The intent here was not to look at the persona or the achievements of the lady whom I highly respect, but her outdated approach and her government's ideological reasoning which is in line with the reasoning of the mid-1990s with respect to gaining recognition. The days when the political elites in the present day Somaliland used to employ rhetorical and theoretical spinning in the company of potential donors and NGOs in the wake of the political calamity in the south are over. Misconstruing and failure to comprehend the political development in over two-thirds of the southern regions of Somalia, of which her advisers and spin doctors should have been aware, is what is inherently lacking in Ms Edna’s interview. The same political and ideological reasoning which applied at the height of the civil war in the mid-90s surely are not going to be applicable in 2003 with the embryonic inceptions of Puntland and Southwest states along with the emergence of Hiiraan and Shabeele regional administrations all of which are in the geographical sphere of the former republic. Fresh thinking interpretive of the realities of the present day Somaliland (Awdal, Hargeysa & Togdheer), and that of the present day southern regions ought to be considered. Indeed the honourable lady is employing similar methodologies of her predecessors in her approach including Dr Dihod (designate envoy) all of whom seem to have been roaming on Noah’s arch whilst trotting in the 21st century. This is a view which neither denies the existence of the present day Somaliland nor attacks the persona of Ms Edna rather highlights the hit-and-run approach, the imbalance and the improbable nature of the target mission. Hypocritical, I disagree. Below the belt, far from it. Ameenah, dear that is the here and now. Not in 1996, but 2003. Ayoub-Sheikh – old chap, you are not suggesting we should not speaks of, nor care about the missteps of the officials in the administration, are you? Angel-Dust – the simple answer my dear is no, I am not on any kind of substance, toxic or otherwise. And I re-read the interview at your advice reaching similar conclusions at all times. In fact I found a couple of other things I could share, but then again I do not wish to be ostracised. Those lines were symptomatic of the lady’s lack of grasp of the changing political situation in the Horn. So long.

Freedom of thought, which implies the possibility of choosing between different ideas, perspectives, and points of views, is what was being challenged by the administration in Hargeysa in the case of Gen. Ghalib. A government totalitarian in nature that controls the raw material (thinking, information, and language) can in principal enslave the minds of the people without them even realising they are not free to practice own thinking. It is the young on the forum who scurry around without a moment’s hesitation to condone these acts which worries me more than anything else. Cheers.

The signs of diverging forces not only in thinking but also in influence are indeed worrisome. Let us all hope it never goes any further than that for all our sakes.

Quote “We are paying a heavy price for being peaceful. … there are no bodies of dead marines being dragged through the streets of Somaliland like there were in Mogadishu. There are no international troops to keep peace … there are no foreigners kidnapped or no hijacks” Edna Ismail, the newly appointed foreign affairs minister. Ms Edna plans to galvanise the globe in her endeavours to market Somaliland as a viable republic in order to secure recognition by disparaging and walking all over the no longer bed-ridden, recuperating body and soul of south Somalia. Instead of putting forth her government’s plan to sustain the delicate stability, develop functioning institutions, maintain economic growth, explore resources, provisions and public service delivery, and guiding framework and policies reflective of the entity’s true attributes and intrinsic elements, she pokes fun of her convalescing sibling. Yet has the audacity to claim knowing the traumatised better than anyone else. Hers and her government’s is all about look at us. We are not kidnapping anyone. Does this warrant recognition? Does the international community wish to promote yet another hungry mouth to feed? Does Ms Edna realise that? http://irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=34962&SelectRegion=Horn_of_Africa So long!

