Learning to be Oromo: Nationalist Discourse in the Diaspora
JOHN SORENSON
Brock University, St Catharines, Ontario
Background to the Oromo Diaspora
Although Ethiopia is home to myriad ethnicities , the situation of the Oromo has
emerged as a pressing component of a state newly reconfigured by the toppling
of the dictatorship which had ruled the country since 1974. The Oromo are the
largest ethnic group in Ethiopia; estimated at 20 million, they constitute 40 per
cent of the population and are one of the largest language-groups in Africa
(Baxter, 1994: 167). Baissa Lemmu (1993: 99) argues that most Oromo people
shared a common republican system of government until the Shoan conquest in
the late nineteenth century and Holcomb (1991: 4) contends that the cultural
and political sys tem of gada organised the Oromo people in an all-encompassing
democratic republic but, in the past, the Oromo were not organised under a
single state; Mohammed Hassans (1990) major historical revision describes the
development of a number of distinct Oromo states in the Gibe region.
Lewis (1993) also notes the variety of political forms which existed among Oromo
groups prior to the Abyssinian conquest. Cultural and linguistic commonalities
existed, but the Oromo have been distinguished by their pursuit of diverse
economic strategies, regional differences and religious affiliations (although the
Oromo practised their own indigenous religion most have adopted Islam or
Christianity). Although a numerical majority, they have remained politically
subordinate. The Oromo were brought into the Ethiopian state in the nineteenth
century through violent conquest, as Abyssinian rulers expanded from the
northern highlands. Under the neftenya-gabbar system, most of the Oromo were
brutally subordinated to those who occupied their territory and forced to
contribute labour and crops to those who controlled them. Formerly this system
was described as a semi-feudal one but Oromo nationalist intellectuals, as well
as Western activists and anthropologists, argue that the situation should be seen
as a colonial one. Considerable energy has been devoted to these terms, given
that Marxism furnished the discursive terrain for competing political groups
throughout the region over the last two decades and seemed for many,
including Oromo nationalists, to set the conditions by which political aims could
be considered legitimate. Lewis (1983: 12± 14) notes some of the positions and
concludes that such terminological distinctions are inevitably arbitrary.
What does seem clear, however, is that the Oromo were economically and
politically subordinated and their culture was denigrated. Ethiopian historians
and politicians established a narrative version of history which portrayed the
Oromo (then known by the derogatory term Galla) as primitive barbarians, and
focused on the glories and achievements of the highland elites . As I noted in
Imagining Ethiopia, the elements of this discursive construction included the
projection of the borders of the contemporary state three thousand years
backward into the past through assertion of direct links with the ancient empire
of Axum; the legend of Solomon and Sheba which linked the Abyssinian rulers
to the ancient Hebrews; the image of Prester John (the mythical Chris tian ruler
who would save Europe from the threat posed by invading Islamic armies); an
emphasis on the Christian identity of Ethiopia and the similarity of its rulers to
those of Europe; classical Greek and biblical references to (a vaguely-positioned)
Ethiopia; the peculiarities of Ethiopia's own discourse of race; and the personal
prestige of the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, widely regarded as a pro-Western
moderniser. Western scholars and journalists collaborated in the construction of
this narrative of Greater Ethiopia, consigning the Oromo to an inferior role.
Despite the cruel exploitation of the majority of Oromo peasants and the
antagonism directed against their culture, some Oromo collaborated with the
Abyssinian forces and class interes ts merged across ethnic lines . Some Oromo
obtained high ranking positions, especially in the military, and several members
of the royal family were of partial Oromo descent. When Emperor Haile Selassie
was deposed by a military junta (known as the Derg) in 1974 many Oromo welcomed
the new regime and expected to benefit from its programme of
nationalisation of land. Indeed, the regime was originally seen by some as an
Oromo movement, due to the large numbers of Oromo in the military and in the
leadership of the Derg itself, and it appears that during the initial stages of the
Derg's rule, the Oromo peasants were the major beneficiaries of land reform
(Clapham, 1990; Gilkes , 1983; Halliday and Molyneux, 1981). However, many
of the Oromo members of the Derg were weeded out, often violently, and
assessments of the land reform are mixed. For example, Markakis (1990: 261)
states that peasants in the south gained control of the land and most of the
Abyssinian landlords lef t the countryside, and that the reforms dissolved the
correlation of class and national divisions while Baxter (1983: 134) contends that
many of the neftenya landlords remained in Oromo areas despite land reform
and that the Derg used armed northern peasants to control Oromo areas. Lefort
(1983) sees the land reform as largely beneficial, while Clapham (1990) regards
it as successful in its aims but disastrous in its effects, as it guaranteed land to
peasants but kept them in impoverished conditions. Despite the benefits that
may have resulted from its initial policies, the Derg rapidly alienated itself from
the general population through its violent and repres sive actions, its brutal
implementation of policies of collectivisation and villagisation, and its monopoly
on agricultural prices, achieved through the state marketing boards. Resistance
to these policies traversed ethnic lines although ethnicity became one of the
major modes of mobilising opposition.
Among the Oromo, Halliday and Molyneux (1981: 197) characterise political
opposition to the Derg as extremely varied ... partly because of the diffuse
character of those speaking Orominya, spread across twelve provinces, with no
cohesive social or political institutions of any kind, and with a high degree of
sub-division into clans and dialects. However, a nationalist movement, the
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), was created in 1974 with the goal of establishing
an independent state for the Oromo. The OLF received training from the
Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) and cooperated with other opposition
movements but its relations with them, particularly with the Tigrayan Peoples
Liberation Front (TPLF) based in the northern province of Tigray, were not
always good.
In 1991 the Derg was overthrown and the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF), a coalition of opposition movements dominated by
the TPLF, took power. Reacting to global political changes , the TPLF abandoned
the Marxist-Leninis t rhetoric that had been the dominant discourse of regional
politics and adopted that of democratic capitalism. The EPRDF established itself
as the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), promised to institute a
democratic system and held a series of elections from 1992 to 1995. The elections
were widely criticised but many observers attributed this to inexperience and
expressed faith in the EPRDFs democratic intentions. National elections in 1995
resulted in an overwhelming victory for the EPRDF but were boycotted by the
major opposition groups who denounced the entire process as a sham intended
to legitimise the EPRDFs seizure of power.
In 1993, an internationally-supervised referendum was held in Eritrea, the
former Italian colony on the Red Sea coast, which had fought for independence
from Ethiopia for thirty years; the results in favour of independence were
virtually unanimous. International observers found the process free and fair and
the new Ethiopian government was among the first to congratulate independent
Eritrea. The referendum concluded what had been one of the longest wars of the
twentieth century and although Eritrea had been devastated by the conflict
many regarded it as a symbol of renewed hope for Africa. Conditions within
Ethiopia itself were less promising. Faced with a bankrupt economy, drought,
famine, widespread banditry and armed political opposition on several fronts,
the TGE became more rigid and repressive. Reports from international human
rights organisations indicated a pattern of serious violations including killings,
disappearances, torture, rape, detention without trial, and harassment and
intimidation of journalists and political activists. The EPRDF had come to power
in a situation of competing nationalist movements, most of them ethnically
based, and the nationalities question emerged as the central one in Ethiopian
politics. The government's solution was to redraw the administrative map into
ten ethnic regions and to establish a policy of ethnic self-determination including
possibility of secession. It has also sought to maintain control of ethnic politics
through the creation of a number of political parties which act as surrogates.
In 1991 the OLF had joined the TGE but remained suspicious of the EPRDF,
which gave its preference to another Oromo organisation, the Oromo Peoples
Democratic Organisation (OPDO); the OLF dismissed OPDO as a TPLF/EPRDF
puppet. Relations quickly deteriorated, and the OLF withdrew from the TGE in
1992 stating that it was not allowed to campaign freely in the election and
that its activists and supporters had been harassed while the government
countered that the OLF was simply interested in acquiring power rather than
participating in a democratic system. The OLF claimed that armed struggle
remained the only option but the EPRDF forces launched a sudden attack on its
encamped forces and captured thousands of OLF supporters . Although
weakened, the OLF has continued to launch military attacks against the
government and to engage in military battles with other Oromo groups. In the
course of escalating violence, both sides have been charged with human rights
violations. Pausewang (1994: 37± 38) argues that the ideological differences
between the various Oromo groups and between the Oromo and the
government are not insurmountable, and suggests that by its emphasis on armed
struggle the OLF is losing out to the OPDO, which can at least partly deliver
what the peasants need most and what OLF hardly can promise: peace, stability
and reasonable conditions for undisrupted work.
