Somaliland set to usher in major port investment Somaliland_medium Ads by BetterSurfAd Options The breakaway state is finalising a huge port investment, boosting its efforts to serve as a trade hub between the African and Arab worlds Somaliland is finalising a multi-million dollar deal with a leading international operator to develop a port at Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, bolstering the breakaway nation’s bid to position itself as a export gateway for landlocked Ethiopia, according to an envoy working on the deal. “After six months of negotiations, an agreement has been put on the table, which is highly exciting, from one of the world’s best port operators,” says Jason McCue, a human rights lawyer who serves as an envoy for the state’s bid for independence, and who is assembling investors to grow the coastal town of Berbera into a $2.5bn logistics hub. “The moment is there for Somaliland.” Mr McCue declined to comment on the size of the port investment, but says it would constitute the single biggest inflow of foreign direct investment in Somaliland’s 22 year history of de facto autonomy. “We are talking hundreds of millions,” he tells This is Africa. “That port will become a major international port.” Authorities in the desert state are trying to overhaul crumbling infrastructure as they seek to capitalise on their position as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Kuwait recently spent $10m reinvigorating the nation’s two airports, and the government in Hargeisa has plans to develop road networks and an oil pipeline to service the export needs of neighbouring Ethiopia. It hopes that the port at Berbera can compete with Djibouti, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, where ships can wait weeks to unload their cargo due to bottlenecks Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous nation, with 91 million inhabitants, and has annual exports worth almost $1bn, led by coffee and gold. “We are trying to see how we could get international partners to help us with infrastructure. We want to develop the corridor between Berbera and Ethiopia because that is really the lifeline,” says Somaliland’s foreign minister Mohamed Bihi Yonis. “We are all aiming at Ethiopia and we believe that we could provide support to a third of the population of Ethiopia.” This kind of large-scale investment may bolster Somaliland’s attempts to gain international recognition. The state unilaterally declared independence when civil war erupted in Somalia in 1991 and is officially seen as an autonomous region rather than a country. But it has held a series of democratic elections, has its own currency, and is a haven of relative refuge from the terrorism and piracy that afflict Mogadishu’s government. As well as targeting infrastructure investors, the government has ushered in frontier oil companies like Genel Energy, which are exploring Somaliland’s potentially huge reserves. But like Somalia, the nation is hampered by the fact that it has no access to international financial services. “There is almost an inevitability occurring [around the independence bid], as Somaliland creates this financial self-sufficiency,” Mr McCue argues. “When big international companies come in, who have immense power in the states where they are from, they are going to demand that their home state pushes for [somaliland’s] independence, because they are going to want to operate in a normal financial services market.” Hargeisa’s foreign minister says that “dealing with the rest of the world in terms of investments and development and security” is proof that the region is fulfilling the criteria required of a country. “We believe that we will get recognition soon, because we have done well,” he claims. But sources close to talks between Somalia and Somaliland tell This is Africa that a new government in Mogadishu shows little indication of changing its stance by recognising the breakaway region’s right to independence. Somalia has contested oil licenses awarded by Somaliland’s Hargeisa-based government, saying they infringe on old concessions awarded by the federal government before 1991. A draft petroleum bill says the central government alone has the “privilege to distribute natural resources”. Somaliland could wait a while longer before it gets the recognition it has been hankering after for two decades. http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Somaliland-set-to-usher-in-major-port-investment?ct=true

