Why not? I don't mind pinning you against the wall again.

Mujaahidiin maxee ku noqdeen kuwani? ma dadkii ee dhiigooda qubeen ayee shahiid ku noqdeen? Diinta kuwan doonaya gooni isu taaga horta maxay tahay? Shahiid horta sidee ayaa loogu noqdaa diinteena?

Whats the point of continuing if I have already made my point sxb. Ilaahay ha u naxariisto adeerkaa iyo cid walba oo gardaro loo dilay.

See there go the SOL subliminals again.........can you guys see the baranoia.........I swear I see baranoia.

Fireside Chat: An African Affair 07.26.2007 The United States’s strategic interests in Africa are getting larger, lending credence to the idea of establishing Africa Command (AFRICOM). At the same time, it would be a mistake to view military entities as the only means of engaging Africa. For the United States to make an impact, the U.S. government needs to have a closely coordinated policy that also involves its civil-affairs programs. Of course, the United States remains consumed by Iraq. And until its diplomatic energies and military assets are relieved by a change in policy, it’s going to find it more difficult to immerse itself in other places of strategic importance. James W. Riley recently spoke with National Interest author Jonathan Stevenson about the evolution of U.S. Special Operations Forces and U.S.-African relations. In "The Somali Model?" you mention the military commander’s increasing diplomatic role around the world and the need for increased military-to-military and civil-affairs programs. Could you expand on this? It means closer day-to-day relationships between the U.S. military commanders who are deployed overseas and their counterparts. And that can mean training, or it can extend to other kinds of security relationships that are struck both bilaterally and multilaterally. I think those kinds of relationships, at least in respect to Africa, stand to become thicker and more intimate by virtue of the creation of AFRICOM, which is scheduled to be stood up in September 2008. Why should the United States strengthen its presence on the continent through AFRICOM? And does AFRICOM increase the chances of actually generating a backlash and anti-Americanism on the continent? Certainly, that is a possibility. I think we need to point out three basic interests or concerns of the United States and its foreign policy that favor the creation of AFRICOM. One is increased terrorist activity and recruitment on the continent. The second is securing access to hydro-carbons and diversifying oil supplies as much as possible outside of the Middle East. There are very clear interests here, particularly in the Gulf of Guinea and west Africa, but also in east Africa the Sudan region. The third is the fact that Africa is becoming of greater geo-political significance because of China’s involvement there. So those are three very substantial strategic priorities that the creation of AFRICOM would service. It is true that some commentators in Africa are worried that the establishment of a combat and command dedicated exclusively to Africa smacks of a kind of neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism that’s going to turn Africa into a geo-political pawn like it had been during the Cold War. I think that the way to counter that impression is for there to be a relatively small footprint in terms of the actual number of troops deployed and administrative infrastructure that’s there. And that we have people there to show a serious interest not just in security concerns, but also in political stability and the need to make African lives better—and to promote better governance. You touch on the relationships between the U.S. government, private military firms (PMF) and their African clients. Is this a type model that could work? I don’t think it’s an alternative to AFRICOM for a couple of reasons. One is that PMFs throw up red flags for an awful lot of African governments. Their viewed as mercenaries, and the mercenaries that some African countries have had experience with have been populated mainly by former South African soldiers, who are not met with sympathy. So, I think you have to be very careful about these PMFs in Africa. Having said that, the United States capacity is very limited, as is Africa’s. I’m sure there is a need and a place for some sort of outsourcing, but I think it has to be seen as being closely supervised by professional military staff, which would mean AFRICOM. In your piece you say, "coercive, strictly military enterprises will not provide durable solutions to Africa’s political problems", but what will ? And is this in any way related to Fourth Generation Warfare? Sure it is. And I think that a lot of the activities of the Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa are engaged in, like drilling wells and providing certain kinds of emergency relief to people in the regions in which they operate, are testimony to the fact that the U.S. military in general is aware of the kinds of non-coercive, non-kinetic activities that SOFs can do in order to improve perceptions of U.S. power. This is not something which the U.S. military is institutionally unaware of. In fact, it talks about this a great deal in the context of "strategic communication", which is viewed as lacking in the War on Terror. We’ve really had a hard time conveying the message that our projection of military power is really intended to better people lives. And I think that as the military moves forward in meeting very stiff challenges today it’s going to be increasingly concerned with this issue. And there’s no question in that SOFs can help with strategic communications. After the Black Hawk Down incident, many feel that the United States suffers from a lack of commitment and that this is a weakness. Are there any correlations to be drawn from our experiences in Africa and Afghanistan and Iraq? I think that the Somalia problem is currently a lot different from Iraq and Afghanistan. I mean, in Somalia there really isn’t a coercive solution, even if you use the Ethiopians as a proxy. And the United States, in order to improve things, would have to engage in a diplomatic slog, which I don’t think is in the cards, as long as Iraq remains the consuming problem in American foreign policy alongside Afghanistan. If the United States does chose to re-engage in Africa it’s going to be with respect to Darfur, but I don’t think that’s going to happen. Broadening out the comparison, Iraq is a much bigger problem than Somalia in military and political terms. I think it’s a dangerous oversimplification to derive from Somalia, or for that matter Vietnam, that pulling out or a strategic withdrawal is going to create the perception of America as a feckless or weak country because you have to look at what the alternatives are. If in Iraq there’s little basis that America’s continued involvement will improve things there, than there seems to me that there is a case for an orderly withdrawal. And those who oppose an orderly withdrawal by characterizing this policy choice as abandonment are creating a straw man and structuring their argument in a dishonest way. Most of the feasible suggestions have not involved complete abandonment—they’ve involved withdrawal to a lower number of troops with over-the horizon forces present for emergencies, along with a major diplomatic mobilization that is designed to try to contain the problems in Iraq. Does the Somali Model apply to Darfur? I think not. Sudan has a regime that controls the country. The thing that made encouraging the Ethiopians so easy is that Somalia didn’t really have a central government in place, which made breaching its sovereignty so easy. In fact, the Ethiopians tried to consolidate a government in exile that would be internationally recognized. So, Somalia was a unique situation from the standpoint of international law. You couldn’t send in a proxy force of any kind into Sudan without raising sovereignty issues. The other point is that the United States isn’t inclined to support another sovereign government as a proxy force in Sudan. It would prefer to encourage the African Union, as part of a larger plan to encourage Africans to solve their own problems. The United States declared Darfur a genocide, but the United States doesn’t want to take part in anything that hints of colonialism. Source

