Walaahay baan ku dhaartaye “In ayna Wadaadada gadhka dhaadheer ee Xamar joogaa a Hargaysa Imanayne Idinkaa u tagi†Faysal Cali waraabe. {Hargeysa}28-07-06waxaa lagu soo gebogabeeyay magaalo madaxda gobolka waqooyi galbeed ee Hargaysa shir balaadhan oo ay isugu yimaadeen Xisbiga lagu magacabo UCID oo uu hogaamiyo ninka lagu magacaabo Faysal Cali waraabe. Sida ay shaacisay saxaafada Hargaysa muhiimada loo qabtay shirka waxay ahayd in la doorto madax cusub shanta sano ee soo socota sida gudoomiyeyaal iyo gudiga fulintaba. Waxaase cayaartii shirku isbedeshay markii la waayey nin la tartama Faysal Cali oo aad loogu yaqaan inuu iska hadlo welibana si maangaabnimo ku jirto. Ka dib markii shirkii uu gebo gaboobay ayaa Faysal halkaa hadal ka jeediyay isagoo aad u weeraray Culimo,udiinta gobolada hargaysa iyo Burco kuna si feeyay niman gacaltooyo u qabo walaalahooda Soomaaliyeed ee Xamar jooga. Mudo laga joogo dhowr sanadood ayuu faysal wuxuu BBCda Soomaliga ka sheegay in wiilka Addis Ababa ku dhashay ee Axmaarka ah uu ka xigo wiilka Soomaliga ah ee Koonfurta Soomaliya Ku nool. Ugu danbayn isagoo Faysal sii wata hadalkiisa ayuu yidhi Walaahay baan ku dhaartaye “In ayna Wadaadada gadhka dhaadheer ee Xamr joogaa ayna Hargaysa Imanayne Idinkaa u tagi. Waxaa lala yaaba noqotay in dadka ku dhaqan gobolada Hargaysa iyo Burco ay dhegaystaan una riyaaqaan qof uu aad u hooseeyo fahamkiisa waxbarasho mid Islaam iyo mid maadi ahba una doortaan gudoomiye Xisbi. C/rahman jama-Hargaysa Somalia Widh Widh Online

Aqoonyahanada Reer Awdal Ee Qurbajooggu Maxay U Taageeraan Qaddiyadda Somalia? Borame () hadhwanaag 2006-07-27 (Hadhwanaagnews) Aqoonyahanadu waa qayb ka mid ah bulshada ee lagu tiriyo inay barteen culuumta kala duwan ee maanta dunida hawlaheeda lagu kala wado, ha ahaato dhinaca sayniska, farsamada iyo cilmiyada caafimaadkaba, waana kuwa lagu tiriyo inay ugu aqoonta iyo kartida badan yihiin, isla markaana aqoontooda lagu tixgeliyo laguna ixtiraamo qaybaha cilmiga sare ee ay barteen si ay dadkooda, naftooda ama dalkooda ugu faa’iideeyaan. Dhinaca kalena aqoonyahanku waa dadka dal ama bulshada u horseedi kara horumar iyo dib-u-dhacba, waana haddii ay si fiican ama si khaldan ugu shaqeeyaan cilmiga ay barteen. Tan iyo markii ay burburtay xukuumaddii milateriga ahayd ee Siyaad Barre dhawr iyo toban sano ka hor aqoonyahanadii ka shaqayn jiray hay’adihii dawladdii Siyaad Barre waxay u kala baxsadeen dalalka dibadda si ay u helaan shaqooyin, inkastoo kuwa kalena ay dalka gudihiisa iyo degaanadii ay u dhasheen uga baxsadeen dagaaladii Muqdisho ku qabsaday, qaar kalena naftoodii ayeyba ku waayeen, halka kuwa kalena hantidoodii iyo dadkoodii ay ku waayeen. Maanta aqoonyahanadaasi waxay badankoodu ku xidhan yihiin ama maanka kala socdaan beelihii, qaraabadii, dadkii iyo dalkii ay ka yimaaddeen, ama waxayba la qabsadeen dalalka cusub ama dunida cusub ee ay aqoontooda ama nasiibkooda kaga shaqaystaan ee ku kala yaal dunida daafaheeda. Haddaba markaan soo qaadanno aqoonyahanada reer Awdal ee ku nool dalalka dibadda ama loo yaqaan qurbajoogga, ayaad mooddaa inay qayb yar uun ka yihiin aqoonyahada ka kala yimi daafaha dalkii hore loo odhan jiray Soomaaliya, su’aashuna waxay tahay kaalintee ayey kaga jiraan horumarinta, wacyigelinta, waddaninimada, taakuleynta dadkii iyo dalkii, gobolkii ama degmadii ay ka tegeen? Sidayse uga muuqdaan arrimaha siyaasadda, dhaqaalaha iyo nolosha mujtamaca ay ka tageen ee gobolka Awdal? Jawaabaha su'aalahaasi iyo kuwa kale oo la mid ah ayaan kaga jawaabi karaa hadal aqoonyahan reer Awdal ahi laftiisu ka yidhi qurbajoogga reer Awdal ee dibadda kuwaas oo ku sheegay inay mujtamacyada kale ee Soomaalida kaga hooseeyaan la socodka dalkii iyo dadkii ay ka tegeen. Dhinaca siyaasadda markaan u soo laabanno waxaad moodda in aqoonyahanada reer Awdal badankoodu ay taageero niyadda ah siiyaan qaddiyadda Soomaaliyada aan weli faro lagu hayn, goobo badanna uga ololeeyaan sidii Soomaaliya wax u noqon lahayd. Waxa kale oo la sheegaa in inta badan aqoonyahanada qurbajoogga reer Awdal aanay weli maskaxdooda gelin in Somaliland tahay dal leh maamul ka horreeya dalal badan oo dunida sheegta dimuqraadiyad. Haddaba su'aasha meesha ku jirta ayaa ah maxay qurbajoogga reer Awdal ee dibaddu ,gaar ahaanna aqoonyahanadu u taageeraan arimaha Soomaaliya. Markaan haddaba dib u raacno taariikhda reer Awdal ku lahaayeen xukuumadihii soo maray Soomaaliya, waxa la ogyahay in reer Awdal hal wasiir iyo waxoogaa shaqaale ah ku lahaayeen. Tusaale ahaan waxay soo qaadi karnaa marxuum Aadan ***** iyo marxuum Muuse Rabiile. Wasiiradaasi reer awdal ugu jiray labadaa dawladood markaan iska reebno waxoogaaga xildhibaanada baarlamaanka Soomaaliya ahaan jiray. Dhinaca kale dhibaatada Soomaaliya ka soo gaadhay reer Awdal ayaa ahayd mid aan umadaha kale ee Soomaalidu la qabin. Waxaan xusuustaa in ninkii ugu horreeyey ee xukuumaddii kacaankii Siyaad Bare fagaare ku toogatay uu ahaa nin reer Awdal ah sannadihii toddobaatameeyadii, kaas oo lagu toogtay Hargeysa isagoo lagu eedeeyey inuu basaas u ahaa xukuumadii Xayle Selaase ee dalka Itoobiya. Waxa kale oo marag ma doonta ah in ninkii ugu horreeyey ee dawladdaas Afweyne ku dishay 300,000 Shillin Soomaali ah uu ahaa marxuumkii Ina Aamin, xisaabiyahana ka ahaa wasaaraddii Caafimaadka ee xukuumaddii burburtay, markii ay ku eedeysay inuu lacagtaasi ka lunsaday dawladda, ergedii uu galay madaxweynihii Djibouti, Xasan Guuleedna ay badbaadin weyday. Dhibaatooyinka Soomaaliya reer Awdal ka soo gaadhay ayaa waxa ugu dambeeyey dilkii saddex ama afar sannadood ka hor Muqdisho loogu geystay Janankii keli ahaa ee reer Awdal lahaayeen. Intaa waxa dheer dhicii, dilkii iyo hagar-daamooyinkii reer Muqdisho ku beegsanayeen dadka ka soo jeeda Awdal ee ka soo firxanayey dagaaladii Muqdisho ee wakhtigaasi. Haddaba iyadoo la ogyahay waxa shacbiga reer Awdal ee koonfur ku noolaa ka soo maray dadka dhulkaa leh, ayaan dhinaca kale la yaabaa kuwa u dhashay reer Awdal, aqoonyahanadana ah ee dalalka dunida uga ololaynaya in Soomaaliya wax noqoto. Reer Awdal waxay maanta xukumaan dadka ku nool dhulka loo yaqaan Somaliland oo qaybo badan oo dadkeeda ka mid ah la isla soo maray dagaallo, dhac iyo dhibaatooyin kaleba, kuwaas oo ay maanta iskaga dhawyihiin cid kasta. Aqoonyahanada caadaystay u ololaynta Soomaaliweyn aan jirin ayaan is idhi malaha weli kama dhaadhacsana xaaladda Somaliland, ee dhinacyada nabadgelyada, dimuqraadiyadda iyo doorka reer Awdal ku leeyihiin mansabyada kale duwan ee aanay weligood Xamar dawlad ka dhalata ka helayn ee ay maanta haystaan. Waxa kale oo aan la yaabay qaar ka tirsan qurbajoogga reer Awdal ee cabsi awgeed u iman kari waayey geeri ku dhacday waalidiintoodii, waxa kale oo aan la sii yaabay aqoonyahanno iyo madax ururro samafal ah oo reer Awdal oo mucaawino ula ordaya dad ku tabaalaysan koonfurta Soomaaliya, iyadoo dadkoodii uga baahan yihiin taageero. Waxan is idhi waxa dhab ah fikradda aqoonyahan reer Awdal ah oo Boorama joogaa ku sheegay in reer Awdalka dibedda joogaa aanay la socon waxa dalka ka dhacaya, oo qaar u haystaan in weli dagaaladii sokeeye iyo hubkii la isku haysto, ama Somaliland ay ka jireen beelo beelo gumaysta, aqoonyahanadaas oo qaarkood magac ku leeyihiin Soomaalida dibedda iyo gudaha ku nool, ayaa Soomaali badani u haystaan inay ka soo jeedaan beelo aan shaqo ku lahayn reer Awdal, kolba qolo Soomaali ahina sheegataa inay iyaga ka dhasheen. Ugu dambayntiina waxa la odhan karaa waa nasiibdarro haysata aqoonyahanada Reer Awdal haddii ay weli aaminsan yihiin xukuumaddii Siyaad Barre inay soo noqoto, fikirkaas oo wax u dhimi kara sumcadda reer Awdal ku leeyihiin dhinaca aqoonta. Waxa kale oo nasiib-darro ah taageerada niyadda iyo maaddiga ah ee ay siiyaan dad aan abtirsiintoodaba garanayn iyadoo dalka maanta magacooda soo saaray ee Somaliland aanay waxba ugu fillayn ama ay u arkaan maamul jabhad beri hore ay col ahaayeen samaysatay. Si kastaba ha ahaatee waxaan sugi doonaa abaalka ay Soomaaliyada mustaqbalka ka helaan aqoonyahada reer awdal ee dunida uga ololaynaya iyadoo maanta aanay reer Awdal ka muuqan maamulada isku horfadhiya Baydhabo iyo Muqdisho. Haatuf