Over the last several decades, impoverishment, political repres sion, war and
famine have created huge refugee movements in the Horn of Africa. Among
these, it is estimated that half a million Oromo fled Ethiopia as refugees or
immigrants and are scattered throughout neighbouring Sudan, Kenya and
Somalia as well as throughout Europe, the Middle East and North America. The
overthrow of the Derg was followed by the repatriation of some refugees ,
particularly from other states within the region, but many of those who came
to North America have remained in the diaspora.
The Oromo Diaspora
No precise figures enumerate the Oromo in North America but among a
population that is unlikely to number more than several thousand it is possible
to distinguish those who are Oromo in terms of ancestry and those who are
Oromo in terms of (factionalised) political commitment. Until the 1990s, political
activism on the basis of an ethnic identity was not significant and many Oromo
may have identified themselves , particularly to North Americans, as Ethiopians
but the sense of a distinct identity has been developing. Hamdesa (1993: 11)
reports that attendance by one thousand people at an Oromo conference held
in 1990 constituted a record high (at this point in time the collapse of the
Ethiopian government was imminent).
Like other diaspora populations, the Oromo in North America must adapt
to new material conditions. They must do so in a context shaped by their own
concerns for relatives and political events in Ethiopia, factors which draw their
focus back to their country of origin, as well as by global economic changes ,
growing racism and calls for reduced immigration, factors which constitute them
as undesirable visible minorities and obstruct their integration into their host
societies . Many of these individuals who have opposed various Ethiopian
governments perceive themselves to be living in a state of indefinite exile and
operate under the assumption that they will eventually return to their original
homes once an independent Oromo state has been established. Thus, the
activities of the Oromo nationalist movement in Ethiopia are of substantial
concern to many individuals in the diaspora who share information through
informal networks as well as receiving it through OLF communiques and a
number of Oromo publications. However, the resolution of the situation is by
no means certain and just as many other diaspora groups maintain a myth of
return that often remains unrealised, the mass repatriation of Oromo from North
America may be something that remains only a fantasy, regardless of political
events in Ethiopia, particularly as individuals become at least partially
established with homes and families in their new countries of residence.
Oromo nationalists in the diaspora do maintain contact with relatives in
Ethiopia and in other countries (many families , from all ethnic groups, have
been scattered among various countries during Ethiopia's decades of war and
political turmoil; economic conditions have also encouraged individuals to seek
education and employment opportunities abroad). Some may make occasional
visits to Ethiopia and a few particularly committed individuals have returned
for periods of what they term national service with the OLF. For the most part,
however, supporters of Oromo nationalism in the diaspora are removed from
direct contact with the Ethiopian state and face entirely different conditions from
those in Ethiopia.
Many nationalist movements derive significant financial and political support
from sympathisers in diaspora populations and the processes of nationalist
politics among diaspora groups seem to have their own particular momentum
and constraints. Diaspora supporters of dissident nationalisms often are not
laced with the direct consequences of their actions; they derive much of their
information second-hand, their motivations and commitment are affected by the
material and cultural conditions they face in their new country of residence,
their desire for the establishment of an independent state is conditioned by
nostalgia and the idealisation of the homeland they left as well as by the degree
of integration they achieve and acceptance they experience in their new homes.
All of these factors mean that diaspora populations are particularly fertile
breeding grounds for the social construction of nationalist mythologies .
Here I am particularly interested in the nationalist discourse produced by
members of the Oromo diaspora population in North America and turn to an
analysis of political speech by examining a series of meetings organised by one
diaspora organisation, the Oromo Studies Association (OSA). This involves the
study of the symbolic expression of political action but along with Szemere
(1992: 625), I do not see these symbolic practices as 'epiphenomenal to
nonlinguistically constituted realities [but as] practices that shape actors
consciousness and their resulting interactions, interes ts and activities'.
The OSA was created by Oromo intellectuals in the diaspora with the
assistance of non-Oromo academics, political activists and supporters from
religious groups active in relief work in the Horn of Africa. It was organised in
1991, growing out of an earlier Oromo Studies Committee formed in 1989 under
the auspices of the Union of Oromo in North America (UONA), one of the mass
organisations of the OLF, at the Unions fifteenth annual congress held in
Toronto from 12± 17 August 1989. From that time, meetings have been held
annually, alternating between Toronto and Minneapolis, two centres which have
organised Oromo communities (in 1989, it was estimated that there were five
hundred Oromo living in and around Toronto (OLF, 1989: 81); another five
hundred Oromo live in Minneapolis, (Hamdesa, 1993: 25)); in 1995 the OSA
meetings were held in Washington DC, another city with a large population of
expatriates and exiles from Ethiopia.
In 1993, the OSA published the first issue of The Journal of Oromo Studies,
designed for the inclusion of papers on all aspects of Oromo culture and society
and dedicated to the preservation of Oromo culture and identity through
scholarship. Those who attend the OSA meetings and contribute to the journal
are engaged in a project to rewrite the history of the Horn of Africa, particularly
the history of the Ethiopian state. They reject the picture of Ethiopia which has
been created in the work of scholars such as Donald Levine, Richard Pankhurst
and Harold Marcus, all of whom have focused on the culture and history of the
Amhara. Rejecting the notion that Ethiopia is one of the world's most ancient
states, a new wave of Oromo and Western intellectuals argue that Ethiopia is a
recent creation, achieved through the collaboration of European imperialism
with an expanding Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century. The fullest
exposition of this thesis is outlined in The Invention of Ethiopia by the Oromo
nationalist intellectual Sisai Ibssa and anthropologist Bonnie Holcomb, both
based in Washington DC (Sisai and Holcomb, 1990). From this perspective,
rather than providing a unifying force for national integration, Abyssinian
hegemony is regarded as a brutal imposition which subdued and destroyed the
culture of groups such as the Oromo, who suffered from discrimination and
remained subordinate until the 1970s when the OLF was established to fight for
self-determination. The OLF's goal is stated as self-determination for the Oromo,
to be achieved through the creation of an independent state, to be called
Oromia.
The OSA's meetings are modelled along the lines of a scholarly organisation,
with panels of speakers who present written papers ; most speakers are Oromo,
many have PhDs and teach at universities in the United States, although
non-academics and representatives of the OLF also speak. Non-Oromo
participants also attend and present papers ; these are mainly anthropologists
who have conducted research in the Horn of Africa, and those affiliated with
religious organisations who maintain relief and proselytisation operations there.
Almost all speakers are male, as is the majority of the audience. Audiences
number between four and five hundred people, mainly Oromo. Most papers and
discussions are conducted in English, although some papers and questions are
given in the Oromo language, Oromiffa. The meetings entail a curious mix of
academic presentations, political mobilisation and deliberate efforts to construct
and solidify a dis tinct Oromo identity. Oromo culture is represented also by
singers and dancers who perform during the evenings.
Although organised on the lines of an academic gathering, not all members
see the presentation of scholarly research as the most significant goal of the
OSA. For example, in the 1992 Minneapolis meeting Jimma Tufa's analysis of
recently-declassified cables issued by the US Embassy in Ethiopia from the 1940s
to the 1970s was abruptly terminated by the panel chairperson. This was not
done for lack of time, as the OSA meetings do not follow a strict timetable,
habitually beginning several hours behind schedule and extending beyond the
indicated closing time, but because the chairperson decided and explicitly stated
that the paper was irrelevant to the contemporary political needs of the Oromo.
Thus, it is clear that at least some participants see the major role of meetings as
being instrumental in creating a sense of Oromo consciousness in order to
mobilise support for current political objectives and that the historical conditions
of such a consciousness should be shaped within a narrow narrative range.
While participants stress that Oromo unity has reached an unprecedented
level, there are divisions within the OSA itself and a second group, composed
of UONA activists, has organised counter-conferences in Toronto and
Minneapolis which are held at the same time and in a nearby location.
Participants in the main OSA conference have been reluctant to speak about the
existence of these alternate meetings , at least partly because of a desire to
present a picture of a unified Oromo community. One informant indicated to me
that the split was based on egotism and in-fighting between members of the
OSA's Executive Committee while another indicated that political differences
also played a role. Former OSA Secretary Hamdesa Tuso (1993) provides some
details of the internal politics of the OSA. Essentially, Hamdesa describes OSA's
take-over by the UONA and the latter organisation's determination to control the
OSA for its own political goals rather than to have it exist as a independent
scholarly association. Hamdesas version indicates both the existence of personal
ambitions and divisive regional and religious divisions in the Oromo diaspora
communities . Hamdesa describes the UONA as unpopular with the majority of
Oromo in North America and subject to divisive bickering; in 1986 the Washington DC
chapter split, and UONA characterised the breakaway Oromo
Democratic Organisation in North America as anti-OLF.
