Northerner you made a comparison between JAFZA and Berbera free trade zone. I have asked you for similarities, you couldn't provide them, because your comparison wasn't a valid one. And thats the point I was making. Jacaylbaro I know that the Berbera free trade zone is not a reality yet and I hope it doesn't become a reality under the present circumstances. Because it doesn't serve the local population in the region, it only serves Ethiopia and the Ethiopians will soon be placing the North West region under direct control to protect their interests and even if the Ethiopians do not want to do that, they will be forced to protect those supply lines and station troops in the area. So all in all the move is not a positive one for the regions people.

I agree with Rudy on this, one can not disagree on true Somalinimo and hold his ground on this forum. He is also right on seperating the real from the fake, allot of people cloaking themselves under the banner of Somalinimo, so why should some segments of our society only scream that the Somalinimo of some Somali's is fake while they are absolutely distancing themselves from the ideology. I am glad that ours secessionist friends are about to take their last stand and say 'yes' Somalinimo exists, but the ones professing are fakers. my reply to them is then, why don't you tell us what real Somalinimo is and why aren't you professing it. Kashafa sxb your all over the place on your last post, in one paragraph your saying there is no such thing as Somalinimo and on the next your saying 'this is true 'Somalinimo islamnimo and walaaltinimo', so aren't you actually saying that Somalinimo exists and thats the way forward.

Originally posted by Northerner: ^^No,,,, point made.

Jacaylbaro thats a lazy statement sxb, I have addressed Northerner because I believe that he has the business sense to understand the point I am making . Let us analyze the business side of the story, Jacaylbaro I believe that you are capable of much more then you show us here. Montana sxb 'hatred' is a word that carries allot of emotional weight, be careful with it. You can be a supporter of whatever and I believe in Somalinimo, so lets exchange ideas and share our views on these matters that concern us all. There can be no dialog if you take a defensive posture and say that anyone who doesn't agree with you is a hater. Badacse walaal maxaa ku helay baryahan, sidan kugumaan ogayne.

Sxb. 1. The Somali republic did not kill its own citizens and if there were casualties, they were innocent bystanders cought in the middle of a war that was declared by rebel traitors supported and armed by the same xabash you are saying is your ally. Innocent civilians were not targets of the Republic. 2. The numbers of casualties floating on the internet is of inflated numbers that serve as propaganda for a narrow-minded political vision, the number of casualties gets more inflated every year. 3. How is it wisely to ally yourself with your enemy that's after only alienating you further from your Somali brothers and is imposing unfair trade deals on you. Is that wise? 4. What leverage does the secessionist entity have on the xabash? isn't it at its mercy? Living free in greater Somalia is better then being a xabash slave in a secessionist entity. The war is coming your way sxb whether your ready or not, we will be allies soon fighting the xabash to free our country.

Sxb Somalinimo is alive and kicking and its the next logical step in Somali's political evolution. When the Xabash that was (and still is) burning and pillaging Somalia Galbeed, it was a far from your bed kinda thing, call it out of sight out of mind, Today its South and central Somalia, its still out of bed out of sight out ofmind for many and even if they see it they do not want to do anything about it. Tomorrow its the people of the North West, when they ask for a fair trade deal. With this new deal the Xabash thats doing all that to Somali people will be economically empowered at the cost of the North West region, the xabash is imposing an unfair trade deal on the people of North West Somalia. The xabash is taking the final steps of directly capturing the North West region of Somalia. I can understand where your coming from now, because it is human nature to rather deny the horrible truth then to accept it. The xabash doesn't care about the people of North Wes Somalia, just as he doesn't care about the people of Banadir, the people of Hiiraan or the people of Somali Galbeed. The xabash is after his own interest, he is not a particular friend of any Somali group including the secessionists he is using you at the cost of alienating you further from your Somali brothers. Together we can fight the xabash, with unity we have strength sxb.

Somalinimo has alot to do with it sxb, the situation at hand is as you have already pointed out that no-one wants to do business with the secessionist entity, since its not a recognized entity. The secessionist entity has alienated almost all Somali neighbours. From Sanaag, Sool, Somaila Galbeed,even Jabuuti wasn't spared. Now the secessionists have no other option but to do business with Ethiopia on Ethiopia's terms. With Somalinimo a.k.a. Somali walaaltinimo, the secessionists would be able to do business with their Somali brothers and they would have a better leverage in negotiating with the Xabash. So that the secessionists have no choice but Ethiopia is the result of their anti-Somalinimo policies. On Ethiopian army patrolling the highways and occupying Berbera port. Isn't it logical that the xabash will protect its lifeline? 20 % of Ethiopia's imports and exports is not nothing, if Berbera port gets closed down the Ethiopian economy will feel that, so the xabash will do anything it can to protect that lifeline. And that the Somalis on both sides of the illegal border will benefit from this deal is a joke sxb, have you not read the news of the starvation tactics the Xabash is using on Somalis in Somali Galbeed?

^Let alone the morality of the deal,lets discuss the business side of it and the political implications of this deal. Berbera Free Trade Zone will be created and the highway linking Berbera ilaa Jigjiga Harer is is being modernized. The goods will come in at Berbera and will be transferred to to trucks that will not stop till Jigjiga, how will the secessionist entity benefit from this? how will the people of the North West benefit from this deal? a) will the truckers transporting the goods be locals? and whats the case now, who does most of the transporting from Berbera to Jigjiga? b) How about goods imported by Somali businessmen from Berbera to Ethiopia do they have to pay import taxes? So if we have to pay import taxes when we are importing goods to them, why don't they have to pay taxes to us? c) Has anyone done any calculations, projections of how much the region or the people of waqooyi galbeed will benefit from this deal? d) Don't you think that Ethiopia will be defending this new lifeline with its teeth once its fully operational and that it will take full control. What I see here is the beginning of a new nightmare for the people of North West Somalia. What I see here is an unfair trade deal. What I see here is that the secessionists are reaping the fruits of their anti-Somalinimo. Somalinimo is not an ideal, its a necessity. We all need Somalinimo, Somalinimo doesn't need us.

1) How can you not see whats happening in Waqooyi Galbeed today and how the xabash is preparing the people of the North West for servitude. 2) How can you not see that the secessionist leadership takes it's orders from Adis Abeba just like the TFG takes its orders from Adis Abeba. 3) How can you not see that the Xabash is isolating the secessionist entity so that it has no other option but to go along with whatever he suggests. 4) How can you say to me on one hand that you 'regret' what the Xabashis doing in Koonfurta Soomaaliya (let alone Somalia Galbeed) and on the other hand that your willing to work with the Xabash and offer him a port that will handle as the Xabash himself claimed 20% of its import and exports (for free in the Berbera free trade zone). 5) How can you not see that the leadership of the secessionist entity has betrayed you. That they have used you to get rich and now have handed you over to the xabash. How can you be so blind, miyaad is indhatiraysaa sxb? You dreamt of independence from Somalia and you got subjugation by the xabash. He sang you a lullaby, He filled your heart with hate, he showed you enemies in your brothers, now you are all alone, isolated, weak and desperate for friendship, now the xabash takes advantage of you. La tasho walaalahaa Soomaaliyeed, Ku kalsoonoow walaalahaa Soomaaliyeed. Kusoo dhawoow walaaltinimada Soomaaliyeed.

No sxb, stop this defensive attitude, lets discuss matters for what they are instead of feeling attacked by everything I say. Lets talk business sense, political sense because do you want an independant secessionist entity or do you want a secessionist entity thats ethiopia's b*tch? what use is it if the secessionist entity becomes independant from Somalia to be annexed by or become a satellite of Ethiopia?

Is this project linked to the Berbera Free Trade Zone? and who was benefiting the most from the free trade zone again? yes the Xabash is placing Berbera under direct control. Now tell me Jacaylbaro when will you report to us that Ethiopian soldiers and secessionist militia are patrolling the high way that links Berbera and the illegal border "together" and that the Ethiopian army will be in control of the "security" of Berbera port. Ethiopian delegation wraps up visit to Somaliland By Moha Dahir Farah Jire HARGEISA, Somaliland- The Ethiopian delegation led by Juneydi Sado, minister for transport and communication ended its week long mission that including evaluating the 12 months the Berbera Corridor Project. Mr. Juneydi Sado in an exclusive interview with SSI before leaving somaliland at Mansour Hotel mentioned that the aim of the delegation’s trip to Somaliland was to evaluate and monitor the progress made on the Berbera corridor project. “First of all Somaliland and Ethiopia have very good relations and have many things to work on together not only this project Berbera corridor, and I myself like the kindness and warm welcomes I received from the people of Somaliland. Secondly there was a plan in which the Ethiopian government was working of how the link the road from Harar to Jijiga up to Tog-Wajale at the border of Somaliland and Ethiopia can rebuild and join them smoothly. Things are going smoothly we will finish in about a year”, said the minister. The minister also stated that talks are taking place with the Eu in the road construction project from Tog-wajale to Berbera and is currently awaiting feed back from the EU. Upon completion of these projects Ethiopia would be able to use Berbera to import and export 20 % of goods going in and out of the country. Ethiopia started using the Berbera port in 2005 to act as an optional port to Djibouti. Mr. Juneydi Sado added Ethiopia considers somaliland ‘s port in Berbera because it is secure and cheaper than other ports in Africa and its proximity to the various regional states in Ethiopia.

^I see you read Baashi's link on propaganda

Originally posted by Juje: quote:Originally posted by me: Ma wada tashanaa? Uu Maleyn ma..! Maxaa dhacay walaalkaa Soomaaliyeed kuma kalsoonid?

Ma wada tashanaa?

Why not buy from a talented young Somali designer. http://www.omarmunie.com/collections_en.html

Haa Soomaali baan ahay, barasho wanaagsan.

labada mas'uul ee xukuumada ugu sareeya ayaa waxaa lugu xantaa inay labadaba isgaadayan oo aysan jirin kalsooni buuxdo oo ay isku qabaan ayidoo midba midkale uu ku fikiraayo sidii uu uga takhalusi lahaa oo uu males zanaawi kalsoonidiisa guuleysan lahaa,taas oo muujineyso in mas'uuliyiinta Soomaaliyeed ay yihiin kuwa ayagu aanan goaa,an ka gaari Karin xaalada maamul ee umadda ayna yahiin dad looga taliyo Addis abeba. Unfortunatly that goes for almost all groups in the Somali conflict. Waa in aan hadii aan Soomaali nahay wada tashano, iskuna kalsoonaano.

I heard Maxamed Dheere got Aids,maxaa ka dhab ah arintaas Duke?

NOrtherner, a working example indeed, now please show me the similarities between the two projects since your comparing the Berbera-Free-Trade-Zone with JAFZA.

Ethiopia’s Starvation Strategy in the Somali Region is endangering the lives of millions WardheerNews Editorial July 28 , 2007 While much of the world has focused its attention on Iraq, Afghanistan and Darfur, the lives of millions of battered Somalis are in danger of being permanently eclipsed. Ethiopia - Administrative Regions and Zones In the past three months, the Ethiopian government unleashed inhumane and brutal collective punishment against its own Somali population in the Somali region of Ethiopia. The government of Meles Zenawi ordered the implementation of a range of officially-orchestrated repressive and intimidating measures intended to terrorize the entire population in the Somali region of Ethiopia, although the worsening of the condition in the region was triggered by an assault of the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF) on a Chinese oil exploration site that left 74 dead, including nine Chinese oil workers in April. The Ethiopian government has been fighting this pro-independence insurgency since early 1990s. State induced large scale starvation and other atrocities intended to inflict fear, terror and widespread displacement is jeopardizing the lives of an entire population encircled by undisciplined marauding Ethiopian military forces. Unabated terror reigns supreme as a result. Ethiopian troops, for example, mounted total blockage through a web of extensive roadblocks and checkpoints to stop all vehicular traffic, movement of commercial goods and population between the major towns with a view to impose economic strangulation that is likely to generate unprecedented large scale man-made famine. A Western humanitarian official talking to New York Times has aptly stated that “It’s a starve-out-the-population strategy. If something isn’t done on the diplomatic front soon, we’re going to have a government-caused famine on our hands.” The Somali region has already been experiencing rampant poverty, political and social injustices and chronic food shortages brought about by drought and limited agricultural activity prior to the current Ethiopian government imposed blockade to emergency food aid and choking of trade flows. Aggravating further the prevailing food and medical shortages, the Ethiopia government continues to forbid the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Somali region. Aid agencies, journalist and representatives of human rights groups are barred from traveling to the beleaguered region. In the past several months, the government forces have manifestly committed gross human rights abuses with impunity, including widespread gang-raping of women and pillage, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention of thousands of persons, disappearances, and burning of entire settlements and blocking of access to water wells for both the civilian population and their livestock. Thousands of villagers were forcibly displaced in what constitutes a tragic case of an all out ethnic cleansing. “Ethiopian troops are destroying villages and property, confiscating livestock and forcing civilians to relocate,” said Peter Takirambudde, Africa director of Human Rights Watch. “Whatever the military strategy behind them, these abuses violate the laws of war.” Civilian population in the major towns and cities has been stifled, harassed, and persecuted. Thousands of business traders, clan elders, politicians, students and women, perceived as dissidents were arrested and subjected to physical beatings and torture and thrown into illegal military punishment camps that notoriously resemble the Soviet Gulags. “Witnesses described Ethiopian troops burning homes and property, including the recent harvest and other food stocks intended for the civilian population, confiscating livestock and, in a few cases, firing upon and killing fleeing civilians” states a recent report of Human Rights Watch titled Ethiopia: Crackdown in East Punishes Civilians. Just this week, Mr. Abdullahi Hassan “Lug Buur,” the president of the largely dysfunctional Somali Regional State of Ethiopia - an acolyte of the Ethiopian government, had announced the expulsion of ICRC, the Swiss-based Red Cross, from the region. ICRC was the sole provider of health care in many parts of the state. Mr. Lug Buur accused ICRC, as he put it, of siding with “our enemy”. Furthermore the eastern provincial capital of Wardheer is now totally under quarantine with the military prohibiting even the use of water points, causing thousands to flee the city and outlying villages in the region. Similar human rights violations and all out atrocities have been perpetuated by previous Ethiopian regimes against the Somalis in this region (e.g., Aisha, Qorahay, Jigjiga Plains and Ina Guuxa in 1963) who have time and again expressed their intent for independence from Ethiopian rule. Like his predecessors, Meles wants to keep Somalis weak and divided. Emboldened by his recent conquest of Somalia, Meles is determined to turn into an Ethiopian sphere of influence the entire Somali inhabited regions in the Horn of Africa. The Western countries lip-sealing silence towards ongoing Ethiopia’s atrocities in the Somali region is indicative of West’s indifference to the plight of beleaguered civilians. The ongoing officially-orchestrated collective punishment in the Somali region of Ethiopia would only breed more hostilities and increased Somalis dissension towards the Muslim dominated but Christian ruled Ethiopia. WardheerNews would call upon the West to step up its efforts to have Mr. Zenawi restrained in his massive blockade of the region and ill-treatment of his own population and let humanitarian assistance reach the innocent civilians in the region. We also welcome Senator Patrick Laheay’s effort to stop all bilateral aid to Ethiopia and have Mr. Zenawi be accountable for his actions. Send your Comments to: WardheerNews Editorial Board Wardheernews

''Faint Signs of Political Evolution Appear in Somalia's Devolutionary Cycle'' From mid-July through mid-August, the political picture in Somalia became mixed, as insurgent violence spiked in the country's official capital Mogadishu at the same time that a National Reconciliation Conference (N.R.C.) was held without interruption in the city. The image of the conference as an island in a sea of strife captures the current dynamics of Somalia's politics, in which the devolutionary cycle into primary solidarities deepens, yet hints of evolutionary processes emerge. Since the ouster of the Islamic Courts Council (I.C.C.) in December, which had gained control of much of Somalia south of the sub-state of Puntland in 2006, by an Ethiopian military intervention backing the country's weak and internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), and supported by the United States, PINR has consistently argued that Somalia is reverting to a condition of political fragmentation and conflict. Now, for the first time, counter-tendencies have appeared, although they do not necessarily indicate evolutionary momentum. PINR's analysis of Somalia's politics is based on the polar variables evolution-devolution, consolidation-fragmentation, convergence-divergence, and integration-disintegration, all of which define -- with slightly different shades of meaning -- movement of a political community toward regularized processes of conflict resolution and movement toward self-help by sub-units of the community in conflict situations, respectively. Unlike most conflict-analysis organizations, PINR does not advocate peaceful conflict resolution; it simply describes the interplay of tendencies. During the past 15 months, PINR emphasized evolution during the rise of the I.C.C. and devolution since its fall, depending on its assessments of events on the ground and in the conference chambers. The justification of a sustained conflict-monitoring project is the value of grasping change in the making, which provides resources for predictive intelligence. Devolution Deepens As Congo's ambassador to the United Nations, Pascal Gayama, said on August 14 -- in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the U.N. Security Council to intervene more robustly in Somalia -- the country "is one of the most difficult among all the conflict situations pervading the world." During July and August, the level of violence rose in Mogadishu as insurgents spearheaded by the radical jihadist Youth Mujahideen Movement (Y.M.M.) attempted to disrupt the N.R.C. and undermine its credibility, and the Ethiopian occupiers and T.F.G. forces mounted crackdowns in order to protect the N.R.C. and provide it with at least a semblance of credibility. The result was that the Y.M.M. and its hardcore ******-clan and nationalist allies were unable to torpedo the conference, and the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces were unable to pacify the city. After the opening of the N.R.C. on July 15 was disrupted by eight rounds of mortar fire, the Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces began intensive weapons searches, going house to house and through markets, arresting suspected insurgents, closing commercial roads and reportedly engaging in looting, beatings and shootings. The insurgents responded by launching grenade and mortar attacks on occupation and government patrols and bases, engaging in shoot outs and roadside bombings, and carrying out targeted assassinations of government officials. A cycle of violence ensued in which an insurgent attack would be met by indiscriminate return fire, searches and lockdowns, followed by new attacks spreading throughout the city. The majority of killed and wounded in the violence were civilians caught in the crossfire or in the attacks. Residents began to flee Mogadishu, hospitals were over-strained, and aid deliveries were impeded, leading to a humanitarian crisis that continues. PINR logs violent incidents day by day from multiple sources, checking them against one another and sorting them out. On an average day, at least five incidents are recorded; there has not been a day without violence and on some days there have been more than ten incidents. A sense of the conditions on the ground can be gained by listing the incidents recorded for a single day. August 9 was one of the more violent days and is chosen because it includes a representative sample of the kinds of incidents characteristic of the conflict in Mogadishu. The major incident on August 9 was a two-hour gun battle in the northern Huriwa district sparked by an attack on a government battlewagon and leading to face-to-face combat. Men and young boys reportedly fled the neighborhood to escape arrest. No casualty figures were available. In other incidents, one person died and three were injured when Ethiopian forces opened fire on civilians after they were attacked near the SOS Hospital. Three people died when Ethiopian troops fired on people in the Suuq Holaha livestock market in an attempt to disperse them during a search operation. A government battlewagon was attacked in the Suuq Holaha neighborhood and two grocers were killed in the return fire. An officer with the T.F.G. security forces was assassinated in a home invasion. A former official in the Darkinley district was gunned down after he left a mosque. Two people -- one of them an employee of a currency exchange -- were gunned own in the Yaqshid neighborhood with no apparent motive. The events of August 9 illustrate the conditions on the ground in Mogadishu by spotlighting the unremitting insecurity brought on by the cycle of attack, counter-attack and preemptive operations. Abstracting from the severe human costs, which have been documented by several U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations, the inability of the occupation and the government to quash the insurgency, despite proactive measures, marks a defeat on the security front. PINR's monitoring of Y.M.M. statements indicates that the jihadist element of the opposition is becoming ever more radical and uncompromising and is taking credit for more incidents. Meanwhile, the measures of Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces increasingly alienate the residents of Mogadishu, making the ability to protect the N.R.C. come at a steep price. PINR sees no early end to the insurgency in Mogadishu because the Ethiopian-T.F.G. crackdown cannot be sustained indefinitely and is not succeeding in any case. Signs of a deepening devolutionary cycle also were evident in Somalia's regions, which are covered almost exclusively by local media and escape international attention. In the strategically important central Hiraan region, which borders Ethiopia, there have been persistent problems with roadblocks set up by militias to extort money from travelers, leading to efforts by Ethiopian and T.F.G. forces to eliminate them. On July 21, a major operation took down ten roadblocks, but has not stopped the practice. In order to tighten control over Hiraan and to build a machine co-opting former warlords, the T.F.G.'s president, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, appointed Yusuf Dagabed -- an ally of Mogadishu's mayor, Mohamed Dheere -- as governor of the region, sparking opposition from the incumbent governor, Hussein Ahmed Moalim and sectors of the population allied with him. On July 30, a truck transporting water to an Ethiopian base on the outskirts of Hiraan's capital Beledweyne was attacked by grenades. The Ethiopians responded with intensive searches for suspects and weapons, and then shelled parts of Beledweyne, killing three people. Local media also reported an attack on an Ethiopian convoy and on the Ethiopian base. On August 4, Dagabed was in the Jalalaksi district of Hiraan meeting with district officials and militias loyal to him in order to mobilize support against Moalim who asserted his claim to be the "legitimate" governor. Local media reported that factions in Beledweyne were preparing for a showdown as 1,000 Ethiopian troops waited in the wings. Meanwhile, five people were killed in inter-clan fighting in the Mahas district. On August 6, Dagabed was back in Beledweyne announcing that members of the I.C.C. would not be harmed if they "lived peacefully." On August 7, Dagabed took a tougher line, threatening to arrest families and relatives of criminals and insurgents if the latter evaded arrest, and defended the Ethiopian shelling as a necessary response to attacks. In the past two weeks, the situation in Hiraan has remained tense, but there have been no reports of clashes between Dagabed's and Moalim's supporters. In the deep-southern Lower Jubba region, dominated by the key port city of Kismayo, the administration of the city remained under the control of militias of the ******* sub-clan of the ***** clan family, which had ousted the region's governor from the ********* sub-clan of the *****, who had been appointed by President Yusuf, also a *********, as part of his machine-building project. Through late July and into August, inter-clan fighting occurred in different towns of the Middle and Lower Jubba regions. On August 14, the former ******* warlord of the Jubba regions and ex-T.F.G. defense minister, Barre Hirale Shire, was reportedly in Addis Ababa, attempting to convince Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, not to permit the T.F.G. to launch an armed operation against Kismayo. Hirale's aim is to establish an autonomous "Jubbaland region" that would recreate his Jubba Valley Alliance, which ruled the Jubba regions before the rise of the I.C.C. The situation in the Jubba regions was further complicated on August 17 by the visit of Abdulqadir Haji Mohamud Dhaqane -- one of the dissident members of the T.F.G.'s parliament who are based in Eritrea -- to the capital of Middle Jubba, Buale, where he conferred with local leaders on the transfer of their allegiance from the T.F.G to its exiled political opposition. Dhaqane vowed that the political opposition would take control of the Jubba regions. Apparent sectarian violence flared up in the central Mudug region on August 14, when two people were killed and seven were wounded in an attack on a religious center run by the moderate Ahlu Sunna wal Jama'a movement in the region's capital Galkayo. Local officials blamed the incident on the fundamentalist al-Ittihad al-Islami movement, a predecessor of the I.C.C. Inter-clan fighting was reported over the past month in the Mudug, Galgadud and Bay regions. Extortionate roadblocks were reported on major roads throughout Somalia. The return of warlords to prominence in Hiraan and the Jubba regions, widespread inter-clan violence and criminal activity throughout the country, the appearance of sectarian violence, and instability where warlords are attempting to assert control, either under the T.F.G.'s aegis or against the government, point to the deepening of the devolutionary cycle in much of Somalia outside Mogadishu. Coupled with the unabated insurgency in Mogadishu, conditions in the regions indicate that the T.F.G. remains weak and dependent on Ethiopian support, and has not made headway toward effective governance. Signs of Political Evolution After opening on July 15 and then being abruptly adjourned after insurgent mortar fire targeted its venue, the N.R.C. resumed on July 19 and conducted regular sessions into the second week of August when it adjourned for a week after discussions on resource policy broke down into acrimonious disputes and elements of the ****** clan family participating in the conference began talks with ****** rejectionists in order to find "common ground." The fact that the clan-based conference is taking place at all and has not been disrupted by violence shows the limits of the insurgency and indicates that substantial sectors of Somali society have at least acquiesced in the reconciliation process and are willing to try to see if it can work. Although the political opposition to the T.F.G. has boycotted the N.R.C. and has its own clan support, the N.R.C. is not entirely composed of President Yusuf's allies. There has been genuine debate and the conference has not served as a rubber stamp for the T.F.G. executive. It is on the basis of the appearance of serious political debate -- not any concrete steps toward reconciliation -- that PINR counts the N.R.C. on the side of evolution. That opposing actors are willing to air their interests and encounter one another in discussion constitutes the germ of the genuinely political process that the N.R.C.'s international backers -- the U.S., European Union and U.N. donors to the T.F.G. -- wanted to engender and hoped for when they pressured Yusuf to hold the conference. Having noted that the N.R.C. is being taken seriously by its participants, it is necessary to add that it has not produced impressive results and has been confused and confusing. Staged by Yusuf as an attempt to reconcile clans and not to address questions of political organization, the N.R.C. has shifted -- under pressure from donor powers -- to embrace a political agenda, rendering its future uncertain. Originally scheduled to spend its projected 45 days on inter-clan issues, such as disarmament of clan and sub-clan militias, and compensation for property stolen in previous clan conflicts, the chair of the N.R.C.'s organizing committee, Ali Mahdi Mohamed, announced on August 1 that the conference had concluded that work and would not move on to political issues. Mahdi's announcement was met with surprise by local analysts and observers, and ****** conference participants, because none of the issues among clans had been practically resolved. Instead, the N.R.C. came to broad agreements on principles: a cease-fire was declared without enforcement mechanisms, an intent to disarm clan militias was proclaimed -- again without enforcement mechanisms, and promises were made to restore looted property to its original owners. Implementation of property compensation is to be vested in a committee that would hear and adjudicate claims. In sum, nothing concrete came out of the "first phase" of the N.R.C., and inter-clan conflict has continued since Mahdi's declaration of "Cease-Fire Day." On August 9, the spokesperson for ****** participants in the N.R.C., Abdullahi Sheikh Hassan, disputed Mahdi's claim that the conference had successfully addressed inter-clan issues, noting that non-participating ****** elders had not signed on, and calling for an extension of the first phase, triggering the conference's adjournment for a week. Even before the ****** withdrawal, the N.R.C. was bogging down on the political issues. The first of those to be considered was the definition of religious extremism, which touched off debates between delegates in favor of isolating radical Islamists and those who did not want to endorse a politically-defined interpretation of what forms of Islam are legitimate. The delegates decided to defer the issue by setting up a committee of clerics to discuss it. The next issue -- resource policy -- was even more contentious, and discussion of it was compromised by the T.F.G. executive's effort to enact a hydrocarbons law that would preempt any decisions of the N.R.C. Garowe Online reported on August 9 that debate over a proposed Somali Petroleum Corporation (S.P.C.) became so heated that "the N.R.C. hall burst into dispute," leading to the suspension of deliberations. As the N.R.C. entered its "second phase," donor powers pressured Mahdi to reach out to the political opposition, based in Eritrea and composed of the political wing of the I.C.C. led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, the dissident "Free Parliament" led by former speaker of the T.F.G. parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, nationalists, and some ex-warlords. On July 29, Mahdi invited the political opposition to meet with him anywhere except Asmara, and the T.F.G.'s prime minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, said that the N.R.C. was "still open" to the T.F.G.'s opponents. On August 5, Mahdi stated that he had been contacted by the opposition, which proposed a meeting in Djibouti. The opposition quickly denied Mahdi's statement and repeated its objections to the N.R.C. Sharif called Mahdi's offer a "ploy" to gain donor support, and Hassan said that although he welcomed dialogue, it would have to focus on removing Ethiopian occupiers from Somalia. Both leaders remained firm in their plans to convene an alternative national conference on September 1 in Asmara. On balance, the N.R.C. has thus far been a practical failure, having achieved neither concrete agreements nor inclusiveness. Skeptics argue that the delegates have remained at the meetings because they are being compensated financially for their attendance, a point that is not discounted by PINR. Yet, it is worth repeating that elements of a political process have been present in the N.R.C., tenuous though they may be. Another faint sign of political evolution in Somalia has been the assertion of factions in the T.F.G.'s parliament attempting to check the powers of the T.F.G.'s executive, which is unprecedented since the ouster of the Asmara group of parliamentarians and has gone unreported in international media. As in the case of the N.R.C., PINR counts the emergence of political opposition within the T.F.G. as evolutionary because it represents an institutional assertion of divergent interests -- a political process. On July 23, parliament began debating a motion to hold the executive accountable by requiring timely reports on its activities. Discussion of the motion, which had been signed by 100 of parliament's 225 members, became acrimonious and, on July 30, a parliamentary session was adjourned when no compromise on the motion could be reached. Meanwhile, Gedi met with parliamentary speaker, Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nuur -- an ally of the T.F.G. executive -- on how to deal with the revolt. On August 1, debate resumed with Deputy Defense Minister Salad Ali Jeele saying that "the time is not right" for accountability and adding that he "rather expected compliments from the transitional parliament." Dissident parliamentarians responded by calling for a vote of confidence on Gedi and urging Yusuf to come to parliament to attempt to resolve the issue. On August 5, Gedi addressed parliament and said that his "government is ready to be taken into accountability," although it had been doing a "great job." Madobe announced the formation of a nine-member committee to study the accountability motion. Since then, parliament has been gearing up to debate a controversial media law and the proposed hydrocarbons law, including the terms of exploration agreements with foreign energy companies, which have begun trying to make deals with the T.F.G., generating confusion and opposition. Although Somalia's oil reserves are unproven, small energy companies, the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (C.N..C.) and reported proxies for energy multinationals are interested in assessing the country's potential. At present the situation is clouded, with reported splits between Gedi and Yusuf; tensions with Puntland, where previous agreements have been signed; and mounting political resistance based on suspicious that Yusuf and Gedi are planning power and money grabs. PINR will explore Somalia's oil policy when the political configuration becomes clear; the looming debate on the hydrocarbons law will be a test of parliament's independence. It is too early to tell whether the transitional parliament will function effectively as an independent institution that can check the executive and represent broad sectors of Somali society. Parliament's track record in the past has been poor, but its use as a tool of political opposition indicates incipient political processes. The most marked evolutionary development in Somalia came on August 1, when a locally chosen governor was installed in the west-central Bakool region, with the blessing of the T.F.G. According to the new governor, Mohamed Abdi Mohed, the electoral process, which was aided by the Center for Research and Dialogue (an N.G.O.), the Italian government and the United Nations Development Program, was based on "interest and principle" rather than clan divisions. In contrast to other regions in Somalia, Bakool appears to have institutionalized a political process from the bottom up and the T.F.G. has had to acquiesce in it. Given the more unstable conditions in the other regions of Somalia, where governors have been imposed by the T.F.G. -- as in Hiraan -- or local warlords are bidding for control in the name of clan or sub-clan loyalty, the probability is low that the Bakool model will be replicated elsewhere in the short run. Nonetheless, if a political process becomes rooted in Bakool, its example would be influential in the long term. Conclusion On balance, the devolutionary cycle in Somalia has deepened from mid-July through mid-August, with an unabated insurgency in Mogadishu led by increasingly militant jihadists, an external domestic opposition adamant in its refusal to participate in the N.R.C., persistent inter-clan conflict in the regions, the appearance of sectarian violence, and resistance to the T.F.G.'s authority in key regions. With the exception of the Bakool region, where opposition has begun to be regularized in a political process, signs of political evolution reside in the emergence of institutionalized opposition in the N.R.C. and the transitional parliament. The latter developments are not yet sufficiently rooted to alter PINR's consistent forecast that devolution is likely to persist, yet they indicate alternative possibilities for Somalia if they gain momentum and become strong enough to provide a check on the T.F.G. executive. Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein Source

Can you talk sense for once brother, maskaxda ka dhididsii . Who will benefit most from this move to create a free trading zone? What foreign investment will come towards the secessionist entity? Look at the politics of the region, its unstable. No one will invest in the region. Free trade zone or no free trade zone and if they are going to invest they will do that when the legitimate government of Somalia can protect their interests. So for now the only ones that will have any benefit from Berbera free trading zone are the xabash. Since they no longer have to pay any taxes (like they ever paid). So lets imagine a cargo ship thats loaded with goods for Ethiopia docks at Berbera. Some locals unload the ship (Thats if we are lucky, e.g. construction industry). The goods get on trucks owned by Xabash of course, the truck gets on the highway without paying any taxes and its next stop is Jigjiga. So how have the locals benefited from that? On why the author thinks a Berbera free trade zone would be beneficial. One , a free zone is typically labor intensive activities. Therefore employment gains are significant. Secondly , a free zone brings new technology, for example, in terms of production methods. That can contribute in the way we produce things even inside Somaliland. Thirdly , this introduction of technology and different know-how in production actually develop human resource, which enters there as employees. It educates them; it is like on the job training. The unskilled can become skilled, and the skilled one can become more professional. Fourthly , it is the way of connecting the Somaliland economy with international markets, with international companies and with the economies of other countries. The chance to export to all over the world is all of a sudden open with out much restriction, through the various industries in the free zone. Fifthly , by having a free zone you also have a chance of availability of resources and raw materials, finished products, technological equipments and so on in your own country. That has a big impact on expediting economic development inside Somaliland. Last but not least , the ability is created for Somaliland to sell its raw materials and its resources to the world through the free zone. We have had problems in trying to export many of our products, but in this one as long as you have companies who are processing that need these resources, you have an instant foreign market and you sell this in foreign currency. Therefore, the revenues gained would enable us to get the necessary reserves in terms of foreign currency. 1. Are the taxes so high in the secessionist entity that a free trade zone will suddenly give a boost in foreign investment? 2. Some politics might play a role, the xabash is looking for a cheaper alternative for Jabuuti and the secessionists might want to try to hurt Jabuuti. Anyhow in my opinion a free trade zone is not beneficial to waqooyi galbeed at this moment.

Cameroon strikes it rich on the internet Cameroon's .cm web address has created an unexpected source of revenue for the West African nation Jonathan Richards The Republic of Cameroon is blessed with many natural riches – among them copious quantities of coffee, cocoa and crude oil. To these more traditional sources of wealth the West African country has recently added a new income stream: the royalties from one of the most lucrative internet country codes in the world. Cameroon’s .cm suffix is a common mistyping of the most popular top level domain, .com, meaning that each day thousands of internet users searching for .com sites are directed Cameroonian web addresses which do not exist. Typically when a browser is unable to locate the site among the 200 or so .cm sites that are registered, an error message is displayed. Under a deal signed by the Cameroonian Government in the middle of last year, however, any request for a .cm sites that is not registered is now sent to a ‘parking’ page where adverts relevant to the site the user intended to visit are displayed. Type in almost any .cm address, including company names (microsoft.cm) and themes (party.cm; beer.cm) and the browser will be redirected to an advertising-laden page called ‘agoga.com’. The deal, struck with a Canadian internet entrepreneur who owns more than 300,000 domain names, was seen by the Government as a chance to capitalise on the unexpected value of the .cm domain, the country’s largest internet service provider said. Only an estimated 10,000 of the Cameroon’s 18 million citizens have internet connections, and the majority of the .cm addresses that are registered with the Government agency that runs the country’s server, ANTIC, are official sites. ‘Typo-squatting’ – the purchasing of domain names which are similar to hugely popular addresses to take advantage when users mistype – is recognised as a lucrative source of advertising revenue. Under the deal reached with Cameroon, however, any request for an unregistered .cm site will default to Agoga’s site – as opposed to the company having to own the domain name, meaning that the number of searches from which Agoga will benefit is potentially limitless. “We can continue to register legitimate .cm names – it’s just when a page doesn’t exist that the person searching is sent automatically to Agoga,” a spokesman for Cameroon’s largest internet service provider (ISP), Camtel, told Times Online from Yaounde. Cameroon is the latest in a succession of countries to have benefited financially from the licensing of their country codes. In 1998, the south Pacific nation of Tuvalu, which owned the rights to .tv, signed a 12-year deal worth $50 million with the .tv corporation as a way of supplementing the income from its exports of copra, a form of dried coconut. Kevin Ham, the Vancouver-born businessman who runs agoga.com, is understood to earn more than $70 million a year from his collection of domain names, which includes god.com and satan.com. Mr Ham, whose sites reportedly receive 30 million unique visitors a month, is said to be negotiating similar deals with Colombia (.co), Oman (.om), Niger (.ne), and Ethiopia (.et). Bloggers criticised Agoga’s business as “sneaky” and “not in the spirit of the internet”. “It’s a total disservice to internet users and to brand names which doesn't provide any benefit to anyone,” David Ulevitch, chief executive of OpenDNS, a company which redirects users to the correct site when they mistype a domain name, said. A writer on the blog ‘Swan Fungus’ said: “I wonder if these people's brains work on a different plane, where the sole focus in on dishonorable ways to make a quick buck.” On its website, Agoga describes its service as “providing top level domain controllers with a way to earn money from the otherwise unused segment of the domain,” and offers a way for companies who feel the service infringes their trademark to get in touch. Neither Agoga nor the Cameroonian National Agency for Information and Communication Technology (ANTIC) were available for comment. Source

The xabash doesn't want to pay taxes, thats what it comes down to, no need for hadhwanaag to lie to themselves or to dadka waqooyi galbeed.

Visualizin the realism of life and actuality/ f*ck who's the baddest, A person's status depends on salary/ And my mentality is, money orientated/ I'm destined to live the dream for all my peeps who never made it/ Cause yeah, we were beginners in the hood as five percenters/ But somethin must of got in us cause all of us turned to sinners/ Now some, restin in peace and some are sittin in San Quentin/ Others such as myself are tryin to carry on tradition/ Keepin this effervescent, street ghetto essence inside us/ Cause it provides us with the proper insight to guide us/" -AZ in - Nas's "Life's A B*tch"