I don't believe you. What evidence do you have that it's the best option 4000 here I come

Before I go ahead and try to prove this, what will it take to convince you. What will you consider evidence enough.

How do you know it's the best option?

^ lol.... magaca Soomaaliya wuu ka horeeyay gumeysigii Ingriisiga iyo Talyaaniga. Soomaaliya waxaa la yidhaahdaa arlada Soomaaliyeed oo dhan. Gumeysigu wuxuu ila kala baxay Italian Somalilan iyo Bridish Somalilan iyo Fransiis Somalilan. The Somali Republic waa magaca Dowladii Aadan Cade dib isku keenkii labada shanta Soomaaliyeed u bixisay Marka Warsama waxa uu ka hadlayaba garan maayo ayaan u malaynayaa. lol@yaan lagu eedayn

JGB futures fall, market swings rattle investors 03.21.08, 3:28 AM ET Japan - By Eric Burroughs TOKYO, March 21 (Reuters) - Japanese government bond futures dropped on Friday as Tokyo stocks posted gains, but many investors stuck to the sidelines after a volatile week fuelled by the collapse of investment bank Bear Stearns (nyse: BSC - news - people ). The volatility has also led to market anomalies, such as negative long-term swap spreads, as foreign hedge funds and other market players have been forced to unwind a variety of positions that have soured on them. The unwinding has sent futures swinging sharply in both directions after they hit a five-year high earlier in the week. Intraday moves had been more than a full point in each of the first three days of the week. "It's kind of a perfect storm for volatility," said the head of derivatives trading at a U.S. investment bank in Tokyo. "These are the most dysfunctional markets I've ever seen." JGB futures have retreated on the rebound in stocks after a flurry of initiatives from the Federal Reserve to calm markets. Those measures have included helping JPMorgan Chase (nyse: JPM - news - people ) take over Bear Stearns, offering direct lending to securities firms for the first time since the Great Depression and slashing rates down to a three-year low of 2.25 percent. June 10-year futures fell 0.34 point to 140.90, off the five-year peak of 142.00 struck in Monday's evening session. For the week, the lead contract was up 0.63 point. The Nikkei share average rose 1.8 percent and has clawed up 6 percent from a 2-1/2-year low hit earlier in the week. JGB strategists at ABN AMRO say futures have outperformed cash bonds, partly because many of the flows tied to bad positions or hedging needs have been concentrated in the lead contract. "JGB yields have been dragged lower with futures rallying, but with little domestic buying so far," they said in a note to clients. Analysts have said the market volatility has been exacerbated by Japanese banks and financial institutions shying away from trading before the fiscal year wraps up at the end of the month. Japanese financial markets were closed for a holiday on Thursday, but activity was subdued on Friday with many financial centres from Australia to Singapore closed for the Easter break. Markets in Europe and the United States will also be closed. The benchmark 10-year yield was flat at 1.270 percent as the other extremes of the yield curve underwent another day of sharp flattening. The two-year yield rose half a basis point to 0.565 percent, and the five-year yield rose 1.5 basis points to 0.770 percent. But the 20-year yield fell 5 basis points to 2.030 percent and has now dropped 19 basis points from this week's peak, hit when funds rushed to dump bets for the yield curve to flatten. The 20-year yen swap rate was quoted at 2.02 percent, meaning the 20-year swap spread was at minus 3.5 basis points. That spread had collapsed to around minus 20 basis points at one point this week, mainly as hedge funds unwound so-called box trades. Earlier this week, the Financial Times reported that hedge fund Endeavour Capital told investors it lost 27 percent in box trade bets in JGBs. The newspaper also said other well-known hedge funds had lost hefty sums of money in JGB trades. Normally swap rates are higher than government bond yields because of the counterparty risk involved in derivative contracts, especially in the current shaky environment when investors fret about the credit risk of financial firms. The dollar's plunge to as low as 95.77 yen earlier this week, a 13-year low, has also forced some securities firms to hedge in longer-dated swaps some of the risk associated with structured instruments like power-reverse dual-currency notes. The big demand for long-term yen duration tied to those structured instruments drove the 20-year yen-dollar basis swap spread to 50 basis points this week before it fell back to 28 basis points on Friday. (Editing by Michael Watson) Copyright 2008 Reuters

I feel trollish maanta.

