@Cawaale. Abwaan, waa iloobey inaan saas dhaho

Yaan la kala guurin.

a) Term of Parliament extension to correspond to the level of meaningful reforms implemented by the TFP. Engagement with the Parliament will be more productive if the discussions are centered on addressing its weaknesses through a bold reform agenda and a detailed implementation plan. Such strategy would shift the burden of proof to the Parliament and would force the members to look inward and engage in the process of internal development. If the Parliament fails to undertake the necessary reforms and meet the agreed benchmarks, then their term could be justifiably curtailed. 　 i) Legitimize and strengthen representation of parliamentarians to their constituents Facilitating meaningful connection of the members of the parliament to their constituents / communities that are relatively peaceful is crucial to making the current parliament function regardless of the term of their extension. The role and functions of federal MPs to the communities they represent must be redefined in partnership with the local authorities. A realistic work plan, with clear benchmarks and specific outcomes should be developed for MPs to accomplish in their constituents. These activities could include, local level reconciliation, forming caucuses to advocate for regional interests, or specific issues and interest groups such as minority rights, facilitating discussions on the constitutional making process, etc. MPs support package can be directly linked to their constituency involvement. ii) Enhance the leadership of the TFP The persistent dysfunction of the TFP can be attributed in large measure to the deficiencies of its leadership. This can be rectified by removing the restrictions placed in the selection process for the leadership of the TFP. Currently only MPs can run for the leadership of the parliament. Opening the competition for the leadership of the TFP to both internal (MPs) and external candidates, similar to all the other senior offices of the TFIs, should raise both the profile and competences of the elected officials. iii) Serious reform to the Parliamentary Committees. Parliamentary Committees need to be reorganized, redesigned and redeveloped to enable them share responsibilities and duties with the leadership of the TFP. Once membership of various committees are selected based on their capacities and skill sets, they will be able to undertake their monitoring and oversight roles as well as initiating and developing relevant legislations. b) Election of the President and Speakership offices before the end of the term must be settled. The current escalation in the political wrangling between the President and the Speaker is driven, in part, by the struggles of the current leadership to manipulate the post transitional arrangements in their favor as the mandate of the current government ends. If the leaders of the transitional governments are allowed to hold onto power and extend their term of office without a consensus and acceptable inclusive process, it could revive armed power struggle as a means to office and undermine the peace agreements. c) Establish Independent Election Commission To compensate for the lack of confidence and poor credibility of the current Transitional Federal Parliament, it would be wise to create an indigenous Independent Election Commission to manage the upcoming election process for the leadership of the TFIs. Setting-up such a credible and neutral body should reduce the incessant charges of bribes and payoffs that have tarnished the reputation of the parliament institution and tainted the election process and its outcome. 2) Constitution making process must be re-activated with the vigorous involvement and full participation of the relevant national stakeholders. While the Constitutional making Process has been underway for the past several years, its utility as a viable tool to facilitate constructive dialogue among the Somali people and reconstruct the fragmented nation back together has not been fully exploited. The continued lingering questions and cynical manipulation of this mechanism by the leadership of the TFIs undermine its relevance and prolong the results anticipated. The constitutional making process can be skillfully employed by local communities in the process of reconciling their diverse populations and developing functioning local administrations. 3) Strengthen bottom-up approaches and indigenous local solutions. It is critical to adjust the centralizing tendency of the successive transitional governments and support local initiatives that attempt to create stability, promote reconciliation, strengthen local administrations and promote economic development. ASWJ efforts in central Somalia and the current localized security operations in Gedo region should be promoted as an effective alternative to the domination of the Shabaab extremists. The disappointing experience of ASWJ in drawing modest financial and political support from the central government and the international donor community for the past two years, despite their remarkable success in defending their communities from the extremists, doesn‟t inspire confidence and encourage others to follow. 4) Establish credible monitoring and arbitration mechanism. The use and relevance of this independent mechanism has been amply explained above. It is only noted here to stress that it is now timely to introduce this instrument as part of the broader reform and re-activation of the transitional institutions following the end of the mandate. 5) Imposing sanctions and punitive measures. When all other interventions fail, sanctions have proven effective in the past to persuade Somali political leaders to act responsibly. The sooner the message of their availability and potential use as a last resort is effectively conveyed, the better the chance for positive political settlement. All indications of the present political discourse in Mogadishu point out that the international community may have to resort to punitive measures in order to exert pressure on the political leaders of the TFI and force compliance.

The functions of this monitoring and arbitration mechanism include: i. To promote full compliance of the Transitional Charter and other applicable laws of the TFIs, and the implementation of agreements entered. The committee will serve as an independent, credible, mechanism to adjudicate and arbitrate the disagreements by senior TFI leadership over the interpretation of the Transitional Charter and other applicable laws and regulations. The committee will have responsibility for making final decisions that are binding. ii. To strengthen good governance, equity, transparency and accountability of the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). In this capacity, the committee will monitor the institutional culture, administrative procedures and dealings with external partners of the TFIs, with the view to identify potential problems, and make corrective measures and appropriate interventions in a timely manner. iii. To mediate disputes over functions, roles, responsibilities and distribution of power between the central government and emerging regional states. One of the major challenges facing political authorities in the country is finding the right balance between the need to empower local citizens through decentralization and devolution of powers to local authorities, with the desire for the unifying approach of strong centralized governance. So far, attempts to reach acceptable power distribution arrangements for the two levels of governments have only managed to intensify the internal conflict between the respective political leaders. This commission could play a pivotal role in facilitating the delicate negotiations between these levels of governments. iv. To monitor the timely completion of the transitional tasks. Successive transitional governments have consistently failed to undertake the necessary tasks during their mandate. Hence, the pressure for term extension of the transitional mechanisms to avert imminent institutional void becomes justified, despite the lack of credible plan to complete the tasks within the new mandate. This independent commission could provide external oversight and support to the relevant TFIs as they carry out the required activities as planned. The committee could also identify factors and circumstances that impede the implementation of the transitional mandate to allow for proper intervention and necessary adjustments in a timely manner. The proposed mechanism can be an independent commission, comprising of prominent Somali nationals with the relevant expertise and credibility to undertake such crucial responsibilities. The TFIs, existing regional and local administrations, as well as relevant stakeholders such as civil society, business groups, Diaspora, etc. can be part of the process of identifying and selecting members of this commission. The international community can allocate the necessary resources for the proper functioning of this commission. Clearly, such an instrument is expected to contribute to curtailing the deliberate misuse and manipulation of laws, reduce the recurring leadership disputes, facilitate better cooperation and coordination of efforts between various levels of governments and restore confidence, credibility and support for the TFIs. Needless to say, this independent mechanism is not aimed to replace the critical roles of a functioning judiciary and effective legislators to offset the increasingly disproportionate power of the executive branch. Instead, this instrument is intended to fill the apparent credibility gap of the existing TFIs during this transitional phase. V. Proposed Steps for Action: Obviously, there are no quick-fix solutions to the myriad of difficulties attributed to the persistent failures of the transitional processes for Somalia. The goal is to better understand the challenges and to undertake practical measures to address these limitations incrementally. 1) The end of the transitional mandate in August presents an opportunity to interject meaningful reform to the TFIs. Since the Transitional Parliament voted to extend their mandate, the political discourse, both inside and outside the country, shifted the focus away from attending to the present-day challenges of the nation. Precious time and resources seem to have been diverted to shaping the future political course of the transitional process, motivated largely by selfish political ambitions. A year has now passed since the internal political struggles of the leaders managed to destabilize the current government, and indeed, all indications point to further escalation of the political tension with the approaching end of the term. It is, therefore, more realistic to close the current chapter and concentrate efforts on adequately preparing for the extension of the transitional period. Suggestions for the reform of the parliament may include;

b. Building security at the community level The collapse of the central state in early 1990s, and the ensuing clan warfare forced large numbers of Somali families to seek refuge in areas identified with their clansmen and to return to the safety and the protection of their kinship territories. Consequently, this massive re-settlement led to the creation of exclusive clan enclaves, which in effect, consolidated the inherent loyalty to kinship affiliations. As a result, traditional leadership has taken over the added responsibilities for the security and survival of local communities, following the collapse the central state. Twenty years later and countless efforts to revive the decomposed centralized governance; the country is largely segmented into clan territories, with authority and decision-making practically entrenched with local traditional elders and community leaders. Repeated attempts by successive transitional governments to reestablish the Somali National Forces and restore peace and security throughout the country have all been unsuccessful to date. The reason is mainly due to the central authorities‟ failure to take into account the dramatic transformations that forced this clan-based society to resort back to their indigenous social structures in administering matters of common concern to their local clans such as peace and security. Clearly, efforts aimed to promote effective security need to properly utilize the proliferation of local clan militias that is already operating in these communities, largely serving as defense forces for clan territories. Surely, this localization approach to security is already in place in much of the country. The TFG forces in the capital are predominantly „Banadir Regional Forces‟, whereas the Kenya trained forces belong to the Southern-Jubba regions, the Ethiopian trained forces currently stationed along the South-Westren border belong to the Bay, Bakool and Gedo regions, and ASWJ and Hiiraan forces belong to the central regions. This de facto regionalization approach to developing functional security must be reinforced as part of a broader strategy to reconstruct Somalia‟s national security system. Besides, this localized security approach responds effectively to the parallel shifts in today‟s warfare. Clearly, the conventional warfare between nation-states that relied on heavy artillery, tanks and aircrafts is now replaced by irregular warfare that is decentralized in nature and skillfully utilizes social exclusion, political marginalization, ideological appeal, and targeted violence as their preferred weapon of choice. Organizing and empowering local militias to defend their communities against invading extremists, and promote peace and stability in their localities would be a more Page 15 effective and realistic undertaking, than the current top-down approach that have repeatedly failed to deliver, despite the considerable resources invested. The advantages of this bottom-up approach to security development include the conduct of simultaneous operation s in multiple fronts; increased local community appreciation, ownership, involvement and support to the security operations; reduced risk of defections and weapons sale to the enemy; enhanced intelligence and collaboration from the local populations; and improved effectiveness and success rate. The experiences of self-governing administrations of Somaliland and Puntland have already proven the success of this bottom-up strategy. More recently ASWJ community leaders in Central regions have amply demonstrated that local clan militias, once organized, can effectively defend their communities from the incursions by external forces such as Shabaab extremists, despite their limited resources. Local militias can effectively maintain security, provided they are properly organized, trained and adequately remunerated, and most importantly, afforded the necessary leadership and support from the local communities. The central government would have a critical role of coordinating the training; equipping and organizing them into professional local police forces that effectively manage the internal security of the districts and regions of the country. In addition, the central authority drawing from these regional forces, can integrate them into national, rapid deployment units that can respond to emergencies and crisis. Furthermore, this bottom-up parallel approach to security development would also allow a more equitable distribution of resources to the various parts of the country, thereby contributing to the confidence building and trust among the various constituents that make up the nation. c. Local Administrations The lack of functioning local administrations contributes to the continued lawlessness, recurrent conflicts and absence of basic services through much of the country. Developing local governance institutions is a key step in the process of building durable peace and stability in local communities. Once the shattered relations among the local populations is restored and inter-community confidence and cooperation is revived through the reconciliation process, it is important to quickly follow-up with the establishment of broad-based , representative local administrations . Community-based administrations provide much needed coordination of community efforts, deliver essential public services, maintain law and order; stimulate local economy and foster development; promote community cohesion, unity and collaboration, etc. These days, the proliferation of grass-roots experiments aimed at establishing local governance mechanisms in many parts of the country is a positive step, but requires timely support to make them successful. An increasing number of emergent local administrations exist only in name, but lack the necessary capacities and resources to make them functional. Adequate support in terms of capacity building, organizational skills, financial management, service delivery and running the day-to-day affairs of citizens are critical to making local governments perform. Given the total erosion of state institutions at all levels of governance, restoring functioning local authorities require serious commitment and investment from the international partners as well as the national government. d. Community economic development The fourth pillar in this bottom-up approach to state reconstruction involves the development of the local economy, rehabilitation of the local infrastructure, creating employment and other economic opportunities for the local populations. There is growing recognition that the rampant unemployment and hopelessness in the country is forcing hundreds of thousands of Somali youth to abandon their homes in villages, districts and towns throughout the country in search of a better life. Consequently, their deepening desperation pushed thousands into extremism, criminality and piracy, while many more voted with their feet in a mass exodus through the high seas. All of these options come with high risk and diminishing returns, but for these youth, they offer a better alternative than the enduring poverty, desperation and hopelessness that trap them in their communities. Clearly, reestablishing security and basic governance alone in districts cannot guarantee durable stability and peace, without improvements in the lives of the people through gainful employment, economic opportunities and investment in local infrastructure. 4) Strengthening the Co-ordination Role of the Central State The proposed bottom-up approach to peace building is not aimed at replacing the role and functions of the Central State. On the contrary, the co-ordination role of the central state needs to be strengthened and legitimized. The distribution of power and responsibilities between the Central government and local State Administrations is clearly defined in the Transitional Federal Charter. What seems to be missing is the genuine attempt to implement these institutional arrangements by the emergent leadership at both levels of governments. Indeed, the critical challenge to the fragile state building experiment in Somalia has been the failure to achieve the right balance between the top down efforts of the central authority and the bottom-up local initiatives and to recognize their interdependence for the realization of durable solution. 5) Independent monitoring and arbitration mechanism In the absence of functioning judiciary and effective legislatures to counter-balance the excessive powers of the executive branch, during this Transitional phase, it is essential to setup independent mechanism that can steer the transitional government towards a culture of accountability, transparency and responsibility. The cynical manipulation of rules and laws, disregard for agreements, abuse of power, and rampant corruption remain at the forefront of the persistent charges leveled against the TFG leadership, giving rise to credibility gap and reduced confidence in the TFIs. Hence, the creation of this mechanism is intended to compensate for the apparent shortcomings of the transitional processes.

IV. The Way Forward Even though, a diverse group of political actors, including seasoned politicians, warlords, intellectuals and moderate Islamists took the helm of the tentative project to create transitional institutions in the past decade, they all managed to self-destruct the fragile experiments. Of course, those in charge of these transitional initiatives can‟t escape their share of the blame and must take ownership for their incompetence and poor leadership. But, it would be rather simplistic and shortsighted to put the blame for the repeated dysfunction solely on the behavior of individual leaders, without considering other contributing factors. This brief analysis clearly demonstrates that the biggest challenges that destabilized the transitional institutions in question can be generally associated with structural deficiencies of the peace processes that produced them. The inherent limitations of these processes in terms of involving legitimate representation, achieving genuine reconciliation and developing viable agreements, among others, continuously hamper the newly formed transitional institutions to launch effectively and start functioning, soon after their relocation back to the country. It is therefore, quite critical that any effort to develop a meaningful strategy for the way forward for the country be built on solid principles, agreed by all the national as well as external stakeholders. These basic principles include; 1) Legitimacy and ownership of the political process. Over 15 attempts of external national peace conferences for Somalia have failed to revive the collapsed central state, produce functioning institutions and restore peace and stability for the country for more than 20 years. A major reason for the recurring failure is the limited participation and genuine representation by the relevant stakeholders in the conferences and lack of ownership of the political process by the Somalis. Since the prolonged conflict and statelessness in the country lead to disintegration and fragmentation of the society, it is quite critical to ensure a broad-based participation in the political process and that all the segments of the society are truly involved. It is only when the legitimate representatives of the Somali communities come together, properly asses their situation, negotiate practical solutions and take collective responsibility for achieving it, that meaningful progress can be expected. The agenda and issues deliberated must be determined by the Somalis and reflect their genuine concerns and aspirations. In short, Somalis must be in charge of their destiny and in the process restore their trust in each other and regain their pride and dignity. 2) Security improvement linked to political progress. The prolonged conflict and statelessness in Somalia for more than two decades is not due to the insecurity and lawlessness in the country, but is the result of the lack of viable political solution for the nation. Indeed, the deteriorating security situation along with the shifting conflict dynamics, from clan conflict, factional and warlords, extremist militancy to external intervention all point to the absence of a meaningful political settlement among the Somalis. There were a number of times in the past 20 years when the various political authorities of the day managed to overpower their rivalries militarily, but failed politically to win over accommodate their rivals and broaden their legitimacy. That is why the tangible international support to the Somali security sector for the past few years have failed to materialize, in the absence of corresponding political progress. In fact, there is a growing recognition that the Shabaab extremists represent a political challenge, rather than security threat. And, therefore, any effort to strengthen security and create stability in Somalia, must consider parallel progress on the political front to ensure lasting solution. 3) Bottom-up approach to peace and state building Decade long efforts to create durable peace and stability in Somalia through top-down central governance approach have so far failed. The externally sponsored peace processes have not managed to reestablish functioning centralized institutions and restore order in the capital city, let alone expand to the regions and districts of the country. The only exception has been in Somaliland and Puntland where local communities have managed to restore some level of order and administration in their areas. Unfortunately, the leadership of the successive transitional governments failed to see the relevance of strengthening local administrations as a way to broaden their authority and legitimize their institution. As a result, a major segment of the Somali population living in the districts, villages and rural communities outside the capital city remained largely disconnected from the governance experiments, along with the limited resources that came with it from the international community. Expectedly, this gap facilitated effortless takeover of much of South-Central Somalia by the radical Shabaab forces. Any attempt to reconnect to these communities, create stability and broaden governance must combine the current top-down approach for centralized state-building with grass-roots level community mobilization strategy to build localized institutions from the bottom-up. Somalis do not have to go far to see the difference. In both Somaliland and Puntland, local leaders and elders have already demonstrated that the bottom-up approach to peace-building is a viable model for reconciling local clans, strengthening local security and stability, and building legitimate institutions for service delivery, resource management and political expression. This administrative decentralization approach has been consistent with the growing demand of Somalis for a federal system of governance, in the latest national reconciliation conferences of Arta and Kenya, respectively. An effective bottom-up strategy must be built around the four interlinked pillars of reconciliation, security, administration and economic development at the local level in a systematic and well-coordinated approach. a. Localized community level reconciliation The Somali conflict is no longer between the major Somali clans along the so- called 4.5 segments. Instead, the mistrust and suspicions is between the sub-clans who share common dwelling and settlement. The collapse of the state institutions, coupled with the weakened traditional institutions left deep seated disputes and grievances among these groups unresolved, contributing to further fragmentation and tension at the local communities. These grievances among the local communities and sub-clans that generally live in the same localities provided Shabaab militants with the most effective tool in their takeover and control of much of South Central Somalia. A simple scan of the districts and regions throughout the country clearly show direct link between the strength of Shabaab militants in the area and the level of grievances and mistrust among the local communities. Examples of territories where Shabaab extremists have skillfully exploited the discord and lingering suspicions among local communities include, yyyyy vs xxxxx sub-clans in Hiiraan region, xxxxx vs yyyy sub-clans in Kismayo region, yyyyy vs xxxxx in Central regions, yyyyy vs xxxx sub-clans in Bay/Bakool regions, and yyyyy vs xxxxx in Banadir region, to name a few. In all these cases, local sub-clans with claims of past injustices against other local communities have tactically opted to endure the occupation and collective punishment of Shabaab militants, until their grievances are redressed through genuine reconciliation and trust restored. Local level reconciliation among the clans and sub-clans of the targeted areas would be a key step to bridge the gap, regain trust and restore the unity and cooperation among local community members. The purpose of this local reconciliation is to bring an end to all active hostilities and tensions, to resolve internal conflicts at the community level, and to pave the way for genuine collaboration on strengthening security and establishing functioning administrations in their local setting. Somali traditional leaders and religious elders are well equipped to facilitate such crucial discussions among their populations using their indigenous systems. Indeed, Somali traditional systems have well developed tools, for resolving disputes through mediation, managing local conflicts and maintaining peace. However, the prolonged conflict and continued lawlessness throughout the country weakened the indigenous mechanisms of the Somali people, leaving them vulnerable to the misuse and exploitation of political actors and faction leaders. It is, therefore, quite important that credible, respected political leaders from the communities affected, get involved in the reconciliation process and contribute to its successful conclusions. The constitutional making process can be adequately utilized to facilitate dialogue and reconciliation among the various clans and populations in local communities.

Assessing the Structural Limitations that undermine the transitional institutions and proposals for resolving by Ahmed Abdisalam Adan Mogadishu, Somalia 27th March, 2011 I. Introduction Successive Somali Transitional National Governments established since 2000 have all been characterized by incessant internal conflict among the top leadership, lack of progress on the key transitional tasks and the failure to build functioning institutions. These transitional national governments formed through the Arta Peace Process in 2000, Kenya Peace Process in 2004 and Djibouti Peace process in 2009, all encountered similar challenges that severely undermined their fragile institutions, eroded the confidence and support of the people and eventually forced them to disintegrate. Meanwhile, in the absence of viable alternatives, Somali political forces and international actors concerned about the evolving situation in Somali continue to scramble to assemble various political actors for yet another peace conference outside the country and try to fill the impending institutional void by extending the transitional process for national governance in Somalia. http://www.hiiraan.com/op2/2011/jun/fixing_the_transitional_process_for_somalia_2000_2011.aspx Mr. Ahmed Abdisalam Adan is former Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Information of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia. Mr. Adan headed the government negotiating team of the Djibouti Reconciliation Conference that successfully concluded with the formation of a National Unity Government and the election of the current President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed in 2009. In 1999, Mr. Adan co-founded Somalia’s first independent broadcaster, HornAfrik Media Inc. in Mogadishu, Somalia serving as its Managing Partner and Director of Programs until 2007. HornAfrik’s growing public support attracted global recognition including 2002 CJFE Press Freedom Award for its work in the face of adversity. After decade long operation, HornAfrik became victim 0f the incessant violence, lawlessness and extremism in Somalia and was shut down by Al-Shabaab insurgents in 2010, following targeted assassinations of a number of its journalists and management, including one of the co-founders.

Waxaan ku rajeynaayaa inaad adiga iyo marwadaada noqotaan kuwii isku waraa oo dadkooda iyo waalidkooda ka duceysta. Waxaan kaloo kuu rajeynaayaa gabar iyo caano, wiil iyo Farmaajo. Congrats on your wedding. Treat her right.

Meet General Duke, the next PL president.

lol@we. Anywho maadan fahmin waxba weli. Perhaps you can PM awoowe si uu xooga wax kuu fahamsiiyo. Viva Ethnic Lander of the year Mudane Xaji Xanjo.

You just described awoowe. Ilaah ha noo daayo Xaji Xanjo. Viva Xunjuf abu ethnic Zubeyra abu John Major!

I'm a Dr too, why I've a PhD in fadhikudirir from the Duke and Xunjuf's Booto and Faan School.

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Poster-ka inuu Xaabsade of the South yaqaan u maleynmaayo. At least Xaji Xunjuf ka baro siyaasada Koonfur asagaa macalin ah lol. Koley future parents waxaan kula talin lahaa iney magaca Xaabsade ka fogaadaan. Wiilashiina Xaabsade ha ubixinina. lol

UN to sack Ambassador Mahiga, but who will replace him? The United Nations Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia Ambassador Augustine Mahiga will be sacked by the UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon, after the collapse of public confidence in his policy to Somalia. Ban Ki-moon had learnt a quick lesson from the diplomatic failure and the growing public anger against his envoy, as he had made no progress on his work for the past 12 months in United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS). UN sources say that the secretary-general will also to dismiss half of the senior officials from UN agencies including UNPOS, OCHA, UNDP, WHO, and UNICEF after the widespread political and financial corruption allegations. Mahiga will probably be replaced by the Professor Ibrahim Gambari, the Nigerian veteran diplomat, who is currently the Special Adviser on the International Compact with Iraq and other issues for the Secretary-General of the United Nations as the sources indicate. Former Nigerian Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the United Nations Gambari is a Muslim, who can fully understand the Muslim communities as he is now in Sudan, as Joint Special Representative of the African Union - United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Angry protesters burn Mahiga’s poster during protest demonstrations in Mogadishu, Nairobi, J’burg, Cairo, Sydney, London, Rome, Stockhlom, MN and Toronto on Friday and on Sunday loudly shouting “The Somali people are against the so-called envoy. We call the secretary general of United Nations to fire him. We completely don’t recognize him” The reason why people of Somalia are frustrated and angry with - is that Mahiga’s apparent intervention in Somalia policy as he signed illegitimate “Kampala Accord” which says “Within 30-days of the signing of the agreement, the Prime Minister (Mohamed Abdullaahi Farmajo), will resign from his position; and the president will appoint a new Prime Minister” which is utterly unacceptable. This is a clear intervention – diplomatic mistake from UN envoy and it is humiliation and disgrace of Somali sovereignty which is an independent nation in the horn of African continent. But suffering Somali people in Mogadishu and the entire nation have answered this - saying “Farmajo is our Prime Minister, not the UN Prime Minister which Mahiga can dismiss, he is our healing hero and we are with him” Various political analysts believe that Mahiga and Ethiopia are the greatest obstacle to attaining and sustaining peace in Somalia. No doubt that the man “Mahiga” who sits in the wooden office in the UN Compound at Nairobi-Kenya doesn’t want peace in Somalia, because his country of Tanzania and Somalia had no real diplomatic relations as it was deteriorated in 1972 and since that time the diplomacy between these African countries remains the same. By Warfa Garad Jama Political Analyst Mogadishu-Somalia. Email: garaad1996@hotmail.com

Great speech awoowe.

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Jacpher;727862 wrote: ^maxaa ku jaban? Magacayga oo sedexan.

Viva Faanoole iyo Nasiib Buundo!

Sabti, June 11, 2011 (HOL) – Shir ay yeesheen golaha wasiirada oo uu shir guddoominayey Ra’iisul Wasaaraha Somalia Mudane Maxamed Cabdullahi Maxamed (Farmaajo) ayaa looga hadlay arrimo ay ka mid yihiin geeridii shalay ku timid Wasiirkii Arrimaha Gudaha iyo Amniga Qaranka, muddaaharaadyadii labadan cisho kadhacayey waddanka gudihiisa iyo waddamada dibedda iyo heshiiskii Kampala. Golaha Wasiirada waxey ka tiiraanyeysan yihiin geeridii naxdinta laheyd ee ku timid Marxuum Cabdishakuur Sheekh Xasan Farax, Wasiirkii Arrimaha Gudaha iyo AmnigaQaranka oo ku geeryooday qarax argagaxiso oo ay soo qorsheysay Al-shabaab. Golahu waxa ay tacsi u direendhammaan shacabka Soomaaliyeed, qoyskii iyo eheladii uu ka geeriyooday marxuumku. Golaha Wasiirada waxay soo dhoweeyeen, rabitaankii shacabka Soomaaliyeed eedalka gudihiisa iyo dibadiisa oo ay ku muujiyeen dareenkooda iyo taageeradooda Ra’iisul Wasaare Maxamed Cabdullahi Maxamed iyo xukuumaddiisa. Taasoo ah markiiugu horreysey ee taariikhda Soomaaliya oo ay shacabka si hagar la’aan ah u muujiyeen dareenkooda iyo taageeradooda. Ugu danbeyntii, Ra’iisul Wasaaraha Soomaaliya Mudane Maxamed Cabdullaahi Maxamed (Farmajo) wuxuu golaha siiyey warbixin ku saabsan kulamadii iyo heshiiskii Kampala. Kadibna Golahu waxay ka doodeen qoddobada heshiiskii Kampala waxayna go’aamiyeen arrimahan: 1. In heshiiska Kampala u baahan yahay in la horgeeyo Baarlamaanka, lana waafajiyo Axdiga KMG ah iyo shuruucda dalka u degsan. 2. Is-casilaadda Ra’iisul Wasaaraha iyo Xukuumaddiisu iyo hirgelinta qoddobadakale ee heshiika Kampala waxay ku dhaqan-geli karaan oggolaanshahaBaarlamaanka Soomaaliya. Golaha Wasiiraduna waxay diyaar u yihiin inayaqbalaan go’aanka Baarlamaanka. 3. Golaha Wasiirada waxay weli u arkaan in danta dalka iyo dadka ay ku jirto inmuddo hal sano ah dib loo dhigo doorashada madaxda Qaranka, siXukuumaddu u dhameystirto howlaha qabyada u ah; waxayna diyaar u yihiin inay u adeegaan shacabka Soomaaliyeed, wadashaqayn buuxdana la yeeshaanHay’adaha Dastuuriga ah ee dalka Afhayeenka Xukuumadda KMG ah Inj. C/ramxaan Cumar Yariisow Muqdisho, Soomaaliya

