^^ loool taasina wa baab kale:D

Carafaat do you know where it all went wrong when the Sumaals people like you and me tried to introduce their way of culture into the rest of the said Somalis in particularly those who we call the farmers who go by the name of Biyo-maal. Our Nomadic pastroralist culture i just a section of what our people are and that's where it all went wrong. There are two major tribes who claim that they are from Arabia or have some genealogical links with the Arabian peninsula kuwa kale waxay yidhahan cali zulu baanu la tol nahay.

^^ Waryaa Somaliland dee siyasada Somalia shaqo kuma laha wa dal la jaar ah Somalia wax fahan:D

Mr Carab ciise is working hard

International engagement in Somalia: lessons from Somaliland? By Michael Walls, on 29 February 2012 Alex de Waal, writing in the NY Times on 21st February, argued that instead of focusing on the negative, international policy-makers should recognise the remarkable achievements of many in Somalia, and most particularly those of the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. [http://nyti.ms/zP0L4T] His comments were timed for two days before a major international conference on Somalia held in London and hosted by the UK government on 23rd February. But in the run-up to the conference, William Hague repeatedly used the phrase ‘Somalia is the world’s-worst failed state’, suggesting that the focus on the negative is here to stay. This is in spite of conference talk about ‘supporting local initiatives’ and the need for the process to be ‘Somali-led’. Taking a rather more cynical line, respected French academic Gerard Prunier described the conference as ‘Alice in Wonderland Goes Imperialist’, and ridiculed the organisers for calling for Somali-led initiatives while inviting few Somalis to the conference itself. [http://bit.ly/whCEH3] So how do we pick our way through the myriad of viewpoints? While I agree with many of Prunier’s points and even much of his argument, I have to say that I am not as cynical about the process as he is. And while I wholeheartedly support the tenor of much of de Waal’s article, we need to take considerable care if we are to chart a constructive engagement that recognises positive achievement. The conference was welcome in many ways in that it raised many important questions and suggested a new sophistication in some of the discourse amongst the international donor, diplomatic and civil society communities. However, there is no consensus yet on what that sophistication means in policy terms. And what of Somaliland? They have certainly achieved an immense amount. Meaningful elections, the transfer of power from a standing incumbent to his opposition challenger … these are remarkable advances, as is the durability of peace throughout most of the country. Indeed, Somaliland is seen by some as an object lesson in how Somalis will succeed if they are just left alone. But that fails to recognise the fact that Somali society has always been based on links, particularly through trade but also religion and politics, with the outside world and between different Somali clans. That model relies precisely on not being ‘left alone’. But Somaliland also clearly shows us that the nature of engagement is vitally important. Heeding that observation, many people are talking about the need to support locally-based initiatives. But there is great risk there too, because it means having to find a way of picking who to support. Somaliland has achieved a lot, and Puntland has also made some progress, but what about the burgeoning number of smaller entities who are claiming ‘local legitimacy’? Individuals were even handing out business cards at events in London during the week of the conference declaring them to be President of some hitherto unknown Somali state. Which ones are real and worth supporting? As complicated as the situation is, there are some lessons we can learn as outsiders. There seems little doubt that there is a need for local disputes to be resolved before there is a move to form a ‘national’ government, whatever that might look like. That is the process that occurred in Somaliland. It means that there needs to be a great deal of discussion amongst Somalis and led by Somalis about how they will settle the complex web of grievances and counter-grievances that have built up over the past two decades of conflict in the south. International actors can support the process by allowing it to take place, by insisting that resolutions are agreed before the process moves on, and by providing small amounts of material support where there is a demonstrable need. But those interventions need to be proportionate. They must not dominate the process, which needs to succeed or fail on its own terms. In other words, there has to be real reward for local groups who succeed in agreeing a peace deal with their neighbouring antagonists, but they must also bear most of the cost of achieving that deal, and also the cost of failing to do so. That also means that an early focus on elections would be counter productive. For many Somalis, representative democracy in which individuals are elected to make decisions on behalf of a populace is less democratic than the patriarchal but otherwise egalitarian (for men) system of discussion and debate that is employed under Somali custom. So elections are not a process of ‘democratisation’ but rather the opposite: a retreat from the slow and unpredictable process of consensus-building to a less egalitarian but more efficient form of decision-making. Now let’s not get this wrong: it is very likely that representative democracy will eventually be needed in some form in the Somali territories in order to facilitate the establishment of a reasonably legitimate state. That is, after all, the transition that Somaliland has gone so far towards achieving. But in the southern areas of the erstwhile Republic of Somalia, the time is not yet right for that transition. And in the meantime, external actors need to be prepared to go along with an unpredictable and probably fairly slow process of consensus-building. The most remarkable thing about Somaliland is that, whatever the claims to the contrary, it was founded as a genuinely multi-clan polity, and no other multi-clan Somali political entity has been so successful and with such genuinely local involvement. The simmering tensions between the different clans represented within Somaliland’s colonial borders represent a significant challenge, but it is important to remember that those who are currently most dissatisfied with the Somaliland administration were intimately involved in the formation of the state between 1991 and 1997. The fact that Somaliland was founded as a multi-clan political union with broad local support should not be forgotten by anyone. Part of the lesson is that political nationalism is not the same as cultural, linguistic or religious unity. The political nation-state is a construct that requires a great deal of compromise. Somali society is remarkably vibrant and, in many ways, successful. The measure of economic performance that would pass for GDP per capita if reliable data were available almost certainly surpasses that of neighbouring countries. The telecoms, finance and trade sectors thrive. Just about everywhere, not just in Hargeisa or Bosaso. But business unity and cultural, linguistic and religious commonalities have not formed a good base for nationhood elsewhere, so why should they here? The dream of a unitary state based on either one or other sub-clan grouping or, at the other extreme, a Greater Somalia, just don’t make sense. As the various actors who met in London on 23rd February move to develop a new approach to supporting stability in the Somali Horn of Africa, they would do well to build on local initiatives, and to support the successes that are already evident. But that needs to be done with caution and patience. Hurrying the process is likely to worsen security for the UK, US and Somalia’s neighbours and prolong the crisis for locals. But facilitating a process which is Somali-led requires a willingness by international actors to step back and let Somalis agree for themselves: first of all, the terms under which they’ll coexist with other clans and sub-clans; and, secondly, what their state will look like. That will test the patience and commitment of international actors, regardless of how sophisticated their dialogue. But it’s a test that they need to pass just as Somalis themselves must negotiate difficult compromises.

