Perhaps the biggest hindrance of all, not mentioned in the piece, are Abiy and Muse’s impediment leadership, the political trajectory and sense of desperation over internal state and anxiety over own position. Which will not be turned by this deal, on the contrary it will further destabilise both countries and at larger the region. Remember how Ethiopia and Somaliland got to the current precarious internal political state in the first place. Will this deal be the healing cure for the political disarray, or perhaps on the contrary become the tipping point?

Reasons to Object to the proposed Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU 10 January 2024 Absent the MoU, we have relied on the initial brief provided by President Bihi and the subsequent public statements from Ethiopian officials to piece together key elements of the deal. Bottom line is that this MoU is not good for Somaliland in a myriad of ways. Below are some of the key concerns related to MoU: 1. The MoU has yet to be shared and there have been mixed signals from both Somaliland and Ethiopian officials on the scope and location of the Ethiopian investments – Is it a port deal? Naval base? Is it providing 20kms on the coast? Where exactly – Loyado/Lugaya/Bulahar? Or is it a land bridge connecting Ethiopia to the sea? What are the payment terms and how much? 2. Ethiopia’s historic claims and recent public statements from Abiy and Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicate an intent to obtain “permanent and reliable” access to the sea for the landlocked country. Therefore, the plans for a naval base, commercial port, and land bridge all should elicit concern that the endgame for Ethiopia may be to redraw the map of Somaliland. One such possible outcome is the map below in which Ethiopia is able to obtain a 20km wide land bridge to the Gulf of Aden: There is a high risk of annexation of land by Ethiopia, as a powerful and much larger neighboring country would never give up military strategic assets and land, and if relations deteriorate would likely choose for annexation, as per example of the Ukrainian region of Crimea annexed by Russia. 3. There should be serious doubts about Ethiopia’s ability to honor any potential payment terms given the fact that the country only just last month (Dec 2023) failed to make a $31 million bond payment. The debt default underscores the Ethiopia's severe financial challenges and explains why the initial payments terms include shares in Ethiopia’s airline and telecom sector or provision of electricity in lieu of cash. 4. The practice of leasing coastal areas to foreign military has not proven to boost overall economic activity in the host country. Djibouti has one of the highest extreme poverty and income inequality rates in the world despite earning hundreds of millions in annual rents from foreign bases on its territory. https://databankfiles.worldbank.org/public/ddpext_download/poverty/33EF03BB-9722-4AE2-ABC7-AA2972D68AFE/Global_POVEQ_DJI.pdf 5. Even if there is no formal annexation of land by Ethiopia, the influx of Ethiopians into the 20 kms of territory will change the demographics of Somaliland and provide Ethiopia with de facto control of the land. Somalilanders have already seen a dramatic increase of mostly Oromo people in the country, most as laborers. There are now several generations of Oromos in Somaliland with children who speak fluent Somali. Social media posts from prominent Ethiopians are clear on their goal to rewrite what they consider an historic wrong. 6. Ethiopia has no ability to ensure that Somaliland becomes an internationally recognized country with acceptance into African Union, IGAD, UN, or the new bloc of BRICS. Northern Cyprus is only recognized by Turkey and Transnistria is only recognized by Russia. Both countries are largely isolated and economically and militarily dependent of the larger neighboring country. Somaliland would require financing to largely be acquired from Ethiopia as it would have no access to international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. 7. The construction of a port for Ethiopian commercial port in Lugaya, Loyado or Bulahar would have disastrous effects on the port of Berbera. In addition, the 20 kms area of the coast that will be controlled by Ethiopia will impact Somaliland’s own commercial activities such as fishing. 8. Ethiopian access to the Red Sea jeopardizes regional stability as Djibouti, Somalia and Eritrea would feel existential threats by Ethiopia surrounding them both on coast and hinterland. In addition, the current high stakes conflict in the Red Sea, where multiple foreign navies are jockeying for relevance, could also draw Somaliland into conflict unwillingly. 9. The debate over the MoU has resulted in several Somaliland communities expressing their opposition to the presence of Ethiopian military in the country. Should the MoU move forward without broad-based support, there is a high chance that internal violent conflict may breakout. After the loss at Gojacadde, a return to war would be devastating for a Somaliland. 10. The presence of Ethiopian military in Somaliland will be draw for Al Shabaab to the region, as the extremist group has already made a public statement vowing to fight “foreign invaders”. Ethiopia’s presence in Mogadishu was also what ignited and gave birth to AS and created a breeding ground for extremism. 11. Somaliland will be affected by the complex internal political and economic turmoil in Ethiopia. Somaliland is already economic dependent on trade with Ethiopia, and adding political and security dependency would leave it at the mercy of the whim of whichever Ethiopian regimes comes to power.

This is exactly the point, Ethiopia’d ambition are not investment and access, but control and ownership. Somaliland balaayo isku furtay, Oromadii wexe wada aamineen iney badu yagu iska leeyihiin.

The Tigray and TPLF who got him in to power at the first place.

Many people don’t know that Awdal folks had a rebel movement that was quite actively fighting against Ethiopia for many years, proff Saleebaan from Amoud was the leader of that movement.

Deni managed to have his cake and eat it too, let’s Hope this doesn’t set a new precedent in Somalia.

Xaaji, you pretty well that these are government invoked Guulwadeyn demos and says little about real support of the people.

Fajis from Afewerki, this alone should give Abiy some nightmares.

For those interested to learn from another example, of a major and more powerful neighbour leasing military ports and coastal lands, should read about the Kharkiv agreement between Ukrainian and Russia on Crimea Ports and what happened eventually to all of Crimea. Powerful countries do not just give up coastal areas and military ports, even if they initially agreed to a lease, and if needed they even annex the whole region, as happened with Crimea. Kharkiv Pact - Wikipedia EN.M.WIKIPEDIA.ORG Putin tears up lease for Sevastopol naval base WWW.FT.COM

I am noticing that media and politicians are self-censoring with regards to Deni and showcasing political divisiveness? Why is that? And, who are the elected speaker and deputy, and are they part of Deni's supporters or is the field still open for elections to go any directions?

The best way forward is for Somalia and Somaliland to resolve their issues through these talks, incl any coastal areas to be leased. This would be in the interest of all parties, but that one needs to keep a cool head, think rational, being modest, while showcasing empathy to each other. And as agreed staying away from incitement, public statements and emotional outcries. its not that difficult to do, but perhaps they need a third party mediator to keep everyone in check, as clearly Somali's are unable to discuss and put the difficult issues on the table in discussion and meetings.

I don’t think IOG on this deal either. But he is fearing an antagonised Ethiopia and has been sidelined earlier by Abiy and Farmaajo.

I detest nationalism of any sorts and I want all the brotherly and neighbourly nations in the Horn of Africa to live in peace side by side and have free movements of people and flow of trade, goods. But what I find concerning is the hegemonic ambitions of any state to dominate others, change historic narratives and annexations of lands, as that only will lead to tensions, animosities and eventually perpetual conflict. The ambitions and narratives for a greater Ethiopia (Abysissinia) are well known and documented, and concern is that once the door is openend to entertain thus greater Ethiopian that it will open the door for hegemonic ambitions in the regions that will have social, cultural and political ramifications for the wider region and above all for the people in Somaliland, to become the sheep in the midst of wolves. We are living in a time of a changing world order, and are witnessing that historic agreements, borders and national sovereignty are being threatened upon by regional powers without consequences. Look at Russia’s unilateral annexation of the Krim where it initially had leased the Black Sea port from Ukraine. Look at India and how it has thrown away the historic agreements and rights of Jammu and Kashmir regions. China and its unilateral annexation of the whole South China Sea and threading upon coastal zones of half a dozen countries. Venezuela recently announcing its plan to annex a third of Guyana. Turkey that has been occupying swathes of Syrian lands. So what makes you think that Ethiopia will adhere to any agreement and not continue its hegemonistic ambitions by in cooperating parts of Somali territories in to its own?

I have travelled the northern parts of Ethiopia by road (Bahar Dar, Gondar, Adigrat, Aksum, Mekele, Wollo, Awash) mainly inhabited by Amhara and Tigray, and I have to say the country is quite fertile and populated specially population density in rural areas is high. And I understand that Oromo parts and Southern Nation are even more populated and fertile than the mountainous northern regions. Even when you fly low altitude over those lands you can see the population density, their villages are as as big our towns all in close proximity and then when you fly over Somali regions that’s when the land becomes like a desert with very little visible population settlements. So I do belief that the Ethiopian populations numbers are correct and it wouldn’t be in the interest of the federal government to inflate them, on the contrary that could complete their internal governance and administration and lead to major internal problems.

You know what’s so strange with Somali’s, they never discuss real issues when they meet. HSM and Muse Biixi met only a day before this deal and have could have discussed real issues as mature man. But Somali meetings are always cover of niceties and protocols and never lead to meaningful discussions of real issues, and they rather air their objections, opinions and concerns through public airways. Very childish and waste of our time, resources. How this could have continued for decades, is a question to me.

Sh Abdirahman Bashir calling for the defence of the sea

Xunjuf is definitely on the Xabashi side

The ‘ictiraaf’ thing has really confused some, Ethiopia already enters agreements with Somaliland, has a diplomatic mission that reports directly to Addis, has direct flights to Hargeisa. What more ictiraaf than that will Ethiopia bring you, changing the sign board of its Consular Mission to Embassy is that worth selling your land for it.

So what’s next, the new MPs have miraculously been selected, sworn in and seated in a matter of 24 hours. Will Deni be elected with the same speed? And how will the Issims, opposition politicians respond?

There is a general public opinion that the political stagnation in Somaliland can not remain and current directions can not continue to be sustained, and thus why politicians are desperately looking for other pathways.

It was clear from the beginning, that the Oromo narrative was pushed by Ethiopia as the precursor for voluntary and indirect annexation. Ethiopia has for decades used a politics of Oromisation in Somali region solidify its government grip on Somali’s and expand its territorial hold, so this wasn’t anything new, what is new however is this politics being applied or expanded to inside sovereign Somali territory.

It’s practically an annexation with the current Ethiopian demographic, political and military dominance in the region and influx of Oromo in to Somaliland. This is not in the interest of Somaliland.

Compromise between who exactly, I thought both Garaads and Puntland Issims position was clear on this? Isimada dhaqanka Puntland oo go'aamiyay in doorashada 2024 lagu galo 49 xildhibaan – Puntland Post PUNTLANDPOST.NET Isimada dhaqanka Puntland ayaa bayaan rasmi ah ka soo saaray xiisadda ka taagan arrimaha doorashada Puntland. Isimada dhaqanka oo...