Ethiopia & Oil, West is almost ready to make *oog-aadeen a mini-Darfur So what do we have here in Ethiopia? There is the Chinese investor. Then there is the Ogad-en region. In it, is Oil, potentially an untapped large source of it. Guess what? America is not that far behind and it is not going to miss this .P. - the ****** Oil Party. As expected, It would do anything just to get it and to make sure China doesn't get a single liter of it. Including of course, doing a 180 degree turn to attack its closest friend in Africa, Meles Zenawi, and make the ****** look like Darfur as much as possible. The latest liberal and angry New York Times article should teach Meles Zenawi a good lesson - never trust the American government! NYT's Jeffrey, as usual, made sure that he didn't talk about the real goals of the ONLF rebels and the forces behind the ONLF. Mr. Jeffrey also made sure that he hid the details about the Somali/****** state officials governing the area. His goal is to make the region as lawless as possible, without any governing body, but just full of Ethiopian genocidal troops attacking the local population that is waiting to be saved by the ONLF rebels. This is same old, same old stuff. Despite the American attempt to portray divisions between liberals and the GOPs, in America, these two groups work hand in hand with each other. It is the job of the "pro-poor" and caring liberals to play angels and show such using their mass media & human rights organizations etc. After that, depending on which liberal spiced up crisis story is the most money-making one, the American government would select the best one and proceed. Once it is assured that there is something worth taking (like Oil) it is the job of the tough GOPs to go down and save the locals from massacre, "famine" and "genocide" and bring justice & democrcay by using force. At the end, ironically, the liberals will ofcourse shout and cry about the harshness of the GOPs, not because they really mean it, but just because it sounds good and portrays the picture that not all Americans are as cruel as the resulting bloody American military occupations. This cycle of deceptive American foreign politics, with liberals and GOPs working together, have been going on for a while. But the fact that it is happening against Ethiopia will be unique but not as strange as the fact that Ethiopians are not ready for this game. Well, the opposition parties in the parliament have already warned Meles Zenawi. Before he went to Somalia, everyone told him of the consequences. Now an overstretched Ethiopian defence forces means that Ethiopia will not be able to easily defeat the combined Eritrea-ONLF-ICU forces in the ******. The saying "time is money" can be applied here. The faster one finishes off the ONLF rebels, the harder it would have been for the anti-China Americans to start the first part of their pre-intervention strategy: which is showing their loving & caring pro-Human Rights side. But so far, it is too late for Meles Zenawi and depending on how much the GOP were laughing about the China oil field massacre in April or depending on how Oil-thirsty they are, it would not be far before the next step of American foreign politics of bloody intervention takes place. Now the time is evaluation period for the "good old America." What are the tradeoffs for the American government? Should it assist the ONLF to get the Oil and to also be seen as a hero by the pro-ONLF people? Or should it stick with Ethiopia, placing security on top of its agenda? It appears like the only way ONLF can gain control is if Eritrean government invades Ethiopia. So would that be the best scenario for America? It seems like the UK and EU are already siding with the Eritrean government & ONLF. The UK confirmed that only the WEST has the exclusive privilage of defining groups as "terrorist organizations" by overtly protecting the ONLF leaders in London even after the bloody massacre by ONLF. The EU also awarded the Eritrean government with tens of millions of dollars, which has ofcourse become Eritrean money that is mostly used to finance and arm the ONLF. So the American government would not feel alone if it decides to help the ONLF. Certainly, there are a lot of tradeoffs in this game for America. For Ethiopia, the options have dwindled. Certainly, by Meles Zenawi making such bad decisions, Ethiopia will inherit a historical burden unless Meles quickly gets himself out of this quagmire. It is not like he hasn't been warned. Actually, the warning started many years ago with his reckless policies including the disasterous Article 39 of the constitution that gives rebels the legal power to take any part of Ethiopia they want. And Meles has been trying to make Ethiopia democratic while keepig her sovereignty in question via Article 39. As expected, he has mostly failed so far. Meles should have read books about how much Human Rights was actually respected by the early European Americans while making their empire by exterminating Native Americans. None. In fact, all nations around the world have such bloody beginning to secure their sovereignty and HRW & Amnesty International certainly were not running around centuries ago and picking on American founding fathers for mass murdering the native Americans. But what Meles has done is take the Ethiopian sovereignity question back to the "survival of the fittest" answer. This would mean more wars with the Eritrea-ONLF alliance just to re-secure Ethiopia's boundaries and sovereignity. Instead of building democracy after keeping Ethiopia's sovereignity, Meles is now trying to re-secure Ethiopia's sovereignity from scratch and secure democracy: both at the same time. Which has beeen an impossible thing to do and will be impossible to do so without facing massive diplomatic setbacks. By trivializing Ethiopia's sovereignity via Article 39 and with his other failed policies, the Meles Zenawi adminstration has so far put the issue of democracy in the back seat. Still the problem in the ****** is not as bad as it looks. The locals have representatives in the Ethiopian parliament and most of them are actually supporting the government against the ONLF rebels. The fact that the ONLF rebels are ignoring their constitutional rights to be elected and do whatever they want, if achieved the majority, would be another political weapon against this separatist group. Also if a central Somalia government succeeds in Mogadishu and the rule of law prevails, ONLF's lawlessness would be less tolerable by the powers in the regions. But the WEST factor and interests play a big role in the future of this eastern Ethiopia ****** region. Afterall, Oil is Oil. Source What a game. Too bad we are not playing, we are just being played.