Tarzan rag badan ba ka cadhooday:D

aun inti dhimatay

War ileen tan oo kale dhimasho dhimasho ka fiican ma jirto allah ha naxariisto all the people died those who died in hargeysa or in mogadisho in 1991 or the one killed by the foreign invaders or the one killed in somali galbeed.

Muxu yidhi dr osman we can bribe nations meesha ma wuxu haysta xeradi xawayaanka eeh faroole. This getting funnier and funnier.

Cabdilahi yusuf the warlord was not welcome in Xamar you have a problem with that.

tarzan will be a great leader if he he actually runs and i am sure he will even win.

Saalixyas were not actual suufis the madhab was based sufism but it had more of Salafaism Muhammad Bin salih the founder of the Salihiya tariqa was a devoted salafist before he went into the Salihya order. The dervishes used to refer to themselves as Darawishiya Saalixiya.

The Senousi Mahdist followers arrived in berbera they were Sultaan nuurs guests in the late 19 century (“Ten days elapsed, but no reply to my letter came from Sultan Nur. I heard, however, that two Senousi Akwan were guests in his kraal ; and this was a very significant fact, since it showed that these guests, members of a very influential community, were hatching a scheme to retaliate on and injure the Administration.â€) The Senousi sent emissaries to Berbera, and we afterwards ascertained from documentary evidence found on the body of a dead Mugrubi (a Western Arab) that a number of these rascals had been specially sent to create riots and disorder at Berbera. Their object was to promulgate hatred against all Christians, to preach the doctrine of “Africa for the Africans” and the total exclusion of the white man. Now the Somali is at heart a trader ; yet many of them, in order to show sympathy with the Mahdi and his cause, agreed not to supply camels or sheep, or to allow the recruitment of drivers and coolies for the British Army, then fighting Osman Digna and the Dervishes at Suakin, however, owing to their deep-rooted commercial instincts, they were unable to bring themselves in practice to cut off trade relations with us, or to exclude the British from Somaliland. These views and actions brought about many serious fights in Berbera and inland between the Senousi and the Mahdists, at which I greatly rejoiced, since these differences of opinion and policy rendered my position very much easier. (Page 212 Under The Flag Somali coastal Stories 1887.)