Wasiirkii Arrimaha Gudaha iyo Ammaanka Qaranka Soomaaliya AUN oo lagu aasay Qubuuraha Sheekh Suufi ee Muqdisho abti, June 11, 2011 (HOL) – Wasiirkii arrimaha gudaha iyo ammaankii Qaranka ee Soomaaliya C/shakuur Sheekh Xasan Faarax ayaa maanta lagu aasay qurbuuraha Sheekh Suufi oo ku yaalla dhabarka dambe ee madaxtooyada Soomaaliya, waxaana aaskiisa ka qaybgalay xildhibaanno, wasiirro iyo xubno ka tiran maamulka gobolka Banaadir. Inkastoo madaxweynaha Soomaaliya Shariif Sheekh Axmed iyo ra'iisul wasaare Maxamed C/llaahi Farmaajo aysan ka qaybgelin aaska, ayaa haddana waxaa ka dhexmuuqday dadka ka qaybgalay ra'iisul wasaare ku xigeenka ahna wasiirka arrimaha dibadda Maxmed C/llaahi Oomaar. Maydka wasiirkii hore ee arrimaha gudaha iyo ammaanka Qaranka ayaa salaaddii duhur kaddib lagula tukaday salaadda janaasadaha ah masjid madaxtooyada ku dhexyaalla, iyadoo janaasada uu tujiyay madaxweyne Shariif Sheekh Axmed ayaa waxaa ka qaybgalay ra'iisul wasaare Farmaajo. Intaas kaddib ayaa waxaa loo qaaday maydka dhinaca qubuuraha Sheekh Suufi oo lagu aasay, waxaana dadkii ka qaybgalay aaska ku jiray walaalkiis Macallin Max'ud Sheekh Xasan Faarax iyo wiil uu dhalay wasiirka geeriyooday. "C/shakuur waxaa dishay gacan ka xaq daran," ayuu goobta aaska ka sheegay Macallin Maxamuud oo ay walaalo ahaayeen, wuxuuna si kulul u cambaareeyay dilka wasiirka. Xubnaha hadlay markii aasku dhammaaday ayaa waxaa ka mid ah Jen. Cabdi Xasan Cawaale (Qaybdiid), iyadoo xubnihii hadlay oo dhan ay cambaareeyeen qaabkii loo dilay wasiirka iyadoo ku tilmaamay fal fool xun. Ugu dambeyn, waxaana goobta ka hadlay guddoomiyaha gobolka Banaadir ahna duqa Muqisho Maxamuud Axmed Nuur (Tarsan) isagoo sheegay in C/shakuur ay isku meel kusoo koreen ayna isbarteen sannadkii 1962-kii, isagoo sheegay inuu ahaa nin aad u wanaagsan. Wasiirkii arrimaha gudaha oo maanta la aasay ayaa ifka uga tagay afar caruur ah iyo hal xaas, waxaana uu xalay fiidkii u dhintay qarax ka dhacay gudaha gurigiisa marqribnimadii shalay, waxaana mas'uuliyadda dilkiisa sheegatay Xarrakad Al-shabaab.