Angel-Dust, Quote “Surely this constitutes high treason and should be dealt with accordingly. He is selfish, greedy and damn right ****** ” Since when did selfishness and greediness constitute or amount to treason?. Quote “But how does democracy deal with a man who represents the interests of his people in a political forum that they clearly and outrightly rejected?” Is this your interpretation of Mr Ghalib’s political beliefs? In other words you are condoning the loss (1 person) of life, injuries (4 in number) and damage to property (two airplanes damaged on the tarmac) due to the political beliefs of the individual? Read the reports from Cige of the BBC for verification. Rasaas ka dhacday garoonka diyaaradaha Hargeysa Posted on Monday, June 23 @ 22:48:27 BST BBC- Axmed Saciid Cige Saaka abbaarihii 11kii subaxnimo ayay rasaasi ka dhacday garoonka diyaaradaha ee Hargeysa kadib markii ay soo weerareen garoonka dhallinyaro hubeysan oo la sheegay inay ka careysan yihiin xariga General Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib oo labadii maalmood ee ugu danbeeyeyba ku xirnaa xabsiga dhexe ee Hargeysa, dawladduna ii sheegtay inay go'aamisay in galbata Jamhuuriyadda la baxday Somaliland laga masaafuriyo Generaalka. Garoonka diyaaradaha ee magaalada Hargeysa oo markiiba aan tegay daqiiqado kadib rasaastaasi ayaa waxaan ku arkay ciidamo isugu jiray boliis iyo milleteri oo qaarkood ay wateen hubka culus ee tiknikada. Taliyaha ciidanka Booliiska Somaliland colonel Cabdilqaadir Muuse oo aan kula kulmay duhurkii madaarka, waxaa uu ii sheegay in dhallinyaro hubeysan oo watay laba gaari oo yar-yar nooca loo yaqaanno MARK II ee fatuuradaha ahi ay dhinaca hawdka ka soo weerareen oo ka soo galeen garoonka, rasaasna ku fureen askartii ilaalineysay halkaasi. Taliyuhu, wuxuu sheegay in saddex ka tirsanaa dableydaasi iyo saddex askari ay ku dhaawacmeen rasaastaasi la isweydaarsaday. Taliyaha ciidanka Booliisku, wuxuu kaloo caddeeyay inay qabteen qaar ka mid ahaa dhallinyarada soo weerartay madaarka. Wasiirka Arrimaha Gudaha Somaliland, Ismaaciil Aden Cusmaan oo isna galabta sheegay isagoo joogay madaarka in dhallinyaradaasi oo tiradoodu ahayd 8 ruux ay haatan wada hayaan, marka laga reebo ayuu yir mid dhintay. Wasiirku wuxuu sheegay in generaal Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib ay dawladdu go'aansatay in la mausaafuriyo oo galabta loo masaafurin doono ayuu yiri dhinaca Jabuuti oo uu isagu codsaday. Wasiirku, wuxuu uga digay sharikadaha diyaaradaha ee yimaadda Somaliland inaay soo qaadaan shakhsiyaadka caanka ah ee la yaqaanno ee denbiyada ka galay Qaranimada Somaliland, waa sida uu hadalka u dhigaye. Cabdiraxmaan Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib oo ah wiil uu dhalay Generaalku ayaa isna ii sheegay maanta in aabihii uu ku jiro jeelka Hargeysa, Madaxweyne Riyaalena buu yiri uu laba qodob inuu yeelo midkood u soo bandhigay oo kala ah in uu ka noqdo federaalka Soomaliya ee uu aaminsanyahay oo sidaasi lagu sii daayo iyo in la masaafuriyo. Cabdiraxmaan Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib, wuxuu intaa ku daray in aabihii Jaamac uu diiday labada qodobba, mar haddii aanay jirin ayuu yiri wax denbi ah oo uu galay oo loo heysto. Suldaan Maxamed Suldaan Cabdilqaadir oo BBC-da la hadlay, wuxuu isna sheegay in madaxweynaha isaga iyo odayaal kale ay ka wada hadleen in Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib la isu dhaafiyo ayuu yiri halkii uu u socday, lana dhawro degenaaanshaha iyo nabadgelyada Somaliland. Rasaasta saaka la isku weydaarsaday madaarka Hargeysa, waxay dhaawacyo fududi ka soo gaareen oo kale laba diyaaradood oo kala leeyihiin sharikada diyaaradaha ee Gallad Air iyo Daallo Airlines, laakiin ma jirto cid shicib ah oo wax ku noqotay halkaasi oo sida dad goob joog ahaa ay sheegeen in rasaastu ay socotay 15 daqiiqo. Hawlihii madaarka Hargeysa, ayaa baadigoodii ku soo noqday duhurkiiba. Genaraal Jaamac Maxamed Qaalib oo lagu qabtay madaarka dayuuradaha ee Hargeysa sabtidii gabbaldhicii, iisagoo ka yimid Nairobi, waxay xukuumadda la baxday Somaliland, gaar ahaan Wasiirka Arrimaha Guduhu hore u sheegay in loo heysto denbiyo la xiriira –waa siduu hadalka u dhigaye- minjoxaabinta jiritaanka qaranimada Somaliland.

