SOMALI HISTROY Early history traces the development of the Somali state to an Arab sultanate, which was founded in the seventh century A.D. by Koreishite immigrants from Yemen. During the 15th and 16th centuries, Portuguese traders landed in present Somali territory and ruled several coastal towns. The sultan of Oman and Zanzibar subsequently took control of these towns and their surrounding territory. Somalia's modern history began in the late 19th century , when various European powers began to trade and establish themselves in the area. The British East India Company's desire for unrestricted harbor facilities led to the conclusion of treaties with the sultan of Tajura as early as 1840. It was not until 1886 , however, that the British gained control over northern Somalia through treaties with various Somali chiefs who were guaranteed British protection . British objectives centered on safeguarding trade links to the east and securing local sources of food and provisions for its coaling station in Aden. The boundary between Ethiopia and British Somaliland was established in 1897 through treaty negotiations between British negotiators and King Menelik. During the first two decades of this century, British rule was challenged through persistent attacks by a dervish rebellion led by Mohamed Abdullah Hassan, known as the "Mad Mullah" by the British. A long series of intermittent engagements and truces ended in 1920 when British warplanes bombed Abdullah's stronghold at Taleex.. Although Mohamed Abdullah Hassan was defeated as much by rival Somali factions as by British forces, he was lauded as a popular hero and stands as a major figure of national identity to many Somalis. In 1885, Italy obtained commercial advantages in the area from the sultan of Zanzibar and in 1889 concluded agreements with the sultans of Obbia and Aluula, who placed their territories under Italy's protection. Between 1897 and 1908 , Italy made agreements with the Ethiopians and the British that marked out the boundaries of Italian Somaliland. The Italian Government assumed direct administration, giving the territory colonial status. Italian occupation gradually extended inland. In 1924, the Jubaland Province of Kenya, including the town and port of Kismayo, was ceded to Italy by the United Kingdom. The subjugation and occupation of the independent sultanates of Obbia and Mijertein, begun in 1925, were completed in 1927 . In the late 1920s , Italian and Somali influence expanded into the ****** region of eastern Ethiopia. Continuing incursions climaxed in 1935 when Italian forces launched an offensive that led to the capture of Addis Ababa and the Italian annexation of Ethiopia in 1936. Following Italy's declaration of war on the United Kingdom in June 1940, Italian troops overran British Somaliland and drove out the British garrison. In 1941, British forces began operations against the Italian East African Empire and quickly brought the greater part of Italian Somaliland under British control. From 1941 to 1950 , while Somalia was under British military administration , transition toward self-government was begun through the establishment of local courts, planning committees, and the Protectorate Advisory Council. In 1948 Britain turned the ****** and neighboring Somali territories over to Ethiopia. In Article 23 of the 1947 peace treaty, Italy renounced all rights and titles to Italian Somaliland. In accordance with treaty stipulations, on September 15, 1948, the Four Powers referred the question of disposal of former Italian colonies to the UN General Assembly . On November 21, 1949 , the General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending that Italian Somaliland be placed under an international trusteeship system for 10 years, with Italy as the administering authority, followed by independence for Italian Somaliland. In 1959 , at the request of the Somali Government, the UN General Assembly advanced the date of independence from December 2 to July 1, 1960. Meanwhile, rapid progress toward self-government was being made in British Somaliland . Elections for the Legislative Assembly were held in February 1960 , and one of the first acts of the new legislature was to request that the United Kingdom grant the area independence so that it could be united with Italian Somaliland when the latter became independent. The protectorate became independent on June 26, 1960 ; five days later, on July 1 , it joined Italian Somaliland to form the Somali Republic. In June 1961 , Somalia adopted its first national constitution in a countrywide referendum , which provided for ademocratic state with a parliamentary form of government based on European models. During the early post-independence period, political parties were a fluid concept, with one-person political parties forming before an election, only to defect to the winning party following the election. A constitutional conference in Mogadishu in April 1960, which made the system of government in the southern Somali trust territory the basis for the future government structure of the Somali Republic, resulted in the concentration of political power in the former Italian Somalia capital of Mogadishu and a southern-dominated central government, with most key government positions occupied by southern Somalis, producing increased disenchantment with the union in the former British-controlled north. Pan-Somali nationalism , with the goal of uniting the Somali-populated regions of French Somaliland(Djibouti), Kenya and Ethiopia into a Greater Somalia, remained the driving political ideology in the initial post-independence period. Under the leadership of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal(prime minister from 1967 to 1969), however, Somalia renounced its claims to the Somali-populated regions of Ethiopia and Kenya, greatly improving its relations with both countries. Egal attempted a similar approach with Ethiopia, but the move towards reconciliation with Ethiopia, which had been a traditional enemy of Somalia since the 16th century, made many Somalis furious, including the army. Egal's reconciliation effort toward Ethiopia is argued to be one of the principal factors that provoked a bloodless coup coup on October 21, 1969 and subsequent installation of Maj.Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre as president, bringing an abrupt end to the process of party-based constitutional democracy in Somalia. Following the coup, executive and legislative power was vested in the 20-member Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC), headed by Barre. The SRC pursued a course of "scientific socialism" that reflected both ideological and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The government instituted a national security service, centralized control over information, and initiated a number of grassroots development projects. Barre reduced political freedoms and used military force to seize and redistribute rich farmlands in the interriverine areas of southern Somalia, relying on the use of force and terror against the Somali population to consolidate his political power base. The SRC became increasingly radical in foreign affairs, and in 1974, Somalia and the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation. As early as 1972, tensions began increasing along the Somali-Ethiopian border; these tensions heightened after the accession to power in Ethiopia in 1973 of the Mengistu Haile Mariam regime, which turned increasingly toward the Soviet Union. In the mid-1970s, the Western Somali Liberation Front(WSLF) began guerrilla operations in the ****** region of Ethiopia. Following the overthrow of the Ethiopian Emperor in 1975, Somalia invaded Ethiopia in 1977 in a second attempt to regain the ******, and the second attempt initially appeared to be in Somalia's favor. The SNA moved quickly toward Harer, Jijiga, and Dire Dawa, the principal cities of the region. However, following the Ethiopian revolution, the new Ethiopian government shifted its alliance from the West to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union supplied Ethiopia with 10,000-15,000 Cuban troops and Soviet military advisors during the 1977-78 ****** war, shifting the advantage to Ethiopia and resulting in Somalia's defeat. In November 1977, Barre expelled all Soviet advisers and abrogated the friendship agreement with the U.S.S.R. In March 1978, Somali forces retreated into Somalia; however, the WSLF continued to carry out sporadic but greatly reduced guerrilla activity in the ******. Such activities also were subsequently undertaken by another dissident group, the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF). Following the 1977-1978 ****** war , desperate to find a strong external alliance to replace the Soviet Union, Somalia abandoned its Socialist ideology and turned to the West for international support, military equipment, and economic aid. In 1978 , the United States reopened the U.S. Agency for International Development. Two years later, an agreement was concluded that gave U.S. forces access to military facilities at the port of Berbera in northwestern Somalia.In the summer of 1982, Ethiopian forces invaded Somalia along the central border, and the United States provided two emergency airlifts to help Somalia defend its territorial integrity. From 1982 to 1988, the United States viewed Somalia as a partner in defense in the context of the Cold War. Somali officers of the National Armed Forces were trained in U.S. military schools in civilian as well as military subjects. Following the ****** war, the Barre regime violently suppressed opposition movements and ethnic groups, particularly the ***** clan in the northern region, using the military and elite security forces to quash any hint of rebellion. By the 1980s , an all-out civil war developed in Somalia. Opposition groups began to form following the end of the ****** war, beginning in 1979 with a group of dissatisfied army officers known as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front(SSDF). In 1981, as a result of increased northern discontent with the Barre regime, the Somali National Movement(SNM), composed mainly of the ***** clan, , was formed in Hargeisa with the stated goal of overthrowing of the Barre regime. In January 1989, the United Somali Congress , an opposition group of Somalis from the ****** clan, , was formed as a political movement in Rome. A military wing of the USC was formed in Ethiopia in late 1989 under the leadership of Mohamed Farah "Aideed," a former political prisoner imprisoned by Barre from 1969-75. Aideed also formed alliances alliances with other opposition groups, including the SNM and the Somali Patriotic Movement(SPM), an ******* sub-clan force under Colonel Ahmed Omar Jess in the Bakool and Bay regions of Southern Somalia. In 1988, at the President's order, aircraft from the Somali National Air Force bombed the city of Hargeisa in northwestern Somalia, the former capital of British Somaliland, killing nearly 10,000 civilians and insurgents. The warfare in the northwest sped up the decay already evident elsewhere in the republic. Economic crisis, brought on by the cost of anti-insurgency activities, caused further hardship as Siad Barre and his cronies looted the national treasury. By the end of the 1980s, armed opposition to Barre's government,fully operational in the northern regions, had spread to the central and southern regions. Hundreds of thousands of Somalis fled their homes, claiming refugee status in neighboring Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya. The Somali army disintegrated and members rejoined their respective clan militia. Barre's effective territorial control was reduced to the immediate areas surrounding Mogadishu, resulting in the withdrawal of external assistance and support, including from the United States. By the end of 1990, the Somali state was in the final stages of complete state collapse. In the first week of December 1990, Barre declared a state of emergency as USC and SNM forces advanced toward Mogadishu. In January 1991, armed opposition factions drove Barre out of power, resulting in the complete collapse of the central government. Barre later died in exile in Nigeria. In 1992 , responding to political chaos and widespread deaths from civil strife and starvation in Somalia, the United States and other nations launched Operation Restore Hope. Led by the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the operation was designed to create an environment in which assistance could be delivered to Somalis suffering from the effects of dual catastrophes--one manmade and one natural. UNITAF was followed by the United Nations Operation in Somalia(UNOSOM). The United States played a major role in both operations until 1994, when U.S. forces withdrew. Following the collapse of the Barre regime in 1991, various groupings of Somali factions sought to control the national territory (or portions thereof) and fought small wars with one another. Approximately 14 national reconciliation conferences were convened over the succeeding decade. Efforts at mediation of the Somali internal dispute were also undertaken by many regional states. In the mid-1990s, Ethiopia played host to several Somali peace conferences and initiated talks at the Ethiopian city of Sodere, which led to some degree of agreement between competing factions. The Governments of Egypt, Yemen, Kenya, and Italy also have attempted to bring the Somali factions together. In1997, the Organization of African Unity and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) gave Ethiopia the mandate to pursue Somali reconciliation. In 2000, Djibouti hosted a major reconciliation conference (the 13th such effort), which in August resulted in creation of the Transitional National Government(TNG), whose 3-year mandate expired in August 2003. The absence of a central government in Somalia also allowed outside forces to become more influential by supporting various groups and persons in Somalia, particularly Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, all of which have supported various Somali factions and transitional governments. A transitional government, the components of which are known as the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) was formed in 2004 following the conclusion of a 2-year reconciliation conference. The TFIs include a transitional parliament , known as the Transitional Federal Assembly (formed in August 2004), as well as Transitional Federal Government (TFG) that includes a transitional President , Prime Minister and a cabinet known as the "Council of Ministers." For administrative purposes, Somalia is divided into 18 regions; the nature, authority, and structure of regional governments vary, where they exist. Principal Government Officials Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed was elected as Transitional Federal President of Somalia in October 2004. On October 29, 2007, Ali Mohamed Gedi resigned as Prime Minister of the TFG; Nur "Adde" Hassan Hussein was appointed Prime Minister on November 22 and confirmed by the Parliament on November 24, 2007. Following a no-confidence motion against former Speaker of Parliament Shariff Hassan Sheikh Adan on January 17 , Sheikh Adan Mohamed Nur was elected the new Speaker on January 31, 2007. A cabinet known as the Council of Ministers also exists; Prime Minister Hussein is in the process of forming a new cabinet. Two regional administrations exist in northern Somalia--the self-declared "Republic of Somaliland" in the northwest and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the northeast. In Somaliland, which is made up of the former British protectorate, Dahir Riyale Kahin was elected President in presidential elections in May 2003. The area of Puntland declared itself autonomous(although not independent) in 1998 with its capital at Garowe. General Mohamed Adde Muse was elected President by the Puntland parliament in January 2005. Puntland declared it would remain autonomous until a federated Somalia state was established.