Language and the Social Construction of Meaning
The observations made in this paper are based on attendance at the main OSA
conference from 1989 to 1994. To understand the OSA meetings as a site for the
social construction of identity, it is useful to turn to the insightful work of
Bohdan Szuchewycz on the study of Irish Catholic Charismatic prayer meetings .
Szuchewycz (1994: 390) employs discourse analysis to investigate how members
of those groups use language to participate in the communal creation of a
spiritual message. Prayer meetings provide the social context in which
participants demonstrate their acceptance of (and thus rein force) the sect's
ideology, so that the prayer meeting, through its repeated performance, conveys
the message which lies at the heart of charismatic ideology (p. 391). Szuchewycz
examines how this communal spiritual message is socially constructed,
emphasising:
the creation of religious experience/meaning really is work: it involves the
deliberate linguistic effort of individuals who exhibit different degrees of
competence. It is also crucially social work: cooperation, attention,
negotiation, and support are essential. (p. 391)
Szuchewycz's analysis of the social construction of religious messages and
meanings can be extended to the study of political messages and the creation of
social identities through appeals to nationalism. As Szuchewycz himself notes,
although religious and political discourse are considered different types of
speech, in both it is the form of language which is identified as providing the
speech with its authority, rather than the actual content (p. 405). As is true of
political meetings in general, one goal of the OSA events is to demonstrate the
urgency and significance of the events that will take place in the sessions.
The OSA meetings employ the same inaugural device used in meetings organised
by other nationalist movements such as the EPLF and TPLF, a moment of silent
tribute to the martyrs who have been killed in the struggle. Referring to the
work of the Basque nationalist organisation, ETA, Heiberg (1989: 229) describes
how the meetings of that organisation also involve the invocation of martyrs for
the cause. Heiberg describes ETA as a charismatic organisation in which the
relationship of members to the nationalist cause is mediated by these martyrs
in much the same way that saints mediate the relationship between religious
believers and the divine. Images of death and torture of ETA militants are
presented in order to provide a sacred and sacrificial aspect to the nationalist
movement, to provide it with legitimacy, to give a sense of immediacy and
reality to an abstract cause and to reaffirm the solidarity of nationalist
supporters . Similarly, one important goal of the Oromo meetings is to create a
sense of shared community and belonging and to enlist participants in support
of the OLF's political programme by creating a link with the fallen martyrs : We,
the children of OLF, will carry on the struggle.
Although designed on the model of a scholarly association, the OSA meetings
are explicitly political and are mainly devoted to the presentation of a single
perspective, that of the OLF. As articulated by OSA's President, Asafa Jalata
(1993: 1), the goal of the organisation and of UONA is to defend Oromo
interests and produce and disseminate Oromocentric knowledge. This goal is
to be achieved under conditions of crisis :
The Oromo have very few friends. There is no single country that
supports our struggle. Beautiful and rich Oromia and its people have
been attacked for more than a century from all directions. Our enemies
have raped our resources and destroyed the Oromian natural and cultural
beauty. (p. 2)
Here, Asafa touches on the key themes of Oromo nationalism, themes typical
of nationalist discourse in general: the golden age of the past, contemporary
persecution and isolation. We may also note here the influence of North
American society and the discourse of Afro-centrism on Oromo nationalist
efforts to reconstruct and reclaim an essentialised identity. Under these
circumstances, Oromo nationalism is presented as a force which will allow the
Oromo to regain their true identity and their true place in the world. Oromo
nationalism contends that, hitherto, the Oromo have been deceived and blinded
to their actual history and culture and to their own true nature by the
imposition of Abyssinian hegemony disguised as an Ethiopian national identity.
At the 1993 OSA conference held in Toronto, Asafa stated that millions of
Oromos had been killed fighting in the service of Ethiopia and Somalia while
not being aware of their own identity:
Most Oromos were decultured, i.e. Ethiopianised, Somalised. Adarised,
and Arabised and rejected their original Oromo identity. Because of these
identity crises, Ethiopia, Somalia and other enemies were effectively able
to mobilise millions of Oromos against their own national liberation
struggle. (Asafa, 1993: 2)
However, Oromo nationalists argue that a psychological transformation has now
occurred; for example, Asafa defines the 1990s as a decade in which the majority
of the Oromo people had been awakened:
Most of the decultured and assimilated Oromos have been re-Oromised.
There are only a very few Oromos who have continued to serve our
enemies. The process of Oromo national awakening is at its highest peak.
(p. 2)
Arguing that a turning point in Oromo consciousnes s has now been
achieved, Asafa urges that the Oromo in North America should mobilise their
cultural and financial resources in order to regain their cultural history and
suggests that in doing so they will be able to overcome the identity crisis that
affects many of the Oromo in the diaspora. Thus, the nationalist project is
conceived as one which will bring positive benefits not only to the Oromo in the
Horn of Africa but to those in the diaspora as well.
Noting that some Oromo have subordinated their Oromo-ness to personal,
religious and regional interests, Asafa (p. 3) argues that it is time to go beyond
this and to reclaim a more basic identity. Oromo nationalist discourse presents
an identity which is derived from citizenship in the Ethiopian state as a form of
false consciousness, opposed to an ethnic identity which is more real and
essential. Authenticity and normalcy can be achieved only through Oromo
nationalism which seeks to create an independent state. According to OLF
supporters , government efforts to construct a new form of civic nationalism in
Ethiopia are fraudulent because they are only a screen to mask the real
intentions of an ethnic regime which seeks to continue the domination of other
groups by the people of the north-central highlands. Waldhannsso, the journal of
the Union of Oromo in North America (UONA), expresses this :
Even when the OLF seemed to have acceded to the possibility that the
quest for total independence of the Oromo might be delayed if full rights
of self-determination are given and the people choose to stay in some
kind of union with other peoples of Ethiopia, Meles and his troops went
out of their way to show that it is impossible for one to be an Oromo and
an Ethiopian at the same time. This is the point we have tried to
emphasise for years and those who are devoted to the sanctity of the
ill-gotten Ethiopian imperial territories tried to say we can be free Oromos
and become full citizens of Ethiopia too. The argument now is a choice
between being an Ethiopian subject with ever diminishing national or
individual rights, or being an Oromo freedom fighter. (Union of Oromo
in North America, 1992: 2)
What is unclear is whether it is civic nationalism itself which represents a
threat to Oromo identity or whether this is a threat only because it has not been
sincerely attempted. UONA takes the position that even if the Oromo had full
rights of self-determination ...the quest for total independence ... might be
delayed, but does not indicate that full rights would lead to the abandonment
of the quest for an independent state. Apparently, then, the only acceptable goal
for UONA is the creation of an independent Oromia, regardless of conditions
in Ethiopia. Oromo nationalist discourse rejects the form of identity that has
been constructed by the Ethiopian state. This is regarded as a form of
colonialism and of cultural imperialism which has sought to erase Oromo
identity:
We must reject Ethiopian ways of doing things and develop Oromocentric
values and knowledge. Successive Ethiopian colonial governments have
prevented the development of Oromocentric knowledge. Oromos were not
allowed to have schools and teach their culture, history, and values to
their children. A few Oromo children who went to Ethiopian schools were
forced to learn Ethiopian history, culture, and values that contradicted the
Oromo. Oromo students were forced to despise their identity. Only those
revolutionary Oromo scholars who have overcome these obstacles and
understood the significance of the Oromocentric culture challenged
Ethiopian mythologies and provided central leadership to the Oromo
nation in political and intellectual fields.[/] (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 4)
What is required to overcome this identity crisis is the development of
Oromocentric knowledge which will allow participants to re-learn their
authentic identity as Oromo. This process of learning to be Oromo involves the
mobilisation of an Oromo cultural identity. Oromo nationalism emphasises the
value of Oromo cultural traditions, stressing how they differ from those of the
Abyssinians. One key aspect of this cultural mobilisation is the goal of
resuscitating the gada system. Gada is a complex and fascinating cultural system
based on a succession of age-grades which incorporated economic, political,
religious and social factors and contained the central values and concepts of
Oromo culture (Asmarom Leges se, 1973). Oromo nationalists emphasise that
gada is one of the central institutions of Oromo culture and praise it as the most
sophisticated democratic system ever in East Africa or maybe even in the entire
of Africa (Namara Garbaba, 1993: 42).
