-
Content Count
30,096 -
Joined
-
Last visited
-
Days Won
79
Content Type
Profiles
Forums
Calendar
Everything posted by Xaaji Xunjuf
-
Nonsense Rayaale is part of the club he has good cordial relations with ina biixi and ina kahin . Rayaale influance is very huge and so is samatar samatar even has a party now in the making and has allot of supporters he him self is in good talks and in good terms with the ugaas , Either way siday u socotto xalaaadu hadda wey degentahay
-
nonsense on your part keep parroting the same walanweyn rhetoric of SL ba dad bay diisha and this and that Abdinasir will get his revenge will get justice . And the Walanweyns will be dealt accordingly . Nothing has failed the only thing that has failed is Somalia now keep on booty clapping for them
-
Why Somaliland’s hard-earned peace and stability is at Risk?
Xaaji Xunjuf replied to Arafaat's topic in Politics
well spoken the suldaan of Hargeisa indeed -
politicans say one thing and they mean something else when he say hassan is his friend what does that even mean haha ... There are 3 things Abiye wants to secure or continue to stay in power. First is to defeat the Amhara fano militia in the Amhara region Second goal and objective is to find a way to counter the Egyptian and the whole Abay Dam Issue. And the lost one which is very important for him is the sea out let thing . Because it became an Ethiopian national obsession since Eritrea broke away in 1991 , meles used the Amhara and the gallas in the border war during the 1998 border war over badme But he illustrated the picture that they are actually fighting for assab but in order to get assab they need to remove and defeat Isias afewerki. General Abraha when he broke the Eritrean defense lines around berentu after they Bombed assap region . General Abraha wanted to go beyond and go deep into Eritrean territory and take Assap but Meles stopped him and called him back, Because Isias had thrown in the towel and accepted the Algiers Agreeement. The sea thing is a major issue for Ethiopian leaders , Abiye believes it will make him or break him and his Premiership is on the line he believes he will not be as great as Haile selassie or Menelik if he doesnt adres the sea issue for Ethiopia
-
Ethiopia first wanted a naval force it wanted to develop its navy forces and that is something they had as an objective, the port issue was never an issue yes they would love to have a cheaper port and there ways to solve that.. Ethiopia today does not have the resources to build a new port at all. The naval thing is not that expensive though for and they wish this to have because for security reasons since they have an issue with Egypt for the dam and all of those things. Berbera was allright so every dollar Somaliland and the UAE make the Ethiopians get 19 cent of that but they have to bring in some investment first for that to happen these things will still be discussed how to come to an agreement about that . As for the force part i do agree that was unprofessional on Abiye part but i think that was really not directed against us but against the Eritreans hence initially abiye wanted Assap but afewerki wasnt having it hence why he moved to option b . But the threat wasnt for us
-
Somalia’s Denial Won’t Rewrite the Books: Somaliland Has Proven Itself a De Facto State Deserving Recognition The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south. BYZELALEM TAMIR FEBRUARY 18, 2024 Image source: flickr/African Union Commission When Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took the stage at the 37th African Union Summit in Ethiopia’s capital of Addis Ababa on February 17th, 2024, his harsh criticism of the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland cooperation agreement displayed a short-sighted and counterproductive approach to a complex political issue with deep historical roots. Rather than advancing reconciliation, his remarks entrenched long-held positions and undermined opportunity for constructive engagement between key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa region. The Summit provided an opportunity for African leaders to discuss collaborative solutions to pressing challenges like food insecurity. However, Hassan utilized the forum to condemn Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland and establish a security partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While no doubt playing to nationalist sentiment back home, the Somalia President’s reaction overlooks crucial context shaping realities on the ground. The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south. Nearly