Lol@ erroneous and biased......sxb the dates are easily verifiable so don't dig yourself any deeper. Ta labaad this is a piece that’s published in an academic journal so its references have been checked. We cannot say that for your sources. Ta sadexaad, I have not denied that there were excesses, but it was the SNM that brought the civilians in harms way not the SNA. You’re not having your day Norf.

I Think you guys should stop dreaming and start reading: Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime, I posted the full article for you guys. 1. The SNM was decimated. 2. it took weeks You guys are claiming August 1988, but they entered teh town in May and within weeks they were decimated. Defeat I was claiming the SNM was defeated but according to this article the SNM was decimated can someone tell me the difference? North give it a try. It was not until October, four months after the fighting finished, that foreign diplomats and representatives of relief and donor agencies were able to go to the north. Hmmmm 4 months before October is yes june, the 6th month of the year, and june follows ...yes MAY the 5th month of the year. So how can you claim that in August 1988 Hargeysa was under SNM command? when the major fighting finished way before that........ Been abuur guys? edited.

Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime Patrick Gilkes Briefings Somalia: Conflicts within and against the Military Regime Patrick Gilkes On 23 May 1986, President Mohammed Siad Barre sustained serious body and head injuries in a car crash and had to be flown to Saudi Arabia for six weeks hospitalisation. It was months before he recovered fully, though he formally resumed the duties of the presidency again in August. The accident had major political repercussions, setting off political manoeuvres within the government and the President's own clan, the *******. For the first time in Siad's 17 years of rule, attention was focused on the succession to the more than 79-year old president. His illness revealed considerable weaknesses and divisions within the regime and a lack of consensus among the various factions and clans on who should succeed him. In the immediate aftermath of the accident, General Mohamed Ali Samatar, First Vice-President and Minister of Defence, took over as acting President and declared a state of emergency. At the same time, the President's eldest son, Colonel (now Brigadier General) Maslah Mohamed Siad, promptly took command of the presidential guard units and the ******* militia guarding the official residence, retaining control of these troops until the President's return. Subsequently, in April 1987, three months after presidential elections in which President Siad Barre, as the sole candidate, took 99.2% of the votes cast, General Samatar was made Prime Minister, but lost his position as Minister of Defence. Samatar is a popular figure in the army. He is also seen by Somalia's western allies as a moderate and reasonable politician, despite his close links with the USSR in the past. In Somali political terms, however, he lacks clan backing, coming from a insignificant group. Somali politics since independence have revolved around the major clans; the Dolbah-unta, Gadabursi, ******, Issak, Maje-rteen, Mare-han, Oga-den and Warsangeli. Of these, the Dolba-hunta, *****t-een, Mare-han and Og-aden are the main components of the ***** clan family. The ***** will often form a united front against the ****** and Issak clans, but will as frequently fall out among themselves. In recent years the most important single clan has been the President's own M-arehan group. While the Mare-han have continued to build up their position in both the civilian and military spheres, they have apparently failed to agree on a successor to Siad Barre. In the presidential stakes the position of Minister of Defence has been of considerable importance, particularly since May 1988, whenthe opposition Somali National Movement (SNM) launched major surprise attacks on several northern Somali towns, including Burao and the regional capital, Hargeisa. The SNM, supported by the Issak clan in the north, is based in Ethiopia and received considerable support from Addis Ababa. This was Ethiopia's chance to offset Somalia's support for the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), BRIEFINGS 55 movement fighting for self-determination of the Somali people in southeast Ethiopia, the region known as the ******. It was the WSLF which precipitated the disastrous war of 1977-78 against Ethiopia, seriously affecting Somalia's fledgling socialist revolution and leading to the break with the USSR. In January 1986, a few months before his accident, President Mohamed Siad Barre met President Mengistu of Ethiopia in Djibouti, and started a cautious dialogue. Both had internal reasons for lowering tension in the region, and the Italian government in particular was pressing both governments towards a deal. Discussions were held up by Mohamed Siad Barre's car crash and by the difficulty of agreeing on an agenda for talks. As a result little progress was made until 1988. In March, the Ethiopian army suffered a major disaster at the hands of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) at the battle of Afabet. With a paralled upsurge of military activity by the Tigrai People's Liberation Front (TPLF) in the neighbouring region of Tigrai, the Ethiopian regime had an immediate need for fresh troops in northern Ethiopia. Within a matter of weeks, Ethiopia and Somalia agreed on almost all the secondary points of issue, leaving the border and nationality questions to be decided at some future date. Most of the Ethiopian troops stationed in the south and southeast of the country were promptly transferred to the north. The effects of this for Somalia were not entirely foreseen. Predictably, the deal upset the Ogad-en clan which remains committed to the self-determination struggle inside Ethiopia. Most of the Somali population of Ethiopia, at least in the southeast, are Oga-den. Oga-den relations with the Mare-han were close for most of Siad Barre's period of rule (Siad's mother is from the Ogad-en), but the Ogad-en were angered by the meetings of 1986 between the two heads of state, and strongly criticised the 1988 agreements which, they believe, effectively abandons their claims. The surprising outcome of the agreement was the SNM's response. Threatened by a complete loss of all Ethiopian support, it opted for an immediate guerilla offensive on a large scale. Earlier it had tried to sabotage an Ethiopian/Somali rapprochement by launching a campaign of urban guerilla attacks in the north in late 1986 and seizing a number of border villages. Its operations against largely conscript troops had some successes. In May 1988 it launched major attacks on Burao and Hargeisa in the north. Burao was captured and held for some time and most of Hargeisa was also seized, though the SNM failed to capture the airport and the military headquarters where the army was entrenched. It took the army weeks to recover the initiative and force the guerillas out, and they had to use heavy artillery and air strikes, as well as infantry house to house assaults to clear Hargeisa. It is widely claimed that mercenary pilots, former Rhodesians, flew bombing missions for the government. It was not until October, four months after the fighting finished, that foreign diplomats and representatives of relief and donor agencies were able to go to the north. They returned convinced that much of the destruction had been caused by government operations, concerned by the army's 56 REVIEW OF AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY control of food and water distribution and more prepared to accept Amnesty International's very critical reports on human rights violations. The SNM was decimated in the fighting (though it still has guerilla units operating, mostly against clan militias), but the army did not come well out of it either. It was heavily criticised for its slow response to the attacks, and then for excessive use of force, particularly against civilians. Amnesty International accused the government of allowing substantial abuses of human rights. The troops in the northern 26th sector also suffered heavy casualties in the fighting. In part because of this the government found it necessary to turn to clan militias to raise reinforcements. Several clans, however, notably the Dolba-hunta, refused to join in a fight they saw as being against the Issak rather than the SNM. It was largely the traditional rivals of the Issak, the Oga-den (with a long history of disputes over water and grazing rights inside Ethiopia) who were prepared to join in. Some 8,000 ****** militia were sent to Hargeisa where they bore the brunt of clearing the town of SNM guerillas. The majority of the present population of Hargeisa are not the former Issak inhabitants but ****** from Ethiopia, previously living in refugee camps. A number of Oromos who fled from Ethiopia in the last few years have also moved into the town. Of greatest concern to the army itself were the internal problems revealed by the fighting, and the apparent growth of clan rivalries even within the military. According to reports, the commander in the north at the time of the SNM assaults, Major General Mohamed Siyad 'Morgan', a son-in-law of the President and from the *********, disagreed sharply with the Minister of Defence, Major General Adan Abdullahi 'Gebiyu', an ******. In mid-1988 General Morgan lost his post amid allegations that he had favoured ********* units during the fighting; early in 1989, General Gebiyu was moved to the Ministry of Information and Tourism, with claims being made that ****** units were refusing anyone else's orders. General Morgan became Deputy Minister of Defence. Clan politics have also continued to bedevil the opposition. The SNM's main problem has been its failure to turn itself into the national organisation it claims to be. Despite some contacts with southern clans, and even for a time the appointment of a vice-chairman from the ******, the SNM has never managed to get rid of its image as a northern and specifically, an Issak, grouping. In early 1989 ****** critics of the government set up their own organisation in Rome, headed by the former SNM Vice-Chairman, Ali Mohamed Osoble. The failure to reach accommodation with the other Ethiopian based opposition, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) also underlined the SNM's weakness. The SSDF's support came largely from the *********, traditional rivals of the ******* within the ***** clan family. The frequently proposed unity between the two fronts would have gone far towards creating a national opposition. The various opposition groups have planned a conference for 1989 to try and improve co-ordination, but there is little expectation of any united front coming into being. The SNM has also failed to solve internal divisions within the Issak itself. These have operated on the level of sub-clan divisions as well as over political and religious policies. The present chairman of the SNM, Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, from the Habr Jello sub clan, has been consistently opposed by critics from the Habr Yunis, another major branch of the Issak. Disagreements have also surfaced over the degree of Islamic fundamentalism that the SNM should accept, and BRIEFINGS 57 whether or not it should openly push for separatism from southern Somalia, an issue that has not been publicised but which is becoming of growing importance. The government unveiled plans for reconstruction in January at a central committee meeting of the ruling party. These included a statement of the need for a political solution and an extension of the existing amnesty. The government also said it planned to take responsibility for resettling displaced people, help them rebuild houses, rehabilitate hospitals, schools, water supplies and set up a high powered government agency to achieve all this. A considerable number of political prisoners have also been released, including many Issak professionals arrested immediately after the first SNM attacks last year. In interviews, the Prime Minister has emphasised that the releases will continue. He has also stressed the need to talk to the elders and people in the north (though not the SNM); and there have been hints that the government will allow more representation of the Issak in central government positions. None of this will come cheap, and it will be difficult to satisfy the north, unless some economic benefits are on offer as well. Given Somalia's economic problems this may be difficult. In September 1987, the Somali government unilaterally broke its agreement with the IMF. This has still not been renewed and one effect has been that much needed meetings of donors to reschedule debts have not been held. The results have been predictable. Donors have become very cautious and major projects have been held up. The government's most important developmental project, the controversial Barhdere dam scheme, has been indefinitely postponed. Financial commitments were made by a number of countries and organisations, including the IDA and the EEC, but all have been held up by the failure to talk to the World Bank. Bilateral relations have done better, though relations between Somalia and the US continued to deteriorate in 1988. Somalia has never been satisfied with the aid, military or economic, promised or given since 1977, nor with the terms for the US use of the Berbera facilities which included the harbour where the US has lengthened the quay, dredged out some areas to take larger ships and built a helicopter pad; there is also an airfield which has one of the longest runways in Africa. In 1987 military aid fell to $5 million and Congress blocked a $55 million aid package, citing human rights violations and the refusal to talk to the opposition. However, the government's use of policies of the type so often suggested by the IMF — cutting back the state sector, dropping subsidies and limiting numbers of civil servants — has meant that some economic aid from the US and Italy has continued to arrive. As so often, the imposition of such policies has produced its own problems. Price control of foodstuffs early last year merely.led to the disappearance of food from the market. By mid-year the government had quietly backed down, telling merchants to ignore the controls. Food returned to the shops, but at a higher price. Inflation has continued to rise, and the increases in civil servant salaries, in August, the pay rises for the army (a 50% rise in gross pay and 100% increase in monthly rations), and new rises budgeted for 1989, will increase the pressure. Continuing rises in fuel prices are another problem. Abu Dhabi is the current supplier under an agreement last year, replacing Saudi Arabia; but in either case Somalia still depends upon the US or Italy or the IMF to cover its annual balance of payments deficit. Oil supplies have often proved erratic, and have been partly responsible for frequent electricity blackouts at the end of 1988. Water supplies too have been causing concern. Shortages in both have caused considerable criticism. Much will be expected of the high level presidential committee set up late last year to recommend ways of easing the shortages. Source: Somalia: conflicts within and against the military regime Author: Patrick Gilkes Published in: Review of African Political Economy, Volume 16, Issue 44 1989 , pages 53 - 58

Saaxiib you should come up with credible sources. This is the second time that you used erronous sources to back up your claims. I truelly believe that you can do better.

Originally posted by Northerner: by August 1988 they had captured Hargeysa and other northern towns. Again you shoot yourself in the foot by quoting erronous sources. May 1988 saaxiib not August. Know your history saaxiib. By August 1988 the SNM was defeated and the region was in the hands of the Somali National Army. EDIT: Jacaylbaro I cant watch teh video now, but will respond to it as soon as I have watched it.

^irrelevant to the topic jacaylbaro, stick to on topic at the time if you would like to discuss the USC and its history we will do it in a seperate thread.

Originally posted by Northerner: quote: North that article your provided claimed that the SNM advanced towards Muqdisho. That was written by the same people whos report your using to back up your claim busy right now, give me a few minutes to reply properly. I think you added that SNM bit to the article Cool take your time.

After the fiasco of 1988 the SNM was on its return. The operations that in late 1988 and early 1989 severely weakend the SNM, by late 1989 the SNM was on its last legs and in March 1990 the SNM was defeated. The SNA was in control of Northern Somalia. So now you tell me did the SNM take over Hargeysa before or after Siyad barre left Xamar in 1991? and who made Siyad Barre leave Xamar SNM or USC?

North that article your provided claimed that the SNM advanced towards Muqdisho. we are not talking about events that took place 100 years ago, I was present in Xamar in 1991 and I can tell you no SNM to be seen The report that was dated March 1990, the fact that the refugees where returning, their peaceful homecoming and that the SNM was only capable of only hit and run attacks only contribute to the mounting evidence against your case saaxiib. North I expected much more from you saaxiib, you used two weak articles to support your case. 1. The first one was written by a misinformed author and didn't contribute to your case. 2. the second was a sensasionalist piece by an organization that is known for exageration in order to get donors. I however have used two credible sources. 1. A detailed state department report 2. Ina Waraabe's claim that the secessionists were defeated. Jacaylbaro your question is irrelevant, prove its relevance first only then will I answer it.

Yes Northerner you should say more, your first article shows the lack of knowledge the author had about the Somali conflict by claiming that the SNM advanced towards Xamar Your second article is nothing but baseless accusations, where is HRW basing these claims on? It’s a sensationalist piece if you ask me and it goes in directly against the documents I provided that indicate the pacification of the region and the peaceful return of the civilians. Organizatiosn such as HRW are known for their sensationalist pieces, since its in their interest to shock readers into becoming donors.

The defeat of the SNM at the hands of the SNA is indicated by the documents I provided and the claim by Ina Waraabe that the SNM was defeated. The article that you posted only show that: 1. Hargeysa was bombed (we all knew that and I was not denying that) 2. The army disintegrated (hmmm, who was discussing about that) So what has this article that you posted conrtributed to our discussion? In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM forces advanced toward Mogadishu. hahahaha , I dont need to respond to that bit. When did the SNM advance to Xamar? now who is telling porkies Norf, me or you?

Originally posted by Northerner: Me, Thats why i dont take your stance seriously. The SNM killed people and was a very sad thing to do. I will never claim otherwise. But you on the other hand are simply telling porkies saxib. Can the bombardment of Hargaisa be classed as killing innocents? Saxiib the SNA never practiced targeted killings, the SNM did practice targeted killings of innocent civillians and remmember it was the SNM that your defending that attacked the cities and put the innnocent civilians in harms way. The SNM brought death and destruction to Hargeysa and Burco not the SNA.

Whats the point of that? its irrelevant to the subjects we are discussing. We are discussing whether or not the SNM was defeated and the evidence is against you saaxiib. 1. There are official documents that indicate that the SNM was defeated. 2. A sesessionist leader claims the SNM was defeated. So what do Siilaanyo and Cabdiraxmaan tuur got to do with our discussion unless your blaming Siilaanyo for the defeat.

Originally posted by Jacaylbaro: It is crazy when you want you accuse and make been abuur on a whole nation just to get intention ....... What nation the Somali Nation? What lie have I told? I provided proof, something you guys can't. In my opinion your the ones that are bussy with been abuur, since you can't back up your claims. Northerner, NO he did not do such things, there have been excesses from the regime which as we all know was an authorotarian regime. There have been political prisoners, but no innocent people where killed deliberatly by the government. Normal people who were not political were no targets of the government. In the wars there have been innocent people who died, but it was no government policy to kill or imprison innocent people. Thats something we can't say about the SNM.

Duke I think your confusing Siyad barre with Cabdulahi Yusuf. Assasination is the trademark of Cabdulahi Yusuf and also failed coups. Badacase, I have already privided prove for the fact that the SNM was milaterely defeated after their failed attempt to hold Hargeysa and Burco in 1988. Old Northerner who I think can argue a better case then you already gave up saaxiib. The SNM was defeated thats a fact. The USC and the revolt in Xamar brought down our government. Not hit and run tactics by the SNM. The SNM was was defeated and the North West region was pacified. the SNM was not safe anywhere, not in teh towns not in miyiga, not in its traditional fall-back lines behind the border. Meel walba waa loogu tagay. The region was in the firm hands of the government by 1989 and the refugees were starting to return to rebuild their houses, there were no reprisals, no genocides, no harrasment. The goverment did what was expected of it, it was protecting the civilians, while the SNM's only objective was to bring pain, hurt and humiliation to the people of the North West.

Don't know whether to laugh or to cry :mad:

TFG got jokes...no no its a joke.

Getting all Arabic miyaa? is ilaali peacenow might deport you. Northerner saaxiib this is SOL we all use articles for political reasons and highlight those bits that support 'our' cause. Now about ina Waraabe's comments, ina Waraabe my favorite secessionist said that the SNM was defeated. We all knew that, but the fact that he ( a contender for the secessionist leadership) said it damages the secessionist myth of SNM martyrs who fought for 'freedom', and 'liberated' the North West region from a 'brutal' regime. In my opinion thats what the 'Chief is getting at. Ina Waraabe told the truth and damaged the seccesionist myth and their cause.

Originally posted by Northerner: ^^Is this the a friend in need stuff,,,, No Northerner I am helping you saaxiib, I am helping you to understand that you should present your case without resorting to lazy insults like 'you hate us' , I am sure your capable of defending your precious secessionist cause without calling everyone who doesn't agree with you a hater. We are no longer bright eyed little boys anymore like you said so act like the grown man you want to be.

Originally posted by xiinfaniin: Me, adeer Siyad was the father of Somalia’s ills. Somalis could have achieved more in 21 years he has been ruling them! Contrary to what you said, we achieved less and not more with him! Nimaan wax aqoon oo Allaah ummadda ku saladay buu ahaa adeer! The guilty of the wicked is still raw, and that you passionately defend him is the disappointment here! Your right Xiin, Somalia could have achieved allot more in the 21 years that he was ruling us. But ask yourself would Somalia have survived without his rule in those years? Somalia would be more corrupt, instable and the civil war would have happened much earlier. The Milatery rule has given us more time to develop. Its easy to blame Siyad for Somalia's ailment, Somalia's problem was not Siyaad Barre's regime but qabiil. It was qabiil that brought down the Daraawiish and its qabiil that destroyed the Somali Republic and its qabiil that will destroy any other form of government we get. I understand where your coming from and I am gladly willing to demonize Siyad Barre if that means that Somalis will get along, but the sad truth is the problem is deeper then Siyad Barre. In this thread we are commemorating qabiil heroes and saints and look at the threat title, an SNM SHAHIID thats how deep it goes adeer.

Is this the 'you hate us' fall-back line, the man doesn't agree with you POLITICALLY that doesn't mean he hates you. Sidan wax isaga dhaan sxb

Ouch!

Northerner it says March 1990, maybe you should open your eyes and read it. Was the SNM serieus in March 1990 by the way? the Is**** are actually returning to Burao and Berbera in growing numbers and, we are told, even larger numbers to outlying villages. We met and interviewed some of these the GSDR {Government of the Somali Democratic Republic) and the Somali Army seem to be facilitatng return of displaced persons, as Samatar promised. (Muqdisho 2485). We saw no sign and heard no report of of any harrasment or punishment So was the SNM in control? and In all your wisdom you are using that biased book as evidence? get serieus sxb. lol@SNM got serieus.

Eebe ha u gargaaro.