As a political sys tem, it constitutes an indigenous form which ensured the balance
and periodic succession of authority. The precise origins of gada are unknown
but it seems to have been inplace by the sixteenth century. By the nineteenth century,
the gada system was weakened as power became concentrated in more state-like societies ,
but these institutions of the Oromo were ultimately swept under by the southward
expansion of the Abyssinian empire in the late nineteenth century and deliberate
attempts to undermine Oromo culture. The practice of gada continued only in
Borana and those now living in the diaspora did not grow up in a society in
which gada functioned as it had traditionally. Despite the fact that it is no longer
widely practised and that few Oromo have direct experience of it, Oromo
nationalists emphasise the importance of the gada system as the basis of a
dis tinct Oromo identity and sugges t that it can be revived to form the political
basis of an independent Oromia. Others have challenged both the egalitarian
character of gada and its universality, however, pointing out that it is based on
age grades with different levels of authority, that it discriminates on the basis
of gender by excluding women and that it did not function to encompass all
Oromo groups under a central state, while also pointing out that Oromo
organisations such as the OLF are not organised on gada principles.
Identity and Tradition
Typically, ethnic nationalism places great emphasis on the revival of rural
traditions, folklore, dances and ethnic cuisine. These traditions are considered
to be imbued with the essence of the group and they provide nationalists with
the symbols that can be used to differentiate the group from others , not only
culturally but also in terms of the moral values that are associated with such
symbols . Often, these cultural traditions and moral values are racialised and
presented in terms which depict them as the result of essential differences. The
outward markers of culture, such as folkdances, costume and cuisine, are
regarded as the expression of a group's distinct essence, the manifestations of
deeper and more fundamental differences which structure social life in unique
ways. While these fundamental characteris tics are viewed as timeless and
enduring and are assumed to create the moral boundaries for the ethnic
community, they are also subject to dilution by exposure to alien forces. Survival
of the group is considered to depend on the protection of these fundamental
qualities . Nationalist intellectuals believe that it is their role to preserve these
distinct cultural features and to prevent them from becoming polluted through
interaction with other groups; in many cases, it is argued that acquisition of an
independent state is required in order to ensure such protection.
Often, cultural revivals in the service of nationalist goals are promoted by
urban intellectuals who are themselves dis tanced from such traditions.
Fitzgerald (1993: 89) suggests that the most vocal champions of cultural revivals
are almost always the educated elites among such minorities . This is paradoxical
because the slogans of ethnogenesis are formulated by the very people farthest
removed from the traditional culture. Those traditions may be viewed quite
differently by the intellectuals who seek to revive them and the rural, peasant
or folk populations from among which they are to be extracted and preserved.
For example, writing on Basque nationalism, Heiberg (1989: 95) finds that many
peasants regarded their rural Basque background as an impediment to their
success in urban centres and attempted to distance themselves from a Basque
identity by speaking only in Spanish and avoiding things considered Basque.
Similarly, Handler (1988: 77), writing on Quebecois nationalism, finds that the
folk come to abandon and even ridicule the traditions that urban collectors have
come among them to discover. A similar process has taken place in Ethiopia
among Oromo peasants who have seen greater opportunities for themselves
through the adoption of Amharic names and speech; what must be emphasised
here is the overall historical context of domination. Handler also notes the
various transformations of tradition that occur through the process of collecting.
Aspects of social life are regarded as objects of study, selected and reinterpreted,
thus changing their meaning. When cultural traditions are mobilised both as the
markers of a group's essence and as the basis for contemporary political
movements there is often a need for pruning. As Lewis (1993: 170) notes, the
elevation of gada to a central ideological place in Oromo nationalism has
required that Oromo intellectuals minimise the role of powerful Oromo chiefs
and kings in some areas. Similarly, violent aspects of Oromo history are
downplayed to create images of unity.
Referring to black political movements based on ontological essentialism,
Gilroy (1993: 32) sugges ts that such movements typically see the intellectual as
a leader, and are frequently disappointed with the actual cultural choices and
patterns of the mass of black people ... The community is felt to be on the wrong road,
and it is the intellectuals job to give them a new direction, firstly by recovering and then
by donating the racial awareness that the masses seem to lack.
Oromo intellectuals in the diaspora have taken on the mission of alerting their
communities to the necessity of supporting the nationalist struggle and to the
need for resuscitating an authentic cultural identity which will one day find its
full expres sion in an independent Oromia. However, these diaspora intellectuals
are doubly distanced from the traditions that are taken to constitute the essence
of Oromo nationalism. Not only have many of them come from urban areas in which
these traditions were not maintained but, according to Sisai Ibssa (1992:
66), they are also flawed due to their class character as members of the petit
bourgeois ie: opportunistic, vacillating and insecure ... by nature fearful, indecisive ...
always battling amongst each other to appear better than the next person
in order to reap some benefit to be bestowed by members of the more
powerful class above.
Nationalist discourse also suggests that exile in North America has further
estranged these members of the diaspora from the authentic moral community.
This is presented as a result not only of geographical distance but also of the
dilution of Oromo values by another polluting force, that of Western culture.
Many Oromo who live abroad in North America or Europe have been
exposed to Western thoughts, which appear to hold the individual as the
primary and most significant unit of difference in society. Accordingly,
the individual is right-based but interest-orientated, and not responsible
for fellow members of the community ... Emphasising individual interests
more than collective or social interests confuses the primary issue of the
struggle for achieving the common goal, Bilisummaa [freedom]. To remain
clear and focused, the Oromo need to emphasise the collective interest,
strengthen their unity, and contribute their fair share to the united efforts
for intens ifying the struggle. (Addisu Tolesa, 1993: 62)
Here, Oromo in the diaspora are depicted as being divorced from their true
place in the world. Exposure to Western thoughts has had the effect of
individualising the Oromo and separating them from their culture and their true
style of thinking and behaving. Living in the diaspora, outside ones place,
creates individuals who have become dis jointed and mentally confused.
(Diaspora thus doubles the displacement of the Oromo already decultured by
Abyssinian colonialism.) This discursive construction is not unique to the
narrative of Oromo nationalism. For example, the phenomenon of reclaiming an
ethnic identity frequently has been noted among the third generation of
immigrant populations.
Individuals feel that something is lacking in their lives and that this absence
can be overcome by embracing the cultural traditions of
previous generations. The passage of time and changing conditions mean that
it is unlikely that these traditions can be adopted completely and further
difficulties confront diaspora groups who seek to engage in such reconstructions.
As a result, this process typically involves considerable imaginative efforts. It is
both an endeavour to partake of a romanticised past in which life was peaceful
and harmonious and to reshape the self.
In the case of the Oromo in the diaspora, Western values of individualism
are seen as a threat to the unity of purpose demanded by nationalist organisers .
From this point of view, it is more important for individuals to sacrifice
themselves in order to preserve a shared culture than for culture to serve as a
mechanism for the realisation of individuality. However, it is only through
immers ion in Oromo culture that one can regain the true self:
All Oromos who want to be mentally and politically free need to learn
from their original culture. Oromocentric knowledge and values are the
building blocks of Oromo identity and nationalism. The lack of
Oromocentric knowledge and values has caused ideological and mental
crises in some Oromos; such Oromos subordinate Oromo-ness to personal,
religious and regional interests. (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 3)
According to Sisai Ibssa (1992: 69), the cultivation and attainment of nationalist
consciousness can also cure the ills that he considers characteris tic of the petit
bourgeois ie: Fortunately we are more than merely petit bourgeois ie. We were Oromo
first. We do have something to bind us to each other beyond our class
nature. We have the Oromo experience and that heritage to reclaim. And
we can reclaim it. But in the meantime, whatever group becomes involved
in organising the institutions of society must safeguard the people from
the illnes s of the petit bourgeois ie while we recover.
Nationalist discourse proposes that both a reconstruction of the damaged self
and of the damaged nation will be achieved through the propagation of
Oromocentric knowledge and values. Reconstitution of culture and revival of
traditions such as the gada system are the means by which the political goals of
nationalism are to be achieved:
The success of the Oromo liberation struggle requires the total
mobilisation of cultural, financial, intellectual and human resources.
Without unders tanding Oromo cultural foundations and mobilising them,
it is very difficult to know the original meaning of Oromo-ness, Oromo
nationalism and the true liberation of Oromia. The mobilisation of Oromo
cultural resources eliminates identity crisis , cures psychological and
mental damages, and facilitates liberation. (Asafa Jalata, 1993: 3)
This immersion in Oromo culture and Oromocentric knowledge not only offers
healing of the damaged self but is also regarded as a means of preparing for
repatriation and the assumption of a more powerful role; as one audience
member stated, We need to learn all we can about our culture so that when
bilisuma comes we can go back and take over.
One significant aspect of the personal and cultural revival associated with
Oromo nationalism is an interest in developing the language, Oromiffa. Mekuria
Bulcha (1993) notes that it is second only to Hausa in the number of speakers
in Africa but that Oromiffa lacks a development of its literature, a situation
which he attributes to deliberate efforts by successive Ethiopian regimes to
undermine it. Indeed, Oromiffa was suppressed by a variety of means and
Amharic was the language of ins truction in Ethiopian schools . As a result, many
Oromo do not speak Oromiffa and several of the Oromo newsletters and papers
offer instructions in basic vocabulary and pronunciation. Given that Oromiffa
developed mainly as a spoken language until the 1970s, some Oromo
intellectuals have concentrated on the collection of oral poetry. Speaking at the
1994 OSA conference, Addisu Tolesa explained that poetry conveyed the cultural
essence of Oromo nationalism, both through references to tradition and through
its expression of the Oromo struggle for liberation.
This poetry expresses the rural life of the Oromo, the backbone of the Oromo struggle.
It expresses the moral basis of Oromo culture and the ethical principles that will guide it.
Culture then is used to demonstrate a sense of difference and stands as the
essential core that legitimises political struggles for land, resources and power.
Poetry and lyrics to songs express the world-view of Oromo nationalists,
emphasising the need for loyalty and calling for all to rally together to drive out
aliens, exemplified in Addisu's translation of one such song:
Ah, our Front, source of our freedom,
OLF comes from our people, be strong and defend our nationhood,
Enemies, if you run north or south, the Oromo are there,
If you climb trees , the Oromo will cut them down and catch you.
Discourses of ethnic nationalism insist on the unique essence and particularity
of the group and invoke a mystical connection between self, nation and state.
Depending upon exclusivist categories , ethnic nationalism polarises social life
and seeks to create boundaries between groups which it presents as being
impermeable. At the same time, hyperbole is a common style of political
discourse and Oromo nationalists often employ totalising figures of speech in
their claims to represent all the Oromo. This rhetoric also involves the attempt
to mask internal differences within the group identified as a unified nation.
Learning to be Oromo
The OSA meetings are devoted to the creation and recognition of a national
identity in exile and exemplify what Szuchewycz (1994: 391) terms the social
work involved in the production of meaning. The sessions involve
condemnations of the Ethiopian government as well as consistent incitements
to audience members that they should identify themselves fully with an Oromo
identity and with the political programme of the OLF, which demands an
independent state. Speakers continuously pose explicit challenges to the
audience: to commit themselves , to contribute financially, to help the OLF and
the Oromo Relief Association (ORA), to learn more about the Oromo language
and culture, to adopt an Oromo identity which will replace the artificial
Ethiopian identity which has been imposed through violence and indoctrination.
Audience members respond to these challenges not only by endorsing (and thus
further encouraging) pro-Oromo statements with applause and comments but
also by making emotional public pledges of their commitment and support.
Imbedded in this pattern of assertions, exhortations and responses is a persistent
vilification of the Abyssinian or Ethiopian Other.
The process of learning to be Oromo is not only a cultural project but a
political one. The (re)discovery of Oromo identity is consistently linked with
acceptance of the programme of Oromo nationalism. Speakers continuously
emphasise the importance of Oromo identity which is linked to the necessity to
support the OLF rather than other organisations which claim to represent the
Oromo people. No allowance is made for those who value a sense of Oromo
ethnicity but do not support the OLF's nationalist programme. For example,
Tilahun Gamta, speaking at the 1992 conference stated, An Oromo can change
his religion but not his Oromo-ness. Those who do not support Oromo
nationalism are traitors.
This linkage of identity with acceptance of only one political position is not
unique to the discourse of Oromo nationalism but seems to be a characteris tic
of ethnic nationalism in general. For example. commenting on the work of
Basque nationalist Sabino de Arana-Goiri, Heiberg (1989: 56) notes:
In nationalist ideology and politics it was not sufficient to be Basque in
terms of surnames, language or religion. One had to be a good Basque
... Arana had to make race a politically operative category not a matter
of once and for all biological inclusion or exclusion. [The a good Basque
status was only awarded to those who accepted Arana's political
programme.] In short, a real Basque could only be a Basque nationalist.
A number of the main themes of nationalist discourse appear in the following
statement made by a member of the OLF Central Committee:
Some Oromos are being told they are Somalis. Some who are
Christianised think they are Amharas. We lost our identity. That was our
first project, to restore our identity so that someone can be proud to say
he is an Oromo. The question of dividing Oromos by different names is
over. The fire is burning. Everywhere the Oromo are fighting their
enemies. They are dying by thousands, they are killing the enemy by
thousands. Even the technocrats, even the scholars are telling them. You
cannot rule us any more. University students left school because they feel
they want to die for their country [standing ovation from audience]. We
have never had this unanimity. Now the spirit of our forefathers is
moving us. Someone said there were five Oromo organisations. We dont
have five Oromo organisations, all of them are united now. We never
consider OPDO an organisation [applause]. If you were there I'm sure
each one of you would die for his country. We expect our scholars to be
behind our organisation. If he is an Oromo there is no way he can not
support the Oromo cause.
These statements demonstrate some of the basic elements of Oromo nationalist
discourse: emphasis on a fundamental ethnic identity that is revealed beneath
the superficial imposition of foreign culture; assertions of complete unity among
all Oromo; stressing links to the past; appealing for support from the audience;
and rejecting alternative political views as inauthentically Oromo.
There is no doubt that the Oromo have been discriminated against in
Ethiopia. They were viciously subjugated by the expanding Abyssinian empire;
their culture was denigrated and their language suppressed. The Oromo were
regarded as inferior to the members of the ruling Abyssinian culture,
particularly those of the Amhara ethnic group. This negative view of Oromo
culture has survived the most recent change of government. For example, New
African (March 1992) reported that in a demonstration organised in Dire Dawa
by Amharas who felt that they had been excluded from power, participants had
labelled a donkey as an Oromo, leading to a gunfight.
Just as Amharas have denigrated the Oromo as being essentially inferior,
speakers at the OSA meetings continually stress the essential differences
between Abyssinians and Oromo, with the difference being that it is the
negative characteristics of Abyssinians that are now emphasised, as indicated in
the following statements made at various OSA sessions:
· if you take power from an Abyssinian, he will beg it back from you;
· the Oromo culture is one of peace and Abyssinian culture is one of war;
· Oromos are democrats, that's our his tory;
· Oromos want peace. They are the most peaceful people in the world.
Abyssinian influence is cited as an explanation for any negative behaviour; for
example, when one Oromo meeting began several hours later than scheduled,
speakers explained this through reference to ethnic difference and the dangers
of pollution: It's a bad habit we learned from our Abyssinian masters.
Ethnic nationalism in its various manifestations relies on distinctions of this
sort. Often these distinctions involve the false notion that there are distinct
human races which exist and possess unique characteristics which sharply
differentiate them from other such races. For example, Heiberg (1989) discusses
the function of the idea of race in the ideology of Basque nationalism.
Nationalist ideologues such as Sabino de Arana-Goiri employed the idea of race
as a key symbol, an exclusive moral category determined by birth. Although
integration of these supposed races was impossible because of their fundamental
differences, race could be lost through intermarriage and thus had to be
preserved through the maintenance of boundaries. Arana emphasised the
positive moral characteristics of Basques (intelligence, nobility, masculinity),
while noting the servile, effeminate sullennes s of the Spanish, under whose
influence Basque character would only degenerate.
Thus, ethnic nationalism depends on the creation of difference and its
continual representation. Oromo are defined as being fundamentally distinct
from those defined as Abyssinians or Ethiopians. Oromo nationalists use these
terms interchangeably and some apply them to Eritreans as well, despite the fact
that Eritrean nationalists argued for the existence of significant differences
between themselves and Ethiopians based on Eritrea's experience of Italian
colonialism and the similarity of the Eritrean case to other former European
colonies which became independent. Although Eritreans fought for thirty years
before achieving their independence from Ethiopia, and provided training to the
OLF during the organisations early years and assistance during the latter part
of the war, some Oromo nationalists now believe that the Eritreans betrayed
them by not supporting independence of Oromia and instead assisting the TGE.
Oromo nationalist discourse also overlooks the ethnic diversity of Eritrea, where
nine ethnic groups are recognised. By linking Eritreans with Ethiopians, Oromo
nationalists subsume an Eritrean national identity within the terms of their own
ethnic discourse, focusing on the culture of the southern and central Christian,
Tigrayan-speaking areas of Eritrea that share similarities with the adjacent
Ethiopian province of Tigray and ignoring the fact that Eritrean nationalism
emphasises its multicultural character. Indeed, early support for Eritrean
independence came largely from the Muslim segment of the population and
various Ethiopian regimes sought to discredit it on that basis .
With the notable exception of Mohammed Hassan (1994), many Oromo
nationalists ignore the multicultural character of Eritrean identity and revert to
a discourse of ethnic essentialism that construes lack of Eritrean support for
independent Oromia as part of a plot in which the EPLF and TPLF seek to steal
Oromo resources. Thus, although Eritrean independence was a significant event
in the Horn, the large map used at the OSA meetings did not indicate an
independent Eritrea either in 1991 (when Eritrea's de facto independence was
attained) or after the 1993 referendum. In Minneapolis, Chaltu Deressa referred
to Eritreans, Tigrayans and Amharas as Ethiopians, all those who claim to be
a part of Ethiopia, disregarding Eritrea's struggle for and achievement of
independence from Ethiopia.
Similarly, at the same meeting, Bichaka Fayissa drew a political connection
between Eritrea and Tigray:
The Eritrean plan and the Tigrayan plan is a joint effort. They can't exist
without each other. The first step is for the EPLF and the TPLF to topple
the central government. Eritrea will get independence but independence
without resources is nothing. The EPLF and the TPLF are now
channelling resources to the north.
A similar statement was made by Namara Garbaba, reporting on a recent visit
he had made to Ethiopia:
The TPLF is extracting resources from Oromia and using them to build
up the north. The government controls all businesses and only gives
licences to Tigrayans and Eritreans since they both speak the same
language ... The Derg planted trees but the EPRDF strips them. I heard
that the wood was being taken to Eritrea to build houses.
Many of the accusations made by speakers about the current discrimination
and exploitation of the Oromo seem to be based on the slightest of pretexts.
Another speaker, also a recent traveller, encountered a number of Tigrayans
staying in a hotel and concluded that the hotel was excluding other guests,
although he noted that he had no proof of this . He also reported that he only
heard Tigrinya being spoken on his flight and concluded that this provided
further evidence that commerce was being monopolised by Tigrayans.
Social Work
Speakers and audience work together in order to construct positive images and,
in essence, to create that of which they speak. Statements which indicate the
uniqueness of the Oromo are applauded by the audience. For example,
Reverend Ronald Ward, of Toronto Baptist Intercultural Services, referred to his
travels from highland Ethiopia to Kenya: These Oromos were very different
from Kikuyu and Somalis (applause). What a beautiful country (applause).
There's no place on earth like it (applause). Through such processes of social
work, audience members also contribute to the effort to mobilise support for
OSA's efforts to develop Oromo nationalism.
Construction of such positive images and the sense of a unified community
often do constitute rather difficult social work. Throughout the course of the
meetings each year there are repeated assertions that the Oromo are all united
in their struggle for independence. At the same time, there are continuous
appeals to audience members for unity, for greater commitment, for efforts to
influence Western governments, for moral and material support to the OLF and
for better organisation. Admonition of insufficient effort and encouragement of
greater commitments in support of the movement constitute a persistent theme
in the discourse of Oromo nationalism. The meetings are intended to create
commitment, unity and political activism. The fact that these have yet to be
created also suggests that for some participants, the OSA meetings may play
functions other than or in addition to supporting independence for Oromia.
Particularly for those who live in North American cities where Oromo do not
have organised communities , the OSA meetings offer a space for social
interaction with people who are considered to be the same in some
fundamental ways, a chance to speak one's own language, reconnect with
friends, reminisce and exchange information on various topics, including, but
not necessarily restricted to, political events in Ethiopia. These activities are
made even more pleasant by the inclusion of performances by Oromo singers ,
bands and dancers . The importance of such attractions should not be
underestimated for a first-generation diaspora population which encounters not
only cultural differences but racism in North America, and for some the social
benefits of such meetings may be more significant than political activism. Some
speakers acknowledge that support for Oromo nationalism needs to be
cultivated among the diaspora. For example, Sisai Ibssa stated at the 1992
meeting:
The Oromo know who they are and what they want. Are Oromos in the
diaspora helping? Oromos in the diaspora have done very little ... The
task is to transform ourselves . We must advise fellow intellectuals to do
their part. If we don't participate in building Oromia then we may become
part of breaking it apart in the future. We know we should participate.
During the conference, what did we do? We exchanged greetings.
The following year, Asafa Jalata made a similar criticism of Oromo in the
diaspora who were not sufficiently committed to and active in the cause of
Oromo nationalism:
There is no doubt that the majority of Oromos support the OLF. Still,
some Oromos are lagging behind. They must catch up. All of you have
a national responsibility.
These repeated appeals indicate that the conference is not simply the expression
of an already existing and fully- formed nationalist sentiment but rather that it
is itself a means of creating that sentiment, of creating the same identity it
celebrates. Speakers frequently take the role of exhorting the audience to greater
commitment; responses from audience members also become part of these
speech rituals. Just as speakers continually encourage the members of the
audience to be more committed and active in the nationalist cause, so do
audience members encourage speakers to show more leadership in such
mobilisation and to achieve practical results. As one individual stated:
I hear lectures every year just telling me what Amharas have done to us,
telling me about my culture. I don't need to know this . Why not tell us
what to do? I am happy when I see foreigners here because I think they'll
tell us where the guns are. But they just say the same things.
This can also take the form of criticism of the political leadership of the OLF
itself. For example, Idris Jamal, speaking at the 1994 conference, was extremely
critical of the OLF: The Oromo national movement has failed to advance revolutionary
culture ... The OLF leadership has failed to develop solutions to Oromo
problems of feudalism, Amhara-ism, nepotism ... The OLF leaders are
acting like feudal lords in relation to the people [applause]. Innuendo and
character assassination are characteristics of Abyssinian culture. Can you
be Oromo nationalist and Ethiopianist at the same time? ... The Oromo
movements have high levels of regionalism, nepotism and religious
difference. That's why the Oromo national struggle is going backwards.
The UONA has kept Oromo nationalism alive. UONA's contribution is
favourable but weak in political education. It hasn't developed study
circles. There is a discrepancy between intellectuals and the masses.
There are also problems between regions. UONA's support to the OLF is
unequivocal as long as it exists. This is wrong for two reasons. There
should be no carte blanche given to any organisation. There's always the
possibility of vacillation. Washington DC was the only office to question
Oromo academics. Ego may play a divis ive role. The OSA split into two
due to egotistical needs. There are too many blind followers of the
now-defunct OLF leadership. The OLF is for all Oromos, it's not the
property of the OLF leaders . Our major task is a critical examination of
our own position. We need political education to create new revolutionary
people. UONA must be independent of the OLF. OSA must resolve its
contradictions and look beyond the cult of leaders . Former OLF fighters
are acting like armchair revolutionaries , they must take part. The present
OLF leaders are putting communities against each other. We need new
leadership. [applause]
Audience members may rise not only to ask questions but also to give
testimonials that reaffirm the existence of Oromo identity, to express their
solidarity and generally to raise the emotional level. For example, in
Minneapolis in 1992, one audience member stood up to declare that he was
ready to give his life for the nationalist cause, an assertion that was vigorously
applauded by the audience. Other participants made emotional and similarly
well-received testimonials to their convers ion to the cause of Oromo nationalism:
For sixteen years I was a diehard Ethiopian. I spoke Amharic. When news
about Eritreans and Gallas came I was the first to tear it up and throw it
away. Thanks to the Oromo Support Committee I'm now convinced that
nothing short of bilisuma will satis fy Oromos. Similarly, another stated: A year ago, t
here were many of us who did not dissociate ourselves
from the mythical Ethiopia. The situation has changed now.
Through these processes of mutual exhortation, criticism and confession,
speakers and audience engage in the creation of Oromo identity.