LOL

Wlc Skipper make yourself at home and have fun, I am sure you will contribute to this place.

The old lady used to look good

I haven't seen that topic, but it hasn't started of the discussion it should have. Puntlands disintegration has been coming for a long time and we all know that Cade's weak leadership has been responsible for that. Now the question is what will follow next. We are already hearing about Maakhir State of Somalia, the calls for a Darwiish State are also getting louder. If you ask me the 'Makharians' (gotta get used to that term) are right on their call for an effective administration in their region and that they should confront Cade and his group with their short commings and corruption. In the short term I think that the Makharians have 'compoamised' on their security, but would Puntland have gone into a war over their region? Or would it keep the area under secessionist occupation just like Adhicadeeye? So there are questions regarding the secessionist threat. I think that soon a Darwiish State will follow the example of Maakhir State and in the near future more and more single clan states will follow, untill every clan is in control of his turf. Soon the United Clans of Somalia won't sound so strange. So how do you see the future of the region? and is Xiin right on his comment that the disintegration of Puntland and the comming of existance of Maakhir State of Somalia is playing right into the hands of the secessionists? Are Cade's corrupt policies responsible for the disintegration of Puntland and what will it take to save the state in its current form?

Its up to you sxb, don't limit yourself because of politics. The TFG got nothing on you if you have the right contacts. Its about money. Play the game, talk to people. I see enough bright hungry heads in this place alone...iskaba daa Dubai.

^He gotta point though. Ifhe visits home he won't changehis mind sxb, he will come back like Xanthus.

You should keep the situaton of AY and TFG in mind, they are weak and desperate for cash, recognition. But even then they should have done better. I don't know much about oil deals, but I know when I am being robbed. Northerner why don't you and Sophist sett up an independant consultancy firm?

Originally posted by NGONGE: ^^ I agree with all of you but I have to insist that our Islamweyn is sunni and salafi. If you don't agree with me I'm afraid I'll have to to breakaway and create my own Islamland. Something tells me that my words will be misread

Its a robbery, the majors will prolly renegotiate the deals they got with old Siyad. AY is a better 'negotiating' partner. Does the TFG have consultants? I don't think they can afford to hire any or that they want to hire any. AY will sign any document for few pennies.

The majors got their own blocks, there are many parts of the country that can be allocated by for AY. The Chinese are disadvantaged, the Ameicans already got the Ethiopians in their pockets, who will protect Chinese interests? The majors got their game tight at the moment all thats between them and robbing us silly is that oil law now. I wonder whether the Americans will tolerate the Chinee in Somalia. The Chinese are late-commers, while the Americans have worked for this moment.