^depends on da currency.

My two cents....look for other job and take time off or call in sick when you have interviews. Nowadays you can apply to jobs via online...so during work time you can apply. Good luck.

Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis? By Janet Morrissey As Bear Stearns careened toward its eventual fire sale to JPMorgan Chase last weekend, the cost of protecting its debt, through an instrument called a credit default swap, began to rise rapidly as investors feared that Bear would not be good for the money it promised on its bonds. Not familiar with credit default swaps? Well, we didn't know much about collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) either — until they began to undermine the economy. Credit default swaps, once an obscure financial instrument for banks and bondholders, could soon become the eye of the credit hurricane. Fun, huh? The CDS market exploded over the past decade to more than $45 trillion in mid-2007, according to the International Swaps and Derivatives Association. This is roughly twice the size of the U.S. stock market (which is valued at about $22 trillion and falling) and far exceeds the $7.1 trillion mortgage market and $4.4 trillion U.S. treasuries market, notes Harvey Miller, senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges. "It could be another — I hate to use the expression — nail in the coffin," said Miller, when referring to how this troubled CDS market could impact the country's credit crisis. Credit default swaps are insurance-like contracts that promise to cover losses on certain securities in the event of a default. They typically apply to municipal bonds, corporate debt and mortgage securities and are sold by banks, hedge funds and others. The buyer of the credit default insurance pays premiums over a period of time in return for peace of mind, knowing that losses will be covered if a default happens. It's supposed to work similarly to someone taking out home insurance to protect against losses from fire and theft. Except that it doesn't. Banks and insurance companies are regulated; the credit swaps market is not. As a result, contracts can be traded — or swapped — from investor to investor without anyone overseeing the trades to ensure the buyer has the resources to cover the losses if the security defaults. The instruments can be bought and sold from both ends — the insured and the insurer. All of this makes it tough for banks to value the insurance contracts and the securities on their books. And it comes at a time when banks are already reeling from write-downs on mortgage-related securities. "These are the same institutions that themselves have either directly or through subsidiaries invested in the subprime market," said Andrea Pincus, partner at Reed Smith LLP. "They're suffering losses all over the place," and now they face potentially more losses from the CDS market. Indeed, commercial banks are among the most active in this market, with the top 25 banks holding more than $13 trillion in credit default swaps — where they acted as either the insured or insurer — at the end of the third quarter of 2007, according to the Comptroller of the Currency, a federal banking regulator. JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America and Wachovia were ranked among the top four most active, it said. Credit default swaps were seen as easy money for banks when they were first launched more than a decade ago. Reason? The economy was booming and corporate defaults were few back then, making the swaps a low-risk way to collect premiums and earn extra cash. The swaps focused primarily on municipal bonds and corporate debt in the 1990s, not on structured finance securities. Investors flocked to the swaps in the belief that big corporations would seldom go bust in such flourishing economic times. The CDS market then expanded into structured finance, such as CDOs, that contained pools of mortgages. It also exploded into the secondary market, where speculative investors, hedge funds and others would buy and sell CDS instruments from the sidelines without having any direct relationship with the underlying investment. "They're betting on whether the investments will succeed or fail," said Pincus. "It's like betting on a sports event. The game is being played and you're not playing in the game, but people all over the country are