Detaining citizens for their political beliefs, suppressing freedom of belief and ideology, and stifling embryonic, intellectual thinking seems NOT to have passed away with the military regime as many proponents of democratic political ideologies would have hoped. Where do the nomads stand on the issue? ././ Dagaal ka dhacay gagida diyaaradaha Hargaysa - Monday, June 23, 2003 at 18:12 Hargaysa, (AllPuntland)- Dhowr iyo toban nin oo ay isku qolo yihiin Jamac Maxamed Qaalib (Jaamac Yare) oo hubaysan watayna 2 gaari ayaaa maanta barqadii soo weeraray Garoonka diyaaradaha Hargaysa, iyagoo muujinaya sida ay uga xun yihiin xariga Jamac Yare oo Jama-yare. Dagaal socday 15 daqiiqo ka dib waxaa ku dhintay nin ka mid ah raggii weerarka soo qaaday, waxaana ku dhaawacmay dhowr qof oo askar iyo shicib isugu jira, dadka dhaawacmay waxaa ku jira ilaa 3 qof oo ka mid ahaa dad la socday mid ka mid ah 4 diyaradood oo garoonka markaas joogay. Waxaa khal khal galay shaqadii garoonka waxaa baqdin xoog leh gashay magaalada oo dhan. Galinkii dambe arrimuhu caadi ayey ahaayeen, waxaadse meel walba ku arkeysaa askar tuuteyaal xiran iyo hub aan hore logu arag Hargeysa in askartu la soo baxdo. Wararka laga heleyo sababta weerarkaan ayaa xaqiijinaya in nimanka weerarka gaystay ay doonayeen inay is hortaagaan masaafurin ladoonay in Hargaysa looga saaro Jamac-Yare. Ilaa shalay iyo ilaa xalay buuq xoog leh oo siyaasadeed ayaa ka jiray Hargeysa, shirarkana looma kala kicin, haba u weynaado mid 8 saac u socday madaxweynaha maamulka la baxay Somaliland Daahir Riyaale Kaahin iyo taageerayaasha JamaC-Yare oo u geeyey Riyaale inuu deg deg u sii daayo, isna uu ku xiray Jamac Yare inuu joojiyo Somaliland diidnimada iwm. Waxaase markii dambe cadaadiskii yeelay Riyaale oo sheegay in maanta subaxnimada loo duulin doono Jamac Yare dalka Jabuuti. Sida ilo xog ogaal ihi u sheegeen AllPuntland Jaamac-Yare qabashadiisu waxay ka dambaysay markii garoonka diyaaradaha Jabuuti looga soo sheegay bilayska Hargaysa inuu Jamac saaran yahay diyaaradii uu ka soo raacay Jabouti, taasi oo markii ay cagaha soo dhigatayba laga soo dhex qabtay. Inkastoo hadda xaaladu caadi ay tahay Hargaysa, haddana, waxaa socda eed iyo is-eedeyn ah wixii dhacay ma astaahileen (ma u dhigmeen) geerida iyo dhaawaca iyo waliba magac-xumida soo gaartay maamulka Riyaale ee is lahaa gool ka dhaliya kooxaha ay siayasadda isku diidan yihiin. Jamac Maxamed Qaalib oo darajada sareeye Gaas ka gaaray Booliiska Somaliya, soona noqday taliyaha booliiska Somaliya iyo wasiir dawladii Somaliya ayaa isagu ka mid ah siyaasiyiinta dhalasho ahaan Hargaysa ka soo jeeda ee aan taageersanayn kala go'a Somaliya, Jamac waxaa garoonka diyaaradaha Hargaysa laga qabtay laba maalin ka hor isagoo la socda diyaarad uu ka soo raacay Nairobi oo uu kaga qaybgalayay shirka Somalida halkaas uga socda, Jamac wuxuu kusii jeeday Muqdisho markii la qabanayay halkaas oo reerkiisu dagan yahay. AllPuntland, Hargaysa

I seem to be missing something here - sayfulaah-almasluul may I ask what is so shameful about reflecting on the events of the past in a moment of nostalgic rendition? What was so disgraceful about their behaviour? And how do you intend to prove that they “ really are war criminals”? And how did you come to the conclusion that they single-handedly brought about the destruction of your beloved country of which you so fondly call “ motherland ”? Enlighten us if you will as mere statements with little substance will not quite do it. Or is that not what courts in your part of the world look for in their deliberations in the process of reaching a verdict, in favour of litigant or otherwise?

A rather cocky bunch, are not you lads? So the Hollywood generation considers itself better than the barrel-of-the-gun generation. I wonder how many of you could do a decent job in presenting a dissertation or a position paper on a subject of your choice and defending it objectively. Or better yet articulate a winning political plan. Presenting and speaking in public is an art by itself, innate in general though tenable through training. Either you have it, or you do not. Have you not seen Dubya being questioned without his spin doctors feeding him pre-coded lines of answers, thus his invention of words (incl. the infamous stratigibally) and analogies (the co-existence of fish and humans) in the English language never heard of. Even some of the greatest orators of this century were known to have buckled on the podium under pressure. Churchill, Roosevelt, Clinton etc., were amongst those to name a few. How many of you have seen supposedly educated Somalis (or persons from the developing countries) in similar situations? Men with no training in any discipline of any kind, public speaking or otherwise will surely muddle, murmur, come across incoherent, foolish in most cases, and definitely clueless in the spotlight considering the condition and circumstances abound. So you see, it is not quite as smooth a ride as one might appear. So long!

