For robustness, speed, security and stability not to mention OpenSource, I prefer Linux/Unix, RedHat8.0/Solaris9.0 flavours, For applications, graphics and its ubiquitous nature, WinXP is brilliant, Win2K is the most stable NOS so far. I have been testing Win2003 server since SR1, though it is a lot faster than Linux, it is not compatible with many Microsoft developed programmes such as SQL, Exchange 200 etc and this I trust is a rather ludicrous marketing decision on Microsoft’s side.

For robustness, speed, security and stability not to mention OpenSource, I prefer Linux/Unix, RedHat8.0/Solaris9.0 flavours, For applications, graphics and its ubiquitous nature, WinXP is brilliant, Win2K is the most stable NOS so far. I have been testing Win2003 server since SR1, though it is a lot faster than Linux, it is not compatible with many Microsoft developed programmes such as SQL, Exchange 200 etc and this I trust is a rather ludicrous marketing decision on Microsoft’s side.

Dear Baashi – Do not you despair, for the dream for a greater Somalia is well alive and kicking far better than ever before though testing times, pitfalls and the unknown factor which tends to scare the living daylight out of most people hang on the balance. The road to recovery is being paved, and shall be reached. It is a process all societies, present or ancient, generally go through in their turbulent times of realisation of desired paths and determination of the future, some attained through harsh and hard realities. Somalis, though suffered painfully and perhaps not as severe in many aspects as had been predicted according to credible resources including the EU and the UN as other nations in the present or past considering conditions on the ground, learnt arduous lesson in their societal movement from the old traditional systems of governing with which Somalis struggled so badly to the expense of the majority that is less fortunate to a more contemporary, if not perhaps indigenous, type of governance seen in my developing as well as industrial nations. What have been witnesses over the past dozen or so years in the old country has been a perfect example of an impaired natural process by way of manipulating traditional methods whilst abusing learnt systems in the process of due progression towards societal maturity and growth in all its aspects, societal, communal, governmental, legal as well as procedural. The penalty, though a hefty one has I trust been paid by the groups least responsible for the resulting occurrences whilst culprits still remain lurking on the horizon for an ample opportunity to waddle the swamp for the mud to blur the desired vision. Could we afford to let that happen? I believe we are better off in many way (private sector) whilst worse off in others (public sector, culture, heritage, literature etc) today than we were in the eighties and nineties. Gain some, lose some as it were. It is notable that almost always discussions to find a befitting resolution for the old country begin and end in the same sentence. I wonder why? Anyone willing to venture an opinion on the matter is welcomed. Instead of addressing the issue concerning the location of the capital city, where do Somaliland or Puntland fit in a future Somalia, should we not be discussing core issues which are the very nucleus of the national predicament, impetus of the downfall of the nation, driving force for the destruction of governmental and structural systems in the old country, and most of all should we not be taking our time in a clean discourse studying one issue as a time? Such issues which require to be studied and addressed include: • Reconciliation (incl. body and mind), • Realisation, owning up and sanctioning of retributions, and punitive damages when considered suitable, • Compensation for the victims and penalisation of the villains, • Recovery and relocation of misappropriated objects of substance • Rehabilitation of uprooted civilians, • Re-appropriation of land, property, and personal belongings, • Harmonisation of communities where forgiveness is sought and given, • Re-configuration of a viable system of government to the local region, district up to the federal institutions, • And then perhaps we could approach the many other issues relating to geographical, structural, socioeconomical or otherwise worthy matters on the path for all developing nations one at a time. Not only shall this enrich, inform and educate the young, but a resolution, and a viable one, shall be derived from such healthy discourses in that on the other side practices and exercises of value could be attained. And I trust this was Baashi and others of the same mindset were attempting to achieve in their initial manoeuvring, but it appears as always it appears one or two with limited vision arrive the scene, twist the tail, bombard others with obscenities, hence decapitate the spirit in one stroke. The dilemma that befell the nation thus lives on! On the issue concerning Somaliland or Puntland as far as I am concerned is outside the domain of the discussion, is not up for discussion at least for the moment, but is definitely within the scope of the subject matters addressable as and when aforementioned issues have been set aside, not necessarily agreed upon, but laid to rest for good measure. Please continue the debate and remain objective. And let us agree to disagree on the core issue that matter, not frivolous matters of no substance. Untill then so long!

Do not you despair mate. It is all in the making provided one stays on course. Studies have shown that a large number of network administrators switch to becoming database analyst in the end, I would advice you to remain persistent with networking and perhaps go into UNIX/LINUX, security and also CISCO network design, routers an switches. Not only will it be rewarding financial wise, but you shall accumulate knowledge in your chosen field for years to come. Security is the hot field at the moment, perhaps you wish to look at that. So long!

Do not you despair mate. It is all in the making provided one stays on course. Studies have shown that a large number of network administrators switch to becoming database analyst in the end, I would advice you to remain persistent with networking and perhaps go into UNIX/LINUX, security and also CISCO network design, routers an switches. Not only will it be rewarding financial wise, but you shall accumulate knowledge in your chosen field for years to come. Security is the hot field at the moment, perhaps you wish to look at that. So long!

Any systems and network security guru(s) out there? If so, your hints, clues, and viewpoints will be appreciated as I am in the process of reading for the CISSP security exam this summer. I would like to be ready for it before an arduous 6-hour marathon with this one. I understand that MCSE, CCNP professional exams are a doodle compared to the CISSP exam. So long!

Any systems and network security guru(s) out there? If so, your hints, clues, and viewpoints will be appreciated as I am in the process of reading for the CISSP security exam this summer. I would like to be ready for it before an arduous 6-hour marathon with this one. I understand that MCSE, CCNP professional exams are a doodle compared to the CISSP exam. So long!

No worries mate. Hope I was able to help. 10 years in the industry goes a long way my brother.

No worries mate. Hope I was able to help. 10 years in the industry goes a long way my brother.

Could not agree with you more on this one Khayr - “How self defeatist a nation can become in trying to imitate its conquerers and modernity”. Are you familiar with the human condition and phenomenon termed as “Stockholm syndrome” where victims begin not only sympathising with their captors but also literally fighting and dying in many cases in the advancement of the cause and legacy of the colonisers, as is the case in many instances including why we are communicating in English when we could do so it Somali. Now to answer your question, yes I trust there were two forms of language used in pre-colonial Somalia: one was local, the other Arabic. The former known as Uthmania was commonly used in NorthEastern regions of Somalia (what is Puntland of the present day) in writing letters, poetry, keeping journals, publishing bulletins, and books as late as just before the 1972 when it was agreed that the Latin alphabet was going to be the national manuscripts for economic and ignorant reasons on the part of the men and women with whom the role of determining the national handwriting was entrusted. Arabic and Uthmania were decided against both for reasons of association: the former for not being identified with the Arabisation that was taking shape in the North Africa and Arabian Peninsula against which the colonies argued, and the other for it was identified with a region rather than the whole country. For further research and what the Uthmania manuscripts look like, please refer to this link. http://somalinet.com/library/osmanya/. Just a sample of how it is written in the name of the proponent of the Uthmania manuscripts – the late Cisman Yussuf Keenadiid, a poet, a playwright, and the author of the first Somali dictionary. I understand there is a movement to revitalise this handwriting in some intellectual corners. There you have it. So long!

