Miskiin geert wilders apart from his anti assylum policies he has good idea for the country to be honest.. as for trump i dont think he is racists really people push him in that direction but i dont think he is really racist.

“Since the announcement of the Ethiopia - Somaliland memorandum of understanding (MoU) the UK has been engaging closely with all parties involved, including the Somaliland” The UK Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, Andrew Mitchell

i have a feeling he will win the elections again i don think the sleepy Joe is a match for the Charismatic Trump

Maybe i am one of the very few Northerners that doesnt harbor any sort of hatret against afweyne for what he has done to the people of Somaliland yes there were attrocities committed for he didnt diffrianate between the SNM a rebel movement he should have attacked defending his supposed country. What was wrong was to carpet Bomb Hargeisa to ground . And let his soldiers scream any one who is from Laascanood galkacyo boosaaso cabuudwaaq leave Hargeisa. because they wanted to level it to the ground and kill the original inhabbitans there.How wrong that is . afweyne thought he was doing it to safe guard the Somali state and protect his Clan in power. Though afweyne harbored some tribal hatred against the Northerns he went as far as killing them in Mogadishu remember the jazeera massacre in 1989 there were no SNM in Mogadishu at that time. Now fast move fowards the Somaliland army in eastern Laascanood didnt carpet Bomb the city kill thousands of innocent civilians they could have though but they didnt yes there civilian areas targetted such as the hospital but because of the Militia that were there but for the most part laascanood is intact . Overall the fighting was between the Nabbdiids terrorists and the SL army . The SL government had no interest in destroying reer laascanood their city and their people, its all about porpotion and context and the scale things were done. Having said that i always said afweyne did what he had to do , we did we had to do there were killings on both sides. We are not his victims we are not pathetic i dont like victim mentallity we licked our wounds and moved on. no hard feelings at all.

UK oo ka Hadashay Heshiiska Somaliland iyo Itoobiya by Qaran News | Jan 24, 2024 UK oo ka Hadashay Heshiiska Somaliland iyo Itoobiya Hargeysa(Qaran news)-Wasiiru Dowlaha Arrimaha Dibedda, & Xafiiska Barwaaqo-sooranka UK , ayaa la weydiiyey su’aal ku saabsan haddii uu wasiirka Arrimaha Dibadda Somaliland la yeelan karo wadaxaajood ku saabsan amniga gobolka, iyo addeegsiga dekedda Berbera. Wasiirka ayaa ku jawaabay. ” Ilaa iyo markii ay soo shaac baxday isafgaradka Somaliland iyo Itoobiya, Dowladda Ingiriisku waxa ay xidhiidh dhow la lahayd dhamaan dhinacyada ay khusayso, oo ay ku jirto Somaliland, annagoo ugu baaqaynay in xaalada la dejiyo, lana wadahadlo. Waxa aannu dhinacyada oo dhan ugu baaqnay in ay ka dheeraadaan wixii ficil ah ee si taban u saamayn kara amniga gobolka, gaar ahaan la dagaalanka Alshabaab. Si taa ka duwan, Dowladda Ingiriisku waxa ay taageero ka geysatay mashruuca “Berbera Corridor” oo qayb ka ahaa mashruuca “Ibofurka Barwaaqada ee Geeska”. Taageeradan oo ay qayb ka ahayd 25 milyan oo Ginniga Ingiriiska ah kaasi oo loogu talagalay horumarinta kaabayaasha dhaqaalaha iyo jidka si loo fudaydiyo isku xidhka Berbera, Itoobiya iyo gobolka intiisa kale”.

Ku-xigeenka Safiirka Itoobiya u Fadhiya Qarammada Midoobay oo Madal Caalamiya ka Difaacay Heshiiska ay la Galeen Somaliland by Qaran News | Jan 24, 2024 Ku-xigeenka Safiirka Itoobiya u Fadhiya Qarammada Midoobay oo Madal Caalamiya ka Difaacay Heshiiska ay la Galeen Somaliland Hargeysa – Kuxigeenka Safiirka Itoobiya u qaabilsan Qarammada midoobay, Samuel Isa, oo ka qaybgalay shir ay Magaalada Kampala ku yeesheen dalalka G77 iyo Shiinaha, ayaa ka hadlay ahmiyadda iskaashiga Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland iyo Itoobiya ay dhawaan is-fahamka ka gaadheen. Danjire Samuel Isa wuxuu sheegay in heshiiska is faham ee Somaliland iyo Itoobiya uu waafaqsan yahay xeerarka caaalamiga ah ee kastamada iyo shuruucda badda. “Heshiiskani wuxuu si cad u jidaynayaa oo loogu talo galay inuu wax ka taro arrimaha ganacsiga si ay uga faa’iidaystaan muwaadiniinta Somaliland iyo Itoobiya,” ayuu yidhi diblomaasigaasi. Samuel Isa waxa kaloo uu intaas ku daray “Waxa isfahamkan loo maray qaab nabadgelyo ah oo ku sallaysan wadahadal iyo iskaashi wadajir ah oo dhinac waliba guulaystay, kaasi oo kor loogu qaadayo nabada iyo barwaaqada gobolka Geeska Afrika.” Heshiiska is faham ee Somaliland iyo Itoobiya ayaa dhigaya in Jamhuuruyadda Somaliland Itoobiya ka kirayso 20km oo ay ka dhigtaan saldhig millatari oo badda ah, iyadoo Itoobiyana ay noqon doonta dalka u horreeya ee aqoonsada Qarannimada Jamhuuriyadda Somaliland ee 33ka sannadood u halgamaysay inay caalamka ka hesho ictiraaf caalamiya.

Ethiopia spy chief has arrived in Hargeisa things are happening

i never blame afweyne afweyne did what he had to do, we were his enemies .

Hasssan sheikh and the koonfurians know if they don’t reach a settlement with somaliland before they draft the final constitution of Somalia . Then the constitution will be null and void in Somaliland al together . So the stalling of the talks isn’t in the benefit of the bunker . It can go on so long . If u want to hold afti si Aad u meel marisid dastuurka u need to reach a final settlement with Somaliland. if you don’t reach an agreement with somaliland then that ship has sailed the elections will be held from raskambooni to raascaseer. No voting willl take place in Somaliland. Which makes the constitution of Somalia solely for Somalia . Sharci maha by default somaliland waad aqoonsatay while not even uttering word . Having said that now with the mou i doubt a settlement can be even reached at this particular time

There was a war people die they have killed also people some one father some one son . U can’t blame somaliland for attoricties when ur shooting at the sl army

Afwerki will never oppose the unity of Ethiopia he has not done it in 1991 and not in 2018. It’s his habesha identity oo u diidaysa inu kala daadiyo itoobiya

massecres and attrocities where and when

The black guy spoke really good and the lady also as she said that territorial integrity and self determination swift and it changes on the context how nations are established.

xassan sheikh says already that SL is recognised by Ethiopia interesting development

THat sur interpertation when they say xuduuudaha somaliyeed they are not talking about somali galbeed jabuuti or kenya they are talking only about raaskaambooni to lawyacade thats what they mean.. ur interpertation is just wrong and so simply wrong xuuduudaha la difaacayo somaliyeed ehe ay sheegayaan and u know it

Muuse biixi break it down

Rayaalen was 8 years from 2002 until 2010 just to corrrecr you. As for talaabo we are against putting journalist in jail I have never condoned that but it happend through out the decades have u forgotten ryaaale arrested both opposition party members and sultans and waheen and radio halgan and jamhuuriya and haatuf yusuf abdi gaboobe can tell u more about this what journalist did muse arrest apart from ilig and that crazy chick busharo who is just pissed muse cut hee welfare .

Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Hopes and Uncertainties As diplomatic manoeuvres unfold, the Memorandum of Understanding between Ethiopia and Somaliland symbolises the rising geopolitical significance of Africa and the effects of competition among great and middle powers. Mehari Taddele Maru January 23, 2024 Prof. Mehari Taddele Maru is currently a Professor Migration Policy Centre and Academic Coordinator of the Young African Leaders Programme at the School of Transnational Governance and at the European... More by Mehari Taddele Maru Share Tweet Facebook Print LinkedIn WhatsApp Telegram Read other stories tagged with: EthiopiaSomaliland Log into your member account to listen to this article. Not a member? Join the herd. At the core of the current debate surrounding the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland lie three major interests: Somalia’s unity, territorial integrity, and sovereignty; Somaliland’s pursuit of de jure recognition of its de facto independence and sovereignty; Ethiopia’s renewed long-standing aspiration to regain access to the sea. Rooted in the region’s history, these issues have evolved to encompass a tangled mix of internal political dynamics, geopolitical significance, and international legal repercussions. Clearly, the controversy is not merely about the lease agreement for a port or navy base. Several states, including China and the USA in Djibouti, and the UAE in Somaliland, have established similar arrangements for ports and military bases. What is new about the MoU is Ethiopia’s consideration of conferring formal recognition on Somaliland as an independent state. Sovereignty in Limbo Somaliland’s legal argument for independence is based on its brief period of sovereignty in 1960, its subsequent voluntary union with Somalia, and the legal ramifications of the dissolution of this union owing to the collapse of the Somali government in 1991. Somaliland claims that it meets the conditions for statehood as set out in international law, particularly the Montevideo Convention. However, the international community’s reluctance to recognise it as a de jure sovereign state remains a significant obstacle. It is an indisputable fact that Somaliland was a recognised independent country in 1960, prior to its unification with Italian Somaliland to form Somalia. Somaliland’s argument for independence is rooted in the principle of respecting colonial-era borders, a fundamental principle of the Organization of African Unity (African Union). Somaliland asserts that, according to the AU’s principle, its borders as of 1960 – when it gained independence from British rule – should be recognised. This argument is centred on the notion that the African Union, which generally upholds the sanctity of colonial-era borders to prevent territorial disputes and conflicts, should recognise Somaliland’s borders as they were at the time of its brief independence. This position challenges the more commonly recognised notion of Somalia as a unified state, which includes the territory of present-day Somaliland. The 2005 African Union (AU) report on Somaliland indeed offered a nuanced perspective on the region’s status and its implications within the context of the AU’s principle of border intangibility. This principle generally upholds the borders inherited at the time of a country’s independence. The AU’s stance, as reflected in the 2005 report, recognises the complexity of the situation, balancing the need for stability and respect for existing borders with the unique historical and political circumstances of Somaliland. Ali Mazrui, a renowned Pan-Africanist scholar, suggested a pragmatic approach in line with these complexities. He advocated for the de facto recognition of Somaliland, proposing that it be allowed representation in AU meetings. He argued that this approach is similar to that of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) at the United Nations, where the PLO participates in discussions without full member status. Mazrui’s suggestion aimed to provide a platform for Somaliland’s voice in the African Union, acknowledging its unique situation while not fully contravening the principle of border intangibility. In effect, Somaliland’s demand is recognition of its independence, not independence per se. Sovereignty can only exist when it is de jure recognised. Somaliland’s push for recognition under the MoU is part of its broader effort to gain international recognition as an independent state, separate from Somalia. Somaliland has enjoyed de facto recognition for the last three decades with its own government and democratic institutions, and it operates independently from the federal government of Somalia. However, its quest for international recognition has been challenging, as most countries and international organisations continue to view it as part of Somalia. As seen with Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan’s from Sudan, recognition requires substantial international support, especially from global powers and organisations such as the AU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Crucially, the pathway to recognition often involves a negotiated referendum process between the capital of the region claiming independence and that of the main state. In this context, negotiations between Hargeisa and Mogadishu, facilitated by robust engagement from regional and global powers, have been considered vital. The most recent mediation efforts between Somalia and Somaliland, led by Djibouti on 29 December 2023, resulted in an agreement to resume talks aimed at resolving their long-standing disputes. While these talks are a significant development, the MoU could preclude their immediate resumption. As seen with Eritrea’s independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan’s from Sudan, recognition requires substantial international support. Collectively, these issues shape the complex and multifaceted debate surrounding Somaliland’s status, involving legal, political, geopolitical, and diplomatic considerations. Of course, the question of when and if Ethiopia will formally recognise Somaliland as a sovereign state and how the MoU will affect Somaliland’s chances of recognition beyond Ethiopia remains a key issue, although it is not the primary focus of this piece. Here, the primary objective is to provide analysis on how the MoU could signify a turning point in the region’s domestic, geopolitical, and diplomatic landscape. Even though both parties have alluded to its contents in individual statements, the specifics of the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland have not yet been finalised and made public. Statements have varied, sometimes appearing to confirm the existence of a distinct agreement, depending on the source. Addis Ababa describes the MoU as a critical step “paving the way to realise its aspiration of securing access to the sea and ports”, viewing it as a foundational stone for long-standing goals. Conversely, Hargeisa perceives the MoU as a groundbreaking move for international recognition, articulating the terms as follows: “In exchange for 20 km of sea access for Ethiopian Naval forces, leased for a period of 50 years, Ethiopia will formally recognise the Republic of Somaliland.” In what appears to be an attempt at damage control, a subsequent statement from Addis Ababa introduces a procedure for such recognition, stating that the MoU “includes provisions for the Ethiopian government to conduct an in-depth assessment before taking a position on Somaliland’s efforts to gain recognition”. The Somaliland Foreign Minister, Esse Kayd, also made it clear that the formal agreement cannot be signed without Ethiopia’s recognition of the Republic of Somaliland. This dilutes the initial declarations by both Ethiopia – that it has gained access to the sea – and Somaliland – that Ethiopia will formally recognise its independence. Thus, core elements of the MoU – access to the sea and recognition – are yet to be ironed out. These latest caveats raise fundamental questions of law and statecraft. Given the heated domestic politics and geopolitical implications, what is the benefit of publicly pronouncing an MoU without finalised details? Could the MoU lead to more misunderstanding than understanding? Could this potentially trigger additional warfare, in addition to the ongoing devastating wars in Sudan and Ethiopia? Reactions to the MoU from both regional and international actors have been knee-jerk. Will Ethiopia’s assessment result in the recognition of Somaliland? And will other states follow suit? Legal consequences From a legal standpoint, an MoU is not considered a binding agreement like a treaty and serves as a non-committal declaration of intent without imposing legal responsibilities on the parties involved. Either party has the option to end the agreement at their discretion, often without cause and at short notice. MoUs are not subject to the legislative procedures of oversight, review, and ratification as outlined in the constitution. When utilised as a binding agreement, an MoU can become undemocratic and circumvent the constitutional safeguards put in place to preserve parliamentary sovereignty. At the international level, an MoU is not governed by treaty law and breaches do not result in international responsibility, nor is it obligatory to be registered under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Hence, neither Ethiopia nor Somaliland have the legal standing to make an international claim regarding the MoU before an international court, and breaches do not automatically lead to compensation or reparations. Although it holds great political, diplomatic, and geopolitical significance, the MoU can be considered a mere “gentleman’s agreement”, with its true value lying in the realm of politics rather than law. Political implications and geopolitical repercussions For Ethiopia, the MoU diverts attention from internal conflicts, famine, and economic woes. For Somaliland, it potentially opens doors to international recognition, legitimising President Muse Bihi Abdi’s government, but it may also intensify conflicts in areas such as Laascaanood and Sool. For Somalia, it represents a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, necessitating an outright rejection of the MoU and the seeking of support from regional allies such as Egypt, Eritrea, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). Somalia has already begun its diplomatic campaign, declaring the MoU null and void. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud had a phone call with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Hamad Thani, while similar conversations are likely or have already taken place with Eritrea and the KSA, and possibly with the Djiboutian leader. This, in turn, consolidates opposition to Somaliland’s bid for recognition and outside interference. Given the heated domestic politics and geopolitical implications, what is the benefit of publicly pronouncing an MoU without finalised details? What is more, the MoU and its diversion of attention could alleviate the rising tensions and possibility of war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, but the potential causes for these are still on the horizon. Geopolitically, if and when the MoU is implemented, Ethiopia will have naval forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden that are aligned with the UAE’s strategic interests. The UAE, with the support of Somaliland and Ethiopia, could thus reinforce its presence there. This could be perceived as a threat by the Jeddah Red Sea Council – the KSA, Egypt, Eritrea, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). In addition, it challenges Djibouti’s role, especially its monopoly over port services to Ethiopia – the second-largest population in Africa. IGAD and its predicament Moreover, Djibouti, as the IGAD chair, could also see the MoU as undermining its mediation efforts between Somalia and Somaliland. Nairobi’s response might be more cautious than expected, influenced by its growing diplomatic rift with Addis Ababa, closer ties with Asmara, and domestic political considerations. Sudan’s divided representation, with the SAF opposing and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) potentially supporting the MoU, adds complexity. Uganda and South Sudan, as IGAD members, may initially remain neutral, but this could gradually change. Recently, Sudan, Chad, and the UAE were involved in a diplomatic tiff, resulting in the reciprocal expulsion of each other’s diplomats. The RSF is gaining control of Khartoum and could use the opportunity to declare itself the legitimate representative of the Sudanese state, placing the UAE in indirect control of Sudan. The RSF (under Hemeti) and the Coordination Body of the Democratic Civil Forces (Taqaddum, led by the former prime minister Abdallah Hamdok) recently held a meeting in Addis Ababa, and diplomatic support from Ethiopia may propel Hemeti to advance this claim as the legitimate representative of Sudan to IGAD and through that to the AU and the UN. This is a long shot, but not unthinkable. Uganda and South Sudan, as part of IGAD, could shift from their neutral stance, potentially exacerbating the challenges in IGAD, already strained by regional conflicts. The IGAD chief’s latest statement, which refrains from mentioning or criticising the MoU and instead calls for a de-escalation between Ethiopia and Somalia, has been met with displeasure by Somalia. The Somali government has cited a bias towards Ethiopia in the statement and requested an immediate apology from the Executive Secretary, along with a retraction of the statement and the implementation of appropriate corrective actions, thereby highlighting IGAD’s predicament. Middle powers and UAE-KSA rivalry Amid the intense competition among the great powers, regional powers such as the UAE and KSA are forming new alliances, carving out their own geopolitical spheres of influence. In Africa, these reach beyond the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea, connecting the Middle East with North Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel. The ongoing war in Gaza has disrupted shipping routes in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, revealing the interdependent nature of security in the Middle East and Africa. This is crucial, as over 15 per cent of global shipping passing through the strategic Suez Canal has been disrupted by these threats, particularly at the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint. As a result, shipping companies are delaying entry into this key maritime corridor, leading to rising shipping costs and increased war-risk premiums. With the UAE and KSA competing for influence, resources, and markets, both seek arable land, ports, and markets for their projected manufacturing and port development and management projects. This has led to the emergence of new power alliances between Middle Eastern countries and regimes in Africa, primarily driven by security concerns, resource access, and power politics. Their involvement in the Horn of Africa is driven by a combination of personal relationships, military strength, and financial influence, transitioning from state-centric to personality-driven and corporate-like powers. A key factor in this competition between the two blocs is the rivalry between their leaders and their desire to consolidate their personal power. Amid the intense competition among the great powers, regional powers such as the UAE and KSA are forming new alliances, carving out their own geopolitical spheres of influence. First the alliance and now the rivalry between the KSA-led and UAE-led blocs are reshaping regional dynamics, with both blocs actively engaging in proxy wars and power politics across the Horn and North Africa. The involvement of Russia and Turkey in various regional contexts further complicates the situation. Key factors influencing this shift include the Gaza war, the Abraham Accord, and the Saudi-Iran rapprochement under Chinese auspices. The UAE and the KSA increasingly occupy pivotal positions, impacting the peace and security of African nations amid the perceived decrease in the US’s influence. These developments are part of the broader multipolar dynamic, with shifting focuses from traditional conflicts such as the Gaza war towards broader geopolitical strategies. Notably, the UAE’s growing military investments in Africa – particularly in Ethiopia and the Sudanese RSF – give it an advantage over the KSA which, owing to internal constraints, avoids such involvement. Generally, however, leaders in these two blocs face few domestic constraints on their power. Reactions from international actors The MoU has elicited various reactions from international organisations. The AU Commission stressed the importance of respecting the unity, territorial integrity, and full sovereignty of all African Union member states, including Somalia and Ethiopia. The Arab League expressed full solidarity with the Somali government’s decision to reject the MoU. The League considered the memo invalid, unacceptable, and a breach of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial sanctity. The European Union (EU) and Egypt have issued statements expressing their support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU unequivocally stated the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia as per its constitution and the foundational instruments of the AU and UN. The UN is yet to pronounce itself. The US State Department called for diplomatic dialogue to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa following the MoU and reaffirmed its acknowledgment of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Somalia within its 1960 borders. It is not entirely apparent which border is being referenced, but the message remains the same – a plea for diplomatic engagement. A clear US position, influenced by global concerns and its 2024 elections, is crucial. On the one hand, the only other power with significant leverage is the US, although the EU and China can also exert influence, to some extent. On the other hand, the US’s position is influenced by broader global concerns such as the Gaza war and maritime security. Despite its hyperpower status, the US has seen its role in maintaining global order diminish, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. This can be traced back to former US president Barack Obama’s policy of “leading from behind”, aimed at withdrawing from the protracted US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, responsibilities were delegated to the KSA, the UAE, and Israel. For instance, in the wars in Yemen and Tigray (Ethiopia), as well as the Jeddah mediation in Sudan, the Western world, particularly the US, seems to have outsourced responsibilities to the KSA. Internal governance issues continue to weaken the US’s role in maintaining global order. The new development must also be seen in light of escalating maritime threats in the region, partly owing to the Gaza war, with the effectiveness of the US’s “Operation Prosperity Guardian” facing severe curtailment. As observed in the conflicts in Yemen, Libya, Sudan, and Tigray in Ethiopia, the UAE, although a close partner of the US, does not always align its policies with those of the US. The pertinent question is: how do Gulf states like the UAE diverge from US policies while the US remains the primary guarantor of their security? In the case of the Gulf states, their special relationship with the military-industrial complex gives them enough clout to influence politics in the West and East. The Gaza war and rising tension in the Horn of Africa may lead the US to re-engage more robustly with these regions albeit not during the upcoming electoral campaign. The US has the necessary power and capabilities – economic, demographic, military, and technological – but its politics of identity challenges have weakened its assertive position in ensuring world order. With the 2024 elections approaching, the US’s engagement in the region may be affected, and the potential for disruptive actions by military adventurers in the region cannot be ignored. This illustrates the complex geopolitical dynamics involving the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the US, and highlights the reduced agency of African nations in shaping domestic politics. As diplomatic manoeuvres unfold, the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland symbolises the rising geopolitical significance of Africa and the effects of competition among great and middle powers. This MoU will be used by two alliances: the Saudi-led bloc, increasingly collaborating with Somalia, Turkey, and Qatar, and the UAE-led bloc, comprising Ethiopia, Somaliland, and the RSF. These developments showcase the intricate interplay of domestic politics, geopolitical interests of extra-continental powers, and the agency of Pan-African institutions. National interests and various forms of power (economic, military, technological, demographic, and diplomatic) are projected, forcing new alliances and intensifying global competition. This scenario indicates escalating pressure on African institutions from both great and middle powers to align with specific blocs. Despite its hyperpower status, the US has seen its role in maintaining global order diminish, particularly in the Middle East and Africa. Due to the ineffectiveness of the multilateral system and the dispersed power polarity, Africa faces strategic policy dilemmas and complex questions regarding partnerships. The African Agency’s effectiveness hinges on its readiness and preparedness, which in turn depends on the quality of leadership, institutional strength, and governance. Consequently, Africa must navigate tough decisions on various global issues. A key question emerges: How should the AU and IGAD approach these decisions? What principles should inform their decision-making in this context? To ensure Africa’s voice is influential and respected by great and regional powers, and its concerns and aspirations are considered by the international community, Africa’s positions should be based on three core principles: Pragmatism – The AU and its member states should eschew dogmatic or idealistic stances in favour of a practical approach that prioritises the tangible improvement of living conditions in Africa. Dynamism – The AU and its member states must be ready to quickly adapt their policies in response to changing regional or global circumstances, including revising foreign or maritime policies and enhancing African countries’ capabilities. Due to the ineffectiveness of the multilateral system and the dispersed power polarity, Africa faces strategic policy dilemmas and complex questions regarding partnerships. A collective unified voice – Given the diversity and fragmentation in the AU and its 55 member states’ approach to partnerships with extra-continental actors, a unified stance is crucial. This collective action is vital in augmenting their agency and shielding Pan-African and regional decision-making from external interference. The AU must continue to issue common African positions, now extending this practice to partnerships with extra-continental actors. This involves defining shared interests, building overlapping consensus, and steering a common rule-based effort. Such a unified voice would amplify Africa’s agency and international clout, helping to counterbalance the asymmetries in international relations. It might require the AU to assert sovereignty over foreign affairs; while member states can enter agreements with third parties as sovereign entities, they should commit to a unified stance and act in unison, ensuring these agreements align with a commonly agreed position. These broad continental issues call for a pan-African transformation, necessitating national introspection and a revamp of the AU’s interventionist and integrationist mandate. Read more at: https://www.theelephant.info/analysis/2024/01/23/unveiling-the-ethiopia-somaliland-mou-hopes-and-uncertainties/ The Elephant - African analysis, opinion and investigation

you talked only about , mental ilness u didnt answer the question why he is a tyran or isnt a tyrant thatst the question the country was in civil war because a terrorist group invaded laascanood

and where did awdal say that they wont participate in the elections? waxad jeceshihid adigu iyo waxa realitygu wa different

he is right though if u say xariiq yar oo isticmaar dhigay xuduud ma noqonayso,., and then if u say xuduuda somaliyeed hala difaaco which were also made by gaalo isnt that contradiction mise waxad leedahay xuduuda somaliyeed waxa sameeyeey soomaali hahaah

How Ethiopia's Red Sea deal could impact Israel, Egypt, and the UAE Ali Bakir 22 January, 2024 Analysis: Ethiopia's potential transformation into a maritime power in the Red Sea will create new regional allies, but also enemies. ShareFlipboardRedditWhatsAppXFacebook On 1 January 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland, a breakaway region of Somalia, signed a controversial agreement granting Addis Ababa access to the Red Sea. Under the agreement, Somaliland agreed to lease 20 kilometres of its coastline to landlocked Ethiopia for 50 years in return for promises to recognise its independence. This arrangement will provide Ethiopia unhindered access to the Red Sea, enable it to use the Berbera port for export-import activities, and build a naval military base. Dubbed a 'historic' agreement by Ethiopia, this marks a strategic shift for Addis Ababa, which lost its direct sea access following Eritrea's declaration of independence in 1993. Post-separation, Ethiopia primarily relied on Eritrea's Assab Port but lost access during the conflict between the two nations from 1998 to 2000, prompting a shift to Djibouti's port to facilitate its trade. The Somali government has denounced the deal as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somalia's strong objection included recalling its ambassador from Ethiopia while Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the port deal. "If Ethiopia were to become a major maritime force in the Red Sea, it could significantly increase its influence and importance to certain countries, such as the UAE, Israel, and the US" Significant public and political opposition within Somalia has also emerged. Prominent figures have expressed serious concerns about the agreement's implications for Somalia's sovereignty and regional stability. The Arab League, of which Somalia is a member, has supported Mogadishu against Ethiopia, accusing Addis Ababa of attempting to violate Somali sovereignty and labelling it as a violation of international law and a threat to Somalia's territorial integrity. The European Union also issued a statement directed at Ethiopia, emphasising the importance of respecting the unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Somalia. The US State Department issued a statement expressing its concern regarding the agreement and urging all stakeholders to engage in diplomatic dialogue. Ethiopia has long had ambitions to gain independent access to the sea. In a statement to the Ethiopian parliament last October, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed emphasised that sea access is an existential matter for his country. He referenced a statement by a 19th-century Ethiopian military leader, Ras Alula, who declared that the Red Sea is Ethiopia's natural border, asserting that Addis Ababa will secure its sea access by any means necessary, including force. Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia have denounced the Ethiopian claims. RELATED Why Ethiopia's Red Sea deal has the Horn of Africa on edge Analysis Abdolgader Mohamed Ali The Emirati role In response to the rising criticism against their agreement, Ethiopia and Somaliland recalled the fact that several countries signed agreements with the internationally unrecognised Somaliland, including developing its port, and no such concerns were raised at the time. The response cites the UAE without explicitly naming it. The agreement is expected to strengthen the security, economic, and political partnership between Ethiopia and Somaliland, and insert Ethiopia as a powerful player in the Red Sea region dynamics. The agreement raises questions on a possible Emirati role given Abu Dhabi’s exceptional relation with Somaliland and its newly rising ties with Ethiopia. The UAE has played a significant role in the development of the Port of Berbera in Somaliland, highlighting its strategic interest in the Horn of Africa. In May 2016, DP World, a Dubai-based maritime trade conglomerate, signed a $442 million agreement with the government of Somaliland to develop the Berbera Port as a regional trade hub. This project not only involves the operation of the port but also the establishment of a free zone as part of the development. The agreement with Somaliland will provide Ethiopia unhindered access to the Red Sea, and enable it to use the Berbera port for export-import activities and build a a naval military base. [Getty] The UAE also committed to building a military base next to the city’s airport and its seafront, which it was said at the time, would be used to fight the Houthis. In March 2018, Ethiopia acquired a 19% stake in the Berbera Port project. The UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa, particularly through DP World's initiatives, aligns with its strategic objectives to establish cooperative governments along the Red Sea corridor. This is crucial for the UAE's maritime security strategy and its investment ambitions in the region, particularly in the Ethiopian market. The UAE's foray into Africa, including developments in Somaliland, was seen as a part of a wider rivalry among Middle Eastern powers, with the UAE seeking to expand its influence in contrast to other regional powers like Qatar and Turkey, who have great influence in Somalia. Although the UAE decided to halt the work in the military base in Berbera later, Abu Dhabi’s influence in Somaliland remained high. "The UAE's involvement in the Horn of Africa aligns with its strategic objectives to establish cooperative governments along the Red Sea corridor" Egypt's concerns Egypt has articulated its stance on the Ethiopia-Somaliland sea access agreement, underscoring the need to respect Somalia's unity and territorial integrity. Egypt’s President Sisi asserted Cairo’s firm position to stand by Somalia against the agreement. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued a statement highlighting the necessity of fully honouring Somalia's sovereignty and its right to utilise its resources. This emphasis on Somalia's territorial integrity reflects Egypt's concern about potential regional instability that could arise from the agreement. Egypt's position is shaped by its broader national security considerations comprising regional interests, notably the security of the Red Sea, its influence in the Horn of Africa, and its problematic relations with Ethiopia. This aligns with Egypt's longstanding interest in maintaining regional stability, essential for the security of the Suez Canal, a crucial maritime trade route and a primary source of foreign currency revenues for Cairo. RELATED What do Houthi attacks in the Red Sea mean for global trade? Analysis Dario Sabaghi Recent developments have seen Cairo apprehensive about the UAE's activities in the Horn of Africa, which Egypt perceives as potentially undercutting its regional interests. The UAE, a significant ally of Ethiopia and Somaliland, has supported Ethiopia in various matters, including its position on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, a contentious issue with Egypt. Additionally, Cairo harbours concerns that the UAE's Abraham Accords with Israel might undermine Egypt’s, political, economic, and strategic interests, particularly regarding plans to bypass the Suez Canal or reduce reliance on it. The Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement could bolster Addis Ababa's position in the Red Sea and the Ethiopia-UAE-Israel trilateral axis, a development that Cairo may not view favourably and might actively work to counter it. Israel has renewed its interest in Africa, including the Horn of Africa, driven by the region's growing economic and political importance. [Getty] Israel's interests The Horn of Africa's proximity to the Red Sea entrance is of strategic importance to Israel due to its significance for maritime routes, impacting Israel's security and trade. This is a concern for Israel, particularly because of Iran's influence and the presence of Iranian arms. Israel has historically cooperated militarily and in intelligence with certain regimes in the Horn of Africa. For instance, Eritrea reportedly allowed Israel to open a naval military base on the island of Daklah in the Red Sea. However, Eritrea's later alignment with Iran, and ultimately with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, affected its relationship with Israel. In recent years, Israel has renewed its interest in Africa, including the Horn of Africa, driven by the region's growing economic and political importance. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visits to several African countries in 2016, including those in the Horn of Africa, underscored this renewed focus, aiming to foster cooperation in economic, political, and security realms. "The Horn of Africa's proximity to the Red Sea entrance is of strategic importance to Israel due to its significance for maritime routes, impacting Israel's security and trade" Israel's presence in this region was intended to establish various forms of cooperation with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. This presence also aimed to oppose Iran, as well as to counter the growing influence of Turkey and Qatar in the Horn of Africa during the Gulf crisis from 2017 to 2021. Israel’s war in Gaza in 2023 has fuelled regional tensions. Iran and its regional arms seized the opportunity to flex their muscles as part of their broader strategy to assert influence in the region with the pretext of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Last month, Yemen's Houthi militia warned of targeting all ships bound for Israel, irrespective of nationality. As a result, several ships en route to Israeli ports were targeted, prompting major shipping companies to reroute their vessels. Houthi threats have compelled major companies to avoid the Suez Canal and the strategic Bab al-Mandab chokepoint. Instead, vessels are taking longer routes around the Cape of Good Hope to reach Europe and Asia. This rerouting increases transit times and costs, affecting both the shipping industry and the economies dependent on these trade routes. The heightened risk of disruption to global trade remains a concern as long as ships continue to be targeted. RELATED Why Arab states didn't join the US-led Red Sea task force Analysis Stasa Salacanin On December 18, 2023, the United States announced the formation of Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational security initiative to protect ships and uphold the principle of freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. However, many countries declined to join the US initiative fearing that it could be seen as another US effort to support Israel rather than protect the freedom of navigation. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two major regional countries did not announce their intent to join the US initiative. Countries such as Italy and Spain distanced themselves from the announced maritime force. The regional dynamics suggest that if Ethiopia were to become a major maritime force in the Red Sea, it could significantly increase its influence and importance to certain countries, such as the UAE, Israel, and the US. Israel, in particular, could use this new situation to strengthen its influence and enhance its security presence in response to Iran's activities in the region. "The Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement could bolster Addis Ababa's position in the Red Sea and the Ethiopia-UAE-Israel trilateral axis, a development that Cairo may not view favourably" However, this move could also escalate tensions and lead to broader conflicts, as Ethiopia's neighbours-Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia - have serious concerns about Addis Ababa's territorial ambitions. These neighbours also have a favourable view of Turkey and Qatar compared to Israel in the region. Furthermore, Ethiopia's transformation into a maritime power in the Red Sea contradicts Egypt's national security considerations and regional interests. This could result in Cairo aligning itself more closely with Turkey and Qatar in Somalia to counter the growing Ethiopian threat. Ali Bakir is an Assistant Professor at Qatar University's Ibn Khaldon Center and a nonresident Senior Fellow with the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative at the Washington-based Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @alibakeer