The security officer rageedi kan madow hadal bu haya si fican ba loga galiyey sida jilibka loogu dhuftay ma arkeysey.

Jacaylbaro;795997 wrote: Elections ??? ,,,,,, ! ! ! ! ! They mean selections u dul qaado

Thats why Mps are being gunned down in baargaal so much for internet states never knew internet states could kill MPs? Again i ask you where is that entity in ceerigaabo can you tell me show me one source even some sort of administration in ceerigabo which is notthe somaliland one. Galkacyo is divided into two cities there is a greenline and galkacyo is also the capital city of galmudug Somalia, Somaliland controls all the six capital of the six regions Somaliland consists of. Somaliland and Somalia uni-faction referendum Somalilanders didn't even vote for the uni-faction referendum. So how is it even valid the Somalilanders than officially dissolved the union in 1991. So mr from the garowe clan enclave you're territory shrinked the past 5 years and atam is even moving closer to Bosaaso hunting down the clanish troops of faroole.

Somalia can you tell me what entity rules ceerigaabo where that administration is located can you even atleast show me some one in the city who waves anything but the SL flag.I don't understand doesn't you're admin clam parts of sool why don't they control it or did you're enclave stop claiming sool region as a whole:D With the declaration of independence of Somaliland in 1991 automatically the union was dissolved you just don't want to hear it just because one side doesn't agree with it, it doesn't mean it isn't dissolved:D Somalia faroole has a hard time keeping the subclan together with baargaal heading their own direction and Pl west state heading their own separate way, i wont count on the maakhir folks they are organizing themselves right away and in the mean time Somaliland ministers freely roam in eastern sanaag badhan and dhahar while the garowe clan enclave so called governor cries from Bosaaso

Siilanyo is right. If we want to re-create the Somali Union Where did you hear that siilaanyo wants to create a Somali union (Somaliland and Somalia) you are being delusional carafaat as usual. Mujahid Siilaanyo is not the Cigaal junior politician of 1960, president siilaanyo is a well experienced politician and he knows what is doing the people of Somaliland trusted him in the 80s and they completely trust him today.Siilaanyo is the man who is going to correct all the mistakes the Q@ldaan wiif politicians and their emotionally invested people made in the 60s.Siilaanyo will make the people of the Somaliland republic proud and they will remember him as a great leader.

Somalina;796183 wrote: Qanyare has a better chance at the presidency than aunt Furoola. Carafaat aunt Furoola maxaad u daba socotaa horta?, qiimo ayaad u yeeleysaa markaad ka badbadiso ee qarasta naga yareey bal. Faroole ma habar yar baa

Somalia;796258 wrote: Read what I wrote, it isn't even late, you started chewing already. You seceded, to where? It's a good question, no one recognizes you so you have seceded to wait for it.. no where! Damn, the joke even got funnier than I wanted. For 20 years you've been in political purgatory. Lool ^^ First of all i did not secede i merely dissolved a union there is a difference son but i am wondering who seceded in Somaliland where are they where can we find them please don't tell me they are on the internet the Xaaji doesn't take cyber states to serious.The pirate enclave a regional clan state that can barely keep a subclan together in their enclave who by the way have a hard time ruling a city divided into 3 entities. Somalidu waxay ku mah mahan doqoni Waxay tahey bay dadka kale mooda.

Somalia;796252 wrote: No, I meant half of SL seceeded, the secessionist triangle, that's why I had the picture Sxb, are you broken or something? Seceded to where I hope you are not talking about the fictional facebook states Bashiir goth was referring two last month.

^ yarku waxan u ka sheekeneyan babaan, fahmin cid ba tagtay oo meel tagtay bu ku leeyahay markasan ku yidhi halkey tageen markasu yidhi xuduud ba la badalay, Wixisu wa kalay shimbiriyow kalay ila heesa cunihi baa ii xabeebtay eh

No i was asking who seceded because i am not aware of it you said regions of Sl seceded, so i wanted to know where they went since you know they seceded.

Who said anything changed this is just samatars opinion don't take it to serious my friend