and of the whole sordid affair. In it the writer talks about after so many years of solitary confinment and the brutality of the wardens he was suprised to see how small, frail and wretched one of his former jailers were when he saw him in hargeisa after so many years of considering him a god, i wish that all somalis could have realised that about the siyaad barre system much sooner.
  9. I do agree with the excessive laughter bit, to me it has always singled out bad mannered people and futher interaction usually confirmed my first thoughts. there is also a hadiith that states a person should not laugh so immoderatley that ones back molars can be seen. Excessive laughter to the point of looking a fool is a ****** habit indulged in by idlers and ****** .
  10. 1. propogate islam through the lengths and breath of the world. 2. peace in somalia. and hope i will never try to build another tower of babel, those were men who also after surveying all before them believed they could not fail. Socrates is right better the struggle to succed and the lessons from our failures than success easily got and just as easily forgotten]
  11. looool hehehe lil cute you made my day i told the guy to tell me which part of himself he thinks is most edible, aperrently the middle finger is his first choice.
  12. Somali english arabic french swahili and aimin for mandarin chinese by my last year in uni inshallah i also speak a little WTF italian] WTF as in what the F***
  13. Ardey ka qalin jabisey Jaamacadda Camuud Axmed Siciid Cige-BBCSomali.Com Jaamicadda Cammuud oo ku taalla deegaan qurux badan oo buuro iyo dooxooyin u dhow oo ilaa sagaal Km dhinaca woqooyi bari kaga toosan magaalada Boorama, ayeey Sabtidii u ahayd maalin weyn. Waxaa Sabtidii dadka halkaasi isugu tegay oo qaarkood ay meelo dheer uga yimaaddeen ay goob joog u ahaayeen qalinjebinta 24 arday oo ku dhammeystay Jaamicadda Cammuud waxbarasho Jaamicadeed. Dufcaddii labaad Ardeydaasi waxa ay yihiin dufcaddii labaad ee ka baxda Jaamicaddaasi, iyadoo afar ka mid ahi ay gabdho yihiin. Dhammaantood dufcaddani waxay wax baranayeen muddo shan sano ahayd oo ay ka qalin jebiyeen kulliyadda maamulka iyo maareynta ganacsiga, siduu ii sheegay guddoomiyaha Jaamicadda Cammuud professor; Suleemaan Axmed Guuleed, Guddoomiyaha oo isagu rasmi ahaan kaga dhawaaqay xafladdaasi qalin jebinta dufcadda labaad wuxuu sheegay inuu ku faraxsanyahay in durbaba qaar ka mid ah ardeydan qalin jebisay Sabtidii ay shaqooyin heleen oo la sii carbuuntay, iyadoo buu yidhi dufcaddii ugu horreysay ee ka baxda Jaamicadda Cammuud ay haatan wada shaqeeyaan. Prof. Soleyman Axmed Guuleed Professor Suleemaan Axmed Guuleed wuxuu hadalkiisa ku xusay sida ay lagama maarmaanka u tahay taageerada Jaamicadaha Cammuud iyo Hargeysa ee dawlad iyo shicibba si ay u taabbagalaan ayuu yidhi. Ardeyda qalinjebineysay Sabtidii ayaa lebbisnaa jubbaddo iyo koofiyaddo madow oo ah dharka ay caanka ku yihiin marka ardeygu dhammeysto tacliintiisa Jaamicadda. Jawigana waxaa sii bilay iyadoo roobabkii gugu ay ka da'ayeen maalmahanba gobolladan. Qeybaha Jaamacadda Jaamicadda Cammuud waxaa rasmi ahaan loo furay sannaddii 1998kii, waxayna ka koobantahay ilaa iyo hadda kulliyadaha waxbarashada, caafimaadka, iyo maamulka iyo maareynta ganacsiga. Waxaa kaloo ka furan Jaamicadda Cammuud barnaamijka tababarka macallimiinta oo heer diploma ah oo ay maalgeliyaan Ururka midowga reer yurub iyo dowladda Denmark. Dufcaddii ugu horreysay ee dhammeysata waxbarasho Jaamicadeed waxay ka qalin jebisay Jaamicadda Cammuud 23kii bishii Julay ee sannadkii 2003da kuwaas oo ahaa 32 arday.