a century of isolated administration yielded distinct administrative structures, economic patterns, and cultural influences in both territories. When they unified as the Somali Republic in 1960 following independence, the forced union of such divergent regions was perhaps destined to face challenges. From the outset, tensions arose between clans and between those nostalgic for colonial-era autonomy and supporters of Pan-Somali nationalism. The authoritarianism and perceived favoritism towards certain clans under dictator Siad Barre’s regime from 1969 intensified discontent, particularly in the northern regions of Somaliland. Armed rebellions ultimately led to Barre’s ouster in 1991 and Somalia’s descent into chaos, but Somaliland immediately took the opportunity to reclaim the sovereignty it had never fully relinquished. While Hassan maintains that such a unilateral move violated Somalia’s borders, Somaliland’s self-declared independence is best understood as a reversion to the pre-1960 status quo, before being subsumed within the ill-fated Somali state project. In the three decades since, through sustained efforts and against all odds, Somaliland has emerged as one of the few relatively stable and democratic successes in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. It has consolidated effective self-governance, with institutions, security forces, government structures, and a populace that overwhelmingly favors maintained independence. In contrast, despite ongoing international support and a succession of transitional administrations, large parts of Somalia remain under the control of Al-Shabaab militants and intermittent conflict. Somaliland’s experience underscores the failure of the 1960 union to unite distinct societies, as well as the viability of self-rule as an alternative to the instability that has plagued Mogadishu. While Hassan’s government clings to a vision of restored territorial control, Somaliland’s reality is one of a de facto independent state in all but name. Ethiopia, as the dominant regional actor, is well within its rights to engage strategically with this reality by recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. In exchange for use of port facilities on Somaliland’s coastline, Abiy has brought added international legitimacy to the separatist administration’s effective rule. Given Somaliland’s record of delivering stability where Somalia struggles, this cooperative approach stands to strengthen security for all parties. Hassan’s hostile condemnation ignores political winds that have shifted definitively away from restored union after more than 30 years of distinct development. Hassan’s remarks promoted an outdated narrative that fails to acknowledge the political realities that have emerged on the ground. While nationalism defines his rigid stance, pragmatism demands recognition that separate Somali and Somaliland societies with distinct geographies and identities have formed since the colonial era in the Horn of Africa. At this stage, after over 30 years of effective self-governance and consolidation of sovereignty, Somaliland is clearly in a position to exist as an independently recognized state should its citizens democratically decide that path. Autonomy within Somalia is not a tenable framework given the turbulent history of their forced union and Somaliland’s clear trajectory towards independence. Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland’s government constructively recognizes this reality and stands to strengthen security cooperation across the region. Rather than criticism, Hassan and Mogadishu would be wise to pursue negotiations in a spirit of reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect the right to self-determination. Only through open and pragmatic diplomacy between equal stakeholders can sustainable political solutions be found that bring long term stability to the Horn of Africa
-
Daahir rayaale was not a tribal chief for the Awdal clan He was the 3rd President of Somaliland and he did allot of good things for SL he met almost all African leaders in Africa and put the SL cause on the AU agenda during his reign. He held 3 democratic elections he closed the Border with Somalia .
-