The definition of misery October the 15th: Rebuttal of Mahmoud Tani’s wishful dream A Norse Pagan myth has it that once upon a time 12 gods were having an evening party; an un-invited god crashed on the party. His name was Loki, he was wicked and immediately got the gods into trouble. He set the blind god of darkness against the beautiful god of joy. god of joy was killed and the world was engulfed in darkness. According to the legend, that fateful day was a Friday and the uninvited guest, god No. 13. Believe it or not, in this day and age there are countless people in North America and Europe for whom the combination of Friday and the No. 13 is a bad omen. This is an unlucky day that freaks out young and old alike. Businesses stop working on that day. People put their important plans on hold, they don’t travel or get into meaningful relationships; others nervously laugh it off, though deep down they may be just as frightened of what this day may bring. So entrenched is this phobia in people’s psyche that telling the afflicted to walk down the aisle on Friday the 13th is as good as pushing them across a hurtling train. Now what do these two totally different issues (Friday the 13th and October the 15th) have in common? For starters, both scenarios are about as clever as shooting yourself in the foot. They’re built on false premises. On the one hand, they’re figments of simple minds, and are what doctors would call, Madman’s hallucinations. And on the other, they are as flimsy as a candle burning itself out at the approach of dawn. Contrary to popular desires, Dahir Rayaale’s flirtations with Sool is neither romantic nor welcome. The much taunted Hargeisa-SSCayn love-affair is anything but real. Suffice it to say, Mohamoud Tani’s much hyped love-affair exists only in the minds of dreamers and errant soulless souls. Let the fans of oppression lie as they will, their days are numbered and once the doctors come calling, lucky shall be the mouse that makes his escape while the cat is away. Until then,Bashir Goth’s latest psychotherapy Awdalnews Somaliland’s kowtowing to Ethiopia is a good read for any patient who desires proper care and wholesome advice. To conclude, Dahir Rayaale’s un-holy adventures into Sool is a dark cloud that haunts the mind of every Somali citizen who loves for others what he loves for himself and loves for other people’s children, mothers, sisters and wives what he loves for his own. When the scribe of this write last checked Buuhoodlemedia This is what she read:Jabhada SNM Waxay Lasscaanood Haysataa: 71 days 10 hours 33 minutes 18 seconds. Safi Abdi Source: Wardheer

Nope. Never been in Pakistan.

The definition of misery October the 15th: Rebuttal of Mahmoud Tani’s wishful dream A Norse Pagan myth has it that once upon a time 12 gods were having an evening party; an un-invited god crashed on the party. His name was Loki, he was wicked and immediately got the gods into trouble. He set the blind god of darkness against the beautiful god of joy. god of joy was killed and the world was engulfed in darkness. According to the legend, that fateful day was a Friday and the uninvited guest, god No. 13. Believe it or not, in this day and age there are countless people in North America and Europe for whom the combination of Friday and the No. 13 is a bad omen. This is an unlucky day that freaks out young and old alike. Businesses stop working on that day. People put their important plans on hold, they don’t travel or get into meaningful relationships; others nervously laugh it off, though deep down they may be just as frightened of what this day may bring. So entrenched is this phobia in people’s psyche that telling the afflicted to walk down the aisle on Friday the 13th is as good as pushing them across a hurtling train. Now what do these two totally different issues (Friday the 13th and October the 15th) have in common? For starters, both scenarios are about as clever as shooting yourself in the foot. They’re built on false premises. On the one hand, they’re figments of simple minds, and are what doctors would call, Madman’s hallucinations. And on the other, they are as flimsy as a candle burning itself out at the approach of dawn. Contrary to popular desires, Dahir Rayaale’s flirtations with Sool is neither romantic nor welcome. The much taunted Hargeisa-SSCayn love-affair is anything but real. Suffice it to say, Mohamoud Tani’s much hyped love-affair exists only in the minds of dreamers and errant soulless souls. Let the fans of oppression lie as they will, their days are numbered and once the doctors come calling, lucky shall be the mouse that makes his escape while the cat is away. Until then, Bashir Goth’s latest psychotherapy Awadalnews Somaliland’s kowtowing to Ethiopia is a good read for any patient who desires proper care and wholesome advice. To conclude, Dahir Rayaale’s un-holy adventures into Sool is a dark cloud that haunts the mind of every Somali citizen who loves for others what he loves for himself and loves for other people’s children, mothers, sisters and wives what he loves for his own. When the scribe of this write last checked Buuhoodlemedia This is what she read:Jabhada SNM Waxay Lasscaanood Haysataa: 71 days 10 hours 33 minutes 18 seconds Safi Abdi Source: Wardheer

Rebuttal of Clanish Wailers Africa, Unite 'Cause we're moving right out of Babylon and we're going to our father's land How good and how pleasant it would be Before God and man, yeah to see the unification of all Africans, yeah Bob-Marley and the Wailers The word Wailer means "a mourner who utters long loud high-pitched cries". Today, in Somalia, we should all be wailers; not only the few individuals listed in the article that carries the misleading title " Clannish Wailers ". We should all be Wailers, not the Wailers of Bob-Marley, because: 1. Those of us who write in these forums and talk about the issues of Somalia are refugees in foreign lands. Most of us have not visited our country for the last 17 years. Most of us have no intention of ever going back there. Most of us are on welfare while many of us work in jobs that pay the minimum wage. A large number of our PhD holders drive taxis in dangerous neighborhoods in the West. 2. Our kids speak all the languages of the world but are unable to speak their mother tongue. Many of them languish in jails as a result of broken families supported mostly by single mothers. 3. Most of our folks back home live on meager remittances they receive from overseas supplemented by meager incomes earned by women who toil all day under the burning sun unable to drink water to avoid the call of nature and as a result suffer from all kinds of urinary tract infections. 4. Most of our people are addicts of a drug called Qat that drains our country of millions of dollars needed to rebuild and rehabilitate. These millions pour into the coffers of our enemy, 5. Our passport is a worthless piece of paper that prompts most of us to travel with foreign passports that are met with raised eyebrows at every airport we use. 6. We have become the laughing-stock of the whole world, and those who do not despise us pity us. 7. We watch the news indifferently when it carries the now too-familiar pictures of women and children who drown daily in the high seas fleeing from all parts of Somalia including Somaliland that is painted by some of us as a paradise on earth. 8. We are ruled by an enemy who wants to divide our country into pieces. Some of us welcome him with open arms, open trade offices for him and offer him our ports to import his goods. Some of us die with him in the same trenches killing our own people. Some of us exploit the refugees the enemy displaces and make them pay for the trees under which they seek shelter. 9. We chase away Somali born journalists from our cities, jail freedom fighters from the ****** and hand them over to our ruthless enemy. 10. We use colonial tactics to divide and rule each other. We turn brother against brother, father against son and fight each other to reach fictitious borders erected by a departed imperialist with the help of money supplied by oil companies and foreign spy agencies 11. We hate each other, despise each other, wish ill for each other ignoring all the instructions of our Quran and Suna. The reasons for becoming wailers are endless and cannot be covered in a short article like this one. Unfortunately, nowadays, unionists who try to defend and lobby for the unity of their people are Wailers while secessionists who are bent on dividing them and erecting barriers among them, with the help of our enemies, are heroes. The Wailer article fails to appreciate the gravity of the situation in Northern Somalia by downplaying the resolutions of the traditional leaders of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn to go to war, if necessary, to evict the Somaliland forces from their city. As we speak, they are mobilizing thousands of their young boys to prepare for a prolonged war that may eventually transform into a clan war. The writer of Wailers has been misled into believing that all Soolis support the occupation of Las Anod. He tries to promulgate that myth. The fact is that most Soolis are opposed to the Somaliland aggression. The mostly fiercely independent nomadic herdsmen have no loyalty to Administrations and their local collaborators. Their loyalty is to their traditional leaders and those leaders have spoken clearly. To express our concern and expect a devastating civil-war in the North is not clan motivated as the writer would lead us to believe. Such concern is based on close knowledge of the area and its people. It is based on concern for the fathers and mothers who stand to lose their loved ones. It stems from our concern for the Nomads who stand to lose his herds and/or the right to graze and water them without let or hindrance. It stems from the potential reaction of the thousands of refugees who fled their city and are lurking around its outskirts bent on seeking revenge against those they hold responsible for their plight. In this day and age, people cannot be forced to join a cause they do not believe in. That era is gone forever. Even if 50% of Sool, Sanaag and Cayn residents voluntarily elect to join Somaliland, who can force the other 50% to follow suit? This reminds me of the Quebecois who were split in the referendum to separate from Canada. The secessionists failed to attain the 51% required for the split just as Somaliland would most probably fail to obtain such a percentage in an internationally supervised referendum. The arguments used in the Wailer article for dividing Somalia into cantons are not practical to say the least. Where do we stop and draw the line? The creation of cantons like Somaliland, Darwishland, Makhir Coast Land, Puntland, Hiiranland, BanaadirLand, JubaLand is not the answer. Even demarcating such borders would be a night mare. At the same time, old colonial borders will not solve the problem. They are history and fell with the departure of those who used them to divide Somalia and they can never come back. Finally, Secessionists normally delegate mercenaries to lobby on their behalf to convince foreign countries to recognize and acknowledge their cause. The Wailer article is a welcome break from that trend. Unionists, unlike Secessionists, welcome healthy debate that is based on facts and common sense. Secessionists usually resort to nasty emails, name-calling and character assassination . Let us hope that this wailer article heralds a serious Somali debate between the proponents and opponents of breaking up the Somali Republic and desecrating the Blue Flag. Statements like "Somaliland is forever" will not get us anywhere. We need to work towards win-win situations that guarantee all Somalis a stable future that helps them come back from the Cold and raise their children to speak their native tongue. Ali H. Abdulla Source: http://www.awdalnews.com/wmview.php?ArtID=9723