I do not believe men flee the scene as soon as educated ladies appear on the horizon. Though there is a school of though in the belief that generally speaking men of any race or culture feel threatened by women of class, tenacity, and authority all of which are resultants of education, I on the other hand am strong believer that the more educated the ladies are the better the relationship between partners, the stronger, healthier the family both the nucleus and extended. It is a simple change of lifestyle and circumstances with which most men & women struggle in adjusting, that tends to blur the line, confuse the traditional way of life in which men were the sole breadwinners as were in the primitive, cave man’s days when men had to go preying in the jungle, and women stayed behind rearing their offspring, and creates a gulf in between where preconceived presumptions are abound on all sides. To the contrary many of us not only view an educated sister as a gift but also encourage that sister get education, for do they not only preserve the culture but also are the very fabric that binds society together. It has been suggested that without them the entire region would have seceded to exist a long time ago judging from the heinous, irresponsible and crude behaviour on the part of men of all ages. This by no means is to suggest that all men are of the same streak. Nor does it suggest to look down or alienate the many who unfortunately had not had the opportunity for education spend their times working their fingers to the bone to make ends meet. Those of us who could adjust with changing times and become accustomed to new lifestyle shall reap the benefit on both sides whereas those who spend their time reflecting on the events of the past, nostalgia if you will, shall be left on the kerb with the “marduuf in one hand and the fag in another”. In a nutshell, the more educated the sister is the more appealing, the sexier and glamorous! A sister who knows to conduct herself, handle and care for herself and her man has a lot to be desired for! Does this mean educated sister do? And the same applies to educated brothers. So long!