Lander- MIS stands for Management Information Systems. MIS covers information management, systems security, systems design & architecture, systems intellegence, systems & networking WAN/LAN, database analysis. Hope that answers your question. Why not be a good chap and tell us your decipline old boy?

As luck would have it, it appears an agreement to a combination of the two forces of influence in the land of Somalis (Isims and leaders) has been reached in terms of who should appoint MPs. I reckon this to be in line with the suggestions that some of you have already put forth. The number of MPs (450) though has already been stamped seems to have generated a host of troubles primarily from foreign elements contributing in many aspects though financial only seems noticeable to the flow and facilitation of the conference. Their protest as to the number of MPs is said to have been influenced by the disintegrating TNG/Arte and the dubious G8. Fort instance Puntland is said to have allocated 10 Isims – 2 for each of the regions of Bari, Sool, Mudug and Sanaag whereas 1 each for Nugaal and Hawd of the 6 regions comprising Puntland- to partake in the conference. I expect Southwest will manage to apportion their allotment among RRA-old and RRA-new with less trouble. But the big question is, how is this to be approached in Banaadir and its environs? Whom will the TNG/Arte which always claims to represent the entire country contrary to popular belief and realities on the ground appoint as their Isims? How about the G8? Murky I know, but then that is the reality of the present day Somalia. Let us wait and see where it all ends. For those of you who take pleasure in reading preceding events of the past for reflection if nothing more, and to find insight as to the nature of conflict in today’s world, Somalia in particular as opposed to the yesteryears, or perhaps centuries could draw a parallel for better understanding from a time when men like Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Adams etc., in the late seventeenth hundred contested similar issues under different circumstances. Does this not sound familiar relative to the ongoing SPP conference in Nairobi. Different calibre of characters of course, but identical issues in many aspects. Read along you may be surprised. “ ….. The Federal Convention convened in the State House (Independence Hall) in Philadelphia on May 14, 1787, to revise the Articles of Confederation. Because the delegations from only two states were at first present , the members adjourned from day to day until a quorum of seven states was obtained on May 25. Through discussion and debate it became clear by mid-June that, rather than amend the existing Articles, the Convention would draft an entirely new frame of government. All through the summer, in closed sessions, the delegates debated, and redrafted the articles of the new Constitution. Among the chief points at issue were how much power to allow the central government, how many representatives in Congress to allow each state, and how these representatives should be elected--directly by the people or by the state legislators. The work of many minds, the Constitution stands as a model of cooperative statesmanship and the art of compromise” For further reading you may visit the Law Library of Yale University. So long!

RaMpAgE – if we do not discuss, debate and analyse issues of concern such as crimes against humanity on a healthy discourse, in other words air our grievances in public forums not just for entertainment but for creating public awareness, do you suggest we simply slide it under the carpet as it were, and bring it all out in 10 years time for the mud to break loose all over again? I think not my old chap. Speaking of issues of this nature in public, objectively of course, is not only healthy but also a remedy of some sort. Any person of position of power believed with supporting evidence permissible in a court room, and not assumed, to have abused authority entrusted with him/her ought to be named including generals in uniform who ordered the poisoning of the swamps and water wells in Mudug in the late 70s during the SSDF armed struggle, burning of entire villages, slaughtering, torturing, raping, confiscating properties, and mortifying civilians for their political beliefs and associations. Included also would be similar atrocities in Hargeysa and Burco during the SMN insurrections in the late 80s. Additional to the said crimes against humanity would be the resulting slaying of civilians in the early 90s in Banadir and its environs. Killings by the USC, and SNM loyalists and forces of civilians in Kismayo, Baydhabo and Mogadishu; Borama, Erigabo, Hargeysa, and Burco ought to be taken into account. Forgive one another on a large scale for life to stay on course preferably yes, but never should we forget the atrocities and the genocide acts that had ravaged throughout the country as early as the mid 70s and as late as to the present. I say names ought to be recorded for historical purposes if nothing else. So long.