Faysal Cali Warabe's [in] famous saying: “a boy born in Hargeisa has more commonality with one born in Addis Ababa than one in Mogadishu.†"Inanka Xamar ku dhasha, Kan Addis Ababa ku dhasha ayaa iga xiga " “haddii ay afkooda bedeli waayaan, Itoobiya ayaad sheegaysaaye anagaaba geli doona…Sidaa darteed, waxaanu mar labaad uga digaynaa in aanu Somaliland carabku kaga dhicin mar dambe. Haddii carabku idinkaga dhaco mar dambena, anagu wax wayn baanu idin yeeli karnaa … Laakiin haddii ONLF, Itaxaad iyo yam-yam iyo qadaad weyn ay isku soo tuuraan, iska daa Itoobiya’e adduunka oo dhanbaa idinla dagaalami doona. Markaa waxaan leeyahay talo xumaantii shalay aad is-daba wadeen oo cumaamadan, oo gadh la baxday uun ha samaysanina†Guddoomiyaha Xisbiga mucaaradka ah ee UCID Md. Faysal Cali Waraabe, ayaa waraysi dheer oo dhinacyo badan leh oo uu siiyay wargeyska Ogaal digniin ugu jeediyay Midawga Maxkamadaha Muqdisho, inay carabka ka dhigaan hadal-haynta midnimo Soomaaliyeed, taas oo uu ku tilmaamay inay furrin kale ku furayso. Isla markaana, wuxuu ugu baaqay beelihii ay xurguftu ku dhex martay degaanka Darroor ee Kililka shanaad, inay sidiisii u dabaqaan heshiiskii laga gaadhay wixii dhexdoda ka dhacay, wax kasta oo ay kala tabanayaanna ay ku dhameeyaan wada-hadal oo aanay marnaba xabbad isku adeegsan. Waraysigaasi oo guddoomiyaha UCID wax lagaga waydiiyay, xaaladda siyaasadeed ee mandaqadda, sida uu u arko gelitaanka ciidamada Itoobiya ee Soomaaliya, taageerada ay siinayaan Cabdilaahi Yuusuf, mawqifka xukuumadda Somaliland ee ku wajahan arrintaas, dhaliilaha dhinaca dimuquraadiyadda ee Xisbiyada dhexdooda, iyo arrimo kale oo tiro badan, wuxuu u dhacay sidan; S: waxa na soo gaadhay inaad u amba-baxayso aagga Darroor ee Kilalka Shanaad ee Itoobiya, si aad u sii xoojisaan heshiiskii nabadaynta ee beelaha walaalaha ah ee xurguftu deegaankaa ku dhexmartay, markaa maxaa ka jira arrintaa? J: markii hore fidmadii dhulkaa ka dhacday, aad iyo aadbaa loogu soo gurmaday, oo niyad wanaagsanbay labada dhinacba is tuseen, in la qiimeeyayna way garteen, waxaanay arkeen inay yihiin dad lagu faano oo la tirsado. Imikana arrinta ka soo cusboonaatay waxay noqotay arrin aan la filayn. Anagoo filaynay in nabaddii la sii balaadhiyo oo dirnay niman kale oo hawshii sii wada, oo beelihii isu soo rara, oo wixii la go’aamiyay dhameeya, ayaa wax aanaan filaynini ka soo yeedheen. Markaa waxaanu leenahay, wax kasta oo la kala tabanayaba wada-hadalbaa lagu dhamayn karaa, oo xabaddu way reeban tahay waqtigan maanta ah. Waad aragtaan oo Soomaaliya ayaa xabaddii ka il-baxaysa, oo dagaal-oogayaashii iska eriday oo nabad qaadatay. Markaa inaga oo nabad ku caano maallay oo Geeska Afrika tusaale u ah, in maanta la yidhaahdo way isku bilaabeen waa mid aad iyo aad u foolxun. Wax kale maaha ee casabiyadda qabiilka ayaa inagu xoog wayn, markaa qofku haddii uu masuul yahay, Suldaan ha ahaado, Caaqil ha ahaado, ama siyaasi ha ahaadee, waa inuu ka sareeyaa qabyaaladda. Maaha ninku inuu reerkooda la soo safto ee waa inuu u caqli celiyaa. Markaa waxaan jecelahay in la soo af-jaro waxyaabahaas. S: ma wax dambe ayaa dhacay? J: haa way dhaceen, oo ninbaa la dilay, baabuurna waa la rasaaseeyay oo dadbaa ku dhaawacmay. Markaa Ilaahay intaa ha inagaga ekaysiiyo, arrintaasina siday markii hore inooga dhamaatay ha inooga dhamaato. Qoladan BBC-da aadbaan ugu mahad-naqayaa, oo markii hore Somaliland qaybta ay leedahay aan siin jirin, oo aad moodaysay in meeshu ay noqotay meel reer iska leeyahay. Laakiin, haddana xalay waxay ahayd arrin degdeg ah, oo kumaanaan talo-gelin aniga iyo Guddoomiyaha Wakiilladuba, qaylo-doon ayuunbaa noo nimi, oo waxa na lagu yidhi, waa la isu hub urursanayaa oo in dagaal dhaco ayaa laga yaabaa, ee BBC-day dadku aad u dhagaystaane kala hadla. Taasaa nagu kaliftay inaanu baaqa ka sheegno oo aanu canaan u muujino Salaadiinta meeshaa joogta. Waayo, Suldaan meel uu joogo haddii ay xabadi ka dhacdo qiimihiisu wuu ku dhacayaa. Suldaanka waxa lagu yaqaanaa nabad iyo dadka oo uu isu soo jiido, markaa Salaadiinta waxaan leeyahay wixii xumaan iyo samaan halkaa ka dhaca iyagaa ka masuul ah. Haddii khayr ka yimaadana iyagay magac u noqonaysaa. Imikana, nabadgelyo ayay ku dhamaatay shalay, wax dagaal ahi muu dhicin, Insha-Allahu dibna u dhici maayo. S: dhinac kale haddii aynu eegno, Soomaaliya waxa ka aloosan xaalad colaadeed, ciidamada Itoobiyana waa taa la sheegayo inay gudaha Soomaaliya galeen, markaa haddii dagaal halkaa ka qarxo, ma u malaynaysaa ama ma qiimayn kartaa in uu saamayn ku yeelan karo Somaliland.? J: Saamayn wuu inagu yeelanayaa, oo waad aragtaayoo Itoobiyadaa dalka la aqoonsan yahay ah baaba tidhi waan iska moosayaa, oo soo tallowday. Markaa wuu inagu yeelanayaa. Nimankan Maxaakiimta qaarkood siday u hadlayaan ee ay u leeyihiin shantii Soomaaliyeed oo dhan ayaanu gaadhaynaa. Anagu horena talo ayaanu ugu jeedinay oo waxaanu ku nidhi dalkiina hoog ha u horseedina, dunidanna mujtamac kasta oo dhibaato haysato, waxa u soo jiida Madax xun, hogaan xunna dhibaatadiisa lagama baxo. Markaa waxaad moodaa inay ku jiraan qaar Somaliland ku hadraya, oo Somaliland-ba u haysta gaalnimo, oo ka hadlaya midnimo iyo waxaan loo fadhiyin, shakhsiyaadna halkan way ku leeyihiin. Laakiin, waxaanu u sheegaynaa anagu, Somaliland in aan Imbghati lagu soo samayn, ee toban sano loo soo dagaalamayay, dhiig loo qubay, dadkuna ay samaysteen Somaliland, oo kala soo noqdeen Soomaaliya. Markaa kuwa sidaa u hadlayaa haddii ay afkooda bedeli waayaan, Itoobiya ayaad sheegaysaaye anagaaba geli doona. Haddii aydaan na soo daandaansan, in dhulkaa nabadi ka dhacdo, wanaag ka dhaco, oo aynu walaalo noqono waanu ogolnahay, laakiin, dalkii Soomaaliya la odhan jiray inta leh waa la yaqaanaa, markaa dadka lehi waa inay ka taliyaan. Laakiin haddii ONLF, Itaxaad iyo yam-yam iyo qadaad weyn ay isku soo tuuraan, iska daa Itoobiya’e adduunka oo dhanbaa idinla dagaalami doona. Markaa waxaan leeyahay talo xumaantii shalay aad is-daba wadeen oo cumaamadan, oo gadh la baxday uun ha samaysanina. S: oo imika qaabka isbedelada Maxaakiimtu ay horkacayaan uu u socdaa, siduu kuugu muuqdaa?. J: ilaa hadda siday u socdaan gees way ka fiican yihiin, laakiin waxa la rabaa inay muuqaal la akhriyi karo yeeshaan, imika la akhriyi kari maayee. Isla markaana inay siyaasad yeeshaan, oo ay calool adaygaan, horena waxaan u idhi, waar Imbgathi dawlad maaha ee idinku intaad jewi nabadeed Xamar ka samaysaan, shir dib-u-heshiisiin ah oo wanaagsan oo sax ah, oo aanay ONLF-na idinku jirin, reerkiiniina idinku jirin sameeya, oo isbasriya oo dhulkiina ku ekaada. Laakiin, is-balaadhis, Maraykanbaa is-balaadhin kari la’. Sidaa darteed, waxaanu mar labaad uga digaynaa in aanu Somaliland carabku kaga dhicin mar dambe. Haddii carabku idinkaga dhaco mar dambena, anagu wax wayn baanu idin yeeli karnaa, dhawr furimood inaad isku furtaanna idinkay idiin xun tahay. Markaa, adduunkana waa inay shakiga ka saaraan, si aanay Muqdisho u noqon sidii Kaabuul (Afgaanistaan), lab-la-kac aan meel gaadhsiisnayna waa in la iska daayaa. S: xukuumadda Somaliland iyo Itoobiya waxa ka dhaxeeya xidhiidh fiican, isla markaana Itoobiya waxay hadda u hiilinaysaa maamulka Cabdilaahi Yuusuf. Markaa haddii sidaa dagaal ku qarxo, siday saamaynta arrintaasi ku noqonaysaa Somaliland? J: horta barigii hore Itoobiya waxa lagala dagaalami jiray Somaliland, dagaalkana waxa hor dareemi jiray Somaliland. markay Itoobiya iyo Soomaaliya dhibaato ka dhex dhacdo, Somaliland ayaa forontka ahaan jirtay, Hargeysa ayaa la duqayn jiray, ee Muqdisho lama duqayn jirin. Markaa, hadda forontku wuu inaga fogaanayaa, oo waxa lagu dagaalamayaa Doollow, Gedo iyo Baay. Laakiin, kollay Islaam-nimadaaba xataa ka soo sokaysa Soomaali-nimada, kolay dad damqanaya oo reer Somaliland ah oo shacbi ah, oo intay halkan ka baxaan xagaa u taga inay daafacaan Muqdisho way jiri karaan. Hase yeeshee, taa macnaheedu maaha kaalay Muqdishooy I xukun isku dal baynu nahaye, ee waa si la mid ah sidii ka Soomaaliyeedba u tagi jiray Afgaanistaan. Laakiin, sidan Galaal sheegayo oo kale noqon mayso. Galaal waxaan leeyahay wax waddaniyad Soomaaliyeed la yidhaahdaa ma jirto, oo idinkaa baabi’iyay, soona noqon mayso. Soomaali waxa u dan ah in dhinac kastaaba dalkiisa hagaajisto. Laakiin, Galaal oo Jannan ahaa, oo 15 sano Muqdisho maamul ka samayn kari waayay, inuu shan Soomaaliyeed oo aan jirin ku riyoodo maaha. Inuu iska daayo weeye, waayo ninkii gurigiisa hagaajiyay ayaa guri kalena hagaajin kara. Runtuna waxa weeye in Soomaalidu ay shan meelood tahay, markaa mid kastaba meesheed Ilaahay khayr ha ku siiyo. S: bayaankii wada jirka ahaa ee hore ee aad kaga hadasheen xayiraad-ka-qaadista hubka, waxaad ku sheegteen in Somaliland ay iska caabbin galayso. Maxaad uga jeedeen taa?. J: Cabdilaahi Yuusuf waa ninka qudha ee Soomaaliyeed ee intuu istaagay yidhi waxaan samaysanayaa dawlad-goboleed qabiil ku dhisan. cid kale oo ay ka suuro gali karto inay yidhaahdaan reerkayaga ayaanu maamul gaar ah u samaynaynaa ma jirto. Haddana, waa ninka isaga oo sidaas ah yidhi Soomaali baan xukumayaa, ee Madaxnimo soo doontay. Laakiin, waxa nasiib darro ah ninkii sidaa lahaa kuwa doortay. Kuwaasi habeen may jirin. Cabdilaahi Yuusuf ilaa maalintii la doortay ilaa maanta hub urursi buu ku jiraa. Yemen hubkuu ka helay, inkastoo aanay dawladdeenu ka hadal, hubkiina reerkooduu siiyay. Imikana waxa uu doonayaa Cabdilaahi Yuusuf in xabashiyi timaado, oo in Koonfur uun loo qabto maahee ilaa Somaliland loo qabto ayuu doonayaa, oo inta dadka loo garba-duubo hubka looga dhigo oo uu mamlakad ka samaysto ayuu doonayaa. Anigu caqligaasi meel ay kala yimaadeen garan maayee, waxay ku sheekaystaan nimankaa reer barigu Soomaali anagaa xukumi jirnay. Meel ay wax ku xukumi jireen iyo dad ay addoonsan jireen anagu garan maynee, laba dawladood oo isku darsaday baanu ahayn, oo iyaga oo maynoorati ah ayaa Ra’iisal Wasaare Soomaalinimo loo siiyay, tii waxay u qaateen oo 15 jirkoodu uu ku odhanayaa Soomaali anagaa xukumi jirnay. Laakiin, waxaanu u sheegaynaa waxba inaanay xukumi jirin, ee Soomaaliyi wax isku darsatay, dimuquraadiyadna lagu doortay Cabdirisaaq, Cabdirashiid iyo Maxamed Xaaji Ibraahin Cigaal. Sidaa aawadeed, hubka la siinayo Cabdilaahi Yuusuf anagu indhaha ka qarsan mayno. Rayaale-na waa la doortay laakiin haddii uu dalka daafici waayo, anagaa daafacayna, isagana amar uga qaadan maynee way joogaan jabhaddii iyo shacbigii Afweyne ka xoreeyay. Markaa haddii ay Rayaale isku arkeen Sanca iyo Itoobiya oo uu been u sheegay, Rayaale wuu iska tegi doonaa, dalkana anagaa daafici doona. Rayaale farbaa ku godan ilaa intuu tagay Yemen, intuu tagay Itoobiya, labada jeerba iyo xataa Kenya way isku arkeen Cabdilaahi Yuusuf. Markaa, arrimahaa waa inuu shacbiga u soo bandhigaa, balse waxba ina yeeli mayso.

Su’aal: Waxaan maqalnaa inaad tahay “ninkii Ethiopiaâ€. Siidee bay Ethiopia kuu taageeraysaa? A.YUSUF: Dabcan, waxaan ahay Ethiopian,(xagga saaxiibtinimada) Ethiopia waa dal aan saaxiib nahay, waxaan la leenahay xiriir wanaagsan, anagoo wadaagna xuduud 2500Km ah, waana joogi doonaa Gobolkan waligayo, sidaa aawadeed waa inaan xiriir wanaagsan yeelano waligayo; mana waxyeelaynayno danaha dalkale; dabcan. Ethiopia kaligeed maaha, wxaan taageero waydiisaney Midowga Africa(AU), Egypt, Sudan iyo dhammaan dalalka kale ee xubnaha ka ah ururka, inay tageeraan Somaliya, waxaana ka rajaynaynaa taagero buuxda dhammaantood; waddan kasta oo ku jira Midowga Africa. Su’aal: Awood ma adeegsan doontaa si aad u midayso Somaliya ama u balaariso Somaliya (ama see u aragtaa fikradda Somaliyada wayn (Greater Somalia, waxaa loola jeedaa, Somaliya oo lagu soo daro, Somalida Kenya iyo Ethiopia, waana fikraddii Somalidu wadatay xilligii Siyad Barre oo keentay dagalkii 1977 ee Somaliya iyo Ethiopia). A.YUSUF: Waxaan filayaa inay tahay siyaasad gaboowday taasi (old-fashioned politics). Ma jiro hadda fikir ama ra’yi noocaas oo kale ah.