United for the benefit of all, together to ward off the preying foe, joined to preserve the culture, sustain stability and regional authority within, but definitely federal and autonomous regions or states is the future in my opinion. I quite agree though has some reservations in some areas with the plan outlined here by professor I. M Lewis. It is quite long, thus suggest perhaps a cuppa or a lattee depending on your locale, read along, keep the hope alive, so we shall guard the blue flag! Cheers. ................................ Topic: Decentralization options Decentralization options by I.M.Lewis October 5, 2000] Executive Summary ------------------------------------------------- This study describes four models of decentralised constitutional government, focusing on aspects that may be appropriate for Somalis. The four models are: (1) a confederation; (2) a federation; (3) a decentralised unitary state with strong guarantees of local or regional autonomy; and (4) a consociational, non-territorially based form of decentralisation. It then looks at different elements of government in modern democracies, such as the political economy, the administration, the judiciary, defence and foreign relations, and electoral designs, and outlines how each would be organised in the different models. The report concludes with a menu of options, and considers a final form, which would be the most decentralised: functional cooperation, which could be applied to however many states Somalis decide they want to establish, or even without the creation of formal state machinery at all. The report does not assume that the former Somali Republic can only be reconstructed as a single state. Introduction: The Uncentralised Somali Legacy by Professor Ioan M. Lewis Today, most Somalis under the age of 30 have no knowledge of the democratic structures that were in place before Mohamed Siad Barre's military rule began in 1969, nor of the colonial period. In traditional Somali politics, all decision making is conducted democratically (although formally excluding women), by segmentary groups of kinsmen whose patterns of alliance and confrontation are fluid and inherently unstable. Pastoralists are individualists who meet in general assemblies, where all adult male family heads (or elders) seek consensus, instead of taking decisions by majority vote. Since so many males can be elders, leadership is often difficult to maintain for very long. In this uncentralised, rather than merely decentralised society, there is thus no tradition of a centralised state nor any set political offices or ranked leaders. The two most stable elements in Somali society are: 1) the ' dia paying group': the contractually defined kinship group within clans or subclans, which acts as a unit in paying and receiving damages for injury and death; and 2) the clan: a grouping of several related 'dia paying groups'. Clans usually live within a roughly defined territory, trade together, share and maintain wells and other resources (camels bear a common clan brand). There are approximately 100 clans in this country of some 5 million inhabitants, though the size and power of each clan varies considerably. Pastoral nomads belong to clans that are larger and more widely spread out than clan members who live by cultivating and in urban areas. All clans belong to a clan family - a group of related clans which is the highest level of political solidarity within the Somali nation or ethnic group. Clan Culture The six Somali clan-families are the Dir, ***** , **** , ****** , Digil and Rahanweyn (also known as Digil-Mirifle). The **** live primarily in the former British Somaliland; the Digil and Rahanweyn are agro-pastoralists who live between the Juba and Shebelle Rivers, where they produce grain and have their own distinct culture and language (May or Maymay). They also adopt migrants from other clans. The ***** and ****** clans are the most widely distributed. There are also marginal Bantu groups along the rivers, other minority urban communities (some of Arab origin), and blacksmiths, leather-workers, and hunters who may seek to maintain retain separate status from the Somali clan structure. Somali men are traditionally either warriors or men of God. Today, almost every male has an automatic rifle, and some have even heavier weapons, which constitute a serious obstacle to the formation of governmental structures. The country thus now consists of clans and unstable clan-alliances with their militias, as well as war lords with free-lance armed forces. There are also, in some areas, small independent Islamic communities, often with their own militias, providing educational and medical facilities and offering support to orphan war victims. In some urban settings, particularly, where other patterns of social control are failing, a fundamentalist style of Islamic law is being applied strictly, controversial though this is for many Somalis. There is in fact a deep-seated tension between universalistic Islam and particularistic local customary values and allegiances. Over the past five years, there have been significant movements of population as people have pushed into the south, where economic and agricultural opportunities are greater. There has also been some 'clan-cleansing' during the same period, creating substantial numbers of refugees and displaced persons. While pasturage is traditionally not owned by specific groups, today clans are trying to maintain control over some regions, especially where there are water points and trading centres. In the absence of any effective central government, clan elders are also consolidating their power by making decisions in local clan councils, often in co-operation with militias, who provide informal police functions. The Colonial and Post-Colonial Experience There was no Somali state before European colonisation, which divided the nation into five parts (French, British, Ethiopian, Italian and Kenyan). This division ultimately served to unite Somalis, giving rise to Somali nationalism. After independence in 1960, which brought together the British and Italian Somalias, formal local councils were set up and elections held. The Italian legal system was largely adopted, while common features of Somali customary law continued to be applied alongside the European codes and shari'a law. The new state (the Somali Republic) was divided into eight regions with 59 districts, administered by regional and district governors. The desire to unite all Somalis under one banner encouraged national solidarity cutting across clan ties, but created conflicts with neighbouring states, especially Kenya and Ethiopia. This unity lasted until the late 1960s when Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, the new prime minister, made peace with the two neighbours. In what proved to be the last civilian elections held in 1969, most voters and candidates behaved according to their clan identifications, with 1,002 candidates contesting the 123 seats in the National Assembly. Military Rule In October 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre took over in a military coup. Siad Barre developed a highly centralised, totalitarian state, and tried unsuccessfully to abolish clan behaviour. He applied what he termed 'scientific socialism'. Inspired by Marx and Lenin, Siad ruled through a revolutionary council, which effectively favoured the ***** clans, and was adept at manipulating clan rivalry in choosing ministers. After the crippling 1975 drought the government adopted relief measures which displaced many northern nomads to the south, where they were settled in agricultural and fishing communities. Both activities were despised by the nomads, and many preferred to survive on food hand-outs while rebuilding their herds. Siad supported the Ogadeni guerillas (his mother's clansmen) in their secessionist struggle in Ethiopia, which by the late 1970s was gathering momentum and led to all-out war in 1977/78. This proved disastrous as Somalia had underestimated the strength of external support for Ethiopia and lost the war. Defeat and the enormous number of Ogadeni refugees who fled into Somalia gradually destabilised Siad's regime. The former Soviet Union had abandoned Somalia for the greater prize of Ethiopia, and Siad desperately switched allegiance to the West to gain assistance. As western aid gradually increased, the national economy collapsed, and Somalia became dependent on this aid for survival, although the informal economy thrived. Current Patterns of Wider Alliance Siad's peace agreement with Ethiopia in 1988, his arming of friendly clans to fight his opponents, the liberation of the 'Republic of Somaliland' by the **** guerillas, of Majerteynia by the SSDF, and his own overthrow in 1991 all helped to forge the current Rambo-style political economy. Clans are not the only political units on the ground today, and, following wider economic and other strategic interests, are themselves involved in shifting patterns of alliance. Outside Mogadishu, there are currently at least three more ambitious political groupings, each with its own specific strengths and weaknesses: 1) 'Republic of Somaliland'/North-West, based on the former Somaliland Protectorate, and including the **** clans and their allies in the Gadabursi, Ise, Warsangeli and Dulbahante clans. The main port is Berbera, the capital Hargeisa; 2) North-East (Regions), based on the Majerteyn clan. The main port and capital is Bosaso; 3) Digil and Rahanweyn (Mirifle) alliance of clans based in the Inter-Riverine region of southern Somalia. The capital is Baidoa. All three regimes claim local autonomy, but only Somaliland has so far asserted full independence (without achieving international recognition). This reflects the localisation of the **** and associated clans. The clan connections and interests of the SSDF Majerteyn in the North East, in contrast, extend far outside this region into the southern part of Somalia (through the Harti grouping). Here since June 1995 the demographically dominant ****** have two 'governments' based in different parts of the old capital, Mogadishu, and variously claiming 'national' status. The Challenge In conformity with their traditionally uncentralised political culture, the majority of those Somalis who feel a need for modern government (and not all do) advocate a lightly administered, decentralised system. Since Somalis have so energetically 'rolled back the frontiers of the state', it will be difficult to establish decentralised and flexible political structures that can accommodate the powerful inter-clan conflicts that pervade their politics. The problems are compounded by the widespread distribution of modern weapons and the practice of voting with the gun which has become so deeply embedded. The challenge facing Somali political leaders will be to persuade people that there are general common interests that could be best served by wider forms of political structures than exist today. They will then have to establish (perhaps along the lines suggested in our Menu) loosely articulated forms of political organisation capable of securing public approval. 1. Decentralisation Options for Democratic Reconstruction Four decentralised models of government are outlined in this report, drawn from the experience of other peoples whose history has something in common with that of the Somalis. These are analysed with reference to emerging institutions in the former Somalia. There are three territorially-based models (a confederation, a federation, and a decentralised unitary state), and one community-based model (consociational) that can be combined with any of the territorially-based models. Decentralised constitutional structures in other parts of the world that have similarly developed through local initiatives should be of interest to Somalis who wish to rebuild one or more states to replace the discredited former republic. It is not yet clear how many states should emerge from the old Somalia. There are three possibilities: 1) to re-establish a united Somalia under either a unitary or a federal constitution; or 2) to create a union or confederation from two or more states; or 3) to form two or more independent states with no constitutional links. Whatever is decided, it need not be permanent. Arrangements can be built into a new constitution that allow for re-unification or secession. Another important issue is where sovereignty, i.e., supreme political authority, should lie. There are three possibilities: 1) sovereignty can rest with all adult Somali citizens; 2) it can also be vested in the constituent territorial units of a Somali state or states; and 3) it can also rest with the clans. A Confederation A confederation is a union of separate but equal states linked by international treaties. In confederations, sovereignty rests with the states, whereas in federations it is shared between the centre and the states (or provinces or regions). A confederation is normally created for specific purposes, such as for common defence, free trade, or to prepare for closer political union; and the centre normally acts as a coordinating body only. For example, in many federations, such as Switzerland, Germany, and the USA, a confederation existed before the member states opted for a closer form of co-operation. In the European Union, which is still more of a confederation than a federation, member states (15 now but there is no limit) agreed to establish common institutions that are responsible for certain areas of policy throughout the Union. Once these functions, such as agricultural policy, are transferred to the centre, they cannot be exercised independently at the state level. In order that each state continues to have some control over these central institutions, provisions in the treaties of union allow each state to veto, or opt out of policies that the state feels damages its interests. In some departments, the EU has moved closer to a federation. The European Court of Justice, for example, is considered the highest court for EU members, and thus sovereignty has effectively been transferred to the centre. Its underlying structure, however, remains confederal because the transfer is voluntary, i.e., the Court does not have any power to enforce decisions. European experience here may have potential relevance for Somalis: one of the motives inspiring European union was to prevent a repetition of the two European wars that also engulfed the world in conflict earlier this century. At some point in the future, and in conformity with traditional political values, it would be possible for the different Somali regions or states to create common institutions and policies. Somalis could then work together in central agencies, with representation from each state or region, protected by the sovereign status of each region and by the right to veto, or opt out of unwelcome proposals. A Federal System It is probably too early to contemplate any form of centralised authority, but in theory, if enough trust developed between the different Somali groups, they could create a federation, satisfying those who want a more substantial central governing capability, and those who want strong regional governments. In typical federations, free and independent states come together, and transfer a limited amount of sovereignty to the federal institutions, although others have been created by decolonisation, or after a war, such as in Germany, where the purpose was to limit the power of the central authority. The centre and the regions (or provinces) share power, and the centre is unable, on its own authority, to change the constitution. There are three ways of organising federal-provincial relations: 1) the provinces have most of the powers of government, with the centre only exercising limited powers; 2) the centre has most of the powers with the provinces having a limited amount; or 3) the provinces and the centre share powers of government with specific means of mediating disputes between them. It is also possible to grant considerable autonomy - even the right to secede - to some regions within any of these three. It is important to repeat that forms of government are not irreversible: a federation can become a confederation, and a confederation can develop into a federation. There are, in addition, many types of federation, and models exist that have never been applied. Federations are designed to allow diverse peoples and cultures to live together, with guarantees normally written into the constitution to ensure that the centre does not seize all the power. This is sometimes facilitated by removing the federal capital from a major city and placing it in a small city in an unimportant region. If Somalis wanted a federation, the capital could be moved from Mogadishu. Swiss experience has some similarities to recent Somali history. Switzerland was forged after civil war, coups in various cantons, attempts at constitution writing, and intervention by outside powers. The federal plan was designed to bring together people torn apart by religious and political differences, all equally suspicious of central government. In the resulting Switzerland, the powers of the centre are sharply defined and limited, whereas those of the cantons are not (Option 1 listed above). The cantons may even have their own constitutions, as long as they do not contradict the federal constitution, and guarantee to continue to govern democratically. Switzerland also has a collective presidency with seven members who take it in turn to serve as president; this assures that no one person or group takes over. This method has been very successful - there are no Swiss politicians famous outside Switzerland. There are two other governmental institutions. The first, the Federal Assembly, has two chambers, one with representation according to the population in each canton; the other has two representatives per canton. The second is the Federal Court, on which the four languages of Switzerland are represented; and which mediates disputes between the federal government and the cantons, and amongst the cantons themselves. The Swiss are first citizens of their communes, then of their cantons, and finally of Switzerland. A Decentralised Unitary State with Guarantees of Regional or Local Autonomy Just as the differences between a confederation and a federation can be slight, so too between a decentralised unitary state and a federation. The main difference is that in a federal system, power is shared between the centre and the regions whereas in a decentralised system, the regions are subordinate to the centre. For example, in Uganda or Papua New Guinea, although regions are allowed considerable control over many of their affairs, the centre retains the right to reduce this or to intervene if it wants to. In Uganda, the decision to decentralise was partly designed to accommodate strong regional pressures. Decentralisation is a top-down process, which by delegating power, can help to reduce the centre's control over the social, economic and cultural life of its citizens. In contrast, the formation of a federation, is a bottom-up process where local units join together creating an additional layer of government above them. This decentralised option might be more appropriate within the local units of state or states that the Somalis eventually establish, providing these reflect traditional structures of political authority. Although any decision to pursue the confederal or federal options would necessarily require widespread popular support, there are two major aspects of decentralised unitary systems that could be included in a future Somali constitution(s): 1) the constitution could define the powers of local governments. These powers can always subsequently be transferred to the centre if a local government wishes; and 2) guarantees should be included to ensure that larger units of government (such as provinces or the centre) cannot abolish smaller local units. Consociation: A Non-Territorial Option Power sharing or consociational principles of government can operate in confederations, federations and decentralised unitary states, and were developed specifically for divided societies. South Africa today is a model of a consociational democracy in its early stages. Consociational democracies normally include four elements: 1) a grand coalition government, which includes representatives from the major groups (or clans or clan-families) in society; 2) a quota of seats or jobs or public moneys for each community according to its population strength; 3) community responsibility for certain matters, such as education; e.g., the distinctive interests of clans and minorities could be respected wherever they lived or worked; and 4) minority veto power. Under consociational arrangements, groups are separate but equal. For these to work, people need to be convinced that it is better to have a share of power than to risk the costs involved in trying to seek full control. Three conditions need to be satisfied: 1) competing communities must not try to integrate other groups or establish their own separate sovereign state; 2) politicians must strive to maintain these beliefs, economic and political stability, and be mindful of the negative consequences of returning to a state of war; and 3) the leaders of the communities must be able to act independently so that they may be able to reach a compromise with other groups without being accused of betrayal by their own community. The Somali tradition of elders participating in consensual decision-making at the local level demonstrates that such principles could be appropriate here. When these conditions are not met, consociations fail, as happened disastrously in Lebanon and Cyprus. The key feature of all four systems of decentralised government is the ultimate location and distribution of power: in confederations, power is above all held by the component states; in federal systems, it is shared between the centre and the constituent states; and in decentralised unitary states, it is located at the centre though certain regions enjoy considerable autonomy. 2. The Political Economy of Decentralisation Only the pastoral livestock industry managed to survive the destructive economic effects of the Siad Barre regime, which officially suppressed private enterprise, although thereby stimulating an extensive informal and black market economy. In the late 1980s, a structural adjustment programme was attempted but not properly implemented, leaving Somalis with little experience of successful economic policy. Once the state collapsed, the country was left with many small traders and producers lacking public services and regulation. There is little prospect in the future that donors will grant the large sums of aid of the past, and foreign investment can be expected to be slight for some time. Thus political reconstruction, at whatever level, will need to operate against a background of small-scale local economies. The switch to private enterprise fits well with decentralisation, which depends on the abilities of local groups to manage their economies and resist pressure from the centre. If the state transfers assets to the private sector, it lets success and failure be determined by the market. Decentralisation may reduce conflict and may minimise the economic benefits associated with political office. Clan loyalties will play an important role in rebuilding the private sector, but need not lead to conflict if success and failure are determined by fair competition, i.e., providing the market is regulated and policed. Some services, such as law and order, defence, roads, health, education, etc., will still need to be provided publicly, but there is no reason why some of these cannot be managed by local authorities, with the assistance of donors and NGOs. Modern states also require conditions that allow traders to produce and exchange their goods through common property laws, stable currency and a credit system. Many assume that local initiatives are the only way to restore order, and that new local authorities can combine to form a state while still retaining significant autonomy. Regional Somali authorities, however, will need access to personnel, financial resources and physical assets. Inter-Regional Transfers Inequality between regions will require attention if poorer regions are to be integrated in all political formations. Market economies often lead to an unequal distribution of income, which can only be corrected through transferring income by both local and central government. In confederations, such transfers are rare, while in unitary states the centre controls taxes and grants and thus can redistribute more easily. In federal systems, transfers often create conflict. It is also difficult to establish criteria that determine who gets what, and in which circumstances. It is unlikely that Somalis will pay taxes to anyone or for anything outside their immediate region, so such a redistributive system may not be practical for some time. This means that local authorities will have to strengthen their ability to raise funds to pay for education, health, roads and water. Regional councils can also set up committees to decide how resources will be distributed, as well as to monitor spending. In the meantime, local authorities will have to charge full cost fees for consumer services, which will eliminate the immediate need to raise taxes and also give local people control over the service that is provided. Foreign donors may also be able to assist the poorer regions in restructuring. Communities can continue to provide services on a voluntary basis, such as mending roads, building schools, and digging wells. Money The collapse of the Somali Republic has removed controls over trade and investment, and ended the creation of state-supported credit and the growth of money supply. While the previous system caused inflation, which was increased by foreign aid, the current situation is deflationary since there is a shortage of money in circulation. Trade is currently conducted in US dollars, Saudi rials and Somali shillings. If the local currency wears out or is rendered worthless by unauthorised printing of new notes, trade will continue, but the use of foreign currencies may expand if remittances and payment for exports continue. In the medium and long term, Somalis will have to decide whether they want to create regional currencies or a central one. There is no reason why several currencies cannot co-exist, although there would be financial costs to their doing so. Trade and Credit Export taxes should be kept to a minimum in economies that depend heavily on foreign trade. Most taxes today are collected at the four major ports and a few larger airports, which give the groups in control considerable leverage. It is obviously desirable that agreement can reached on the distribution of these resources. Attempts will also have to be made to discourage internal customs barriers, which can stimulate conflict. Most federations try to maintain free internal trade to avoid such disputes. Currently, small producers and traders use their own assets and family networks for credit, while international traders also use foreign banks. Central banks may not be necessary, as experience has shown, and private banks can often be more effective. Community banking systems, such as those run by NGOs in Bangladesh, Bolivia and South Africa, could also be tried. Property Rights and Agriculture A means of sorting out property claims, returning assets to owners, and compensating those who cannot return to their property will need to be established. The legal system, courts of law, prisons, and police could be financed locally, possibly with donor support. Other issues of concern include the destruction of rangelands, illegal charcoal production, over-exploitation of fishing resources, and toxic waste dumping. To improve agriculture, the private sector needs better credit facilities to buy fertilisers, crops, etc. If subsidies are to be involved from foreign NGOs, they should be careful not to discourage local initiatives. Health and Water Whether for people or livestock, health care requires many types of services that are often expensive and specialised. The major consideration now is access to clinics, drugs, and doctors or healers. Many of these services can be provided privately on a fee-for-service basis, supplemented by foreign NGOs, which would work similarly in unitary or decentralised political settings. Poorer consumers could be subsidised by communities or foreign donors, although it is often difficult to establish standards for deciding who needs these services the most. Wells and water rights may continue to be operated by clans and individuals as before, with some involvement of regional governments. Education and Roads As with health, similar problems arise for education. Private and public systems can operate at the same time, paid for by local parent-teacher associations and foreign donors. Local communities may manage and regulate their own schools, irrespective of type of government. Higher education will be more difficult to provide in the short-term, though it too could be controlled by local governments. The most widely used roads should be maintained by the widest possible groupings, while local roads and footpaths can be a local responsibility, with some sub-contracting to private firms where necessary. Security A major concern will continue to be the huge number of weapons in circulation. New forms of community-based security could be established which recognise the right to bear arms, but also subject people to the authority of clans and local authorities. A citizen army could always be mobilised if there were an imminent danger, but meanwhile, regardless of the nature of the state, i.e., confederal, federal or decentralised unitary, costs would be kept down and control exercised by those with most authority at the local level. 3. Remaking Administrative Structures The six basic requirements here are: 1) how to organise a stable administration for even the most decentralised government; 2) how to overcome the assumption that every position is a prize for which rival groups compete, especially for those posts controlling public funds; 3) how to create administrative structures that allow policy to be implemented while also meeting the challenge set out in (2); 4) how to save funds by coordinating some services and functions of government on a state-wide basis; 5) how to resist any temptation to create a uniform administrative structure throughout the country (regional structures should reflect the needs of the region); and 6) how to finance and staff, over the long term, these public administrative structures, bearing in mind that numbers of people employed should be kept to a minimum. Minimum Functions There are seven minimum functions necessary for the effective running of a state administration: 1) Police and maintenance of order. In a unitary system, local governments can be responsible for police who work alongside national police forces. Under confederal arrangements, police forces would be organised by their own states, although there could be a coordinating body at the confederal level. In a federal system, local and national police could share certain duties. Consociation means communal self-government and is easier to organise in the judiciary than in the police - though fair representation of all clans is possible in a national police force. 2) Defence. Issues to consider here include land border protection, prevention of smuggling, protection of fisheries and off-shore resources, and the response to internal disorder and disasters. These would need to be covered in whatever form of government is adopted. 3) Fiscal policy. The issuing of a national currency would function at a central level in both unitary and federal states, while taxation and public borrowing are normally shared by the centre and regions/provinces. In a confederation, these responsibilities would normally be handled by the member states. 4) Collection, management and allocation of central revenue. Assuming there will be some funds gained from export and import duties, the centre in a confederal model need not be involved in this, whereas each state in a loose federation could control these functions, although some authority would be necessary to secure subsidies for poorer regions. 5) Judicial systems. These vary according to form of government and are discussed in Chapter 5. 6) Public service management. This is necessary under all models. 7) External representation. This is also a general requirement, and is discussed in Chapter 6. Other Functions In the medium term, other functions that would be essential for the proper running of any administration include: posts and communications, which need to be accessible throughout the country in any type of system, although it is not imperative that this be centrally controlled, and could even be privatised; major public works, such as roads; and tertiary education. In the short term, however, there are several concerns that need to be addressed, though not necessarily at the central level. These include: primary and secondary education, health, veterinary and agricultural services. Already in many parts of Somalia and the 'Republic of Somaliland', NGOs are assisting in providing some of these services, most of which are paid for on a fee-for-service basis. The scarcity of trained staff for any of these functions makes it important to offer services on as wide a basis as possible. Some government funding will be necessary to plan for the future, although this often causes spiralling costs as demands increase for ever more services. Staffing Typically those working in the public sector are recruited on merit (by competitive exams, specified qualifications, and some consideration for representation), and are normally hired for life. Neither of these would seem to be appropriate for Somalis. Because of the clan-based nature of Somali society, representation should be the primary principle of recruitment and promotion. Difficulties will arise, especially concerning how many clans or sub-clans or regions should be given representation, and this is especially problematic when such jobs are to be kept to a minimum in order to ensure that a greater proportion of available funds is directed to substantive service provision and not primarily to salaries. This dilemma might be resolved by limiting the period of service, rotating jobs, and, should sufficient trust be established, holding a census to determine exact numbers. 4. The Judicial Branch of Government This chapter does not directly discuss the situation that would arise if the former Somalia were to split into several independent states - although the same general considerations would hold and they might wish to operate common judicial institutions. There are six key areas to consider in decentralised systems: 1) the supreme court (or the highest court in the state); 2) the coordination of judicial systems; 3) multiple systems of laws; 4) Islamic law; 5) administrative justice; and 6) human rights safeguards. The Supreme Court A constitution is a guarantee that the agreement leading to the coming together of different peoples and groups will be observed. In confederal and federal systems, and in some decentralised unitary states, defending the constitution is normally the task of the supreme court. As such, the powers of the supreme court are very important for the proper functioning of the state. There are several fundamental questions related to the supreme court. Who appoints members of this court? There is no set formula. They can be appointed by the president or prime minister, or they can be elected by the legislature. The 1960 Constitution of the Somali Republic allowed for the involvement of both, and it may be appropriate to consider a similar option in the future, for however many states finally emerge. How many members should there be? A possibility would be to follow the method of the European Court of Justice, which has 15 judges, one from each member state. The more the court reflects the diversity of the state or states, the easier it will be to have its decisions enforced. How long should a judge serve, and how can judges be removed? The advantage of long terms of office is that decisions can be made independently of political pressures, but this may also create friction between the court and the executive branch, and in turn cause the executive to either remove judges or pack the court with supporters. Short terms of office, on the other hand, often cause political considerations to take precedence as the continuation of employment is somewhat dependent on the approval of the executive. These obstacles can be overcome, especially for state courts. Judges may be elected for medium length terms, such as six to ten years, as happens in Switzerland or in states of the US. An independent body can also appoint and discipline the judiciary. Mandatory retirement is another possibility. Just as in appointment, removal from office can involve different branches of government, especially in controversial cases, such as removal from the supreme court. The supreme court should be the final court of appeal for civil and criminal matters. It has the responsibility to uphold the laws of particular states or regions, while also ensuring that common standards apply throughout the federation. Confederations would not normally have a supreme court, although each member state would have one. In any future Somali federation, by contrast, this court would also have the responsibility developing unified federal law. To resolve constitutional disagreements, a combination of arbitration and referendum could be adapted to traditional Somali dispute-solving procedures. Multiple Judicial Systems An initial problem in reconstructing a Somali state or states will be finding enough qualified lawyers. In a confederation or a federation, an important issue to resolve will be how to enforce decisions made by courts in one state in another state, as well as between the state and the central government in a federation, as different laws develop in different areas of the country. One solution would be for the states to agree to enforce each other's judgements, irrespective of whether they were in line with the public policy or legislation of the enforcing state. In all matters, though, it is important that (con)federal laws are enforceable throughout the (con)federation. This holds for criminal as well as for civilian law: the existing Penal Code in Somalia could be re-applied while courts are being established, and used as a basis by the successor state or states on which to construct their own criminal law. Multiple Laws and Islamic Law Federations and confederations may develop multiple systems of laws, which often complicate their administration and implementation. Somalis already have experience of multiple legal systems since customary and Islamic law have existed alongside English and Italian law. This previous Somali practice could therefore provide a possible model for a future decentralised state or states, and representative commissions could be established to ensure that laws are harmonised and disputes resolved during this process. Until 1962, there were separate shari'a and non-shari'a courts in Somalia, with different methods of combining and ordering the various forms of law. Some similar formulation could be applied if Somalis agreed to establish a federation or a confederation. Administrative Justice The current international emphasis on 'good governance' has implications for the judiciary. For example, the new constitutions of Malawi, South Africa and Uganda all give citizens the right to fair treatment by government agencies as well as the right of appeal against government decisions. The question is where to locate such mechanisms, at the state or central levels, or both. Most decisions directly affecting citizens are probably best taken at the regional level, as people generally prefer legal disputes to be dealt with informally, using customary practices wherever possible. Human Rights Implications Some international laws are binding on states even if they do not wish to be bound. Even so, international human rights standards will need to be written into law, not only to protect the individual, but also to reassure potential donors and foreign investors. Many treaties already exist that try to protect minorities by establishing political, education, language, and property rights, in addition to the fundamental rights theoretically enjoyed by all individuals, e.g., non-discrimination, freedom of conscience, and religion. Since it is easier to frame laws protecting human rights than to implement them, there is scope for a careful study of Somali traditional concepts of rights, and their relation to internationally recognised human rights. International obligations are easier to legislate in unitary states than in decentralised systems because the centre has authority over the laws of the country. Yet at the same time, abuse of power is also more likely in such states. To avoid this danger the problems associated with federations and confederations need to be addressed at the start. For example, in federal systems one component state may not comply with international laws, or inconsistent laws may prevent the application of human rights norms. It is possible to overcome such problems by mutual coordination of laws or by creating a common Charter of Rights, and a constitutional court to oversee the process of coordination and implementation. The advantages of federal systems are that laws can be adjusted according to local needs. Federal systems also can protect minority rights, especially in terms of language, religion, education, marriage and family issues, where relevant. In confederal systems, each state would have responsibility for ensuring that human rights obligations are followed, although here too it would be desirable to create a coordinating body, or even to allow a single organisation to frame such laws. 5. Alternatives for Defence and Foreign Relations Issues and problems related to foreign affairs will be similar irrespective of how many states are created. As foreign relations are relations between states, their conduct is generally guided by central structures, though adjustments can be made to cater for the needs of decentralised government. There are seven main concerns related to foreign affairs and defence that need to be addressed: 1) treaty-making; 2) foreign representation; 3) defence; 4) citizenship; 5) foreign trade, customs and excise; 6) foreign aid; and 7) currency. Treaty Making Treaties, whether they pertain to membership in international organisations such as the UN, or bilateral relations between states, are normally signed by some central authority, and then ratified by the president (or head of state), parliament and/or constituent states. All government systems, from a centralised, unitary state to a confederation, operate in this manner, although some federal states allow a degree of independence in treaty making. For example, in Australia and Canada, the provinces may sign treaties that deal with foreign trade matters, as long as such treaties do not conflict with those signed by the central authority. Further, in situations where the province or canton or state signs its own treaties, the central authority may also retain the right to approve it. Conflicts resulting from treaties signed by different authorities can be resolved by an independently appointed group, comprised of members from all segments of society. Confederations allow for more decentralisation. The options for treaty making in confederal systems are as follows: 1) the central authority is granted full rights to conclude international treaties, while constituent states retain control over domestic matters; 2) member states have some independence in treaty-making as long as they are not in conflict with the interests of the confederation; and 3) member states can conclude treaties with foreign powers independently, while at the same time sharing common services and rules covering relations amongst themselves, as well as relations with external states in particular areas. In very loose confederations, such as the European Union, where members still have not granted the central authority sole jurisdiction over all treaty-making, even on issues which have been transferred, they retain the right to veto legislation that conflicts with their interests. For such a loose arrangement to work, there must exist a measure of trust between the centre and the constituent parts. If Somalis were eventually to agree to confederate along similar lines, it would also be necessary for the component states to honour pre-existing agreements signed by earlier heads of state of Somalia (unless they were opposed to the principles of the new state or states). Foreign Representation The right to conclude treaties generally also determines who represents the new state or states in embassies abroad, at multilateral institutions, and international conferences. In unitary and federal states, the appointment of such representatives is usually controlled by the head of state. In confederal systems, such appointments will depend on how extensive the sharing of foreign relations decisions is between member states. The range of options for diplomatic representation may be illustrated by the European Union (where member states each have their own foreign embassy staff) and the United Arab Emirates (where such staff represent the federation and come from all member states). The key issues concerning foreign representation relate to recruitment of staff and the cost involved. The first difficulty is how to recruit personnel, whether on merit or according to a system of community representation (based on region or clan, for example), or on a combination of the two. In theory, this dilemma should not arise in unitary or federal states, but it would be a problem in confederal or decentralised unitary states, and could be very serious in states with deep divisions between groups, where no group trusts the others to fully represent its interest, e.g., a Kurd in Iraq would be unlikely to trust a non-Kurdish Iraqi to represent his or her interests in country-wide institutions. In such a situation, the solution may be to rotate offices between clans or regions, and establish safeguards so that while in office, each representative would not be able to pursue his or her group's interests at the expense of others. As the new state or states will inevitably be short of funds, a further difficulty arises concerning how to pay for such offices. One solution would be to minimise the number of offices. For example, there could be a delegation to the UN which might also cover relations with the United States, a representative in Brussels to handle the European Union as well as bilateral relations with member states, a representative to work with neighbouring East African states, one for the OAU, and a small group to cover regional issues such as trade, refugees, drought and food security. The need to deal with such issues will arise under any system of government but in no case do they require a large diplomatic establishment. Defence Even in decentralised systems, it may make sense for the centre to provide for common defence, in order to reduce the financial burden that is inevitably involved. Indeed, it is to make such savings that many federations and confederations are formed, as was the case in the short-lived Senegambian Confederation, or the United Arab Emirates. In most states, whether they be unitary or federal, responsibility for declaring war and maintaining the defence of the union rests with the centre. In Africa, however, central control over defence has often proved disastrous. In many countries, there should be no need for large defence budgets, since they face no serious external threat. Yet almost invariably the government devotes a substantial portion of its expenditure to defence. The army often ends up usurping power, and far from protecting society, threatens the civilian population. The problem is even worse in states that have fallen apart due to civil war, and where, as in the former Somalia, most adults are armed. In these cases it is seldom possible to disarm the population and/or abolish the armed forces without enlisting the support of an outside power, which is likely to be unpopular and widely resisted. Yet without a regional threat there is no need to reconstruct a standing army. Once again, Swiss experience may offer some useful lessons for Somalis: the Swiss have no standing army, but if an emergency occurs, they can easily assemble a force from the different regions of the country, particularly as all citizens have to undergo a period of military service. An additional safeguard to prevent internal conflicts between clan militias or regions could take the form of a dispute settlement group with representatives from all parts of the country and all clans, which could be assembled in time of need. Such a group would resemble the gathering of clan elders to settle inter-clan disputes. If there is insufficient trust to set up such a group, at least initially, an alternative would be to contract out this function to an international or regional organisation, such as the OAU. This would have the advantage that the donor community might be more willing to reinvest in whatever state or states are established if there are transparent mechanisms for preventing the abuse of power. A final defence issue is the protection of the environment. In the absence of a Somali government or governments, Somali waters are already being overfished and used as a dumping ground for toxic waste. In the short term, it might be possible to contract out supervision of these activities to an outside agency to monitor and safeguard Somali natural resources. Citizenship In most systems, issues related to citizenship, such as the issuing of passports, naturalisation, emigration and immigration are handled by a central authority. Some countries allow dual citizenship, and in confederal systems, like the European Union, citizens belong first to their state, and second to the union. This could work for Somalis: they could have common citizenship, and also belong to their own regions or states, where they would vote. Thus a Somali could live in any part of the reconstituted state or states, but perhaps only vote in his or her particular area. If this were to be agreed, then each region could also issue its own passports, as members of the European Union already do. Foreign Trade As Somalis have demonstrated, foreign trade can continue even in chaotic political circumstances. But for trade to contribute to economic recovery over the long term, it is important that it take place in a stable and secure environment. In some federal systems, the different provinces maintain independent trade relations with foreign states, as do the states in most confederations. Providing the rules, enshrined in the GATT, WTO and Lome conventions, are applied, it would be possible to devolve responsibility for trade policy to regional governments. In most countries matters relating to customs and excise are under the overall control of a central ministry. The main reason is to prevent trade wars between the constituent states. For example, without some regulation they might be tempted to compete with one another by lowering import taxes. In unsettled conditions, this would not promote healthy competition but make it more difficult to maintain the peace, as it did in the Senegambian Confederation before its collapse (the Gambia refused to give up its low tariffs and liberal trade policy). The general problems that come up with regard to trade relate to the collection of taxes and redistribution of funds, normally from wealthier regions to poorer ones, and how to convince those controlling strategic assets, such as ports and airports, to give them up. In the short term, it may be necessary to leave such assets under their current 'managers'. Each region would have responsibility for buying into whichever services (health, veterinary, fishing, transport, etc.) they needed, raising the money to buy the service by taxes within their region. Foreign Aid Decentralisation is probably necessary if development aid is to revive. Donors increasingly attach political and economic conditions to aid and will need to be assured that the local government(s) are legitimate and stable, and that the money will be used wisely. From this point of view decentralised governments would have an advantage over unitary ones in that legitimate representatives from local areas could manage (and petition for) projects, rather than having them administered by a centrally located agency. Aid could be managed in this fashion in confederal unions or federal states. Even in decentralised unitary states responsibility for foreign aid could be delegated to local authorities. Indeed it is possible that donors might make such delegation a condition for the resumption of aid. In addition, with regard to disaster relief, as opposed to development assistance, attention will need to be paid to re-establishing early warning systems so that future famines may be prevented. International regional organisations could be enlisted in the first instance, on the condition that they train Somalis to staff their own offices in the long term. Currency Authorities controlling the money supply are normally centrally located, though they may be independent of the government, as the Federal Reserve is in the United States, or they may maintain different values for domestic and foreign transactions, as the Republic of South Africa did until recently. In some countries where the local currency is very weak or has collapsed, a foreign currency often circulates next to the local one. But there are no unitary states or federations where rival currencies compete with each other. This is because of the fear that the authorities in one state or province might off-load their economic problems onto their neighbours by depreciating their own currency to make exports cheaper and imports more expensive. The situation in confederations is more ambiguous (see 1 and 2 below). There are four possible arrangements for currency that comply with decentralised models. They are: 1) Each state or region could maintain its own currency and exchange it at a rate agreed upon by all parties. In this instance, it would be better to peg its value to a major international currency or basket of currencies. Difficulties may arise, however, if one region is wealthier than others. 2) A currency system modelled on the European ecu could be established. This would take the previous idea one step further by pegging each region's currency to a common one. This could work as an interim solution while trust was being restored in the new political structure. Eventually the common currency could replace regional currencies altogether. 3) The pre-existing Somali shilling could continue to be used for trading purposes along with a major international currency, such as the dollar, which would gradually replace shillings as they wear out or are devalued because of possible over-printing. 4) An independent monetary authority could be created for the entire state or states. Initially, staffing for this organisation could be contracted out to an international financial institution, such as the IMF, which could also train Somali bankers. 6. Principles of Constitutional and Electoral Design If Somalis decide on some form of decentralised democratic system, they will need to design it in a way that will prevent a return to authoritarian rule. It will need a separation of powers, checks and balances, and some form of consociational or consensual, co-operative government. Parliamentary Democracy Democracies can be organised in several ways. One is parliamentary democracy, in which the legislature has most of the power. In the United Kingdom, for example, the legislature (or parliament) has significant control over the executive because the authority of the prime minister and the cabinet ultimately rests on the support of parliament. There are nine key features of this type of system: 1) a concentration of executive power, normally in a one-party government; 2) a mixing of executive and legislative power; 3) a two-chamber parliament, with one chamber being less powerful; 4) a mainly two-party system; 5) party competition normally over left and right issues, such as economic policy; 6) simple plurality rule which gives seats to the candidate with the most votes; 7) unitary and centralised government, where local governments can be abolished or curtailed by the centre; 8) an unwritten constitution, with minimal judicial involvement in its interpretation; and 9) representative democracy with little use of referendums. Parliamentary and majoritarian systems, which give power to the elected majority, only work well in fairly homogenous societies that are based on the concept of liberal individualism. In deeply divided societies, such systems do not function well, and it is often the case that a dominant community can take over and run the society for its own purposes. Consensual/Consociational Democracy Another form of organising a democracy is the consensual or consociational method, which is the opposite of the former system. Consensual models try to maximise participation and representation in government while also holding back attempts by a powerful group to take control. This type of system may be more appropriate for a divided society, and has something in common with traditional Somali decision-making processes. In consensual systems, there are eight distinctive features which could work in a federal Somali state that was based on a multi-party system, or in the independent states of a confederal system: 1) executive power sharing that enjoys support from many communities, including a multi-person rotating presidency with representatives from each of the regions, veto powers, and separate elections for the executive and parliament; 2) separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers that allows for co-operation between the branches of government, or perhaps in the Somali case, a 'council of state' formed by elders and former presidents and prime ministers who would mediate disputes and take certain issues to the Supreme Court; 3) two federal chambers with equal powers and minority and/or territorial representation; 4) a multi-party system; 5) a multi-dimensional party system where language and clan differences, for example, are included in party platforms; 6) a proportional representation voting system in which the elected chambers genuinely represent the population and encourage some integration; 7) a type of decentralisation that allows some communities or clans greater autonomy; and 8) a constitution that gives minorities specified rights. Consensual systems enable all those who are affected by political decisions to take part in making those decisions. They also allow distinct communities the opportunity to govern themselves, so long as they respect the rights of others to do the same. Electoral Options There are numerous types of electoral arrangements that can be adapted to a society's particular needs. In a federal system, each state or region could equally choose separate systems so long as they fall within overarching electoral rules. The same is true for a confederation. It must be remembered, however, that no outcome is certain in the different systems. Proportional representation (PR) systems ensure a proportional relationship between the votes for parties or candidates and the seats they win. PR systems differ from non-proportional (NPR) systems, which are often called majoritarian systems. There are three ways of organising NPR systems: 1) plurality rule, where a candidate is elected in a single person district and wins if he or she has the most votes; 2) alternative vote, where a candidate only wins if he or she has a majority of the votes; and 3) exhaustive double-ballot procedure, where if no candidate wins in the first ballot, there will be run-off elections between the top two candidates. The advantage of having a NPR system in the Somali context would be that it would encourage parties to broaden their appeal to include many clans. The disadvantages, however, are three: 1) parliament could be filled with many small parties, which could in turn make it easier for a strong party to take control; 2) the 'winner takes all' principle would not be acceptable to those that lost; and 3) dominant coalitions of clans could try to damage weaker clans or parties. PR systems, on the other hand, may be more likely to produce a stable government, and would cope better with population shifts. In a PR system, moreover, clans could be allowed to form their own parties or coalitions if they so wished. 7. Conclusion: The Menu of Options A concluding menu lists the advantages and disadvantages of the three constitutional models considered in the report, i.e., confederal, federal and decentralised unitary state, and also of consociational government. This analysis, which is already in summary form, is not reproduced here. Functional Co-operation There is one final possibility to consider: co-operative arrangements without an overarching political authority. Functional services, in which most Somalis have an immediate interest, and on which they might be prepared to co-operate include veterinary or health services; fishery protection and licensing; educational services such as curriculum development, the provision of textbooks, teacher training, and the negotiation of scholarships for Somalis in foreign universities; posts and telegraphs; weights and measures; and currency. Thus if attempts to construct a confederation, federation, or decentralised unitary state break down, or proceed at a very slow rate, agencies could still be created to provide specific services to meet certain needs. Indeed there is a traditional Somali precedent in the concept of contractual agreement (heer ). There are two ways in which such functional agencies could be set up, although they are not mutually exclusive. The first and theoretically most desirable would be by agreement amongst those Somalis from different clans, regions and/or 'states' who share a particular functional interest. Such agencies would employ Somalis and this might make external donors more willing to reinvest in their future. The second would be to contract out such services to an international agency, such as the World Bank. This would have similar advantages as the previous one regarding employment and foreign investment, and avoid the disadvantages that might spring from continued inter-clan competition, even over the provision of agreed welfare services. Such collaboration might foster wider Somali sentiments of national solidarity. END

Xafladii Saxiixa Heshiiska Puntland oo Sabtida la qabanayo - Friday, May 16, 2003 at 10:35 Bosaso, (Radio Midnimo)- Shir maanta ay yeesheen Golaha Xukuumada Puntland oo uu shirgudoominayey Madaxweynaha Puntland Cabdullaahi Yuusuf Axmed ayaa maanta lagu qabtay xarunta Madaxtooyada magaalada Boosaaso. Shirkaan oo ahaa mid albaabadu u xiran yihiin ayaa ugu danbeyntii waxaa ka soo baxay in la qabto galabnimada Sabtida ee fooda inagu soo haysa xafladii gunaanadka barnaamijkii nabadeynta Puntland ee mudaba soo jiitamaysey. Lama sheegin sababta ay horay ugu baaqatay xaflad la qorsheynayey in la qabto galabnimdii Talaadada ee ina dhaaftay, waxaase muuqday in ay jireen caqabado salka ku hayey qaybsiga awoodaha Maamulka oo markii horeba aan si rasmi ah la isula meel dhigin. Barnaamijka nabadeynta oo xiligaan galay wejigiisii ugu danbeeyey ayaa dadku sugayaan in lagu soo bandhigi doono xaflada gunaanadka waxyaabaha salka u ah heshiiska labada dhinacba isku waafaqeen oo ilaa iyo iminka aan ciddina wax war ah ka haynin. Radio Midnimo Boosaaso, Puntland, Somaliya AllPuntland.com

I see your point, but though I don not see the problem relating to DNS, I was allowing the gentleman posing the question with a room to manoeuvre in the process of identifying and eliminating the problem, if you get my drift. If he could perhaps tell us the steps that are being taken to connect to the w/stations, then we could be of assistance. So long!

I see your point, but though I don not see the problem relating to DNS, I was allowing the gentleman posing the question with a room to manoeuvre in the process of identifying and eliminating the problem, if you get my drift. If he could perhaps tell us the steps that are being taken to connect to the w/stations, then we could be of assistance. So long!

Though I have not been following the debate,and would like to reserve the right to do so sometime in the future, I must admit not only are ladies true shining stars here presenting thier standpoints with civility and maturity, but they are trully the very fibric that binds our families together. Keep it up ladies.

What are the steps you are taking in order to access clients from the server? Is the server DC and DHCP? Are they in the same subnet? Do the clients have static or dynamic IP addresses? If so, do you have the server ad the primary DNS server? I do not think it is DNS since you were able to join the w/stations to the domain. See if you ping the clients buy name. Best of luck!

What are the steps you are taking in order to access clients from the server? Is the server DC and DHCP? Are they in the same subnet? Do the clients have static or dynamic IP addresses? If so, do you have the server ad the primary DNS server? I do not think it is DNS since you were able to join the w/stations to the domain. See if you ping the clients buy name. Best of luck!

Am glad to see our young people are interested in studying so as to better themselves. Though my undergraduate was Accounting (and I am a Chartered Accountant), earned MBA in MIS, and I plan to finish off my PhD in MIS with systems security & nano tech & intellegence concentration by the end of year 2004 all things being equal. And though it matters not the least bit as to what subject one is reading at the moment or wishes to pursue in the future, it be IT,literature, Arts or otherwise, it would have been beneficial if more of us were to concentrate in the field of Medicine, Science and Engineering. Keep it up lads and lasses - Education is the future, Future is education. Best of luck.

This sounds like a power supply (PS)issue. If you have another one lying around, pull the PS out and plug onto the defective w/station. It is possible your PC had a 300 watts PS which reached the end of its life cycle. Perhaps you want to purchase 350watss or better yet 400 watts which should not cost you more than 39.00 usd. It is also possible that your videa card is either not lodged in correctly, unplugged or had failed you. Try the power supply first. Let me know if that does not work.

This sounds like a power supply (PS)issue. If you have another one lying around, pull the PS out and plug onto the defective w/station. It is possible your PC had a 300 watts PS which reached the end of its life cycle. Perhaps you want to purchase 350watss or better yet 400 watts which should not cost you more than 39.00 usd. It is also possible that your videa card is either not lodged in correctly, unplugged or had failed you. Try the power supply first. Let me know if that does not work.

Brilliant to see political differences being sorted out between the two camps. Though it should have never happened to start with,I am glad to see it finalised. What caught my attention more than anything else is the beauty of the presidential palace in the picture both inside and outside. Absolutely gorgeous - look at the lawn, the interior design and the leather seats. Let us hope our brothers in the Southwest and Banadir follow suit. Well done to all parties for their agility, committment and dedication to a peaceful end of the conflict. Best of luck!