The Search for Recognition for “Somaliland” By Faisal Roble Introduction For some time now, Hargeisa has been systemically putting in place the infrastructure for a successful secession. Chief among them is an army that proved superior to that of Puntland. It has also successfully recruited a number of Western scholars to champion the cause(2). Unusual silence blanketing the other side, Prognosis including the TFG and the elite of the *****(3)clan, with the exception of the nascent Northern Somalis for Peace and Unity (NSPU),(4) did not hurt either. Since the fall of Las Anod (October, 2007) into the hands of “Somaliland,” and the blurb of a Pentagon employee of the Djibouti-based AFRICOM, suggesting the “eagerness of his Department to recognize “Somaliland”, the Hargeisa administration has been moon struck by a robust [glimmer] of hope for recognition. There are three more immediate [local and global] developments that may change the equation of secession and the search for recognition. First is the continued fiasco and the never-ending conflict in the southern part of the country, which Dr. Abdiweli Ali calls a manufactured conflict in that secessionists “perpetuate the war, they perpetuate the fighting in the south by helping (al Qaeda-connected) Shabaab and I think they are now in cahoots with the Eritrean groups... There is an argument that some of the Shabaab who left Mogadishu are now in Hargeisa, Somaliland."(5) A second factor is Hargeisa’s resolve to create a “new reality on the ground,” and show to the worldthat it, as a state, fully controls its borders.(6) A not-so-important third factor is the recent defection of Ahmed Xabsade to Hargeisa, whose attributes include former speaker of “Somaliland’s” parliament under the late Egal, a co-founder of the ailing regional government of Puntland, and now back to Hargeisa’s fold. Mr. Xabsade joins a host of *********** notables (Qaybe, Fagadhe, Fuad Adan Cade, et al). Although initially Xabsade’s defection was thought to tip the balance in Hargeisa’s favor, it seems to have now energized the unionists and could generate a backlash that neither Hargeisa nor Xabsade expected. A fourth yet critical factor in deciding the fate of “Somaliland” is largely dependent on a possible policy shift by the only supper-power, i.e., the United States of America.(7) The two Resolutions (1541) (XV) and (2649) (XXV) of the General Assembly,(8) which govern and arbiter issues of secession that so far protected the territorial integrity of Somalia notwithstanding, it is not unthinkable that the US could “partition Somalia” if its interest is being served this way.(9) New Diplomatic Developments The first week of December, 2007, almost one year since Ethiopia invaded Somalia with the tacit approval of the Bush administration, witnessed well-healed US leaders including Gondaleezza Rice and Robert Gates, Secretaries for State and Defense, respectively descending down on the region; their visit was highlighted by a foreign policy blurb given by one Captain Wright, a member of the US Defense Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa, AFRICOM, stationed in Djibouti, to the Washington Post, indicating his department’s “eagerness” to recognize “Somaliland”(10) and how “the State Department is in the way.” To which Mrs. Frazer, undersecretary for African affairs, who at the time was in Addis Ababa travelling with the Secretary of State, responded: “We do not want to get ahead of the continental organization on an issue of such importance.” Following the Post’s article, a simultaneous fact sheet released by the State Department on December 5, 2007, noted one of the most direct diplomatic languages that inch us towards a potential but real “partition of Somalia”: We understand that Somaliland is pursuing bilateral dialogue with the African Union and its member-states in this regard. However, as the African Union continues to deliberate on this issue, the United States will continue to engage with all actors throughout Somalia, including Somaliland, to support the return of lasting peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.(11) Mrs. Frazer says this with the full knowledge that the AU fact finding mission, a one sided mission, had diplomatically indicated to endorse the claim of “Somaliland” by saying that “Somaliland’s status was unique and self-justified and that the cause should not be linked to the notion of “opening a Pandora box.” (Alison Egger, 2007). For an American marine captain to suggest to “partition Somalia”, most of which is already under the occupation of Ethiopian soldiers encouraged by the US, is rather incongruent to international law and mutual respect of UN charter.(12) Yet both America’s flirtation with “partitioning” Somalia and the AU’s findings to potentially sanction the secession of “Somaliland” are in total contravention to international relations laws. Both the General assembly Resolutions and the Montevideo Convention, which set the framework for the regulatory authorities for secession versus territorial integrity and provide for the framework concept of a nation, respectively, provide for the protection and maintenance of the territorial integrity of states, in this case Somalia. For example, the Montevideo Convention explicitly conditions that any nation must satisfy the following four factors before recognition is warranted: it must (1) establish a permanent government; (2) a defined territory; (3) a permanent population; and (4) a capacity to enter into relationship with other states are prerequisite for statehood. These instruments stipulate that a secessionist part must seek its objectives within the framework of the “parent” state. Mogadishu’s say so in this case is a key to any future change in the status quo.(13) While it appears plausible to argue that “Somaliland” has established a modicum of permanent but fragile government, it is nonetheless a government within a government and may not be able to enter meaningful relationships with neither bilateral governments, excepting Ethiopia, nor with international bodies. Moreover, unlike Alison’s argument, neither the population nor the territory claimed by “Somaliland” is defined. If “Somaliland’s” territory is to be defined as those regions inhabited by clans who had signed treaties with the former colonial government of Britain in the late 1800s, to distinguish them from that of the Italian protectorate, the *********** clan did not do so.(14) There has never been an Anglo-Dhulbahae treaty at any time. Both the territories and the clans who inhabit “Somaliland” are porous and shifting constantly. A case in point is the multiple allegiances that Mr. Ahmed Xabsade, among many others, exhibited in the last 15 years. Besides, if the former British Somaliland opted out for not uniting with the former Italian protectorate in that fate night of July 1, 1960, the *********** and the ***** tribes may have charted their own political course. With significant human cost, the same could take place now in the event that the status quo is changed. As to a US marine indicating a policy shift to “partition Somalia,” it is an egregiously imprudent diplomacy to dismantle a nation state in order to satisfy the short-term needs of AFRICOM in Djibouti. International law clearly limits an overtly hostile diplomacy, such as the one the Djibouti-based US marine suggested in that (1) “states shall not dismember other states (i.e. use of force unlawfully) under the pretense of aiding self-determination; and (2) international law does not encourage secession, either.”(15) Remaining oblivious to this law and flirting with the idea of “partitioning Somalia” at any time is tantamount to a deliberate destabilization of an already volatile region.(16) Prognosis If it chooses, the US government has its own way to circumvent international law by invoking Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Sec. 201, enacted in 1987. This law enables US government to define and engage whomever entity it considers a nation, regardless of local, regional or international laws. In other words, the US foreign interest and what it terms “national security” take precedence over any other interest including democracy, human rights, or least in this case, the Somali public opinion. Ted Dagne, an expert on the Horn who works at the Congressional Research Service in Washington says “recognition by the United States and, perhaps, the European Union would not give Somaliland legitimacy in the eyes of other Somalis,”(17) Mr. Dagne’s caution warrants serious attention lest the situation in the region is so fluid. It is too soon to make any serious conclusion based on one Captain’s blurb on whether the US policy is shifting towards a “partition” of Somalia.” However, the diplomatic significance of the “Somaliland” issue surfacing at a time when power-studded leaders visiting the region is not an accidental phenomenon, and, at minimum, underscores what one analyst called a “ragging debate” in Washington in search for a new direction to the Somalia crisis. Many analysts believe that “Somaliland” has entered a new phase of crisis and active conflict. If the new threat issued in Booame, Sool region, by the council of Garadas and sultans and chiefs of the *********** tribe comes to fruition, any shift in US policy towards the troubled waters of Somalia “may as well set ablaze”, writes Abukar Arman, “the volatile inter-tribal tension looming in northern Somalia,”(18) This in turn may divert the scope of the AFRICOM from concentrating on the “war on terror,” to mediating inter-tribal conflict. How the clouds of war unfold in the coming months and propel “Somaliland” into a new conflict rather than into a state of recognition remains to be seen.

