Ifiye

Nomads
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Everything posted by Ifiye

  1. Dowladda Puntland oo shuruud ku xirtay qaadashada Dastuurka Soomaaliya. Dowladda Puntland ayaa sheegtay in aysan qaadan doonin Dastuurka Soomaaliya ee haatan dib-u-eegistu ku socoto,haddii aan la waafajin nidaamka Federaalka dalka,sida ku xusan qoraal ka soo baxay shirkii Golaha Wasiirada dowladda Puntland ee maanta. Golaha Wasiirada Puntland ayaa ugu baaqay guddiyada gacanta ku haya Dastuurka , in qodobada ay diyaarinayan ay waafajiyaan haykalka hannaanka Federaalka ee dalku qaatay,waxaana dowladda Puntlan ka digtay in Dastuurka laga weeciyo nidaamka Federaalka ee Soomaali ku heshiisay. War-murtiyeedka ka soo baxay shirka Golaha Wasiirada Puntland ayaa lagu caddeeyay, in Puntland aysan marnaba aqbali doonin, in Dastuurka Soomaaliya loo diyaariyo hannaan dowlad dhexe,halkii laga rabay in la waafajiyo nidaamka Federaalka ee dalka. PUNTLAND POST
  2. When our central government shows some teeth the IC intervenes. The same thing happen when the government attempted to tame some regional goverments to stop them acting like an independent country while at the same time the IC gives aid to this tribal regions way more than it gives to the central government.
  3. When your boss[Musaveni] is a long time African dictator but somehow you still feel you earned the right to lecture Jawaari and the gangs about democracy. It just happened in Villa Hargeisa.
  4. Very ugly and depressing situation at the same time. I knew we were 80 percent under AmiSomia and but it now seems we are 100 percent under AmiSomia and their Western masters. This is as low as it gets. Jawaari is doing his job as spy and spoiler. His foreign handlers are coming to his rescue.
  5. Abdirahman O. Osman @engyarisow · 21h Thanks to #Mogadishu residents who paid all the $42.5m domestic revenues that Fed Govt of #Somalia raised in 1st quarter of 2018
  6. Mr Madoobe marki eey barako maleh sheekadu gaarto dhulkii uukayimid ee uukudhashay ee Ethiopia ayuu u cariridoonaa. Xaalufinta dhirta laguhaayo ee sadaxgeesoodka looqeeybsaday[shabab/Madoobe/his Kenyan masters] will be a disaster to the locals for a long time. The sooner this criminal and his Kenyan handlers leave the better.
  7. Another racist article from the Standard newspaper.
  8. Nationalism iyo kuwaan kaladheer. Videowgan waa Axmad madoobe oo difaacayo kenyaatiga.
  9. Farmaajo waa nin waxqabadkiisu badanyahay qeeyladiisuna yartahay. Sida madaxda qaarkood nin kamerada jecel maaha. Nin faanbadan maaha. Sidi kuwiihore nin meelkasta oo gurbaan lagatumayo igusawira dhaho ma aha. Waa sideey ilatahay aniga shaqsi ahaan.
  10. The locals should expect more oppression not less. We will also see millions of poor Ethiopian economic migrants move in and out number the nomadic locals in short period of time.
  11. There ain't no free lunch. Shareef Sakiin will not last a single day without his Ethiopian masters protection. I guess this is one of the many gifts both the Kenyans and Ethiopians will get.
  12. Cabdalla Cali Yoonis Feysal Axmed Yuusuf Dalmar Ali Hayan Cabdale Macalin Baashe Cabdullaahi Gaabow Axmed Cali Siciid(Dalmar)
  13. Tplf mafia has no shame. As we speak tens of thousands of Ethiopian civilians are pouring into Kenyan refugee camps and here we have woyane chearleeder publicly brag about the lucrative market of refugee hosting.
  14. -An independent Somaliland would have been in a good position to negotiate and get a better deal than a renegade province of Somalia. Both Ethiopia and UAE took advantage of this situation. -Ethiopia feels it was baby sitting this renegade province of Somalia far too long and wants to see the fruits of their labor very soon.
  15. Ethiopia, Berbera Port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa http://risingpowersproject.com/quarterly/ethiopia-berbera-port-shifting-balance-power-horn-africa/
  16. This is a very enlightening article on the Berbera port deal between Ethiopia, UAE and Somaliland.
  17. How an Ethiopia-backed port is changing power dynamics in the Horn of Africa Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter March 18, 2018 1.06pm SAST When Eritrea gained its independence from Ethiopia in 1993, Ethiopia became landlocked and therefore dependent on its neighbours – especially Djibouti – for access to international markets. This dependency has hampered Ethiopia’s aspiration to emerge as the uncontested regional power in the Horn of Africa. Recently, however, the ground has been shifting. As we point out in a recent article, Ethiopia has attempted to take advantage of the recent involvement of various Arab Gulf States in the Horn of Africa’s coastal zone to reduce its dependency on Djibouti’s port. The port currently accounts for 95% of Ethiopia’s imports and exports. It has done so by actively trying to interest partners in the refurbishment and development of other ports in the region: Port Sudan in Sudan, Berbera in the Somaliland region of Somalia, and Mombasa in Kenya. But it is Berbera, in particular, that will prove the most radical in terms of challenging regional power dynamics as well as international law. This is because a port deal involving Somaliland will challenge Djibouti’s virtual monopoly over maritime trade. In addition, it may entrench the de-facto Balkanization of Somalia and increase the prospects of Ethiopia becoming the regional hegemon. Ethiopia’s regional policy Ethiopia’s interest in Berbera certainly makes sense from a strategic perspective. It is closest to Ethiopia and will connect the eastern, primarily Somali region of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. It will also provide a much needed outlet for trade, particularly the export of livestock and agriculture. The development and expansion of the port at Berbera supports two primary pillars of Ethiopia’s regional policy. The first is maintaining Eritrea’s isolation. The aim would be to weaken it to the point that it implodes and is formally reunited to Ethiopia. Or it becomes a pliant, client state. The second pillar rests on maintaining the status quo in post-civil war Somalia. Simply put, a weak and fractured Somalia enables Ethiopia to focus on quelling persistent internal security difficulties. It also keeps up pressure on Eritrea. The Horn of Africa. supplied Ethiopia’s ambitions for Berbera have been hampered by two problems. Firstly the Republic of Somaliland – a de-facto independent state since 1991 – still isn’t recognised internationally. This makes engagement a political and legal headache. Secondly, Ethiopia, doesn’t have the critical resources needed to invest and build a port. Ethiopia had been trying to get Abu Dhabi and Dubai interested in the Berbera Port for years. It’s latest push was assisted by a number of factors. These included a shift in the UAE’s military focus in Yemen and Ethiopian assurances of more trade and some financing to upgrade the port. Ethiopia’s diplomatic push – which coincided with developments across the Gulf of Aden – finally got it the result it craved. In May 2016, DP World, a global mega-ports operator, signed an agreement to develop and manage Berbera Port for 30 years. The Berbera Port deal It is unlikely that DP World would have signed the deal if it didn’t see some long-term commercial benefit. The deal also includes economic, military and political dimensions. Economically, for example, there will be investments in Somaliland’s fisheries, transportation and hospitality industry. The UAE will also establish a military installationin Berbera. The base is intended to help the UAE tighten its blockade against Yemen and stop weapons being smuggled from Iran. Politically, the Berbera Port deal has provoked mixed reactions in Somaliland. There has been some popular anger aimed at Somaliland’s former president, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamoud aka “Silanyo”, and his family who reportedly benefited personally from it. Anger also stems from inter-clan and sub-clan rivalry over land, particularly in the Berbera area. But the anger in Somaliland pales in comparison to the reaction in Mogadishu. This is because the Somaliland government has remained largely isolated internationally – until the port deal. Somalia Federal Government ministers have publicly challenged the right of Somaliland to enter into official agreements with any country. The Ethiopian-driven deal means that Mogadishu’s claims over the breakaway territory have weakened substantially. The deal means that Somaliland has partially broken the glass ceiling of international recognition by entering into substantive deals with viable business partners and states operating on the global stage. Mogadishu can no longer pretend it controls the government in Somaliland’s capital Hargeisa. Ethiopia’s wins The bottom line is that Ethiopia has engineered access to another port and enhanced its security and strategic economic interests. With the growth in annual volumes of transit cargo, Ethiopia has, for a long time, needed alternative routes from Djibouti. In addition, Ethiopia has ensured its presence in the running of the port by acquiring a 19% share in the deal. And by wangling a legally binding agreement between Somaliland and another state, Ethiopia has potentially paved the way for eventual international recognition of Hargeisa. Ethiopia has also further cemented its hold over Somaliland through a combination of pressure and material incentives. By bringing significant outside investment and recognition, Ethiopia can also increasingly meddle in its internal affairs. This is a conundrum for Hargeisa. It finds itself increasingly emboldened to act independently. Yet it remains constrained by the need to get Addis Ababa’s approval. As Ethiopia begins to move increasing amounts of goods and services on Somaliland’s new highway to the refurbished port of Berbera, Hargeisa may begin to question key aspects of the port deal. But one aspect will not be in question: Ethiopia’s rising power and influence over the entire region.
  18. I couldn't help but notice through out the whole trip looks a lot like a business visit than presidential. Time will tell.
  19. OO tries hard to portray a fictitious image of United strong Ethiopia.
  20. End game is near. Will the Tplf gangs declare independence or join with Eritrea or maybe listench to Uncle Sam one more time and stay within Oromo/Amhara majority dominated Ethiopia.
  21. Tplf run Ethiopia is like a donkey transporting goods and services into Somalia for her own as well as for others and when this donkey gets wounded because of internal problems her customers are panicking everwhere. There will be Somali orphans too.
  22. OO hates Mogadishu for a reason. Only he and the Tplf thugs like him know the hospitality and the welcome party they received in Mogadishu last time their midget leader Meles attempted to occupy the proud capital city of Somalia.