betting on the outcome." But as the economy soured and the subprime credit crunch began expanding into other credit areas over the past year, CDS investors became jittery. They wondered if the parties holding the CDS insurance after multiple trades would have the financial wherewithal to pay up in the event of mass defaults. "In the past six to eight months, there's been a deterioration in market liquidity and the ability to get willing buyers for structured finance securities," causing the values of the securities to fall, said Glenn Arden, a partner at Jones Day who heads up the firm's worldwide securitization practice and New York derivative. The situation is already taking a toll on insurers, who have been forced to write down the value of their CDS portfolios. American International Group, the world's largest insurer, recently reported the biggest loss in the company's history largely due to an $11 billion writedown on its CDS holdings. Even Swiss Reinsurance Co., the industry's largest reinsurer, took CDS writedowns in the fourth quarter and warned of more to come in the first quarter of 2008. Monoline bond insurance companies, such as MBIA and Ambac Financial Group Inc., have been hit the hardest as they scramble to raise capital to cover possible defaults and to stave off a downgrade from the ratings agencies. It was this group's foray out of its traditional municipal bonds and into mortgage-backed securities that caused the turmoil. A rating downgrade of the monoline companies could be devastating for banks and others who bought insurance protection from them to cover their corporate bond exposure. The situation is exacerbated by the heavy trading volume of the instruments, the secrecy surrounding the trades, and — most importantly — the lack of regulation in this insurance contract business. "An original CDS can go through 15 or 20 trades," said Miller. "So when a default occurs, the so-called insured party or hedged party doesn't know who's responsible for making up the default and if that end player has the resources to cure the default." Prakash Shimpi, managing principal at Towers Perrin, downplays this risk, noting that contractual law requires both parties to inform and get approval from the other before selling the CDS policy to someone else. "These transactions don't take place on a handshake," he said. Still, being unregulated, there is no standard contract, no standard capital requirements, and no standard way of valuating securities in these transactions. As a result, Pincus said she wouldn't be surprised to see a surge in litigation as defaults start happening. "There's a lot of outcry right now for more regulation and more transparency," said Pincus. A meltdown in the CDS market has potentially even wider ramifications nationwide than the subprime crisis. If bond insurance disappears or becomes too costly, lenders will become even more cautious about making loans, and this could impact everyone from mortgage-seekers to municipalities that need money to fix roads and build schools. "We're seeing players in all of those spaces being more circumspect about whose credit they're going to guarantee and what exactly the credit obligation is," said Ellen Marshall, partner at Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP. Shimpi admits a meltdown or even a slowdown in the CDS market would affect the amount and cost of liquidity in the market. However, he dismisses concerns that municipalities and others seeking capital could be left in the dust. "Even if the U.S. takes a hit, there are other markets in the world that have different dynamics, and capital flows are international," he said. Still, most agree the potential repercussions are far-reaching. "It's the ripple effects, the domino effects" that are worrisome, said Pincus. "I think it's [going to be] one of the next shoes to fall" in the credit crisis. Miller said the subprime debacle, rising unemployment, record-high oil prices, and now CDS market troubles "have all the makings of the perfect storm.... There are some economists who say this could be another 1929 — but I don't believe it," he said. "We have a lot of safeguards built into the system that did not exist in 1929 and 1930." None of them, though, are directly targeted at CDS. On Wall Street, innovators are always ahead of regulators. And that can sometimes have a very steep price.