Gender and Oromo Nationalism
In general, nationalist discourses construct an image of an undivided community
and seek to disregard internal differences, regarding these as divisive for the
struggle against external enemies. Gender emerges as one of the key differences
and paradoxical issues of nationalism. While some nationalist movements stress
a need for women to remain in or return to the domestic space and maintain
traditional roles of wife and mother, others may appeal to women through a
discourse of emancipation from gender inequality. In most societies of the Horn
of Africa, women have been consigned to a subordinate role; both the Eritrean
and Tigrayan liberation fronts used a rhetoric of emancipation for women in
order to gain support and the role of women in Eritrea and Ethiopia following
the acquisition of state power by those two groups will be a matter of
considerable interest. In contrast to these cases, the role of women in the Oromo
national struggle receives little attention. In part, this is due to the emphasis on
reclaiming traditions such as gada, which excluded women, as the basis of
identity.
Most of the OSA panels are composed entirely of men and do not address
gender issues. In 1992, a women's panel was put together at the conference itself
and in 1993 and 1994, women were scheduled as speakers . Seada Mohammed
outlined the suffering of Oromo women under both Abyssinian colonisers and
the Somali invasion of the ****** region during the mid-1970s. This included
death in military attacks, rape, slavery, forced marriage and prostitution in order
to survive. Seada (1993: 122) told a story of the rape of an Oromo girl by a
soldier in Djibouti:
In one of those outrageous dark nights this unfortunate Oromo girl was
taken by an impotent military man. She was a virgin, and he tried to
penetrate her night after night but he could not. What seemed to him to
be the most logical thing to do was to use an opening instrument to pave
the way for his victorious entrance. So, he used a kitchen knife and cut
her and opened her. The girl was bleeding to death when word got out
to the refugee camp.
Response from the audience included considerable laughter at Seada's reference
to the soldier's impotence. Although this was silenced fairly quickly by the grim
details that followed, the laughter does indicate that nationalist discourses are
narratives of power, frequently expressed in what we might call masculinist
terms. For example, discussing rape as a device of ethnic marking in wars in
Eastern Europe, Meznaric (1994: 76) argues:
Women are the special victims of nationalist ideologies and quests for
ethnic purity. As with every nationalism, conservative Balkan nationalism
(Albanian, Serbian, Croatian) reassert the theme of the home and hearth
as womens natural location. Nationalist exhortations disguise the
opposition between men and women that inevitably accompanies the
entrance of women into the public domain in traditional societies .
My notes from Seada's presentation record other examples of abuse suffered
by Oromo women as refugees in the diaspora:
Women had to have arranged marriages with any available person. They
go to Saudi Arabia and then the man becomes a beast ... Women can't
travel by themselves ... Only when the OLF gets a good position will we
get our slaves back ... Here Oromo women are isolated. They have a baby
every year. They can't go to school. They are in prison [in their homes].
They face violence from their husband. They need translators to go to the
doctor. I appeal to Oromo men. You are supposed to be our next-of-kin.
How could a next-of-kin tie up a woman and burn her with cigarettes ?
Our next-of-kin aren't doing much. Try to help your sisters.
Seada also referred to a contradiction between the OLF's rhetoric of liberation
and its failure to incorporate the emancipation of women into its practice.
Women joined the OLF but were only allowed to do the cooking. We
didn't expect much from the Derg's organisations. We expected more from
the OLF. But the OLF ignored women's issues. We must not wait for
national liberation, we must work for equality. Most Oromo men are
afraid to work with women as equals. You have subordinated women all
your lives . We must work together. We need separate organisations to
find our voices but we must get organised together .
Seada's presentation indicates the paradox faced by many women who have
supported nationalist movements. As Yuval-Davis (1994: 414) puts it,
Often, the particular culture they would like to assert vis-à-vis the
hegemonic culture includes also elements which they feel subordinate
them as women and which they would like to resist and transform within
their own community.
The Algerian case is often taken as a prime example of a tendency on the part
of patriarchal nationalist organisations to roll back freedoms gained by women
during the course of the struggle for independence. Discussing the involvement
of Palestinian women in the national movement, Peteet (1991: 209) points out
some of the contradictions those women faced.
Women's perceptions of themselves were in dissonance with those of a
leadership that continued to propagate the idea of womens participation
in national politics, but in a secondary manner, vacillating between
conception of female persona as sex and citizen ... Activist women were
caught between the demands of loyalty to the national movement and
knowledge of the inextricability of their struggle from the Palestinian
struggle and an awareness of the need for an autonomous struggle.
Writing in the newsletter Qunnamtii Oromia, Sabboontuu Jiilchaa (1992: 24)
takes a more aggressive tone in her rejection of the patriarchal aspects of Oromo
culture:
The womb that carried you is convulsing with fury and blood is dripping
from the breasts that once suckled you with milk. You've changed our
necklaces into chains and our bracelets into handcuffs. Our wedding rings
have become tormenting, sharp hot irons that burn and cut into our flesh.
Instead of a home, you gave us a prison which has become a living hell.
The heart that once loved you passionately, now aches with deep pain
when you, Oromo men, call yourself liberators. Can we, Oromo women,
agree with you, knowing what you're doing to us? How are you different
from the Tigrean liberators? ... You call yourself liberators but you are
ens laving women, or do you think slavery is a delicious dish when the
cooks are Oromo men?
While a number of Oromo women have raised issues of gender inequalities and
the need for Oromo nationalism to addres s them, it is clear that some Oromo
nationalists are not convinced that such issues are significant. For example,
although Seada's presentation was applauded by the audience, one man rose
from the audience to ask the question, Are you looking for a separate country
for yourself?. Delivered in a swaggering tone, this question clearly was intended
to trivialise any claims made for the necessity of women's emancipation. The
question was followed by laughter from other men, who apparently
sympathised with the man's position. Another male questioner asked to what
extent Seada had been influenced by Western feminism; this is not an
uninteresting question but, as Seada indicated in her response, it also serves as
a device to delegitimise the concerns of Oromo women through a resort to the
notion of tradition and by portraying them as infected with the values of a
foreign culture. Dismissal of gender issues as simply a creation of Western
feminism is another facet of nationalisms attempt to construct and maintain the
image of an authentic, undivided self.
Non-Oromo and the Creation of Oromo Identity
In looking at the creation of Oromo identity in the diaspora we must understand
this as a discursive project which is undertaken not only by those who consider
themselves to be Oromo but also by non-Oromo observers , commentators and
supporters . Historically, European imperialism has had a significant impact in
shaping Oromo nationalist discourse. For example, Mekuria Bulcha (1993) has
outlined the role of European travellers and missionaries in developing a written
Oromo script and their influence on ethnic identity and nationalism among the
Oromo in the nineteenth century.
During the years in which numerous forces struggled to overthrow the Mengistu
regime, many of those groups sought to convince foreign politicians, journalists, intellectuals
and activists of the legitimacy of their cause and to encourage their support. Despite some
protestations to the contrary, virtually all of the Western writers who have
commented on political struggles in Ethiopia during the last two decades can
be identified by their strong sympathies for one or another of these conflicting
forces. In this context, readers may wish to bear in mind that I have been
associated with the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) for a number of years.
Western supporters of the OLF also have contributed to the discourse of
ethnic essentialism and to the social construction of the idea of an independent
Oromia. For example, speaking at the 1993 OSA conference in Toronto, Rev.
Ronald Ward claimed that Oromia is now a reality that had been recognised
by expatriates (referring to Western observers ). On the basis of two vis its to
Oromia in 1993, Ward noted that there was a tremendous affirmation of
Oromo-ness ... a new sense of pride and expectancy in being Oromo throughout
the area, which he depicted as a tremendous bee-hive of activity. Ward stressed
that the Oromo had been betrayed by the TGE and that Oromos here [i.e., in
North America] must take leadership roles, thus discursively constructing the
diaspora audience as a significant actor with a decisive role to play in the
nationalist struggle in north-eastern Africa. Having suggested such a role for his
audience, Ward stressed a sense of imminent danger for the Oromo: Our
enemies are not sleeping. The EPRDF is setting up a puppet OPDO government
in Oromia while doing anything to discredit Oromia. Here Ward explicitly
identifies himself with the Oromo cause, creating a sense of a community
threatened by the Ethiopian government, which is represented as a hostile force
gathering for harmful purposes. Ward's proposed solution to this threat mirrors
that chosen by the OLF: he stresses the need for the Oromo to have an
independent army to avoid the betrayals of the past. Rather than suggesting
peaceful means of negotiating equal rights for the Oromo, Ward advocates
further violence, by playing on the image of the Oromo as warriors (The
Oromos are the fighters of the Horn of Africa) and by referring to Dylan
Thomas poem Do Not Go Gentle Into That Good Night: Sometimes I find you
people have lost your rage. You seem to potter around. Brothers and sisters,
rage! rage! rage!.
Speaking again later on another panel at the same conference, Ward
addressed The Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the Oromo. In
this paper, he also portrays the Oromo as victims who have been unfairly
treated: My topic NGOs and the Oromo might also be titled, Why do NGOs
ignore the Oromo?. There can be little or no doubt that the majority of aid
which flows into Ethiopia through NGO sources goes to the north
particularly Eritrea and Tigre [sic] (p. 17). Ward identifies the major up-front
reason for the imbalance as the activities of the Eritrean Relief Association
(ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the relief organisations
maintained by the EPLF and TPLF, respectively. Ward stated that both operated
well oiled public relations machines and produce unlimited numbers of
pictures, reports, statistics, videos, etc. They are user friendly for western
NGOs (pp. 17± 18).
Adopting the terms of an Oromo nationalism that does not distinguish
between Eritrea and Tigray but identifies both as Habasha or Abyssinians on
the basis of shared ethnicity and political objectives, Ward makes no effort to
differentiate between the two organisations; yet even if one were to overlook the
subjective aspects of identity formation in favour of a version based on
similarities of culture and language, this position is still problematic because of
the (not always cordial) relations that existed between the Eritrean and Tigrayan
liberation movements and the different types of relationships that their relief
organisations established with Western institutions. Overall, ERA was much
more successful than REST in dealing with Western agencies, a situation
explained in part by the relative underdevelopment of Tigray, the greater
numbers of Eritrean intellectuals and professionals (many of them educated
partially in Western countries ), and the fact that the TPLF was perceived as
being more rigid ideologically. REST's resources were much more limited and,
especially in North America, its production of information could hardly be
termed unlimited. While the steady production of information might be
considered a useful activity on the part of indigenous organisations, Ward hints
that deception is involved.
The provision of detailed information is presented as merely public relations.
Ward indicates that he does not object to aid in the north. God knows Tigre [sic]
and Eritrea are little more than devastated deserts. There are thousands of terribly
poor Tigreans [sic] and Eritreans. They need help but they should not grab
everything. (p. 19)
Due to the fact that famine did not affect all parts of the Horn equally over
the last few decades, Wards argument is problematic also because he does not
offer a precise time-frame for his charges of imbalanced relief aid. During the
early 1980s, starvation first struck at the northern regions and it was only later
that massive numbers of people in the southern areas faced widespread
emergency. Furthermore, he ignores the argument made by both ERA and REST
that not enough relief aid was supplied to Eritrea and Tigray to alleviate the
crises of the 1980s, and minimises the continuous lobbying efforts conducted by
both organisations as well as by Eritreans and Tigrayans in the diaspora. While
Ward notes that some of the Canadian NGOs claim that more has gone to the
south in recent years than to the north, those claims are simply dismissed with
no counter-evidence other than the statement that statistics are very deceptive
things and that according to Ethiopia's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
in 1993 roughly the same amount of relief food has been assigned to the south
as the north (p. 19). In the absence of any detailed presentation of needs,
accessibility and distribution, an alleged discrepancy (it is very hard to check)
between more and roughly the same amount of aid is offered as evidence of
a plot against the Oromo (p. 19). Ward downplays the fact that famines hit the
north harder in the 1980s and that Eritrean and Tigrayan groups, both in the
diaspora and in the areas controlled by the EPLF and TPLF, organised to
dis tribute aid effectively. Rather than seeing either organisation as a model for
ORA, arguing that these relief organisations might have common goals and that
all should live up to their avowed humanitarian principles by working
cooperatively to ensure that relief aid was delivered all who needed it, or
considering that ORA may have been less organised and effective than the other
organisations, Ward ins tead presents ERA and REST not only as competitors but
as agents in an ethnic plot who are acting unfairly (they should not grab
everything). Ward stressed this image of a struggle for scarce resources in a
statement not included in the published text of his paper, sugges ting that
Competition is very high. If you don't get the money, ERA and REST will get
it.
Ward's statements focus on criticism of what he sees as the unfair activities
of Eritreans and Tigrayans who grab everything. In addition, Ward charges
that NGOs are ideologically predisposed against the Oromo. In his view, they
are driven by an Ethiopianist bias which favours the highland cultures and are
quite ignorant of the ethnic composition of Ethiopia. Adhering strictly to the
ethnic essentialism of Oromo nationalist discourse, Ward also criticises NGOs
which have a vision of one humanity, internationalism in which there is no
room for ethnic identity, dismissing this internationalist ideology as unrealistic
and unworkable: it is something like the Kingdom of God (pp. 19± 20). That
Ward's comments explicitly conveyed and contributed to a sense of persecution
was indicated in the summation by discussant Bichaka Fayissa, who informed
the audience that governments, NGOs and Ethiopianists are all against the
Oromo.
Despite numerous ins inuations and direct assertions that the Oromo have
suffered from plots directed against them, some Oromo recognis e that an
alternative interpretation also exists to explain the lack of support to ORA rather
than the machinations of enemies. Several speakers attributed ORA's limited
achievements to lack of support from Oromo in the diaspora. For example, at
the 1992 OSA conference in Minneapolis, ORA representatives themselves both
criticised the limited involvement in relief work on the part of Oromo in the
diaspora and acknowledged their own res tricted efforts in the areas in which
they worked. Terfa Dibaba, ORA representative from Germany, referred to a
discrepancy between the aid money that went to ERA and REST and that which
went to ORA and stated The others have worked hard. Have we? The stronger
you are fed, the stronger you grow. You have lef t us alone; we were not fed
properly. Similarly, in his remarks at the 1993 conference, Mohammed Hassen
criticised the inactivity of Oromo in the diaspora: We have not done a fraction
of what is expected of us ... We have not done our share. Please let us mobilise
our resources to help our people. An audience member responded by stating
We haven't done what we have to do. I accept that.
Ward's presentation is significant because it indicates the importance of
external legitimisation for nationalist discourse. Most of the protagonis ts in the
struggles that have taken place in the Horn have sought support from external
sources. In turn, opponents have used these external sources of support as signs
of illegitimacy, claiming that external agents are the source of discontent and
that if these inauthentic elements could be purged, the real sentiments of the
people would be expressed. In Imagining Ethiopia, I argued that the trope of the
foreign agent was a typical rhetorical strategy used in such a way. While the
foreign agent cannot be used to explain all sources of conflict, it is also
important to recognise that foreign academics, journalists and other writers have
been active in the production of nationalist discourses and that their
contributions are encouraged by the main protagonis ts. Wards statements
indicate that the emotions of nationalism are not confined only to those who are
considered to be full ethnic members of the nations concerned and also raise
further questions about the creation of other types of selves .
Conclusion
Just as the discourse of Greater Ethiopia has relied on a particular version of
history which sought to project the existence of the contemporary state
backwards into time in order to claim the legitimacy conferred by a continuity
of three thousand years, Oromo nationalism has sought to deconstruct this idea
of the past and to substitute its own version. As Szemere (1992: 636) notes, the
evocation of the past is intended to erect a structure of feeling vital to a
tragic-heroic sense of national identity. The attractions of such an identity may
be particularly appealing to members of a diaspora population, especially to
intellectuals, who may find in the nationalist project of creating a new
homeland, a broader projection of their own personal efforts to deal with
displacement and modifications of their own identities . Annual conferences
organised by Oromo nationalist groups provide a site for creating a sense of
identity and community among the diaspora population through the emotional
focus provided by the project of creating an independent state.
Even those who do not agree with the position taken by the OLF, UONA and
others that independence is the only possible path that can lead to Oromo
self -actualisation should bear in mind that some of the claims made by Oromo
nationalists about historical mis treatment appear to be valid. While nationalist
discourse seeks to overlook the matter of class alliances formed across ethnic
lines , it is the case that the bulk of the Oromo have been dominated and
exploited and their current predicament should be addressed. Assertions of the
superficiality and the imposed character of Ethiopian identity also should be
taken seriously; as Baxter and Blackhurs t (1978: 160) note, many of the groups
who are now included as members of Greater Ethiopia have been under control
of the state for a comparatively short period and not all of them have a strong
sense of Ethiopian-ness, especially one which is based on the history and culture
of a dominant minority. Nevertheless, the recognition of these factors should not
blind us to the constructed aspects of Oromo nationalism, particularly to its
essentialism, romanticism and chauvinism. Finally, it is also true that the
primary concern of the vast majority of Ethiopians, regardless of their ethnic
background, is an improvement in their material conditions, which remain
desperately impoverished.