UNITED NATIONS, Dec 20-- The Security Council late Wednesday requested Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to report by February 8 on progress made regarding contingency plans for a possible UN peacekeeping operation to succeed the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Italy's Foreign Minister Massimo d'Alema, whose country presides over the council this month, read out a statement in a council meeting saying the members reaffirmed their respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia UN reaffirmed Territorial Integerity & Unity of Somalia . The council reiterated its strong support for AMISOM and urged the international community once again to provide financial resources, personnel, equipment and services for the full deployment of AMISOM. It urged all Somali parties to reject violence and, with the support of the Secretary-General's Special Representative, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, to enter into a substantial dialogue aimed at achieving a full and all-inclusive national reconciliation. Expressing its deep concern at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Somalia, the council emphasized the need for strengthened efforts to provide humanitarian relief assistance to Somalia and demanded that all parties in Somalia ensure unfettered access for all humanitarian assistance to vulnerable populations, fulfill their responsibilities and obligations under international humanitarian law and take measures to protect civilians. Ould-Abdallah briefed the council earlier this week on the situation in Somalia, calling on the international community to commit itself to a "clear course of action" there and inviting Saudi Arabia to play a "leading role", because of its "successful" contribution to peace in other conflicts. "The situation in Somalia is deteriorating daily and it is time for the international community to commit itself to a clear course of action. If the current trends of internal violence and external neglect continue, the consequence would be catastrophic for peace in the region, for the UN's reputation" and for Somali civilians themselves, OUld-Abdallah warned. Source: Kuwait News Agency (KUNA)

BUSINESS AS USUAL’ APPROACH TO SOMALIA WILL NO LONGER WORK WARNED IN BRIEFING BY SECRETARY-GENERAL’S SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE He Calls for Immediate, Effective United Nations Initiatives, All-inclusive Measures by Transitional Federal Government While new immediate and effective political and security initiatives of the United Nations would not be “a magic recipe for peace”, they could help Somalia end its intractable 17-year-old conflict, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for that country, said during a briefing to the Security Council this morning. Warning that the Organization’s “business as usual” approach would prove ineffectual in Somalia -– where 3 million people had been forced to flee as refugees and another 1 million were alleged to have been internally displaced -- Mr. Ould-Abdallah called for a new strategy. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government must also be more active and make room for neutral personalities and competent opposition members in order to effectively and peacefully form a self-supporting and self-administering Government of national unity and as representative a Cabinet as possible. Selected members of the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition should meet often to prepare for further, higher-level meetings, but large conference or freelance mediators should not be allowed to participate, he said. Those discussions should be held near Somalia or in a location where most observers following the situation were based. Once agreement was reached, the discussions should be concluded within a fixed time frame. Political leaders, the business community and prominent members of the Somali diaspora should be invited to contribute as well. He said he was preparing the agenda and identifying a possible list of participants, as well as the timing of such a process. “I am convinced that, when left alone, Somalis are ready to join ranks and efforts to get their country back on its feet in the next few months.” At the same time, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) must remain operational and its effectiveness must be strengthened through the deployment of extra capacity to stabilize the country. That new “peace presence” was essential and neighbouring Saudi Arabia, which harboured many Somali refugees, should be invited to play a leading role. Support from one or two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member States should also be made available, if necessary. On a practical level, the United Nations and the Transitional Federal Government should come to a swift agreement in close consultation with other concerned countries. The Special Representative said that, with the Secretary-General’s support, he planned to pursue that road to peace without delay, and called for the Council’s blessing for a “group of partners” to reinforce Somalia’s security capacity and deploy its peace presence, thus bringing about national reconciliation, encouraging the international community’s return to Mogadishu and beyond, and allaying the security concerns of neighbouring States. Such an approach would limit the conflict and promote economic assistance and military cooperation. Sanctioned by a major international conference, it should mark Somalia’s complete return to the international fold. “There are serious consequences for Somalia, the region and probably the world if the conflict is not addressed and a definite, lasting solution agreed on.” Warning that a second option -– withdrawing from Somalia altogether -– would provide an easy alternative to the Organization’s costly continued engagement, considering the limited number of international staff inside Somalia, he said it would, however, risk further crippling the country and creating an even more serious power vacuum. Moreover, humanitarian aid had reduced the population’s suffering and the withdrawal of the United Nations presence would present an ethical problem. The Organization’s hesitation to intervene in some conflicts but not others of similar gravity would significantly impact public opinion. South Africa’s representative said he hoped the Council would revisit the African Union’s request for an expedited United Nations deployment in Somalia, noting, however, the unfortunate but subtle reluctance, if not resistance, to that request. The international community had a responsibility not to abandon the Somali people, and the way to stop their country from constantly threatening international peace and security was to encourage and support the political process and to deploy a peacekeeping operation. AMISOM, which was no longer sustainable or effective, had been deployed as a stop-gap until the United Nations could deploy. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should speed up the deployment of an assessment mission to facilitate further United Nations engagement in Somalia. Similarly, Somalia’s representative, speaking on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government and “all the suffering people of Somalia”, wholeheartedly endorsed Mr. Ould-Abdallah’s proposal for swift action, saying many Somalis around over the world wondered why it was so easy for the Council to move faster in other conflict locations. The first step should be to implement already decided measures, such as the deployment of African Union peacekeepers. The Council must also come up with an acceptable formula to move ahead in the political and security spheres. It would not be in the Organization’s interest to delay real action. Portugal’s representative, speaking on behalf of the European Union, encouraged the newly appointed Prime Minister of Somalia, Nur Hassan Hussein, to invite all political forces inside and outside Somalia that renounced violence and accepted the Transitional Federal Charter. The Transitional Federal Institutions were primarily responsible for implementing the outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress and creating a road map for actions, which must include preparations for a constitutional referendum and elections by 2009. The European Union called on all other actors in the country to ensure humanitarian access to those in need and on the Transitional Federal Government to investigate all human rights abuses and bring those responsible to justice. Also making statements were the representatives of China, United Kingdom, Indonesia, Slovakia, Belgium, Ghana, France, Panama, Russian Federation, Peru, United States, Qatar, Congo, Italy and Norway. The meeting began at 10:15 a.m. and adjourned at 12:10 p.m. Background Before the Security Council was the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (document S/2007/658), dated 7 November and covering developments in the country in the four months since the previous report of 25 June (document S/2007/381). It includes the progress and outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress, efforts to promote an all-inclusive political process and an update on the security and human rights situation. According to the report, the political situation during the period under review was marked by the exacerbation of divisions within the Transitional Federal Institutions, the hardening of the opposition stance and the intensification of the insurgency. The National Reconciliation Congress, held in Mogadishu from 15 July to 30 August, saw the participation of some 2,600 delegates, but some of the Haawiye subclans, as well as opposition groups based in the Eritrean capital of Asmara, refused to attend. Participants agreed on a number of outcomes, including the announcement of an end to all conflicts and feuds among Somali clans that began in 1991. Stressing that the humanitarian situation in south-central Somalia continues to deteriorate, the report says that 1.5 million people overall are in need of assistance, a 50 per cent increase since the beginning of the year. There are currently 750,000 internally displaced persons, and humanitarian access continues to be a challenge. On 17 October, Transitional Federal Government soldiers violated the United Nations premises in Mogadishu and arrested the head of the World Food Programme (WFP) Office, causing the agency temporarily to suspend food distribution. On 22 October, the staff member was released and food aid was resumed. By the end of September, the consolidated appeal for Somalia was 53.2 per cent funded, with $161 million committed out of the $304 million required. There has been no significant improvement in the security situation, the report states, noting that the situation in Mogadishu remains volatile, with the Transitional Federal Government and Ethiopian forces continuing to concentrate on securing the city and seeking to apprehend and disarm insurgent elements. Limited progress has been made to date. Elsewhere, lawlessness and inter-clan violence continues in large areas of central and southern Somalia. Piracy is on the rise again and the President of France announced his readiness to send warships to protect humanitarian supplies. On 17 September, fighting between Somaliland, a self-declared independent republic, and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland resulted in a high number of casualties. The Secretary-General believes that, under the circumstances, the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation cannot be considered a realistic and viable option. For security reasons, it has not been feasible to send a technical assessment mission. A strategic assessment of United Nations interventions has been initiated in order to provide an integrated approach and framework for United Nations engagement in Somalia. It may be advisable to look at additional security options, including the deployment of a robust multinational force or coalition of the willing. In due time, such a force could be built to a level that would enable Ethiopian forces to commence a partial, then complete withdrawal. According to the report, the United Nations is elaborating a two-track approach for Somalia, based on a political track to encourage dialogue within the Transitional Federal Government with all opposition groups within and outside the country, and a security track that would necessitate the strengthening of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to a level that would allow the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Secretary-General recommends the strengthening of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, and the United Nations has also embarked on developing a coherent peacebuilding strategy. The Secretary-General calls upon the leaders of the Transitional Federal Institutions to implement without delay the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Congress, including the development of a road map for the completion of the constitutional process, preparations for a national population census and the holding of elections scheduled for 2009. Concerned about the continuing piracy off the coast, he reiterates his call to Member States with naval and military assets in the region to take action to protect merchant shipping transporting humanitarian aid. Briefing by Secretary-General’s Special Representative AHMEDOU OULD-ABDALLAH, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, said the United Nations and other international partners were still making extraordinary efforts to assist Somalia under extremely harsh conditions. AMISOM was doing excellent work with limited resources and manpower, and it was time to draw up a road map for the future. The conflict was not an African Union, Arab League or Organization of the Islamic Conference issue. The frequently shifting allegiances between and within clans showed that factors other than ethnicity, religion or liberation were responsible for Somalia’s continuing instability. A small group drawn from various backgrounds was driven by lust for money and power. Some did not want peace at all. The conflict was becoming increasingly dangerous, he said, noting that 3 million Somalis had been forced to flee as refugees while another 1 million were allegedly internally displaced. The only work available for youth was to participate in the conflict. The situation had continued over the last 17 years despite 14 peace agreements, and there was little reason to believe there was any chance of success if the international community continued business as usual. “There are serious consequences for Somalia, the region and probably the world if the conflict is not addressed and a definite, lasting solution agreed on.” In light of the seriousness of the situation, coupled with the multiple human and security impacts of the crisis, he proposed three possible international approaches to Somalia. The first course of action would be simply to continue the current status quo; the second would be an organized withdrawal of the international community, in effect accepting its inability to protect the population or to bring about a lasting peace. The third would be immediate and effective action on the political and security fronts. That was not “a magic recipe for peace”, but it could help Somalia move in the right direction. Compared to Sierra Leone, Liberia and other African civil wars, efforts to resolve the Somali conflict had failed to bear fruit so far. The internationally recognized Transition Federal Government had not managed to take control of Mogadishu or end the violence. The continuing fighting had provided a cover for human rights abuses against civilians and journalists. The infrastructure had disintegrated, malnutrition was widespread and roadblocks and extortion hindered trade and the delivery of assistance. Aid might give the impression of addressing the root causes of the conflict but it did not, he stressed. Increased humanitarian aid and improved access for aid agencies was helpful, but it would not end the violence. National reconciliation remained elusive despite repeated efforts, leaving Somalis and their neighbours frustrated, resentful and cynical. However, the current military situation could not last forever and should not be used as an excuse to continue business as usual. As for the second option, a withdrawal would provide an alternative to the costly, continued engagement in Somalia and it may not be a difficult operation as only a limited number of international staff was in Somalia and none in Mogadishu. However, the country would be further crippled by the withdrawal, as more groups or clans would appear and the resultant fighting could create a humanitarian catastrophe. The Transitional Federal Government had difficulties in governing the country and defending itself effectively. Warning that a withdrawal could create an even more serious power vacuum, he said that instead of moving towards unity, small fiefdoms carrying out abuses and illicit activities would emerge and factions with a passion for violence and looting would rule the day. Most outsiders –- often blamed for Somalia’s problems -– had intervened because the Somalis had yet to unite and govern themselves peacefully, thereby reassuring their neighbours. Moreover, humanitarian aid had reduced the population’s suffering and the lack of a United Nations presence would present an ethical problem as the hesitation to intervene in some conflicts and not others of similar gravity would significantly impact public opinion. The third option of taking effective action would entail new political and security initiatives. The Transitional Federal Government would have to be more active and make room for neutral personalities and competent opposition members, with the objective of forming an effectively and peacefully self-supporting and self-administering Government and as representative a Cabinet as possible. Emphasizing that the United Nations must launch diplomatic action to mobilize consensus to stabilize the country, he proposed two simultaneous actions on the political and security fronts. The Transitional Federal Government should take concrete steps to unite and strengthen its own ranks, while also making approaches towards the opposition. The creation of a Government of national unity was one of the best ways to do that. There should be more meetings between selected members of the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition to prepare the ground for further and higher-level meetings. No large conference or freelance mediators would be welcomed. For such a critical path to stabilization, the opposition should be part of the political process and assume its responsibilities. Those discussions should be held near Somalia or in a location where most observers following the situation were based. Once the agreement was reached on talks, the discussions should be concluded within a fixed time frame. Political leaders, the business community and prominent members of the Somali diaspora should be invited to contribute, he said, adding that he was preparing the agenda and identifying a possible list of participants, as well as the timing of that process. “I am convinced that, when left alone, Somalis are ready to join their ranks and efforts to get their country back on its feet in the next few months.” At the same time, AMISOM must remain operational and its effectiveness must be strengthened. A new initiative should reinforce it through the deployment of extra capacity to stabilize the country. That new “peace presence” was essential, and Saudi Arabia, the custodian of the two holiest Muslim sites and a close neighbour harbouring many Somali refugees, should be invited to play a leading role. Support from one or two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member States should be made available, if necessary. On a practical level, the United Nations and the Transitional Federal Government should come to a swift agreement in close consultation with other concerned countries. Stressing that, with the Secretary-General’s support, he planned to pursue that road to peace without delay, he called on the Security Council to support those two simultaneous actions. With the Council’s blessing, a “group of partners” should reinforce Somalia’s security capacity and deploy its peace presence. That would bring forward national reconciliation, encourage the return of the international community to Mogadishu and beyond, and reassure neighbours about their security concerns. It would also help limit the conflict, both internally and externally, and promote economic assistance and military cooperation. That arrangement, sanctioned by a major international conference, should mark Somalia’s complete return to the international community. Statements AHMED DHAKKAR (Somalia), speaking on behalf of the Transitional Federal Government and “all the suffering people of Somalia”, wholeheartedly endorsed the last option mentioned by the Special Representative, namely for the Council and the United Nations system to move in the right direction with the speed necessary to regain lost time. Many Somalis all over the world wondered, after all, why it was so easy for the Council to move faster in other locations where there was conflict. Calling on the Council to move speedily, he said the first direction should be towards implementation of already decided measures, such as the deployment of African Union peacekeepers, for which Somalia thanked the African Union and the Governments of Uganda and Ethiopia for their help in the country’s hour of need. Second, it must be possible for the Council to come up with an acceptable formula to move ahead in the political and security spheres. It would not be in the interest of the United Nations system to delay real action. Since the civil war of 1991, Somali pride had been cruelly dented, but there was faith that the people would regain their strength. Somalia supported fully the position taken by the Special Representative and endorsed the need for the Council to move fast in the right direction. Somalia had faith in the Council and the United Nations system. Hopefully, five years from now, that faith would still be there. LIU ZHENMIN ( China) said the key to settlement of the situation was for the various factions to carry out national reconciliation, engage in dialogue and reach a political understanding. China appreciated the work of the Transitional Federal Government and encouraged it to continue its broad-based dialogue. However, its efforts were far from enough. The factions should take the people’s aspirations for peace seriously and not set any preconditions for dialogue. The country’s future depended on the Somali people, but the assistance of the international community was also indispensable. Expressing the hope that the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) would be further strengthened, he said his country was concerned about the security situation in Somalia and appreciated the role played by AMISOM. There was an urgent need to improve the Mission’s situation by providing assistance. China supported a United Nations takeover of AMISOM, but understood the difficulties that the Organization faced in deploying peacekeepers and looked forward to a contingency plan developed by the Secretariat. The humanitarian crisis in Somalia was a disaster, exceeding even the crisis in Darfur, but the international community had paid insufficient attention to Somalia compared with Darfur. JOHN SAWERS (United Kingdom), noting that Somalia remained a challenge, said the United Nations was uniquely placed to address the country’s humanitarian and political needs and must coordinate the humanitarian response. Easing the humanitarian crisis should be an immediate priority and humanitarian access was vital. The Transitional Federal Government should ensure that humanitarian relief could be delivered freely and protect those receiving relief as well as internally displaced persons trying to return home. The United Kingdom welcomed the appointment of the new Somali Prime Minister, which would provide an opportunity to revitalize the political process. Full implementation of the conclusions of the National Reconciliation Congress would be crucial, he said, as would the establishment of a road map to elections at the end of the transition period and the involvement of all political stakeholders. The United Kingdom welcomed the Special Representative’s thinking on security and supported the proposal to establish a technical evaluation and assistance mission. The United Nations should continue to support AMISOM, and Burundi’s announcement that it planned to contribute additional troops soon was welcome. The United Kingdom stood ready to consider further support for other countries to deploy. BASO SANGQU ( South Africa) said the situation in Somalia was clearly not getting better. It was characterized by grave humanitarian crisis, major political divisions, including within the Transitional Federal Government, and general insecurity. Some 200,000 people had reportedly fled their homes recently as a result of increased fighting and the country was being plunged further into an unfolding disaster. The humanitarian situation was fragile precisely because of insecurity and political divisions. Humanitarian assistance was needed to alleviate the suffering of the Somali people. However, as the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, John Holmes, had warned in his briefing to the Council earlier in the month, a robust humanitarian response could not make up for the absence of desperately needed progress on the political and security fronts. It was important to continue promoting an inclusive political process and reconciliation while looking seriously into a contingency plan to the possible deployment of a peacekeeping force, he said. Despite the oft-cited admirable work of AMISOM, it was no longer sustainable or effective. The problem was not just one of resources, but also the nature of the Mission’s mandate. AMISOM had been deployed as a stop-gap until the United Nations could deploy. South Africa hoped the Council would revisit the African Union’s request for an expedited deployment in Somalia. Unfortunately, there seemed to be a subtle reluctance, if not resistance, to that request, he noted, stressing that the international community had a responsibility not to abandon the Somali people. The way towards stopping Somalia from being a constant threat to international peace and security was to encourage and support the political process and to deploy a peacekeeping operation. There was a need to create a security environment conducive to political process, and South Africa hoped the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would speed up the deployment of an assessment mission to facilitate further United Nations engagement in Somalia. HASAN KLEIB ( Indonesia) said the Council must contribute to managing and resolving the 17-year-old conflict, noting that the continuing divisions within the Transitional Federal Institutions and between the Transitional Federal Government and the opposition were the main obstacle to any possible progress on the political front. It was therefore crucial that the Government of Nur Hassan Hussein, the new Prime Minister, strengthen all-inclusive dialogue. Voicing his country’s support for the dual-track approach, he said that, on the political track, the primary task for Somalis should be the completion of the tasks set out in the Transitional Federal Charter, in particular the constitutional process, the preparation of the census and the holding of the 2009 elections. On the peacekeeping track, Indonesia favoured the deployment of a United Nations multidimensional peacekeeping force, but since such a deployment was still under assessment, greater technical, logistical and financial support for AMISOM was absolutely essential. The Council and the Secretary-General should continue to work on contingency planning, he said, adding that the strengthening of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) should be able to support a two-track approach. Indonesia welcomed the establishment in the Secretariat of an interdepartmental and inter-agency integrated task force on Somalia. The continued presence in the country of foreign troops reflected in part the hardening stance of the opposition. The international community must contribute to a situation conducive to the withdrawal of all foreign forces that were not part of AMISOM. Indonesia called on all parties to respect international humanitarian law and appealed to all armed groups to cease any indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks affecting civilians. PETER BURIAN ( Slovakia) expressed concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Mogadishu and the rest of the country, as well as the increased fighting. The international community must do everything possible to provide humanitarian assistance to all in need. All parties must do everything to ensure humanitarian access. The abuse of humanitarian and human rights law was unacceptable. Slovakia deplored the kidnappings and killings of journalists and human rights workers and hoped that the French journalist abducted in Puntland would be set free soon. The Transitional Federal Government’s restrictions on the independent media were also a cause of worry. A humanitarian disaster could only be avoided through national reconciliation and stabilization, he said, welcoming the appointment of the new Government. The President and Prime Minister must start political dialogue with all parties, including opposition parties. Slovakia hoped the Transitional Federal Institutions would move expeditiously to establish inclusive democratic institutions in preparing for the 2009 elections, and that the international community would play a more instrumental role in helping Somalia on its way to achieving peace and prosperity. It was also to be hoped that the international community would address ongoing arms embargo violations. Slovakia called on all States to prevent any non-State actors from supplying arms to the country. JOHAN VERBEKE ( Belgium) said the gravity of the situation in Somalia posed serious threats to peace and security in the region, but the nomination of Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein created a window of opportunity for progress during the transition process. Mr. Hussein should invite all political forces, both within and outside the country, to denounce violence and accept the Transitional Federal Charter as a framework to restore peace. The Transitional Federal Government had a responsibility to implement conclusions reached at the National Reconciliation Congress. The humanitarian crisis had pushed dozens of non-governmental organizations to call upon the international community for help, he noted. A growing portion of the population was dependent on aid, but barriers to aid delivery remained. All stakeholders should protect the population, respect international humanitarian law, facilitate access to those in need and ease the return of internally displaced persons to their homes. The Prime Minister must facilitate humanitarian aid access and put an end to impunity. AMISOM was the only option available to ease the retreat of international forces in Somalia, and Belgium reiterated the need to reinforce the Mission, especially with respect to resources, and encouraged the United Nations and the African Union to study new forms of technical assistance and operational issues. The international community must continue and intensify its involvement with the crisis in Somalia. LESLIE KOJO CHRISTIAN ( Ghana) said the continuing political stalemate and the escalating insurgency during the review period had delayed the adoption of a road map for the implementation of critical benchmarks in the Transitional Federal Charter. Both Government and opposition parties should respect the outcomes of the National Reconciliation Congress and implement those outcomes, including the urgent need to disarm, complete the constitutional process and conduct free and fair elections in 2009. Opposition parties that had boycotted the Reconciliation Congress should come on board. In keeping with the understanding reached at the September international donor conference in Stockholm, a coordinated and harmonized approach was needed to provide support and assistance in addressing the volatile political and security crisis, the socio-economic conditions and the humanitarian catastrophe in Somalia. He condemned the attacks on Ugandan contingents of AMISOM and reiterated his country’s appeal for international support for the Mission through the provision of the necessary financial and logistical resources. A strengthened AMISOM would expedite the withdrawal of foreign forces. The Security Council and the Secretariat should continue to accord priority attention to the development of a contingency plan for the deployment of a robust United Nations peacekeeping force to replace AMISOM. Ghana called on all parties to facilitate access through humanitarian corridors and welcomed the re-establishment of the Monitoring Group, with which all States should continue to cooperate. The Security Council should adopt concrete measures to combat piracy along the coast, and the Somali authorities should act in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX (France), expressing his country’s full support for Somalia’s new Prime Minister, said Somalia was embroiled in an overarching political and humanitarian crisis that threatened security throughout the region. It was crucially important to meet the country’s humanitarian needs. More than 600,000 individuals had been forced from their homes in 2007 and fighting was continuing in the capital. Attacks and assassinations were often answered with the launching of artillery. Humanitarian aid must be stepped up and guaranteed, and the working conditions of humanitarian staff improved. The same protection should be extended to journalists. France, while demanding the immediate release of the French journalist kidnapped on Sunday, would continue to provide protection for aid shipments. The crisis would not be resolved without political dialogue and the Transitional Federal Government must engage with the opposition in a dialogue that was as inclusive as possible. The Council must provide unreserved support for the new Prime Minister. He expressed support for the idea of bringing together a small group of decision makers, adding that the notion of an ad hoc force to supplement AMISOM deserved the Council’s consideration. The Council must not rule out any option, including that of an ad hoc force, AMISOM or a United Nations peacekeeping force. The Council must also review the rapid deployment of a technical assessment team. There was a need for greater dialogue in Somalia. France had participated actively in the deployment of the peacekeeping force in Burundi and supported the notion that the United Nations must change its approach to Somalia. There was a need for full commitment by the international community, as the status quo was not acceptable. France hoped the Council would be able to carry out a rapid examination of the options presented by the Special Representative. ALFREDO SUESCUM ( Panama) said Somalia’s humanitarian situation had been given special attention in the reports presented by Louise Arbour, High Commissioner for Human Rights, on 12 December, and John Holmes, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, on 6 December. Ms. Arbour had outlined her concerns about the human rights situation of Somali civilians, particularly in Mogadishu, while Mr. Holmes had addressed the terrible conditions in the refugee camps surrounding the capital city that were home to 600,000 individuals, perhaps the largest group of internally displaced persons in the world. Recent political events underscored the weakening of the Transitional Federal Institutions, which should incite the international community to show greater support. The Administration of the new Somali Prime Minister was at risk, in the short and medium term, of collapsing along with the international community’s efforts to stabilize Somalia. While there were signs of progress in the humanitarian coverage, much more must be done, he said. The Government and the opposition must address the critical security situation. AMISOM’s mandate expired in February, but the Council had yet to strengthen or replace that operation. The Council must make fundamental decisions in the coming weeks either to deploy a multinational force or a peacekeeping force. AMISOM must be strengthened and a technical evaluation mission must be sent. The Government must institute a zero-tolerance policy towards soldiers and civilians holding illegal arms, reduce excessive border controls and better protect aid workers and shipments. The Council’s lack of action could prejudice its credibility. It must act energetically and promptly address those challenges. KONSTANTIN K. DOLGOV ( Russian Federation) expressed serious concern about the security and humanitarian situation in Somalia, noting that, despite the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government, AMISOM and other troops, the situation was deteriorating. All parties, including the Transitional Federal Government, must take decisive steps for a speedy normalization of the situation and to assist the peacebuilding process. National dialogue and national reconciliation would prevent a further slide into humanitarian disaster. Warning that the conflict could still spread further into the region and destabilize the Horn of Africa, he stressed the importance of ensuring strict adherence to the arms embargo, and of neighbouring countries helping to reach a settlement. Maintaining the status quo was unacceptable. Full deployment of AMISOM would create the conditions for progress in national reconciliation and it should therefore be strengthened. It was essential to continue planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation; but, under present circumstances, due to the security situation, such an operation was not possible. A multidimensional peacekeeping operation for Somalia should be considered with care. JORGE VOTO-BERNALES ( Peru) welcomed the efforts of the Transitional Federal Government to implement national reconciliation. The convening of the National Reconciliation Congress had been a milestone and it was crucial that the dialogue between parties, including opposition groups, continue. The Transitional Federal Government must show openness in dealing with opposition groups and develop a road map including the constitutional process, the population census and the 2009 elections. Opposition groups must lay down their arms and avoid violence. All parties must understand that only through political dialogue could sustainable peace be achieved. Expressing concern about the humanitarian situation, he said that, due to the security situation, access to aid was being impeded. There were 750,000 internally displaced persons in Somalia, and in view of their plight, Peru urged all parties to guarantee strict compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights. Peru commended the AMISOM troops for their professionalism while working in a high-risk environment and asked that the operation be strengthened through a new deployment of troops. JACKIE WOLCOTT ( United States) expressed the hope that the Transitional Federal Government could focus on a comprehensive, all-inclusive political process and work to alleviate the current impediments to humanitarian aid. It must move quickly to draft a new Constitution and form a new electoral commission so that elections could be held in 2009. All Somali stakeholders should address key elements of the political process. She said that in fiscal 2007, the United States had been the largest bilateral donor to Somalia, giving $90 million in addition to aid for development and democracy assistance. All Somalis and regional actors should to stop using Somalia as a safe haven for attacks against civilians and work towards an effective ceasefire as the best way to isolate extremist elements. AMISOM should be commended for its commitments and for working under dangerous circumstances, and the United States called on more countries to contribute troops. Stressing the need for contingency planning for a United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia, she said the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should send a technical assessment mission to Somalia as soon as possible. It was vitally important to begin contingency planning now, so the United Nations could deploy as soon as possible. The United States commended the task force of combined partners for their work in protecting humanitarian cargo shipments from piracy. A Council resolution was needed to address the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. The United States was gravely concerned about the deteriorating humanitarian situation, especially in south-central Somalia, and welcomed the close cooperation from the United Nations country team in Nairobi. NASSIR ABDULAZIZ AL-NASSER ( Qatar) said the United Nations could play a larger role in mobilizing and providing support for the African Union’s efforts to strengthen its Mission in Somalia by completing the deployment of Burundian troops this month. Qatar agreed with the view that ensuring stability in Somalia required working simultaneously on political and security concerns, and commended the Special Representative’s efforts to push the national reconciliation process forward and create the necessary conditions for the country to continue towards stability and democracy. That could only be achieved by ending the violence, withdrawing foreign troops and building constitutional democratic institutions. Somalia must continue to expand the political reconciliation process to include all groups. It must also form a Constitution, develop a road map for the remainder of the transitional period and pave the way for a census and elections before the end of that period. All parties should refrain from using violence to express their political positions, jeopardize the safety of civilians, impede humanitarian access to civilians and target humanitarian workers, journalists and AMISOM staff, he said. Qatar hoped for the formation of a new broad-based Government that would be able to communicate well with the opposition. It was also to be hoped that the new Government would play an effective role in mitigating the worsening humanitarian situation, especially since Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein had a background and experience in that area. Somalia’s dire humanitarian situation was the worst in Africa, and social and health indicators for women and children were among the worst in the world. The flow of humanitarian aid must continue and coordinated efforts must be made by various international and regional actors, as well as the Transitional Federal Government, in that regard. LUC JOSEPH OKIO ( Congo) said the situation in Somalia remained serious, both in the security and political spheres. The humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate and the number of people needing humanitarian assistance was growing. There were continuous violations of the arms embargo and weapons from countries in the region continued to be supplied to extremist groups. Piracy was also continuing and Congo welcomed the courageous French initiative to provide protection for humanitarian convoys. It was regrettable that the initiative would soon come to an end without others taking over, so that pirates would have free rein until new measures were taken. Appealing for a ceasefire and national reconciliation in the context of an intra-Somali political dialogue, he expressed support for a multidimensional force and stressed that a solution to the situation should take into account the regional aspects of the problem. The Council should support the new Government and Prime Minister Hussein, and advise that Government to continue its efforts on the basis of the recommendations made by the National Reconciliation Congress. The Council should also ensure the strengthening of UNPOS so that it could play a leading role in coordinating efforts to strengthen AMISOM and establish a commission of inquiry, among other things. Congo condemned the kidnapping of the French journalist and called for his immediate release. Council President MARCELLO SPATAFORA ( Italy), speaking in his national capacity, said Somalia was a strong priority for his country, noting that the scale of human suffering in the country had become unacceptable. Addressing that emergency must be a top priority. The Red Cross, non-governmental organizations and the humanitarian community had done great work to alleviate the suffering but without a consistent and strong approach, the humanitarian approach could not solve the crisis. He said the situation in Somalia was a serious threat to international peace and security, and the agenda for Somalia should therefore be radically changed. Business as usual was no longer an option. A coherent multidimensional strategy was necessary, with the paramount goal of establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Hopefully, concrete options towards that end would be included in the contingency plan, which should be presented to the Council soon. After all, that plan had been requested in August. Moreover, the technical assessment mission, requested in resolution 1772 (2007), must be dispatched to the region without delay. Keeping the United Nations option alive would also encourage African countries to participate in AMISOM. Strengthening AMISOM was a crucial priority and, to that end, Italy had provided €10 million. But support for AMISOM should not prevent the Council from responding to the African Union request for United Nations intervention as soon as possible. UNPOS should also be strengthened. JOÃO SALGUEIRO (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, said the situation in Somalia posed a significant threat to peace and security in the Horn of Africa and beyond. Urgent efforts were necessary by all parties towards an inclusive political process. The European Union welcomed the appointment of the new Prime Minister and encouraged him to invite all political forces, inside and outside Somalia, that renounced violence and accepted the Transitional Federal Charter. The Transitional Federal Institutions had the prime responsibility of implementing the outcome of the National Reconciliation Congress and establishing a road map for actions that must include preparations for a constitutional referendum and elections by 2009. Condemning all acts of violence and calling on all parties to cease hostilities and engage in ceasefire, confidence-building and security arrangements, he also urged the Transitional Federal Institutions, Ethiopia and all other actors in the country to ensure humanitarian access, respect human rights and international humanitarian law and facilitate the secure return of displaced persons. Peace could not be built on impunity, and the Transitional Federal Government must investigate all human rights abuses and bring those responsible to justice. Noting that AMISOM was presently the only available option to facilitate the withdrawal of foreign and regional forces from Somalia, he reiterated the need to strengthen it, including by identifying substantial new financial support. The United Nations should provide more support and move forward with contingency planning for a possible peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The European Unionstood ready to support the implementation of the international action plan and welcomed the French initiative to protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels. JOHAN L. LØVALD ( Norway) said security and lasting stability could only be achieved through a genuine and broad-based political reconciliation that would include all Somali political forces that renounced violence and were ready to take part in a political process. In order for the Transitional Federal Institutions to secure support and gain credibility among the Somali people, it was essential that the Government be able to deliver a minimum of basic services. So far, that had hardly been possible. In order to act in a more determined manner in dealing with the humanitarian crisis, it might be time to consider a compact among the Transitional Federal Institutions, civil society and other groups, with the United Nations and international agencies securing service delivery. He said it was imperative to improve the security situation, which meant there was an urgent need to strengthen or substitute the present AMISOM force with a more substantial peacebuilding mission. That would also relieve Ethiopia of its present security burden. Due to the prevailing security situation, the international presence in Mogadishu was negligible at best, which was hampering the work of humanitarian agencies. It was therefore important for the United Nations and international agencies to increase their presence inside Mogadishu. Such a presence was important for service delivery and as a signal to the Somali people that the international community cared. Mr. OULD-ABDALLAH, in closing remarks, said the Council must review its working approach to Somalia, stressing that, if the working method in place for the past 17 years was continued, not only would there not be results, but the United Nations would risk losing credibility. The Organization could continue with the status quo of providing useful and essential humanitarian assistance, but there were limits to that after 17 years. After so much money and energy had been spent, the question remained about what should be done, he said. Withdrawing from Somalia was morally difficult and it was crucially important to accompany the Somali people in their political discussions. They could act consistently and seriously, but the United Nations must give them security and reassure them that if it could provide escorts on the high seas it could also give them stability and thus reassure the population of Mogadishu. He acknowledged that the United Nations could not send a field mission at the present time and that its rules forbade it from doing so. The Organization could go to Somaliland and Puntland, but Mogadishu was prohibited. Further, there was a sense that there was no AMISOM as it comprised only the Ugandan contingent. The operation could be strengthened and the Council knew better than he how to strengthen it. Perhaps neighbouring countries in the region could contribute more troops. Council President SPATAFORA ( Italy), in a concluding statement, assured the Special Representative of the Council’s full support for his work, noting that today’s debate had been organized to strengthen his hand. The strengthening of AMISOM was a necessity and also a matter of credibility. Tribute should be paid to the Government of Uganda for providing troops to the operation.