OK 3000st it is

Ok my opinion on this....Faarax B, this is news. The gameplan has changed. ciyaar cusub ayaa bilaabmaysa maanta ka bacdi.

^wax waalan...I believe you have enough evidence now they have confessed.

*waves back* sup

^Too late. You have already been reported. Expect that knock on your door.....horta do they still knock?

Originally posted by Malika: Horta why do folks like to pick on marcsmith? CL,why oh why dont you like marcsmith? They are jealous. Marc kicks a$$.

Mwenye kovu usidhani kapowa.

^Nazi mbovu harabu ya nzima

Mambo mazuri hayataki haraka

Samir iyo iimaan.

Is Lehman Liquid Enough? The firm's heavy subprime exposure and minimal writedowns to this point have investors nervous. But defenders say it's no Bear Stearns by David Bogoslaw In the wake of the sale of Bear Stearns (BSC) to JPMorgan Chase (JPM) for the investment-banking equivalent of pocket change, the worry now on Wall Street is that the high-stakes game of dice the big firms were playing with asset-backed securities of dubious quality may force more players to exit the table. Fear that the crisis of confidence that hit Bear Stearns last week, causing the fifth-largest U.S. investment bank to be sold for 2% of its former value on Mar. 16, could quickly spread to other big firms was only partly relieved by expansion of the Federal Reserve's discount window to other kinds of players, broader collateral, and longer lending terms. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson's assurances Mar. 17 that the Fed and the Treasury could be counted on as lenders of last resort if any other banks face liquidity shortages rekindled investor confidence in the broader equities market but offered scant comfort to investors in financial stocks. And that has market players asking: Who may be next? More Subprime Fallout Some figure Lehman Brothers (LEH) may be vulnerable to a liquidity seize-up. Shares of Lehman took a beating Mar. 17 because of the similarity of its business model to that of Bear Stearns. Lehman shares lost as much as 48.4% of their value before bouncing back to finish 19% lower, at $31.75. Other big names got caught up in the selling as well. Morgan Stanley (MS) shares fell 8%, to close at $36.38. Citigroup © shed 5.9%, to end at $18.62, and Merrill Lynch (MER) lost 5.4%, to trade at $41.18. The pounding Lehman shares took was understandable given concerns that its relatively heavy exposure to the subprime mortgage market puts its capital balance at risk. "At Lehman, fixed income is very big. They were leaders in securitization of mortgages. Bear was No. 2," says Christopher Whalen, managing director at Torrance (Calif.)-based Institutional Risk Analytics, which builds customized risk-management tools for audit firms and others. "That's why everybody is looking at Lehman now." And though Lehman has a stronger investment banking business than Bear did, its merger-and-acquisition advisory services are effectively worthless in view of the credit freeze, making Lehman next on the target list for a liquidity crisis, Whalen says. The "Pro" Lehman Position Deutsche Bank Securities disagrees, upholding its buy rating on the stock and declaring in a Mar. 17 research note that Lehman is not Bear. As that note got some play in the financial media on Monday, it may have helped prompt investors to rethink their gloomy outlook for Lehman, leading to the bounce in its share price as the market closed. Deutsche Bank (DB) analyst Michael Mayo cited Lehman's $2 billion working capital line with 40 banks as proof that counterparties haven't lost confidence in the broker-dealer and pointed to the fact that nearly half of Lehman's franchise is outside the U.S. and that its asset-management business is more than twice as large relative to its size as evidence of its diversified business model. Mayo predicted that Lehman will weather the credit storm and reaffirmed his estimate of a price-to-adjusted-book-value ratio of 83%. At the close of 2007, Lehman had $35 billion in excess liquidity, combined with $63 billion of free collateral, implying $98 billion available for liquidity, or $70 billion more than needed for $28 billion of unsecured short-term debt, including the current portion of long-term debt, Mayo wrote in his note. While it also has $180 billion of repurchase financing lines, "we take comfort that 40 banks extended credit on Friday and believe that some of the repos [reverse repurchase agreements] are likely to be termed at least to some degree," he said. (Deutsche Bank does business with and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports.) Results Under a Magnifying Glass Jeff Harte, an analyst at Sandler O'Neill & Partners, says it's doubtful Lehman had as much overnight repo financing as Bear had, but its heavy reliance on even longer-term repo financing is still cause for concern. Like the rest of Wall Street, Harte is looking for answers in the earnings releases for Lehman and other investment banks this week. "What would be nice to hear from Lehman and Goldman Sachs and others is, how big is [their] repo book, what's the rollover, and what's [their] term?" says Harte. "That is not disclosed anywhere." (Sandler O'Neill has received compensation from Lehman for noninvestment banking services in the past 12 months.) While Lehman's earnings, scheduled to be released Mar. 18, will come under particular scrutiny, other investment banks' results will also be closely watched this week for anything they reveal about potential capital shortfalls. Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, which specializes in analyzing companies for their environmental, social, and governance performance, is concerned that since the credit crisis began, Lehman's disclosures about its exposure to subprime mortgages has been paltry compared with those of other big Wall Street players. More Information, Please "One reason I'm so skeptical is that Lehman is so heavily into the subprime mortgage sector, yet their writedowns so far have been so small," says Greg Larkin, a senior analyst at Innovest. It's fair for the market to assume the dearth of writedowns has less to do with Lehman's adeptness as risk managers and more to do with the fact that the firm hasn't calculated the full extent of its losses yet or hasn't figured out how to market the securities profitably, Larkin says. A major part of Innovest's analysis of the banks it covers involves evaluating the quality of the mortgage loans they securitize in terms of the potential impact on borrowers, as well as studying the delinquency and foreclosure rates of those mortgages, Larkin says. "Of the subprime loans Lehman is exposed to, it's impossible for me to say that 95% of those are fixed-rate, fully amortized mortgages [which hardly ever run the risk of going into foreclosure]. It's a black box," he says. Relying on the Fed So far the company hasn't gone out of its way to provide any details about either the strength of the assets on its books or its liquidity situation. On Mar. 17, Lehman Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Richard Fuld Jr. issued a statement saying the Fed's "decision to create a lending facility for primary dealers and permit a broad range of investment-grade securities to serve as collateral improves the liquidity picture and, from my perspective, takes the liquidity issue for the entire industry off the table." A separate statement by a company spokesman saying Lehman's liquidity position remains strong was short on specifics. To dispel the market's doubts about Lehman's liquidity, it's critical that Fuld disclose what's on the firm's books, says Larkin. "If he were to have a no-holds-barred, fully candid disclosure of what they're sitting on, that is the only way for people not to assume the worst at this point." Anything less and Lehman risks a mass withdrawal of capital similar to what hit Bear Stearns last week, he adds. In contrast, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs (GS), and Morgan Stanley historically have been forthcoming about the quality and volume of the mortgages they have securitized, Larkin says. Not only have their asset writedowns been considerable, but their efforts to clean house, such as the ouster last fall of Merrill CEO Stan O'Neal, served to reassure the market that these firms are displaying their dirty laundry and that excessive asset valuations are a thing of the past, he adds. Heated Debate On Mar. 17, UBS (UBS) analyst Glenn Shorr downgraded all the financial names he had buy ratings on to neutral, saying he believes the crisis of confidence in the capital markets will combine with lower earnings and lower valuation multiples and cause the stocks to stay under pressure for the near term. (UBS, its affiliates, or subsidiaries have received compensation for investment banking services from Lehman Brothers within the past 12 months.) Marino Marin, managing director at Gruppo Levey, a specialty investment bank in New York, who once worked in Lehman's M&A advisory division and still owns some stock, thinks Lehman doesn't deserve to be lumped with Bear Stearns because of differences between the two firms' liquidity positions and levels of commitment by top management. "I can tell you no one [at Lehman] was playing bridge or golf over the weekend," he says. (Bear Stearns Chairman James Cayne was playing in a bridge tournament in Detroit over the weekend, according to sources cited in a Wall Street Journal report, and was also away from New York last summer when two of Bear's hedge funds failed.) "The level of commitment makes all the difference." Lehman's sealing a deal with 40 banks on Friday for a three-year unsecured credit line of $2 billion should also go a long way toward bolstering the market's confidence in the firm's access to capital, Marin says. While he doesn't profess to know the condition of his former employer's balance sheet, he says "knowing there's $2 billion in place on top of what they had in place before should be a comfort" to counterparties. Will the Fed Take a Loss? Some people believe the Fed discount-window opening to independent broker-dealers as well as commercial banks puts Lehman in a much better liquidity position than Bear. Whalen at Institutional Risk Analytics dismisses that, however, as a Band-Aid and only a temporary solution to Lehman's deeper liquidity issues. "At the end of 28 days, if their collateral has been downgraded by Moody's [Ratings Services], the Fed will ask for more collateral," he says. "The Fed could actually take a loss on some of these loans. They can't afford to hold them if the value of the collateral is effectively zero." At best, the Fed's moves are a stopgap designed to buy time until investor sentiment rebounds to the point where broker-dealers can fund their own investments, Whalen says. Lehman's proactive stance in securing more long-term loans is admirable, he says, but ultimately, without being able to raise capital apart from debt, the firm will be forced to shrink and sell assets at very low prices to raise cash. "They work on leverage, just like hedge funds. Their leverage is 30 to 1, and probably more when you take everything else into account." As more hedge funds are forced to liquidate in the course of this year, Whalen predicts, broker-dealers such as Lehman will get hit again because hedge funds won't be able to make good on the credit-default swaps they have with broker-dealers. And that could make an already difficult year for Lehman even more unpleasant. Bogoslaw is a reporter for BusinessWeek's Investing channel .