Faysal Cali Waraabe warned Ethiopia over Somalia Faysal Cali Warabe's [in] famous saying: “a boy born in Hargeisa has more commonality with one born in Addis Ababa than one in Mogadishu.†"Inanka Xamar ku dhasha, Kan Addis Ababa ku dhasha ayaa iga xiga " Faysal Cali Waraabe oo canbaareeyey Ethiopia ugana digeya dhibaatada ka imaan karta siyaasadeeda Somalia ku wajahan “xaq uma laha inay u tallawdo Soomaaliya" "Itoobiya haddii ay Soomaaliya u talowdo khamaar xun bay ciyaaraysaa" hadhwanaag 2006-07-24 (Hadhwanaagnews) Qaybtii labaad ee waraysigii Faysal Cali Waraabe Hargeysa (Ogaal)- waxaanu halkan idiinku soo gudbinaynaa qaybtii labaad ee waraysi uu Ogaal la yeeshay guddoomiyaha xisbiga UCID, Faysal Cali Waraabe. Kaas oo wax lagaga waydiiyay dhinacyo badan, qaybtiisii koowaadna aanu idiinku soo gudbinay cadadkii hore. Qaybtii labaad ee waraysigaasina wuxuu u dhacay sidan; S: Guddoomiye, sideebaad u aragtaa mawqifka xukuumadda Madaxweyne Rayaale ka qaadatay xaaladda Soomaaliya ee mandaqadda ka taagan, ee aad labadiina Xisbi mucaarad hore uga hadasheen? J: Horta, Itoobiya haddii ay tidhaa Soomaaliya ayaan gelayaa, khamaar xun bay ciyaaraysaa. Waxa laga yaabaa intay is leedahay Soomaaliya iska caabbi, oo dawlad aan diini ahayn ka samee, inay Itoobiya lafteeda xitaa burbur u keento. Waanu ognahay waxa Itoobiya dhibaato dhexdeeda yaala iyo sida ay hoosta uga shidan tahay. Markaa anagu jaar ahaan waxaanu leenahay, Itoobiya xaqbay u leedahay inay xuduudeeda ilaashato iyo inay nabadgelyadeeda ilaashato. Laakiin, xaq uma laha inay u tallawdo Soomaaliya. Mid kalena waanu sheegaynaa oo IGAD Soomaali ma xukunto, waxa ay IGAD saxeexayaan ee ka Kenya lahaa Jabuuti ka joojin kari mayso, waxaanu leenahay, Kenya inay arrinta Soomaali dhex gashaba maaha. Waayo, Kenya iyadaa dhul Soomaaliyeed haysata, oo 1984-kiina Soomaali ku xasuuqday. Sidaa darteed, Kenya inay maanta tidhaahdo Soomaali danteed ayaan ka hadlaynaa qalad weeye. Itoobiya xaqeeda ha ilaashato oo ha is-difaacdo, laakiin inay tallowdo maaha. Waanan ka xunahay in aanay ilaa hadda dawladda Somaliland mawqif ka qaadan arrimahan taagan. S: Guddoomiye, mawqifka xukuumadda Somaliland miyaanay hore uga hadal Wasiirka Arrimaha dibeddu, Marwo Edna? J: Kaasi ma ahayn go’aan adag oo ofishal ah, oo waxay u muuqatay qof shakhsi ahaan u hadlaysay. Laakiin, dhawaaq dawladeed oo adag ma ahayn. Waraysi yar buu ahaa, shir jaraa’idna may qaban, ee arrin saxaafaddu daba-gashay bay ahayd. Markaa, mid baanu sheegaynaa oo waxa la yidhi, nin hagoog xumi inuu wax qarsanayo ayaa la moodaa. Hadda, Rayaale far baa ku godan ilaa intuu tegay Yemen, intuu tegay Itoobiya, labadaa jeerba iyo Kenya xitaa way isku arkeen Cabdilaahi Yuusuf. Arrimahaas inuu shacbiga u soo bandhigo weeye. S: Adigu, miyaad hubtaa inay Kenya isku arkeen Cabdilaahi Yuusuf iyo Rayaale?. J: Way wada joogeen, aragtidaa macnaheeduna maaha inay labada Madaxweyne goob isugu tagaan, balse madaxda waa loo kala hadal qaadaa, oo waa loo kala dab-qaadi karaa. Laakiin, Yemen waan ogahay in loo kala dab-qaaday Rayaale iyo Cadde Muuse, oo minitiskii baanu haynaa, wax badanna waanu ognahay oo aanan hadda umadda u sheegayn. S: Guddoomiye markaynu gudaheena u soo noqono, 25-ka bisha waxa laga yaabaa sida aad hore u baahiseen in Xisbiga UCID uu shirweynihii qabsado, dhinaca dimuquraadiyadda marka laga hadlayana Xisbiyadiina laftooda waa la dhaliilaa, waqtiganna waxa la tilmaamaa in aydaan dimuquraadiyadda lafteeda hoos ugu daadejin xisbiyadiina. Markaa, adigu wali ma musharaxa Madaxweynaha ee UCID ayaad u taagan tahay, mise…? J: Dimuquraadiyadda macnaheedu maaha in kolba madaxda la bedelo. Waxyaabaha aynaan aqoonin weeye taasi. Muhiimku waxa weeye in xisbiga la dhiso, dawladda la dhiso, dalka la dhiso weeye. Hogaanka markaa jooga waa in rikoodhkiisa la eegaa, haddii inta uu hayay uu wax soo kordhiyay oo uu wax qabtay, dee ceeb maaha in lagu celiyo. Laakiin, inaga haddii aad dib u raacdo taariikhdii SNM oo kale, dhibaatada haysatay waxay ahayd, labadii sanaba waxa la yidhi mar ha la shiro, oo wax hala bedelo iyada oo aan la qiimayn qofkii markaa xilka hayay. Markaa hogaanka uunbaa la eegayay iyo kursiga yaa maanta fadhiya? Reer hebel baa ku fadhiya, dabadeedna sanadka dambe reer hebel kale baa isa soo abuubalayay. Hadda, anagu waxaanu nahay Xisbi qudha. Afar jeer ayaanu Golaha dhexe simanaaro u qabanay, sharcigana waanu ku soconaa. Imikana shirkani golihii shanta sano ahaa weeye. Markaa waxa imika la dooranayaa waa, guddoomiyaha xisbiga, saddexda guddoomiye ku-xigeen, xoghayaha iyo xoghaye ku-xigeenka. Shantaa qof ayaa la dooranayaa. S: Xisbiga dhexdiisa cid guddoomiye-nimada kugula tartamaysaa, ma jirtaa?. J: Qof walba way u furan tahay, laakiin qofka haddii loo garto, oo la yidhaahdo hogaankiisu horumar buu keenay, sharaf ayuunbay u tahay. Inagu waxaynu badanaa ka qabnaa xasaasiyad haddii dadku wada shaqeeyo. Imika, waxa aad u wada shaqeeya shirguddoonka Wakiillada. Saddex qof oo wada tashada weeye, oo si fiican u wada shaqeeya. Taasi waxay neerfis ka dhigtaa UDUB iyo Madaxtooyada. Taasina waxa weeye siyaasaddii uu Afweyne inagu maamuli jiray, ee macnaheedu ahaa haddii aanay labada qof col ahayn, sir ka heli maysid. Markaa waxa weeye Xisbigu haddii uu madaxdiisa ku kalsoonaado, dee ceeb maaha. Xisbigayagu waa Xisbi aanu ka ilaalino tafaraaruqa, waa xisbi doonaya inuu wado cusub jeexo. Xisbiga qofkan abaabulay ee sameeyay aragti ayuu leeyahay, aragtidaa horta waa inuu dadka baraa, oo uu faafiyaa, oo uu sameeyaa dad badan oo fikraddan ay doonayaan qaba, oo haddii uu isagu meesha ka baxo sii wada. Maxamed X. Ibraahim Cigaal, UDUB ayuu dhisay, maanta UDUB mee?, Rayaale wuu ku soo booday, wax aragti siyaasadeed ah oo uu dhisay ma hayo. Isaga oo aan baran oo Madaxweynihii hore aanu siyaasadda Xisibigiisa wax badan kala samaynin, ayuu xilka qabtay. Markaa, waa kaa maanta la yuurura ee gees alla gees uu u dhaqaajiyo garan la’. S: markaa ma waxaad leedahay anagu dimuquraadiyadii waanu dabbaqaynaa, oo aragti baanu leenahay, laakiin UDUB dimuquraadiyaddii may dabbaqin, oo aragti ma leh? J: maya, siyaasad baan jirin, anagu siyaasadda waanu wadaynaa, oo marka aanu dadka siyaasadda barno ee mabda’eeda la barto, ee hadhaw aanu ogaano inaan aragtidayadii baaba’ayn, marka aanu ka tagno meesha, markaas ayaanu dhiibi doonaa Insha-Allah. Laakiin, madaxda uunbaa la bedelaa maaha dimuquraadiyad. Ogaal Newspaper Hargeysa,Somaliland ogaalwar@hotmail.com

Ethiopian troops advance into Somalia Abraham Fisseha Sapa-AFP ADDIS ABABA — Fear of war rose at the weekend after Ethiopia vowed to “crush†Somalia’s powerful Union of Islamic Courts, which has threatened a “holy war†against Addis Ababa. Hundreds of Ethiopian troops moved into a second Somali town at the weekend, ostensibly to protect the country’s weak government, which is backed by the US and the United Nations (UN). Reports said that the troops were on their way to the capital, Mogadishu, where Islamic Courts fighters are in control. Arab League-sponsored talks aimed at easing tension fell apart at the weekend. The government negotiators failed to show up and Islamic Courts militia objected to Ethiopia’s intervention. Both sides signed a temporary cease-fire agreement on June 22 in which the Islamic Courts formally recognised the government, something they had previously said they would not do. The transitional government at the weekend demanded an internationally backed undertaking from the Islamic grouping that it would honour future accords before talks started in earnest. Ethiopian and Somali government officials have denied Ethiopian troops are in the country. But about 200 Ethiopian troops — accompanied by at least five pickup trucks with mounted machine guns, other vehicles and a helicopter — were seen in Wajid, about 75km southeast of the Somali-Ethiopian border. Residents and UN staff said there were Ethiopian soldiers in Wajid and Baidoa, where the fragile transitional government is based. The soldiers took control of the town’s airport from a militia serving the local administration, they said. Rumours of an Ethiopian troop presence in Somali began last month. Last week witnesses said a 400-strong, well-armed force had entered Baidoa, 240km northwest of Mogadishu, ahead of an advancing force of militia. The Islamic militia pulled back as the Ethiopian troops moved in and denied that there was any bid to take over Baidoa. Somali government leaders may be reluctant to acknowledge that Ethiopian troops have come to their aid because they do not want to appear to be beholden to the country’s traditional adversary. Anti-Ethiopian sentiment still runs high in this mostly Muslim country. Ethiopia’s move could give the Somali government its only chance of curbing the Islamic militia’s increasing power. If a full-scale battle starts, Ethiopia has a superior fighting force. It sent troops to Somalia in 1993 and 1996 to crush bids by Islamic militants to set up a government based on sharia law. Diplomats said indications pointed to full-scale fighting unless diplomatic efforts were moved up a gear in the next few days. The US last week urged Ethiopia to exercise restraint and said the European Union, the US, the African Union, the Arab League and others in an international contact group on Somalia would meet soon to consider the volatile situation. Somalia has been without a central government since warlords toppled dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 and then turned on each other, carving much of the country into armed camps. Meanwhile, a senior Somali government official called for the disarmament of the Islamists, saying they posed a threat to the government that has been unable to exert its authority since returning from exile in Kenya last year. “The Islamic Courts present a threat to the transitional federal government if they are not disarmed,†said the official who spoke on condition of anonymity. “Islamic Courts are part of this community. They have no right to keep weapons,†the official said . The leader of the Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia last week vowed to wage a holy war against Ethiopia — a call some observers said was populist rhetoric. “They have to tailor some kind of mechanism to keep the momentum of the people’s support,†said Abebe Tadesse, a Horn of Africa watcher. However, in Mogadi-shu, residents rallied in support of Supreme Islamic Council leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in denouncing Ethiopia’s move, with some calling it a deliberate act of provocation. “The incursion by Ethiopia is a deliberate act to provoke Somalia and to further destabilise it,†said Mahamoud Abdullahi, a former police officer. “It is a move contrary to international law. The Ethiopian troops are killing their people inside Addis Ababa and there is no way they will bring peace to Somalia.â€

Warlords Don't Love Ethiopia Any Less But Hate Yusuf More Warlords Don't Love Ethiopia Any Less But Hate Yusuf More By Faisal Roble March 21, 2005 The story of Somali collective memory is told and retold as being short and selective. Here is another variation of such a story pertaining to the controversy about Ethiopian peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Maxamed Siyaad Barre In the 1980s, the Somali National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC), and the Somali Salivation Democratic Front (SSDF) were all housed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. They all collaborated to overthrow Mohamed Siad Barre, the late dictator that ruled Somalia from 1969 to 1990. Most of the constituents that these movements claimed to have represented showed or seemed to have shown a high degree of affinity towards Ethiopia throughout the last 20 or so years, a period that has one of the lowest points and marked the speedy erosion of Somali nationalism. One way that the above-mentioned groups and their followers showed gratitude towards Ethiopia was carried: By helping the late Ethiopian dictator Megistu Haile Mariam to dismantle Somalia and create what has since then deteriorated to the current disarticulated stateless nation; By killing and or throwing Somali Galbeed refugees out of their respective districts. In Mogadishu, for example, helpless civilians who hailed from the Somali Region of Ethiopia were killed mercilessly during the early years of Somalia's civil war. In Jalalaqsi refugee camps, hundreds of people were beheaded and thrown to the Shabelle river and were denied any proper Islamic burial ceremony. In Hargeisa, thousands of refugees were slaughtered in what was called the Dam, or “Biyo xidheen.†And not many refugees went to Garowe or Bossaso, although these cities were as hostile when one looks that the sternest verbal abuses came from these regions. And so far, neither Ethiopia nor its yesteryear's or today's allies in Somalia has raised this human tragedy. Faysal Ali Waraabe - UCID Party Chief Somalilanders are on the record to say that they loved Ethiopia more than their own Somali brethren inside and outside of the republic. This sentiment is represented by one of the leader of Somaliland, Faysal Cali Warabe's [in] famous saying: “a boy born in Hargeisa has more commonality with one born in Addis Ababa than one in Mogadishu.†"Inanka Xamar ku dhasha, Kan Addis Ababa ku dhasha ayaa iga xiga " "Haddii Ethiopia Xamar ciidamo u dirto wabiyo dhiig ah ayaa qulquli doona " Faysal Cali Waraabe In the case of USC supporters, love for Ethiopia was captured by a pamphlet that I read in the early years of the 1990s that said some thing akin to “Hobyo port for Ethiopia.†As a result, the late General Caydid used to be the only warlord who was received in Ethiopia with a red carpet stretched out to his Pole Airport arrivals. As to Garowe's loyalty to Ethiopia, retelling the story here would be an overkill. Suffice it to say Bosaaso port is almost to replace the role Berbera had hitherto played for Ethiopia. Today, irrespective of past affinity, all these groups are using Ethiopia as their bogyman to get to the top price and that is derailing Abdulahi Yusuf's government. They all have somehow agreed to shame Ethiopia not because they love Ethiopia any less, but because they hate what Ethiopia is doing for Abdullahi Yusuf more. It is a reminiscent of Shake Spear's assessment of the Rome of Caesar's killing of Brutus when he wrote: “It is not that I Love you any less, but that I love Rome more.†One Somalilander Website (Awdelnews) ran an editorial (Ethiopia as an enemy is engraved in the collective memory of Somali people) and went as far as suggesting that Ethiopia's animosity with the Somali people goes back to the war of Imam Ahmed Gurey in the 15 th Century. That is precisely the case. But, can one talk about Ethiopia's animosity and its role to stunt Somali national aspirations, and then let have Ethiopia train its navy at the coast of Berbera at will? Other websites prematurely wrote in droves op-ed pieces to condemn Ethiopia as Somalia's eternal enemy while Yalaxow was telling the press that Ethiopia had in the past supplied weapons to himself (Yalaxow), Aidid, Qanyare and of course Abdullahi Yusuf. In another instance, one Somalilander, who recently decried about Ethiopian troops as peacekeepers in Somalia, once equated the search for Somali unity to racial purity, hence equating greater Somali nationalism with racism. To make matters worse, this piece was posted on Ethiopian websites! Where does really Ethiopia fit in each group's particular and narrow agenda? As the Somali clan politics shifts like the weather of London, we may never give a precise and short answer to this question. It is intriguingly puzzling, however, to know that Ethiopia, as an old and more complex country, correctly reads the uncontrollable and immature emotions of Somalis for the authorities in Addis Ababa refer to Somalis as a simplistic tribal groups, as in “ armane ya Somale Zalan gosawoch,†pagan Somali tribal groups. As such, Ethiopia perhaps reads where every one of these different interest groups stands and it claims to understand their agenda in the current fiasco. The issue of Ethiopian peacekeeping mission in Somalia itself is as strange as Ahmed Silanyo of Kulmiye party carrying the banner for the reinstitution of the former Democratic Republic of Somalia. That does not mean all of the critics of Ethiopian peace mission in Somalia do not have merit. Some of them may have. However, painting Ethiopia as a cruel colonial force that is Somalia's eternal enemy is quite a laughable matter. Did we suddenly wake up as of January 2005 from the slumber that Dr. Ali Abdul Rahman Hersi, a genuine proponent of Somali nationalism and critic of Ethiopian intervention all along, identified as a plague in today's Somalia? All of the groups beating the drum against Ethiopia have in the past used or are still using Ethiopia (as in the case of Puntlanders and Somalilanders) as their friend to weaken Somali nationalism. As viciously as clannish Somali clans and groups are, the current controversy surrounding Ethiopian peacekeeping mission is a classical case where a Somali clan or a political group would use anything at its disposal to advance its narrow tribal interest, even if that is smoking up the nation. And one may suspect that the rest of the world, with the exception of some gullible western liberal groups like the International Crisis Group (ICG), sees said controversy as one of the many manifestations of Somalia's clan politics. If so, the entire Ethiopian bashing is nothing more than a political gymnastics by one political group against another. What is disheartening is that Somalis in Ethiopia have lost what is estimated to be a third of their land in a sham plebiscite this past October that the Ethiopian parliament hastily rubber-stamped. Not a single Somali group, party or news group ever mentioned this historical miscarriage of justice with the exception of Wardheernews. Ethiopia is carrying the most comprehensive land grabbing policy . Most of the groups shedding crocodile tears have their own hidden agenda about their bone of contention with Ethiopia, but are masquerading it as Somali nationalism. Having said this, I join those on the other side of the fence and argue that Ethiopia may not be the right force to enforce either disarmament or peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Ethiopia is already, though, in Somaliland, Puntland, Hiiraan region, Baydhabo. Worse, Ethiopian Airlines have been flying into Somali cities, violating its air space for a number of years. But, the very forces that have destroyed anything that was good about being Somali must not opportunistically use the cause of Somali nationalism in their political gymnastics to reach their parochial agenda. Using Ethiopia as the bogyman must not be read outside the web of clan politics. To maximize one's clanist agenda, no stone is usually left unturned and that is the story of the 1980s and 1990s that would be told and retold. The Ethiopian bogyman is nothing more than one such a stone to be turned by as many groups and individuals as we have seen within the last two weeks. This is the real story retold, unflattering as it may sound.

shiikhiina nabad waa ka waayey soomaali!!!

Osman Jaamac oo ahaan jiray Siyaasi reer Somaliland ah ayaa hadal jacbur ah oo uu ka sheegay laanta Afka Soomaaliga ee BBC-da Maanta 25/07/2006 ku aflagaaday Jabhada SNM ee dhalisay Xornimada Somaliland ee lagu caano-maalay. Mudane Osman oo had iyo jeer hadalkiisu duqeeyo meelo aanu ugu talo-galin ayaa yidhi Jabhadihii Somalia ka dagaalamay oo ay ku jirto SNM waxa baabiiyey ama Burburiyey Qabyaalada. Hadalkaa Osman ayaa ah mid aan Qiimayn badan lahayn, isla markaana meel ka dhac iyo Gef ku ah Jabhada Barakaysan ee SNM iyo Madaxdeedii Geeriyootay iyo kuwa nool-ba. Mr. Osman oo jecel in uu wax ka noqdo Somalia ayaa ka soo duday, kan soo cadhooday kooxdii Carta ee Cabdiqaasim hogaaminaayey ka dib markii wax tix-galin iyo Maamuus ah uu ka waayey. Osman markii uu ku soo fashilasy Carta ayuu qabtay Kenya si uu uga qayb-galo shirkii Qabqablayaasha Somalida ee lagu soo yagleelay Maamulka Imbagaati ee Baydhaba ku sugan, sida Rag goob joog ka ahaa shirkaas ay sheegeen.... Osman waxa Geeska ku Feedhay Mr. Buubaa iyo Sifir oo ka Riixday Jagadii Madaxnimo ee uu ka hunguraynaayey kooxda Imbagaati. Adeero Osman oo aan u hubsan isbedelada Siyaasiga ah ee ka dhacaaya Somalia ayaa maantana u hanqal-taagaayaMaxkamadaha uu hogaaminaayo Wadaaadka dad-dilka ah kornayl-Sheikh Hassan Dahir Awes. Waxaan dadweynaha Xasuusinayaa Maqaalkan hoos ku qoran oo layidhaahdo (Faras Qaayihiisii iyo Qiimigiisii Quus-buu ka joogaa). Maqaalkan oo ku saabsan dhacdooyinka Siyaasiga ah ee Osman ayaan qoray 28/02/2004, Faras Qaayihiisii iyo Qiimigiisii Quus-buu ka joogaa. Aragtida dadweynaha reer Somaliland ee gudaha iyo debedaba ayaa ka midaysan Mawqifka siyaasiga ah ee Osman Jama, taas oo ah mid faashila oo aan dhinacna u fayoobayin Mr. Osman oo markii uu kooxda Al-carta ku biiray si toos u lumiyey kalsoonidii siyaasiga ahayd ee reer Somaliland u hayeen ayaa haddana ka faraxashay kartidii Siyaasigu wax kula soo bixi jiray markii uu ku hungoobay ee waxba ka noqon waayey xataa kooxdii Al-carta ee uu seddexda sano la joogay......Taa soo keentay ka ma danbeyntiin in uu Hadh-cad ka soo baqoolay. Hadaba waxa mudnaan leh oo la is weydiinayaa …. Mudane Osman oo xaaladiisa Siyaasiga ahi Iminka ku Qiimaysantahay *laba jeer khasaar*, koonfur iyo kooxdii Cabdi qaasim ee Al-cartana ka gubatay oo Quus ka jooga, Somaliland aanay jahaba u wada tukanayn, Xaga uu ka keenaayo Karaamada iyo kartida uu Somali ku midaynaayo. Waxaan ku gunaanadaya qoraalkayga Adeer *laf ayaad toobin ku haysaa* ama *Haan gun la' ayaad dhaaminaysaa oo ka midho dhalin kari maysid Midnimada Magac u yaalka ah ee aad meel walba la taagantahay, waxa jirtay Maahmaah odhanaysa Afkaan reer hebel ku amaanayo maan Waalidintay Faataxo ugu akhriyo* Taas oo aan uga jeedo Tamarta iyo Awooda aad Somaliweyn ku luminayso in aad wax kale oo ku haboon ku isticmaasho ayaa ka fiican. Gabagabo…waxaan kuu sheegayaa oo adna aad naftaada u sheegtaa..... mid kuu dhaw iyo Mid kaa dheer, mid kula dad ah iyo mid kula dal ah oo kaa dhegaysanayaana ma jiro Somali-weyntan ma dhalayska ah. Hadaba……… *Ka tasho Cismaanow in tuu Tuhunku sii muuqdo By:Osman Abdillahi Sool….Freelance Journalist. 28/02/2004. E-mail: sooldhuub@hotmail.com

Well written response Abdi and Ahmed Samater are two great Somali scholars Secessionists are determined to hijack the all the territories of the irrelevant -former British Somali colony – including pro unity regions like Sool, Sanaag, Cayn, and Awdal The table below shows the distribution of votes and indicates that two areas voted against the constitution while six approved. A finer resolution of the evidence reveals major differences within those localities where opposition was strongest (Table 1). In the North, 54.63% of the voters in the Hargeisa area rejected the constitution while 51.15% of those in the surroundings around Burao approved it. The figures in the table show that a narrow majority of the voters in the central areas of the North voted against the constitution while an overwhelming majority of the people in eastern and western zones voted in favor of the charter. most of the people of the eastern and western areas as well as a minority in the central parts are opposed to the secession; a majority of people in the latter zone support the separatist agenda. The authors of the ICG Reports conceal these facts. We think that the aim is to advocate for a segment of the population in the central parts rather then express the comprehensive temper of the whole population of the region. Here, it is worth remembering the fact that the resistance against the odious dictatorship of Siyaad Barre’s order that appeared in the North, in the form of the Somali National Movement (SNM), forcibly imposed the secessionist project on others in 1991. SNM was quintessentially the armed party of one genealogical group (see Part II, pp.16–17 of the attachment). Finally, in our opinion, the ICG team fails to understand the difference between authentic democratic practice and propaganda. To be sure, there have been elections but it is a undeniable fact that the foundational ones were neither democratic nor free around such a critical topic. Democracy entails, among others, autonomy and choice; freedom’s prerequisites are an absence of intimidation and fear. Together, democracy and freedom presuppose tolerable reasonableness over contentious issues such as the nature and future of associative belonging.At that time in the region, some communities had the freedom to publicly propagate their preference for separation while others were coerced to toe a predetermined line -- that is, to endorse the secessionist demand by the armed wing of the Somali National Movement. Given the above, we propose that the AU should embark on a new task that IGAD and the international community have, disappointedly, failed to accomplish; that is, playing the role of an impartial, competent, and patient facilitator for reconciliation. The AU and prominent African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, and Egypt should take the lead and act as non-partisan mediators. Reconciling Somalis in an environment that precludes duress and violence is the most precious gift continental leaders can offer to the Somali people in this darkest hour of their contemporary history. We proffer that the transitional period is the appropriate time to engage in rigorous constitutional negotiations. Used wisely, such an opportunity could afford the people of northern regions as well as those in other parts of the country to debate any restructuring of the future political dispensation. At the conclusion of such a process, the entire population of the country could then vote freely (as they did in 1961), with international witness, on the adoption of a new constitution. The ICG Report minimizes clashes that have already occurred in the eastern third of the region as communities there have refused to submit to an unrepresentative secessionist administration. We believe that there is a silent majority in the west of the territory who are equally opposed to the secession but who have decided to buy time. The fact that nearly the whole eastern third of the North is beyond the reach of the Hargeisa Administration (as well as the fierce resistance of the population there) highlights the presence of a worrisome conflict. This situation should not be underestimated, as it is potentially a serious warning of a deeper problem.

If I am his cousin as you said (which is not true) and I accused both of you same thing, that should mean that I sided with you xoogsade or at least I was I am a fair Maybe duke and I are affiliated with same imaginary clan, but still its wrong and immoral Xoogsade to say that Garaad and Duke are cousins, if its true that we are cousins, then Xoogsade you are cousin of Rahima, Allah ubaahne, olol, yoyoma etc...Nonsense

Amxaaro controls Hargeysa and its leaders as much as it does on other places in Soomaaliya. Hubka Soomaalida la iskugu diro oo la iskugu dhiibo Berbera ayuu kasoo degaa, shib iska dheh. And who handed the poor xoriyaddoon Soomaalis of Soomaali Galbeed, labeling them ‘terrorists’ back to Sanaawi? Who did this? Who says 'a boy living in Addis Ababa is closer to me than the one in Xamar.’ Who every single other day idaacadaha kaleh anaga iyo Itoobiya [Amxaaro] walaalo ayaa nahnay. When a so-called Soomaali foreign minister utters those rubbish words wax kale haray ayaa iska yar. MMA runta waan kugu ogaaa, xaqiiq baad ka hadashay

Xoodsade Now you are accusing me baseless tribalism, I accused both of you same thing and still you telling me that I am unfair what a hypo critic you are? Now where did I sided with duke, unless you hate particular tribes

Juje is from Marka, and he has a reason to support or oppose warlord Indhacadde and his ally Sheikh Aweys because Indhacadde subjugates people of Marka The question is Red sea whats your problem? I think you need in aad edabdarada jooojisid Mr. Secessionist you don’t need to take sides between the two Muslims, who have a conflict, or do you want to keep the south in turmoil as other secessionists, when side with the daalim muslim you wish chaos in south somalia

xoogsade iyo duke isku mid baa tihiin, laba qabiil baad kale taageertaan, both you are cyber warlords

Its fact that Buuhoodle is occupied presently by Ethiopian troops Red sea paragon and duufaan I don’t understand why you guys are ignorant and support Ethiopia's invasion over Buuhoodle,What a two-faced and clannish people you are? This has nothing to do with southern somalia. What you mean it has nothing to do with southern Somalia? Don’t you care a invaded Somali town whether its north or south by Ethiopia I believe Ethiopia’s occupation over Buuhoodle has something to do with the presence of Ethiopian troops in Baydhabo. Duufaan Ethiopia has grand plan to colonize all Somalia, so don’t be blinded by tribalism Buuhoodle is in the border. the largest part of the city is the somali side of the border, the second part call Sweto is "ethiopian" side. Now you insulting Buuhoodle, where this Soweto came from sxb? I from Buuhoodle and I know only one buuhoodle, True Buuhoodle is near to the fake Somali-Ethiopian border I have relatives in Buuhoodle, and they confirmed the presence of strong Ethiopian troops in Buuhoodle, again this is not the first time that Ethiopian troops took over Buuhoodle, for the last 16 years Ethiopian troops were stationed in Buuhoodle although they leave sometimes, but return to the soon after. What’s different now is the timing and the large number of Ethiopian troops reached Buuhoodle Illow naga badbaadi xabashida