Well, hand-wringing ain't going to get it done. Impeach the traitor.

James Knight, Director, Office for East Africa, Bureau of African Affairs Remarks from the Conference Working Toward A Lasting Peace in the ****** The University of San Diego, CA December 7, 2007 Thank you for inviting me to join you here in San Diego. I want to thank the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace and Justice, the University of San Diego, and the ****** Voice for Peace for this opportunity to discuss U.S. policy and engagement in the Horn of Africa, especially as it addresses Ethiopia’s ******. In the Horn as elsewhere in Africa, our policy is to support good governance and prosperity for all Africans. These goals entail working to support democracy and Africa's full participation in the world economy, and, in today's world, containing international terrorism. The Horn of Africa As all of you know -- some much better than I -- the Horn of Africa is beset with challenges. It has been plagued with revolutions, guerrilla wars, and international conflicts since the post-colonial era began. It is a region that has historically suffered poor governance -- one need only point to the brutality of Ethiopia’s Derg, authoritarian one-party systems in much of the region until the 1990s, and Somalia’s lack of government until very recently. Winner-take-all politics and violent regime change have been the norm. The Horn's often adverse political and security climate has been a profound impediment to the region's economic development. The Horn ranks near the bottom according to most human development indicators. The region is socially, environmentally and economically challenged. Most of its countries are lagging on the path of economic development. Despite these longstanding challenges, there are many signs of progress. Djibouti has held peaceful elections, its port has become an economic hub, and its government has become an international partner in the fight against terrorism. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government, despite its ongoing challenges, offers the best hope for peace and stability in that tragic country for the past 20 years. Kenya has achieved strong rates of economic growth and investment as its vigorous civil society helps to fortify democratic institutions. Despite setbacks, Ethiopia continues to struggle toward democratic governance and effective anti-poverty programs. All of these countries and governments are increasingly close partners of the United States. The exception to this broadly favorable picture is Eritrea. Eritrea is increasingly authoritarian, its economy continues to worsen, and it now has established a record of interference in the affairs of its neighbors. Nonetheless, while progress is incremental, the overall trajectory of the Horn is positive. Our Embassies in the Horn are the U.S. government’s principal platforms for promoting effective cooperation, governance reform and sustainable development. We also have a great asset to support the people of the Horn in the U.S. Central Command's Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa, based in Djibouti. This Task Force is contributing to the professionalization and improved effectiveness of national armed forces in the Horn. Eritrea I'll now address key U.S. interests and concerns for each of the countries of the Horn, beginning with Eritrea. Eritrea is in the throes of ongoing economic decline led by a short-sighted and oppressive government. It is sorrowful to consider what has become of Eritrea in the 14 years since it gained independence. Its praiseworthy constitution has yet to be promulgated -- a sad index of the country's failed promise. President Isaias has become increasingly isolated in the region as he actively seeks to destabilize the Horn by fueling insurgencies among his neighbors and supporting groups linked to international terrorists. Eritrean government policies have choked the Eritrean economy and consolidated power among a small group surrounding President Isaias. The government actively blocks humanitarian assistance from international donors and interdicts economic development projects, despite the enthusiasm of the international donor community to help Eritreans emerge from poverty and dependence on remittances from the Eritrean diaspora. Eritreans who flee the country's economic morass or its political repression risk their families' imprisonment and heavy fines. President Isaias permits no political opposition and no independent media. Any senior government official who dares to speak out is subject to severe punishment. Eritrea pursues expensive and dangerous adventurism in the Horn. Eritrea materially supports extremists to undermine the internationally-supported Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. While other nations of the Horn and the wider international community pursue a common strategy for lasting peace and stability there, Eritrea encourages unending violence, especially in Mogadishu. Eritrea is also believed to support Ethiopian insurgents, including the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the ****** National Liberation Front (ONLF). President Isaias is leading Eritrea toward ever-worsening repression and hardship, and has made exacerbated regional instability an Eritrean national priority. Our relations with Eritrea are increasingly strained by these policies. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Eritrea's boundary dispute with Ethiopia remains an imminent threat to the tenuous peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and is symptomatic of the deep divisions between them. The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (the EEBC), was established by the Algiers Agreements which brought an end to the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea war. The EEBC’s mission was to define the border between them. The EEBC issued its delimitation determination in 2002. That determination established the boundary defined by earlier treaties and agreements. Owing to its inability to achieve physical demarcation of the border since 2002 -- that is, by placing physical boundary markers along the border -- the EEBC attempted to fulfill its mandate through demarcation by map coordinates (sometimes called 'virtual demarcation’ since no markers are placed), then declared its own dissolution on November 30 of this year. It is now up to both parties, Eritrea and Ethiopia, to implement physical demarcation of their common border in consultation with each other. The U.S. government has consistently called on both parties to cooperate with the EEBC and meet their commitments as spelled out in the Algiers Agreements. We believe it is essential for the parties to undertake direct discussions to resolve how to do so, as well as address the other issues that divide them. We will continue our efforts and support those of others to resolve this issue. Djibouti Djibouti celebrated 30 years of independence in June. Those thirty years stand in stark contrast to Eritrea's experience, and epitomize both the promise and the challenges of the Horn. Djibouti has moved beyond violent civil conflict since 2000, with the end of fighting between the government and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy and the return of the Front’s leader to Djibouti. General elections in 1999 and 2003 were orderly and peaceful, although marred by a boycott by the major opposition coalition. Despite that boycott, opposition members are represented in local and regional councils. More needs to be done to ensure that all citizens have a voice in government, but Djibouti's transition from civil war to a peaceful democratic political process has been a great step forward. Djibouti remains a poor country. Its annual per capita income is still below $1000. However, its vision for development of its key assets – that is, its port and strategic location along major sea routes -- offers great promise. Tonnage at the Port of Djibouti tripled after the 1998 Eritrea-Ethiopia war, when Ethiopia lost access to the Eritrean port of Assab. Afterwards. tonnage increased 30 per cent each year between 2002 and 2004. The United States has long enjoyed very positive relations with Djibouti. We have seen this partnership continue to deepen. Djibouti’s port is increasingly used by U.S. shippers. Djibouti has hosted the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa since 2002, with great benefit to both Djibouti and other nations of the Horn. Djibouti plays an increasingly important diplomatic role as a bridge to other countries of the Horn and between African and Arab states. Somalia I'll now turn to Somalia. The United States continues to support efforts to achieve lasting peace and stability in Somalia and bring economic development to its people. This goal is a priority for the United States. We believe that the key to long-term stability in Somalia and the key to protecting Somalia from serving as a safe haven for terrorists is inclusive political dialogue between the Transitional Federal Government (the TFG) and key Somalian stakeholders. This kind of dialogue will permit resumption of the transitional process outlined by the Transitional Federal Charter and the full deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). With the recent appointment of Nur 'Adde' Hassan Hussein as Prime Minister, the TFG has a fresh opportunity to revitalize efforts toward lasting political resolution and the program for national elections in 2009, outlined in the TFG's Charter. We continue to encourage TFG leadership to reach out to all Somalians who seek lasting peace and stability. We work through the United Nations and NGO partners to improve governance in southern and central Somalia, including programs to re-establish effective judicial, legislative, and administrative institutions under the TFG. We hope that Prime Minister Nur Adde will draw on his personal experience in Somalia's security and legal sectors to rebuild Somalian civic institutions, address the needs of the country’s million and a half displaced persons, and eliminate impediments to international humanitarian assistance. The United States is the largest bilateral donor of humanitarian assistance to Somalia, and has provided more than $180 million in humanitarian and development assistance in the last two years. Working with the United Nations and our NGO partners, the United States provides assistance for internally-displaced persons and other vulnerable populations inside Somalia. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is a critical component of regional and international efforts to stabilize Somalia and support political dialogue and reconciliation, including creation of conditions necessary for withdrawal of Ethiopian forces from Somalia. AMISOM is now staffed by 1600 Ugandan soldiers. Deployment of 700 Burundian soldiers has begun, and we anticipate deployment of additional contingents from Burundi, Ghana, and Nigeria in the coming months. The United States has provided $60 million in support of AMISOM deployments and follow-on logistical requirements. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles and foreign ministers from the Horn in Addis Ababa on December 5 to review progress in Somalia. At that meeting she emphasized ongoing U.S. humanitarian and development assistance to Somalia and stressed the urgency of timely deployment of additional AMISOM contingents to bring greater stability and security. She also emphasized the U.S. commitment to a regional approach to resolving the crises in Somalia. Kenya Kenya is an African success story. Kenya is beginning to enjoy the fruits of its stability and openness. Its economy has grown by more than 6 per cent annually in recent years. It enjoys a growing middle class. Lack of transparency in government spending and regulation slows its vibrant economy, so we continue to urge more focused leadership from the Government of Kenya to end corruption. Kenya stands out as one of Africa’s strongest economies -- an economy driven by a diverse mix of industrial production, services, and commercial agriculture, and one which we believe has potential for much greater growth. Kenya’s Northeast Province is home to ethnic Somalis with ties to clans in Somalia. Kenya's Somali community is a magnet for Somali refugees fleeing violence in Somalia and Ethiopia's ******. Kenya closed its border with Somalia in January, but more than 1,000 refugees still arrive each month. A significant number of Oromos reside in northern Kenya as well. Oromos are the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, which further ties northern Kenya to Ethiopia. Kenya’s 2002 elections were an important step on Kenya’s path to full democracy. This year's national elections on December 27 should consolidate those gains. The U.S. is providing elections training to civil society organizations, political parties, and youth and women candidates, as well as supporting the Electoral Commission of Kenya ensure that these elections are smooth, free, fair, and transparent. Nairobi hosts the largest U.S. diplomatic mission in sub-Saharan Africa. Our Mission there has responsibilities for U.S. goals and objectives in Kenya and across the Horn. Our bilateral assistance program for Kenya is more than $500 million for 2007. Cash and commodities from the U.S. to Kenya from public and private sources amount to about $1.5 billion each year. We work closely with the government of Kenya on a broad range of regional concerns, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to resolve hostilities in Sudan and the International Contact Group and bilateral initiatives on Somalia. In its capacity as Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) -- the regional sponsor of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government -- Kenya plays a leading role in promoting peace and stability for all the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia With a diverse population of more than 80 million and borders with all the other countries of the Horn, Ethiopia, like Kenya, is a key strategic partner for the United States for the Horn as well as Africa as a whole. We work together on a wide range of economic and social development initiatives to buttress regional stability. We systematically promote progress toward democracy and democratic institutions in Ethiopia. As you know, the runup to Ethiopia's May 2005 national elections was the most open, free, and genuinely competitive political campaign in Ethiopia's history. Opposition candidates enjoyed unprecedented opportunity to rally support and campaign against ruling party opponents. Unfortunately, democracy suffered a reverse in the contentious aftermath of the 2005 vote. The opposition turned out in force to demonstrate against official election results. 200 demonstrators, bystanders, and policemen died in these demonstrations. Hundreds of opposition members and their leaders were jailed. Much of the independent media was shut down. With the release of opposition leaders this past summer after lengthy mediation by respected elders, Ethiopia’s political leaders have a new opportunity to go forward with democratic reforms. The U.S. insistently and urgently encourages the full range of Ethiopians to remain engaged in a democratic political process. U.S. programs bring together leaders from across the political spectrum to address critical questions of national governance and the future of the country, build the capacity of parliament, and bolster judicial independence. Democracy in Ethiopia is still embryonic. Key issues, including the media law and political party funding, remain to be addressed. We encourage Ethiopia's leadership to insure that legitimate opposition enjoys access to media and the ability to campaign freely in the months remaining before local elections in April 2008. Our Embassy in Addis Ababa, in partnership with other donors, is building the capacity of the Ethiopian National Electoral Board and supports its training outreach to NGOs that will conduct voter education campaigns. We continue a broad program of U.S. humanitarian and development assistance for Ethiopia. Overall, we will provide half a billion dollars in assistance to Ethiopia this year – on par with our assistance to Kenya. $160 million in humanitarian assistance will help Ethiopia break the cycle of famine and ease the impact of drought and other natural disasters. We are providing over $300 million to the health care system in Ethiopia, especially to help Ethiopia combat HIV/AIDS. In conflict-prone areas, U.S. programs bring together representatives from diverse communities to build understanding and prevent new conflicts from erupting. We are working with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (the ENDF) to assure that it remains a professional and apolitical defense force. We are confident that, working together with all stakeholders, we can help Ethiopia become more secure, more democratic, and more prosperous. The ****** The ****** area of Ethiopia's Somali Region has historically been marginalized and underdeveloped. It now faces a humanitarian crisis owing to drought and especially an active insurgency led by the ****** National Liberation Front (the ONLF). The ONLF insurgency is regional as well as internal to Ethiopia, since the ONLF uses Somalia as a safe haven to evade Ethiopian forces. The ONLF receives support from other anti-Ethiopian groups connected to terrorism. It appears clear that the ONLF receives support from Eritrea, including weapons and training. The growing ONLF insurgency has brought on harsh counterinsurgency operations, severe restrictions on commerce to interdict supplies for insurgents and avoid land mines, and forced relocation of communities. The ONLF has been fighting the Ethiopian government since well before the current government took power in 1991. Over the past year ONLF attacks have become much more deadly. In April 2007 the ONLF attacked a Chinese oil exploration facility. Nine Chinese oil workers and 77 Ethiopians died in the attack. The ENDF responded to the unprecedented April 2007 attack with an aggressive counterinsurgency campaign beginning in May of this year. The ENDF undertook search and destroy missions and restricted humanitarian food aid and commercial shipments in much of the ****** to deny insurgents food, weapons, and munitions. Human rights abuses by both sides have been reported since this campaign began, including razing of villages and forced removal of populations. According to the UN, land mines have recently been laid by the ONLF. On July 29 three aid workers were killed when their vehicle hit a recently planted mine. Another occasionally violent ethnic movement, the Oromo Liberation Front (the OLF), may have links with the ONLF as well. There have been reports of Ethiopian soldiers of Oromo background deserting to the ONLF, then joining the OLF in eastern Oromiya. Commercial deliveries from Somalia normally provide 80 per cent of the ******'s food. Commercial traffic from Somalia began to decline in January 2007, before the current ENDF campaign, but recently-imposed restrictions have reduced commercial food shipments to a trickle. Food prices have doubled in most of the ******. Prices for livestock -- whose sale is a primary component of household income for many ******is -- have been severely depressed since herders have been unable to ship animals to markets in Somalia. NGOs have curtailed operations in the ****** because of security risks, and medical supplies have become increasingly scarce. Humanitarian conditions in the ****** have reached crisis levels. A UN assessment team traveled through the ****** in early September, and other NGO and a USAID team have also made assessments. There is general agreement in the donor community that at least 800,000 individuals in the ****** will need humanitarian assistance, especially food aid, in coming months. U.S. response to current conditions in the ****** On August 24 our Ambassador in Addis Ababa announced a $19 million humanitarian assistance program for the Somali region. In early September Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer visited Gode, the major base for relief operations in the ******, to see first hand how the humanitarian needs of the area are being met. Our Embassy has been working diligently to coordinate NGO and international donor operations with the Ethiopian government to address the crisis in the ******. Our Embassy was decisive in encouraging the Ethiopian government to allow UN, NGO, and USAID assessment missions into the ******. On November 24 USAID Administrator Fore announced in Addis Ababa that the U.S. government has allocated an additional $25 million in food assistance for the ******. Total U.S. food assistance for the ****** is now $44 million. We continue to work for greater humanitarian access to the ****** at the highest levels. Several NGOs and UN offices have resumed or are planning to resume operations there. 19 NGOs have been authorized to resume work in the ******, and two UN offices have reopened -- one in Kebre Dahar and another in Degahabur. UN Under Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes visited the ****** in late November to facilitate return of UN relief agencies. He told reporters that Prime Minister Meles agreed to a joint assessment of humanitarian conditions in the ****** with the UN; we expect a joint World Food Program and Ethiopian government assessment mission to begin December 17. We will continue to be primary contributors to assistance operations that follow that assessment. Humanitarian and commercial shipments have brought food to major towns in the ******, although distribution to smaller settlements remains a challenge. The Ethiopian government recently increased the number of food distribution sites in the area to 174. We understand that limited commercial food deliveries have recently resumed. The only immediate solution to the humanitarian crisis in the ****** is a credible cessation of hostilities by the ONLF so that food and medical supplies can be delivered at levels necessary to meet the region's urgent needs, both through humanitarian efforts and through commercial channels. A credible cessation of hostilities will permit commerce to resume, including both food deliveries to the ****** from Somalia and shipment of ******i livestock to markets in Somalia. We are eager to support a cessation of hostilities in the ******. When security conditions have stabilized, the Ethiopian government and the ******i people must begin effective dialogue to end the insurgency permanently and to address ******i aspirations. Prime Minister Meles, when he spoke to the Ethiopian Parliament in October, underscored his government’s willingness to open discussions with the ONLF. The ONLF has stated its willingness to begin such discussions with the Ethiopian government as well. When the humanitarian needs of ******is have been met, a path must be found to bring lasting peace, security, and prosperity to the ******. In her recent meetings in Addis Ababa, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed our partnership with the Ethiopian government to support Ethiopia’s economic development, address humanitarian concerns, and further Ethiopia’s pursuit of democracy. For the ******, she promised further substantial U.S. food and medical assistance and pressed for full resumption of commerce to ensure that adequate food deliveries reach the people of the region. The U.S. government is determined that the crisis in the ****** be quickly and effectively addressed. Released on December 13, 2007. U.S. Department of State

Here is the link again. http://pajamasmedia.com/2007/12/homeland_security_snoozes_whil.php

Are America’s enemies operating freely from inside the country? Patrick Poole reports on one Somali terrorist leader’s hassle-free trip to Minneapolis. The Twin Cities metropolitan area has become the largest haven for Somali immigrants in the Untied States. At Pajamas Media Patrick Poole reports on the recent fundraising visit to Minneapolis (and to Falls Church, Virginia) by major Somali terrorist leader Zakaria Mahmoud Haji-Abdi. As Poole explains, Abdi is deputy chairman of the Eritrean-based Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia and part of the al-Qaeda-backed Islamic Courts Union. Poole notes that Abdi was the featured speaker at the fundraiser hosted by the United Somali Diaspora at the Crowne Plaza Hotel in Minneapolis on November 24. Poole links to this SomaliTalk issue covering the Minneapolis conference. Poole's PJM report is "Homeland insecurity: Terrorist fundraising in the heartland." and the link is: