The MOU has given SL so much exposure SL was never ever mentioned by the UN , i doubt though the UN can stop anything all they do is rehash old statements for the most part

well spoken the suldaan of Hargeisa indeed

politicans say one thing and they mean something else when he say hassan is his friend what does that even mean haha ... There are 3 things Abiye wants to secure or continue to stay in power. First is to defeat the Amhara fano militia in the Amhara region Second goal and objective is to find a way to counter the Egyptian and the whole Abay Dam Issue. And the lost one which is very important for him is the sea out let thing . Because it became an Ethiopian national obsession since Eritrea broke away in 1991 , meles used the Amhara and the gallas in the border war during the 1998 border war over badme But he illustrated the picture that they are actually fighting for assab but in order to get assab they need to remove and defeat Isias afewerki. General Abraha when he broke the Eritrean defense lines around berentu after they Bombed assap region . General Abraha wanted to go beyond and go deep into Eritrean territory and take Assap but Meles stopped him and called him back, Because Isias had thrown in the towel and accepted the Algiers Agreeement. The sea thing is a major issue for Ethiopian leaders , Abiye believes it will make him or break him and his Premiership is on the line he believes he will not be as great as Haile selassie or Menelik if he doesnt adres the sea issue for Ethiopia

why would he do that he doesnt have many friends not in good terms with afewerki or with sisi or with the bunker leader culusow.. His only 3 friends he has in the region are Djibouti leader Omar geele and Kenyan president wiliam ruto. And the Somaliland President Biixi .sadexda isku xumayn mayo

The war has began Abdinaasiir rag baddan ba u dhiman doona and his death will be avenged oo walanweyn ah oo Somaliland hadda ku nool. Anti walanweyn sentiment already have began in Somaliland main cities now.. Warar badan baydu maqli doontan the next coming days..

remember few years ago UN Ambasador to the Bunker said the. On the airspace dispite conflict between Somaliland and the bunker

Ethiopia first wanted a naval force it wanted to develop its navy forces and that is something they had as an objective, the port issue was never an issue yes they would love to have a cheaper port and there ways to solve that.. Ethiopia today does not have the resources to build a new port at all. The naval thing is not that expensive though for and they wish this to have because for security reasons since they have an issue with Egypt for the dam and all of those things. Berbera was allright so every dollar Somaliland and the UAE make the Ethiopians get 19 cent of that but they have to bring in some investment first for that to happen these things will still be discussed how to come to an agreement about that . As for the force part i do agree that was unprofessional on Abiye part but i think that was really not directed against us but against the Eritreans hence initially abiye wanted Assap but afewerki wasnt having it hence why he moved to option b . But the threat wasnt for us

Somalia’s Denial Won’t Rewrite the Books: Somaliland Has Proven Itself a De Facto State Deserving Recognition The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south. BYZELALEM TAMIR FEBRUARY 18, 2024 Image source: flickr/African Union Commission When Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud took the stage at the 37th African Union Summit in Ethiopia’s capital of Addis Ababa on February 17th, 2024, his harsh criticism of the recent Ethiopia-Somaliland cooperation agreement displayed a short-sighted and counterproductive approach to a complex political issue with deep historical roots. Rather than advancing reconciliation, his remarks entrenched long-held positions and undermined opportunity for constructive engagement between key stakeholders in the Horn of Africa region. The Summit provided an opportunity for African leaders to discuss collaborative solutions to pressing challenges like food insecurity. However, Hassan utilized the forum to condemn Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s decision to formally recognize Somaliland and establish a security partnership through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). While no doubt playing to nationalist sentiment back home, the Somalia President’s reaction overlooks crucial context shaping realities on the ground. The separation between Somaliland and the rest of Somalia began during the colonial era, when Britain administered the territory as a protectorate separately from Italian-governed areas further south. Nearly a century of isolated administration yielded distinct administrative structures, economic patterns, and cultural influences in both territories. When they unified as the Somali Republic in 1960 following independence, the forced union of such divergent regions was perhaps destined to face challenges. From the outset, tensions arose between clans and between those nostalgic for colonial-era autonomy and supporters of Pan-Somali nationalism. The authoritarianism and perceived favoritism towards certain clans under dictator Siad Barre’s regime from 1969 intensified discontent, particularly in the northern regions of Somaliland. Armed rebellions ultimately led to Barre’s ouster in 1991 and Somalia’s descent into chaos, but Somaliland immediately took the opportunity to reclaim the sovereignty it had never fully relinquished. While Hassan maintains that such a unilateral move violated Somalia’s borders, Somaliland’s self-declared independence is best understood as a reversion to the pre-1960 status quo, before being subsumed within the ill-fated Somali state project. In the three decades since, through sustained efforts and against all odds, Somaliland has emerged as one of the few relatively stable and democratic successes in the turbulent Horn of Africa region. It has consolidated effective self-governance, with institutions, security forces, government structures, and a populace that overwhelmingly favors maintained independence. In contrast, despite ongoing international support and a succession of transitional administrations, large parts of Somalia remain under the control of Al-Shabaab militants and intermittent conflict. Somaliland’s experience underscores the failure of the 1960 union to unite distinct societies, as well as the viability of self-rule as an alternative to the instability that has plagued Mogadishu. While Hassan’s government clings to a vision of restored territorial control, Somaliland’s reality is one of a de facto independent state in all but name. Ethiopia, as the dominant regional actor, is well within its rights to engage strategically with this reality by recognizing Somaliland’s sovereignty. In exchange for use of port facilities on Somaliland’s coastline, Abiy has brought added international legitimacy to the separatist administration’s effective rule. Given Somaliland’s record of delivering stability where Somalia struggles, this cooperative approach stands to strengthen security for all parties. Hassan’s hostile condemnation ignores political winds that have shifted definitively away from restored union after more than 30 years of distinct development. Hassan’s remarks promoted an outdated narrative that fails to acknowledge the political realities that have emerged on the ground. While nationalism defines his rigid stance, pragmatism demands recognition that separate Somali and Somaliland societies with distinct geographies and identities have formed since the colonial era in the Horn of Africa. At this stage, after over 30 years of effective self-governance and consolidation of sovereignty, Somaliland is clearly in a position to exist as an independently recognized state should its citizens democratically decide that path. Autonomy within Somalia is not a tenable framework given the turbulent history of their forced union and Somaliland’s clear trajectory towards independence. Ethiopia’s engagement with Somaliland’s government constructively recognizes this reality and stands to strengthen security cooperation across the region. Rather than criticism, Hassan and Mogadishu would be wise to pursue negotiations in a spirit of reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect the right to self-determination. Only through open and pragmatic diplomacy between equal stakeholders can sustainable political solutions be found that bring long term stability to the Horn of Africa

Daahir rayaale was not a tribal chief for the Awdal clan He was the 3rd President of Somaliland and he did allot of good things for SL he met almost all African leaders in Africa and put the SL cause on the AU agenda during his reign. He held 3 democratic elections he closed the Border with Somalia .

The only people that can stop this agreement now is. Somalia not the way it’s doing now by going to foreign capitals but by reaching on a long lasting solution with Somaliland . It should be an offer that somaliland can’t refuse I suppose . but they are not opposed to Ethiopia having a sea out let hassan begged the Ethiopians to make a deal with the bunker but they are not interested in the Indian Ocean but more on the golf of Aden and the Red Sea. He said anaga rabna in itoobiya bad hesho Laakin qaabka ay u gashay banu diidayna , which means making deals with Somaliland they are opposed to not that Ethiopia gets a sea out let . Only Djibouti is ideologically opposed to Ethiopia having a sea out let of their own . Because it threatens their very life line which is port trade . But the bunker just wants to make the deal themselves getting the xaqu qalam and ofcourse stopping somaliland political objectives . Waxwalba way isku dayeen they have one card left and talk to Somaliland in al honesty . Or the ship will indeed sail , hadi heshiiska qalinka lugu duugo it’s done deal . The only people that can. Stop it now is not the international community . It’s the somaliland parliament and guurti . Or Somalia and they have to come with a deal sl can’t refuse

Somaliland oo ka hadashay wakhtiga la hirgalinayo heshiiskii ay Itoobiya la gashay Axad, February, 18, 2024 (HOL) - Somaliland ayaa sheegtay in dhawaan heshiis rasmi ah loo badali isfahamkii ay Itoobiya la gashay isla markaana loo xilsaaray guddi aqoonyahano ah oo dhamaystirkiisa ka shaqaynaysa. Wasiirka Warfaafinta Somaliland Cali Maxamed Xasan ‘Cali Mareexaan’ oo BBC-da la hadlay ayaa sheegay in heshiiskani uu wax ka tarayo xoojinta xidhiidhka iskaashi ee Somaliland iyo Itoobiya. “Somaliland iyo Itoobiya waxay leeyihiin iskaashi ganacsi, mid amni iyo mid xiriir oo muddo soo jiray, wayna ka wada hadlaan sidii loo xoojin lahaa arintaas” ayu yiri wasiir Cali Mareexaan. Wasiirka ayaa beeniyey in saraakiil sar sare oo Itoobiyan ah ay ku sugan yihiin Somaliland sida uu sheegay Madaxweyne Xasan Sheekh Maxamuud balse wuxuu xusay inay jiraan saraakiil sare oo Somaliland oo ku sugan Addisa Ababa, oo uu ku jiro Wasiirka Arrimaha Dibadda D.R. Ciise Kayd Maxamuud. Madaxweynaha Somaliland Muuse Biixi Cabdi, ayaa dhawaan magacaabay guddi aqoonyahano, sharci-yaqaano iyo dibulumaasiyiin iskugu jira oo uu hoggaaminayo Amb. Baashe Cawil, kuwaasi oo ka shaqayn doono dhamaystirka heshiiska. Wasiirka Cali Mareexaan ayaa sheegay in heshiiska loo dhamaystiri doono sida ugu dhakhsaha badan kadibna la horgayn doono golayaasha sharci dajinta. Somaliland ayaa sheegtay in heshiiskani uu sababi dooni in Itoobiya ay u aqoonsato dal madaxbannaan, halka dowlada Soomaaliya ay ku tilmaantay madaxbannaanideedii oo lagu soo xadgudbay.

The murderus walanweyn bandits have began their killings all in the name of somaliweyn unity bunker style

Nonsense Ethiopia it doesn’t serve them to annex anything they will get 50 year lease and after that lease another 50 years and after that another, they pay some money for it . Why look for headache conflict annexation while u can have it . Makes no sense at all . There is even on the table that they can build a separate port. This what the Ethiopians have suggested not sure if biixi accepted a port they co own with sl and can have. A majority share in it . Where they annually just give a revenue of 300 million to Somaliland and they can have a discount of almost 1,8 billion dollar which they pay for jabuuti now this I also heard this . Not sure if it will materialise as muuse will press then to use berbera port where they can have. 20 percent share still much cheaper then jabuuti since sl economy isn’t based on port revenues since oil is being drillled next year

Defend from who

I have told u before. Awdal has nothing to worry about this . It’s in the heart land of the duriyad clan

It’s not on kulmiye kulmiye just said what wadani wanted they you can’t oppose what u presented ur self. Ha wareegto

Galbeedi u have been saying that for a decade or so but sl stands and stands stronger then ever wedi ina bixi wa iska jeediye it’s in the hand of the guurti led the wakiilada and the electoral commission deal with this it’s a done deal

the guurti passed the same law the wadani party wanted it isnt kulmiye fault wadani wanted this sort of elections 20 percent u cant blame it on kulmiye for appeasing wadani the biggest oppostion party , so what do u want kulmiye to do

well its in biixis interest the awdal clan and kulmiye are on the same side they want the 3 parties with the most votes can be the winners or be the new national partys where as wadani want the 20 percentage from each region to become the winner ucid kulmiye and hilaac are on the same side

Thé conflict of the airspace willl continue until the ic and icao intervenes and find a solution sl will show that bunker is not competent to control the airspace this is all good

Djibouti and Ethiopia-Somaliland’s Memorandum of Understandingby Qaran News | Feb 16, 2024 Djibouti and Ethiopia-Somaliland’s Memorandum of Understanding The year 2024 began with a political shakeup in the Horn of Africa when on January 1, Ethiopia and Somaliland revealed the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). Somaliland, previously British Somalia, is formally part of Somalia, from which it unilaterally seceded after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. The territory has been self-governing since 1991 and is considered a de facto state. Nevertheless, it still lacks any legal recognition. The agreement thus set the stage for possible Ethiopian access to the Red Sea via Somaliland and for Addis Ababa’s legal recognition of the Hargeisa government. The announcement, however, immediately raised concerns among all regional actors. Many doubts remain about the future steps involving the MoU, and it is not even certain that the terms of the agreement will be implemented. Notwithstanding, the announcement was enough to further shake the Red Sea region, which is already plagued by deep rifts and crises. The present analysis focuses on how the MoU announcement has affected the state of Djibouti. While the presence of several military bases seems to ensure the stability of the small African country, the MoU has intensified the dynamics within the power circle of Djibouti President Ismaïl Omar Guelleh. After the Eritrean War of Independence in the early 1990s, Ethiopia lost its Red Sea ports and is now the most populous landlocked state in the world. Since 1998, Djibouti’s ports have handled 95 percent of the trade to and from Ethiopia. Access to the Djibouti port has cost Addis Ababa between $1.5 and $2 billion, a cost that Ethiopia considers excessive. Hence, there is a need to find a viable alternative. Apart from Djibouti, only Eritrea and Somalia are the remaining options. Since August, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has increased his claims for Red Sea access, emphasizing in many public speeches that this is critical to the country’s developmental path. These statements alarmed Eritrea in particular and caused the relationship between Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isais Afewerki to cool rapidly after a brief initial honeymoon. Although fears of a new Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict were on the rise, the MoU now seems to have temporarily eased tensions. Reports indicate that Hargeisa is allowing Ethiopia access to the port of Berbera. In addition, Somaliland is granting Addis Ababa an area on the Gulf of Aden for military use. In return, Ethiopia would have to consider recognizing Somaliland and divesting shares of one of its public assets, such as Ethiopian Airlines. Ethiopia’s ability to access the Red Sea through Berbera would provide an alternative to Djiboutian ports. However, the Berbera option is not new, for the Ethiopian government previously committed itself to buying a 19 percent stake in the commercial port. Nevertheless, the conflict in Tigray diverted Addis Ababa’s resources to complete the acquisition. With the MoU signature, the access of Ethiopian goods to Berbera once again becomes potentially viable. In addition to the many political setbacks for any recognition of Somaliland, however, Ethiopian plans also face an economic hurdle, in addition to the many political setbacks to the recognition of Somaliland. No funds are available for the construction and development of an Addis Ababa-Berbera corridor. It is difficult for Ethiopia and Somaliland to find foreign investors, apart from possibly the UAE, which would be interested in expanding commercial traffic out of Berbera, a port operated by DP World. Despite many doubts about implementing the agreement, the MoU has created a ripple effect in the region. Djibouti was caught off guard by the agreement, for its economy would be the one most negatively affected in the region. Besides losing Ethiopian annual fees, Djibouti would see commercial transit plummet. Port revenues, along with foreign military bases, are the country’s primary source of income. Therefore, the impact on Djibouti could exacerbate discontent and divisions within its society. Malaise would be particularly acute among the Afar community, whose members have been marginalized for years by the ruling Somali majority. The international actors’ interest in securing the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is insurance for Djibouti, meaning that none of its stakeholders have an interest in seeing the country dragged into instability, especially in the light of Houthi attacks. Furthermore, revenue from the ports has political value in that it feeds the patronage relationships that the president has built up over the years. Therefore, a decrease in earnings would affect the loyalties built up by Guelleh and further inflame internal power struggles over his succession. The announcement of the MoU has already had a political impact. Guelleh faced a severe blow to his political credibility when the MoU was signed just a couple of weeks after he had promoted a major diplomatic initiative. Guelleh had hosted a meeting between Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and Somaliland President Muse Bihi with the ambitious goal of reviving the dialogue between Mogadishu and Hargeisa. The MoU, however, halted any further development of the initiative. This failure has shown how Guelleh’s ability to read the region’s politics is gradually fading. This is not an insignificant trend for a leader who has consolidated his regime on two pillars: diversifying political relations with extra-regional players and engaging in the role of broker in regional affairs. Guelleh seems to have reached the end of his political path. The president, in office since 1999, was elected in 2021 for his fifth term, scheduled to end in 2026. However, there are many doubts about the 76-year-old president’s health. The announcement of the MoU has added fuel to the many rumors about his succession and has, in particular, accelerated the maneuvering within his power circle. For several months, a virtual game of thrones has been going on within political and economic power structures. In an undemocratic and over-centralized context, alliances and political convergences are forming in preparation for the post-Guelleh era. Within the president’s inner circle, various factions align along paths defined by a mix of power dynamics, family connections, and ethnic or clan loyalties. Following this logic, two factions have emerged. The first power bloc revolves around the influential figure of Guelleh’s wife, Kadra Mahamoud Haid, who has, since 1999, gradually gained centrality in the decision-making process. The first lady exerts her influence on Djiboutian political affairs primarily through a network of formal and informal ties based on clan affiliation. She is an ethnic Somali but belongs to one of the minority clans of the Isaaq. The most powerful Somali clan, the Issa, to which Guelleh belongs, has regularly marginalized the Isaaq in Djibouti, while the first lady’s weight of influence has facilitated the promotion of Isaaq figures to top positions within the state apparatus. Kadra Haid’s actions are aimed at preparing for the rise of her son from her previous relationship, Naguib Abdallah Kamil. He is the current secretary to Prime Minister Abdoulkader Kamil Mohamed, who is an ethnic Afar, as is Naguib’s father. Therefore, Kadra Haid is strengthening the Afar-Isaaq alliance to consolidate Naguib’s position as an eventual successor to Guelleh. The second faction consists of the Somali Issa and especially members of the president’s sub-clan, the Massamans. Among the leading Massaman proponents are prominent figures in the state apparatus, including Interior Minister Said Nouh Hassan, Intelligence Chief Hassan Said Khaireh, and Republican Guard Commander Colonel Mohamed Djama Doualeh. They view the First Lady’s moves and the recent MoU with suspicion. Indeed, the first power bloc has strong identity affinities and ties with Somaliland and Ethiopia. Therefore, they fear an imminent reversal of the country’s inter-clan power relations supported by extra-regional actors. The Massaman group, on the other hand, has forged a connection with the youngest daughter of the presidential couple, Haibado Ismail Omar, who is Guelleh’s financial advisor. Haibado has consolidated ties with the Dir clan, a prominent Somali group that includes the Issa. In addition, her marriage to Sadak Omar Mohamed, aka Sadak John, cemented her direct ties to Mogadishu. Haibado’s financial power, the Dir support, and the influence of Massaman members within the country’s security apparatus provide a credible alternative to Kadra Haid’s plans. Thus, within President Guelleh’s circle of power, two factions are forming that are ready to clash politically over his succession. The danger is that rivalries within power circles will overlap with regional ones. On the one hand, Naguib enjoys the support of the Afar and Isaaq clans and seems oblivious to Addis Ababa and Hargeisa. On the other hand, Haibado moves to increase Somali support for her cause. While no signs of external interference exist in this contest, regional and extra-regional actors are looking for a horse to back. Therefore, the MoU and a possible escalation of tensions between Mogadishu and Hargeisa could profoundly impact the power struggles within the Djibouti regime. The MoU has put the issue of Somaliland recognition back on the table, regardless of the next concrete steps. This means that the United States and other extra-regional actors cannot ignore the situation. However, a fundamental flaw prevents international actors from taking an innovative approach to the matter. Most of them believe that there is a strong link between the success of Somalia’s state-building process and its territorial integrity, a narrative fed directly by Mogadishu’s political elite. Supporting this belief is creating tensions within Somaliland itself, as evidenced by those in Las Anod. In reality, the state-building process and territorial integrity are separate. The presence of a large number of Somalis in different regional states implies that the Somaliland issue should be addressed from a regional perspective, but to do so would be to call into question one of the key principles of the African Union. For this reason, international policymakers are called upon to tread wisely, seeking a balance between Somaliland’s demands and the need to avoid dealing a blow to the continental normative architecture. __________________________________ Orion Policy Institute (OPI) is an independent, non-profit, tax-exempt think tank focusing on a broad range of issues at the local, national, and global levels. OPI does not take institutional policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions represented herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of OPI. Federico Donelli Assistant Professor, University of Trieste Orionpolicy.org

i never knew this keyse fellow became a traitor and went to the bunker in 2017 and worked with the cheese fellow. when asked about why did he go maxa kugu kalifay inad tagtiid he said it isnt relevant wa ku jawaabi kari wayey. dameer foqal dameer weye keyssanihi waan u han weyna walahi bergi hore berigi wasir ah dawladi daahir rayaale oo uu is yidhi siilaanyo hargeisa ka celi