Take ur trolling somewhere else.

^Exactly what it says.

SB, How am I contradicting myself? Answer that question for me. Is it so hard to comprehend what I am saying? SOMALIS ARE UNITED IN THEIR VIEWS NOT IN THEIR ACTIONS AND A GENUINE RECONCILIATION WITH REAL HORSE TRADING CAN ENSURE THAT SOMALIS ALSO TAKE ACTION! I am against the xabash, you are, she is, he is and hebel and heblaayo are.....but all we do is pay lipservice.....because we also have other issues that need to be addressed before we can take any action against the xabash. Thats the reality, now deal with it will ya, instead of posting the naive BS your posting here.

MMA - I do not want to give dacaayad to Xabashis or any stooge. What I am saying is it's time to go soul searching. Time to go back to the drawing table and come up with a better plan. In order for Somalia to be a strong nation again. I am saying that the resistance should not loose the battle for the hearts and minds of the Somali people. No one likes the TFG government but the resisance is winning by default now in the Somali public opinion. If we want the resistance to win, we should work on peace and unity.

People please read what I wrote before replying. I could not be more clearer about how I came to my conclusions. MMA - Most Somalis as you said don't want the Ethiopians there. I even believe that people that are TFG supporters don't want Ethiopians there. The question is not who wants or who doesn't want the Ehiopans troops in Somalia. But how many Somalis are willing to take action? and why aren't they if they believe so strongly that the Ethios should be kicked out? do you see people sending weapons? sending money? go back to fight? how many Somalis do you see on the streets protesting? Do you want to tell me that the whole Somali naton is UNITED in their effort to kick the Ethiopians out of our land? or is there only one section of the Somali population that feels strongly about this issue? Look I want to believe that too, but lets not close our eyes from the reality here. Only when we accept the reality can we change things. As long as we are deluding ourselves, there will be no change. There are two questions here 1. HOW do we get the Ethiopians out of Somali soil? 2. HOW do we build a strong nation? The Somali people are divided in their effort and the fact that you come to me with I have strong feelings about Laas Caanood points out the mistrust amongst the Somali people. If I wanted to settle for Laas Caanood, we wouldn't be having this discussion. It's because I believe in Somalia that I am here discussing these issues with you. I am discussing them with you not because I am sooooo I against the resistance but because I want them to win and for them to win, they have to change their tactics. And you guys need to be more critical if you want the resistance to win this war. I mean do we have parrots here or thinking men? This is war! The Ethio's are killing, raping, destroying properties, turning allot of people into refugees. It's a serious matter folks, fist wavings and strong language will get you nowhere. Justice maybe on your side today, but being just alone will not win a war. At the end of the day there is no right, there is no wrong. There are only winners and loosers. Do you want to win?