Kooxo hubeysan oo Siddeed Qof oo Kenyan ah ku dilay Libooyo oo ku dhow Soohdinta u dhexeysa Soomaaliya iyo Kenya Talaado, December 10, 2013 (HOL) — Dabley aan haybtooda la garanayn ayaa siddeed ruux oo Kenyan oo isugu jiray askar iyo rayid ku dilay maanta deegaanka Liboyo oo ku dhow xadka ay wadaataan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya, kaddib markii ay weerar gaadmo ah ku qaadeen gaari ay ciidamada Kenya wateen oo halkaas marayay. Saraakiil ka tirsan booliiska Kenya ayaa sheegay in weerarkaas ay lagu dilay askar iyo dad shacab ah kuwo kalena si xun loogu dhaawacay, isagoo xusayin shank a mid ah dadka dhintay ay askar ahaayeen. “Weerarka waxaa lagu dilay shan askarta booliiska ka tirsan iyo saddex qof oo shacab ah,” ayuu yiri sarkaal booliiska oo aan magaciisa sheegin oo wareysi gaar ah siiyay wakaaladda wararka Faransiiska ee AFP. Wararka ayaa intaas ku daray in in laba askari oo ka tirsan ciidamadii booliiska Kenya ee la socday gaariga ay maqan yihiin oo aan la ogeyn halka ay aadeen, iyadoo wararkuna ay ku darayaan intaas in laba qof oo kooxihii weerarka geystay ka tirsan la dilay. Sidoo kale, ayaa hadalkiisa raaciyay in laba askari oo booliis ah ay iyaguna si xun ugu dhaawacmeen weerarkan; iyadoo weerarkan uu qayb ka noqonayo weerarro soo laalaabtay oo kooxo hubeysan ay la beegsanayeen ciidamada Kenya tan iyo markii uu dalkaas ciidamada u diray Somalia sannadkii 2011. Illaa hadda lama oga cidda weerarkan geysatay, laakiinse saraakiisha booliiska Kenya ayaa weearrkan ku eedeeyay Al-shabaab, waxaana la xusuustaa in Al-shabaab ay dhowr jeer oo hore sheegatay inay ka dambeysay weerarro lagu dilay ciidammo Kenya ah oo ka dhacay deegaannada ku dhow soohdinta ay wadaagaan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya. Xaduudda ay wadaagaan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya oo dhirirkeedu yahay 700-km ayaa ahayd goobta ugu khatarta badan ee kooxaha hubeysan ay ku ugaarsadaan ciidamada dalka Kenya. Taliye ku xigeenka ciidamada Kenya, Samuel Arachi ayaa xaqiijiyay in lagu dilay askar badan weerarka ay kooxaha hubeysan ku qaadeen baabuur ay wateen booliiska. “Weerarku wuu jiraa waxaana lagu dilay saraakiil booliiska ka tirsan iyo dad shacab ah, waxaana socda howgallo lagu baadi-goobayo kooxihii weerarkan ka dambeeyay,” ayuu yiri Arachi. Weerarkan lagu dilay askarta iyo dadka shacabka ah ayaa wuxuu imaanayaa xilli uu dalka Kenya looga dabaal-degi doono maalinta Khamiista ah ee soo socota sannad-guuradii 50-aad ee kaso wareegtay markii ay xorriyadda ka qaateen dalka Britain sannadkii 1963-kii. Xarakada Al-shabaab weerar ay ku dhinteen 67-qof ku qaaday dhammaadkii bishii September ee sannadkan dhismaha ganacsiga ee Westgate Mall oo ku yaalla bartamaha magaalada Nairobi ee xarunta dalka Kenya.

^^ You wasted a golden opportunity in 1990 when Mengistu was about to be ousted when the Tigre of Eritrea and Tigray were making deals underneath their bunkers. Its sad ONLF only started its struggle armed struggle in 1994, Never trust Xabashi.. Mad mullah oromos are two Huge there is no oromo national consciousness. More than Half of the Oromo consider themselves Ethiopians the rest are in pursuit of their identity. ONLF started fighting Ethiopia when Meles already consolidated his power. Now its for ONLF very difficult to defeat the EPRDF, The EPRDF gets billions of Military aid, there is no Somali state that can challenge the Ethiopians, it doesn't look good.

I know the clan ducaysane I just wanted to know if he was from garowe or garbaharay I guess garbaharay.

Source and who confirmed it and from what region is this goonjeex

Dont expect the Koonfurians to accept that the only way a UN supervised referendum is going to be carried out in SL is if the EU forces Somalia and Somaliland to compromise on that , Dont expect the Koonfurians to come up with that. When kala tago officially happens in the eyes of the world i doubt relations will be warm just after that. it will take decades before relations become warm again. It took the two countries to hold talks after the international community came up with this , do you think they would have talked if the international community didn't initiate the talks. Trust me it took them 23 years , it will take another 23 years for relations to be warm

Its unfair to compare tiny Eritrea with Ethiopia with a bigger territory with more resources , Eritrea has no other resources than Gold and Fish, Issaias hungered the Eritreans because of his self reliance economic program, and rejected much of the aid even when Eritreans needed it the most. Ethiopia remains the darling of the west and is treated as such, while the Eritreans are isolated. Issais is a soldier. Meles will be remembered for his construction of the grand renaissance dam if that projects is finalized. But he him self did not do wonders Ethiopia still remains one of the poorest countries of the world and Ethiopian refugees are fleeing in numbers to Saudi Arabia and UAE.

After 13 years there might be some prospect of a better future but can they overcome the stalemate. Issais was doing fine up to 2009, when he lost the proxy war with the eprdf in Somalia. Now he is sanctioned isolated in return he turned the country into a giant prison. Up to 2009 he was doing very well both arming the olf and onlf and the ICU. He had meles sweating , but after 2009 all went wrong. In 20 years time China will be the super power and Africa will be under the Chinese sphere of influence.

The main concern for policy-makers in Addis Ababa is no longer Asmara's military capacity, but rather the possibility of Eritrea plunging into chaos. This fear is apparently so daunting to Ethiopia that it may prefer a reformed Eritrean government led by People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), rather than the insecurities of a violent power transition next door. On two occasions this year, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has signalled his government's interest in dialogue and his willingness to go to Asmara for peace talks, at anytime and without any pre-conditions. Delicate issue of Bademe At the heart of the stalemate are symbolic politics and domestic constraints on both sides - of which the contested border town of Bademe is an embodiment. It is very possible that the EPRDF will hand over the symbolic town of Bademe to Eritrea - which was awarded to the latter by the EEBC - but it can only get away with such a move domestically by selling it as a necessary sacrifice for a comprehensive and durable peace. The fact that the individuals leading the current Ethiopian government did not take part in the decision-making processes of the border war and subsequent peace agreement, means that they are less constrained by the commitments of their predecessors. For President Afwerki, on the other hand, the stakes are much higher. In fact, resolving the stalemate is likely to create more challenges than benefits to his personal power base. The suspension of the parliament and the constitution, the universal and indefinite military conscription policy, and in general, the system of one-man rule have all been justified by the need to counter the "Ethiopian threat". A settlement of the border issue would eliminate the rationale for maintaining this system and would undoubtedly lead to new domestic demands for addressing the nation's many political and humanitarian problems. 'Brothers at war' Sentimental notions of brotherhood, betrayal, and ethnic-stereotypes have shaped the manner in which Ethiopia's EPRDF and Eritrea's PFDJ ruling parties have been relating to each other since the days of the guerrilla struggle. It is now time to think about what the relationship between these two states will look like without the two omnipresent strongmen that have heavily shaped their histories. The cultural and political intimacy and sense of fraternity that developed during their time as rebel movements led both parties to delay institutionalising the relationship between their newly established regimes in 1993 - and thus made possible the border war. These sentimental aspects also played an important role in making the conflict prolonged and eventually intractable. This sense of "intimacy" has also had some positive implications. One such effect is the preferential treatment given to Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia - who now number around 100,000 people. Eritrean refugees - provided that they satisfy certain criteria - are given residency and work permits and the opportunity to study in Ethiopian universities (as opposed to refugees from other neighbouring countries). Around 1,200 university scholarships have so far been offered to Eritrean refugees. However, the passing of time has brought with it substantial changes, and the more than a decade-long political and physical barriers led to an increasing cultural disconnectedness even among the people that live along the border. In Addis Ababa and other urban centres, it is even more challenging to arouse interest for Eritrean affairs among the average Ethiopian. Post-Zenawi and post-Afwerki A refugee crisis, high-level defections, and a recent mutiny in the army, are some of many indications that Afwerki's regime is facing an existential threat that may lead to its demise in the near future. Afwerki is now on "survival mode" and may engage in new and desperate gestures to prolong his time in power, such as opening up to the international community for dialogue and humanitarian aid. However, if his past behaviour is anything to go by, such moves are only likely to be tactical survival manoeuvres that will not reverse the current political trajectory. It is now time to think about what the relationship between these two states will look like without the two omnipresent strongmen that have heavily shaped their histories. In Ethiopia, this process of change has already begun, and the time when both countries will be led by a generation without the historical and political baggage inherited from the liberation war, the border war and subsequent peace settlement might not be far ahead in time. Free from these constraints, the post-Afwerki and post-Zenawi Eritrea-Ethiopia relations will most likely not only be normalised, but also much more institutionalised. Kjetil Tronvoll is a professor of peace and conflict studies at Bjorknes College, and Senior Partner at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has written Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War and The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and Political Development, 1991-2009. Goitom Gebreluel is an advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has previously worked for the Norwegian government (Norad) and taught foreign policy studies at Mekelle University, Ethiopia. The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: Brothers at war no more New internal and external dynamics are shaping the relations between the two countries. Last updated: 08 Dec 2013 12:29 Goitom Gebreluel is an advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has previously worked for the Norwegian government (Norad) and taught foreign policy studies at Mekelle University, Ethiopia. Kjetil Tronvoll is a professor of peace and conflict studies at Bjorknes College, and Senior Partner at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has written Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War and The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea. Eritrean refugees meeting certain criteria are allowed to study and work in Ethiopia [Reuters] The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia is arguably the most important and volatile in East Africa. The fall-out between the former brothers-in-arms initiated a two-year-long border war in 1998, which claimed around 100,000 causalities, cost billions of dollars, and continues to serve as the main source of regional instability in the Horn of Africa. The fighting was brought to an end with the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement and establishment of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) in 2000. However, Ethiopia's refusal to implement the rulings of the EEBC prior to negotiations and Eritrea's insistence on an unconditional and immediate demarcation of the border, have locked the two governments in an intractable stalemate. Despite the official cessation of hostilities in 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea continued their war through proxies by supporting various rebel movements throughout the Horn of Africa. In this way, they have been fuelling conflict and instability in each other's countries as well as the wider region. Thirteen years after the Algiers Peace Agreement, domestic conditions in both states and the regional geopolitical equation have undergone substantial changes. Ethiopia lost its long-time strongman, Meles Zenawi, in 2012. There are strong indications that Eritrea is also very likely to see the departure of its own leader, President Isaias Afwerki, in the near future. Moreover, Ethiopia has been experiencing robust economic growth and political stability over the last decade, a development that has also coincided with a significant weakening of its regional adversaries. The political standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea has very much been tied to the role, interests and historical experiences of particular individuals and circles that hail from one generation - the Marxist-Leninist student movements turned guerrilla fighters in the 1960s and 1970s. With the political and generational changes that are taking place in both countries, a normalisation of relations between these two states might take place in the not so distant future. A new chapter In Addis Ababa, the discourse on Eritrea has evolved from initially being considered a significant military threat next door to that of concerns over state collapse, civil war and its security implications. Ethiopia's ruling EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) government faced, as recently as 2007, the tactical alliance of Eritrea, Ethiopian armed rebels and factions in Somalia (such as the Islamic Courts Union - ICU). To many observers the security equation seemed at that time to be in favour of this alliance. In a significant turn of developments, Eritrea underwent a process of rapid economic, political and humanitarian decline - a clear indicator of which, is its emergence as one of the top refugee producing countries in the world. In Somalia, the ICU has been eliminated, and its successor al-Shabab has also been dealt a blow that it is unlikely to recover from. Ethiopian authorities are adamant about the normalisation of relations and economic integration of the two nations. Armed Ethiopian insurgent groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Front and ****** National Liberation Front, have largely declined, due to, among other things, their inability to remain cohesive. In addition to this, the Ethiopian economy - and consequently its military power - has undergone sustained growth over the last decade. Asmara's support for Somali-based rebel groups made it an international pariah and target of a regime under UN sanctions. Although Eritrea is not the only actor to engage in such actions (Ethiopia harbours a dozen Eritrean rebel groups), the consequences have been particularly severe for Eritrea. This is mainly due to its choice of allies in Somalia, which happened to be at loggerheads with much of the regional and international community. President Isaias Afwerki's inability to play the diplomatic game and persuade the international community to support, or at least understand his viewpoint, created conducive conditions for the late PM Zenawi - who succeeded where Afwerki failed.

No double standerdnimo at all.

No jawaab, Siilaanyo lugu ma casumin garowe wax shuqul oo kale oo ka dhexeysa ma jirto no cilaqaad,between him and garowe ededadi habaryarti, saaxib toona kama joogo,,marka maxa baas eeh meesha geeynaya. Siiilaanyo ma waxa lugugu yidhi meel walba wa iska taga. Silaanyo xita waligi zambia ma tegin, inkasto nin ay saaxib yihin degenyahay zambia. Dadku ma wada budhcad badeed ba oo meel walba daf bay iska odhanayan ileen inaga wax aragnay.

Brother Iqbal was married to a Somaliland lady and he has lived for more than 12 years in Somaliland thats why he got the SL citizenship not just because he wrote a book, He wrote the book much and much later.

Mandela was an African icon RIP old lion. Now we have Robert Mugabe the last African lion

^^ You said u never see Siilaanyo in garowe,, but why would u see Siilaanyo in garowe weye suaashu maxa ka yaala , adiga leh maxaan ugu arki wayey garowe, dee maxaad ugu arki maxase ka yaala ?

By the way brother Iqbaal he did more for Somaliland, than many other SL citizens he raised awareness for the SL cause Brother Iqbaal wrote this book about Somaliland back in 2010

dee anigu garan mayo waxa Siilaanyo Ka yaala Garowe, bal adigu ino sheeg adiga yidhi wa inu taga.

Gheelle.T;990427 wrote: What do an old albino man, an Indian from South Africa, and a duriyadda lady in Djabouti have in common? They are all Somalilandish citizens. Cant beat that, Xaaji. Brother John is not an old albino man he is just an elderly man , but you are right they are all Somaliland citizens:D

Yahya is Arabic John is English Yochanan is Hebrew and as Yahya or John the baptist, was of the Bani israil thats his correct name Somalis need to have their own name for John, like some have Johnny.

Brother John has the Somaliland citizenship he has been in Somaliland since 1943 ,he voted for Siilaanyo in the last elections. Brother Iqbal also has the Somaliland citizenship he was the former SL representative to South Africa currently he is the South African Ambassador to Eritrea Khadra Hayd Djiboutis first lady also has the Somaliland citizenship

^^ Somalilandish is the language and the ethnicity,, Somalilander is the demonym

^^ Depends if its a female it goes smoothly, for a male it takes much longer

^^ If he was born in Somaliland, the Somaliland government on some occasions gives them citizenship

guleed_ali;990403 wrote: Xaji what are the criteria to be considered a Somalilander? Is it lineage, qabil, residence? Its based on a Somalilandish ethnicity and, citizenship is often also given to some residents people some Europeans Arabs and some Koonfurians.