Ciidamada Ethopianka oo soo Degay Buuhoodle. Jul 23, 2006 By:Xuseen Aadan Yuusuf Buuhoodle(Radiossc,net):-Iyadoo xaaladda Guud ee Deegaanka Buuhoodle ay kacsanayd maalmahii ugu dambeeyey ka dib markii dhacdooyin kala duwan oo xagga Ammaanka wax u dhimayaa ay dhaceen ayaa Saaka goor hore waxaa Magaalada Buuhoodle soo degay Ciidanka Federaalka Ethopia. Raxan ka tirsan Ciidanka Federaalka Ethopia ayaa Ku waabariistay Meelaha ay Xeryaha ka dhigtaan Ciidanka Ethopianku marka ay Buuhoodle soo degaan, Ciidamadan ayaa waxa ay ku sugan yihiin Xaafadda Suweeto oo magaalada Buuhoodle kaga taalla dhinaca Xuduuda Ethopia mana jiraan wax Ciidamo ah oo u soo talaabay dhinaca Xuduuda Soomaaliya. Ma jiro illaa hadda wax kulan ah oo dhexmaray Ciidamada Ethopianka iyo dadweynaha deegaanka marka laga reebo hawlwadeeno derejo hoose ah oo Ethopianka uga wakiil ah dhinaca Xuduuda ka talowsan, waxana lagu rajo weyn yahay inuu kulan noocaas ahi uu qabsoomo Duhurnimada Maanta. Sida la ogyahay dhacdooyin kala duwan oo dhinaca Ammaanka ah ayaa hadheeyey Deegaanka Buuhoodle maalmahii ina dhaafay, ka dib markii ugu yaraan maalintii shalay ay gabadh dhalinyaro ahi ku dhaawacantay rasaas ay is weydaarsadeen kooxo hubaysan oo aan abaabulayn badhtamaha magaalada Buuhoodle khilaaf ku saabsabn Baabuur la kala iibsaday oo dhinac ka mid ah dadkii kala iibsaday ay dalbadeen in iibka lagu kala noqdo halka dhinaca kalena uu diiday dalabkaasi. Sidoo kalena waxaa Buuhoodle la keenay Duhurnimadii shalay labo nin oo dhaawac ah oo ay waxyeelaysay rasaas ay maleeshiyo ka tirsan Beesha bariga Burco ay la beegsatay gaadhi siday Qaadka shirkadda 571 oo ka yimid dhinaca magaalada Gaashaamo una soo socday dhinaca Buuhoodle. Xaaladda guud ee magaalada Buuhoodle ayaa hadda degan waxaana sii yaraanaya dadka rayidka ah ee qoryaha garabka ku qaata kuwaasi oo maalmahii u dambeeyey khatar geliyey amnigii & degenaanshihii ay caanka ku ahayd magaaldan 60 Jirsatay ee shaxdu. Xuseen Aadan Yuusuf Radiossc.net Buuhoodle

The International Crisis Group Report on “Somalilandâ€: Advocacy not Impartial Analysis July 20, 2006 If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal men. Without this transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics, strictly speaking, no common world, and no public realm is possible. … It is what we have in common not only with those who live with us, but also with those who were here before and with those will come after us. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, P. 55 In responding to the ethnic appeal, the voters are frozen in a moment of particularity that effectively cancels the prospect of sharing in the universality, at any rate, the synthesis of universality and particularity which is the whole meaning of democratic participation and consensus-building. They are left one-sided, stunted, undeveloped, as they remain confined to their small parochial space, and in their entrapment pay for the realization of the ambitions of the elite for whom their enthnicization is just one strategy of power. Claude Ake, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa, Codresia, 2003. pp. 171-172 I. A Rebuttal: Round Two The International Crisis Group (ICG) Report on Somalia’s northern region (Somaliland) released on May 23, 2006, is the second of its type since 2003. The Reports are useful in that they add to the plethora of contributions urging the International Community to help Somalis help themselves. In addition to an attached reprint of our response to the 2003 Report, this intervention consists of three components: Part one presents brief responses to the most recent ICG Report; the second section proposes an alternative; and the third part comments on the danger of substituting aprioristic perspectives for an open-minded and judicious analysis. The ICG Report rehashes many of the claims made in the 2003 account. A central argument at that time was this: If the International Community does not recognize the region (Somaliland) as a separate and independent country, it will be tantamount to inviting war and violence. Three years later, that ICG attempt to frighten the world on the basis of faulty analysis and alarmist predictions did not come to pass. The new Report tries the same tactic and urges the African Union (AU) to act urgently. We think that heeding such blatantly biased analysis and ill-founded prognosis will not serve the best interests of the Somali people or the African Union. Consequently, we urge the African Union and African governments to become more engaged with the Somali problem, but in a manner that is based on careful and deliberative analysis. That alone, we propose, will foster reconciliations and the reknitting of the “common self†among the Somali people. Rather than providing a constructive analysis, we hold that the two ICG Reports put forth dangerous propositions that could only further corrode national identity and, therefore, compound the current fragmentation. On the contrary, we suggest that the most sensible mechanism for solving the Somali crises is through a democratic reconciliation among Somalis rather than the imposition of a solution from above or endorsing a sectarian project. The African Union is well placed to play a pivotal role in such a scheme. Our response to the first ICG Report, a companion to this memo, challenged nearly all the claims repeated in this most recent one. This brief essay, then, is intended to alert the AU, African governments, and others sympathetic to Somali issues about the fatal flaws inherent in the Report. We hope this memo and the attached essay provide sufficient information and analysis to generate an alternative roadmap for the way to a peaceful resolution of the Somali predicament. In combination with the attached essay, these remarks directly and succinctly tackle key points of the ICG Reports. A. The history of the voluntary union between the British and Italian Somalilands is wrongly portrayed in the ICG Report. A more accurate assessment of this issue is in our earlier response (See pages 5–7 of attachment). Moreover, item E of this memo provides useful historical data on the subject. B. The ICG Report submits that unless the AU urgently acts in accordance with its prescription, there might be war between the North and South. This assertion is identical to the alarmist prognosis contained in the first Report, which has not been borne out by the facts. More significantly, since the issuance of the 2003 ICG Report, the admittedly feeble and less than legitimate Somali Transitional Federal Institutions have committed themselves to a peaceful resolution of the question of the North. Our judgment on the panic-mongering tactics by the Report is on pages 14–15 of the attached document. C. This new Report claims that a noisy minority of the people from the North and militant Jihadists from the South favor unity. Surprisingly, elsewhere the Report indicates, “a significant minority of the people in the region is opposed†to secession. Now, a careful reader would wonder which of the two statements represents the greater truth. Moreover, given the fact that it is highly treasonous in Hargeisa to question the ambition of breaking away, how do the authors of the Report know what proportion of the total population of the region is opposed to the secession? D. The Report conveniently describes the propagation of a new “Somaliland†identity as an inclusive project and, in the process, avoids the unpleasant fact that kin genealogy has been turned into a poisonous political apparatus. Consequently, some groups consider the idea of a “Somaliland†as theirs; others feel disenfranchised. This is a main reason why the sentiment towards secession is strongest in some parts of the central zone and weakest in the east and the west of the region. For more on this see Item E below. E. The Report notes that, “the claim to statehood rests on the territory’s separate status during the colonial era.†This assertion has two major failings. First, it privileges colonialism as an indelible historical experience that trumps choices Somalis had made in pre-colonial as well as post-colonial eras and the resultant experiences. Here is one critical historical fact that the authors of the ICG Report consciously erase from memory: various Somali kin groups in the region signed different treaties with the British. These agreements were the foundation of the colonial establishment. In light of this, it would seem reasonable to expect that the ICG authors would underscore the traditional autonomy of the genealogical groups at least to the extent that their document relies on colonial records. Moreover, and even more compelling, is the voluntary choice Somalis of the North and South made in 1960 to form a united Somali Republic. The whole people of the two regions made this decision in a free and democratic way, without any fear or intimidation. We think that objective analysts would seriously consider the importance of these three major historical benchmarks rather than favoring the one that sits well with a particularistic agenda: pre-colonial autonomy of genealogical groups; colonial treaties; and democratic choice free Somali people made after independence. We would like to remind readers of some crucial facts about post-colonial democratic Somalia. One of the most impressive events of the Somali Republic’s post-colonial democratic history was the constitutional plebiscite of 1961. It was in this referendum that the Somali people endorsed the Union Act embedded in the constitution, which read, “The state of Somaliland and the state of Somalia do hereby unite and shall forever remain united in a new, independent, democratic, unitary republic, the name of which shall be the Somali Republic.†The results of the plebiscite sanctioned the birth of the new African Republic and closed the curtain on pre-colonial and colonial political order. The table below shows the distribution of votes and indicates that two areas voted against the constitution while six approved. A finer resolution of the evidence reveals major differences within those localities where opposition was strongest (Table 1). In the North, 54.63% of the voters in the Hargeisa area rejected the constitution while 51.15% of those in the surroundings around Burao approved it. The figures in the table show that a narrow majority of the voters in the central areas of the North voted against the constitution while an overwhelming majority of the people in eastern and western zones voted in favor of the charter. The other area in the country where most of the voters rejected the constitution was in Hiran. In fact, Hiran had the highest rejection rate of 61.99%. It is critical to understand the reason why the margin of the majority negative vote in the North was relatively slim and why the Hiran region was the exception in the South. Our research shows that the rejectionist areas had one thing in common: two leading politicians were not satisfied with the way the new ministerial portfolios were distributed. In Hiran, Sheik Ali Jimale, one of the leading politicians who hailed from the area, was very unhappy with the fact that the Provincial President did not appoint his friend, Abdillahi Issa, as prime minister, but instead chose Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke. Similarly, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, the most eminent northerner who was allied with Abdillahi Issa’s camp, felt unappreciated despite being called to run the Ministry of Defense of the new Republic. Available evidence illustrates that Sheik Ali Jimale, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal, and their associates decided to campaign against the constitution in order to get even with President Aden A. Osman, Prime Minister Sharmarke, and their political camp. The dissidents assumed that if voters turned down the constitution, then the new government would be discredited and, as a result, they could rise to power. Thus, their campaign was about portfolios in government rather than the substance of the draft constitution. Unfortunately, however, they politicized kin identity to such an extent that it enabled them to mobilize a notable proportion of their respective genealogical groups to oppose the constitution. An examination of the political geography of the plebiscite clearly reflects the influence of politicized genealogy in the two regions at the time. But we hasten to add that, despite the power of this ideology, the vast majority of the Somali voters sanctioned the constitution. Over forty years later, the political divide among the population in the North (Somaliland) is along the same lines: most of the people of the eastern and western areas as well as a minority in the central parts are opposed to the secession; a majority of people in the latter zone support the separatist agenda. The authors of the ICG Reports conceal these facts. We think that the aim is to advocate for a segment of the population in the central parts rather then express the comprehensive temper of the whole population of the region. Here, it is worth remembering the fact that the resistance against the odious dictatorship of Siyaad Barre’s order that appeared in the North, in the form of the Somali National Movement (SNM), forcibly imposed the secessionist project on others in 1991. SNM was quintessentially the armed party of one genealogical group (see Part II, pp.16–17 of the attachment). A. An African Analogy A South African context will most vividly reveal the hidden but divisive propensity of the ICG Report. It is instructive to recall that the vast majority of the black African population and other progressive groups resisted the apartheid regime’s strategy of maintaining tribal/race groupings as a basis of citizenship and, instead, opted for a national identity and political order that would be inclusive. The fact that the African National Congress (ANC) did not win a majority of the votes in two important provinces in 1994 did not invalidate the liberation of South Africa and the new democratic constitutional order. To the contrary, the country has flourished since. We think that the analytical framework the ICG team reporting on Somalia has adopted would have interpreted differently the meaning and significance of South Africa’s first national election. The authors’ logic would legitimate a secession of the zones that the ANC did not win. Astonishingly, the IGC would have advised the Organization of African Unity to endorse the formation of Zululand and Colorland republics! II. An Alternative Proposal The 2006 ICG Report raises four specific questions and provides four correlate answers. We find their answers/recommendations wanting. A. Should the people of “Somaliland†be rewarded for creating stability and democratic governance in the midst of the chaos that is the failed State of the Somali Republic? The authors of the ICG Report advocate that the AU should at least reward “Somaliland†for its peaceful, stable, and democratic order by minimally granting it observer status in the AU. We strongly agree that the people of this region have come together to put into place a modicum of peace, order, and institutional life that are superior to other initiatives around the country. This success deserves positive and concrete encouragement. Here, substantial international aid in the critical spheres of human development (e.g., security, education, health, agriculture, water and electricity, transportation, job creation, and the consolidation of the democratic procedures) is long overdue. We hasten to add, however, that such support for the achievements of the region ought not to be conflated with an acceptance, let alone an endorsement, of the disintegration of Somalia. On this issue, and because the actual historical record is at odds with the claims of the ICG Report, our analysis leads us to urge the AU and the rest of the world community to resist ill-informed and partisan points of view that, in the end, only accelerate the destruction of Somali peoplehood. Finally, in our opinion, the ICG team fails to understand the difference between authentic democratic practice and propaganda. To be sure, there have been elections but it is a undeniable fact that the foundational ones were neither democratic nor free around such a critical topic. Democracy entails, among others, autonomy and choice; freedom’s prerequisites are an absence of intimidation and fear. Together, democracy and freedom presuppose tolerable reasonableness over contentious issues such as the nature and future of associative belonging. At that time in the region, some communities had the freedom to publicly propagate their preference for separation while others were coerced to toe a predetermined line -- that is, to endorse the secessionist demand by the armed wing of the Somali National Movement. Given the above, we propose that the AU should embark on a new task that IGAD and the international community have, disappointedly, failed to accomplish; that is, playing the role of an impartial, competent, and patient facilitator for reconciliation. The AU and prominent African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania, and Egypt should take the lead and act as non-partisan mediators. Reconciling Somalis in an environment that precludes duress and violence is the most precious gift continental leaders can offer to the Somali people in this darkest hour of their contemporary history. We proffer that the transitional period is the appropriate time to engage in rigorous constitutional negotiations. Used wisely, such an opportunity could afford the people of northern regions as well as those in other parts of the country to debate any restructuring of the future political dispensation. At the conclusion of such a process, the entire population of the country could then vote freely (as they did in 1961), with international witness, on the adoption of a new constitution. In this context, a word on the national responsibility of the political class of the South is in order. For too long, many in the southern part of the country have been so preoccupied with their own peculiar form of clanist and destructive battles over what we have called, “the cadaverous state.†In addition to the local ruin, best underscored by the ghastly condition of the capital, that such horrid and myopic indulgence has brought, the greatest cost has been a devastating withering of the national spirit. Subsequently, many among the most thoughtful of the people of the North, who hold on to the sanctity of a united and democratic Somali Republic have often and bitterly spoken about the repetitive failure of the Southern elite to help hold up and protect the national cause. Northerns frequently pose, “Wey isku maqanyhiin; intayba lasugi?†(They are obsessed with their own petty ambitions and grudges; how long must one wait?). This question is not merely rhetorical. On the contrary, it is as urgent as any of the great concerns that face the Somali people. In short, the communities of the South ought to realize that the preservation of national unity has been a most difficult topic in the North to such an extent that the keepers of the faith, as it were, have found their conviction shaken by the constantly depressing tidings from the rest of the country. The moral of the point, then, is this: if compatriots from the South, too, continue to be mesmerized by local clanist machinations and instrumentalist politics to the neglect of the pressing and supreme national project, they will deprive themselves and the rest of the nation the invention of a formula that at once successfully addresses genuine local troubles and responds effectively to the gathering danger of dismemberment. B. Would rewarding “Somaliland†with either independence or significant autonomy adversely impact the prospects for peace in Somalia or lead to territorial clashes? The ICG Report minimizes clashes that have already occurred in the eastern third of the region as communities there have refused to submit to an unrepresentative secessionist administration. We believe that there is a silent majority in the west of the territory who are equally opposed to the secession but who have decided to buy time. Members of the latter group have been partially placated by the accident of one of their junior politicians becoming president as a result of Mohamed Ibrahim Egal’s death and subsequent political maneuvers in Hargeisa. The fact that nearly the whole eastern third of the North is beyond the reach of the Hargeisa Administration (as well as the fierce resistance of the population there) highlights the presence of a worrisome conflict. This situation should not be underestimated, as it is potentially a serious warning of a deeper problem. We think an AU acceptance of a self-declared independent Somaliland will mean the endorsement of divisive and flammable politics that masquerade as democracy. In the end, a tribalist disposition, akin to a “gangrene of the mind,†in the sobering expression of Breyten Breytenbach, and corresponding political arrangements are not good for either the whole country or for any of its regions. Subsequently, we have faith that the AU will not allow itself to be hoodwinked to chaperone such a dangerous proposition. C. What are the prospects for peaceful preservation of a united Somali Republic? The ICG Report claims that new identities have formed in post-1991 Somalia and this will make it nearly impossible to put humpty-dumpty back together in the form of a Somali Republic. There is no question that politicized genealogy has overtaken Somali nationalism in the last two decades, but any serious scholar and investigator of the country will recognize the weak hold clanist ideology has on the population. We submit that it is the absence of legitimate rule of law, competent leadership, and an inclusive vision of an attractive and plausible future that makes myopic identitarian logic unavoidable. Nonetheless, we are confident that such a perspective will recede once a legitimate and capable order is restored. We think that advocating for and enhancing highly sectarian ideas is catastrophic as Rwanda’s history most vividly teaches all of us. The challenge to the ICG advocacy for clanist fiefdoms is the presence of a significant counter-movement across the widest reaches of the old Republic, as well as in the diaspora. Here, numerous groups are working for civic reunion rather than degenerative fragmentation of Somalis. Our long-term and historically grounded research in the country continues to reinforce our conviction that what is missing is a genuine process of reconciliation – that is, a dialogic mood protected from intimidation and force, and facilitated by a sympathetic, honest and able mediator. We have little doubt that once such an intermediary, as it were, steps up to the plate, a new Somali consensus about a sane, intelligent, and constructive politics will re-emerge. D. What would be the implications of recognition of a “Somaliland†for separatist conflicts elsewhere in the continent? Again, the authors of the ICG Reports on northern Somalia seem so invested in the secessionist project that they fail to separate fact from fiction. The conflicts in the region alone negate ICG observations and recommendations. For instance, take the case of neighboring Ethiopia, where several groups have been contesting the nature of that country. Some of these, such as Oromos and Somalis, have openly championed the establishment of independent Oromia and Somali regions. It is worth remembering that Ethiopia is, culturally and linguistically, an extremely diverse country. In the face of mountains of evidence from Ethiopia, the ICG authors cannot defend the claim that AU recognition of northern Somalia will not encourage populations in neighboring Ethiopia, who are disgruntled over the nature of representation and power arrangements, to seek total independence — a frightening eventuality for anyone who cares about Ethiopia and Pan-African unity. We think the ICG Report is dangerously shortsighted. If the AU sanctions clanism in Somalia, it ought to realize that the genie will be out of the bottle. In the Horn of Africa, centrifugal forces in Ethiopia loom large and cannot be ignored. III. Objectivity and Conflict of Interest The two ICG Reports on northern Somalia (Somaliland) have been presented as an objective examination by dispassionate investigators from an internationally reputable institution concerned with peace and the well being of the Somali people and the Horn of Africa. Alas, we must point out that the form and the substance of the Reports belie these lofty ideals. Rather than judiciously informing the International Community and the African Union on the basis of a non-partisan assessment of the historical and political conditions in Somalia, its authors chose to significantly misinterpret or misrepresent the record in order to support a particularistic agenda. We hold this to be highly regrettable. To the contrary, we are of the opinion that evidence gleaned from the morphology of Somali political history will lead to a contrasting conclusion. If we are right, the glaring ethical and professional question is why would an establishment such the ICG, which prides itself on being an impartial think tank, risk soiling its reputation by producing and disseminating this partisan agenda? This is a puzzle that requires serious investigation. Applying a “hermeneutic of suspicion,†we advance the following proposition as a point of departure: the chief author of the Reports has been an articulate supporter of and counsel to the secessionist movement in northern Somalia for quite sometime. He has lobbied for the movement and has used his position in the War-Torn Societies Project Somalia office as a platform for this cause. Subsequently, some of the key documents cited to support the Reports were edited by the lead author (in the name of War-Torn Societies). This would suggest that the ICG Reports have, in essence, become an extension of a lobbying business. Why, if our hypothesis were valid, would the ICG contract him to head such Reports? We cannot be certain, but it is plausible that the organization lacked the necessary expertise on Somalia and, therefore, saw the author as a valuable resource without carefully checking his political affinity and agenda. The ICG could assert that they had no knowledge of the main author’s background. However, such an explanation will not wash, for, since the publication of the first Report (2003), we have posed serious and publicly circulated doubts about the intellectual integrity and the conspicuous analytical deficiencies of that Report. Instead, and inexplicably, the ICG ignored the challenge and simply reiterated its earlier claims in the second Report. This suggests that there might be other agendas at work in the ICG, hidden behind the vow of providing sound analysis of the Somali problems. If so, this is a grave charge that should be addressed seriously. We find the ICG approach sufficiently troubling that we openly request the ICG and its authors to reveal their logos, interests, and other affiliations with regard to the Somali society. Such an “x-ray†moves us closer to exposing subtexts that might have crucial implications for the diagnosis and treatment of the Somali condition. We are willing to start with ourselves and, therefore, reveal our orientations and associations. We are both Somali-Americans who grew up and were educated in northern Somalia. Ahmed I. Samatar is James Wallace Professor and Dean of the Institute for Global Citizenship at Macalester College in St. Paul Minnesota. He is neither a consultant to any one organization nor campaigns for any political party. Abdi Ismail Samatar is a professor and Director of Graduate Studies in Geography and in Global Studies at the University of Minnesota. He was a senior research fellow at the Human Sciences Research Council in Pretoria shortly after that country’s liberation. He is not a consultant to or lobbyist for any political party. To conclude, an Egyptian expert on development noted over two decades ago, “to do the impossible you must see the invisible.†Somalia’s greatest national poet of the modern era, Abdillahi Sultan, “Timacadde,†who hailed from the North, repeatedly warned, over forty years ago, about the deadly pitfalls of a mix of exclusive tribalist interest and neo-colonial machinations. Finally, in a similar vein, both Graham Hancock and Michael Maren, in their memorable and respective volumes The Lords of Poverty (1989) and The Road to Hell (1997), noted that the real beneficiaries of development aid are those who manage it, and not the poor of Africa and elsewhere in the wretched zones of the world — the very people in whose name resources are called for and committed to. With the Somali situation so present in our minds, we sense that different types of lords have emerged in recent times: the lords of disaster. Rather than search for the pivotal questions, seek the best analysis and discern the implications, these individuals and their influential organizations not only often employ superficial and sectarian agendas but also plant new confusions that, combined, infantilize the present and enervate any potential of the future. This breed of lords, while sharing many of the attributes of the old type, is unequivocally more deleterious. The AU and others genuinely concerned with peace, reconciliation, and development must be wary of any advice that comes from such quarters. As for Somalis, the vast majority realizes that they are living in, comparatively, the most politically destitute of their modern history. In the end, only they can clean their humiliating mess. Until the Somalis are ready to become agents of their own history again, it is important that the rest of the world, and particularly their African and Muslim kin, not be party to an agenda that could propel Somalis to become even less than they are now. Abdi I. Samatar & Ahmed I. Samatar

AFTER SOMALIA GAINED INDEPENDENCE in 1960, its military grew steadily, despite the country's status as one of the poorest states in sub-Saharan Africa. Largely under Soviet patronage, the military expanded from 5,000 troops at independence to 23,000 during the 1977-78 Og den War. By 1981 the armed forces had 50,000 personnel; by 1990 that number had increased to 65,000. Until the Og den War, Somalia possessed one of East Africa's best equipped armed forces. However, Ethiopia destroyed much of the army's fighting capability during the 1977-78 conflict. To rebuild its military, Somalia sought assistance from China and a variety of Arab and Western countries, including the United States. Somalia's defeat in the Og den War and deteriorating internal conditions lost the government much of its domestic support. As the Mahammad Siad Barre regime became more politically isolated, the president and members of his Mareehaan subclan increasingly dominated the government, the economy, and the armed forces. Growing oppression in Somalia forced many critics into exile, where they organized opposition groups. A lack of resources initially limited the exiles' opposition activity to propaganda campaigns and occasional minor guerrilla forays into Somalia. By the late 1980s, several opposition groups had transformed themselves into relatively powerful, clan-based (see Glossary) insurgent movements. Relying on financial assistance from Somali exile communities and various foreign governments, the insurgents grew in strength and numbers. The armed forces, which eventually faced insurgencies throughout Somalia, gradually disintegrated. Finally, in early 1991 Siad Barre and many of his closest Mareehaan advisers relinquished power and fled Mogadishu. If Somalia were to have a future as a single nation, reconstituting the armed forces on a more representative basis would be essential to national unity and stability. Somalia INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS From independence until the mid-1980s, Somalia's national security concerns focused largely on the threat posed by its neighbor, Ethiopia. After the Og den War, Ethiopia used Soviet, Cuban, and East European military and technical assistance to establish itself as the dominant power in the Horn of Africa. By the mid-1980s, Ethiopia's support of Somali insurgent groups posed a growing threat to Somalia's internal security. In early 1991, Somali-Ethiopian tensions eased as long-established governments fell in both Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. By the spring of 1992, however, it remained unclear whether relations between the two countries would be characterized by cooperation and peace, or if old arguments over the Og den's (******** ) status would renew the hostility between Somalia and Ethiopia. Somalia Irredentism and the Changing Balance of Power Somalia's defeat in the Og den War, Ethiopian hostility, the emergence of an alliance between Addis Ababa and Moscow, regional tensions, and periods of international isolation all resulted directly or indirectly from Somalia's unwillingness to recognize political boundaries drawn by British, French, and Italian colonists, in conjunction with Ethiopia. Since independence, successive Somali governments had sought to reincorporate those Somalis living in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti into Greater Somalia. (Under the Siad Barre regime, the five-pointed star on the Somali flag represented the northern and southern regions of the republic and the "unredeemed territories" in Kenya's NorthEastern Province, Ethiopia's Og den Province, and Djibouti.) In 1960-64, for example, guerrillas supported by the Somali government battled local security forces in Kenya and Ethiopia on behalf of Somalia's territorial claims. Then, in 1964, Ethiopian and Somali regular forces clashed. By late 1964, it had become obvious that the initial campaign to unify all Somalis had failed. Ethiopian forces had established superiority over the Somalis in the Og den, in part because of Ethiopia's ability to conduct air raids on Somali territory. In Kenya the government relied on assistance from British counterinsurgency experts to control Somali guerrillas in what was then the Northern Frontier District (NFD). In late 1964, Kenya's president Jomo Kenyatta and Ethiopia's emperor Haile Selassie signed a mutual defense agreement aimed at containing Somali aggression. The two countries renewed the pact in 1979 and again in 1989. These factors, in combination with the opposition of the Organization of African Unity to Somali aims and defense costs that amounted to 30 percent of the national budget in the mid-1980s, forced Mogadishu to reconsider its territorial ambitions. Under Mahammad Ibrahim Igaal, Somalia's last civilian government initiated--and Siad Barre's military regime initially continued--a policy of détente with Somalia's neighbors. During the 1970s, however, Somali military strength gradually increased as a result of Soviet support. The Soviet Union supplied the Somali National Army (SNA) with the largest tank force in subSaharan Africa, transport vehicles--including armored personnel carriers--for a largely mechanized infantry, and jet aircraft that included MiG-21 fighter-bombers. In 1974 Somalia and the Soviet Union formalized their relationship by signing the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The Ethiopian army at that time remained twice as large as Somalia's 23,000-man force, but because of reduced military aid from the United States, the Ethiopians were not as well equipped. Furthermore, in 1974 Ethiopia's imperial government was headed toward collapse. In September of that year a group of military officers deposed Haile Selassie. Conflict ensued among those responsible for his overthrow, and several insurgent groups sought to secede from the erstwhile empire. Somalia's military buildup, coincident with the turmoil in Ethiopia, temporarily altered the balance of power between the two countries. In 1976-77 Somalia attempted to take advantage of the situation by supporting a guerrilla campaign by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), a pro-Somali liberation group in the Og den, to seize the Og den from Ethiopia. By the late summer of 1977, Somali armored forces and mechanized infantry supported by aircraft had invaded the Og den, capturing 60 percent of the disputed territory within several weeks. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had started supporting the Marxist-Leninist regime that had emerged in Ethiopia while simultaneously attempting to maintain Somalia as a client state. After its attempts at mediation failed, the Soviet Union decided to abandon Somalia. In August 1977, the Soviet Union suspended arms shipments to Siad Barre's regime and accelerated military deliveries to Ethiopia. Three months later, Somalia renounced the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, expelled all Soviet advisers, broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, and ejected all Soviet personnel from Somalia. Following Moscow's decision to support Addis Ababa, Ethiopia received massive amounts of Soviet arms. Along with Soviet military advisers, about 15,000 Cuban combat troops also arrived. By early 1978, this aid had turned the tide of war in Ethiopia's favor. By March 9, 1978, when Siad Barre announced the withdrawal of the Somali armed forces from the Og den, the Somali military had lost 8,000 men--one-third of the SNA, three-quarters of its armored units, and half of the Somali Air Force (SAF). For all intents and purposes, Ethiopia's victory during the Og den War ended Mogadishu's dream of recreating Greater Somalia. Even before the setback in the Og den, Siad Barre had relinquished his claim to Djibouti after 95 percent of the voters in that country indicated a preference for independence over incorporation into Somalia. In 1981 Somali-Kenyan relations improved after Siad Barre visited Nairobi and indicated that his government no longer had any claim to Kenyan territory. In December 1984, Somalia and Kenya signed a pact that pledged both governments to cease hostilities along their common frontier. Subsequently, the level of insurgent activity along the border was minimal. However, the activities of Somali shiftas, or bandits and ivory poachers and the periodic influx of Somali refugees into Kenya continued to strain relations between Mogadishu and Nairobi. Somalia The Og den War: Performance and Implications of Defeat The SNA never recovered from its defeat in the Og den War. The battles to retake and then defend the Og den stripped the Somali armed forces of many troops, much of their equipment, and their Soviet patron. For the next decade, the SNA sought unsuccessfully to improve its capability by relying on a variety of foreign sources, including the United States. The Og den War therefore remains the best example of the SNA's ability to mount and sustain conventional military operations. Before the Og den War, the most striking feature of the 23,000-man SNA had been its large armored force, which was equipped with about 250 T-34 and T-54/T-55 Soviet-built medium tanks and more than 300 armored personnel carriers. This equipment gave the SNA a tank force more than three times as large as Ethiopia's. The prewar SAF also was larger than Ethiopia's air force. In 1976 the SAF had fifty-two combat aircraft, twenty-four of which were Soviet-built supersonic MiG21s . Facing them was an Ethiopian Air Force (EAF) of thirty-five to forty aircraft. Ethiopia also was in the process of acquiring several United States-built Northrop F-5 fighters from Iran. At the outbreak of fighting, Ethiopia had approximately sixteen F5A /Es. As chaos spread throughout Ethiopia after Haile Selassie's downfall, Mogadishu increased its support to several pro-Somali liberation groups in the Og den, the strongest of which was the WSLF. By late 1975, the WSLF had attacked many Ethiopian outposts in the Og den. In June 1977, Addis Ababa accused Mogadishu of committing SNA units to the fighting. Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, Somalia denied this charge and insisted that only "volunteers" had been given leave from the SNA to fight with the WSLF. By late 1977, the combined WSLF-SNA strength in the Og den probably approached 50,000, of which 15,000 appeared to be irregulars. After the Somali government committed the SNA to the Og den, the conflict ceased to be a guerrilla action and assumed the form of a conventional war in which armor, mechanized infantry, and air power played decisive roles. The SNA quickly adapted its organization to battlefield realities. The centralized Somali logistics system controlled supplies at battalion level (600- to 1,000-man units) from Mogadishu, an unwieldy arrangement given Somalia's limited transportation and communications network (see Transportation; Communications , ch. 3). To facilitate operations, the logistics center and headquarters for forces fighting in the northern Og den moved to Hargeysa, the SNA's northern sector headquarters. Before the war, all Somali ground forces had been organized into battalions. After the conflict started, however, the standard infantry and mechanized infantry unit became the brigade, composed of two to four battalions and having a total strength of 1,200 to 2,000 personnel. During the summer of 1977, the SNA-WSLF force achieved several victories but also endured some significant defeats. In July 1977, it captured Gode, on the Shabeelle River about 550 kilometers inside Ethiopia, and won control of 60 percent of the Og den. By mid-September 1977, Ethiopia conceded that 90 percent of the Og den was in Somali hands. The SNA suffered two setbacks in August when it tried to capture Dire Dawa and Jijiga. The Ethiopian army inflicted heavy losses on the SNA at Dire Dawa after a Somali attack by one tank battalion and a mechanized infantry brigade supported by artillery units. At Jijiga the Somalis lost more than half of their attacking force of three tank battalions, each of which included more than thirty tanks. Somalia's greatest victory occurred in mid-September 1977 in the second attempt to take Jijiga, when three tank battalions overwhelmed the Ethiopian garrison. After inflicting some heavy losses on Somali armor, Ethiopian troops mutinied and withdrew from the town, leaving its defense to the militia, which was incapable of slowing the Somali advance. The Ethiopians retreated beyond the strategic Marda Pass, the strongest defensive position between Jijiga and Harer, leaving the SNA in a commanding position within the region. Despite this success, several factors prevented a Somali victory. Somali tank losses had been heavy in the battles around Dire Dawa and Jijiga. Moreover, because the EAF had established air superiority over the SAF, it could harass overextended Somali supply lines with impunity. The onset of the rainy season hampered such air attacks; however, the bad weather also bogged down Somali reinforcements on the dirt roads. The Soviet Union's decision to abandon Somalia in favor of Ethiopia eventually turned the tide of battle in the Og den. From October 1977 through January 1978, about 20,000 WSLF guerrillas and SNA forces pressed attacks on Harer, where nearly 50,000 Ethiopians had regrouped, backed by Soviet-supplied armor and artillery and gradually reinforced by 11,000 Cubans and 1,500 Soviet advisers. Although it fought its way into Harer in November 1977, the SNA lacked the supplies and manpower to capture the city. Subsequently, the Somalis regrouped outside Harer and awaited an Ethiopian counterattack. As expected, in early February 1978 Ethiopian and Cuban forces launched a two-stage counterattack toward Jijiga. Unexpectedly, however, a column of Cubans and Ethiopians moving north and east crossed the highlands between Jijiga and the Somali border, bypassing Somali troops dug in around the Marda Pass. Thus, the attacking force was able to assault the Somalis from two sides and recapture Jijiga after two days of fighting in which 3,000 Somali troops lost their lives. Within a week, Ethiopia had retaken all of the Og den's major towns. On March 9, 1978, Siad Barre recalled the SNA from Ethiopia. After the SNA withdrawal, the WSLF reverted to guerrilla tactics. By May 1980, the rebels had established control over a significant portion of the Og den. Eventually, Ethiopia defeated the WSLF and the few small SNA units that remained in the region after the Somali pullout. In late 1981, however, reports indicated that the WSLF continued to conduct occasional hit-and- run attacks against Ethiopian targets. Postwar Status of the Armed Forces In the early 1980s, the Somali armed forces had to adjust to the realities of their defeat in the Og den War. Somali manpower had doubled during the conflict, but the Ethiopian army had destroyed a significant amount of Somali equipment. Shortages of military hardware, inadequate maintenance, and lack of spare parts for what remained of Soviet-supplied equipment limited the effectiveness of all units. Better relations between Somalia and the United States resolved some of these problems. Between 1983 and 1986, United States military assistance to Somalia averaged US$36 to US$40 million per year (see Foreign Military Assistance , this ch.). This aid was insufficient, however, to restore the Somali armed forces to their pre-Og den War effectiveness. As insurgent activity intensified during the late 1980s and the Somali government failed to develop additional sources of large-scale military assistance, the armed forces slowly deteriorated. By 1990 the Somali military was in a state of collapse. After Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in January 1991, the SNA and all related military and security services ceased to exist. Most of their military equipment fell into the hands of insurgents, clan militiamen, or bandits. The status of former military and security personnel varied. Some fled abroad to countries such as Kenya or Ethiopia; others returned to civilian life or became insurgents, bandits, or clan militia members. A small number remained loyal to Siad Barre, who took refuge in southern Somalia and then launched a military campaign to regain power. The campaign failed, however, and Siad Barre sought exile in Nigeria, where he remained in early 1992.

Many of you are probably think it is impossible to be happy without Money. For instance, majority of you with certainty will say "Yes, we are happier" as your paycheque grows or as you may receive significant raise from your employer or in some cases from welfare system. Whatever your case is, I found this topic very interesting and worth discussion. Happiness can be looked at as a mixture that contains many solutions, ranging from visible components to undetectable atoms. Furthermore, these components and atoms come to homogenous and diverse combinations and have different magnitude from individual to individual. However, the ultimate question is could money be out of the picture. To formulate a viable answer, first it is important to excavate the nature of the surrounding of being happy human being. First, what are the elements / atoms that make us happy? What are the favorable combinations? Is there an ultimate point of happiness? Here are some of elements / atoms that perhaps found in the pool. It is easier to classify to quantitative and qualitative factors, which possibly retain inflating or deflating consequences on individual’s state of happiness: Quantitative factors are, for example, wealth accumulated, person’s current income, person’s investment, outstanding debt, married or not, number of children does the person have and so on. Qualitative factors are more decoding person’s emotional feelings, for instance, is your job meaningful to you, do you find what you do pleasurable, how close are you to your family members e.g. to your wife, to your children, are you spiritual for the right reason, how do you interpreter pain, how do you define loss / failure and so on. In Fact, all above variables play different roles in the model some are exogenous and others are endogenous. In order, to incorporate them in this broad model in a favorable form it’s very important to measure their magnitude with caution. However, for the sake of précis, I will make two key break-downs. For simplicity, will interpolate how individual’s state of mind and state of their bank account correlate with individual’s ultimate currency –Happiness. As the bank account gets healthier the less constrains out there, to build satisfactory environment around us. This directly will lift our state of mind; this could be view as a linear line with positive slope. Moreover, as we adjust with changes and increase our consumption with fix income the line will get flatter as slope approach to zero. At close ranges of income it is notable to see indifference of state of mind because lifestyle in which we can obtain with that close range of income is ultimately will be the same. Therefore, the individual is not happier; zero slope mean zero change in qualitative measure of happiness. Is there an ultimate point of happiness? I doubt, naturally we are hunt and gathers, therefore, as long as there is a room to accumulate extra unit of wealth so does our welfare utility increases. But, does that mean we are better-off – happier. During the course it is likely that individual’s marginal utility of return to fall. Now the interesting question is what will substitute to improve degree of happiness as money becomes irrelevant?

qudh Maamulka Hergeysa is a clan based,and so is Puntland Accusing only sool people clan card is bizarre and hate motivated People of Laascaanood joined their tol in Garowe and Boosaaso, as people of Burco joined with their tol in Hergeysa and Barbare

Somaliland says Somalia unrest helps statehood bid 07 Jul 2006 12:22:58 GMT Source: Reuters Printable view | Email this article | RSS [-] Text [+] Background Somalia troubles More By Alistair Thomson DAKAR, July 7 (Reuters) - International unease over last month's seizure of Somalia's capital Mogadishu by Islamists may help the self-declared breakaway republic of Somaliland in its quest for international recognition, a Somaliland minister said. Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 when President Mohammed Siad Barre's overthrow plunged the Horn of Africa state into chaos. The country was then carved into fiefdoms by warlords who were forced out by the Islamic Courts Union in June after heavy fighting. Somaliland's government and its supporters say their enclave has maintained relative peace and stability while Mogadishu has become a byword for violence and chaos, and that this should be rewarded with greater international recognition. "Somehow the bad news travels faster. I think the (recognition) process should have been accelerated long ago, but now with the situation in Mogadishu, that is happening," Somaliland's Information Minister Abdillahi Duale told Reuters. "We are not taking advantage of what is happening unfortunately in Somalia. That is not the point, what is the point is that we have a legitimate case," Duale said in a telephone interview from Gambia, where he spent last weekend lobbying delegates at an African Union (AU) summit. No foreign governments have recognised Somaliland, but diplomats say some governments in east and central Africa have privately supported the independence bid. But there has long been a preference in Africa -- stemming from the AU predecessor the Organisation of African Unity -- to keep the borders defined at independence intact, for fear of opening the floodgates to a host of secessionist claims. Somaliland President Dahir Rayale Kahin's government says it has a special case since Somaliland, formerly ruled by Britain, was independent from June 26, 1960, until it voluntarily joining the rest of formerly Italian-ruled Somalia on July 1. Somalia's transitional federal government, which now only controls the small town of Baidoa, has said it opposes the breakaway move by Somaliland. GROWING SUPPORT The Brussels-based International Crisis Group think tank said in a May report that support was growing for Somaliland's statehoood case, but it added that without a negotiated separation the dispute risked descending into violence. Duale said during the AU summit in Gambia he and Finance Minister Hussein Ali Dualeh had met several African foreign ministers, some African leaders, Britain's Africa minister David Triesman and a U.S. State Department delegation. "All in all we have been quite satisfied with our dealings. We were not expecting at this stage outright recognition, but it was brought up at the ministerial level meetings. A number of countries brought it up and it was discussed," Duale said. But he disagreed strongly with the call by the AU Peace and Security Council for the United Nations to relax an arms embargo to allow Somalia's transitional government to build up its security forces and pave the way for a regional peace force. "In every household there are at least six guns, big or small, so you're talking about a country that is already awash with weapons. It's beyond reason to believe that the AU and the international community is encouraging (ending the embargo)," Duale said of Somalia. "We are not out to take action against anybody, but if we feel our peace is threatened, then we will not hesitate to take action against them," he said.

Islamists, Somali govt can never agree, says warlord Sat Jul 15, 2006 2:54 PM GMT Printer Friendly Top News Tsunami kills 37 on Java tourist beach, official says Somali Islamists open court in govt-controlled area G8 launch bid on trade amid strains on MidEast Sudan, EU set for clash over UN troops for Darfur Cuba's Castro sends Mandela 88th birthday cigars MORE By Guled Mohamed MOGADISHU (Reuters) - Somalia's interim government and the Islamists who now control Mogadishu can never share power because they have conflicting ideologies, a recently defeated top warlord said on Saturday. Fired National Security Minister Mohamed Qanyare Afrah -- until last month one of Mogadishu's biggest warlords -- said Somalia's future looks very bleak as a result. "The government wants to govern by the charter while the Islamic Sharia courts want to rule by the Koran. There is no way they will ever agree," Qanyare told Reuters in an exclusive telephone interview. In February, the Islamist Courts Union -- from which the Islamist movement sprang -- attacked Qanyare and eight other warlords just hours after they had formed the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism." After months of battles that killed at least 350 people, the Islamist militias ran Qanyare and his allies out of the capital on June 5. The Islamists went on to seize a strategic swathe of Somalia that has made them the prime challenge to the authority of the government, forced to base itself in the provincial town of Baidoa because it lacks the strength to enter Mogadishu. The government has rejected a second round of Arab League-brokered talks in Khartoum with the Islamists, due on Saturday, and many fear that another war in the Horn of Africa country will be the inevitable result. "I am really sorry for the Somali people. Whenever one problem ends, another one starts. The future does not look very good," said Qanyare, speaking from his rural home Dirin, 500 km (310 miles) north of the capital Mogadishu. Islamist militias tried to attack him there late on Wednesday, killing two of his fighters and one civilian. But five Islamists were killed by a land mine blast. Qanyare and three other warlords who were dissident ministers in the government were fired from their posts because of the fighting. Days after their defeat, the regional peace-making body, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) slapped Qanyare and the other alliance warlords with an east African travel ban and asset freeze. "They have to clarify what problem we have created," he said. "They are saying there are terrorists in Somalia and those who fought them committed an offence. Now who is right and who is wrong? This is what I don't understand." The Islamists are busy chasing out the last remnants of the coalition and last week ejected its sole defiant member, Abdi Awale Qaybdiid, after two days of gun battles that killed at least 140 people and wounded scores. Though Qanyare followed many other warlords in handing over his fighters and about 100 technicals -- pick-up trucks mounted with heavy weapons -- to the Islamists, he said he would not give up his remaining arsenal. "It is my personal property. I bought them in the market," he said, referring to Mogadishu's Cirtogte gun market where machineguns, missiles and other weapons are sold. "I don't want to attack anybody or to fight anyone. These weapons are for my own personal safety," he said. Qanyare and other warlords were widely despised by ordinary citizens in Mogadishu, who suffered extortion, murder and rape at the hands of their fighters after dictator Mohamed Siad Barre was ousted in 1991 and anarchy was unleashed. Many believe the self-styled anti-terrorism coalition was funded by U.S intelligence, but Qanyare denied that. "People who wanted to put a scar on the coalition claimed that America was funding us. That is not true," the 65-year-old former policeman said. He said the alliance was finished. "We were defeated maybe because of lack of coordination or support. I have no intention of returning to Mogadishu," he said.

Somali president in talks U-turn Somalia's interim President Abdullahi Yusuf has dropped his opposition to talks in Sudan with Islamist leaders who control the capital, Mogadishu. He boycotted talks with the Union of Islamic Courts, accusing them of breaking a previously agreed ceasefire. But he was urged to reconsider after pressure from the parliamentary speaker and diplomats meeting in Belgium. The International Contact Group, made up of western and African countries, rejected sending foreign peacekeepers. Meeting in Belgium, it issued a final communique urging broad-based talks among all Somali groups. It backed training and equipping a Somali army and police force, but did not endorse an African Union plan to deploy troops to the country in support of President Yusuf. The president's weak, UN-backed government wants peacekeepers and a lifting of the weapons ban to rebuild security forces. But Islamist leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys has said there is no need for peacekeepers, as the UIC have reunited the capital under their control after 15 years of anarchy and conflict. Mr Aweys has denied US accusations that he and the UIC have links to al-Qaeda. He also criticised the UN Security Council, which last week said it would back moves to lift the arms embargo and send peacekeepers. "The problem of Somalia is not a lack of weapons, but a lack of peace and understanding of each other," he told the AFP news agency from his home in Galgadud, central Somalia. Conflict fears The UIC controls much of southern Somalia but another Islamist leader, Sheikh Sherif Sheikh Ahmed has been quoted denying reports the Islamist forces were planning to attack the government at its base in Baidoa, 200km from Mogadishu. "We are making it clear that we are not planning to attack Baidoa, Kismayo or any other third region in the country. We want to work with whoever who wants to return peace to Somalia," he said, according to the Somalia's Puntlandpost website. Some fear that Somalia could descend into renewed conflict between the UIC and the government, possibly involving regional and international players. Eritrea is accused of arming the UIC, while Ethiopia is seen as close to the government. The UIC has accused Ethiopia of already sending troops to Baidoa but both governments have repeatedly denied such claims. The International Contact Group was set up by the US after the Islamists seized Mogadishu last month.

Halkee SomaliLand loo yaqaanaa? [17/07/06] Dhibaatooyinkii shacbiga Somaliyeed oo ku hadla Afka Soomaaliga ka soo gaaray gumeystayaashii, waxaa ka mid ahayd iyadoo la kala qaybiyey. Sababtoo ah gumeystayaashii ayaan isku mowqif ka ahayn arriimaha Somalia. labo ka mid qaybihii ayaa nasiib isu helay iney midoobaan, oo kala ahaa "Italian SomaliLand iyo Biritish SomaliLand". hadaba erayga SomaliLand macnihiisu waa "Dhulkii Soomaalida" waa magac Soomaali oo dhan ka dhexeeyey. waxaana magacaas loo Beddelay "Somalia" Hadda magacii SomaliLand (dhulkii Soomaalida), waxaa sheegtay degaanno gaar. Haddaba aan u soo noqdo Ujeeddada Cinwaanka, oo ah halkee SomaliLand loo yaqaan. Somalia waxay u qaysan tahay Woqooyi iyo Koonfur, Woqooyiga Somaliya waa halka loo yaqaan maanta SomaliLand. Juqraafi ahaan waxay ka soo bilaabataa Xuduudka Jabuuti (Lowyacadde), Ceerigaabo ilaa Sanaag bari, marka la soo dhaafo Sool, oo la soo gaaro meel wax yar u jirta Garoowi, iyo dhanka kale meel Bosaaso wax yar u jirta. Aagaas waxaa Calaamadeeyey Gumeystihii. Xayndaabkaas ama Xuduudaha SomaliLand waxaa deggan Qabaa'il kala duwan oo asal ahaan ka soo jeeda degaankaas. deegaan walba wuxuu gaar u ahaa Qabiilka halkaas deggan, waxayna weligood kala lahaayeen xuduudo. Xitaa xilligii Dowladnimada, Xuduudaha Qabaa'ilku waa jireen. Markii dowladnimadii Burburtay waxaa waddankoo saameeyey dagaal Sokeeye. Qabaa'illada qaarkood waxay ku heshiiyeen inay Colaadda ka baxaan, nidaamna sameystaan, nidaamyadaas ayaa waxaa ka dhashay dowlad gobaleedyo, oo markii dambe isu rogay gooni isu taag iyo madaxbanaani. Haddaba goballada iyo degmooyinka ku jira Xayndaabka SomaliLand arrintaas ma isku raaceen. maalinta 18-ka May ma laga xusaa dhammaan degaannada ku jira Xudduudda Mustaqbalka ee aqoonsiga loo raadinaayo, oo la rabo in loo calaamadeeyo halka loo yaqaan SomaliLand. maamulka Hargeysa ma wada gaaray Xuduudda xisaabtanka ku jirta ee SomaliLand. Haddaba degaannadaas aan gaarin maamulka Hargeysa, isla markaana laga xuso 1da July, waxay ku jiraan Juqraafiga la raba in loo bixiyo "SomaliLand Goverment". waana deegaannada lagu xisaabtamayo in map cusub loo sameeyo ama la goosto, laakiin muddo 15 sanadood ah maamul Hargeysa halkaas lagama aqoon, weligoodna ma arag. Siyaasiinta SomaliLandna aagaas cag ma dhigi karaan. hadaba sidee arrintaas ku suurtageliysaa, halkeese loo yaqaan SomaliLand. Markii labada maamul ee SomaliLand iyo PuntLand la sameeyey, haba kala horreeyaanee, mid walba waxaa ka hirgashay maamul Shaqeeya oo dowlad leh, Madaxweyne leh, Gole Baarlamaan leh. waxayna ku heshiiyeen labo arrimood oo Dimoqraatiyada aasaas u leh oo ah: 1- in qolo walba maamulkeeda ay ku ekaato, oo aan wax fagelin la isku sameen, in ganacsiga la is weydaarsado oo aan la iska carqaladeen, in muwaadiinta isu gudbaan oo aan safarkooda la iska carqaladeen. in qolo walba caalamka waxay ka raadsaneyso aan la iska faragelin. sida SmaliLand oo aqoonsi raadsata, Puntland oo khayraad dabiici ah soo saaristiisa caalamka ka raadsata. qodobkaas si fiican ayuu aagaas uga hergalay. 2- qodobka kale ee lagu heshiiyey ayaa ah in qolo walba maamulkeeda uu ku ekaado xudduudooda. waa xudduuddii Qabaa'ilka. Taasna waa lagu heshiiyey, in Maamul walba Xudduudiisa uu ku ekaado, Taas ayaana sababtay in maamulka Hargeysa uu gaari waayo aagagga xuduudaha xisaabtanka ugu jirta. Haddii qodobka 2aad la jebiyo oo xudduuda la isu soo tallaabo, waxaa halkaas ka dhacaya dagaal sokeeya oo ka xun kii Koonfurta. Khilaafka ugu weyn ee ka jira geeska Afrika wuxuu ka jiraa SomaliLand Dhexdeeda, oo ah degaano rabo gooni isu taag iyo deegaano ka soo horjeeda arrintaas, oo aan u arkin Madaxbannaani, oo u arka qabiil ku soo dhulballaarsanaya, ka dibna ay Minority u noqdaan. Siyaasiinta SomaliLand markay caalamka ku wareegayaan oo ay aqoonsi raadinayaan, waxay wataan Map ama deegaanno aysan wakiil ka ahayn, oo uusan maamulkooda gaarsiisneyn, laakiin ka mid ah xayndaabka SomaliLand, taasna waxay ka mid tahay beenta Somali wada fahamsan tahay, laakiin aan Caalamka fahamsaneyn. Ceebaha siyaasiinta SomaliLand ka soo gaartay aaggaas, waxaa ka mid ah Caleema saarkii Garaad Jaamac oo ka dhacay Laascaanood kana mid ah deegaanada ka tirsan SomaliLand. Garaad Jaamac waa garaad SomaliLand ah, aagiisana wuxuu ka mid yahay Xuduudda Siyaasiinta SomaliLand xisaabta ugu jirta, oo ay aqoonsi u raadinayaan. Caleemasaarka Garaadka waxaa ka soo qeybgalay Madax Dhaqameedyada SomaliLand iyo Somalia inteeda kale, Laakiin Siyaasiinta SomaliLand cag ma soo dhigin oo uu ku jiro Madaxweyne ku xigeynkooda. waana deegaan SomaliLand ah laguna caleema saarayo Garaad ka mid ah Garaaddada SomaliLand. waxaase ka soo qeyb galay siyaasiinta Dowladda F.K. qaarkood waana ka qudbeeyeen. waxaa kaloo ka soo qeyb galay Madaxweynaha Puntland iyo Dowladdiisa, kana qudbeeyeen. Waxaa halkaas lagu sharxay Calanka Somalia, iyo Calanka Puntland. Calan SomaliLand iyo Siyaasiin Somalind xafladdaas laguma arag. waana magaalada ay magaceeda gacanta ku wataan oo ay caalamka aqoonsi uga raadinayaan, kana mid ah xududddda ay ku xisaabtamayaan. Waxaa intaa ka sii daran khudbaddii Garaadka oo ay ka mid ahayd, inuu ka shaqeynayo midnimada Somalia. Garaadka wuxuu ka mid yahay Garaaddada SomaliLand, waxaana hoos yimaada Qabaa'il deggan aagga SomaliLand oo aan taageersaneyn gooni isu taagga. Haddaba su'aasha la is weydiin karo waxay tahay halkee loo yaqaan SomaliLand. Boohoodle oo wax yar u jirta Burco, kama mid aha Maamulka SomaliLand. Beelaha u dhashay SomaliLand oo aan ka tirsaneyn maamulka Hargeysa waa iska aamusan yihiin, deegaankooda waxaa xisaabsanayay oo caalamka kula wareegaya aqoonsi raadin, maamul aysan ka tirsaneyn. waxaa mustaqbalka laga yaabaa in deegaankooda loogu soo dhaco, haddii SomaliLand la aqoonsado, in dagaal aysan hadda xisaabta ugu jirin inay madaxa la galaan. Hadaba maxaa la gudboon dadka deegaankaas degan? Waa iney matelaan deegaankooda, waa iney barbar cararaan Siyaasiinta SomaliLand, caalamkana u sheegaan in deegaanka SomaliLand ay ka mid yihiin, wakiilna aysan ka aheyn Maamulka Hargeysa. waa iney dowladda ku meelgaarka cadaadis ku saaraan, iney beesha caalamka u sheegaan in deegaankooda uusan ka tirsaneyn maamulka Daahir Riyaale, laakiinse ay yihiin deegaan SomaliLand ah, kana tirsan maamulka Puntland. waa iney Jaraa'id calaamka u diraan, iyo UN-ka maqaallo ah, iney degan yihiin degaan SomaliLand ah oo aysan rabin inay Somalia ka go'aan. Warbaahinta Somalida iyo Caalamka waxay hadal hayaan SomaliLand, Laakiinse halkee SomaliLand loo yaqaan. Jawaabta akhristayaasha ayaan u daayey. Abdullah Jaamac Boqor