''China Invests in Somalia Despite Instability'' The Financial Times reported on July 13 that the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (C.N..C.) has signed a deal with Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf to explore the northern Puntland region for oil. The initial agreement was signed last May, and it was endorsed at the China-Africa summit held in Beijing last November. [see: Upcoming Summit Highlights Africa's Importance to China] A meeting between C.N..C. and Somali officials was held on June 24 to finalize the deal. The terms indicate that the Somali government would retain 51 percent of the oil revenues under a production-sharing arrangement. Further reporting from the Financial Times, however, revealed that Somali Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi was not aware of the contract, suggesting that the oil deal remains vulnerable to political infighting. China's willingness to invest in Somalia -- before the Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) completes work on a national oil law and as the security situation continues to deteriorate -- shows that Beijing has not been deterred by the growing backlash across Africa at Chinese policies and remains willing to take on political risks that Western firms will not tolerate. Threats to China in Africa Chinese investments have come under attack in recent months, and a general wariness about closer ties with Beijing has become part of the political dialogue in most African countries where China does business. Days after the June meeting in Somalia, a Chinese mining executive was kidnapped in Niger. The incident followed the killing of nine Chinese workers in Ethiopia, near the border with Somalia, in April. Chinese workers have also come under attack in Nigeria in recent months. Politically, Chinese investments have become a touchy subject. Michael Sata's opposition campaign in Zambia received strong backing after he attacked Chinese investments and threatened to renew ties with Taiwan. He ultimately failed in his bid for the presidency, however, after China threatened retaliatory measures if he was elected. Similar complaints have been raised in Nigeria and South Africa. China began to address the growing unease in Africa toward its investments earlier this year. Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Zambia and South Africa in February where he pledged further investments and a greater focus on community development plans. China has also publicly used its leverage in Sudan to press Khartoum to accept the terms of last year's U.N. Security Council resolution on the Darfur crisis. [see: "China Adjusts its Approach in Africa" and China Claims Success on Darfur] Nevertheless, China's fundamental goals in Africa have not changed. In Africa, China is looking to secure access to the natural resources it needs to keep its economic expansion humming, as well as support for its policies at the United Nations. The C.N..C. deal in Somalia is evidence that China's risk appetite has not decreased as it pursues these goals in Africa. Investing in Somalia Somalia has no proven oil reserves, and only 200 billion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves. Companies including Agip, Shell (Pecten), Conoco and Phillips (now merged), and Amoco (now part of BP) spent over US$150 million on onshore exploration in the 1980s and early 1990s, but no oil reserves were discovered. Still Range Resources, a small Australian-based oil firm with close contacts to the government in Puntland, estimates that the region could hold 5 to 10 billion barrels of oil based on an analysis of the previous exploration reports. The Puntland province claims autonomy from the government in Mogadishu, but not independence like Somaliland. The region has been relatively calm compared to central and southern Somalia since 1991, but the political situation remains uncertain. President Yusuf was certainly involved in the negotiations with the Chinese firm, as he hails from the Puntland province and maintains close ties with the local leadership, but the prime minister of the T.F.G. was left out of the loop. The fact that Prime Minister Ali Mohamed Gedi was kept out of the negotiations suggests that the terms of the deal are not beneficial to the T.F.G. or Somalia's other provinces. This could exacerbate already strained ties between the prime minister and the president. [see: Somalia Continues its Political Collapse] The prime minister appears to have led an effort within the T.F.G. to pass a national oil law that would allow Western firms to return to Somalia under production-sharing agreements, which require oil firms to share their production with the government after initial costs are covered. He told the Dow Jones Newswire in April that a national oil law would be passed within two months, a deadline that has slipped. The oil law in question seems to be similar to the one pushed in Iraq by the United States, which has also not been passed. China may have wished to sign the deal for exploration rights in Puntland before the law was passed, in order to avoid competition with Western majors, but the emergence of a national oil law could threaten the investment. [see: Sectarian Fighting Overshadows Oil Law Debate in Iraq] The fact that China would enter into an agreement in such an uncertain legal and political environment, to say nothing of the security concerns, shows that it is still willing to take on risks that the Western oil majors cannot tolerate. This remains the main competitive advantage for China in the race to secure natural resources around the world -- while Chinese firms do not have the technology to drill in some of the conditions that Western firms can, they do not have the same political and financial constraints that prevent them from investing in regions considered off limits to Western firms. Last month, for example, China National Petroleum Corporation (C.N.P.C.) signed a deal to co-develop an offshore block in Sudan, where China has been the dominant player in the oil sector after sanctions caused Western firms to suspend their operations or pull out completely. Sudan now supplies up to ten percent of China's oil imports. In Angola, China provided $2 billion in soft loans to the government that allowed it to avoid implementing reforms requested by Western donors. In return, Angola ensured that it would provide continuous oil supplies to Beijing. [see: China and Angola Strengthen Bilateral Relationship] C.N..C. said earlier this year that it would boost output to 78 million tons from 40.3 million tons last year. In order to maintain growth rates near this level, Beijing will need to continue to help its oil companies invest in regions where Western firms cannot. This means that China will fund infrastructure projects in countries under Western sanctions, such as Sudan, or where security concerns dissuade Western firms from investing more, such as Nigeria. The decision to invest in Somalia's Puntland region is part of this strategy. Only a small firm, such as Range Resources, would be able to take on a similar risk level, and that firm has spent several years courting the local government officials there. With the financial and political backing of the Chinese government, C.N..C. and C.N.P.C. have a distinct advantage over the smaller Western firms. Conclusion China's move into Somalia's oil industry is a further example of its strategy for securing access to natural resources around the world. Rather than purchasing oil on the global markets, as the United States does for the most part, China prefers to secure control of the resources it needs at the source. However, because China's oil firms lack the technical capabilities and political clout of the Western majors, Beijing prefers to deal with regions that are out of reach to the competition. This practice has sparked a growing backlash across Africa to China's policies. Many locals see Beijing's actions as protecting corrupt and often dictatorial leaders. Beijing has attempted to counter this perception recently by investing in infrastructure projects in regions where the backlash is strongest, leaking reports of its unhappiness with the most controversial leaders, and granting local businesses better access to China's markets in some industries. The investment in Somalia's Puntland province still looks risky, even by Chinese standards. The deal appears to have been struck with the local officials in the province that claims autonomy from the transitional, central government. However, the president of the T.F.G., who is from the region, was involved in the deal. The prime minister of the T.F.G. appears to prefer another model to attract investments, passing a national oil law that will clarify the legal questions that prevent Western firms from returning to Somalia. The Chinese deal may well fall victim to the political infighting that is likely to follow. Still, the T.F.G.'s claim to control Puntland appears to be weakening as the central government remains frozen in a state of political collapse. Two days after the Financial Times first reported about the Chinese oil deal, the much awaited national reconciliation conference had to be delayed because security for the meeting could not be guaranteed in Mogadishu. Given the T.F.G.'s uncertainty, Beijing's decision to work with the local representatives in Puntland may well prove to be enough, and China could soon be pumping Somali oil, if it even exists. Report Drafted By: Adam Wolfe www.pinr.com

''The 'Puntland State of Somalia' Comes into Play'' Puntland, which is self-described as the "Puntland State of Somalia," has been considered by analysts and observers to be one of the more politically stable regions in that fractured country. During the past two months, however, Puntland has experienced a bout of unaccustomed political instability that culminated on July 26 in a street demonstration in its capital Garowe that ended in protestors throwing stones at its president, Mohamud "Adde" Muse, who had attempted to mollify the crowd, which was demanding an end to hyper-inflation. Puntland has begun to come into play in Somalia's tortured web of conflicts. With a population of approximately 2.5 million, Puntland occupies the northeastern portion of the area compromising the post-colonial Somali republic, which in 1960 joined the former Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland into a single state. Puntland is socially dominated by the ***** clan family, with the most power residing in the ********* sub-clan of the *****. Its major industries are livestock and fisheries, and exploration for oil and natural gas deposits is projected, as PINR detailed in its July 23 report. [see: China Invests in Somalia Despite Instability] Puntland came into being in August 1998, when ********* warlord Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed -- now president of Somalia's internationally recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.) -- engineered the autonomy of the Nugal, Karkar, Bari and part of the Mudug regions. In 2002, Puntland forces occupied *****-dominated parts of the Sool, Sanaag and Togdheere regions, which are claimed by Somaliland -- the territory of the former British Somaliland, which declared its independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991 and has failed to gain international recognition. During its nine years of autonomy, Puntland has developed a political system characterized by a strong presidency and a weak legislature, which is not organized into parties. Until he assumed the T.F.G.'s presidency in 2004, Yusuf was Puntland's strongman, serving as its president from 1998 until 2001, and then from 2002 through 2004, after he militarily defeated his rival Jama Ali Jama, who had resisted Yusuf's efforts to extend his original term. Muse was elected to Puntland's presidency by its parliament in 2005 and has attempted to follow the presidential model set by Yusuf. Overhanging and forming the context of Puntland's politics is its equivocal political and legal status. Unlike Somaliland, Puntland's autonomy is officially provisional, with reintegration with the southern regions of the former Italian Somaliland to be achieved after a successful process of national reconciliation. Standing between independence and integration, Puntland's relations to the other parts of the original Somali republic are complex and uncertain. It is in an incipient state of war with Somaliland over the disputed territories, and it has a vital interest in keeping the gains that it has reaped from autonomy in any wider political settlement with the T.F.G., to which it is closely tied through Yusuf. For the first time since it declared its autonomy, Puntland is now faced with the possibility of a day of reckoning, as a process of reconciliation gets underway in the south and the T.F.G. mounts attempts to assert its authority over economic resources and security, and Somaliland asserts its territorial claims more aggressively. As is the case throughout the Horn of Africa, the model of Puntland's politics is the political machine, in which the leader retains support by paying off allies, trying to avoid marginalizing any groups sufficiently to drive them into effective opposition, and attempting to suppress opposition if it arises. That formula is viable when there is enough largesse to go around and when the machine is well disciplined, neither of which is true for Puntland, where Muse -- under pressure from the outside -- confronts increasing internal opposition sparked by economic and security failures. The events of the past two months reveal that Puntland's apparent stability concealed underlying tensions that have now surfaced. An Accumulation of Divisive Issues At the heart of Puntland's present instability is a failure of governance that spills over into a host of interrelated issues involving the economy, control of resources, security, governmental functioning and the de jure and de facto status of the sub-state. The most pressing problem confronted by Muse's administration is hyper-inflation, which triggered the unprecedented July 26 protest demonstration in Garowe that was organized by civil society organizations and had the support of the business community. Since June, the value of the Somali shilling has fallen from 16,000 per US dollar to 21,000, causing prices of staples to rise by a third. The inflation has been blamed on the massive counterfeiting of shillings by an operation in Puntland's major port and commercial center Bossasso, with administration opponents claiming that it is supported by the government, which is strapped for funds, and Muse claiming that it is the work of local and southern Somali businessmen seeking to "undermine the economy." On June 14, Muse attempted to freeze the shilling-dollar exchange rate. His effort failed, and on July 3, traders in Bossasso staged a strike and protest march, charging that the government was using the counterfeit money to pay its employees, whose wages were months in arrears. On July 25, as demonstrators gathered in Garowe, the government announced that its security forces had confiscated the printing presses used to produce the counterfeit shillings, but that did not head off the protests. Muse responded by claiming that much of the problem was caused by a rise in the prices of imported goods. Even if Muse's administration is not complicit in the counterfeiting, its inability to control hyper-inflation shows the weakness of the government and has exposed it to emboldened grassroots opposition that is unlikely to subside as long as the situation persists. Coupled with the possibility of Puntland's reintegration into Somalia proper, which is still remote, the financial problems of the government have led to efforts by Muse to exert control over the sub-state's economic resources, spurring further conflict. On May 27, Muse finalized a deal with the Arabian al-Jabberi enterprise, giving that firm exclusive rights for 15 years to export Puntland livestock, triggering opposition from local businessmen and dissent in parliament, which would supposedly have to ratify the deal. Disputes within Muse's administration have also surfaced over the export of natural stones to the United Arab Emirates that have similarly spilled over into parliament. During the spring, the Puntland administration attempted to address the longstanding problem of illegal fishing in Puntland's coastal waters by arresting and detaining the crews of foreign fishing vessels. The actions led to negotiations with Yemen that culminated in an agreement over fishing rights, coastal security and human trafficking that met with immediate opposition from the T.F.G., which asserted that the Puntland administration had no authority to make inter-state agreements. On July 6, Puntland's minister of fisheries, Said Mohamed Rage, told parliament that Garowe has the authority to sign deals with "foreign partners" and that "Puntland owns its coastal resources" and will continue to do so until there is a "referendum on federalism." Rage's comment marked an assertion of sovereignty that throws into doubt Puntland's commitment to reintegration with southern Somalia within the terms of a reconciliation process. Puntland nonetheless retains close relations with the T.F.G. and is represented at the ongoing National Reconciliation Conference in Somalia's official capital Mogadishu. Most importantly, it has dispatched thousands of troops to the south to protect the T.F.G., causing opposition in parliament and opening up security gaps. On August 1, the ninth anniversary of Puntland's autonomy, Muse announced that he had reached an agreement with the T.F.G. that Puntland's security forces would be integrated into the T.F.G.'s military, and that the T.F.G. would pay for equipping them. The result of major deployments in the south has been an apparent loss of Garowe's grip over the territories that it annexed in 2002. On July 28, local media reported that an independent autonomous authority had been set up in the Sanaag region that would eventually place itself under the T.F.G.'s authority. On July 29, a delegation from Somaliland visited the major town of Lascanood in the Sool region to discuss development initiatives with ex-Puntland officials. The delegation vowed that Somaliland would "regularly conduct governmental affairs" in Sool now that the region has been abandoned by Puntland forces, which have either been redeployed or have deserted due to nonpayment of wages. The accumulation of divisive issues has weakened Muse's administration and his hold on his machine, generating conflict that has played out in unprecedented parliamentary assertiveness and direct action in the streets. The interrelated yet cross-cutting pressures on Muse have forced him into a defensive posture, rendering Puntland's political future uncertain. Muse Retreats Under Political Fire By the end of May, opposition to Muse's policies, his authoritarian style of governing and -- as Dr. Abdeweli M. Ali precisely put it -- "performance failure" had mounted in Puntland's political class. Two months earlier, Somaliland forces had made a probe into the Sanaag region and had reportedly withdrawn only after ***** troops among the invaders defected and joined the Puntland militias. The incident showed Puntland's military vulnerability, despite its outcome. Resistance among Puntland's legislators to Muse's treatment of parliament had also been growing and was about to break out into open conflict. At the end of May, Muse was in Bossasso trying to deal with rising crime, disaffected businessmen and piracy, and had delayed his return to Garowe, leaving Vice President Hassan Dahir Afqura to fend off questions from legislators on the salary arrears of civil servants and security forces. On May 27, Afqura met with Puntland's parliamentary speaker, Ahmed Ali Hashi, and told him that Muse would not come to parliament to answer questions because only a "complete parliament" could legally compel his presence. As the meeting between Afqura and Hashi was going on, Muse was finalizing the livestock export deal with al-Jabberi, leading to further opposition from legislators under the pressure of local businessmen. Muse returned to Garowe on June 5 and, on June 13, failed to show up at parliament to answer questions about security, the economy and his alleged overriding of laws. On the same day, he fired the governor of the Nugal region, Abdullahi Isse, who had reportedly leagued with the parliamentary dissenters. On June 14, Muse made his ill-fated attempt to freeze the value of the Somali shilling and, on June 16, he assumed direct control over Puntland's security forces, a move that baffled observers, since Puntland's constitution stipulates that the president is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Muse also remained steadfast in his rejection of a question session in parliament. That Muse's initiatives and responses were defensive is evidenced by his delay of an expected cabinet reshuffle meant to consolidate his control over his administration. Local media attributed the delay to the resistance of powerful ministers and pressure from Yusuf who feared that a shake-up would increase instability. On June 17, Muse gave his keynote address to parliament, focusing on health, education and economic development. Hashi replied to Muse's speech with an alternative agenda, including irregularities in the budget, consideration of agreements with foreign companies and the transition from a non-party to a multi-party political system. The stage was set for confrontation. The slide toward instability became steeper on June 19, when the mayor of Bossasso, Khadar Haji Mire, was hit by a vote of no confidence of 19-0-2 from the city's district council, which accused him of abuses of power and of selling off public land. Refusing to accept the decision, Mire showed up at the mayor's office with two battlewagons and 30 militiamen. Muse reacted quickly, declaring the council's action illegal because neither the mayor nor an official from the Ministry of Local Government was present at the vote. On June 21, Muse attempted to deflect growing dissent by accusing the political opposition to the T.F.G., which is based in Eritrea, of trying to undermine his administration, blaming "the Asmara group" for the Somaliland raid into Sanaag and for the district council's action against Mire, claiming that the council members had been bribed by the opposition. Thrown into a defensive posture and bowing to pressure, Muse, accompanied by several of his cabinet ministers, acquiesced in a question session in parliament on June 24. Amid questioning on the export of natural stones and the counterfeiting of Somali shillings, the proceedings broke down into acrimony and Hashi brought them to a close before legislators had a chance to put forward all of their concerns. Local media noted that the wave of dissent was unprecedented in the history of Puntland's normally acquiescent parliament. On June 27, another round of questioning cut deeper into Muse's performance. Legislators demanded explanations for why government workers went unpaid when the budget had been increased by 12 percent, complaining that they had been given no accounting of how funds had been spent. Muse reportedly left the session in anger. The looming confrontation erupted on July 4, when -- on a vote of 25-16-6 -- parliament sent back the administration's 2006 budget review to Muse without approving it, citing "discrepancies" in which some agencies -- the presidency and the Ministry of Finance -- had been given more funds than parliament had allocated to them, and others -- the security forces, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Interior -- had been given less than had been allocated. Reacting to his first political crisis, Muse met with his ministers on July 6 to discuss the administration's relations with parliament and its positions toward the reconciliation process, the folding of Puntland's security forces into the T.F.G. and the T.F.G.'s opposition to agreements with foreign companies and states. He promised to set up a constitutional court that had been provided in Puntland's 1998 constitution, a move that observers marked as a means to allow him to override parliament. Tensions remained high through the second week of July, breaking into the open on July 16, when Hashi revealed that he had been given a copy of a letter from the chief justice of Puntland's High Court, Ahmed Said Abdi, requesting Puntland's attorney general to bring charges against the speaker. On July 17, Abdi resigned, only to retract his resignation on July 19, reportedly after being pressured by the administration to do so. On July 20, a cabinet committee met with a parliamentary committee appointed by Hashi to discuss legislators' accusations that Muse, Afqura and Abdi were attempting to "silence" the speaker. The ministers apologized to Hashi and promised that Muse would issue an official apology shortly. Garowe Online reported that the attorney general had refused to press charges because he had no case against the speaker. On July 22, Muse issued a formal apology, in return for which parliament would reinstate his ally, former speaker Osman Dalmar, who had been ousted for misconduct. That move sparked opposition from elders in the Sanaag region who accused Muse of interfering in the region's choice of its representatives. On July 23, Muse fired his security minister, Ahmad Abdi Habade, from the Sool region, who had reportedly urged the attorney general not to bring charges against Hashi. Muse also fired Puntland's auditor general, Ahmed Mohamed Hassan, from the Sanaag region, in order to gain control over his increasingly fractious administration. On July 25 and 26, dissent burst into the streets, with demonstrations in Garowe against Puntland's hyper-inflation that ended with stones being thrown at the president. On July 28, an autonomous authority was set up in the Sanaag region, which has become a base for politicians who had been marginalized by Muse's shake-ups and policies. On July 29, a Somaliland delegation visited the Puntland-claimed parts of the Sool region for the first time since the 2002 annexation. Meanwhile, Yusuf and Muse held discussions in Garowe on "political and security issues," with Muse promising that Puntland was ready to help the T.F.G. On August 1, Muse announced an agreement to fold Puntland's security forces into the T.F.G., giving Yusuf what he wanted and, perhaps, gaining external support to prop up his administration. In his speech on the ninth anniversary of Puntland's autonomy, Muse said that there is a "need to deal with people who oppose the administration of Puntland." Conclusion Although it is far too early to project the results of Puntland's unprecedented slide toward instability, it is clear that the sub-state's presidentialist system has been weakened and that Muse is on the defensive -- with each move that he makes to consolidate his power, he narrows his machine and alienates more political and social forces that become actual and potential power centers. If that process continues, Puntland will be subject to the same devolutionary cycle that PINR has repeatedly described in its accounts of Somalia's southern regions. The causes of Puntland's current instability reside primarily in fundamental structural factors and secondarily in Muse's "performance failure." Those factors can be presented in a series of questions. What is Puntland's juridical and political status in "Somalia"? Does Yusuf have the power to get his way and control Puntland through the T.F.G. and use it as a resource to achieve his broader political aims? How will a weakened Puntland administration cope with the problem of negotiating the tightrope act of defending Puntland's particular interests in the context of broader national reconciliation? Will internal opposition to Muse lead to the fragmentation of Puntland and the appearance of the decentralized politics characteristic of Somalia's southern regions, or will the oppositions coalesce and shift the balance of power between the branches of government relatively peacefully? How emboldened will Somaliland become in the pursuit of its territorial claims? To what degree will the political opposition to the T.F.G., which includes Jama Ali Jama among its prominent figures and is slated to hold its own national conference in September, attempt to intervene in Puntland's politics? Will nonpayment of civil servants, deployment of security forces in the south and hyper-inflation continue; and will interests disaffected by Muse's policies and investment and trade agreements harden their opposition, setting the stage for a popular movement aimed at removing the president, which can be achieved by a two-thirds majority of parliament? Will the T.F.G. and its Ethiopian ally attempt to rescue Muse if his authority collapses? All of the preceding questions are open and they do not exhaust the relevant possibilities. They show, instead, the complexity of Puntland's political situation at the present moment. As events unfold, it appears that the underlying structural tensions shaping Puntland's politics were subdued by Yusuf and his machine, and that they have now come to the surface because Muse lacks Yusuf's political skills, military resources and power base -- he simply does not have the clout that is necessary to keep a machine functioning and, therefore, he has not been able to make a presidentialist formula work. Occupying one-third of the territory of the original Somali republic and with one-quarter of its population, Puntland's stability is crucial to the success of broader reconciliation efforts and to stability in the Horn of Africa. If Puntland enters a devolutionary cycle, any national accord will be more difficult to achieve; if major armed conflict breaks out between Puntland and Somaliland, there will be a threat of instability spreading through the Horn of Africa. None of the possibilities offered here has a precise probability attached to it. What is clear is that Puntland's relative stability can no longer be taken for granted by international political actors and foreign investors. Puntland has come into play. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein www.pinr.com

How did this happen and why are you on your msn at work? How it happenned? I don't know........ifI did would I ask? Its sunday, no work.

Originally posted by Northerner: Me, I cant even see what your screen shows (cant see the image you posted) Dauud why you gotta play me like that! I would be the first to take you serieuse man MMA is atleast trying to find a logical explanation.

People this is nothing, Wilders is a crazy man who is narcistic, he loves the damn attention........having said that a new poll said that about 19% of the Dutch population agrees with his stance on Islam and that the Quraan should be banned or alterred to take out 'óffensive' bits. So what happaned next an Iranian exile writter stepped up to the plate.........and said to be writting a 'literary version of Quran' (WTF is that?) one thats accesable for all people, an edited version for all Dutch houses that will be in stores during the holly daysof chrismas....gotta love them persians. I don't see Wilders the populist as a danger to Islam in Holland. The real danger is coming from this group of persians that want to make name ala Ayaan Hirsi Ali at the cost of Muslims and Islam in Holland. Islam bashing has reached its limits now, talking bad about islam is no longer sexy and won't win votes anymore, the large parties are distancing themselves from the likes of Kader Abdolah (the writter that wants to write a new version of the quran thats less offensive to gays, jews and westerners), Ehsan Jami (a counselman in a small town, wanting to make name and the founder of the comite of ex-moslims), efshan elian (a lecturer from the university of Amsterdam, good vriend of our Ayaan and highly critical of Islam). If you look at the way some people are talking its like they a have a death wish, but I hope that they live long.....I would like to seethen in a year or two when the attention is gone The serieuse media also doesn't take these folks serieuse. NRC handelsblad the most respected newspaper in the country has said that wilders sent then the letter in which he is calling for the banning of the quran, but that they refused to publish it. They said that Wilders was ranting in the letter and that he could not provide any sound arguments for his case. So the letter was not even suited to be published in the opinions section of the nwspaper. It did not reach the quality levels that is expected.

Whats fake man, dude thats what my screen shows, I am not kidding.....MMA I am also using latest version of firefox, no internet explorer.

Dauud warqadle really? MMA, I am using windows 2000 (mobile internet). Norf yea man. The one and only, NO I don't!

Iraqi Oil Law I have read that the Somali Oil Law is similar to the Iraqi Oil Law and it's all that the major western oil firms are waiting for in order to retun to Somalia. Has anyone seen the Somali Oil Law? if so what do you think it will mean for Somalia?

Is there an invisile cross in the dark area of the hind legs of the camel?