Muqdisho (Caasimada Online)-Warar dheeraad ah ayaa waxa uu kasoo baxayaa dhismaha darbiga lagu sugayo amniga dalka Kenya ee laga wado xadka u dhexeeya Somalia iyo Kenya. Dhismaha oo inkabadan sanad socday ayaa waxaa iminka lasoo sheegayaa inuu galay hakat, kadib markii ay mushaar la’aan soo food saartay shaqaalihii waday dhismaha. Saraakiisha adeegga dhallinyarada Kenya ee NYS ee loo dadaad-gureeyey si ay u dhisaan Derbiga Ammaanka ee Xuduudka Kenya la wadaagaan Somalia ayaa xaqiijiyay inaan shaqaalaha lasiin wax mushaar ah. Saraakiisha adeegga ayaa dalbaday in la siiyo Mushaarkooda oo dhan 350 million oo Shillinka Kenya, maadaama dhismaha uu yahay mid heer gabago ah. Saraakiisha adeegga, waxa ay intaa raaciyeen in ka badan 500 shaqaale oo ka soo jeeda Webiga ‘’Tana River’’ ay sheegteen inaysan wax mushaar ah helin muddo 18-bilood ah. Dowlada Kenya ayey ugu baaqeen inay la imaado qorsho ka duwan kan ay iminka ku dooneyso inay kusii wado dhismaha darbiga maadaama aanu jirin wax xuquuqa oo ay bixiso. Dowlada Kenya ayaa iska dhaga tireysa dhawaqa kaga imaanaaya shaqaalaha, hase ahaatee waxa uu arrinku u muuqanayaa mid sabab u noqon doono hakinta dhismaha. Si kastaba ha ahaatee Dowlada Somalia ayaan weli ku qanacsaneen hanaanka ay Kenya u wado dhismaha Derbigaasi oo ay Dowladda Kenya sheegtay inay kaga hor tagayaan sidii loo joojin lahaa Dagaalamayaasha Alshabaab ee u gudba Xuduudka Kenya, si ay Howlgallo uga fuliyaan. Caasimada Online Xafiiska Muqdisho Caasimada@live.com

Muqdisho (Caasimada Online)-Guddoomiyaha Maxkamadda Darajada 1-aad ee Ciidamada Qalabka Sida G/sare Xasan Cali Nuur Shuute, oo la hadlayay ciidamo ka jawaabay dalabkii Madaxweynaha kedib weerarkii 14-kii October oo ku jira dugsiga tababarka Gen. Gordan ayaa kula dar-daarmay marka hore in ay ku shaqeeyaan anshax wanaag. Guddoomiyaha ayaa uga digay ciidamada in dhexdooda ay isticmaalaan qabyaaladda, waxa uuna ku nuux-nuuxsaday in qofkii arrimahaasi ku soo cadaadaan loo ciqaabi doono, isagoo sii wata hadalkiisa ayuu ciidamada kula dar-daarmay in ay bartaan qeybaha kala duwan ee aqoonta, rajjooyinkooda iyo hamigoodana ay sara u qaadaan. Mar uu soo hadal qaaday dhacdooyinka ciidamada dhexdooda ah oo maalmahan dambe ka dhacayay magaalada ayuu si cara leh u sheegay in aan la aqbali doonin in shacab ay ku dhinteen isku dhacyada ciidamada. Laamaha baarista oo kaashanaya xeer ilaalinta ciidamada ayuu ku amray in ay baaraan dambiyadii dhacay, soona cadeeyaan cidda masuuliyadda wixii dhacay dusha u ridata si loo mariyo wadada cadaaladda. Gaba-gabadii ayuu sheeegay Guddoomiyaha Maxkamadda Darajada 1-aad in aysan noqon doonin markii ugu dambeysay oo ay u yimaadaan ciidamada balse ay si joogta ah uga howlgeli doonaan rugaha ciidamada. Maalmihii la soo dhaafay Magalada Muqdisho waxaa ku soo kordhayey isku-dhacyada Ciidamada dowladda Dhexdooda ah kaas oo sababay dhimashada dad Shacab ah. Caasimada Online Xafiiska Muqdisho Caasimada@live.com

A visiting delegation from the African Union (AU) headquarters left Somalia today, after a three-day assessment tour of AU funded community projects in the country. Source: Hiiraan Online

Two lawmakers from Somalia’s semi-autonomous Hirshabelle state were killed on Tuesday along with several of their bodyguards in an ambush near the Somali capital Mogadishu claimed by militant Islamist group al Shabaab. Source: Hiiraan Online

The mother of a man whose skeletal remains were found in a bush grave months after his killer fled Perth for Somalia has been awarded $23,000 in criminal injuries compensation. Source: Hiiraan Online

The head of the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) Kerem Kinik said the aid agency aimed to reach a total of 10 million people during the Holy month of Ramadan. Source: Hiiraan Online

Ethiopia's governing coalition has announced it will fully accept and implement the peace deal that ended its border war with Eritrea. Source: Hiiraan Online

Doxa (Caasimada Online) – Amiirka dalka Qadar Sheekh Tamim bin Xamad Al Thani ayaa ka digay war xumo tashiil uu sheegay in Dowlada Imaaraadka Carabta ay ka faafineyso Qadar. Sheekh Tamim, waxa uu sheegay inay jiraan warar aan munaasib aheyn oo warbaahinta ay la wadaagan Dowladaha Imaaraadka iyo Sacuudiga, waxa uuna ka digay in qiima tirka Qadar loo maro saxaafada. Waxa uu tilmaamay Sheekh Tamim in Qadar aysan u dulqaadan doonin in lagu xadgudbo sharafkeeda, waxa uuna intaa raaciyay in Qadar ay dhowrto dowladaha kala dhexeeya calaaqada iyo kuwa siyaasad ahaanta aysan isku wanaagsaneyn. ‘’Waa arrin muqadas ah in dal waliba lagu tixgaliyo waxa uu yahay, waxaa nasiib darro ah in warar aan wanaagsaneen laga faafiyo dowladaha, waxaan ku talineynaa in laga fiirsado waxa u dhexeyn kara khilaafka iyo ku taraxyaga arrimaha hoose’’ Sheekh Tamim, ayaa sidoo kale soo hadal qaaday hanjabaad dhawaan kaga imaaday dowlada Sacuudiga taa oo ku aadan in Qadar aysan soo iibsan Karin diyaaradaha qumaatiga u kaca. Waxa uu Sheekh Tamim cadeeyay in Qadar ay iibsan doonto diyaarado dagaal nooca aadka u dheereeya, isagoo sacuudiga kaga digay inuu qaado talaabo lid ku ah Qadar. “Sacuudiga hanjabaadeeda waa mid khuseysa Qadar wixii u roon wey garaneysaa weyna iibsaneysa diyaaradaha” Sidoo kale, Sheekh Tamim, ayaa adduunka ugu baaqay inay la socdaan hanjabaadaha iyo waxa uu ugu yeeray borobagaandada ay faaninayaan Sacuudiga iyo Imaaraadka. Haddalka Sheekh Tamim, ayaa kusoo beegmaaya iyadoo dhawaan Sacuudiga iyo Imaaraadka ay ka digeen in Qadar ay iibsato diyaarado dagaal oo hor leh. Caasimada Online Xafiiska Doxa Caasimada@live.com

Hargeysa (Caasimada Online) – Dalalka beesha caalamka ayaa dawladaha gobalka Geeska Afrika ee IGAD u xilsaaray inay xaliiyaan dagaalada dhex maray maamullada Somaliland iyo Puntland, Sidaas waxa xaqiijiyay ilo xog ogaal ah. Sida ay xogahani sheegeen wadamadan beesha caalamku waxa ay dalalka gobalka bariga Afrika ee ku bahoobay IGAD, u xilsaareen inay u hawlgalaan sidii xaalad nabadeed loogu soo dabaali lahaa colaadda Tukaraq ee u dhaxaysa Somaliland iyo Puntland. Warku wuxuu xaqiijiyay in wadamadani ay si gaar ah daminta xiisadda dagaal ee Somaliland iyo Puntland ugu xilsaareen dawladda Itoobiya oo xidhiidho dhinacyo badan la leh Somaliland iyo sidoo kale maamulka Puntland ee Soomaaliya. Wararku waxay intaas ku dareen in laga yaabo inay Itoobiya socdaal la xidhiidha nabad raadintan iyo doonista ay Itoobiya ku doonayso inaan dagaal dambe dhicin ku tagaan masuuliyiin ka tirsan dawladda Somaliland. Dawladda Somaliland ayaa dhawr goor ugu baaqday dalalka beesha caalamka inay awoodooda isugu geeyaan sidii ay maamulka Puntland ugu qancin lahaayeen inuu joojiyo dagaalada. Laakiin iyadoo ay beesha caalamku ku hawlantahay daminta dagaal mar dambe qarxa, ayaa waxa ay Puntland iyaduna ku hawlantahay abaabul dagaal, waxaanu madaxweyne-xigeenka Puntland toddobaadkan ku dhawaaqay inuu bilaabmi doono dagaal lagu lagu hoobtaa.

Kulanka aadka looga dhursugayo ee dhex maraya madaxweynaha Maraykanka Donald Trump iyo hogaamiyaha Kuuriyada Waqooyi Kim Jong-un ayaa ka dhici doona hoteel ku yaalla jasiiradda Sentosa ee dalka Singapore sida uu shaaciyay Aqalka Cad ee looga arrimiyo Maraykanka. Kulankan taariikhiga ah ee la qorsheeyay ayaa dhici doona 12 Juunyo, laakiin wali macluumaad badan oo la xaqiijiyay lagama hayo. Waxay noqon doontaa markii koobaad ee ay kulmaan hogaamiye Kuuriyada Waqooyi iyo madaxweyne xil haya oo Maraykan ah. Trump wuxuu sheegay Talaadadii in qorsheyaashu ay “si wanaagsan u socdaan”. “Xiriiro badan ayaa la sameeyay, wada xaajoodyo badan ayaa socda safarka ka hor” ayuu ku yiri saxafiyiinta. “Waa arrin ahmiyad leh” maalmo aad muhiim u ah ayayna noqon doonaan”. Xoghayaha dhanka saxaafadda ee Aqalka Cad ee looga arrimiyo dalka Maraykanka Sarah Sanders ayaa Twitter-ka ku xaqiijisay in shirku uu ka dhici doono huteelka Capella. Sentosa waa mid ka mid ah 63da jasiiradood ee ay Singapore ka kooban tahay. Jasiiraddan oo badkeedu 500 oo hektar yahay wax yarna u jirta dhulwaynaha kale ayaa hoy u ah goobo loo tamashle tago, doomaha qaaliga ah ee sida gaarka ah loo adeegsado iyo goobo lagu ciyaaro golf. Balse jasiiraddaas ayaa sidoo kale taariikh u leh, burcad badeed, dhiig ku daata iyo dagaal. ISHA BBC

Hargeysa (Caasimada Online) – Hoggaamiyaha maamulka Somaliland Muuse Biixi ayaa wax ka beddelay hadalkiisii hanjabaadda ee colaadda ka dhaxeysa Puntland, wuxuuna sheegay in maamulkiisa uu doonaayo inuu ka fogaado colaad ay u qaadan Somalia. Waxa uu sheegay in Somaliland ay dooneyso inay nabad kula noolaato dhammaan Soomaalida kale, sidaa aawgeed aysan waxba u dhimi doonin Somalia, waa haddii laga badbaado. ‘’Anagu dooni meyno inay cadaawad na dhexmarto Somalia inteeda kale, waxaanu dooneynaa nabad inaan kula noolaano walaalaheen Somalia, waxaanu ka digeyn in nalagu soo xadgudbo’’ ‘’Somaliland waxa ay jeceshahay in Somalia ay dhan waliba iska caabiyaan anagoo aan isku sameyneynin xadgudub, balse waa inaan isku gafin oo aan si wada jira u ilaalinaa dareenka labada shacuub’’ Biixi waxa uu intaa raaciyay mar uu la hadlaayay warbaahinta gudaha ‘’Somalia inaanu wax u qabano mooyaane anagu colaad lama dooneyno, waxaanu jecelnahay nabadda waa in Somalia laga helaa nabad si ay nooga nabad hesho’’ Biixi, waxa uu sidoo kale sheegay in Madaxda Soomaalida laga doonaayo inay ilaaliyaan wada noolaanshiyaha labada dhan, waxa uuna taasi ku sheegay inay horseedi karto xiriir iyo wada shaqeyn wanaagsan, sida uu yiri. Sidoo kale, Biixi ayaa cadeeyay in Somaliland aysan diyaar u aheyn in xiligaan ay dagaal la gasho Somalia qeybaheeda kala duwan, maadaama aan horay looga baran. Haddalka Biixi, ayaa u muuqanaaya mid ku fooraara Dowlada Somalia oo looga dalbanaayo inay ka shaqeyso Nabadda, isla markaana xaliso colaada Tukaraq. Caasimada Online Xafiiska Hargeysa Caasimada@live.com

Addis-Ababa (Caasimada Online) – Dowladda wadaaga ah ee dalka Itoobiya ayaa ku dhawaaqday inay si dhamaystiran u aqbashay oo ay hirgelinayso heshiiskii nabada ee lagu dhamaynayay dagaalkii xuduuda Ereteria. Itoobiya waxay kaloo ay ogolaatay natiijadii ka soo baxday gudigii loo saaray calaamadaynta xuduudii la isku hayay laga soo bilaabo sanadii 2002-dii. Gudigaasi ayaa Ereteriya u calaamadeeyey deegaano ay ka mid tahay Badme. Arinkani ayaa soo afjaraysay ismariwaagii ka dhaxeeyey Itoobiya iyo Ereteriyan, dagaalkaasoo noqday dagaalkii ugu dhimashada badnaa Afrika ee 1998-dii. Tobonaan kun oo qof ayaa ku dhintay dagaalkaasi oo socday mudo labo sano ah. Labada dal ayaa colaad xoogan ay u dhaxaysay tan iyo waagaasi. Itoobiyana waxay diiday inay aqbasho natiijadii kasoo baxday gudigii xadaynta xuduuda oo qayb ka ahaa heshiiskii la gaaray. Natiijadii ka soo baxday heshiiskaasina Itoobiya waxay diiday inay ciidankeeda ka saarto dhulka lagu muransan yahay, Ereteriyana waxay ku eedaysay Itoobiya inay xoog ku haysato dhulkeeda. ‘Ereteriya waa inay qaado tilaabo noocan oo kale ah iyadoon wax shuruud ah ku xirayn ayna aqbasho baaqeenan si loo soo celiyo nabadii luntay ee labada dal ee walaalaha ah’ waxaa sidaasi lagu qoray bogga Facebooga ee ururka EPRDF. Ereteriya ayaa diiday inay wax wadahadal ah la gasho Itoobiya ilaa ay ka ogolaanayso shuruud la’aan natiijadii ay soo saareen gudigii xuduuda loo xilsaaray. Ra’iisul Wasaaraha Itoobiya Abiy Axmed ayaa balanqaaday inuu nabad ka keeni doono dalka Ereteriya markii uu xilka qabtay. Hadii Itoobiya ay ciidankeeda ka saarto xuduuda lagu muransan yahay waxay taasi muujin doontaa sida ay Itoobiya uga go’an tahay nabada ay sheegayso. Isha: BBC Somali

Golaha Amniga Qaranka ayaa kulankoodii joogtada ahaa ku yeeshay magaalada Baydhabo, 3-5 Juun 2018. Shirkaas oo ka dhacay Xarunta Madaxtooyada, Koonfur Galbeed ee Baydhabo waxaa looga hadlay arrimaha Amniga Qaranka, waxaana shir-guddoomiyey Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Maxamed Cabdullaahi Farmaajo. Waxaa sidoo kale, shirka ka soo qeyb galay Raiisul Wasaaraha Xukuumadda Federaalka Soomaaliya Mudane Xasan Cali Khayre, Madaxweynaha Puntland Mudane Cabdiweli Maxamed Cali Gaas, Madaxweynaha Jubaland Mudane Axmed Maxamed Islaam, Madaxweynaha Koonfur-Galbeed Mudane Shariif Xasan Sheekh Aadan, Madaxweynaha Galmudug Mudane Axmed Ducaale Geelle Xaaf, Madaxweynaha Hirshabelle Mudane Maxamed Cabdi Waare, Guddoomiyaha Gobolka Benaadir ahna Duqa magaalada Muqdisho, Mudane Cabdiraxmaan Cumar Cusmaan (Eng. Yariisow), Wasiirka 1aad ee Galmudug Sheekh Maxamed Shaakir Cali Xasan, Wasiirka Arrimaha Gudaha, Federaalka iyo Dib-u-heshiisiinta, Wasiirka Amniga Gudaha, Wasiirka Difaaca, La-taliyaha Amniga Qaranka, wasiirada dawlad goboleedyada, iyo Taliyeyaasha Ciidamada Qalabka sida. Goluhu wuxuu u mahadcelinayaa Madaxweynaha Koonfur Galbeed Mudane Shariif Xasan Sheekh Aadan iyo dhammaan shacabka Koonfur Galbeed oo si habsami leh u marti galiyay shirka. Goluhu wuxuu sidoo kale u mahad celinayaa ciidamada amniga Konfur Galbeed, XDS iyo AMISOM. 1. Arrimaha Amniga: Goluhu markii uu dhageystay talooyinka ay soo jeediyeen Guddiga Farsamada ee Amniga Qaranka, tix-galiyeenna aragtiyada iyo talooyinka ku saabsan amniga dalka, Goluhu wuxuu isku raacay qodobada hoos ku xusan: 1.1. Madax-bannaanida: Golaha Amniga Qaranku wuxuu adkeynayaa in midnimada, wadajirka iyo madax bannaanida Soomaaliya ay tahay mid lama taabtaan ah. 1.2. Ka hortagga khataraha: Golaha Amniga Qaranka markii uu dhegeystay khataraha amni ee ay argagixisadu ka geysanayaan dalka waxa uu adkeynayaa in la dardargeliyo qalabeynta iyo tayeynta ciidamada qalabka sida, labada heer, lana siiyo tababarro iyo xirfado la xiriira qaababka looga hortagi karo falalka argagixisada. 1.3. Qorshaha Kala-guurka: Golaha Amniga Qaranka wuxuu ansixyey qorshaha kala-guurka (Transition plan), kaasoo loo arkay inuu yahay qorshe horseedaya in Soomaalidu hanato, kuna filnaato amnigeeda, iyada oo la raacayo tallaabooyinka soo socda; 1.3.1. In si wadajir ah looga mira dhaliyo fulinta wejiga koowaad ee qorshaha kala guurka oo dhigaya qaabka lagu hawlgalinayo Ciidamada Xoogga Dalka Soomaaliyeed iyo ciidamada Booliiska ee labada heer oo ay ka mid yihiin Daraawiishtu. 1.3.2. In ciidamo ka tirsan Daraawiishta Koonfur Galbeed ay qeyb noqonayaan hawlgallada qorsheysan ee lagu furayo waddada muhiimka ah (MSR) ee isku xirta Muqdisho iyo Baydhabo. Hawlgalkan waxaa doorka hoggaamineed qaadanaya Guddiga Amniga ee Koonfur Galbeed, waxayna ciidamada ka amar qaadanayaan Taliska Ciidamada Xoogga Dalka inta hawlgalkaas lagu jiro. 1.3.3. In Guddiga Qaran ee Isku-dhafka Ciidamada la yimaadaan muddo soddon (30) maalmood guduhood ah qorshe hawleedkooda. 1.3.4. In qorshaha kala guurku uu noqdo mid dhammeystiran oo ay ka mid yihiin dadaallada xasilinta, soo kabashada dhaqaalaha, sarreynta sharciga iyo caddaaladda. 1.4. Dhameystirka Qaab-dhismeedka Amniga: Goluhu waxa uu ansixiyay in muddo soddon (30) maalmood gudahood ah lagu hawlgeliyo Xafiisyada Aminga Dowlad-goboleedyada iyo Gobolka Banaadir, si loo dardargeliyo in Golaha Amniga Dowlad-goboleedyada iyo Gobolka Benaadir ay noqdaan kuwo waajibaadkooda shaqo gutaan. 1.5. Goluhu wuxuu isku raacay in muddo lixdan (60) maalmood gudahood ah guddiga farsamadu ay ku fuliyaan Qodobka 1.2 ee go’aankii 6-10ka bishii Febraayo 2018, kasoo qeexaya “Dawladda Federaalku waxay ka caawineysaa ciidamada Booliiska Dawlad-goboleedyada, oo ay ku jiraan Daraawiishtu (hub, saanad, agab ciidan, raashin, daawo, gunno, tababar iyo tayeyn) ee kala qeyb qaadan doona ciidanka Xoogga Dalka Soomaaliyeed hawlgallada lagula dagaallamayo argagixisada.”Goluhu wuxuu ku boorrinayaa ummada Soomaaliyeed in ay u midoobaan la-dagaalanka argagixisada. 1.6. Goluhu wuxuu isla qaatay in Galmudug iyo Puntland, oo aysan joogin ciidamada AMISOM, laga caawiyo hawlgallada ka dhanka ah argagixisada Al Shabaab iyo Daacish oo ku sugan Buuraha Galgala, deegaannada Bariga Fog iyo Koonfurta Galmudug, lagana taakuleeyo saddexda qaybood ee qorshaha kala guurka. 1.7. Goluhu wuxuu soo dhoweeyay isbeddellada wax ku oolka ah ee laga wado CXDS oo ay kamid yihin sida qaab-dhismeedka ciidanka, mideynta tababarka iyo hagaajinta anshaxa iyo adaabta ciidanka iyo sidookale qaabaynta hannaanka dallacsiinta saraakiisha iyo saraakiil xigeennada oo la waafajiyey sharciga dallacsiinta. 1.8. Goluhu wuxuu farayaa Guddiga Dib-u-habeynta Booliiska Federaalka ee hoos yimaada Wasaaradda Amniga Gudaha in ay kusoo dhameystiraan qaabka dib-u-habeynta Booliiska Federaalka muddo sagaashan (90) maalmood gudahood ah. 1.9. Goluhu wuxuu bogaadinayaa hawlgallada sugidda amniga Caasimadda iyo barnaamijka Derisaynta ee ka socda degmooyinka Gobolka Benaadir, wuxuuna qirayaa in degaanada ku dhow Caasimadda ee Shabeellaha Dhexe iyo Shabeellaha Hoose ay qeyb muhiim ah ka yihiin sugidda amniga Caasimadda. 2. Arrimaha Siyaasadda Goluhu waxaa kale oo uu falanqeeyay qodobada soo socda: ¢ Habka Doorasho ee Jamhuuriyadda Federaalka Soomaaliya 2020-ka. ¢ Wadaagga Kheyraadka Dabiiciga ah (Shidaalka iyo Macdanta). 2.1. Goluhu wuxuu bogaadinayaa waxqabadka Guddiga Wada-xaajoodka iyo Wasaaradaha ka shaqeeya Tubta Siyaasadda Loo Dhanyahay. 2.2. Goluhu wuxuu bogaadiyay horumarka laga sameeyay hawlaha la xiriira dib-ula-falgelidda hay’adaha dhaqaalaha adduunka, gaar ahaan wada shaqeynta ay Xukuumaddu la leedahay Hay’adda Lacagta Adduunka (IMF) iyo Bangiga Adduunka (World Bank) oo uu Goluhu dhiirrigelinayo in lasii adkeeyo wada shaqeyntaas, si wadajir ahna loola dagaallamo musuqmaasuqa, lana joogteeyo nidaamka isla-xisaabtanka. 2.3. Goluhu wuxuu go’aamiyay in si deg deg ah loo mideeyo canshuuraha dalka, sida canshuurta Furdooyinka, macaashka shaqaalaha iyo faa’iidadda ganacsiga. 2.4. Goluhu wuxuu ku heshiiyay in dalka laga hirgaliyo doorasho qof iyo cod ah sanadka 2020 sida ku cad heshiiska habka doorasho ee lagu saxiixay magaalada Baydhabo 5ta bisha Juun, 2018. 2.5. Goluhu wuxuu soo dhaweeyey isla markaasna bogaadiyey horumarka laga sameeyey wadatashiyada caqabadaha ka hor imaan kara doorashooyinka, iyo daraasaadka Diiwaangalinta Cod-bixiyeyaasha. Wuxuuna Goluhu faray in Guddiga Madaxa bannaan ee Doorashooyinku soo dhammaystiraan kala xulashada nidaamka diiwaan galinta. 2.6. Goluhu wuxuu isla qaatay in hawlaha dib-u-eegista Dastuurka la sii dardar-galiyo, laguna soo gabagabeeyo sannadka 2018-ka, ayada oo qodabadda dib-u-eegista loo kala hormarinayo sida ay u kala muhiimsan yihiin. 2.7. Goluhu wuxuu heshiis ka gaaray Lahaanshaha, Maamulka, iyo Wadaaga Khayraadka Dabiiciga ah ee dalka sida ku cad heshiiska Wadaaga Khayraadka Dabiiciga ah ee lagu saxiixay Magaalada Baydhabo 5ta bisha Juun 2018. 2.8. Goluhu wuxuu faray Guddiga Farsamada (TC) ee Golaha Amniga Qaranka in ay soo gudbiyaan Hannaanka Caddaalada iyo Asluubta shirka xiga ee la qabanayo bisha Agoosto iyadoo laga amba qaadayo go’aamadii shirkii Wasaaradaha Cadaaladda ee ka dhacay magaalada Jowhar bisha Jannaayo 2018. 2.9. Goluhu wuxuu go’aamiyay in la hawlgaliyo xubnihii ay dawlad gobaleedyadu u soo magacaabeen guddiyada dib uu eegista dastuurka. 2.10. Goluhu wuxuu go’aamiyay in la dardar geliyo wadaxaajoodka arrimaha federaalka si loo dhamaystiro hannaanka awood qaybsiga ee ku qeexan Qodobada 53-54 ee Dastuurka. 2.11. Goluhu wuxuu soo dhaweynayaa hindisaha lagu abuurayo Golaha Dhaqaalaha Qaranka. Goluhu wuxu si wadajir ah tacsi tiiraanyo leh ugu dirayaa Xildhibaannadii iyo dhammaan dadkii ku geeriyooday weerarradii xaqdarrada ahaa ee ka dhacay Degamada Balcad ee Gobolka Shabeellaha Dhexe. DHAMMAAD PUNTLAND POST The post AKHRISO:-Shirkii Baydhabo oo la soo gabagabeeyay, war-murtiyeedna laga soo saaray appeared first on Puntland Post.

Wararka naga soo gaaraya Degmada Ceel-waaq ee Gobolka Gedo ayaa waxa ay sheegayaan in Kooxda Al-Shabaab ay halkaasi la wareegtay. Ciidamadii Dowlada ee maamulayay degmadaasi ayaa isaga baxay Galinkii dambe ee maanta iyaga aaday dhanka iyo xadka Kenya. Al-Shabaab ayaa xiligii Afurka si toos ah gudaha u galay Degmada Ceel Waaq ee Gobolka Gedo koonfurta Soomaaliya. Al-Shabaab oo wata Gaadiidka dagaal ayaa si toos ah gudaha ugu galay Degmada Ceel iyaga oo dadka kala hadlay masaajida iyaga oo ku baaqay in ay is dajiyaan. Lama oga sababta ay ciidamada dowlada uga baxeen Magaalada Ceel-waaq hayeeshee horay maamulka waxa uu u sheegay in Ciidamada ku sugan ceel waaq aanay aheyn kuwo qalabeeysan. Dhowr jeer oo hore ayeey sidaan oo kale Al-Shabaab u la wareegeen Degmada Ceel-Waaq ee Gobolka Gedo inkastoo hadana ay dib uga baxayeen. Xasan Maxamed Samatar Cowke Puntland Post The post Al-Shabaab oo La Wareegay Degmada Ceel-Waaq ee Gobolka Gedo appeared first on Puntland Post.

Koox Bastoolado ku hubeeysanaa Ayaa Degmada Wada Jir ee Muqdisho waxa ay ku dileen Nabadoon Caan ahaa sidoo kalena kamid ah Ganacsatada caanka ah ee Muqdisho. Ninka la dilay ayaa lagu magacaabi Jiray Macalin Daahir Cali Tifow Waxaana dishay dableey hubeeysan xili uu ka soo baxay masjidka. Kooxdii dilka geeystay ayaa goobta ka baxsatay waxaana goobtaasi soo gaaray Ciidamada Dowlada oo baaritaano ka sameeyay. Sidoo kale Allaha u naxariistee Macalin Daahir Cali Tifow ayaa sidoo kale kamid ahaa Xubnihii soo xulay Baarlamaanka Soomaaliya. Magaalada Muqdisho ayaa waxaa ka dhaca Dilal Qorsheeysan oo loo geeysto Masuuliyiin iyo odoyaashii wax ka soo xulay Baarlamaanka Soomaaliya. Xasan Maxamed Samatar Cowke Puntland Post Muqdisho The post Nabadoon iyo Ganacsade Caan ah oo lagu Dilay Muqdisho appeared first on Puntland Post.

Baydhabo (Caasimadda Online) – Warka ka imaanayo Magaalada Baydhabo ayaa sheegaya in shirkii Amniga Qaran ee magaalada Baydhaba uga socday madaxda dowladda Federaalka iyo kuwa maamul Goboleedyada lagu gaaray heshiis. Heshiiska ayaa ku saabsan labadii Qodob ee sida weyn la isugu khilaafsanaa, kuwaasoo kala ah Wadaagga Kheyraadka iyo Hannaan Doorasho Federal ah ee 2020-ka, waxaana munaasabadda lagu saxiixayo heshiiska ay goor dhow ka dhacday magaalada Baydhaba. Qodobadda lagu heshiiyay waxaa ugu waaweyn: 1- In doorasho qof iyo Cod ah ay dalka ka dhacayso Sanadka 2020 oo ay kuraasta Barlamaanka ku tartami doonaan Xisbiyo Siyaasadeed . 2- In la mideeyo Canshuuraha Dalka. 3- In laga heshiiyey habka Qeybsiga khayraadka dalka. 4- In la Dhameystiro Dastuurka KMG ah. 5- In la qaadayo Howlgal lagu furayo Wadadda isku xirta Muqdisho iyo Baydhabo iyo guud ahan Goobaha ay shabab kaga sugan yihiin dalka oo dhan. Madaxweynaha Jamhuuriyadda Federalka Soomaaliya Mudane Maxamed Cabdullahi Farmaajo oo ka hadlay Munaasabadda ayaa sheegay dhamman qodobada Shirka loo Gudbin doono Barlamaanka Soomaaliya. Shirka oo lagu waday in caawa xilli hore lasoo gabagabeeyo ayaa dib ugu dhacay dood ku saabsan hab qoraalka heshiiska labada qodob ee ay gaareen dowlad Goboleedyada iyo dowladda Federaalka.

Balcad (PP) ─ Ugu yaraan sagaal qof oo laba ka mid ah ay ahaayeen xildhibaanno barlamaanka Hir-shabelle ka tirsanaa ayaa lagu dilay weerar gaadmo ah oo ka dhacay inta u dhexeysa degmooyinka Balcad iyo Jowhar oo kawada tirsan gobolka Shabeellada Dhexe. Xildhibaannada weerarkan lagu dilay ayaa waxaa lagu kala magacaabi jiray; Ismaaciil Muumin Hilowle iyo Sheekh Daahir Mukhtaar, waxaana sidoo kale lagu dilay weerarkaas guddoomiye ku xigeenkii degmada Raage-Ceelle ee gobolka Shabeellada Hosoe, Muuse Cabdule Maxamed Muuse [Af-weyne]. Sidoo kale, Waxaa kaloo weerarkan lagu dilay lix askari oo ilaalo u ahaa xildhibaannada la dilay, waxaana weerarkan uu noqonayaa kii ugu khasaare badnaa oo loo geysto xildhibaanno ka tirsan baarlamaanka Hir-shabeelle. Inkastoo Maamulka Hir-shabeell uusan weli ka hadiln weerarkaan, ayaa haddana waxaa mas’uuliyaddiisa sheegatay Al-shabaab oo sheegtay inay ku dileen weerarkaas 12-qof oo isugu jira ciidammo iyo xildhibaano ka tirsanaa baarlamaanka maamulkaas. Weerarkan ayaa ka dhacay inta u dhexeysa Qali-moow iyo Balcad, waxaana weerarkan uu noqonayaa mid aan ku cusbayn waddada isku xirta Jowhar iyo Muqdisho oo ay inta badan adeegsadaan mas’uuliyiinta maamulka Hir-shabelle. Dhanka kale, Ciidammo fara badan ayaa gaaray halka weerarkaas uu ka dhacay, waxaana goobtan horay loogu weeraray ciidammo ka tirsan kuwa AMISOM oo ku socday Jowhar, kuwaasoo laga dilay tiro askar ah, gaadiid kala duwan looga gubay. Ugu dambeyn, Al-shabaab ayaa kordhisay weerarrada ay ka geysanayaan deegaannada ka baxsan Muqdisho, waxaana maamulka Hir-shabelle uu ugu baaqay dhawaan in la adkeeyo amniga waddada isku xirta Muqdisho iyo Jowhar. PUNTLAND POST The post Xildhibaanno Baarlamaanka Hir-Shabeelle ka Tirsan oo lagu dilay Weerar Gaadmo ah appeared first on Puntland Post.

Garoowe (Caasimada Online) – Maamul goboleedka Puntland ayaa si carro leh uga hadlay lacag ay dowladda federaalka ah ee Soomaaliya siisay maamulka Somaliland, oo maamulka sheegay in Muuse Biixi uu hub kusoo iibsan doono. Shir Jaraa’id oo ay maanta magalada Garoowe ku qabteen mas’uuliyiin ka tirsan maamulkaas, ayaa waxa ay war ka soo saareen lacagta halka milysn ahayd ee shalay dowladda federaalka ugu deeqday fatahaadda Somaliland. Dowladda ayaa lacagtaas ugu talo gashay dadka ay duufaantu saameysay ee ku nool degaanada bari ee maamulkaas, sida uu sheegay Ra’iisul Wasaare ku xigeenka Soomaaliya Mahdi Maxamed Guuleed Khadar, oo ah guddoomiyaha guddiga qaran ee fatahaadaha. Wasiirka arrimaha gudaha Puntland Cabdullahi Jaamac Xersi (Timacade) ayaa walaac ka muujiyey lacagtaas in loo adeegsado hab siyaasadeed, islamarkaana maadxweynaha Somaliland uu ku iibsado hub looga qeyb qaato dagaalada u dhaxeeya labada dhina, sida uu hadalka u dhigay. Waxaa kaloo oo uu sheegay in Puntland aysan ka soo horjeedin gurmadkaas basle xilligan dowladda Federaalka Soomaaliya looga baahnaa in ay u wakiilato culimada iyo waxgaradka, laakin taasi ay hadda faraha ka baxday, islamarkaana Muuxe Bixi ay gacanta u gashay. Halkan hoose ka dhageyso shirka jaraa’id https://www.caasimada.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Wasiir-Puntland.mp3

Jowhar (Caasimada Online)-Warar dheeraad ah ayaa waxa uu kasoo baxayaa weerar ka dhacay inta u dhaxeysa degaanka Qalimow iyo degmada Balcad ee Gobolka Shabeellaha Hoose. Weerarka oo ahaa mid jidgal ah ayaa waxaa lagu dilay Xildhibaano ka tirsan baarlamaanka HirShabeele, Saraakiil iyo Ciidamo la socday Xildhibaanada. Xildhibaanada lagu dilay weerarka ayaa la socday gaari noociisa lagu sheegay PRADO, waxaana wehlinaayay gaari Cabdi-Bille ah oo ay la socdeen ciidamo ka tirsan maamulka HirShabelle. Xildhibaanada la dilay ayaa lagu kala magacabaa Ismaaciil Muumin Hilowle iyo Sheekh Daahir Mukhtaar, waxaa sidoo kale weerarkaasi lagu dilay Guddoomiye ku-xigeenkii Raage Ceelle Muuse Afweyne. Labada Xildhibaan iyo Guddoomiye ku-xigeenkii Raage Ceelle, ayaa si wada jira u saarnaa gaariga noociisa uu yahay PRADO, halka ciidamad ay saarnaayen gaariga Cabdi-Billaha ah. Waxay kaloo masuuliyiinta Hirshabeelle inoo sheegeen in sidoo kale weerarkan lagu dilay 7 askari oo ka mid ahaa kuwii xildhibaanada u soo galbinayay magaalada Muqdisho, waxayna ka soo ambabaxeen magaalada Jowhar. Al-shabaab oo weerarkan uga hadlay baraha ay wararkooda ku faafiyaan ayaa waxa ay ku sheegteen in weerar jidgal ah ay u dhigeen kolonyo galbineysay masuuliyiin ka tirsan maamulka Hirshabeele, halkaasina ay ku dileen 12 qof oo isugu jirta saraakiil iyo ciidan. Maleeshiyada ayaa weerarka kadib dhaawacyada iyo meydadka Askart ka furtay qoryihii ay wateen, halka sidoo kale ay goobta kala baxsadeen Hub ciidamada u saarnaa gaariga Cabdi-Billaha. Sidoo kale, weerarkan wuxuu ku soo aaday xilli magaalada Baydhabo uu ka socdo shirka Golaha amniga Qaranka oo madaxda ka qeyb galeysa uu ka mid yahay Hogaamiyaha Hirshabeelle Maxamed Cabdi Waare. Dhinaca kale, weerarkaan ayaa noqonaaya kii ugu cuslaa oo lala eegto mas’uuliyiin ka tirsan maamulka HirShabeelle. Sawirka Xildhibaanada lagu dilay weerarka Caasimada Online Xafiiska Jowhar Caasimada@live.com

The de-escalation of tensions and increase of peaceful political dialogue is the fundamental principle of the United Nations’ mandate for international security. If that is the case, there comes a question of whether the Special Representative of United Nations Secretary-General to Somalia Michael Keating is fulfilling that mandate? Michael Keating is the head of United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM). An organisation established by UN Security Council Resolution 2102, following a comprehensive assessment of the United Nations in support of the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia. The mandate of UNSOM was subsequently renewed by Security Council resolutions 2158 (2014), 2221 (2015), 2232 (2015), 2275 (2016) and 2358 (2017). Keating’s specific mandate differ considerably from that of the Forum for the Family of Nations. UNSOM’s machinery is to turn its mission into an instrumental for unilateral backup for what was once called the Somali Republic in the form of Federalised Tribal Regional States. There comes another question, why Somaliland still hosting UNSOM and allowing Keating to fly in and fly out Somaliland soil? Keating’s record of non-partisan watchdog is full of hypocrisy. He supervises a mission that singled out one portion of the disintegrated Somali Republic – an assignment that is detrimental to the image of the world and that of the United Nations’ mandate as a beacon of hope and world champion of peace. Mr Keating intentionally overlooked his last statement to the Security Council – the complete success of Somaliland elections, but praised the malfunctioning administration of Mogadishu. Keating never cited why the Somali Republic withered and shrunken into an anarchic domicile due to the despotism command of Siyad Bare and his cluster of thugs in 1991? Keating, on the other hand, never stated the reasons why the Northern part of the country (currently renowned the Republic of Somaliland) restructured its political system and referred back to its history of ‘’British Somaliland’’ prior the amalgamation of the two regions. Ill-advisedly, despite Keating’s partiality in a mode of operation and political bias, the Southern part of the very same country, what is vastly renowned Somalia still roaring overhead and going into nosedive once again same as the ash of a cremated dead body. This resulted in turning the capital city of Somalia (Mogadishu) into clan-based fiefdoms. The political pandemonium created the seizure of the capital into the hands of Islamic extremism, followed chieftains of clansmen puppets, who graft for their individual and tribal interests. Most surprisingly, Mr Keating still supports this inferno state when such an unfortunate annihilation is taking place under the auspices of his so-called UNSOM project. Sad

Ethiopia’s parliament approved on Tuesday the government’s decision to lift a six-month state of emergency two months earlier than planned, state-affiliated Fana Broadcasting reported. The government imposed emergency rule in February to clamp down on unrest sparked by a planned development scheme for the capital Addis Ababa which some fear will lead to land seizures in the nearby Oromiya region. The matter led to Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn to step down. On Saturday, Ethiopia’s cabinet had met to assess the security situation and “noted that law and order has been restored”, setting the stage for Tuesday’s vote in parliament. Abiy Ahmed, a former army officer who replaced Hailemariam as premier, has travelled around Ethiopia, promising to address grievances strengthen a range of political and civil rights. Authorities have pledged to push through a raft of reforms that have included the release of thousands of prisoners. Source” – Reuters

The state is one of the international legal personalities which has its own elements that determines whether it is a real or artificial. In international law, the state should have a defined territory, a permanent population, has the capacity to enter into relations with others, and a government which has the capacity to control the territory it claims and provide services to its citizens. The political scientists both classical and contemporary agreed that sovereignty is an integral part of the state and regard it as the engine room of the post-Westphalia Peace Agreement statehood. This concept has two distinct dimensions: internal and external. A range of elements determines the internal, therefore, the state should have the capacity to govern the state, make laws, provide social services and security to the citizens, and have an authority in the territory it claims. Providing those services to the citizens’ at large lead the citizens endorse and trust to the state institutions, thus ensures state legitimacy, and this in return legitimizes the internal sovereignty of the state. In a broader sense, the internal sovereignty stems from the consent of the state citizens. Not similar to the internal, external sovereignty in international law relates to two crucial factors: the recognition which is the practices of the modern states to formally recognize each other through diplomatic means and also equality within the states in the international system, respect of other states, and policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the other states. Having this in mind, does Somalia has the legal claim as a genuine state let alone its foreign-imposed governments, in accordance with the above elements of the state. Does Somalia has the internal sovereignty with the assent of the Somali citizens, or does it has the external sovereignty. If the latter does exist, is it real or artificial in connection with the existing condition in the entire Somalia regions, the Somalia Italian Trusteeship? From the ‘provisional government’ of Ali Mahdi in 1991 to ‘Salballaadh’ of Aideed in 1994, Abdikasim in 2000, Abdullahi Yusuf in 2004, Sheikh Sharif in 2009, Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud in 2012, and the recent Farmajo government in 2017. All these ‘governments’ have had and still has an illusion claiming as genuine governments representing the will of the Somali citizens. These claims are entirely baseless fabricated by foreign actors which are beneficial to the protracted state collapse in the south. In Mogadishu for instance, the federal government has no physical presence at all as it resides only in a small highly secured area protected by Amisom. The question arises here is: does Farmajo aware what is going on in Halane, neighborhood of Villa Somalia, which is in contrary to the security and sovereignty of the Somali people, does he also aware what is going on in Balli Doogle, before he talk about other regions and towns in the south–central Somalia. These two military bases are neither in the control of the Somalia’s ‘government’ nor under the jurisdiction of their ‘authority’. Not only in Halane and Balli Doogle, but also Balkanization of your state ‘Somalia’ into self-governing states by competing interests both from the region and beyond are undeniable facts. Doubly important, there are growing numbers of autonomous regions which claim independent administrations from the ‘federal government’ in Mogadishu, with the support of foreign governments. These regional states, including Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Jubbaland, and the Southwest State of Somalia claim greater autonomy within the ‘Somalia’ state territory. The real Somali citizens believe that these multiple administrations in the name of federalism have not only contributed its part in endangering the existence of your state, but also derail the efforts to establish long-lasting peace and state institutions in ‘Somalia’. Do you agree Mr. Farmajo? In contrast to this chaos in Somalia, Somaliland was known as the British Somaliland Protectorate approximately for 80 years before its merger with the Italian colony. The aim of this blinded union was a part of the Greater Somalia Ambition in which most of the Somali people anticipated. In 1991, Somaliland declared its withdrawal from the unjust union of the 1960 for political, social and economic reasons. The euphoria of the citizens who were enthusiastic about the birth of an independent, inclusive Somali State in the 1960, their exhilaration has quickly dissipated as the south occupy all state institutions without considering Somaliland as an independent state which united with the south just to realize the Greater Somalia Agenda. The unjust practices of the Somalia’s southern-led governments (1960–1991) is as clear as the daylight. In his book “Search for a New Somali Identity” (2002), Hussein Ali Dualeh stated that since the independence in 1960, Somalia has got a total aid of 4.482 billion dollars, for 148 projects. Barefacedly, 139 projects went to the south, while only 9 projects went to Somaliland. In other words, the people of Somaliland got 142 million dollars, out of a development aid of about 4.4 billion dollars. In support of the Dualeh’s argument, I have the list of all projects, including the project name, the place where the project was implemented, and the amount allocated in each project. This kind of practice and thinking of the Somalia decision-making circles made Somaliland citizens to become hostile to the Somali state institutions till it ceased to exist as a state in 1991. Given the emphasis on this argument, the unjust distribution of power and national resources between the two (British Somaliland Protectorate and Italian Trusteeship in Somalia), remains the source of the Somalia’s conflicts and the protracted civil war and its subsequent disintegration of the state. Do you agree Mr. Farmajo? In spite of all difficulties, in the post-1991 period, Somaliland has managed to build its own state institutions without an international engagement, has a full control into its territory, and later transitioned the country from elders appointed to popularly elected presidents. Somaliland’s road to democracy and multi-party politics is an outcome of Somaliland’s successful political reconciliation, reconstruction of its economic infrastructures and the subsequent well-built state institutions. Somaliland is an island of peace and stability surrounded by a violent and a volatile region. Do you agree Mr. Farmajo? Certainly, Somalia’s statehood is uncertain, let alone its floating ‘government’, which isn’t in control of about 1km2 in its capital. The concrete evidences acquired from the Somaliland indigenous peace and state building endeavors affirm that building governance institutions and security mechanisms work best when the people at the grassroots are part of the process, and thus elect and rally behind their leader without international interference. But nothing would work if the leader is clapping without crowd as the current situation of the Farmajo clearly states. Farmajo’s ‘government’ is just nominal and is anti-thesis of the Somalia peace and reconciliation efforts as it isn’t a genuine government representing the will and interest of the entire territory of the former Italian Trusteeship in Somalia. Despite the illusion of the Somalia politicians, since 1991, Somalia remains in what John Burnett described in his book “where soldiers fear to tread” (2005), as a shambles, torn apart by more than [two] decades of lawlessness and near-classic anarchy. It is the only nation without some form of central government, and it is considered still to be one of the most dangerous places on earth. Nasir M. Ali Hargeisa, Somaliland

HARGEISA—The International Community has given the duty of bringing and end the animosity between Puntland and Somaliland to Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The IC has said that the Ethiopia must bring a lasting solution to the war that is raging between the Puntland and Somaliland. Ethiopia which shares borders with both sides is said to be an active mediation role to the long standing war that has been raging between the two authorities. Government officials from Somaliland are supposed to travel to Ethiopia for talks aimed at ending the hostilities. Somaliland called on the int’l community to put pressure on Puntland authority which is fueling the war in Tuka Raq. The IC is doing all it can to end the war while Puntland authority is inciting the war. Puntland’s Vice President, Amay has said that his authority will wage a war where Somaliland will be heavily defeated. On the other hand, Puntland authority has cried foul over a one million dollar donation that the Somalia Federal Govt has pledged to Somaliland on its relief project in the aftermath of Sagar cyclone which hit hard to coastal regions in Somaliland particularly in the west. Puntland said that the SFG has sides with Somaliland over the aid it earmarked for humanitarian relief.

The quarrel between Gulf monarchies has spilled into Somalia, with the fragile state now caught between the rival interests of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The competition has already aggravated intra-Somali disputes. All sides should take a step back before these tensions mount further. What’s new? The rivalries underpinning the June 2017 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis – particularly between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the one hand and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey on the other – have spilled into the Horn of Africa, notably fanning instability in Somalia. Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi tensions have risen sharply. Why did it happen? The Somali government of President “Farmajo” says it remains neutral in the GCC rivalry, but the UAE perceives it as too close to Qatar. Abu Dhabi appears to have upped support to Somalia’s regions, or federal states. Farmajo, in turn, has deepened ties with Doha and Ankara and repressed rivals. Why does it matter? Certainly not all of Somalia’s problems can be pinned on the GCC crisis. But competition among the Gulf powers and Turkey has magnified intra-Somali disputes. As Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations unravel, those disputes – which pit the Farmajo government against rival factions in Mogadishu and against federal states and Somaliland – could escalate. What should be done? The Somali government should remain neutral in the intra-GCC spat and reconcile with Somali rivals. Qatar and Turkey could encourage such reconciliation. The UAE should coordinate with Mogadishu regarding all its aid and investment in Somalia. Abu Dhabi-Mogadishu talks are a priority – Saudi or European Union officials could mediate. Executive Summary The bitter rivalries underpinning the crisis among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have added a dangerous new twist to Somalia’s instability. Competition between the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and Qatar and, by extension, Turkey on the other has aggravated longstanding intra-Somali disputes: between factions in the capital; between Mogadishu and the regions; and between it and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Abu Dhabi’s relations with the government of President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” have tanked. Farmajo’s government accuses the Emiratis of funding its rivals and stoking opposition, particularly in Somalia’s federal states. Emirati officials deny meddling and accuse Farmajo of falling under Doha’s and Ankara’s sway. All sides need to take a step back. Farmajo’s government should abide by strict neutrality in the intra-GCC spat and seek to reconcile with its Somali rivals. The UAE should pledge to coordinate its aid and commercial interests with Mogadishu. Talks between the Somali and UAE governments are a priority. After the June 2017 Gulf crisis, which saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE and a number of allies sever diplomatic relations with and impose an economic blockade on Qatar, President Farmajo, who had assumed office only months earlier, faced intense Saudi and Emirati pressure – reportedly pushing him to cut ties with Doha. Farmajo insisted he preferred not to pick sides. But for the UAE, reports that the president had received Qatari funds ahead of his election and his appointment of officials known to be close allies of Doha belied his claims of neutrality. Abu Dhabi feared that increased Qatari and Turkish backing for the Somali government could embolden political Islamists – whose influence it regards as a threat but to whom Doha and Ankara tend to be more sympathetic – and that, amid intense jockeying for influence around the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, it was fast losing ground to its main geopolitical rivals. In response, the UAE appears to have stepped up support for other Somali factions and Somalia’s federal states. The Farmajo government in turn has displayed an increasingly authoritarian bent, using rivals’ alleged ties to the UAE to justify crackdowns against them. Long adept at manipulating foreign involvement, politicians across the Somali spectrum have exploited the escalating rivalry for their own ends. Mounting tension between the UAE and what it perceives as a Qatar- and Turkey-backed government in Mogadishu intersects with a number of Somali fault lines. First, it has amplified disputes between the government and rival factions in the capital, complicating a crisis in the Somali parliament that threatened to turn violent in late 2017. In early 2018, the government raided the homes and offices of two prominent critics, accusing them of receiving Emirati funds. Deteriorating relations between the Somali government and the UAE also may heighten risks of factionalism within the Somali security forces; Somali officials accuse Emirati-backed units of ignoring orders (Abu Dhabi says all troops were under the Somali Ministry of Defence’s command). Still more perilous is the deterioration in Farmajo’s relations with Somalia’s federal states. As his government refused to distance itself from Qatar, federal states, some of which depend on Emirati investment and chafed at Mogadishu charting a course on the Gulf crisis they perceived as contrary to their interests, took a public stand against his position. Circumventing the capital, some appear to have accelerated negotiations with DP World – an Emirati conglomerate the activity of which is widely perceived as serving Abu Dhabi’s strategic goals – over deals that would see DP World develop and manage their ports. Recent months have seen increasingly heated recriminations between senior government officials and federal state leaders, some of whom have made provocatively timed trips to Abu Dhabi. A bitter standoff between Mogadishu and the breakaway region of Somaliland could prove as dangerous. In March, Hargeisa’s finalisation of its own contract with DP World, according to which the conglomerate would develop Somaliland’s Berbera port, prompted a furious reaction from Mogadishu. Farmajo’s government protested to the Arab League that the deal violated its sovereignty. The Somali parliament enacted legislation banning DP World from operating in Somalia, thus targeting not only the Berbera contract, but also potential deals between the company and federal states. Somaliland’s leader, Muse Bihi Abdi, referred to Mogadishu’s attempt to block the agreement as a declaration of war. In April 2018, Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations took their worst turn yet, when Somali officials confiscated millions of dollars from an Emirati plane in Mogadishu, citing the money as evidence of Abu Dhabi’s meddling. According to Emirati officials, the funds were destined for Somali security forces whose salaries it has long been paying. Those officials point to years of Emirati subventions to Somali forces fighting pirates and Al-Shabaab – support welcomed by successive Somali governments. Frustrated at the seizure, Abu Dhabi halted aid projects, pulled all personnel from and abandoned the Mogadishu base at which it was training Somali security forces. As relations between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi unravel, any one of the intra-Somali disputes – in Mogadishu; between the Farmajo government and the regions; or between it and Somaliland – could escalate. All sides need to reverse course before that happens. The Somali government should ensure it remains neutral in the intra-GCC spat and adopt a more conciliatory approach to rivals, including by rekindling talks with the federal states and rescheduling a meeting previously planned between Farmajo and Muse Bihi. Gulf powers should not allow the rivalry that has split the GCC to upend weaker states. Abu Dhabi should be ready to enter talks with Farmajo’s government and coordinate its aid and investment across the country. Qatar and particularly Turkey, whose investment in Somalia gives it considerable clout, might nudge Mogadishu toward compromise with its rivals in the capital, the federal regions and Somaliland. Saudi or European Union officials, who appear to enjoy the trust of both Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, could mediate between the two. Clearly, Somalia’s troubles today cannot all be laid at the Gulf’s door. The optimism generated by Farmajo’s election win in early 2017 was always likely to run aground on the country’s thorny clan politics and a resilient Al-Shabaab insurgency. But Gulf rivalries have made things worse. The zero-sum politics that the Somali government and foreign powers appear to be pursuing are unlikely to end well. Somalia will always be too factious for any one axis to dominate. The Gulf powers – and even more so the Farmajo government and its Somali rivals – all stand to lose from the instability their competition provokes. The likely winner is Al-Shabaab. Nairobi/Brussels, 5 June 2018 I. Introduction Many Somalis greeted the February 2017 electoral win of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” with euphoria. Farmajo’s cross-clan support and a vote perceived at the time as reasonably credible left many optimistic that he could turn the page on decades of instability. Fifteen months later, however, Farmajo’s government is embroiled in a number of debilitating crises. Factionalism in Mogadishu is rampant, security in the capital is deteriorating, the president’s dealings with Somalia’s federal states souring, and animosity between Mogadishu and the breakaway Republic of Somaliland fiercer than at any time in the past decade. The president’s difficulties stem, in large part, from challenges inherent to ruling Somalia, surmounting its factious clan politics and containing a resilient Al-Shabaab insurgency. Intense struggles over power and resources have long been endemic to both the capital and regions; the 2012 Somali provisional constitution, which should have helped resolve such disputes, instead does little to decide how authority and assets should be allocated among institutions and between Mogadishu and Somalia’s federal states. In that light, today’s instability is nothing new. But what lends it particular potency is the fact that it is amplified by the wider geopolitical confrontation that, since the June 2017 Gulf crisis, has pitted Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) against Qatar and, by extension, Turkey. The four powers’ involvement in Somalia predates this crisis. For years, Gulf and Turkish assistance, including direct budgetary support, humanitarian aid, infrastructure development, and training and funding for Somali security forces, has been critical for Somalis and welcomed by successive Somali governments. Their engagement has always involved some jockeying for influence in a country of enormous strategic value, given its proximity to the Gulf, centrality to Red Sea security and string of ports with vantages on key shipping routes.But any competition was largely kept in check. Since the June 2017 crisis, however, that competition has spilled over. Farmajo’s government accuses the Emiratis of agitating against it. Abu Dhabi rejects that charge and believes it is ostracised due to the new government’s proximity to Doha and Ankara. Friction between Mogadishu and Abu Dhabi, having simmered since the crisis, boiled over on 8 April 2018, when the Somali government confiscated $9.6 million in cash at Mogadishu airport from a UAE plane. Shortly thereafter, the UAE suspended military cooperation with Mogadishu, extracted Emirati trainers and halted aid operations. President Farmajo’s May 2018 visit to Doha only five weeks later, apparently cementing his ties to Qatar, added fuel to the fire. The media has amplified tensions further, as both UAE- and Qatar-allied outlets have carried partisan and inflammatory coverage. This report examines how rivalries among Gulf powers and Turkey and the deterioration of Abu Dhabi-Mogadishu relations have deepened Somali instability, notably by aggravating disputes between Farmajo’s government and opposing factions in Mogadishu; between the government and Somalia’s federal states; and between Mogadishu and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. It draws upon interviews in Somalia, including with senior Somali officials; as well as in Abu Dhabi, Doha, Ankara, Addis Ababa, Nairobi, New York and Washington. II. Farmajo’s Presidency and the Gulf Crisis In the Gulf crisis’s aftermath, President Farmajo’s declaration that he would remain neutral was met with scepticism in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, who perceived his government as wedded to Qatar and Turkey. In response, Abu Dhabi appears to have doubled down on its relations with other Somali factions and Somalia’s federal states, prompting anger from senior Somali officials and disquiet among Western and African diplomats. The government’s use of its rivals’ alleged Emirati backing to justify crackdowns and adoption of anti-Emirati rhetoric to play to its nationalist base has not helped. Farmajo’s reluctance to cut ties with Qatar and Turkey makes sense, particularly given the scale of Turkish aid and investment, though his increasing reliance on both countries has further soured relations with the UAE. In June 2017, as the Gulf spat escalated and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and their allies broke off relations with and imposed an embargo on Qatar, the Gulf powers lobbied governments worldwide, including in Africa, to pick sides. Several African leaders expelled Qatari diplomats, though a number quietly restored diplomatic ties shortly afterward. Farmajo’s government faced particularly acute pressure, with Riyadh allegedly offering it additional financial backing in return for it severing ties to Qatar. Instead, Farmajo insisted he was set on keeping Somalia out of the fray.Beneath the president’s claims of neutrality, however, lies a more complicated reality. Before his election, Farmajo ran what seemed to be a bare-bones campaign for the presidency. His outreach appeared – and likely was – less well-financed than that of other contenders, who were widely perceived to have received significant outside funding. After the vote, however, unconfirmed reports surfaced that Farmajo’s campaign had received a last-minute boost from Qatar. The president’s early cabinet appointments added to speculation about his close ties to Doha. His refusal to publicly pick sides in the Gulf spat was thus viewed in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi not as neutrality, but as, in effect, siding with their rivals.His relations with the Saudi-led bloc deteriorated sharply, triggering a temporary suspension by Riyadh of direct budgetary support of some $30 million per year.​​​​​​ The Saudis backtracked shortly thereafter, in part, reportedly, worried by anger on the Somali street – and elsewhere in Africa – that they were using financial muscle to extract concessions from weaker states.Riyadh resumed budgetary support in October 2017. It may still resent the influence wielded by individuals in Farmajo’s cabinet it perceives as pro-Qatar or Turkey, but its channels of communication to the government remain open. Abu Dhabi’s relations with Mogadishu, on the other hand, have gone from bad to worse. The UAE has deeper commercial and military ties to Somalia than Saudi Arabia, part of what Emirati officials describe as a region-wide policy to promote freedom of maritime navigation and combat Islamist extremism. Specifically, the UAE had trained and supported Somali units since at least 2014, first to combat piracy, and later for operations against Al-Shabaab.​​​​​​ According to one senior UAE official: “If there was no Al-Shabaab in Somalia, we wouldn’t have a footprint. We have supported the government in Mogadishu to claim back Somali territory. This is linked to our work in Afghanistan. One of the main reasons we are interested is because we believe there is a connectivity in this fight – these are the same groups, being affected by the same narrative. This was the reason for our initial presence in Somalia and it remains our main goal.” From the Emiratis’ perspective, Qatar aimed to use its influence in Somali politics, which has expanded over the last few years, to obstruct their own. In Somalia as elsewhere, Abu Dhabi voices concern about Doha’s and Ankara’s support for political Islam, particularly movements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, a force that Emirati leaders argue is akin ideologically – and a gateway – to more violent and intolerant forms of Islamism. Over recent years, the UAE has accused Qatar of promoting Somali politicians sympathetic to Islamists or at times even to Al-Shabaab itself.Abu Dhabi argues that despite its concerns about Farmajo and his staff, it was willing to work with the new president, but that Qatar was intent on forcing it out. As the Emiratis perceived themselves losing ground, they appear to have reinforced relationships with other Somali leaders, particularly in Somalia’s federal states.The Somali government, on the other hand, denounces Emirati interference. According to Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheyre: We cannot compromise on issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity. When we say we are neutral, we mean we are neutral. We cannot accept to be questioned on this. No one questions Kenya’s or Ethiopia’s neutrality. Why should Somalia be punished for saying it wants to be independent. Many Western and African officials agree. According to a former Western ambassador to Somalia: Farmajo’s position of neutrality in the Gulf crisis shocked and angered the Saudis and Emiratis. He reasoned – correctly in my view – that Somalia had important relations with all parties and no interest in their dispute. Asserting Somalia’s sovereignty was in Somalia’s interest. Besides, Turkey is a huge investor in Somalia and Qatar helps in other ways. Roughly four years earlier, when the Saudis demanded that Somalia break ties with Iran and expel its diplomats and citizens, it did so immediately. This defiance from a formerly compliant and weak African state was unwelcome. Certainly, President Farmajo had good cause to remain neutral. That said, his government’s reaction to what senior officials perceive as Emirati pressure has not helped. It has adopted increasingly repressive tactics (detailed in subsequent sections) against rivals, often using their alleged ties to Abu Dhabi as pretext. Farmajo’s rhetoric against the UAE also appears in part as an attempt to reconnect with his nationalist base. During his campaign, Farmajo pledged repeatedly to defend Somalia’s sovereignty against foreign powers, particularly Ethiopia.​​​​​​ In office, however, he moved quickly to reassure Addis Ababa – sensibly, given the Ethiopian contingent fighting Al-Shabaab and the importance of maintaining relations with Somalia’s powerful neighbour.But for many supporters, Farmajo’s rapprochement went too far when he handed over a prominent Ethiopian-Somali rebel commander, Abdikarim Muse “Qalbi Dagah” to Ethiopia, and declared Abdikarim’s Ogaden National Liberation Front a terrorist group – a line no previous Somali leader had dared cross. Since then, Farmajo appears to have sought to offset that concession to Addis Ababa with a harder line against Abu Dhabi. The government’s nationalist stand against the UAE also strengthens the perception, which it has struggled to shake, that it is overly attached to Doha and, to a lesser extent, Ankara. Beyond his appointment of officials perceived as tied to those two powers, the president has accepted additional Qatari and Turkish aid. In November 2017, his government signed a deal with Qatar under which Doha will provide $200 million for the construction of two major highways, the rehabilitation of several federal government buildings and other smaller development projects in Mogadishu and the Shabelle river valley. For their part, Qatari officials argue that Doha’s deepening ties with Mogadishu are a natural progression of its past humanitarian support and deny its involvement has an ideological bent. According to one foreign ministry official: “Our goal was never to have a rivalry with the UAE in Somalia. Our engagement is prior to that. It’s about creating stability and countering extremism in Somalia, through genuine humanitarian and developmental projects that we are implementing either bilaterally or through the UN”. Doha aims, according to Qatari officials, to carve out a long-term role as a donor, investing in health, education and exploration of Somalia’s natural resources, including oil and gas.As for Turkey, it is now one of Somalia’s major donors and investors. Turkey’s initial provision of humanitarian aid, particularly during the 2011 famine, has morphed into commercial interests, direct budgetary support to the government, training of Somali security forces and thus considerable influence in a country that offers Ankara an important market for Turkish goods and services as well as strategic depth.Turkish officials echo their Emirati counterparts in emphasising that Ankara’s support is motivated largely by security, though they place greater weight on strengthening the central state: Our priority is security, in other words increasing the ability of the central government to provide security. Without security, you cannot have development and people will distrust the central government. The 14 October 2017 Mogadishu bombing and the smaller suicide bombings since show that Mogadishu needs all the support it can get. Like Qatar, Turkey rejects that its support enables Al-Shabaab. According to one Turkish official: “That is ridiculous. Our priority is strengthening the national army. How can this be in line with supporting terrorists?” Ankara argues that the Muslim Brotherhood – in Somalia as elsewhere – is a political reality, a movement that has never taken up arms itself and an antidote against harder-line groups like Al-Shabaab.Turkish officials emphasise the extent and history of their engagement in Somalia, against which they view both Emirati and Qatar involvement as superficial. They tend to distance Ankara’s role from that of Doha. In addition to managing Mogadishu port since 2014 and opening, in 2016, the largest Turkish embassy in the world in the Somali capital, Turkey has expanded its security assistance. According to Turkish officials, Ankara’s direct budgetary support to the Somali government also has increased – from $2 million per month a year ago to $2.5 million today. While Turkish influence and investment in Somalia has been significant for years, these increases reinforce the sense in Abu Dhabi that Mogadishu is turning from the UAE to Turkey.Overall, while the government’s crackdowns against Somali rivals are counterproductive, its apparent tilt toward Qatar and Turkey is understandable, given the importance of their investment and aid, Farmajo’s deteriorating relations with Abu Dhabi and the latter’s apparent backing of his rivals. But as those ties deepen, so, too, does Emirati disquiet. III. A New Twist to Old Struggles in Mogadishu Gulf rivalries are intertwined with competition among factions in Mogadishu. Alleged Emirati funding of factions opposed to the federal government and, in turn, Farmajo’s crackdown on rivals, accusing them of receiving millions of Emirati dollars to agitate against him, have added new complexity to struggles in the capital, as a series of recent disputes illustrates. The first split the Somali parliament into two factions, pitting Prime Minister Kheyre and a pro-government faction against opponents led by the lower house speaker, Mohamed Osman Jawari. Reportedly triggered by Kheyre’s frustration at Jawari’s repeated obstruction of government-sponsored bills, in late 2017 the dispute escalated into a full-blown crisis, with the government accusing its rivals of orchestrating an Emirati-funded parliamentary rebellion aimed at forcing out Farmajo and Kheyre. In March 2018, it threatened to turn violent when the government replaced the parliamentary police with army units, which deployed outside the parliament building and at checkpoints across the capital. In response, Jawari issued a press release calling on parliamentarians and the Somali people to protect the legislature. Some parliamentarians reportedly summoned clan militias to defend them. Armed clashes were averted only when the African Union mission, AMISOM, brokered a meeting between the president and speaker.Many in Mogadishu believe Gulf funding aggravated the dispute. That said, the UAE-Qatar rivalry does not map precisely onto the opposing sides, as illustrated by the subtle game Jawari himself has played. Though often portrayed as Emirati-backed, in reality he often played pro-Qatar and pro-UAE factions in the lower house off against each other in order to maintain influence. In March 2018, for example, he masterminded a parliamentary motion against a long-discussed deal that would allow the Emirati company DP World to develop Somaliland’s Berbera port – a deal Farmajo and his allies in parliament also have opposed (see Section VII). This move allowed Jawari not only to demonstrate his clout in parliament but also, reportedly, to pressure the Emiratis, who have built close ties to Jawari’s rival for leadership of the Digil Mirifle clan, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden, president of South West federal state. The speaker’s manoeuvres illustrate the fluidity of Somali politicians’ ties to Gulf powers and the adroitness with which many extract personal and political gain from foreign jostling for influence. Jawari resigned on 9 April, reportedly when he realised that he would lose a government-sponsored – and allegedly Qatar-funded – vote to oust him. Tensions within parliament have subsided, though for how long is unclear. In principle, the speaker’s departure could improve prospects for dialogue between the government and its rivals, but the acrimonious nature of his exit appears to have entrenched divisions. Parliamentarians admit that the overlap between parliamentary infighting and the Gulf powers’ rivalry has increased opportunities for patronage.A second dispute involved opposition leader Abdirahman Abdishakur Warsame. Over the course of 2017 and early 2018, Abdishakur levelled increasingly strident critiques at the government. In response, senior officials accused him of receiving Emirati funds and planning to destabilise the government. In December 2017, Somali forces raided his Mogadishu residence. Five of his bodyguards died during the raid. Abdishakur was held by security forces for three days, his passport confiscated and was reportedly released only on condition he would not speak to the media or leave the country.The government blames him and his guards for resisting a routine search-and-interrogate operation and provoking the firefight. A day after the raid – while Abdishakur was still in detention – Farmajo sent a minister to meet elders of his Habar Gedir clan to apologise and offer compensation for the security guards’ deaths. The minister admitted “a mistake occurred” and hinted officers misinterpreted orders. With no independent probe and two contrasting, partisan narratives, the truth may never come to light. But whatever happened, many Mogadishu residents blame the government. The opposition claims the raid reflects its “growing authoritarian tendencies” and even calls for a caretaker administration to oversee forthcoming elections, planned for 2020. A last clash involved Mogadishu mayor, Thabit Abdi Mohammed, a former Farmajo ally from the powerful Abgaal clan, part of the Mogadishu Clan clan family. Thabit’s response to the October 2017 Al-Shabaab attack at Soobe junction, the deadliest terrorist attack suffered by the capital, won him considerable applause. Despite his initially close ties to the government, he became a more prominent critic as his popularity grew. He also championed the longstanding Mogadishu Clan demand that greater Mogadishu, estimated to host over two million inhabitants (of a total estimated fourteen million in Somalia), should be designated a federal state – called Banaadir – which would allow it greater self-governance and representatives in parliament’s upper house. Thabit appears to have promoted the capital’s statehood mostly to build his own support base. Instead of seeking to turn down the temperature, the government picked a public fight with the mayor, accusing him of corruption and, again, of receiving Emirati funds. In January, it deployed forces to take control of the national Banaadir regional headquarters, which houses the mayor’s office. The next morning Thabit resigned. While Thabit’s opportunism in promoting Mogadishu’s statehood might have justified his removal, the manner in which it happened solidified opposition to the government. Shortly after his replacement, Engineer Abdirahman Osman Yarisow, took over, Qatar donated 30 buses to the mayor’s office. As the UAE shut down its aid projects after the April 2018 seizure of its funds at Mogadishu airport, the mayor reportedly asked Qatar to assume responsibility for some of those projects.To some degree, all these disputes are extensions of traditional Somali factionalism. The precise impact of the Gulf crisis on them is difficult to ascertain, given the difficulty of linking often opaque foreign funding directly to politicians’ actions and the fact that the government, either overreading Emirati influence or using it as a pretext, has cracked down even on opponents whose UAE ties are unclear. That said, Gulf rivalries – whether directly or indirectly – appear almost certain to have exacerbated divisions, hardening both the government’s and its rivals’ positions and complicating efforts to reach consensus. They have added a thorny new layer to elite struggles in the capital. IV. Fracturing the Security Sector? The UAE versus Qatar/Turkey rivalry also appears to be aggravating factionalism within the security forces. This dissension risks undermining the campaign against Al-Shabaab and could stoke future conflict, given that it often mirrors political divides. Security sector divisions are hardly new. Much of the Somali army is a patchwork of former clan militias, whose primary loyalty is often to commanders or elders rather than up the formal chain of command. Nor is the UAE’s support – or that of other countries – for the security forces new. As part of a memorandum of understanding it signed with the Somali federal government in 2014, the UAE has trained personnel and built infrastructure for the Somali army, marine police and regular police force, including beyond Mogadishu. Its initial support for counter-piracy operations in the 2010s has gradually morphed into the struggle against Al-Shabaab, which is the primary focus today.For example, the UAE ran a training camp in Mogadishu and paid the salaries of Somali trainees. It also trained, kitted out and paid the salaries of the Puntland Marine Police Force, which focuses on maritime security and counter-terrorism operations. Abu Dhabi has also trained and helped command specialised brigades of the Somali army. In May 2015, it donated armoured vehicles to Jubaland state. Some officers and other civil servants have also gone for training in Dubai. Abu Dhabi argues that its efforts have been coordinated with those of Western governments in Somalia.Similarly, Turkish investment in the security sector dates back a number of years. Since 2011, the Turkish government has been training Somali forces both in Somalia and in Turkey. In October 2017, it commissioned a new military academy (estimated to have cost $50 million) in Mogadishu to train 10,000 Somali soldiers in the next few years. The academy, the construction of which had been long in the works and coordinated with other donors including the U.S. and European Union (EU), cements Turkey’s role as a major security player. Turkey has long supported creating a strong Somali military, arguing that security is a prerequisite for addressing the fragile nation’s dire humanitarian needs. Qatar, which has traditionally steered clear of the security sphere, may be considering a shift. After a Somali military delegation met Defence Minister Khalid Bin Muhammad al-Attiyah in Doha in March 2018, Qatar – according to a senior Somali official – pledged to construct new Somali army barracks. Qatari officials say talks between Doha and the federal government about supporting security sector reform are ongoing.Over the past year, however, the escalating rivalries among Gulf powers and Turkey appear to have brought troublesome new dynamics to their assistance. Specialised units trained and equipped by rival powers reportedly face pressure to lend their weight to competing political factions. The 30 December 2017 raid on Senator Abdi Hasan Awale Qeybdiid’s residence in Mogadishu by UAE-trained troops revealed the disconnect between the various security forces operating in the capital. Farmajo’s government claims it had no knowledge of the attack on the senator’s house. Farmajo himself ordered the arrest of more than 40 UAE-trained army troops and launched an investigation into the raid. Somali officials accuse UAE-trained units of carrying out operations not sanctioned through the regular chain of command, in some cases defying orders and seeking to “protect” individuals deemed to be government opponents. The UAE denies this charge, arguing that its trainees fall under the command of the Defence Ministry, together with AMISOM (both of which had sanctioned the training program). As the Emiratis announced in April they were ending military cooperation with the Somali government, the government assumed full command of the Mogadishu-based, Emirati-trained unit at a special ceremony in the capital.The threat of greater factionalism is all the more worrying given the dysfunction that already wracks the security forces. A 2017 operational readiness assessment revealed that the army “lacked the properly trained manpower, barracks, weapons and ammunition, as well as logistical support …. The Somali national army needs to be capacitated in all fields – training, equipment, mobility and weapons – to be able to inherit, hold and preserve the gains achieved”.On assuming office, Farmajo promised to rebuild the army and crush the insurgency within two years. In May 2017, his government unveiled a national security pact at the London conference. This pact was backed not only by donors but by federal states, suggesting a degree of consensus between Mogadishu and the regions that has since dissipated. But Al-Shabaab remains a formidable force, with clear command-and-control within its ranks, a ruthless intelligence apparatus, and a revenue generation system and ability to deliver basic services, particularly dispute resolution, that outstrip those of Mogadishu. U.S. airstrikes and ground operations since early 2017 may have taken a toll on its leadership and assets, but such tactics are unlikely to defeat the insurgency. Indeed, in some cases the civilian casualties they cause drive up support for militants.In response, Al-Shabaab has stepped up attacks, carrying out over a dozen in Mogadishu over the past eighteen months. The uncertainty over the continued presence of African Union forces – AMISOM announced it would begin a phased exit in late 2017 – serves to deepen unease inside and outside the country. Factionalism in Mogadishu and potentially within the security sector, together with Mogadishu-federal states tension described in the next section, distract from efforts to counter Al-Shabaab and risk playing into the insurgency’s hands. V. Mogadishu-Federal State Government Friction President Farmajo, who hails from outside traditional Mogadishu elites, came to power enjoying considerable support from beyond the capital. The Gulf crisis, however, has helped catalyse escalating tension between his government and Somalia’s federal states, some of which rely on Emirati aid and investment. The UAE has been involved in Somali regions for a number of years. Receiving minimal funding from Mogadishu, some federal state leaders see Emirati support as key to rebuilding their economies and infrastructure. Following the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, senior Somali officials and Western diplomats believe that Abu Dhabi quietly stepped up offers of support, particularly to federal states located along the coast, whose ports make them of greater strategic interest. Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, says that its policy has been consistent, and only the Somali government’s perception of it has changed. One official said: “If we can’t be there through the federal government, we think it’s better that we keep our relationships with the federal states. They recognise what the UAE has done to support their development …. We don’t want them to collapse”.Whatever the case, federal state governments adopted an increasingly assertive posture against Farmajo. In August and September 2017, they released a series of statements expressing support for the Saudi-Emirati bloc, contradicting Farmajo’s declared desire not to pick sides, and in one case openly attacking Mogadishu’s supposedly neutral position. Federal state officials express frustration that the government did not consult them as it adopted a position on the Gulf crisis that they believe works against their interests. In turn, many in Mogadishu – including civil society leaders and diplomats, not just government officials – perceive that resistance in part as sparked by Emirati funds and as a means of pressuring Farmajo to distance himself from Qatar. The Farmajo government objects that federal states’ stance on the Gulf spat undercuts Somali foreign policy, which is Mogadishu’s prerogative. It also views growing commercial and military assistance funnelled directly to the regions as a threat, likely to diminish its already shaky influence in the regions and embolden an assertive periphery. Other foreign powers have their own ties to federal states, but the Somali government argues that they usually coordinate with Mogadishu or at least keep it informed. Qatari officials, for example, argue explicitly that, unlike the UAE, they channel aid only through the federal government “to protect Somalia’s territorial integrity” and accuse Abu Dhabi of seeking to regionally divide Somalia. The Somali government echoes that charge. The friction may have hurt counter-insurgency efforts. The security pact unveiled at the London conference, shortly after Farmajo’s inauguration and before the June 2017 Gulf crisis, envisaged federal states’ forces becoming part of the Somali army and the establishment of federal and regional state police departments. All federal states and donors signed up to the pact, which set a six-month deadline for the reforms. That deadline has since been missed, partly due to political infighting in the capital but also to Mogadishu-federal state tensions.Meetings between the government and regional representatives in the latter part of 2017 had appeared to make some progress on easing the standoff. But 2018 has brought fresh strain, as news broke that the UAE-based conglomerate DP World was in direct negotiations with Puntland, South West State and Jubaland for the development of those federal states’ ports and to increase other investment. The visits of the Puntland and Jubaland leaders to Dubai in late April and their subsequent reiteration of calls for continued Emirati funding have stoked further tension.Then, in mid-May, during a meeting in Baidoa, the capital of Somalia’s South-West federal state, all the federal state leaders issued a hard-hitting statement accusing the Somali government of violating Article 53 of the provisional constitution, which calls for consultation on all local and foreign policy issues. They claimed the deterioration in relations with the UAE was not in the national interest and appealed to Mogadishu to seek to reverse it. They also called on donors to disperse aid directly to federal states, bypassing Mogadishu. Senior Somali officials express increasing anger at the federal states’ actions. “They will lose if they side with Emiratis”, said one. “The bulk of the nation is with us because they want to defend Somali sovereignty and resent seeing Abu Dhabi try to compel us to take their side. The power-hungry federal state leaders will isolate themselves. Many of the federal states will have elections in two years and will be voted out”. Overall, political hostility between Mogadishu and regional governments is at its worst level in years, threatening to further fracture the country. VI. A Dangerous Spat with Somaliland Gulf rivalries and Farmajo’s heavy-handedness also have played into a deepening row between Mogadishu and the self-declared Republic of Somaliland. Shortly after Farmajo’s June 2017 announcement that Somalia would not pick sides, Somaliland appeared set to chart its own course, declaring it would ban Qatar Airways from using its airspace. Over the past few months, a deal that Somaliland has signed to allow DP World to develop its Berbera port has provoked an angry response from Mogadishu. Somaliland’s relations with Somalia have been frosty since 1991, when the central government in Mogadishu collapsed and the region declared independence. Its statehood is recognised by neither Somalia nor any other state (though a handful of governments admit travellers on Somaliland passports). Years of diplomatic efforts by African and international actors to nudge the two toward dialogue yielded little. In 2016, fresh talks between representatives of both the Somali and Somaliland governments, mediated by Turkey and supported by the UK and others, appeared to breathe new life into prospects for some form of resolution. An escalating war of words between Mogadishu and Hargeisa over a deal formalised in March 2018, between the Somaliland government and DP World, appears to have extinguished hope of any such rapprochement. According to the $442 million deal, the Emirati conglomerate would modernise and manage Berbera port, with DP World holding 51 per cent of shares, Somaliland 30 per cent and Ethiopia 19 per cent.Farmajo’s government has reacted angrily. Prime Minister Kheyre, who argues that he travelled to the UAE in an attempt to block it, was particularly incensed by the manner in which he learned of it: I was in Abu Dhabi recently and met senior Emirati officials to express our concerns about the Berbera deal and find a solution. I told them Somalia wanted to be a country that gets along with everyone. But even as we were talking, the Emiratis were secretly negotiating with Somaliland on the Berbera contract. They did not even take the trouble to inform me. I only learned of it when I was about to board my flight home. Mogadishu formally protested to the Arab League, declaring the contract null and void and “a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty”. Shortly thereafter, parliament’s lower house adopted a motion, as described above, rejecting the deal. It took the additional step of banning DP World from operating in Somalia, potentially obstructing the company’s attempts to secure contracts to develop federal states’ ports. In response, Somaliland President Muse Bihi ominously described Somalia’s opposition to the Berbera deal as “a declaration of war”, adding “we are ready for you”. For their part, the Emiratis claim to have been taken aback by Mogadishu’s anger. According to one official: The Somalis surprised us with the complaint at the Arab League about trampling on their sovereignty. We have been consistent in our One Somalia policy. We had an oral agreement [about this] and we can’t accept that a new government comes in [and changes everything]. This has to be understood as a commercial and development project. Somaliland similarly contends that the federal government had been aware of negotiations over Berbera’s development for more than a year before the contract was signed (Farmajo’s predecessor, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, reportedly at one point considered whether the Somali government itself might become a partner). Moreover, the deal comes against the backdrop of renewed efforts to start a fresh round of talks, mediated by Djibouti, between Somaliland and Somalia, with a face-to-face meeting planned between Farmajo and Muse Bihi.Deepening animosity over the past year between the Somali government and Abu Dhabi clearly has played into the dispute. Farmajo’s stance on the Dubai port could prove a misstep. Mogadishu mostly likely lacks the leverage to block the deal, and its inability to do so could make it look still weaker in the eyes of federal states, increasing the likelihood they chart an even more autonomous course in striking their own deals. Attempting to scupper the deal also risks damaging prospects for dialogue and a negotiated settlement to the dispute over Somaliland’s status. It is likely to complicate any attempt to calm the recent outbreak of violence between Somaliland and Puntland forces. VII. Taking a Step Back Of all the African states forced to navigate the rivalries unleashed by the Gulf crisis, Somalia faces the gravest challenges. The UAE, alarmed at losing ground to its main geopolitical rivals, appears to have upped support for Somali opposition leaders and federal states in an attempt to promote its interests and protect its investments. The Somali government, feeling besieged, has deepened ties to Qatar and Turkey, further fuelling Emirati disquiet, and adopted heavy-handed tactics against rivals at home, aggravating Somali factionalism. The result has been a dangerous standoff, pitting the government against opponents in Mogadishu, the federal states and Somaliland. Any of these disputes could escalate. All sides need to take a step back before that happens. Repairing Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi relations will be an uphill struggle. Sentiment is raw on both sides, particularly since the government’s seizure of Emirati money in Mogadishu in April 2018 and the UAE’s subsequent withdrawal. Some Somali officials threaten retaliatory steps against what they view as an attempt to violate their country’s sovereignty. According to a Somali minister: The UAE is undermining our sovereignty. We engage them and express our concerns. They continue to escalate. We have shown restraint and have not taken retaliatory measures. They sent a ship to evacuate their people and equipment. We said: fine. But they convened meetings for federal state leaders to undermine the national government. They will lose in the longer term because public opinion is with us. Indeed, our government has benefited from the crisis as the people are rallying around us. So far, we are giving space for dialogue. But we can respond in kind. We have contingency measures. We could, for example, deny the Emirates overflight rights over Somalia – tens of daily Emirates flights use Somali airspace. We could reopen the Iranian embassy in Mogadishu. We don’t want to do either, but we could. Senior Emirati officials have tended to express similar anger. That said, despite the heated rhetoric, both sides appear to want to find a way out. According to Emirati officials, Abu Dhabi recognises that it needs to de-escalate the dispute. One pointed out that the UAE has neither closed its embassy nor downgraded diplomatic relations with Mogadishu – an intentional move to avoid escalation and leave the door open for re-engagement with Farmajo’s government. Another said: “We don’t want to disconnect ourselves from the Somali government, even though we are reluctant to engage with them …. What we need now really is for things to just calm down. They will cool. Then a mediator could come in”.Senior Somali officials argue that they have reached out to the UAE since the start of the crisis. Privately, they acknowledge that escalation helps them in the short term by solidifying public support for the government, but will hurt them in the long term, as it will weaken Somalia and, by distracting the government itself, help Al-Shabaab. That said, they are clear they will not offer compromises they believe could be seen as surrendering Somali sovereignty – so no public apologies or removal of officials of concern to Abu Dhabi.Some form of Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi dialogue is a priority and could aim for rapprochement based on the Somali government taking steps to showcase its neutrality and the UAE pledging to keep Mogadishu better informed on its involvement in federal states. Even without such dialogue, President Farmajo’s government should urgently seek accommodation with rivals in the capital, federal states and Hargeisa. In this light, the Somali government should: Express publicly its willingness to participate in talks with Abu Dhabi and potentially seek Saudi mediation. It also could find a way to distribute the Emirati money it has seized to pay salaries of personnel in the units for which Abu Dhabi says the cash was destined. It could pledge to guarantee the security of Emirati diplomats and military personnel. Senior officials also should dial down their anti-Emirati rhetoric. Stop the selective criminalisation of clientelism, notably its crackdown on rivals under the pretext they receive UAE funding. The influence of foreign funds on Somali politics has long been a concern, but the opposition is not the only guilty party. The government also should promote financial transparency; its annual report on aid flows is a good start, but it and federal state governments should declare significant donations. Step up efforts to finalise the draft permanent constitution – which would clarify the power and resource-sharing arrangements with federal states that are at the root of centre-periphery tensions – including by resuming the dialogue with federal states it started in October 2017. Recommit to a meeting between President Farmajo and Somaliland leader Muse Bihi; Bihi should make the same commitment. As a gesture of good-will to both Somaliland and the UAE, Mogadishu also should curtail its opposition to Hargeisa’s contract with DP World, a deal long in the making. For their part, Gulf powers and Turkey should exercise restraint across the Horn, particularly in Somalia. The factious nature of Somali politics means that no axis can fully dominate. Attempting to consolidate control is likely to further fracture the Somali state, either along factional lines in the capital or between Mogadishu and the federal states. Such fragmentation would serve nobody’s interests. The UAE should agree to dialogue and could offer to share information with Mogadishu on all DP World’s dealings with Somali regions and Somaliland. Its existing diplomatic overtures to federal states and Somaliland are provocative; if it is intent on maintaining relationships and commercial ties, it should do so in a way that doesn’t exacerbate Somali fractures. It also could encourage allies in the federal states to reconcile with Mogadishu. Qatar and Turkey should press Farmajo to repair relations with rival factions, federal states and Somaliland.They also should support its adoption of a more balanced stand on the Gulf Cooperation Council crisis; Doha and Ankara may benefit in the short term as the Emiratis withdraw, but for Somalia, a genuinely neutral stance that allows it to receive much-needed support from donors of all stripes would better serve its interests. Qatari-allied media should dial down their inflammatory coverage of the UAE’s role in Somalia. Saudi Arabia, which enjoys the relative trust of Somali and Emirati leaders, should promote dialogue between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi; Riyadh could be an emissary and potential facilitator of talks. Somalia’s other partners should work to limit the impact of the Gulf rivalries. In particular, the African Union, the United Nations, the regional body the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the League of Arab States, the U.S., the EU and its member states should urge that all states cease covert sponsorship of Somali leaders. Western powers with close ties to both the Somali government and Gulf powers should promote Mogadishu-Abu Dhabi dialogue, and back any attempt by Riyadh to mediate. EU officials, also reportedly trusted by both sides, might also play some facilitation role. VIII. Conclusion Clearly, Somalia’s many challenges cannot all be pinned on Gulf powers, particularly given that their aid and investment for years has been a lifeline for many Somalis. Nor are Somali elites, long adept at navigating foreign clientelism, helpless victims. Moreover, many foreign powers – in the region and beyond – have long played favourites and aggravated factionalism in Somalia. That said, almost a year after the Gulf crisis, the enmities that have riven the GCC have brought fresh complexity to Somali instability. They illustrate, too, the increasing jockeying for influence among Arab and other powers around the Red Sea and in the Horn of Africa. The extension of the Middle East’s fault lines into the region have unsettled already fraught relations among Horn states and led their leaders to recalibrate their policies toward neighbours and outside powers alike. Of all those states, it is Somalia – already arguably the weakest – whose internal politics have been most fiercely buffeted, with rivalries among Gulf states and Turkey and the unravelling of relations between the Farmajo government and Abu Dhabi intensifying disputes among factions in Mogadishu, between the Somali government and federal states, and between it and Somaliland. Even without Gulf meddling, efforts to reconcile clans and overcome centre-periphery tensions – a prerequisite for peace in Somalia – face an uphill battle. But if the country becomes a battleground for richer, more powerful states, and they and Somali factions pursue a form of zero-sum competition ill-suited to the country’s factious and multipolar politics, the bloodshed and discord that have long blighted Somalia risk taking an even darker turn. All involved need to reverse course before that happens. Ideally, the Gulf powers would end the spat within the GCC that serves all their interests ill. But absent that, they should not let their rivalries destabilise weaker states. Source: – ICG

President Farmajo chairing the National Security Conference in Baidoa, Somalia. June 4, 2018. PHOTO: COURTESY (VILLA SOMALIA) Mogadishu (HOL) – The 7th National Security Conference on Somalia between the Federal Government of Somalia, Federal Member States and security personnel met for the second day in Baidoa, the capital in the southwestern Bay region. The high-level meeting was chaired by President Farmajo and Prime Minister Khaire. On the agenda for the conference is national security, preparations for the proposed ‘one-man-one-vote’ general election ins 2020, the health of the economy and the adopting of a new federal constitution. Somalia has been conducting a series of military operations throughout the country to weed at Al-Shabaab militants with the help from international partners who train Somalia’s security and direct military assistance from U.S. Special Forces. In the past week, two separate U.S. airstrikes killed a total of 39 suspected Al-Shabaab fighters. According to the U.S. Africa Command, it is the 15th and 16th airstrikes this year against the Al-Qaeda-linked militants. In the last six months of 2017, there were 34 U.S. airstrikes in Somalia Although the Pentagon assessed that there were no civilian casualties in the latest airstrikes, the U.S. government in the past been accused by Somali elders of killing innocent civilians in their joint U.S. – Somali operations against Al-Shabaab. Since taking office last January, U.S. President Donal Trump drastically reduced the rules of engagement for the U.S. military. His decision has led to the largest American involvement in Somalia since clan militias downed two U.S. Black Hawks in 1993. Government officials and international donors have conceded that universal suffrage will be next to impossible to achieve if Al-Shabaab continues to be as potent as they are currently. Although their operational capacity has been reduced dramatically over the years, the group continues to hold large swathes of land in central and southern Somalia. They have been able to launch military raids of SNA and AMISOM bases with varying degrees of success and are capable of conducting massive bombing campaigns as illustrated in the infamous ‘October 14’ bombing that killed 587 people and wounded another 316. Security forces are also growing increasingly alarmed about ISIS-affiliated groups gaining a foothold in Somalia. The group – led by former Al-Shabaab commander Abdulkadir Mumin – primarily operated in Puntland’s mountainous regions but recent assassinations targeting intelligence officers in Mogadishu has worried officials who fear ISIS fighters fleeing Syria and Iraq may end up in Somalia. AMISOM is expected to gradually withdraw it’s nearly 22,000 troops and begin to hand over national security responsibility to Somali security forces by December 2020, but leaders from the main troop-contributing countries – including Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, Burundi and Ethiopia – have all warned that a premature withdrawal would undermine gains made over the past eleven years. In order to combat these security issues, Somalia’s federal and regional leaders will be discussing plans to establish well-trained soldiers in a national integrated army in place of the largely ineffective collection of clan militias. They will also discuss establishing regional police forces who will be armed and funded by the federal government. The government plans to have a technical committee to meet every 3 weeks to monitor the developments. Somalia’s federal government and her regional member states have been at loggerheads at times. Many analysts have opined that the ongoing ‘Gulf crisis’ next door to Somalia has spilled into Somalia and has restoked the flames regional rivalries. Although the federal government has officially maintained a position of neutrality in the conflict, the UAE and many regional Presidents believe that Farmajo is firmly in the Qatar/Turkey camp. The Somali government has accused the Emirati’s of intentionally exacerbating the situation by funding regional leaders and opposition figures to destabilize the country and undermine his authority. Farmajo’s detractors have accused him of acting as an authoritarian leader after the homes of two political critics were raided earlier this year. Political cooperation between the federal government and regional member states is said to be high on the agenda for Tuesday’s talks. The leaders will also be discussing the constitutional review process which has been a bone of contention with at least one regional member state. Jubaland decided to skip the National Constitutional Convention last month. Shortly after announcing their absence from the convention, Jubaland’s Ministry of Justice and Constitutional & Religious Affairs said via Twitter that legitimate stakeholders and authorities can’t be dressed up as a superficial display. Last October, two pivotal bodies that are responsible for the review and implementation of Somalia’s constitution boycotted a planned conference scheduled in Mogadishu, citing an overreaching Ministry of Constitutional Affairs of sabotaging the talks. The Somali government was forced to cancel the entire conference due to “technical reasons”, without citing any specific details. Finally, the group of leaders are expected to discuss Somalia’s economy and the division of natural resources between the federal government and regional member states. The leaders hope to finalize an agreement that would create a fisheries authority to regulate the industry. The resource sharing deal would ensure all member states have a slice of Somalia’s marine resources. President Farmajo is reported to have met with Galmudug Chief Minister Mohamed Shakir Ali Hassan at the sidelines for the National Security Conference to discuss the fragile political stalemate that has gripped Galmudug. The crisis was sparked by a disagreement over a power-sharing deal that was signed by the Galmudug administration and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (ASWJ). Their historic merger in mid-January was in part brokered by President Farmajo. In exchange for ceasing hostilities, the two sides decided that they would unify their assemblies. A joint communique is expected to be released after the conference.