March 4, 2013 Ney York Times The Brutality Cascade By DAVID BROOKS Let’s say you were a power hitter during baseball’s steroids era. You may have objected to steroids on moral and health grounds. But many of your competitors were using them, so you faced enormous pressure to use them too. Let’s say you are a student at a good high school. You may want to have a normal adolescence. But you are surrounded by all these junior workaholics who have been preparing for the college admissions racket since they were 6. You find you can’t unilaterally withdraw from the rat race and still get into the college of your choice. So you also face enormous pressure to behave in a way you detest. You might call these situations brutality cascades. In certain sorts of competitions, the most brutal player gets to set the rules. Everybody else feels pressure to imitate, whether they want to or not. The political world is rife with brutality cascades. Let’s say you are a normal person who gets into Congress. You’d rather not spend all your time fund-raising. You’d like to be civil to your opponents and maybe even work out some compromises. But you find yourself competing against opponents who fund-raise all the time, who prefer brutalism to civility and absolutism to compromise. Pretty soon you must follow their norms to survive. Or take a case in world affairs. The United States is a traditional capitalist nation that has championed an open-seas economic doctrine. We think everybody benefits if global economics is like a conversation, with maximum openness, mutual trust and free exchange. But along comes China, an economic superpower with a more mercantilist mind-set. Many Chinese, at least in the military-industrial complex, see global economics as a form of warfare, a struggle for national dominance. Americans and Europeans tend to think it is self-defeating to engage in cyberattacks on private companies in a foreign country. You may learn something, but you destroy the trust that lubricates free exchange. Pretty soon your trade dries up because nobody wants to do business with a pirate. Investors go off in search of more transparent partners. But China’s cybermercantilists regard deceit as a natural tool of warfare. Cyberattacks make perfect sense. Your competitors have worked hard to acquire intellectual property. Your system is more closed so innovation is not your competitive advantage. It is quicker and cheaper to steal. They will hate you for it, but who cares? They were going to hate you anyway. C’est la guerre. In a brutality cascade the Chinese don’t become more like us as the competition continues. We become more like them. And that is indeed what’s happening. The first thing Western companies do in response to cyberattacks is build up walls. Instead of being open stalls in the global marketplace, they begin to look more like opaque, rigidified castles. Next, the lines between private companies and Western governments begin to blur. When Western companies are attacked, they immediately turn to their national governments for technical and political support. On the one hand, the United States military is getting a lot more involved in computer counterespionage, eroding the distance between the military and private companies. On the other hand, you see the rise of these digital Blackwaters, private security firms that behave like information age armies, providing defense against foreign attack but also counterattacking against Chinese and Russian foes. Pretty soon the global economy looks less like Monopoly and more like a game of Risk, with a Chinese military-industrial complex on one part of the board and the Western military-industrial complex on another part. Brutality cascades are very hard to get out of. You can declare war and simply try to crush the people you think are despoiling the competition. Or you can try what might be called friendship circles. In this approach, you first establish the norms of legitimacy that should govern the competition. You create a Geneva Convention of domestic political conduct or global cyberespionage. Then you organize as broad a coalition as possible to agree to uphold these norms. Finally, you isolate the remaining violators and deliver a message: If you join our friendship circle and abide by our norms, the benefits will be overwhelming, but if you stay outside, the costs will be devastating. In his effort to fight what he regards as Republican zealots, President Obama is caught between these two strategies. He never quite pushes budget showdowns to the limit to discredit Republicans, but he never offers enough to the members of the Republican common-sense caucus to tempt them to break ranks. Clearly the second option is better for dealing with the Chinese. Establish a Geneva Convention that bans cyberactivity against citizens and private companies. Establish a broad coalition to enforce it. Unfortunately, standard-setting is a dying art these days, so we are living with these brutality cascades. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/05/opinion/brooks-the-brutality-cascade.html?hp&_r=0&pagewanted=print

Best decision he made so far. That trip was long overdue. He needs to do some pork barrel politicking and ensure folks in Galgadud and Central regions are provided with basic services. I know he does not have legislative control over local appropriation. But still he can use PM's bully pulbit to help the region. Well paid local District Commisioners, fully staffed police stations, a regional hospital in Dhusamareeb with full services, government supported school districts with region-wide shared curriclum for all public schools, etc. War intaa tabiya oo iga gaarsiiya ina Shirdoon. Wax-tarka rasmiga ee taaba galka ah ee dadweynaha degaanku u baahan yahay taa weeye. Haddanu intaa tarri karin ee waxa loogu mashxaradaa oo lagu taageera garanmeyo. Awoowe that's where the rubber meets the road!

Outch! Awoowe hadalkaa ma aha mid meesha soo gali kadha. Marqaati waxan ka ahay in eray rag lagu yiraahdo aanu hadalkaa ahayn. Mooge waa iska xukuman yahay. Shido waxay ka joogtaa golaha hadalo qadaf oo aan habooneyn baa ka dhaca had iyo goor. Giddi ma xukunaa awoowe mise waxad leedahay kan baa qoyan ee bal horta meel issaga meel ha la saaro

Oodweyne awoowe ragga ha isku leyn . Mooge waa kaftamayaa and he understands Kismayo port and the region it serves have the resources to feed millions of Somali. When all said and done Juba region will need talented professionals, laborers, farmers etc. -- middle class folks that have the income and capacity to transform the area and make it the engine of growth... Awoowe one thing the region is in need of is population and if I have the power I would have recruited folks in Benadir, Mudug and Togdheer folks and settle them in the city in order to compete with Benadir, Bossasso, berrbera and even Mombasa. Awoowe naga badan meeshu

Common now We're talking about Somalia and Somalis that inhabit them. Waxaad xaafada markaad joogtaan aad isu sheegtaan miis rag leeyahay ha keenina Quite the opposite, awoowe. You see the gridlock and impasse stem from the fact that each interest group wants to have all its demands considered and wants to see the other side concede. All the while the same interest group want to deny their perceived foe everything the supposed clan enemy considers the bottom line. Hence the much despised ‘Winner Takes All” mentality that characterized our politicians. Take any issue of importance and my statement above rings true. Secessionists want to secede their corner for the benefit of their clan under the guise of colonial legacy. Their opponent equally is adamant in their opposition against secessionist stated objectives. Each player in this clannish tag war has stakeout clear position. No mystery here. If one side compromises all is well and civil strife ends momentarily. Beelaha Mogadishu wants to rule the country in the the post-civil period as Inna Barre once did. Puntland is clear in its desire to redefine the status of Mogadishu (move the capital to another city or make Mogadishu shared government seat – just like DC), reduce the central government’s awesome power and shift back to federal member state in dual governance federal arrangement with all checks and balances). Again both sides have stakeout a clear position. If one side concedes all will be well and dandy and if it each side insist on their objective and reject compromise the mayhem will continue. AS rebels made it clear they want to bring the state and the surrounding Somalis in the neighboring states under Islamic state. Numerous coalitions – clan interest groups, neighboring states and western powers are dead set to prevent that vision by any means necessary. Again there is no grey area here. Everyone understands the stakes and plays hardball to win the ultimate prize. In this unfortunate environment, the winner takes all mentality and the absence of compromise is what destroyed the country boowe. Oh yeah folks tell it as it is – on the radio, in the print, in the marfish and on the national stage. Inna Barre told by decree any intelligent analysis of where the country is heading was akin to treason. He was clear that he and only he were fit to rule. Inna Aideed was clear what he wanted and what prize he was willing to pay (even if the country goes down the drain). Ina Egal was also clear about the status of Somaliland going forward. Inna Yussuf had it in his genes to tell it as it is. The reason none of them made to promise land is because they can’t. This is unwinnable civil war. You can dream of dreams of grandiose, tell tall tales and convince yourself and folks from your tuulo that you are making progress, others are lacking behind (because of their inferior clan genes) and the golden cup is within reach and in the process destroy a country and generation of Somalis. One thing Somalis are good is insisting on getting all their political wishes at one go by any means necessary. They did that and they intend on doing that going forward.

Oodweyne, But what about the MPs? I don't know what to make of them!! I mean if you read the constitution all the relevant issues of the age are their turf and only they can decide the way forward. They have awesome power but they seem to be a spectators of this looming crisis.

Back to the topic. While I despise political kabuki theater and partisan bickering, I am disappointed in what appears to be dereliction of duty in Gollaha Umadda. All the issues making news today are issues the parliamentarians supposed to weigh in, study (appoint national level commissions) and make final decision on. Expect more of the same unless this loophole-ridden, unfinished document called Federal Constitution is clarified and prepared for ratification (when its time comes). Federal member states pin all their hopes on the constitutions’ safeguards and expect the governance to be a shared enterprise by both federal and member states – cooperation, consultation and what have you. So far the admin in Mogadishu focuses on foreign relations and carries out an agenda neither the parliament nor member states have little input whatsoever. The arms embargo issue is case in point. The admin does not get the prerequisite right nor does it consult with the political stakeholders outside of Benadir. The author invokes the dog days of the past and points to the fact that the country is awash with guns. All true. The issue is bigger than that though. At issue are the credibility of the political settlement and the effectiveness of the constitutional checks and balances. That’s the crux of the issue. Is this admin going to behave like military junta of the past and govern the country as it pleases or realpolitik in the country, political parties, other pillars of state institutions and above all constitution will serve as effective check and limit its power and influence?

Nimanaan dhulka Ganaane iyo sida loo kala dego aqoon baa hadaaqa ceynkaas oo kale ah ka soo yeeri kadhaa. Awoowe hadii Suldaan inala joogi lahaa Dharbaaxa jinni gabaygiis buu noo tirin lahaa: Dayfkii reerka martiyey ee daacadu soortay, Ee goortii u dibaray, maalka reerka kula dooday, Kamay duwana tay wadaan nimanka D**ood e, Dooda abwaanku waaba ka shisheeysay nimanka tay wadaan oo issagu waxa uu lahaa dooxada Ganaane ha joogtee, Gedo baysan ba degin

Kismayo is ground zero of Somalia's ever-shifting political chess game. Puntland is not in the driver seat here (mighty OG is) and anyone who tells you otherwise is a novice and uninformed lay person (in the clannish realpolitik sense). The most astute players in this chess game are Killinka 5aad's Iley and Kenya's OG top echelon Somali elites. Thanks to Professor Gandi ground game, Jigjiga, Garrisa, Garbahareey and Garowe are on the same page on creating a new federal member state in most resourceful region of the Somali peninsula. As Oodweyne correctly guessed Caabudwaaq has to make its mind and very soon at that or else they will be forever be locked in the Wallaalaha Galgaduud alliance.

I remember that. There was a map too I had friends in Minneapolis who believed in that tall tale. If you add that narrative to the glowing endorsement of clan-cleansing, rape, civilian displacement of certain clans by Oodweyne and his ilk you will see where rubber meets the road. Remeber "defeated-lot"! Allow sahal.

malistar2012;920229 wrote: Local state governments, officially recognized as Federal Member States, have a degree of autonomy over regional affairs and maintain their own police and security forces. However, they are constitutionally subject to the authority of the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia. The national parliament is tasked with selecting the ultimate number and boundaries of the Federal Member States within the Federal Republic of Somalia. With time and effort the government plan is to exercise authority over all Somali land ( defiant border) Somalia Federal President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud Government Number one priority should be the Arm force. 1. Recruit soldiers from every regions 2. All regional arm force namely Puntland , Galmudug Raskkamboni and Ahlu sunna have to come under one chain of command .. The army has to function in depended we need to see a chain of command from Puntland to Xamar . This post transition Government should use the opportunity in front of them , DF minister and the commander of arm force are to hold reconciliation between Regional force`s create Viable National Army. The answer is Country (Somalia including all the fiefdoms) Let me ask you this; do you support dismembering Somalia into what colonial power colonized what area?.

malistar2012;920179 wrote: With time and effort the government plan is to exercise authority over all Somali land ( defiant border) What is the government's plan for instance to recruit from regions it has no authority (practically speaking)? There are 2 regions namely Puntland and Somaliland where by the Government has no authority over. Other than 2 regions mentioned the government has influence or direct authority over Somali territories. Puntland is well represented in the Federal government , I don’t see the problem to why the Puntland Arm force cannot be incorporated with newly trained Somali Arm force,Puntland soldiers will get training they need. Arm Force will be one, no region or clan will be armed …… Army will be mixed in every level and regions. Time for mistrust is over once we get strong Somali national army. We cannot effort to miss this opportunity. Awoowe government has no authority over any region yet. It has the support of ordinary people everywhere. Parliament is not functional yet. The cabinet meets in a hotel. Political institutions of the state have yet to be resurrected. All major ministerial institutions, judiciary, national defense, regulatory agencies, etc are not functional. It’s not the government’s fault as this is what it inherited. Making all these institutions functional and effective will need manpower, expertise, and money. The reconstruction will take time. And so forth. But make no mistake it needs security and political space first. What Hassan’s government is planning to do is build capacity to exercise authority over all 18 Somali provinces (pre-civil war political geography). Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Jubas, Shabelles and Central provinces are clan enclaves with residual AS forces. It’s up against goliath – complete destruction of infrastructure (all basic social services are absent and the private owned business providing minimal serfaces are unregulated), never-ending clannish tug war, regional interferences, demands from world powers zeroing in AS type rebels and top of that it is broke and lives on hand outs. Ain’t that something! Huge challenge is understatement. This is some task baba. Puntland (is in political transition) and Somaliland (even though Silanyo is sympathetic for reconstituting Somali state but on his terms) are not helping and they are demanding a cut for every handout whilst keeping all port revenues for their constituents. There is little room for mistake. Government needs to get every step right from the get-go or it will be consumed taking out fires!

Af laba daan leh baan ileyn muranka deynayn e! Inna Abdulle Hassan was right when he coined this famous stanza taken from one of his memorable poems. NG, awoowe details are important. They are not irrelevant. As they say the devil is in the details. The issues you thought of as being trivial have the potential to make or break the political settlement after a promising start. Small things in policy and schemes or even in engineering design, if overlooked, can cause serious problems later on. Awoowe it is often details like the ones you seem to dismiss that often prolong a task or make it difficult or challenging. Government made its move. It’s demanding lifting of arms embargo. The author of the article, Xiin, Rahima and I support the move and sympathize with the government as it has to address huge, monumental security challenges. The criticism stems from numerous unfinished businesses that I think government should give the utmost priority. Security forces (police), securing government premises, reconciling different interpretation of provisional federal constitution, readiness, recruitment policies, national bases, and on and on should be front and center of the government’s effort. True there are political forces (supported by clans) who mistrust government in Mogadishu (for clannish reasons) that will not support it if they suspect their interested are not taken into account. These clan-based political forces were vocal before this government made demands relating to arms embargo and they will continue to be vocal every step of the way. That’s given. I am at loss where you are going with this obvious reality that everyone in the forum seems to acknowledge. As to this clan influence stuff you are peddling from post to post let me say this one more time at the this risk of sounding like a broken record YES clan is strong undercurrent of the majority of political activities in both Somalia and Diaspora (the only exception I can think of is nationalism and Political Islam -- both political stripes do exist). Agreed 110%! And I would add any rational and informed Somali who argue with you on that point does not have facts on his/her side. Now, it is one thing to say the clan is a major factor in Somali politics. It’s quite another thing to stretch that factual nugget into a litmus test for all and every statements folks made on current events. I see you are throwing yourself in Habar vs. Habar politics and declaring your political allegiance on that basis. That’s your prerogative. But I don’t think you should bully Rahima or other nationalist or Islamist who espouses different understanding that transcends clan politics into following suit or tell her to declare allegience to her clan first before she could share her opinion on political issues of the day. Accusations, finger pointing and impugning others intentions does not substitute for discussion awoowe . Xiin don’t deal with one liner brigade. They are not here to discuss issues. Folks like Abwaan (still waiting a report from him ) and others of similar mold excel accusing others but have difficulty in penning coherent and articulate thought silent readers of SOL could follow and understand. I guess we made a good run on this and got a lot of mileage out of it.

N.O.R.F;919662 wrote: Baashi, I understand what you’re saying but training needs equipment and bases need to be equipped to train. Logic dictates that the embargo will not be fully lifted. Essential equipment for the purposes of establishing security, starting the training and building processes should be made available. Any lifting of the embargo will have stringent conditions attached such as putting AMISOM at the centre of receiving, storing and distributing the equipment. Sure it does. Yes government does need equipment, training facilities, trainers, and what have you. I am with you on that one Norf. Make no mistake awoowe laakiin at issue is not about facilitating training program for the future national army. Nor is it lifting of arms embargo per se. No. The issue at the heart of this discussion is about the timing. It is also about the prerequisites the governments needs to meet before the ban is lifted. The US and its allies are taking this issue very seriously. That’s why UK is volunteering its military personnel to provide the training which is what Hassan’s administration needs the most in my view. Administration in Mogadishu asserts that it needs to consolidate power into Somali hands and push aside foreign elements be it AMISOM or the IC. I totally sympathize with that argument. Sovereignty requires degree of independency and that’s what Hassan’s government is after. As the legacy of the civil war subsides and peace gains momentum, the Somali state has a good chance to recover and attain its former glory. We are just exhorting the government to do the right thing and prioritize its agenda and avoid issues of a most contentious nature. Deal with security by starting with the local police while at the same time accepting recommendations and assistance provided to them by world powers when it comes to national defense. We can always agree to disagree, NG. Your point that since this government made the decision to demand lifting of the arms embargo, online discussion on the subject should cease and desist is beyond me awoowe.

Rahima, qallanjo there is nothing wrong in having an opinion on the current events in Somalia. NG seems to be in the view that only active partisans with clannish leanings should partake in and discuss current events in Somalia. He excludes you and all concerned folks outside of this group of clannish nomads from having a mere opinion on a topic of national significance. You see he’s been preaching this catchy phrase “clan is everything” for a while and looks like he’s convinced himself quite literally that clan IS everything to everyone and that there are no exceptions In NG’s understanding of all things Somali there are no impartial or neutral nomads when it comes to these types of discussion. You came along and shared your two cents on the subject at hand and look what happen! He came out swinging! I think you and many nomads in SOL will readily acknowledge that clan is part and parcel of Somali culture. Clan is the basis of political organization and clannish sensibilities color political views of ordinary nomads. Former military government retained power through clan machinations. Those who opposed that government used clan grievances to recruit clan loyalist. The northern fiefdoms succeeded in establishing recovery areas by rallying certain clans. All true. No informed and rational person would object to these facts. However clan is not everything to everyone. It may be everything to NG but certainly not to Rahima. The topic at hand is whether lifting of arms embargo on Somalia is appropriate at this time given the political and security situation of the country at large. You, Xiin and I all agree now is not the time for lifting of arms embargo. Our reasons may differ but we agree on the fundamental premise of the article and that is this government need to put its ducks in a row first. If it is sovereignty that’s keeping the president awake at night he needs to roll up his sleeves and get to work in figuring out ways and means to replace ten thousand strong (impartial) AMISOM soldiers. Replacing AMISOM soldiers will take time. Recruits must be selected, screened and trained. Bases must be reclaimed and renovated. Once the recruits (officers as well) that are representative of the country are trained and military basis are established then government can take the next logistical step and equip them with weapons.

Innaa Lilaahi waa inna Ileyhi Raajicuun. Alla yarxama. Samir iyo iimaan dhamaan ehelka, inta shiikha taqaaney iyo inta samaha jecel. Qolooyinkan waashay Allaha soo hadeeyo.

Hambalyo. Marba hadaad go'aansatay inaa qabiltu tiraahdo dee sidii inna rag yeeli jidhay yeel. Hawsha qeybna waad ka soo gudubtay oo waa xulashada iyo iska eegida; qeybta ugu adagna waa kuu laaban tahay oo waa hadde saad uga dhigi lahay guur lagu liibaano oo lagu nasto. Kaliya waxan talo kugu siinayaa haddii Allah isku kiin calfo waa inaad baari noqotaa (within reason) oo sidii rabaayadii aad ogolaataa wax badan oo aadan qaadateen berrigii aad wiil hooga ahayd. Hambalyo.

This young government has monumental challenge in front of it. There is little room for mistakes. We pray it makes the right decisions. Awoowayaal governing is very complicated business. And governing a broken society such as ours is a challenge with monumental proportions. How do you rebuild the state security apparatus, reclaim sovereignty and keep political opposition and their loyal constituencies on board? There are no simple answers to these questions. If Hassan's government wants to leave a lasting legacy it should reconsider unilateral moves regarding rearming one faction out of several competing interest groups. For those of you who think that this government is in a position to receive or manage a sizable military shipment need to focus on the government’s capacity to manage an institution as important as the military. Suppose arms embargo is lifted tomorrow. Western powers or Turkey agrees to sell the government arms on a discounted loan. Now suppose first shipment – let’s say the bill of material lists 12 tanks, three helicopters, 200 military trucks, uniforms for three divisions -- arrives at the port and the airport tomorrow. Suppose the loan is also for the salary of 12 thousand soldiers for three years. Now tell me what happens next. Anyone? The task is the logistics -- the storage and security of this important national asset! The second task is recruitment effort, the training, and the selection of the basis. The third task is the procurement of materials to build new or renovate existing facilities. The fourth task is the dispensation of the money, contract awards, etc. These are questions worth asking – try to think about them and see if this young government is prepared for the task or if it needs to take things in a piecemeal fashion and tackle them one at a time. Once it covers all the basis then it has every right and actually it’s the government duty to reconstitute the national army. The political issue is a whole can of worms. If I were in president shoes I would get the 1000 thousand police trained, indoctrinated, equipped and serving first before I overreach and risk getting political opposition all worked up. Again governing is a complicated business and this government, and in fact all admins throughout the country, are learning the trade on the job.

More like the latter Investing is the name of the game. There are numerous business opportunities in the upcoming reconstruction period. Hope all go well.

Il Presidente Hassan is the boss here. Premiere Saacid works for the president. He was handpicked by the president for a reason. If he becomes adverserial to the point where he risks derailing president's political plans, he will be deposed for if he stays the whole government will become dysfunctional. That's not how to run a state or govern a polity. Parliament is in a better position to challenge the government by either blocking its policies or witholding its budget or bringing down the whole cabinet via no confidence vote.

Abwaan, fadlan warbixin waafi ah naga sii magaalada. Nabadgalyada -- yaa gacanta ku haya? Ma ummada daashay oo shidada iska daysay, mise ciidan amaanka suga oo laga heybeysanyaa jidha? Mise wali AMISOM baa lagu tiirsan yahay? Olole iyo dhaqdhaqaaq muuqda oo ka Abwaan ahaan aad dareemi kadho oo hawshaa ku aadan ma jidhaan? Cadaalada -- Haddii dhib dhaco ama khilaaf yimaado yaa loo dacwoodaa? Ma hab hoose baa loo falaxashaa sida xeer hoosaadkii iyo odayo loo ergoodo mise haba tayo liitee meel la abaaro oo sida maxkamad baa jidha? Madaxweynuhu waxuu sheegay in xukuumadiisu ay damacsan tahay in ay hawshaa gasho oo wax ka qabato. Addigu Abwaan ahaan maxaa kuu baxay? Meel and xarun la yaqaan oo agabkeedii uu dhan yahay oo maxkamad loo asteeyay miyaa jidha oo aad aragtay? Maatada soo barakacday -- Dadka maatada ah ee u badan gobolada colaadaha iyo abaaruhu saameeyeen ee la yidhi xarumaha qarranka bay daadsan yihiin bal golaha warbixin ka sii fadlan. Ma run baa inay u badan yihiin dad ka soo hayaamay gobollada Bay, Bakool iyo Shabeelada hoose? Wax hadal heyn ah sidii loogu heli lahaa xal bini'aadnimo oo aan ahayn ha baneeyeen goobaha qarranka? Xukuumada wax qorshe ah oo dib u dejin, dhul bixin, iwm oo ay soo bandhigtayma jidhaa? Siyaasada -- saameyn intee le'eg bay ku yeelatay xisbigaan haatan talada hantay xoogaga kale ee siyaasada ee Muqdisho ka hawl gala mise wali beel beel baa loo kala socdaa? Maamulka Degaanka -- Awoowe bal fadlan addigaa indho noo ah e oo dee goobtii joogee waxad warbixin naga sii saa maamulka degmooyinka. Dhawr jeer baan waxa i soo gaaray in qashinka, bulaacadaha, guryaha wadooyinka laga dhisanayo ay dhib weyn ku hayso magaalda. Warkaa maxaa ka jidha? Maxaase maamulka haatan ka jidha magaalada uu ka qabtay? Wax qorshe ah oo arrintaa lagu xalinayo ma maqashay. Hantida la kala heysto -- Waxan maqlay in inta badan dadku isu celiyey hantida muuqata iyadaanba dawladi kala dhex galin. Walise waxa jidha dad aan waxna loo diidin oon la oran ma lihid laakiin lagu xujeeyey wax aan xal lahayn oo ah warqadii lahaansha ah keen. Dadkaas waxa ay keeneen daris marqaati ah misena waa la duudsiyey. Waxa kale oo dhib weyn ka taagan yahay guryaha dadkii degay ay dhisteen oo ay ku dacwinayaan in loo cawil celiyo waxii hanti ah ee ka gashay qeymo aan maangal ahayn ee sheeganayaan. Wali addigu ka Abwaan ahaan intaad joogtay ma aragtay is qabsi hanti maqan ku saabsan? Guud ahaan warbixin kooban naga sii mawduuca hantida la kala haysto. Awoowe geesinimaad muujisay ee Allaha hawsha aad u tagtay kuu yasiro.

Analysis: The murky motives behind Mali's crisis The small Islamist groups would find it near impossible to take the whole of Mali France's intervention to stop the advance of Islamic Jihadi in Mali has similarities with French action to protect the people of Benghazi from Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya two years ago. In both cases the motives of all players in the crisis are more complicated than they publicly pretend. Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (Aqim) is demonised as threat to France and Europe because it might establish a Taliban type regime in Mali. But Aqim has never launched a single attack in France or Europe since it was established in 1998. Its activities in the vast wastelands of the Sahel have been confined almost entirely to smuggling cigarettes and cocaine and kidnapping foreigners. Aqim may hold the official al-Qa'ida franchise but the movement, founded in Algeria as a breakaway from an even more ferocious Islamic revolutionary group, has always been suspected of links with Algerian intelligence. It still has some hardcore bastions in the Kabylia in northern Algeria, but its nucleus migrated south more than 10 years ago. It was previously under pressure from Colonel Gaddafi, who maintained a sort of order on Libya's southern flank, but this disappeared with his fall. It has money and has probably recruited some foreign Jihadi wishing to wage a holy war. The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the al-Qa'ida-linked Ansar Dine are the two Tuareg groups that took over northern Mali – an area the size of France – in April 2012. The MNLA, the more secular and nationalist of the groups, wants independence for a homeland for the Tuareg ethnic group. Ansar Dine, led by a famous Tuareg rebel, Ag Ghaly, joined hands with the smaller Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (Mujao) to brush aside the MNLA. The Islamist parties achieved notoriety by banning music, for which Mali is famous, and destroying ancient Sufi shrines in Timbuktu. These movements have their sponsors, open and covert. Morocco has been enthusiastic for foreign intervention in Mali, probably as part of its rivalry with Algeria for influence in the region. Algeria has opposed intervention by France in the past and has always been more concerned by ethnic separatists, like the MNLA, than it is by fundamentalist Islam. Many of the MNLA fighters were previously with Colonel Gaddafi, who opposed Tuareg separatism, but offered opportunities for Tuareg in his security forces. For all the rapid advances and retreats in this war, the two Islamist groups have only an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 fighters and the MNLA about the same numbers. The great majority of Mali's 15 million people live in the south far from the empty lands of the north. The small Islamist groups would find it near impossible to take the whole of Mali, which is the size of South Africa, despite French protestations to the contrary. But the vastness of the country also means that the central government, even with French air support, will have difficulty in eliminating the Islamists. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/analysis-the-murky-motives-behind-malis-crisis-8451562.html

Mali and the Geo-Politics of Africa John Glaser, January 15, 2013 Ben Schreiner points out at CounterPunch that the US involvement in the French-led war in Mali is more about the geo-politics of imperial grand strategy and competing with China in Africa than it is about eliminating serious terrorist threats: According to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), the Pentagon plans on deploying soldiers to 35 different African countries in 2013. As NPRreports, upwards of 4,000 U.S. soldiers will “take part in military exercises and train African troops on everything from logistics and marksmanship to medical care.” (The Malian army officer responsible for the country’s March coup just so happened to have received U.S. military training.) …as the Army Times notes, “the region in many ways remains the Army’s last frontier.” And in order to satiate the U.S. appetite for global “power projection,” no frontiers are to be left unconquered. …“The U.S. currently receives about 18 percent of its energy supplies from Africa, a figure that is slated to rise to 25 percent by 2015,” Hallinan writes. “Africa also provides about one-third of China’s energy needs, plus copper, platinum, timber and iron ore.” What’s more, as Maximilian Forte contends in Slouching Towards Sirte, “Chinese interest are seen as competing with the West for access to resources and political influences. AFRICOM and a range of other U.S. government initiatives are meant to count this phenomenon.” The Obama administration has waged several military interventions in Africa – from regime change in Libya, to a drone/proxy war in Somalia, boots on the ground in and around Uganda, covert special operations in Nigeria, and now Mali. Through the Pentagon’s Africa Command, the US is now training and equipping militaries in countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tunisia in the name of preventing “terrorists from establishing sanctuaries.” The strategy appears irreconcilable with recent history, however, given how the US-sponsored invasion of Somalia by Ethiopia in 2006 gave rise to the militant group al-Shabaab – now ironically justifying current interventions; and the action in Libya, the consequences of which led to this latest intervention in Mali. “China-Africa trade grew 1000% from $10 billion in 2000 to $107 billion in 2008,” a trend Washington apparently intends to counter with persistent efforts to produce client military states throughout Africa and extend economic influence over the continent. In the context of Obama’s Asia-Pivot – which amounts to a desperate economic and military offensive aimed at containing China’s rise – this shift in focus to Africa makes a lot more sense. http://antiwar.com/blog/2013/01/15/mali-and-the-geo-politics-of-africa/

Poor Africa! History repeating itself again. Neo-colonialism is in full force. The old masters want to keep the riches of resourceful Africa for themselves. With convenient terrorist card on hand, they found a way to invoke the bogeyman when things don't go their way. The first domino has fallen in Libya, now Mali is in play. The domino-effect is in place. The old masters know how to play on both sides of the equation (Just like tactics employed in The Promised Land -- the movie by Matt Demon). They create ghosts of their own making, take a u-turn and then declare a war against the very enemy they themselves helped create! In Somalia, they pushed Ethiopia to invade Somalia in order to preempt Islamic Courts in Mogadishu and when Islamists formed AS and declared a war against Ethiopia, powers-that-be labeled AS as a terrorist group and went after them.

The crisis in Mali Saved for the moment Jan 16th 2013, 23:38 by The Economist | BAMAKO FOR half a year African governments in the region and various ones in the West, especially in France and the United States, had been fretting over Mali, where rebel groups tied to al-Qaeda had taken over the northern half of the country. Earlier this year things dramatically worsened, when the jihadists suddenly pushed south, threatening even Bamako, the capital. So France’s President François Hollande decided to act. On January 11th French aircraft swooped in, bombarding the rebels and their bases. For the moment Bamako is safe. But the French president has given himself a daunting task. No one is sure of his campaign’s precise aim, nor how or when his forces will get out. Earlier this year the rebels, a mixture of Tuareg tribesmen and assorted jihadists, many of them hailing from outside Mali, suddenly captured the town of Konna, 500km or so (310 miles) from the capital, but well south of the vast Saharan terrain where the guerrillas have imposed a harsh Islamist rule along the lines of Afghanistan’s Taliban. From Konna they threatened a military airport near the town of Sevaré and were in range of a bridge over the Niger river at Markala. If they had captured it, they could have headed for Bamako. Though Mr Hollande’s decisive action has halted them, the conflict is far from over. The rebels may number fewer than a thousand men, but they are well-armed and bold. Bolstered by ransoms paid for kidnapped Europeans, sometimes worth millions of dollars each, they have plenty of weapons captured from Malian bases they overran in the north or smuggled from Libya since Muammar Qaddafi’s fall. Some of the guerrillas are veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan. Most know the desert far better than the French forces or those expected to be sent from countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the region’s 15-member club. After France’s counter-attack on Konna, a separate column of rebels responded on January 14th by capturing the town of Diabaly, about 320km north of Bamako. It was unclear whether the rebels had fled are were merely biding their time and lying low. Residents in Timbuktu, one of the three biggest northern towns, along with Gao and Kidal, all held by the rebels since April, said that some of the jihadists had left but others remained. People were still too nervous to smoke in the street or let women go out unveiled. Nor have the rebels all been chased out of Konna. A rebel spokesman issued hellfire threats against France and its citizens. In the far south-east of Algeria, near the border with Libya, jihadists acting in sympathy for their brethren in Mali killed a Frenchman and a Briton working at a gasfield and took another 41 hostage, including seven Americans. Though French officials say they are working closely with Malian troops and are keen to welcome ECOWAS forces as soon as possible, the French seem sure to carry the burden of the battle for some time. By January 16th, the number of French troops in Mali had risen to more than 750; another 2,000 or so were expected imminently. British aircraft have ferried in French supplies. The Americans may also provide intelligence and logistics, perhaps including drones. But neither country is likely to put boots on the ground. Though ECOWAS plainly supports the French venture, some countries in the region need persuading. Tunisia’s Islamist foreign minister has condemned the French intervention. The 57-country Organisation of Islamic Co-operation called France’s action premature. A key country is Algeria. Though it has allowed French aircraft to use its airspace, it has sounded wary. But the hostage-taking on its soil may prod it into joining the anti-jihadist fray in Mali more ethusiastically. The Malian army, estimated last year at 7,700 men, is feeble. It has been plagued with defections and divisions since a coup led by Captain (now General) Amadou Sanogo in March last year. It is in no state to tackle the rebels on its own. In any event, most Malians seem happy with Mr Hollande. “Vive La France!” cried a newspaper headline, dropping its usual anti-French tone. People who had previously fled from the northern trio of cities, where smoking, music and football had been banned and amputations imposed on criminals, expressed delight. In one of Bamako’s crowded streets, where women hitch up their bright dresses to ride scooters to work and shops blare out hypnotic Malian melodies, Seyba Keita, owner of Bar Bla Bla, explained that Malians were secular, humane and easy-going. “The whole population is against the Islamists,” he said, as he poured himself another beer. But few Malians have much confidence in their own government. Last month General Sanogo summarily sacked the civilian prime minister. The acting president, Dioncounda Traoré, is too weak to force the country’s squabbling politicians and soldiers to accept a timetable leading to an election. There were demonstrations earlier this month in Bamako, just as the rebels were about to make their push, calling for Mr Traoré to be replaced by a military man. Mr Hollande may be keeping the jihadists at bay. But rescuing Mali from the political mess in Bamako is quite another issue, which he will avoid trying to solve. http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2013/01/crisis-mali