The only people that can stop this agreement now is. Somalia not the way it’s doing now by going to foreign capitals but by reaching on a long lasting solution with Somaliland . It should be an offer that somaliland can’t refuse I suppose . but they are not opposed to Ethiopia having a sea out let hassan begged the Ethiopians to make a deal with the bunker but they are not interested in the Indian Ocean but more on the golf of Aden and the Red Sea. He said anaga rabna in itoobiya bad hesho Laakin qaabka ay u gashay banu diidayna , which means making deals with Somaliland they are opposed to not that Ethiopia gets a sea out let . Only Djibouti is ideologically opposed to Ethiopia having a sea out let of their own . Because it threatens their very life line which is port trade . But the bunker just wants to make the deal themselves getting the xaqu qalam and ofcourse stopping somaliland political objectives . Waxwalba way isku dayeen they have one card left and talk to Somaliland in al honesty . Or the ship will indeed sail , hadi heshiiska qalinka lugu duugo it’s done deal . The only people that can. Stop it now is not the international community . It’s the somaliland parliament and guurti . Or Somalia and they have to come with a deal sl can’t refuse
-
Somaliland oo ka hadashay wakhtiga la hirgalinayo heshiiskii ay Itoobiya la gashay Axad, February, 18, 2024 (HOL) - Somaliland ayaa sheegtay in dhawaan heshiis rasmi ah loo badali isfahamkii ay Itoobiya la gashay isla markaana loo xilsaaray guddi aqoonyahano ah oo dhamaystirkiisa ka shaqaynaysa. Wasiirka Warfaafinta Somaliland Cali Maxamed Xasan ‘Cali Mareexaan’ oo BBC-da la hadlay ayaa sheegay in heshiiskani uu wax ka tarayo xoojinta xidhiidhka iskaashi ee Somaliland iyo Itoobiya. “Somaliland iyo Itoobiya waxay leeyihiin iskaashi ganacsi, mid amni iyo mid xiriir oo muddo soo jiray, wayna ka wada hadlaan sidii loo xoojin lahaa arintaas” ayu yiri wasiir Cali Mareexaan. Wasiirka ayaa beeniyey in saraakiil sar sare oo Itoobiyan ah ay ku sugan yihiin Somaliland sida uu sheegay Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud balse wuxuu xusay inay jiraan saraakiil sare oo Somaliland oo ku sugan Addisa Ababa, oo uu ku jiro Wasiirka Arrimaha Dibadda D.R. Ciise Kayd Maxamuud. Madaxweynaha Somaliland Muuse Biixi Cabdi, ayaa dhawaan magacaabay guddi aqoonyahano, sharci-yaqaano iyo dibulumaasiyiin iskugu jira oo uu hoggaaminayo Amb. Baashe Cawil, kuwaasi oo ka shaqayn doono dhamaystirka heshiiska. Wasiirka Cali Mareexaan ayaa sheegay in heshiiska loo dhamaystiri doono sida ugu dhakhsaha badan kadibna la horgayn doono golayaasha sharci dajinta. Somaliland ayaa sheegtay in heshiiskani uu sababi dooni in Itoobiya ay u aqoonsato dal madaxbannaan, halka dowlada Soomaaliya ay ku tilmaantay madaxbannaanideedii oo lagu soo xadgudbay.
-
Nonsense Ethiopia it doesn’t serve them to annex anything they will get 50 year lease and after that lease another 50 years and after that another, they pay some money for it . Why look for headache conflict annexation while u can have it . Makes no sense at all . There is even on the table that they can build a separate port. This what the Ethiopians have suggested not sure if biixi accepted a port they co own with sl and can have. A majority share in it . Where they annually just give a revenue of 300 million to Somaliland and they can have a discount of almost 1,8 billion dollar which they pay for jabuuti now this I also heard this . Not sure if it will materialise as muuse will press then to use berbera port where they can have. 20 percent share still much cheaper then jabuuti since sl economy isn’t based on port revenues since oil is being drillled next year
-
Doorasho iyo Dagaal, Somaliland kee ayee dooran?
Xaaji Xunjuf replied to Arafaat's topic in Politics
It’s not on kulmiye kulmiye just said what wadani wanted they you can’t oppose what u presented ur self. Ha wareegto -
Galbeedi u have been saying that for a decade or so but sl stands and stands stronger then ever wedi ina bixi wa iska jeediye it’s in the hand of the guurti led the wakiilada and the electoral commission deal with this it’s a done deal
- 383 replies
-
- somaliland
- somalia
-
(and 1 more)
Tagged with:
-
Doorasho iyo Dagaal, Somaliland kee ayee dooran?
Xaaji Xunjuf replied to Arafaat's topic in Politics
the guurti passed the same law the wadani party wanted it isnt kulmiye fault wadani wanted this sort of elections 20 percent u cant blame it on kulmiye for appeasing wadani the biggest oppostion party , so what do u want kulmiye to do -
well its in biixis interest the awdal clan and kulmiye are on the same side they want the 3 parties with the most votes can be the winners or be the new national partys where as wadani want the 20 percentage from each region to become the winner ucid kulmiye and hilaac are on the same side
- 383 replies
-
- somaliland
- somalia
-
(and 1 more)
Tagged with:
