Yes I am very aware of what is being offered to the **** in ethiopia, and their continued rejection of that particular temptation. Contrast their rejection with others collaboration. Perhaps now the ONLF will realise that cosanguinty will never determine rejection of Ethiopia. . From another angle why is it you guys got so comfortable in Puntland? Was it not obvious that diffrent intreasts would manifest in this particular way as happened in Somaliland? Just curious? [ November 03, 2009, 11:23 PM: Message edited by: Miskiin-Macruuf-Aqiyaar ]

Yes I am very aware of what is being offered to the O in ethiopia, and their continued rejection of that particular temptation. Contrast their rejection with others collaboration. Perhaps now the ONLF will realise that cosanguinty will never determine rejection of Ethiopia. . From another angle why is it you guys got so comfortable in Puntland? Was it not obvious that diffrent intreasts would manifest in this particular way as happened in Somaliland? Just curious?

Jabarti National Movement. Thats whats up.

Probably Shabaab. or makirians, or "air-pirates", it is not JB because he is scared of jumping too high let alone flying.

A&T I have seen you and your compatriots endlessly adress this issue on the forums, quite simply as a non-o.gadeni I am 100% behind the struggle of the ONLF and any entity that FIGHTS [this being the operative word] for the survival and self-determination of Somali galbeed, whilst not being blind to obvious shortcomings, the shortcomings do not in anyway make it acceptable, for saaqajans to even breathe the words ONLF let alone purport to guide and advise the ONLF on tactics or strategy, when they are day and night representing Tribal bantustans, or politicians on the basis of the clannism that they accuse the ONLF of being based on. One mans Clannism leads to a heroic and increasingly savvy liberation movement being formed, while another allows for the creation of mini-mendacious-malicious statelets all over somalia. The support of every right minded somali is behind the ONLF, regardless of what even you say P.S was their ever any somali jabhad based on anything but clan, composed, sponsored, run and benefiting in the majiority intreast of one clan or the other, either in the intreasts of revisioned history or pure baseness?? SNM,USC,SSDF and what ever alphabet soup organisation dismembered somalia, the ONLF will dismember Ethopia. This galls some, but others wait for it in quiet expectation.

Originally posted by Jacaylbaro: ^ ^ and that is the problem when you don't bring Ethiopians with you ,,,

The United States is willfully letting millions of Somalis go hungry in its drive to hunt down terrorists. There is a new humanitarian crisis unfolding in Somalia, and the United States is partly to blame. Despite sending $2 million and 40 tons of arms and ammunition to the country's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) earlier this year, now, the United States is withholding humanitarian aid until relief agencies agree to comply with strict, game-stopping conditions. The decision to abruptly halt assistance came following suspicions that U.S. aid might be ending up with Somali "terrorists." The main worry is an al Qaeda-linked group called al-Shabab, the leading Islamic militant group fighting against the feeble but internationally backed government. Al-Shabab controls most of south-central Somalia, while the TFG controls only a few areas of the capital, Mogadishu. The south-central region is home to 2.7 million of the 3.63 million Somalis in need of emergency assistance. So, reaching many of Somalia's people with aid would likely entail operating on al-Shabab's turf and interacting with elements of the group to facilitate logistics. U.S. Treasury Department sanctions strictly prohibit any financial transactions or dealings with al-Shabab and other Somali groups labeled as "terrorists." Yet clearly the concern is not absolute; the U.S. government seems less concerned that the guns and ammo sent as military assistance, intended to prop up the fragile government and keep control of a country brimming with violence, are allegedly being resold on the streets of Mogadishu. The halt in humanitarian assistance will cripple the work of relief organizations and, as a consequence, hurt their Somali beneficiaries. U.S. officials justifiably fear that they and their partners could be held responsible, even prosecuted, for supporting terrorists if relief funds ended up in the hands of al-Shabab. At first, the U.S. government reviewed the situation and "delayed" funding. Subsequently, Washington issued conditions with which aid agencies must comply to legally operate in Somalia. But the conditions are so restrictive that it would be virtually impossible for operating agencies to meet them. (To preserve the security of those groups on the ground, specific conditions cannot be stated here.) The damage is not just temporary. The new, politically charged rules would destroy relief organizations' neutrality in Somalia. Humanitarian aid derives its legitimacy from impartiality -- the notion that aid is provisioned on need alone, rather than politics. In Somalia, where the U.S. government is often viewed unfavorably, political impartiality is a practical consideration as well; it is central to the ability of relief agencies to function safely and effectively. The new U.S. conditions would undermine this core principle by making it nearly impossible for relief agencies to legally operate in al-Shabab-run territory, including many of the most desperate regions of Somalia. The country is already one of the most dangerous for humanitarian workers, so the United States' attempt to bring relief workers under its purview will only increase Somali suspicion toward them and make the environment more precarious. On top of this policy disaster, money for relief in Somalia is running out. The U.N. World Food Program estimates that its coffers will be empty within the next few weeks. Even if more funds were pledged today, it could require as many as four months for the money to reach beneficiaries on the ground. There will be an inevitable gap in assistance to Somalis. The timing could not be worse. The country's already catastrophic humanitarian crisis is being compounded by a drought that has struck much of the Horn of Africa. Nearly half the population is estimated to urgently need aid -- some 3.63 million people. The U.S. government is holding the Somalia relief enterprise and its beneficiaries hostage to its counterterrorism policy. Agencies have resolutely upheld their commitment to humanitarian impartiality and refused to be shut down by unreasonable conditions. Unfortunately, that precludes them from accepting U.S. funds -- normally half of all aid to Somalia. Until Washington lets agencies fulfill their mission unhindered, the U.S. mission to win "hearts and minds" in Somalia, a feared up-and-coming stronghold of terrorism, will be completely undermined. Knowingly allowing millions of people to suffer is no way to win friends.

y MUGUMO MUNENE and GITAU WARIGI Posted Saturday, October 24 2009 at 22:34 The Kenyan military has been secretly training police officers on behalf of Somali’s fledgling transitional government in what Department of Defence spokesman Bogita Ongeri says is in line with international agreements. The timing of the official admission by Kenya’s usually tight-lipped military is telling. It coincides with rumours widely circulating in northeastern Kenya and in Somalia itself that the Kenya Government has been recruiting fighters from among young Kenyan Somalis to help the TFG fight the Islamist threat inside Somalia. Dismissing the reports, Mr Ongeri said “as far as we know, all those we have trained are from Somalia and were handed over to us by the TFG for training”. “The Kenyan military has not done anything outside the UN and AU frameworks of assisting Somalia as a country to achieve peace and tranquillity. Kenya was to chip in by training the Somali police. We will continue to train them,” he told Africa Insight. The location of the training remains secret for “security reasons”. According to Mr Ongeri, the Kenyan military had not received any complaints from any Kenyan parent that their son was recruited to be trained as a Somali police officer or to play any other role in the conflict that has raged for nearly two decades. Potential soldiers The commander of Somali military forces, General Yusuf Dhumal, told reporters in Mogadishu last Thursday that Somalia and Kenya are cooperating in efforts to recruit potential soldiers for the Somali government from Kenya’s northeastern region. The general said that 1,500 Kenyan men have been recruited and are being trained at camps in Kenya to fight Islamist rebels in Somalia. He says the recruiting effort is part of the Somali government’s plan to build a strong army that can defend the country. But Mr Ongeri said if at all there is any Kenyan who may have lied on his nationality to enrol for the police training, if discovered, will be discontinued and punished. Human Rights Watch had accused Kenya of backing the recruitment of Somali refugees at United Nations camps in northeastern Kenya to fight for the Somali army against militant Islamist insurgents in a report released this week. But Somalia’s Prime Minister Omar Sharmarke dismissed the Human Rights Watch report. “We never recruited in Kenya,” Mr Sharmarke said. On his part, Mr Ongeri dismissed the claim as “propaganda’’. “We are not involved in any such operation,” he was quoted as saying in the Human Rights Watch report. A month ago, Kenya’s Defence Minister Yusuf Hajj said leaders from North Eastern Province had received unconfirmed reports that Al-Shabaab was targeting Kenyan youth for training but that there was no conclusive evidence to show the same. However, the leaders – MPs and sheikhs from the vast province – did not just dismiss the unconfirmed reports but launched a campaign to ask their youth to desist from falling to extremist teachings and tendencies associated with some militia groups in Somalia. It is noteworthy that the Kenyan military are the ones conducting training for Somalis who are meant to be police officers. Kenya has for long borne the brunt of an unstable Somalia with proliferation of small arms that have been used to push Kenyan law enforcers to the limits. That notwithstanding, the likelihood that these personnel trained by the Kenyan military will be inducted by the hard-pressed TFG into paramilitary duties cannot have escaped the Kenyan trainers. But it’s a matter squarely in the hands of the TFG. The TFG has not disclosed where exactly it trains its troops. But this month, it emerged that Djibouti was one of the countries that conduct training when the first batch of trainee soldiers estimated at 500 were received at the Villa Somalia, the presidential palace in Mogadishu. According to Radio Garowe, which broadcasts from Puntland, French military advisers assisted in the training. Some of the freewheeling Somali blogs claim that Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia are assisting the TFG with military training, but the reports have not been confirmed. Whereas the extent of Al-Shabaab’s possible penetration into northern Kenya remains unclear, the reach of the Islamists’ recruitment outside their homeland appears to be extensive. The TFG itself has repeatedly circulated reports of fighters allied to Al-Shabaab trickling in from Yemen, the Persian Gulf and even Pakistan. Ethnic Somalis driven to join the Islamists have been uncovered coming from as far away as Minnesota in the US. However, it is the reported presence of so-called international jihadists with links to Al-Qaeda that the US and Somalia’s secular neighbours are particularly alarmed about. This is the element believed to have introduced into the Somali conflict the signature jihadist method of suicide bombing. Last month, such a suicide attack targeted premises occupied by AU peacekeeping troops in Mogadishu and resulted in several fatalities. In the same month, a Kenyan fugitive accused of Al-Qaeda links, Ali Saleh Nabhan, was killed in a helicopter attack staged by US special forces in southern Somalia. The circumstances that prevailed at the time the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) were scoring their successes in Somalia are markedly different from those Al-Shabaab and its allies are encountering presently. Though in most cases the same militias who fought for the ICU are the same ones who reconstituted themselves into the ranks of the Al-Shaabab insurgency, the ICU had a more coherent programme of extending civil order among the population and were able to win popular support for being a bulwark against the hated clan warlords of old. Thus, the ICU was able to rapidly entrench its authority in much of Somalia and to wrest control of the capital Mogadishu before the Ethiopians intervened in December 2006 and crushed them militarily. Despite the air of invincibility Al-Shabab’s hold is limited to south and parts of central Somalia. Control over Mogadishu – the biggest prize – remains stalemated between the Islamists and TFG forces. The all-important port of Mogadishu still remains in the hands of the TFG. The Islamist front in Somalia has actually been significantly weakened by open differences between Al-Shabaab and their chief ally Hizbul Islam. These differences recently degenerated into brutal gunfights in Kismayu. The control of Kismayu is critical for the levying of port taxes which the militias appropriate. It is also crucial as the entry point of clandestine shipments of weapons needed by the Islamists. Analysts do not discount further fragmentation within the Islamist ranks, especially if the overall situation in Somalia continues to be a stalemate and the international community remains steadfast in ensuring the TFG does not collapse. They believe that the strategy is to keep the TFG standing with the hope that Al-Shabaab will lose steam and fragment as the deadlock persists.

Another Somali city enduring pax shabaab.

Does it bring tears to your eyes.

Xiinfanin is a teacher and all learned somalis wear glasses consequently.....thats Xiin. deduction my dear watson

omali Islamist commander gunned down in capital Posted: Oct 9, 2009 03:27 PM Updated: Oct 9, 2009 03:27 PM MOGADISHU, Somalia (AP) - An Islamist spokesman says gunmen have killed a senior member of Somalia's insurgency in the country's capital. Hizbul Islam spokesman Mohammed Osman Aros says the group does not know who killed Ahmed Abdurahamn Odawa, known as "Taliban". Local resident Mohamud Aden says Odawa's bodyguard and a nearby civilian were also killed. The attack follows clashes between the Islamic Party and al-Shabab over revenues generated in the southern port town of Kismayo. It was unclear whether the al-Shabab group was responsible for the attack. Three people were killed and six injured in a separate incident Friday. Local resident Salad Ahmed says he saw the bodies after the Islamic Party attacked a government base in the central Somali village of Bacda. Copyright 2009 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Really thats the only reason I could think of. 8 months into office and already this accolade, did Bill Clinton even win it for the white house moment or George bush senior for Oslo?

People are beggining to see spys everywhere. Where are they....they are right behind you. How long did al-shabaab think its control of kismayoo would go uncontested.

JB waa inoo sidaas! :cool:

The Well Runs Dry Christopher Boucek, Gregory Johnsen Yemen is invariably referred to as the "land of faith and wisdom" in jihadi journals and videos, echoing a famous saying of the prophet Mohammed. But what was true 1,400 years ago rings more than a little hollow today. Few in the West have much faith in the continued stability of the Yemeni state or see wisdom in investing in an opaque economy plagued by rampant and systematic corruption. These concerns, combined with the rapid depletion of Yemen's water table and its oil reserves, are causing the state's already limited power to recede further back into major urban areas. Meanwhile, the rural and tribal areas of the country, many of which have long been beyond the full reach of the government, are gaining increasing autonomy -- opening up space for al Qaeda to regroup and use the country's undergoverned regions as a staging area for attacks throughout the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It's not hard to imagine Yemen ultimately looking a lot more like chaotic Somalia, its neighbor across the Gulf of Aden. The security situation in Yemen is steadily worsening. In February 2006, 23 al Qaeda prisoners tunneled out of a political security prison and into a neighboring mosque, where they walked out the front door to freedom. Among the escapees was Nasir al-Wahayshi, a former secretary to Osama bin Laden who fought in the battle at Tora Bora before escaping to Iran, where he was eventually arrested and extradited to Yemen. At the time of the prison break, al Qaeda's Yemen branch had been largely eliminated. But the past three years of violence have underscored the dangers of lapsed vigilance, illustrating what can happen when highly experienced and motivated fighters return to the battlefield. This is surely a concern for U.S. officials as they debate what to do with the 99 Yemenis being held at Guantánamo Bay. Although some appear to be innocent, separating them from the guilty has proven to be an overwhelming task for U.S. investigators. Wahayshi, along with fellow escapee Qasim al-Raymi, have spent the years since their escape rebuilding and restructuring an al Qaeda network in Yemen that is designed to survive the loss of key commanders. Once a durable infrastructure was established, their ambitions grew and they looked to expand and upgrade their local al Qaeda chapter into a regional franchise. This took place in mid-January, when the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al Qaeda combined forces under Wahayshi's command. But as dangerous as al Qaeda is, in the Yemeni government's calculations it does not represent an existential threat to the survival of the regime in the same way as the religious revolt in the north and talk of secession in the south do. The northern revolt began in June 2004, when the Yemeni government overreached and tried to arrest a former member of parliament, following years of confrontations and government support for transplanted Wahhabi extremists against a local community of Shiites known as Zaydis. The fighting has been centered in the mountainous northern governorate of Sadah, and the Zaydis' Shiite identity has led to claims that Iran is meddling on Saudi Arabia's southern border, drawing the attention of Saudi and U.S. security officials. But despite Yemeni allegations to that effect, no firm evidence has come out. The war is on hold, following a secret deal between the president and the rebel leader, which is likely to last only until parliamentary elections are held later this year. Nationwide elections were originally scheduled for April, but threats of a boycott and backroom negotiations could postpone them six months. Further complicating matters are muttered threats of secession and popular protests organized by some in the Yemeni Socialist Party. Despite the party's relatively weak power base, the government takes these threats seriously. It recently put 160 Islamist militants in the southern governorate of Abyan on its payroll, which many southerners see as a replay of the early 1990s, when scores of socialist leaders were assassinated in the buildup to the 1994 civil war. As if these political and security problems were not enough, Yemen's chronic economic, demographic, natural resource, and human development challenges are only growing worse with each passing year. Most critically, the state's oil reserves are almost tapped out. Yemen is a very modest oil producer, yet it generates approximately 80 percent of its income from oil exports. As of 2003, the country was exporting more than 450,000 barrels per day, but Minister of Oil Amir Salem al-Aidroos warns that exports had fallen to roughly 280,000 barrels per day by January 2009. Barring any major discoveries (and none are expected), Yemen will likely run out of exportable oil within the next decade. This is not merely an economic issue. The Yemeni government relies on the hard currency generated by oil exports to fund the state and lubricate the extensive patronage systems that tie the country together. For the past several years, record global crude prices had masked the reality of Yemen's declining export capacity, allowing the government to ignore the impending reckoning. The country now exports fewer barrels of oil per day and earns significantly less income per barrel -- almost $100 less than it did only six months ago. The resulting nose dive in government revenues has forced several budget revisions and led the Ministry of Finance to order budget cuts of 50 percent throughout the entire bureaucracy, further underscoring how serious the government is taking threats of southern secession. The economic crisis will likely hit Yemen hardest at just about the time that President Ali Abdullah Saleh will be forced to step down as the unified country's first and only president -- leaving a power vacuum in his wake. Yemen has done little planning for a post-petroleum economy, and most analysts doubt state expectations that natural gas will be able to fill the void left by oil. In a best-case scenario, if natural gas exports come online in significant quantities, there will still be a lag between the end of oil and the rise of gas. It is not at all clear how the country will deal with this inevitable gap. Of even greater concern, perhaps, is the fact that the country is rapidly running out of water. Groundwater used for agriculture and basic human needs is being consumed faster than it can be replaced, resulting in dramatically falling water tables -- up to several meters per year in some places. Sanaa might very well become the first capital in the world to run out of water. Natural aquifers are being depleted at astounding rates due to a lack of any serious legal oversight, reckless irrigation techniques, and unregulated private exploitation. India, with more than 50 times the population, has fewer than one eighth as many private water-drilling rigs. Nearly all Yemen's arable land is devoted to cultivating khat, a seminarcotic plant whose leaves are habitually chewed by most male Yemenis. The more water khat is given, the more it thrives, leading many farmers to irrigate with little thought to the consequences. Given the costs and terrain involved, desalination is not feasible. In the absence of significant measures to reduce urban population growth and eliminate the hidden subsidies that encourage unlimited private exploitation of the country's water, Yemen's future looks extremely bleak. Exacerbating all these trends are the country's demographics. Yemen has one of the highest population growth rates in the world, at just under 3.5 percent. The current population is expected to double to more than 40 million within two decades. The delivery of basic government services is hampered by the fact that the population is spread throughout 135,000 villages, with many located in isolated areas. Education and healthcare services are limited for most, as is reliable electricity and other services. Most Yemenis outside major urban areas receive little from the central government, and as a result the regime's authority and presence in the governorates is largely absent. Yemen has long had a reputation among outside observers of stumbling from one crisis to the next without ever completely collapsing, but much of what appeared to be blind luck was calculated governance fueled by petrodollars. When the well runs dry, that luck may run out as well. Gregory D. Johnsen is a Ph.D. candidate in Near Eastern studies at Princeton University.

^^^^ Indeed good analysis. Clannism per se can be used positively, up until other factors be they economic or social supersedes it.

Indeed Xiin, but fundamentally one cannot "outlaw" the psyche of the somali people. It will always be there until other segmentations preoccupy the minds of our people, like class, regions e.t.c Laws and decelerations would be broken during the Jalle era or at any other time, until when qabiil truly becomes irrelevant.

the law was passed and failed miserably during the Barre era.

Ibtisam would you not be debating with non-maharam as the education minister as well, indeed would not that be a position of leadership, that you have removed yourself from?

^^^ Do you automatically disqualify yourself from the presidency because you are a woman ibtisam?

Waar Cowke awaay? Why are you laughing xaasid yahow

SANAAGPOST - Inj. Xuseen Maxamed Faarax Ceydiid, wuxuu mar ahaa hogaamiyaha siyaasadeed ee ugu weyn Koofurta Soomaaliya kadib dhimashadii geerida aabihii, wuxuuna la wareegay degaan balaaran, hanti iyo ciidan markaasi awood badan lahaa. Wuxuu mar kale ahaa hoggaamiyaha ugu da’a yare ee qabqableyaashii dagaalka, isagoo shirkii Carte ee madaxweynaha loogu soo doortay arrimaha uu uga baaqday ay ugu weyneyd isagoo markaa aan 40 sano gaarin una tartami karin jagada madaxweynaha. Mar kale waxaa Xuseen Ceydiid lagu sifeyn karaa siyaasi aan deganeyn laakiin waxaa la xusuustaa intii uu socday shirkii Kenya inuu ka dhawaajiyay halista islaamiyiinta Soomaaliya ka soo socota. Ina Ceydiid waxaa la yaab lahayd inuu ka hor yimid musharaxnimadii adeerkii C/llaahi Axmed Caddow kuna tilmaamay nin ka haray xukuumadii Siyaad Barre oo xitaa haddii uu doorashada ku soo baxo aanu ogolaan doonin inuu fariisto madaxtooyada Villa Somalia oo marka taageerayaashiisu gacanta ku hayeen halka uu C/llaahi Yuusuf ku tilmaamay halgame loo furayo madaxtooyada. Waa nin aan inta badan mowqif cad laga qorin ee warkiisu u dhaxeyo run iyo been, waana halkii uu C/llaahi Yuusuf ka yiri: waa nin aan caadi ahayn, markii uu shaaca ka qaaday in Itoobiya iyo Soomaaliya la isku darayo hal baasaboorna ay yeelanayaan xilligaan oo ra’iisal wasaare xigeen iyo wasiirka gudaha uu ka ahaa xukuumadii Cali Geedi. Mar kale ayuu Xuseen Ceydiid is bedelay wuxuuna qabtay Ereteria isagoo ku biiray baarlamaankii xorta ahaa waxna ka dhisay Isbaheysigii dib u xoreynta ee Asmara, laakiin waxaa la yaab lahayd inuu Xuseen Ceydiid ku garab noqday Sheekh Xasan Daahir oo aanay isku qaab iyo wado ahayn. Kala jabkii Isbaheysiga wuxuu Xuseen Ceydiid dadka kaga yaabiyay isagoo Sheekh Shariif ku tilmaamay nin ku kacay qiyaamo qaran, waxaana intaas u raacday doorashadii Shariifka kadib inuu gaabsaday isaga iyo raggii kale ee ku mowqifka ahaa sida; 1. Sakariye Xaaji Maxamuud 2. Gen. Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib 3. Jaamac Cali Jaamac 4. iyo Shariif Saalax Maxamed Xubnahan waxay ka hareen nidaamkii ay garanayeen ee cilmaaniga ahaa sababo aaan si cad loo garaneyn balse duruufo ku xeeran yihiin, waxayna daba safteen Sheekh Xasan Daahir oo isna halkoodii uga dhaqaajiyay una wareegay hogaaminta Xisbigii saaxiibadii u aasaaseen ee Xisbul Islaam. Xuseen Ceydiid iyo xubnahan kale waxay awoodi waayeen inay sii wadaan howshii uu Xasan Daahir uga baxay ee Isbaheysiga Asmara haba ugu wacnaato dowladda Ereteriya oon dooneyn, wayna ku dhici waayeen inay Xisbul Islaam la galaan Sheekhii ay taageereen ileyn kooxaha diiniga ah sal kuma lahayne, horena waxay uga hareen saaxiibadoodii kale ee Shariifka raacay, sidaas ayay duufaan siyaasdeed ku qaaday oo muuqood daaye maqalkood loo waayay. Haddii aad akhristayaalow wax inagu dhaantaan Xuseen Ceydiid iyo raggan aanu baafineyno meel ku sheega. Sanaagpost News Desk

Yup I think of most diaspora communities they are very engaged and vibrant. In comparision london and the Nordic states have diaspora communities that just make you want to hide your self in shame. Either in the shisha hall or in the welfare office. But minnesota is setting track on debates over the motherland. By thw way anyone in Ohio currently attending/attended?

It seems Xisbul fighters are voting with their feet.