  14. Dagaallo Laas-Caanood Saameeyey Axmed Siciid Cige Wararka ka imaanaya magaalada Laas-Caanood ayaa sheegaya in iska hor imaad hubeysan oo saddaxdii maalmood ee u danbeeyey ka socedey miyiga laba beelood oo halkaasi wada dega uu ayaa Khamiistii saameeyay magaalada Laas-Caanood. Mar uu xafiiska BB-da ee Hargeysa uu la xidhiidhey magaalada Laas-Caanood ayay dad goob joog ahi, BBC-da u sheegeen in subaxnimadii Khamiista ay haweenay ku dhimatay rasaas ay isku weydaarsadeen magaalada Laas-Caanood gudaheeda dabley ka tirsan labadaa beelood ee iska soo horjeeday. Iska hor imaadkan hubeysan oo ka bilaabmay Salaasadii, tuulada la yidhaahdo DABA-TAAG oo 60km, koonfur ka xigta magaalada Laas-Caanood, waxa warar xog ogfaal ahi BBC-da u sheegeen in halkaas ay lix ruux ku dhimatey. Waxa kale oo wararku sheegeen in dagaaladan ay ku dhaawacmeen ilaa sagaal qof. Ilaa iminka lama yaqaan sababta dhalisey dagaalada Laas-Caanood.
  15. Kenya: Baasaboorka Soomaaliga oo Fiise loo diidey Axmed Maxamed-BBCSomali.Com Sarkaal ka tirsan laanta socdaalka ee Kenya oo magaciisa noogfu soo gaabshey Mr Chege ayaa BBC-da u sheegay inuu jiro amar dowladda ka soo baxey oo baasaboorada Soomaalida loogu diidayo Visaha ama dalkugal. Waxa uu Mr Chege uu BBC-da u xaqiijiyey in dadka loo diidey soo galista dalka ay ku jiraan xataa kuwii horey loo siiyey visaha mararka badan lagu soo gali karo ee loo yaqaanno Multiple-ka. Xaalka dadka deganaashaha heystey Mar aan Mr Chege wax ka weydiiney dadka deganaashaha dalka ku leh ee wata baasaboorada Soomaaliga oo qaar lagu celshey garoomada dayuuradaha maalmihii na soo dhaafey, waxa uu Mr Chege ku jawaabey tafaasiil dheeraad ah ayaan soo saari doonna dhawaan. Sarkaal kale oo ka tirsan Laanta Socdaalka ee Kenya oo diiday in magaciisa la sheego ayaa isaguna BBC-da u sheegey in dadka u shaqeeya hey'adaha samafalka ee deggan Kenya gudaheeda looga baahanyahay iney ogeysiiyaan xafiisyada ay la shaqeeyaan marka ay safrayaan, si xafiiskoodu uu u war galiyo Laanta Socdaalka. Durbaba dad Somali ah oo ka yimi Soomaaliya iyo Yurub ayaa lagu qabtay gegeda diyaaradaha ee caalamiga ee loo yaqaan Jomo Kenyatta International Airport oo ku taal Nairobi sababtuna ay tahay inaan la ogalayn baasaboorada Soomaaliga. Waxa BBC-du ka warheshey in Khamiistiii dhowr qof oo Soomaali ah oo qaar u shaqeeyaan hey'ado caalamiya lagu xirey garoonka dayuuradaha ee Nairobi, ka dibna subaxnimadii Jimcaha loo qaadey xafiiska Laanta Socdaalka ee Nairobi. Maxaa laga yeeli doonaa dadka xir-xiran? Waxa kale oo wararku sheegayaan in dad kale oo Soomaali ah oo dhawaan iyagana lagu qabtey garoomada dayuuradaha ee Kenya loo masaafirin doono Soomaaliya. Amarkan Laanta Socdaalka wuxuu ku soo beegmay iyadoo ay boqolaal Soomaali ah ay ka qayb galayaan wada hadalada nabadda ee ka socda Nairobi, intaa waxaa dheer dad faro badan oo Soomaali ah oo ka ganacsada waddanka Kenya oo haysta baasboor Soomaali ah oo leh 'Multiple Visa' iyo Fisaha daganaanshaha Kenya oo arinkani saameyn doono
  16. I dont know and god forbid it is bracketed in the same sentence as the arusha trials www.allafrica.com
  17. LIQAYE100, I know you would never have guessed
  18. :eek: :eek: :eek: My condolences to the family, and i hope the man/woman who did this is brought to justice.
  19. Mine apperntly is this one: Introspective self assured Reflective You come to grips more frequently and thoroughly with yourself and your environment than do most people. You detest superficiality; you'd rather be alone than have to suffer through small talk. But your relationships with your friends are very strong, which gives you the inner tranquility and harmony that you require. You do not mind being alone for extended periods of time; you rarely become bored.
  20. color personality test try it and say what you think.
  21. As the police crack down on the trade in illegal jobs, Anushka Asthana reports from Salford on the reality of life on the immigrant front line, and three refugees tell of the struggles they have faced Anushka Asthana Sunday March 28, 2004 The Observer In a street in Salford, the man at Number Seven has been asking the council for years to fix his fence. It hangs away from the garden, swinging in the wind, with only a few patches of splattered paint left to show it was once white. As I park my car I notice him looking suspiciously across the road. Following his eye-line, I find myself staring at a house that has all the curtains drawn tight. The front window is covered with smears from dozens of eggs. At another house there is a hole in the glass where a stone has broken through. Later I find out why the man is peering at these houses. He is bitter that the council, which, he says, has given him so little, has provided two properties on the street to house families seeking asylum. Inside one of those houses is a 21-year-old woman called Leyla. She came to Britain from Somalia in search of a better life, but has failed her claim and appeal. Her hopes for the future were wiped out six months ago when she returned home to find her keys no longer fitted the lock to her door. Since then she has moved from family to family, staying on floors until they ask her to move on. As a failed asylum seeker, she has no benefits, no home and no right to work. Were it not for the kindness of families offering her shelter, she would be destitute. The man across the road is not alone in feeling bitter. Asylum seekers are an isolated group in the UK. Vilified in fear-mongering headlines and subject to increasingly draconian measures by the Government, they are the latest in a long list of scapegoats. I went to live with Leyla because I wanted to find out what life is really like for people who have traveled thousands of miles to escape a country - to discover their motivations and to understand how it feels to step out of Somalia and find yourself in a predominantly white and working-class Northern suburb. It takes less than five minutes to drive up the A6 from Manchester to Salford, but it feels like a different world. For, while Salford has benefited greatly from the regeneration of the Quays and the opening of the Lowry Arts Centre, it remains one of the more deprived cities in Britain, sitting in the shadow of its thriving neighbor. In this part of Salford, there are no squares filled with beautiful sculptures and fountains and no streets lined with multi-cultural restaurants, delis and designer shops. Instead there is row upon row of worn-down and boarded-up terraced housing. I knock on the door of the house that Leyla is supposed to be in, but there is no answer. I try twice more before the door-handle turns and a shy-looking woman peeks her head around it. She looks younger than 21. I walk into a room with three women and a man - everyone seems nervous. On the television is a video of Somali women singing. The small lounge has basic furniture sitting on thin blue carpets. The seats are pushed up against the walls. The house has heating and water, but the wallpaper is peeling and there is damp on the ceiling. There is only a dull light and it is cold. A kitchen chair becomes a table when one woman brings me a cup of tea. She has a deep scar across her face, which looks as though it was made by someone taking a bite out of her cheek. The women begin to talk. They say they fled Somalia because they were raped, they saw their sons, husbands and fathers killed. They lived every day in fear. So far the Government believes one of them, Mariam, and has given her and her two daughters residence. One more, Fathia, is waiting with her three sons. 'Salford is OK,' says Mariam, who lives at another house near by. 'Some people good, some people bad.' Leyla and I spend the days together. We sit in the house, talking, watching the children. Leyla has scars on her face and legs. She says it is irrelevant now whether her story is true, because the Government does not believe her. She claims that she was raped as a child, lost her family and was taken into slavery. Eventually someone took pity on her and helped her to escape. She was put alone on a plane to England. In her first attempt to gain asylum they said she was lying about being Somali. In her appeal, they conceded that she was Somali, but denied that she was from a persecuted minority clan. In her final attempt, they said it was unlikely that someone would have taken pity on her. Now she is not sure what to do. The future seems bleak. There is nothing for her here, but there is nothing for her in Somalia. They have not tried to deport her - they have made her homeless, then left her alone. 'I want you to know,' she tells me more than once, 'that I like Britain and I like the Government. I don't blame them, but now my life is useless.' When she arrived she could not speak English but now she is almost fluent because of the time she spent in a college. On the first evening we go for a walk. At the end of the road there is a park where teenagers are making a bonfire. We pass them, but then Leyla says she prefers to avoid the area. As we turn to go I hear someone shrieking. A boy is leaning forward and screaming. To my horror, he is screaming at us. I can't hear at first, but it soon becomes clear. 'Asyyylluuum,' he hollers. 'Get the **** out of here. Blaacky.' His friends all start laughing. So does Leyla. As we walk away she does an impression of the boy. She leans back her head, holds up her arms and yelps: 'Asylum, blacky.' She turns it into a joke, but it reminds me of the past. My parents came to England in 1975 and I grew up only ten miles away from Salford. When I was a child people would sometimes scream 'Paki' at me and my brother. When I was six or seven I wished I was white and would ask my mum not to wear traditional clothes in public. But that stopped years ago and I am proud and comfortable about my race today. The kids who shouted at us are a new generation. They also want to abuse those different to them. But the focus has changed from anyone who is not white to asylum seekers. Being sworn at by a stranger always upset me and I am surprised at Leyla's calm and amused response. 'It is not all right for people to do that,' I say. 'It is not all right for people to launch eggs at your window or scream abuse at you.' She tells me that Salford is fine, and has got better over the past two years. 'It gets really bad when it snows,' she says giggling. 'They throw snowballs at the house.' A month ago a boy covered a stone in snow and threw it at her. We return and eat food with the others. That night we are both given beds to sleep in at Mariam's house. All night Leyla tosses and turns. The next morning she tells me she can't stay here much longer. These families have been incredibly kind, but they are also scared. If anyone from the council comes round to the house, Leyla has to hide in the bathroom or a storage cupboard. If she ends up on the streets it will be worse. 'I can't sleep at night,' she says hugging her knees, her eyes glazing over. 'All the time I worry about my situation. I want to get married, I want to have a family, I want to work. Now I can't do any of that. But Somalia is not safe to return to.' We walk down to the house that she used to live in. 'When the key didn't work I tried for two hours before I realized what had happened,' she says. 'Life felt so useless from that day. At least if I had a husband or children, but I am so alone. That night I went to the Salford Rapar building and screamed. I just stood outside crying.' Salford's Refugees and Asylum Participatory Research Project (Rapar) provides a place for people to go to for information and help and researches how dispersal is working. Inside Leyla is with friends. She passes me a piece of paper that outlines Fathia's story. It says her husband left her and her sons when she was gang-raped. Her family was locked into one room while four men attacked her with knives and guns. She claims to have been bitten in her cheek until blood was drawn. That is the scar I noticed when I first arrived. Listening to personal stories instead of statistics, I feel only sympathy. I ask them how they feel when they read that many Brits do not want asylum seekers here. 'Why would anyone hate me?' says one of Leyla's friends, who has also failed her claim. 'I have nothing, no food or money, nothing.' But life in Salford has a positive side. Each day at 3pm we go to pick up the children from school. They career around shouting and playing with the other children. In less than a year they are all fluent in English. Mariam has two daughters who would have nothing if they were in Somalia. But here they have an education and are safe. 'For me, I thank God and I thank the British Government,' Mariam tells me. 'When I came here everywhere people were kind to me and my daughters. You can't say no to children.' She saw her son killed in Somalia. 'My life is finished,' she adds, 'but I am so happy to be here, because my children and their children can have a future.' I tell her about my school and university and her eyes light up: 'I hope my girls, they get to university. Without children life is nothing.' One night Mariam puts back on the video of dancing Somali refugees in the Netherlands. After a few moments three women, five children and two men are dancing around the room. Mariam wants me to know what they are singing: 'Men of Somalia listen to us, stop this civil war - you kill our brothers, fathers and husbands, and us women we cry.' Inside that room it didn't matter if we were in Salford or Somalia. This is not a story of economic migration. The women would love to go home if it were safe. They reminisce about Somalia. 'There are animals everywhere, giraffes, elephants, donkeys,' says Leyla laughing. All of them have left close family members behind, and there is no contact to know if they are dead or alive. Whenever I ask Leyla if she would prefer to go back, she says 'no, Somalia not safe' and everyone agrees. Fathia leaves the room and sits down in the kitchen to have a cigarette. I sit with her. She only speaks broken English: 'We smile to try to forget, so we don't cry any more - so the children don't see cry. They will be happy here.' The phone rings and Fathia's youngest son picks it up. He holds his hands in the air and gasps 'police', and then bursts out laughing. At only six years old he is aware of their situation. His mum tells him I have come to take him to Somalia and he screams 'no'. The chances are he will be allowed to stay. But Leyla has no hope left. Sitting in the lounge, I become very aware of the clock ticking by and try to imagine what it would be like if there was nothing to look forward to. Every month Leyla is required to sign in at a local building to show she is still here. She never tries to deceive the authorities. 'People have been dumped in Salford, but without resources,' says Dr Rhetta Moran, a senior research fellow at the Revans Institute with overall responsibility for the Salford Rapar project. 'There was no additional support for local practitioners. There is not one immigration solicitor in the whole city. And it leads to bitterness because this is a place where locals have been making their own demands on the council for years.' Moran thinks that adjusting to this situation is as hard for those seeking asylum as the indigenous population. 'They are the most vulnerable people in the country,' she adds. 'It is a waterfall of suffering and we just see a tiny part of it. Again and again we see feelings of isolation, loss and anxiety.' During my time with Leyla, I have felt eyes looking at me wherever I go. Children are happy to scream abuse at asylum seekers. But she doesn't mind being a scapegoat, she doesn't mind the screaming or the eggs. It is ten times better than being raped. At least here she was able to tell her story more than once. Where she comes from there was and is no appeal system - her boss just threw boiling water on to her legs if she ever complained. As I leave Leyla, I tell her she must not give up hope. To that she simply laughs and says: 'I hope if you tell our story it might make everything better.' Names have been changed.
  22. Justice On the Corner for Respected Somali Traditional Chief Sultan Hurre Somali Peace Rally (Galkaio City, Somalia) Galkaio City, Somalia SPR is pleased to know that the criminal case against Abdullahi Yusuf, the man who calls himself the President of Puntland has made a major breakthrough. Col. Yousuf ordered the elimination of the respected traditional chief Sultan Hurre who was brutally shot point blank by the dictator’s bodyguards on August 17, 2002, at Kalabeyr village in Puntland State of Somalia. Sources close to the case confirmed to SPR that the case passed two major hurdles that the Colonel’s defense attorney had set up. Initially, Abdullahi’s team argued that this is a civil dispute, and repeatedly offered blood money, sometimes trying to play dirty games. In the end, the choice was given to the family of the killed Sultan whether to take blood-money or press criminal charges against the Colonel. Obviously, they opted for the latter. More recently and more importantly, the Colonel’s defense did not only lost the venue of the court proceedings but agreed to the defendants’ that Puntland is not convenient for a case like this. Abdullahi’s defense was arguing that the case should be taken by Puntland authorities and elders. The defense admitted that if Abdullahi is convicted, nobody can enforce a judgement against him. SPR believes that it is a great development for today’s Somalia, where killing people and roaming international capital cities have become a normal thing. If Sultan Hurre’s case sees the light of the day, this would be a major progress for all the Somalis who are (or were) the victims of brutal warlords. Indeed, the world would know that there are people who have blood on their hands and are not only going around with impunity but want to get immunity by becoming Somalia’s future leaders. It is hoped that this case will set the record straight, and call spade spade. SPR congratulates the family of Sultan Hurre, their supporters in Somalia and outside, and the Sultan’s attorney who did a great job. Now justice is on the corner for the great respected traditional chief who succumbed under the order of a ruthless dictator. The dictator is now hiding in London and seeking a medical help from the country whose citizen was brutally killed by him.
  23. Nairobi The Ethiopian military and militiamen have invaded Kenya through Moyale, the House was told. Three villages had been raided by the foreign force, Moyale MP Guracha Galgalo (Kanu) informed the House, after which the Opposition accused the Government of doing nothing about the invasion. An assistant minister in the President's Office, Mr Stephen Tarus, who was bombarded with questions, failed to offer a satisfactory explanation about the Government's action on the matter. His remarks that a military detachment based in Moyale would tackle the invaders did not go down well with members. Galgalo said he had received reports of the invasion yesterday, adding that locals had fled their homes for fear of being attacked. He added that about 50 people, dressed in military fatigue, stopped two passenger vehicles, robbed and harassed people before abducting a boy. The MP, who had stood to speak on a point of order after question time, said the Medical Officer of Health for Moyale had also been abducted and was being tortured in Ethiopian cells. The MP, who expressed his anger by banging the dispatch table as he spoke, charged that the Government had done nothing to contain the situation. Tarus, who had been asked to furnish the House with a ministerial statement yesterday on the matter, asked to be allowed to do so on Tuesday. However, his response angered opposition MPs, with most of them standing up simultaneously to protest. Galgalo demanded that the minister explain what the Government would do to control the situation as the statement was being awaited. "Mr Speaker, can the minister order the military to deploy and contain the situation," he pleaded. Deputy Speaker David Musila said the matter was serious as the country's security was in jeopardy. He ordered Tarus to tell the House what the Government had done in the meantime before he delivered the statement on Tuesday. The minister sparked more anger when he said he had information that it was not the Ethiopian military but militias who had crossed over into Kenya. The Government would use the military to repel the raiders, he said, adding that displaced people would be supplied with relief food. At this point, Kajiado Central MP Joseph Nkaissery (Kanu) said Tarus was probably unaware of the international procedures to be followed in such circumstances. Nkaissery, a former top army officer, said the Government should approach the problem by first summoning the Ethiopian ambassador to make an official protest. The second step, the MP went on, would require the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call Kenya's ambassador in Ethiopia and direct him to protest to the Ethiopian Government. Nkaissery, who was applauded during his contribution, added that the third step would entail the deployment of the military to contain the situation. "Mr Speaker, we cannot afford to do nothing as our country is being invaded. If this Government has failed, it should resign," he remarked amid applause. Tarus said the Government would give diplomacy a chance before taking any military action.