Koora-Tuunshe

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Everything posted by Koora-Tuunshe

  1. This is a sign of complete defeat of the Al-Shayaadiin. By retreating to remote towns and villages and terrorizing the communities there, it shows the TFG has handled them with firm hand. I am glad that the government gradually cleaned the capital, which is the most important part of this campaign to restore the failed Somali state.
  2. Stay away, Vladimir Putin tells Nato 5 Apr 5, 2008 - 10:20:19 AM Vladimir Putin yesterday told Nato that it would become a "direct threat" to Moscow if it expanded further east. Emboldened after routing the alliance's plans to offer membership to Ukraine and Georgia, the Russian president yesterday gave warning that the countries must be locked out permanently. "The emergence of a powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russian security," Mr Putin told Nato heads of state at a summit in the Romanian capital, Bucharest. "The efficiency of our co-operation will depend on whether Nato members take Russia's interests into account." While the tone of his speech was typically strident, Mr Putin refrained from the insults with which he often pepper his foreign policy speeches. Nor, however, was he as conciliatory as some Western European countries had hoped after their retreat on membership. Many analysts described Nato's capitulation as the biggest foreign policy victory of Mr Putin's presidency. Mr Putin, who switches jobs to become prime minister next month, offered no substantial compromises in return and ties with the West will consequently remain strained over a number of potentially explosive issues. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, the Nato secretary-general, sought to put a brave face on the failure to make concrete progress in improving the worst crisis in Russia's relationship with the West since the Cold War. "I cannot report that we saw stunning breakthroughs," he told reporters after Mr Putin addressed the summit. Gordon Brown met Mr Putin on the sidelines of the summit. British diplomats had feared the meeting would go badly, with London and Moscow at odds over the killing in London of Alexander Litvinenko, and Russia's closure of two British Council offices. However, they were relieved that Mr Putin had taken a "low key" approach and hoped that relations with London would improve Diplomats say efforts to find common ground will now be stepped up in the run-up to the first meeting between Mr Brown and the new Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev. That meeting is likely to come at the G8 leaders' meeting in Japan this summer. Mr Putin also suggested he was baffled that officials thought he might have been aggressive in his address. "I don't know where their horror in expectation of my speeches comes from," he said. "Let's be friends guys and engage in an honest dialogue." The speech set the scene for a meeting between George W Bush and Mr Putin at the Black Sea resort of Sochi to discuss Washington's plans to build a missile defence shield in central Europe. Although the US president won unanimous Nato backing for the project, Mr Putin remains virulently opposed to the shield and has threatened to target Europe with nuclear missiles if it is built. Russia has rejected Washington's explanation that the shield is meant to protect Europe from a nuclear strike by Iran as well as several offers to co-operate in the project. The Kremlin maintains that the true purpose of the shield is to remove Russia's ability to strike first in the even of a nuclear war. The American defence secretary, Robert Gates, yesterday said that Mr Bush had told Nato that the US would send "significant additional" troops to Afghanistan next year. The alliance summit has so far failed to secure the number of combat troops from other countries requested by commanders in Afghanistan. Source: Telegraph (UK)
  3. Fuaad who used to march the secessionist militia into his own region is fired for only impugning the Riyale fiefdom on corruption, the invasion of Sool and other related issues. -------------- HARGEISA, Somalia Apr 4 (Garowe Online) - The Rural Development Minister in the government of Somalia's breakaway region of Somaliland was officially relieved of duty on Thursday, according to a decree issued from the office of Somaliland President Dahir Riyale. Mr. Fuad Adan Adde, the former Somaliland Rural Development Minister, was ordered to respectfully transfer his authority over to the Deputy Minister effective April 3. The Somaliland leader's decree said Mr. Fuad Adan Adde had used repeatedly language that is inappropriate for a government minister. "On several occasions, the President [of Somaliland] did not take steps when these violations occurred," the presidential decree stated. An independent journalist in the breakaway region's capital, Hargeisa, tells Garowe Online that Mr. Fuad Adan Adde was very critical of the Somaliland government during a recent television interview. According to the journalist, the former Rural Development Minister criticized the Riyale government for mismanaging funds allocated to the region of Sool, Mr. Fuad Adan Adde's home region. The former Minister was also very critical of Somaliland troops in Sool region, since the bulk of the Somaliland military force in Sool hail from other regions. During the interview, Mr. Fuad Adan Adde expressed his displeasure with six new regions created by President Riyale, saying that the regions divided the people into clans. [ Full story] Locals in Sool region where the presence of Somaliland troops remains a controversy remember Mr. Fuad Adan Adde as a vocal supporter of Somaliland' s expansion into the region of Sool. Breakaway Somaliland has been fighting for control over Sool region since 2002 with the rival sub-state of Puntland, which claims the region's inhabitants share clan ties with Puntland. In October 2007, Somaliland troops successfully dislodged Puntland security forces from the Sool regional capital of Las Anod. Source: Garowe Online
  4. The World According To John McCain He’s both the consummate pragmatist and a zealous crusader for causes he feels just. The question is which America needs now. By Michael Hirsh; With Holly Bailey Newsweek 7 April 2008 “We need to listen,” John McCain was saying, “to the views … of our democratic allies.” Then, though the words weren’t in the script, the Arizona senator repeated himself, as if in self-admonishment: “We need to listen.” A lot of meaning was packed into that twice-said line, which was a key theme of McCain’s first major foreign-policy speech since becoming the GOP’s nominee-apparent. McCain was telling America, and the whole world: if I’m elected there will be, at long last, a return to what Jefferson called “a decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” There will be no more ill-justified lurches into war, no more unilateralism, no more George W. Bush. Above all, McCain seemed to be saying that while Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama tear each other to pieces, I’m going to be the wise and welcoming statesman patching up America’s global relations even before I get to the Oval Office. Not surprisingly, after the speech last week at the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, McCain’s campaign could not talk enough about international cooperation—what McCain had called a “new compact.” “He has such a deep relationship with so many Europeans and those in other regions, including Asia and the Middle East,” said one adviser, Rich Williamson, who added that McCain has kept up his global profile by “going each year to the Munich Security Conference.” It was all very reassuring. There’s just one problem: John McCain doesn’t always behave according to his own statesmanlike script. In fact, while attending that same Munich conference in 2006, the Arizona senator had another one of what have come to be known as McCain Moments. In a small meeting at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof, McCain was conferring with Frank-Walter Steinmeier, the foreign minister of Germany—one of America’s most important allies—when the others heard McCain erupt. He thought the German was being insufficiently tough on the brutal regime in Belarus. Raising his voice at Steinmeier—who’s known for speaking in unclear diplomatese—McCain “started shaking and rising out of his chair,” said one participant, a former senior diplomatic official who related the anecdote on condition of anonymity. “He said something like: ‘I haven’t come to Munich to hear this kind of crap’.” McCain’s old pal Joe Lieberman jumped in. “Lieberman, who reads him very well, put his hand on McCain’s arm and said gently, ‘John, I think there’s been a problem in the translation.’ Of course Lieberman doesn’t speak German and there hadn’t been any problem in the translation … It was just John’s explosive temper.” Certainly this was no great crisis, and the Germans later said all was forgiven. But McCain’s Munich outburst could not be called an isolated incident. Fearless and righteous, McCain has long been known to unleash a lacerating anger on those who cross him—Senate colleagues, foreign interlocutors, even the interrogators who once held his life in their hands at the Hanoi Hilton. (Lieberman, his fellow centrist, recently seems to have assigned himself the role of McCain’s monitor. Just two weeks ago, when McCain mistakenly said Iran was training Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters, it was the Connecticut senator who again pulled him aside, gently reminding him that the Iranian regime has been accused of training fellow Shiite extremists, not Sunni Al Qaeda.)( ) For someone who is just an election away from the White House—and who is running on his image as a tested statesman—there remain serious questions about how exactly McCain might behave as president. Partly this is because McCain himself is not easy to pin down. There is McCain the pragmatist: worldly-wise and witty, determined to follow the facts to the exclusion of ideology—a man willing to defy his own party and forge compromise, even with liberals like Ted Kennedy (on granting illegal immigrants some amnesty) and John Kerry (on normalizing relations with Vietnam). And then there is the zealous advocate, single-minded about pressing his cause, sometimes erupting in outrage at detractors and willing to stand alone—without any allies at all, if need be. There is much to like in both McCains. He’s pragmatic in the service of the national interest; he rises to passion when he believes that America’s best values are at stake. Even some of those who fret about his zeal and temper say they plan to vote for him (just as many ultraconservatives who worry about his centrism say they’ll reluctantly pull the lever as well). Lieberman says McCain’s anger “is part of his strength. And his guts. There are some things we should get righteously angry about.” Sometimes these two McCains—the crusader and the pragmatist—have combined to make him a powerful and leaderly force for change, which seems to be what Americans want now. It was McCain the savvy military analyst who looked hard at the emerging Iraqi insurgency in the fall of 2003, decided a lot more U.S. troops were needed, and then went head-to-head with the mulish Donald Rumsfeld over the issue. (McCain was, in effect, the first person in Washington to call for a “surge.”) Ultimately, four years later, he brought the Congress—and the president—with him. “I went against the will of my own party when it wasn’t politically expedient,” McCain has said. What’s also true, however, is that he had long supported calls to topple Saddam Hussein, and was an enthusiastic promoter of the war in Iraq. Despite his best efforts to project himself as a healing president, the antic Arizonan has already worried many voters. His Beach Boys wisecrack about whether to “bomb, bomb, bomb” Iran is perhaps too easily mocked. But McCain has said over and over that as president he will rise to what he calls the “transcendent challenge of the 21st century”—the fight against radical Islamic terrorism. And he’s gone beyond that: he’s indicated that anyone who disagrees with that premise—read Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton—is simply incompetent. As he declared in Los Angeles: “Any president who does not regard this threat as transcending all others does not deserve to sit in the White House, for he or she does not take seriously enough the first and most basic duty a president has—to protect the lives of the American people.” This is what troubles some about McCain’s zeal for certain causes: he can be pragmatic in the pursuit of them, but seems to see them in largely black and white terms, not unlike George Bush, and rejects too much of the gray. Terror cells may be spreading, but their crazed ideology— all that talk of establishing a medieval caliphate—keeps dying every time it is exposed to the open air. And what about other major threats, like global warming? McCain, in an interview with NEWSWEEK, said those were important, “but I do not believe that anyone who fails to understand the dimensions and enormity of this [extremist] challenge is qualified to serve as president of the United States.” In Iraq, where last week the Iraqi government failed to quell renewed hostilities from cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army—forcing U.S. troops to step in once again—McCain declared recently: “We’re succeeding. I don’t care what anybody says.” The diatribe against Belarus was another case in point: no one doubts that Alexander Lukashenko is an evil if fairly insignificant dictator, but sometimes one has to talk to evil people. On similar grounds, McCain has refused to consider meeting with the current Iranian government. Some critics worry that despite McCain’s stated commitment to diplomatic coercion against Tehran, such an uncompromising approach could lead to hostilities. “The typical thing you’d expect from a war veteran, especially someone with his searing experience, is more caution than he shows,” says Winslow Wheeler, a defense-budget expert who observed McCain for years as an aide to different senators. This tendency to pursue causes so relentlessly—like his almost visceral dislike of Russia’s quasi-dictatorial Vladimir Putin, whom he wants to cast out of the G8 (contrary to European wishes)—even concerns some GOP stalwarts. “I tried to talk to him about Russia, but he just stiffened,” a former senior GOP foreign-policy official, who would speak only on condition of anonymity, said. “To me that’s one of the most troublesome things about him. Advisers need to be able to walk into the Oval Office and say, ‘Look, Mr. President, I think you’re wrong.’ That’s not easy to do anyway. But if you think your head’s going to be taken off and he will never forgive you, then you’ve got a real problem.” As Wheeler puts it: “Joe Lieberman’s not going to be there at 3 o’clock in the morning, in bed with him, when the phone call comes.” McCain himself has long been aware of what he called, in his 2002 book “Worth the Fighting For,” his “legendary” temper. “I am combative, there is little use in pretending otherwise,” he wrote. While he insisted then that people tend to exaggerate his anger (most people with tempers say the same), he admitted that it “has caused me to make most of the more serious mistakes of my career.” But it is not just McCain’s anger that worries his detractors; it’s the fierce righteousness that is joined to it. During his first Senate run, in 1986, McCain grew so tired of hearing complaints about his anger that he thundered to his staffers (“as they struggled to keep straight faces,” recorded author Robert Timberg): “I don’t have a temper! I just care passionately.” The participant who witnessed McCain’s 2006 spat with Steinmeier agrees with this distinction. “He is, plain and simple, the most openly emotional politician in the United States,” he says. “Other people have had tempers. Eisenhower had a famous temper. Clinton has a temper. Reagan had a temper. But it’s that McCain is so emotional. He does jump to conclusions.” In the Senate, McCain is known for getting up and walking out if he doesn’t like what he’s hearing. “You really don’t have the luxury of walking out when you’re president; you have a broader obligation,” says a longtime Democratic Senate staffer who would describe private meetings only if he were not named. McCain denies he ever walked out of a meeting for that reason, saying that his Senate record shows “calm, sober hours of negotiations, good faith and respect for those who hold opposing notions.” But he adds: “I feel passionately about issues, and the day that passion goes away is the day I will go down to the old soldiers’ home and find my rocking chair.” Not even his harshest critics suggest that McCain—whose character and sanity were tested by some of the most savage torture a human being could endure—is unstable. And even many Democratic admirers, such as former senators Bob Kerrey and Gary Hart, think he’d be an outstanding president. Lieberman, perhaps his most avid supporter in the Senate, says it’s “fair” to ask whether the displays of temper that so characterized McCain’s Senate career are suitable for the Oval Office. But he adds: “I’ve never seen him get angry to the point of a loss of control.” Which fights is he likely to pick as president? As a Vietnam veteran, tempered in the failure of that war, McCain has made many thoughtful and careful judgments about the use of force during his more than 20 years in the Senate. In 1983, as a congressman, he called for the withdrawal of the Marines from Beirut—defying a president he professed to admire, Ronald Reagan. He voted against intervention in Haiti and in favor of a cutoff of funds for the “Black Hawk Down” mission in Somalia. He was leery of a ground war against Iraq in 1991, though he ultimately voted for it. But since then, McCain has also shown a willingness to use force that suggests he has escaped from his Vietnam-bred caution. McCain himself denies there’s been much change in his views, and aides say he’s been fairly consistent in embracing the concept so many Vietnam vets have: the “Powell doctrine.” Named after former Joint Chiefs chairman and secretary of State Colin Powell, the doctrine says the U.S. military should not be used unless the mission and exit strategy are clear and overwhelming force is applied. In Beirut and Somalia, McCain saw that the missions were muddled, says Mark Salter, his longtime speechwriter and alter ego. “He thought, ‘What in the world are these few hundred Marines doing but making themselves targets?’ ” (Soon afterward, on Oct. 23, 1983, 241 Marines died in a terrorist bombing.) McCain began to grow somewhat more sanguine after the stunning successes in the gulf war—the start of the “smart bomb” era—and the fall of the Soviet Union. He came to expand his view of America’s calling, especially after Serbs slaughtered 8,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995. In the late 1990s he forcefully backed the air war in Kosovo, and signed the Project for a New American Century letter along with neocons like Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle that called for Saddam Hussein to be ousted. A decade later, after 9/11, McCain proved more eager than Bush was to take on Saddam in the middle of the war against Al Qaeda, declaring in early 2002 that Iraq was “the next front.” He has since pledged to keep U.S. troops there indefinitely, saying he’s in accord with none other than Osama bin Laden that Iraq is the central battleground in the War on Terror. “General Petraeus and I and Osama bin Laden are in agreement,” McCain said recently. “It is hard to understand why Senator Clinton and Senator Obama do not understand that.” McCain knows that his candidacy will rise or fall on how the public sees Iraq and the larger War on Terror. “How people judge Iraq will have a direct relation to how they judge me,” he recently told reporters on his campaign plane. “In some ways, it’s out of my control.” Last week, as violence scorched Baghdad and Basra, there were renewed questions about whether McCain even now “gets” Iraq and the delicate counterinsurgency campaign being run by Gen. David Petraeus. When he traveled there last year, appearing in a flak jacket in an open Baghdad market to demonstrate the success of the surge, “many of us were very uncomfortable,” says a former member of the U.S. command in Baghdad who would reveal internal discussions only on condition of anonymity. “We felt he was pushing things too hard and too fast.” Despite McCain’s nuanced record on the use of force, his team understands that he’s got something of an image problem. Hence it was no surprise that the first lines of his remarks last week were designed to remove any lingering doubts that McCain is a warmonger, according to Salter. “I detest war,” McCain declared. “When nations seek to resolve their differences by force of arms, a million tragedies ensue … Whatever gains are secured, it is loss the veteran remembers most keenly.” Still, McCain’s Vietnam experience, not surprisingly, shapes him yet. “His position on Iraq is heavily influenced by his Vietnam experience,” says Gary Hart, who was an usher at McCain’s 1980 wedding. “I think that he has an emotional stake in not losing. He, like other veterans, believes that we could have ‘won the Vietnam War,’ but the politicians panicked and caved in to public sentiment and withdrew prematurely.” If there is one issue that haunts the reinvigorated McCain candidacy even more, it is whether he will start a new war with Iran. McCain told NEWSWEEK that he “will continue to exhaust every other option before committing young Americans to harm’s way,” but that “we cannot afford to have Iran acquire nuclear weapons.” Lieberman says McCain is precisely the man to keep America out of a war. “He’s going to do everything he can to avoid military confrontation with Iran,” he says. “There’s an old expression: the best way to achieve peace is to prepare for war.” McCain has called for expanding the U.S. Army and Marines by about 100,000 service members, but he also understands that the global struggle against terrorists and their state sponsors is counterinsurgency writ large, requiring aid and the winning of “hearts and minds” as much as military ops. “In this struggle, scholarships will be far more important than smart bombs,”he said in Los Angeles. If John McCain becomes president, which will be used more? Newsweek
  5. Peace-action, that is deep Bari. Bari is a huge region with very long coast. We need many factories to drive up the quite steady growth of Somalia's economy.
  6. Xiinfanin, AU is worse than UN and it is part of the non-territorial, indirect system of dividing and ruling Africa. What would you have to say if AU promotes the issue of "somaliland" as distinct and different from Somalia?
  7. Originally posted by shaken and deterred: its a cute article... it needs editing. Point that to me, New Guy?
  8. Faarax, you are breaking the rules saxib. Take it easy. NO need to strive for the formalization of a whole Somali territory as a Qabiil-name.
  9. Secessionist -Geejire, the people of Puntland, Maakhir and occupied Sool also live in the south in great number. Most of us here are from the south like Jimcaale who is from Kismaayo. Thinking from a northern perspective, you're not doing any justice to us who are from the south. Naxxar and Feynuus, Isn't that Red-herring, introducing a different topic into this discussion. There is no need to give reputed Jimacaale a bum rap for his analytical views of the latest developments in Kismayo given the past and ongoing wrongs committed against its inhabitants.
  10. CNN’s Hate Mongering Attitudes towards the Somali Community Dalmar Kaahin April 3, 2008 Read full article and other sources of valuable info attached. Source
  11. interesting editorial from a secessionist site. Rayale’s Republic Of Clanistan www.kulmiye.org 28 March, 2008 Awadalnews network Rayale’s Republic of Clanistan (Awdalnews Editor’s View) Awdalnews Editorial March 27, 2008 - 14:37 Rayale’s Republic of Clanistan The policy of divide and rule is the mainstay of colonial administrations and dictatorial rulers. It is only through division along tribal lines that such shaky governments retain power and consolidate their grip on the life of their subjects. Rayale’s recent announcement of new regions and districts in Somaliland is a textbook example of such bankrupt regimes that cannot survive without leaning on clan crutches. The people of Somaliland had great dreams for their sovereignty. Emerging from the yoke of brutal dictatorship that thrived on division and playing one clan against the another, they aspired to build a viable state based on good governance, social cohesion and constitutional democracy where elected houses made decisions through transparent systems and public debates. But with his latest decision, Rayale proved to us once more where his priorities lie. He made it clear that all he cared about was his chair. Rayale’s decisions have become so predictable on the advent of any election. Among his previous tactics were announcements of major trade deals with phony foreign companies, cabinet reshuffles and nominating honorary parliamentary seats, presidential advisors and other redundant posts for political gains. Accordingly, his designation of new regions and districts at this time when the country is preparing for the second presidential elections comes as no surprise. The gravity of this decision, however, lies in its long-term effects of dividing the country into tribal ghettoes. Instead of building a united, integrated and cohesive society that puts the higher national interests at its focus, Rayale opted to heighten tribal polarization and hostility among the people of Somaliland. Somaliland consisted of two regions only during the British colonial administration. All clans of Somaliland were governed from Hargeisa and Burao. Borders of the Southern regions of former Somalia also cut across clans and sub-clans. It was Siyad Barre who designated regions on clan basis. As a man schooled in Barre’s system of ruling the country as tribal fiefdoms, Rayale finds it quite normal to turn a page of his mentor’s policy book whenever he feels threatened. Safeguarding his chair through clan loyalties is the core of this policy. To create new regions and allow different areas of the country to manage their resources and run their own affairs may be an essential factor for the decentralization of administration, but demarcating regions along clan lines is a call for division and reversing the wheel of the country’s progress towards statehood. It is Rayale’s attempt to realize his delusional dream of ruling Somaliland as a republic of clanistan. Source / Awdalnews Network
  12. Ukraine's NATO bid: What does Russia have to do with it? Apri 3, 2008 By John Marone Ukraine and Georgia were not offered a Membership Action Plan [MAP] at the NATO summit in Bucharest this week. Moscow and her supporters were jubilant and defiant at the news. Their reaction is based on the following thinking: Russia is sick and tired of being pushed around by the West, and particularly by the United States, which has continuously imposed itself on Russia's area of interest. In addition, the argument goes, many if not most people in Ukraine want to be aligned with Russia or at least neutral, while Georgia still has to work out its territorial disputes before it can join a 'foreign' military alliance. To anyone who still sees the world as 'us and them', this line of thinking and arguments is logical. The unspoken sentiment is something like: Poor Russia has been humiliated enough, while the United States needs to get its comeuppance. Lot's of emotion here indeed, but let's look at the facts. First of all, Russia is not poor. It has enjoyed a windfall of revenues from the sale of gas, oil and arms in the last several years. Instead of using this money to invest in its people, infrastructure and technology, it has allowed well-heeled individuals to get rich at the expense of everyone else. Worse yet, these individuals then flee the country or export their capital abroad for fear of their country's capricious attitude toward private property. To anyone attending a fashion show, a tennis match or a cocktail party in Moscow, the Russians have joined the rest of the world. But just go to a peaceful demonstration against President Putin & Co. or try to open a small business in the Russian hinterland, and the backwardness and barbarism hit you right in the face. Russia is now capitalist, and foreign companies with enough clout and connections can do business there. But it is hardly democratic, and losing ground every day. But don't try to tell all this to German and other European officials keen on securing gas supplies for their countries. It was Germany, and to a lesser extent France, Italy, etc., who most vigorously opposed allowing Ukraine and Georgia to get a NATO MAP for the reasons cited above. Besides the fact that MAP isn't a guarantee of membership, Europe knows full well that many Ukrainians are against NATO membership because they have been subjected to Soviet and then neo-Soviet propaganda for decades, while Moscow is the one keeping Georgia's territorial disputes frozen. One doesn't even have to believe in conspiracy theories. Just listen to the cold war rhetoric that regularly comes out of the Kremlin. But the Europeans have been as united in their stand against those 'pushy' Americans as they are divided in their feeble attempts to come up with a common energy policy. The continent is already dangerously dependent on eastern exports of blue fuel, with the price set by Moscow set to rise even further. The German relationship with the Kremlin is particularly suspect, considering former chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's employment at Russian Gazprom. Russia is not only Germany's energy supplier, but a major consumer for the third largest economy in the world's exports, such as heavy machinery. On the other hand, history shows the two countries have a short-lived capacity for cooperation due to conflicts for influence over the territories lying between them, which they initially agree to divvy up. Remember the eighteenth century partition of Poland, which was only restored after World War One? How about the Molotov Ribbentrop pact, which led to World War Two? The point here is not to dig up skeletons from the past. Germany is a modern democratic state, and Russia is apparently no longer bent on world revolution. But this doesn't mean either country no longer has any geopolitical interests. And these interests might again be running their historical paths if not for the United States, which is also pinning its hopes on Central and Eastern Europe. For Russia, these countries represent security, a connection to its Slavic cousins. For Germany, they are the natural direction of its economic and geopolitical growth, while for the United States they are new markets and a strategic foothold in Europe. If the US were again to retreat into isolationism, would Russian-German history repeat itself? Did the two agree on the independence of Kosovo? Will Russia ever be satisfied with controlling only its present borders? Will Germany allow itself to be blackmailed over gas and oil? Instead of ceding to the whims of an increasing authoritarian Kremlin, Berlin (which knows full well the danger of tyrants), should lead the continent in challenging Moscow to reform. Russia will never be secure from hydrocarbon sales alone anyway. Sooner or later it's going to have to invest in other forms of revenue, which ultimately will entail a return to the path of free-market democracy. The path of reform is what NATO expansion is all about, regardless of the rhetoric coming out of Moscow. And to deny Ukraine and Georgia a chance to tread along this path is to drive them back into the arms of repression. Whether anyone wants to admit it or not, Vladimir Putin's Russia has turned its back on Western values to seek companionship with countries like Belarus, Uzbekistan and other democratic failures. Like a kid from the wrong side of the tracks, Russia would rather play the bad boy than second fiddle to Europe or America. Although Putin has arguably won the support of most Russians in this policy of defiance, he has not achieved the same in Ukraine and especially Georgia, despite a serious effort in the case of the former. Whatever disappointments may have followed it, Ukraine's Orange Revolution was a definite signal in favor of Western integration over Russian hegemony. This signal was sent by the people as well as a new generation of politicians. Moscow's candidate failed to steal the elections, and the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko became president. The revolution is still being played out in a seemingly endless string of elections, gas negotiations and campaigns in support of the Russian or Ukrainian language. But the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians genuinely support their president's drive to integrate them with the West. The misinformation, mismanagement and corruption that they are subjected to on an everyday basis should serve as evidence of the opposition Ukrainians face rather than a reason to reject their application. The fact that European leaders have the gall to invoke Russian interests in rejecting Ukraine's NATO bid shows that old-lady Europe may harbor some of the old-world chauvinistic feelings that Russia is roundly condemned for. What is the message for Ukraine and Georgia: that the Orange and Rose revolutions were just an academic experiment, that Ukraine and Georgia should go back to being controlled by Russia, or whoever? Unlike many of the Central Asian regimes happy to maintain their relationship with Moscow, Kyiv and Tbilisi see themselves as part of Europe. It's a dirty trick to start pointing out their democratic flaws this late in the game. Both nations have made a noble, if not altogether successful, effort to join the rest of the continent - certainly no less than countries like Romania and Bulgaria. Contrary to the demagoguery coming out of the Russian legislature, neither country is anti-Russian, but both fully realize the prospect of being in Moscow's area of influence, where stagnation and authoritarianism stare out across the fence that separates them from a prosperous and democratic Europe. In Czarist and Soviet times, Moscow always went to great lengths to keep its subjects from fleeing. The tide of immigration to Europe speaks for itself. Thus, there can be no talk of Russian interests. Until Russia is fully brought into the family of Europe, through democratic and market reforms that it must itself embrace, the country will (or should) always be at odds with Europe. And if countries like Ukraine and Georgia choose Europe over Russia, they should be helped, like a woman fleeing from a violently jealous husband. And if some - the Kremlin, Ukrainian communists, anti-globalists - think that this woman is being seduced away from her lawful spouse by a wealthy but uncaring West that will be equally indifferent to her interests, they should consider that: first, Ukraine (especially Western Ukraine) wasn't always under Russia; and second, it's better to be in a European bird cage than on a Russian leash. This not only applies to Ukraine and Georgia but to Poland, Hungary, Romania and their neighbors, all of whom chose Europe over Moscow. The Kremlin not only needs to know that it has no right to bully its neighbors, but that it might be better off without them. Instead of trying to incorporate more satellites into its orbit, it should look after the vast territory that it currently controls. On the other hand, the expansion of NATO and Europe will ultimately mean as much input from the newcomers as 'indoctrination' from the West. Poland has certainly been unwilling to take a back seat in European affairs. Georgia and Ukraine aside, an organization that encompasses cultures and governments stretching from California to eastern Turkey will be more occupied with maintaining order within its territory than threatening others. US leadership is already being challenged by member countries like Germany and France, forcing NATO to live up to its democratic ideals. If Ukraine and Georgia want a place under this umbrella of democracy, which by necessity must be able to project force, no one - neither the Germans nor certainly not the Russians - has the right to reject them. Germany was more divided than Georgia when it joined NATO, and citizens in all the former Warsaw pact countries initially expressed doubts about the need for membership. To make Ukraine and Georgia out to be special cases in order to reject them is a rejection of the values that NATO purports to defend. Source: Ukraine Observer
  13. Putin has a point Editorial The Russian president opposes Bush's push to expand NATO eastward, and he's right. April 2, 2008 It isn't often that we take Vladimir V. Putin's side on issues of international governance, but the bellicose Russian president is right about the matter expected to dominate this week's NATO summit: Ukraine and Georgia don't belong in the alliance. At least not yet. President Bush spent Tuesday in Ukraine talking up that country's membership bid, part of an ongoing administration strategy backing NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe. For Bush, a larger NATO means more potential allies willing to contribute troops to the struggle in Afghanistan, still largely an American project despite the alliance's approval of the invasion. With much of Western Europe deeply reluctant to put its soldiers in harm's way, the East represents the best hope for relieving the pressure on U.S. forces. But that short-term benefit has to be balanced against the many long-term problems associated with an expanded NATO. In the first place, there's the fact that the larger the organization grows, the more unwieldy it becomes. NATO's decisions are made by consensus, which is far harder to achieve as it adds members with broadly divergent security interests. For an example of the institutional paralysis likely to result, see the United Nations. Second, adding Ukraine and Georgia to the 26-member alliance would needlessly antagonize Russia. Moscow and the West made an implicit deal amid the collapse of the Soviet Union: Russia would allow German reunification and pull its troops out of Eastern Europe as long as NATO didn't expand eastward. The betrayal of that trust infuriates and frightens the Russian people, fueling nationalism and insecurity that have strengthened the current autocratic regime. With the Cold War imperative of containing Russia now long outdated, there is no compelling security reason to add former Soviet republics to the alliance, while doing so harms our relations with a country whose support is critical in resolving dangerous conflicts with Iran and other nations. Lastly, the two potential members come with serious risks attached. Both are young, and not entirely stable, democracies riddled with corruption and internal dissent. The majority of the Ukrainian people oppose membership, and Georgia is rent by a secession movement in two pro-Russia regions. Not many Americans would favor sending their sons to die defending Tbilisi, but that's precisely what they would be committed to do with Georgia in the alliance. The door should not be slammed in their faces, but neither the two countries themselves, nor Russia, nor NATO is ready for them to start on the path to membership. Let's talk in 2010. Latimes
  14. Bush wants 2 ex-Soviet states in NATO By James Gerstenzang, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer April 2, 2008 BUCHAREST, ROMANIA -- President Bush said Tuesday that he has told Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow has "nothing to fear" if former parts of the Soviet Union join NATO and that Russia should welcome cooperation on a U.S. missile defense network in Central Europe. After meeting with Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko in Kiev, Bush declared that he would not soften his support for bringing Ukraine and Georgia into NATO in exchange for Russia dropping its opposition to the missile defense network. "There's no trade-offs. Period," Bush said in response to a reporter's question about a possible compromise. He stated that it was a "misperception" that he was willing to make such a bargain. The president said he told Putin in a recent telephone call that it would be "in his interests" to receive information from the missile defense network. The question of whether to take the initial steps that could lead to Ukraine and Georgia joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became a dominant issue in the days leading up to an alliance summit, which begins today in Romania. Bush arrived late Tuesday in Bucharest to attend the meeting. The future of the missile defense system, which the United States wants to build in Poland and the Czech Republic as a shield against warheads launched from Iran or elsewhere in the Middle East, also is likely to be a central topic during Bush's weekend visit with Putin in Sochi, a Russian Black Sea resort, in what probably will be their final face-to-face meeting before Putin leaves the presidency May 7. Putin and other Russian officials have objected strenuously that the system, set close to Russia's borders in former communist bloc nations, would threaten Russian rockets. For Bush, the Bucharest summit provides an opportunity to draw attention to changes in the alliance since his presidency began in 2001, its reach now covering a swath of Eastern Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea that during the Cold War was part of the Warsaw Pact. In a speech today, Bush said that extending the initial invitation to Ukraine and Georgia would signal to their citizens "that if they continue on the path of democracy and reform they will be welcomed into the institutions of Europe." It would signal to the wider region, including Russia, that the two "are, and will remain, sovereign and independent states." He said that "the need for missile defense in Europe is real and it is urgent." Bush spoke Tuesday in Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, at a news conference with Yushchenko, who has been outspoken in his own country in favor of joining NATO. Yushchenko acknowledged that he did not yet have the support of a majority of his citizens. Referring to that opposition, Bush took note of a demonstration by Ukrainian Communists displaying red flags bearing the hammer and sickle and banners linking Bush and NATO to a profanity. The demonstrators were encamped Monday and Tuesday at Independence Square, the central site of the Orange Revolution of 2004 that brought Yushchenko to the presidency. "Just because there was a bunch of, you know, Soviet-era flags in the street yesterday doesn't -- you shouldn't read anything into that," Bush said. Ukraine and Georgia sit on Russia's southern flank. Putin has objected to the prospect that NATO, which was founded 59 years ago as a military and political balance to the Soviet Union, might take the initial steps in Bucharest that could lead to their membership. While Bush seeks to ease Russia's opposition to Ukraine and Georgia being given what is called a "membership action plan" as a first step, he also must persuade Germany and France to drop their objections, reportedly fueled by Russia's opposition. "As every nation has told me," Bush said, "Russia will not have a veto over what happens in Bucharest, and I take their word for it." Yushchenko said that if Germany and France yielded to Russia, NATO's open door to membership would be "replaced by the veto right" of a country that "is not even a member of the alliance." During the news conference and while delivering a toast later at a luncheon, Bush drew attention to Ukraine's contribution to NATO, even though it is not a member; Ukraine has provided about 330 police officers and soldiers to the NATO peacekeeping force of 16,000 in Kosovo, sent soldiers to Iraq in 2003 and provided aircraft to transport troops to Afghanistan. james.gerstenzang @latimes.com
  15. I believe If Ukraine formalises its acceptance to join NATO, it would keep western donors happy but place Russia in a strategically vulnerable position. Besides NATO may request Ukraine to force Russia to remove her portion of the Black Sea Fleet from Ukraine. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 NATO has been expanding into former Soviet territories in order to get rid of the last trace of Communism and spread Capitalism throughout Europe. Russia shares a nearly 1000 mile border with Ukraine. Ukraine also maintains an army of 300,000 troops and a very modern military including nearly 3000 plane air force. Their relations have been tense except short periods of cooperation. The stumbling block here is that Russia is walking on thin ice as its hegemonic influence in the region is on the wane. Their past agreement that divided the Soviet Navy's Black See Fleet is shaken as Ukraine claims that Russia has not abided by the agreement,(the reason is clear) and if this stalemate persists, it could lead to more threats of fuel shutdowns and thus hamper the flow of cash money into her economy. By contrast, Russia relies on Ukranian ports to export oil and on Ukraninans pipelines to ship gas to western Europe. With one democratic system, the west is convinced that future conflicts in Europe would be highly improbable and might henceforth come to an end thus to maintain their mode of control and dominance in their access to strategic global resources. Their aim, nevertheless, is to make Russia a pariah state with no friends. Though I have no reason to expect military conflict but this signals the begining of a bitter hostility and arms race
  16. Sanaag and western Bari regions are neither Somaliland nor Puntland. Maakhir state wey duushey
  17. ^That is what I gathered. The title is Somaliland but skip to the first line and it writes on the deployment of a possible 27,000 U.N peacekeeping troops. I thought something was wrong about this news article.
  18. Suldan, your propaganda warfare has no bounds. Why distort the title of the news. One would be swayed as if the whole article is about your clan fiefdom. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/26/AR2008032602972_pf.html Selling one piece of Somalia's territory to the 21st century colonialist won't tip balance in your favor. I wonder if this case is different from Puntland and her illegal contracts with a number of countries including China .
  19. ^I agree He is very sincere and honest person indeed.
  20. ^Ma reer Gedood baa ninku?
  21. LX, nin aan taariikhda aqoon iyo dadkaba baa qorey articlaad ku post gareysay. Jaahilnimadiisana muuqata. I wonder if you agree with the rubbbish he scrawled?
  22. I used to like Land Rover back in Somalia. It is good strong car. CNN
  23. Horta Somalida maxaa inkiraad laga siiyaa. IndhaAdeyg iyo Inkiraad waaba u caado.
  24. Originally posted by Ibtisam: Isseh there had to be a reason behind your post eh. I don't think there is a reason behind it that Isse was imparting to us as special message. The whole dialogue is for the whole of Somalia.