indeed Berbera port has the potential to become a major commercial hub in East Africa

i foresee a progressive automobile industry in the near future that is if Somalilanders use their human resources to the fullest extent , Somaliand can produce better cars than presented here, but Somalilanders need to unite their strength and visions.

Well done this looks promising.

It doesn't really matter The president actually controls everything from government to state affairs the next PM will most likely be just like saacid and operate as a mere vice president.

Waayo xalane ma nin xun baa

Indeed it touched on all major issues, and why the balkinasation might happen. It is very interesting.

As for the African Union (AU), Somaliland satisfies the controversial convention that Africa's borders should by and large mirror those existing at the end of the colonial era. British Somaliland was, after all, a political entity separate from Italian Somaliland. Legalities, however, do not tell the whole story. The real opposition is political and the little wannabe country is up against powerful foes. Most obviously, Somalia, its mother country, is not particularly interested in losing territory that officially belongs to it, especially as Somaliland represents one of the few areas within its borders that works. Few official figures exist on Somaliland's economy, but a 2006 World Bank Report said its GDP was $1.3 billion, with 65% generated by agriculture and livestock. (The only sheep that can be slaughtered in Mecca come from Somaliland, as it is a special breed favoured by the Prophet back in the day.) There is a sense among some Somalis that Somaliland should be trying to spread its peace and stability through the rest of the country, rather than seeking to separate itself. "Many people in south-central Somalia feel that Somaliland has done extraordinarily well, and that instead of helping and assisting their brothers to the south they are just running away from the fire instead of contributing in [sic] putting out that fire," Mr Aynte observed. For Somalia's federal government, Somaliland's independence is not even up for discussion. In the wake of recent, very tentative talks between Somalia and Somaliland in Istanbul in July, Somalia's President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud expressed his position in no uncertain terms in a statement to Somali media: "With the good offices of the government of Turkey, we have continued our dialogue with the authorities in Somaliland, underscoring our determination to preserve the unity of the country, not by force and coercion, but through dialogue." But Somaliland faces a far larger obstacle in the form of the AU. Its members worry that recognising Somaliland could reinvigorate secessionist movements within their own countries. "The African Union detests the idea of secessions because it opens a can of worms for them," Mr Aynte said. The first and only time the issue of Somaliland was brought formally before the AU was in November 2005 during a meeting of the Peace and Security Council, the AU body responsible for solving and preventing conflict. The commissioners at that meeting quietly shelved the issue. It has not been seriously considered since. AU recognition is vital, because it also determines the international community's response. The United States, the United Nations and the European Union have all said they would be willing to consider Somaliland's independence, but only if the AU does so first. Somaliland's struggle for international recognition has informed the political direction of other semi-autonomous entities within Somalia, most notably Puntland. Located in northern Somalia, just east of Somaliland, Puntland has also created its own governance infrastructure, declaring its autonomy in 1998 following a conference of political elites, tribal elders, business leaders and civil society representatives which sought relief from the ongoing civil war. Like Somaliland, it is to all intents and purposes an independent state. Unlike Somaliland, it even has its own air force. But - mindful of Somaliland's failures in this regard - Puntland has never sought or claimed to be independent. It is not, strictly speaking, a secessionist movement, although it maintains complete control over its internal affairs. This paradox was neatly illustrated in August 2013, when Puntland's government abruptly cut ties with Mogadishu. "Puntland will suspend all cooperation and relations with Somali Federal Government until the country's genuine federal constitution is restored," said Abdirahman Farole, Puntland's president, following a spat with Mogadishu about whether Puntland's education qualifications should be accepted at a national level. "Puntland educational certificates do not require Mogadishu's stamp of approval. If anything, Puntland should approve Mogadishu's educational certificates, because Puntland has a unified curriculum, functioning institutions, standardised examinations, and an educational policy," the president explained in a speech marking Puntland's 15th anniversary of self-governance on August 1st 2013. Puntland, in other words, wants to be part of a federal Somalia, just as long as the federal government does not interfere too much. It may not officially aspire to independence, like Somaliland, but it demands almost complete autonomy from Mogadishu. And, thanks to Mogadishu's weakness, it gets it. Puntland's position is not unique. Somalia's current constitution, passed in August 2012, is based on federalism, which envisages strong regional and weak central government - a reaction to the leadership vacuum in Somalia over the past two decades and Mr Barre's brutal authoritarianism. But there is considerable disagreement both within the federal government and between the various regions (including Puntland and Somaliland) about the divisions of power within this federal system. "What people want is not a separation. What they all want is confederation," said Mr Aynte, referencing research performed by his think-tank. "A very loose link to the central government in Mogadishu, and almost entire autonomy for everything else. Almost like a European Union-type confederation; they might not know the political-science terms for these things but what they're saying to us is they want very minimal relations with the central government," he said. "The federal government is not receptive to this idea. Some think the Mogadishu government is even resisting the idea of a federation, let alone a confederation. What they want is more of a centralised unitary state where the ultimate power rests with the central government but where regions are responsible for administration." Mogadishu's position is not limited to holding on to its territory and expanding its power base, although those are both powerful factors. It is also mindful that allowing Somaliland and Puntland too much autonomy sets a precedent, which Somalia's other regions could follow; and, dangerously, which neighbouring countries could take advantage of. Jubaland, a region in southern Somalia, is a prime example of these fears. Its main city, Kismayo, is Somalia's second largest and a former stronghold of the Shabab. Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, leader of the infamous Ras Kamboni militia, which fought alongside Kenya during the 2011 invasion, now runs this approximately 87,000 square kilometre territory, slightly larger than Austria. An agreement with Somalia's federal government signed in August in Addis Ababa, officially known as the Jubba Interim Administration, has legitimised Mr Madobe's control. Some have hailed this agreement as a victory for Somalia's neighbours because it put Kenya and Ethiopia in an excellent position to capitalise on Sheikh Madobe's notoriously fickle loyalties. (His Ras Kamboni brigade was once an important strategic ally for the Shabab.) Kenya, in particular, is known to be invested in the idea of Jubaland as a friendly buffer state, which will insulate it from Somalia's instabilities. Nairobi is unlikely to pass up the opportunity to wield its influence there, even if it seriously undermines the Mogadishu government. Somalia is often described as one of the world's most homogenous nations, a place where almost everyone shares the same language, religion and ethnicity. This fact is often cited to underline the observation that homogeneity does not necessarily breed peace and stability; that humans, no matter how alike, can always find concerns that divide them and issues to fight over. The various semi-autonomous, fully autonomous and would-be independent regions, which the hapless Mogadishu government tries to rule, seem to prove this dictum. Another lesson, however, can be drawn from Somalia's balkanisation, one that is a little more encouraging. In the midst of all the fighting and the poverty, pockets of the country work, particularly Somaliland. In the world's most failed state, some areas have succeeded. Perhaps Somalia, and the international community, should be encouraging these areas to share these governance lessons with the rest of the country, rather than force them to bow to the authority of a government in Mogadishu that has contributed so much to Somalia's malaise.

Somalia: The Threat of Balkanisation 10 December 2013 , By Simon Allison, Source: Africa In Fact For a country that does not exist, Somaliland does a remarkably good job of pretending. It has a green, red and white-striped flag, a foot-tapping national anthem, and a bustling capital city, Hargeisa. Its administrative district contains ministries, a central bank and even a presidential palace. Its government is fully autonomous. Its 3.85m residents elect the president and legislative assembly in polls that are relatively free and fair. (The last general election was held in June 2010.) They show a Somaliland passport when crossing borders, although only neighbouring Djibouti and Ethiopia accept it as a valid travel document; and pay for goods with Somaliland shillings. They vigorously celebrate Somaliland Independence Day each May 18th. Their own police force, coast guard and army protect them, if need be. Above all, Somaliland boasts peace, stability and a basic respect for the rule of law - the foundations upon which all modern states are built. Somaliland exhibits all the trappings of a real country. But it is not. Under international law, it is a semi-autonomous region of the Republic of Somalia, measuring approximately 137,600 square kilometres (a little larger than Malawi or England). It is theoretically answerable to the government of Mogadishu, Somalia's capital. Somaliland, however, has refused point-blank to heed that call since its unilateral declaration of independence in 1991. It is perhaps the best-organised and most successful secessionist movement in the world. It should come as no surprise that various regions within Somalia have stopped relying on the central government. Somalia is, after all, number one on the failed-states index produced by Foreign Policy magazine and the Fund for Peace, a research organisation. For the last two decades, it has been engulfed by civil war and foreign military interventions. Even now, Mogadishu is in physical control of just a small percentage of the country, thanks to the thousands of soldiers involved in the African Union Mission in Somalia. In the absence of a functional central government, many within Somalia's borders have improvised their own governance. In some places, clan structures have filled the void left by the state; in others, the ideology and structure offered by Islamist groups such as the Shabab have provided a modicum of normality. Still others have formed their own civil administrations, running a government in parallel to the one in Mogadishu. Of these, Somaliland, in north-west Somalia, was the first and continues to be the most successful, by far. This makes a certain amount of sense. The borders of Somaliland today are roughly analogous to those of British Somaliland, a territory carved out by British colonialists in 1888. French Somaliland is now modern-day Djibouti; and Italian Somaliland corresponds to south-central Somalia. In 1960, a newly-independent British Somaliland voted to join up with Italian Somaliland to form the union of Somalia; French Somaliland, perhaps wisely, declined. Somaliland, in other words, has a track record as an independent entity. Mogadishu has not always ruled it. When the union started to sour, it simply opted out. This, at least, is the argument put forward by the administration in Hargeisa. Mogadishu maintains that the union was not an opt-out deal and very much remains in force. It is worth noting here that before the union split, Somaliland suffered the very worst of former dictator Mohamed Siad Barre's excesses. "The people of Somaliland and the elites there have legitimate reasons against the previous Somali government of Mohamed Siad Barre, the previous regime that is, which really levelled cities like Hargeisa to the ground and killed hundreds of thousands of people in the space of two years, 1988-1989," explained Abdi Aynte, a former Al Jazeera journalist who recently established the Heritage Institute of Policy Studies in Mogadishu, Somalia's first independent think-tank. The devastating assault, orchestrated by Mr Barre from Mogadishu as he tried and ultimately failed to consolidate his power, remains central to Somaliland's determination to separate from Mogadishu. No area of Somalia escaped unscathed from Mr Barre's unstable autocracy, Mr Aynte pointed out. Even Hargeisa's souvenir shops sell "Somaliland genocide" postcards. Since then, in relative terms, Somaliland has prospered while the rest of Somalia has disintegrated. It is a success story in a land where achievements are few and far between, although its ultimate goal - of genuine, globally-recognised independence -remains as elusive as ever. Somaliland may have a genuine case for legal recognition. "There are no legal barriers to Somaliland's independence," argued Casey Kuhlman, the American head of Watershed Legal, Somaliland's first and only private law firm. "Somaliland has long met the Montevideo criteria for statehood. It also meets the non-legal but relevant African Union criteria for independence." The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, which forms the basis of the classic definition of modern statehood, declares that a state should possess a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the ability to enter into relations with the other states. Somaliland ticks these boxes.

Somaliland set to usher in major port investment Somaliland_medium Ads by BetterSurfAd Options The breakaway state is finalising a huge port investment, boosting its efforts to serve as a trade hub between the African and Arab worlds Somaliland is finalising a multi-million dollar deal with a leading international operator to develop a port at Berbera, on the Gulf of Aden, bolstering the breakaway nation’s bid to position itself as a export gateway for landlocked Ethiopia, according to an envoy working on the deal. “After six months of negotiations, an agreement has been put on the table, which is highly exciting, from one of the world’s best port operators,” says Jason McCue, a human rights lawyer who serves as an envoy for the state’s bid for independence, and who is assembling investors to grow the coastal town of Berbera into a $2.5bn logistics hub. “The moment is there for Somaliland.” Mr McCue declined to comment on the size of the port investment, but says it would constitute the single biggest inflow of foreign direct investment in Somaliland’s 22 year history of de facto autonomy. “We are talking hundreds of millions,” he tells This is Africa. “That port will become a major international port.” Authorities in the desert state are trying to overhaul crumbling infrastructure as they seek to capitalise on their position as a bridge between Africa and the Middle East. Kuwait recently spent $10m reinvigorating the nation’s two airports, and the government in Hargeisa has plans to develop road networks and an oil pipeline to service the export needs of neighbouring Ethiopia. It hopes that the port at Berbera can compete with Djibouti, Mombasa and Dar es Salaam, where ships can wait weeks to unload their cargo due to bottlenecks Ethiopia is Africa’s second most populous nation, with 91 million inhabitants, and has annual exports worth almost $1bn, led by coffee and gold. “We are trying to see how we could get international partners to help us with infrastructure. We want to develop the corridor between Berbera and Ethiopia because that is really the lifeline,” says Somaliland’s foreign minister Mohamed Bihi Yonis. “We are all aiming at Ethiopia and we believe that we could provide support to a third of the population of Ethiopia.” This kind of large-scale investment may bolster Somaliland’s attempts to gain international recognition. The state unilaterally declared independence when civil war erupted in Somalia in 1991 and is officially seen as an autonomous region rather than a country. But it has held a series of democratic elections, has its own currency, and is a haven of relative refuge from the terrorism and piracy that afflict Mogadishu’s government. As well as targeting infrastructure investors, the government has ushered in frontier oil companies like Genel Energy, which are exploring Somaliland’s potentially huge reserves. But like Somalia, the nation is hampered by the fact that it has no access to international financial services. “There is almost an inevitability occurring [around the independence bid], as Somaliland creates this financial self-sufficiency,” Mr McCue argues. “When big international companies come in, who have immense power in the states where they are from, they are going to demand that their home state pushes for [somaliland’s] independence, because they are going to want to operate in a normal financial services market.” Hargeisa’s foreign minister says that “dealing with the rest of the world in terms of investments and development and security” is proof that the region is fulfilling the criteria required of a country. “We believe that we will get recognition soon, because we have done well,” he claims. But sources close to talks between Somalia and Somaliland tell This is Africa that a new government in Mogadishu shows little indication of changing its stance by recognising the breakaway region’s right to independence. Somalia has contested oil licenses awarded by Somaliland’s Hargeisa-based government, saying they infringe on old concessions awarded by the federal government before 1991. A draft petroleum bill says the central government alone has the “privilege to distribute natural resources”. Somaliland could wait a while longer before it gets the recognition it has been hankering after for two decades. http://www.thisisafricaonline.com/Business/Somaliland-set-to-usher-in-major-port-investment?ct=true

Kooxo hubeysan oo Siddeed Qof oo Kenyan ah ku dilay Libooyo oo ku dhow Soohdinta u dhexeysa Soomaaliya iyo Kenya Talaado, December 10, 2013 (HOL) — Dabley aan haybtooda la garanayn ayaa siddeed ruux oo Kenyan oo isugu jiray askar iyo rayid ku dilay maanta deegaanka Liboyo oo ku dhow xadka ay wadaataan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya, kaddib markii ay weerar gaadmo ah ku qaadeen gaari ay ciidamada Kenya wateen oo halkaas marayay. Saraakiil ka tirsan booliiska Kenya ayaa sheegay in weerarkaas ay lagu dilay askar iyo dad shacab ah kuwo kalena si xun loogu dhaawacay, isagoo xusayin shank a mid ah dadka dhintay ay askar ahaayeen. “Weerarka waxaa lagu dilay shan askarta booliiska ka tirsan iyo saddex qof oo shacab ah,” ayuu yiri sarkaal booliiska oo aan magaciisa sheegin oo wareysi gaar ah siiyay wakaaladda wararka Faransiiska ee AFP. Wararka ayaa intaas ku daray in in laba askari oo ka tirsan ciidamadii booliiska Kenya ee la socday gaariga ay maqan yihiin oo aan la ogeyn halka ay aadeen, iyadoo wararkuna ay ku darayaan intaas in laba qof oo kooxihii weerarka geystay ka tirsan la dilay. Sidoo kale, ayaa hadalkiisa raaciyay in laba askari oo booliis ah ay iyaguna si xun ugu dhaawacmeen weerarkan; iyadoo weerarkan uu qayb ka noqonayo weerarro soo laalaabtay oo kooxo hubeysan ay la beegsanayeen ciidamada Kenya tan iyo markii uu dalkaas ciidamada u diray Somalia sannadkii 2011. Illaa hadda lama oga cidda weerarkan geysatay, laakiinse saraakiisha booliiska Kenya ayaa weearrkan ku eedeeyay Al-shabaab, waxaana la xusuustaa in Al-shabaab ay dhowr jeer oo hore sheegatay inay ka dambeysay weerarro lagu dilay ciidammo Kenya ah oo ka dhacay deegaannada ku dhow soohdinta ay wadaagaan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya. Xaduudda ay wadaagaan Soomaaliya iyo Kenya oo dhirirkeedu yahay 700-km ayaa ahayd goobta ugu khatarta badan ee kooxaha hubeysan ay ku ugaarsadaan ciidamada dalka Kenya. Taliye ku xigeenka ciidamada Kenya, Samuel Arachi ayaa xaqiijiyay in lagu dilay askar badan weerarka ay kooxaha hubeysan ku qaadeen baabuur ay wateen booliiska. “Weerarku wuu jiraa waxaana lagu dilay saraakiil booliiska ka tirsan iyo dad shacab ah, waxaana socda howgallo lagu baadi-goobayo kooxihii weerarkan ka dambeeyay,” ayuu yiri Arachi. Weerarkan lagu dilay askarta iyo dadka shacabka ah ayaa wuxuu imaanayaa xilli uu dalka Kenya looga dabaal-degi doono maalinta Khamiista ah ee soo socota sannad-guuradii 50-aad ee kaso wareegtay markii ay xorriyadda ka qaateen dalka Britain sannadkii 1963-kii. Xarakada Al-shabaab weerar ay ku dhinteen 67-qof ku qaaday dhammaadkii bishii September ee sannadkan dhismaha ganacsiga ee Westgate Mall oo ku yaalla bartamaha magaalada Nairobi ee xarunta dalka Kenya.

^^ You wasted a golden opportunity in 1990 when Mengistu was about to be ousted when the Tigre of Eritrea and Tigray were making deals underneath their bunkers. Its sad ONLF only started its struggle armed struggle in 1994, Never trust Xabashi.. Mad mullah oromos are two Huge there is no oromo national consciousness. More than Half of the Oromo consider themselves Ethiopians the rest are in pursuit of their identity. ONLF started fighting Ethiopia when Meles already consolidated his power. Now its for ONLF very difficult to defeat the EPRDF, The EPRDF gets billions of Military aid, there is no Somali state that can challenge the Ethiopians, it doesn't look good.

I know the clan ducaysane I just wanted to know if he was from garowe or garbaharay I guess garbaharay.

Source and who confirmed it and from what region is this goonjeex

Dont expect the Koonfurians to accept that the only way a UN supervised referendum is going to be carried out in SL is if the EU forces Somalia and Somaliland to compromise on that , Dont expect the Koonfurians to come up with that. When kala tago officially happens in the eyes of the world i doubt relations will be warm just after that. it will take decades before relations become warm again. It took the two countries to hold talks after the international community came up with this , do you think they would have talked if the international community didn't initiate the talks. Trust me it took them 23 years , it will take another 23 years for relations to be warm

Its unfair to compare tiny Eritrea with Ethiopia with a bigger territory with more resources , Eritrea has no other resources than Gold and Fish, Issaias hungered the Eritreans because of his self reliance economic program, and rejected much of the aid even when Eritreans needed it the most. Ethiopia remains the darling of the west and is treated as such, while the Eritreans are isolated. Issais is a soldier. Meles will be remembered for his construction of the grand renaissance dam if that projects is finalized. But he him self did not do wonders Ethiopia still remains one of the poorest countries of the world and Ethiopian refugees are fleeing in numbers to Saudi Arabia and UAE.

After 13 years there might be some prospect of a better future but can they overcome the stalemate. Issais was doing fine up to 2009, when he lost the proxy war with the eprdf in Somalia. Now he is sanctioned isolated in return he turned the country into a giant prison. Up to 2009 he was doing very well both arming the olf and onlf and the ICU. He had meles sweating , but after 2009 all went wrong. In 20 years time China will be the super power and Africa will be under the Chinese sphere of influence.

The main concern for policy-makers in Addis Ababa is no longer Asmara's military capacity, but rather the possibility of Eritrea plunging into chaos. This fear is apparently so daunting to Ethiopia that it may prefer a reformed Eritrean government led by People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), rather than the insecurities of a violent power transition next door. On two occasions this year, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn has signalled his government's interest in dialogue and his willingness to go to Asmara for peace talks, at anytime and without any pre-conditions. Delicate issue of Bademe At the heart of the stalemate are symbolic politics and domestic constraints on both sides - of which the contested border town of Bademe is an embodiment. It is very possible that the EPRDF will hand over the symbolic town of Bademe to Eritrea - which was awarded to the latter by the EEBC - but it can only get away with such a move domestically by selling it as a necessary sacrifice for a comprehensive and durable peace. The fact that the individuals leading the current Ethiopian government did not take part in the decision-making processes of the border war and subsequent peace agreement, means that they are less constrained by the commitments of their predecessors. For President Afwerki, on the other hand, the stakes are much higher. In fact, resolving the stalemate is likely to create more challenges than benefits to his personal power base. The suspension of the parliament and the constitution, the universal and indefinite military conscription policy, and in general, the system of one-man rule have all been justified by the need to counter the "Ethiopian threat". A settlement of the border issue would eliminate the rationale for maintaining this system and would undoubtedly lead to new domestic demands for addressing the nation's many political and humanitarian problems. 'Brothers at war' Sentimental notions of brotherhood, betrayal, and ethnic-stereotypes have shaped the manner in which Ethiopia's EPRDF and Eritrea's PFDJ ruling parties have been relating to each other since the days of the guerrilla struggle. It is now time to think about what the relationship between these two states will look like without the two omnipresent strongmen that have heavily shaped their histories. The cultural and political intimacy and sense of fraternity that developed during their time as rebel movements led both parties to delay institutionalising the relationship between their newly established regimes in 1993 - and thus made possible the border war. These sentimental aspects also played an important role in making the conflict prolonged and eventually intractable. This sense of "intimacy" has also had some positive implications. One such effect is the preferential treatment given to Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia - who now number around 100,000 people. Eritrean refugees - provided that they satisfy certain criteria - are given residency and work permits and the opportunity to study in Ethiopian universities (as opposed to refugees from other neighbouring countries). Around 1,200 university scholarships have so far been offered to Eritrean refugees. However, the passing of time has brought with it substantial changes, and the more than a decade-long political and physical barriers led to an increasing cultural disconnectedness even among the people that live along the border. In Addis Ababa and other urban centres, it is even more challenging to arouse interest for Eritrean affairs among the average Ethiopian. Post-Zenawi and post-Afwerki A refugee crisis, high-level defections, and a recent mutiny in the army, are some of many indications that Afwerki's regime is facing an existential threat that may lead to its demise in the near future. Afwerki is now on "survival mode" and may engage in new and desperate gestures to prolong his time in power, such as opening up to the international community for dialogue and humanitarian aid. However, if his past behaviour is anything to go by, such moves are only likely to be tactical survival manoeuvres that will not reverse the current political trajectory. It is now time to think about what the relationship between these two states will look like without the two omnipresent strongmen that have heavily shaped their histories. In Ethiopia, this process of change has already begun, and the time when both countries will be led by a generation without the historical and political baggage inherited from the liberation war, the border war and subsequent peace settlement might not be far ahead in time. Free from these constraints, the post-Afwerki and post-Zenawi Eritrea-Ethiopia relations will most likely not only be normalised, but also much more institutionalised. Kjetil Tronvoll is a professor of peace and conflict studies at Bjorknes College, and Senior Partner at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has written Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War and The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and Political Development, 1991-2009. Goitom Gebreluel is an advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has previously worked for the Norwegian government (Norad) and taught foreign policy studies at Mekelle University, Ethiopia. The views expressed in this article are the authors' own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Ethiopia and Eritrea: Brothers at war no more New internal and external dynamics are shaping the relations between the two countries. Last updated: 08 Dec 2013 12:29 Goitom Gebreluel is an advisor at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has previously worked for the Norwegian government (Norad) and taught foreign policy studies at Mekelle University, Ethiopia. Kjetil Tronvoll is a professor of peace and conflict studies at Bjorknes College, and Senior Partner at the International Law and Policy Institute. He has written Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War and The Lasting Struggle for Freedom in Eritrea. Eritrean refugees meeting certain criteria are allowed to study and work in Ethiopia [Reuters] The relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia is arguably the most important and volatile in East Africa. The fall-out between the former brothers-in-arms initiated a two-year-long border war in 1998, which claimed around 100,000 causalities, cost billions of dollars, and continues to serve as the main source of regional instability in the Horn of Africa. The fighting was brought to an end with the signing of the Algiers Peace Agreement and establishment of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) in 2000. However, Ethiopia's refusal to implement the rulings of the EEBC prior to negotiations and Eritrea's insistence on an unconditional and immediate demarcation of the border, have locked the two governments in an intractable stalemate. Despite the official cessation of hostilities in 2000, Ethiopia and Eritrea continued their war through proxies by supporting various rebel movements throughout the Horn of Africa. In this way, they have been fuelling conflict and instability in each other's countries as well as the wider region. Thirteen years after the Algiers Peace Agreement, domestic conditions in both states and the regional geopolitical equation have undergone substantial changes. Ethiopia lost its long-time strongman, Meles Zenawi, in 2012. There are strong indications that Eritrea is also very likely to see the departure of its own leader, President Isaias Afwerki, in the near future. Moreover, Ethiopia has been experiencing robust economic growth and political stability over the last decade, a development that has also coincided with a significant weakening of its regional adversaries. The political standoff between Ethiopia and Eritrea has very much been tied to the role, interests and historical experiences of particular individuals and circles that hail from one generation - the Marxist-Leninist student movements turned guerrilla fighters in the 1960s and 1970s. With the political and generational changes that are taking place in both countries, a normalisation of relations between these two states might take place in the not so distant future. A new chapter In Addis Ababa, the discourse on Eritrea has evolved from initially being considered a significant military threat next door to that of concerns over state collapse, civil war and its security implications. Ethiopia's ruling EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front) government faced, as recently as 2007, the tactical alliance of Eritrea, Ethiopian armed rebels and factions in Somalia (such as the Islamic Courts Union - ICU). To many observers the security equation seemed at that time to be in favour of this alliance. In a significant turn of developments, Eritrea underwent a process of rapid economic, political and humanitarian decline - a clear indicator of which, is its emergence as one of the top refugee producing countries in the world. In Somalia, the ICU has been eliminated, and its successor al-Shabab has also been dealt a blow that it is unlikely to recover from. Ethiopian authorities are adamant about the normalisation of relations and economic integration of the two nations. Armed Ethiopian insurgent groups, such as the Oromo Liberation Front and ****** National Liberation Front, have largely declined, due to, among other things, their inability to remain cohesive. In addition to this, the Ethiopian economy - and consequently its military power - has undergone sustained growth over the last decade. Asmara's support for Somali-based rebel groups made it an international pariah and target of a regime under UN sanctions. Although Eritrea is not the only actor to engage in such actions (Ethiopia harbours a dozen Eritrean rebel groups), the consequences have been particularly severe for Eritrea. This is mainly due to its choice of allies in Somalia, which happened to be at loggerheads with much of the regional and international community. President Isaias Afwerki's inability to play the diplomatic game and persuade the international community to support, or at least understand his viewpoint, created conducive conditions for the late PM Zenawi - who succeeded where Afwerki failed.

No double standerdnimo at all.

No jawaab, Siilaanyo lugu ma casumin garowe wax shuqul oo kale oo ka dhexeysa ma jirto no cilaqaad,between him and garowe ededadi habaryarti, saaxib toona kama joogo,,marka maxa baas eeh meesha geeynaya. Siiilaanyo ma waxa lugugu yidhi meel walba wa iska taga. Silaanyo xita waligi zambia ma tegin, inkasto nin ay saaxib yihin degenyahay zambia. Dadku ma wada budhcad badeed ba oo meel walba daf bay iska odhanayan ileen inaga wax aragnay.

Brother Iqbal was married to a Somaliland lady and he has lived for more than 12 years in Somaliland thats why he got the SL citizenship not just because he wrote a book, He wrote the book much and much later.

Mandela was an African icon RIP old lion. Now we have Robert Mugabe the last African lion