To push the discussion forward, let us look at the following definitions derived from the Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, and Against Humanity, December 20, 1945 in relation to the present day situation in Somalia: i) War Crimes. Atrocities or offences against persons or property, constituting violations of the laws or customs of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. ii) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offences, including but not limited to murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where perpetrated … ” Now based on the above definitions, who in the whole region of Somalia from Zaylac to RasHafun to RasCamboni committed acts of criminal nature, thus qualify to be called a war criminal including both the living and the dead? Let us set up a scenario where we list possible names of people who might have committed acts of criminal nature, or are suspected of having committed such acts by region, and by era beginning after the Ethiopian/Somali war of 1977. Since the persons concerned have not been found guilty of any crime(s), perhaps we could refrain from branding them criminals until proven guilty of the said crimes(s). Suspects of criminal acts might suit better in the interim. And perhaps you could tell us why you believe one is a suspect of criminal acts. Somaliland - Puntland - Southwest - Banadir and its environs - Juba - So long!

Entrepreneur – I can image the scepticism and the disinclination to trusting leaders (warlords) with the task of lifting the mutilated morale of the society, the predicament of them gaining the trust of the people, and the once-bitten-twice-shy attitude towards them which truly is shared by the majority as the natural relic of the grisly past that unfortunately has become synonymous with the word Somali. Virtuous it has been argued for the long term, and vile as suggested by the myopic minority for the moment at least amongst the intellectuals, I think we might have just flipped a new page. I was never so enthused by the Arte conference for the actors who were pushing the wagon forward were the very culprits and remnants of the military regime, were rather roguish bunch with devilish agenda, were neither truly resolute about the country nor the people, and thus did not consider any of them suitable in one way or another. In other words, the old regime was trying to resurrect itself from the ashes. The present conference though ambitious and I have my reservations about the passiveness and acceptance of the demands on some seems in balance on most accounts in my view, and might produce the desired result. Despite the utopic nature of the desire to see a government with neither a parliament nor ministries, which I trust it is not quite feasible on practical terms and proceedings of historical perspective, I trust the discussion of whom shall appoint MPs (Isims or leaders) might continue. Yes to the bottom-up approach, or the building blocks approach, where each state or region appoints its representatives, leaders, and establishes its local administration, authority, and constitution, institutions and so forth as have been done by Puntland, Somaliland, and Southwest to some extent. Bashi- let us explore the issue relating to the Isims: the old versus the new. The former being the handful few (and their successors)prior to the military regime whereas the latter is new phenomenon which has gotten out of hand during and after the military regime. I understand Puntland by itself has close to 49 Isims if not more whereas in reality there only should have been no more than a dozen. Do you reckon a blend of the two (50/50) could perhaps be the solution to the problem? So long!

I have not laughed this hard for a long while. Dantay1 – you truly have an imaginary, creative mind – the phantom from Galgadud, quick feet the Borama bomber, the gun from Galkacyo. My bet is on the "Gun from Gaglkacyo" for his track record going back to 1978 is undisputable. Not only can he recover from a left hook, but puts together a deadly combination. He seems one step ahead of the bunch. His camp is said to be the only side that has an agenda, a plan and the connections - made up of true champions. He is as you put it a veteran acquainted with murky matters. Keep it up!

The issue of crimes against humanity and “war criminals” in the case of Somalia has been so frequently raised, passionately debated, regularly approached and then shied away though it will have to be studied objectively sometime in the very near future all things being equal. The question is whom do we (Somalis) consider a “war criminal”? Is there a definition in existence of what constitutes a war criminal in the Somali culture? Is this a new phenomenon, or had it existed before, what were the traditional and cultural modes of resolving such issues? Are we to adopt the UN definition of crimes against humanity, or is a Somali definition needed? Who are the war criminals in the Somalis context? Before we get to the names of known individuals, could we objectively define what makes one a war criminal in relation to one’s deeds, attributes, nature of the felony in relation to the injured party, and most of all do we really have to have a criminal tribunal? Cheers

Dear Nomands, It is being debated in the conference halls in the Somali PP, who should appoint members of parliament (MPs) for the federal government in Somalia? It has been proposed that Traditional Isims (aka Gurti or Malaaqyo) should do the honours. Another proposal which favours leaders (aka warlords) has also been put forth. How much confidence do you have in Isims? How much trust do you have in leaders? Considering empirical and historical events in the local as wells as in other cultures, which of the teams do you reckon is cognisant of the ills, virtues and providence of the society? And why do you think so? Cheers.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Back from a brief getaway to find the twist of the debate being so vulgarly decompossed by crude analysis of irrelevant factors on the peripheral concepts of no importance at least to the subject matter, dynamic yet impertinent, which neither add value nor quality to the content of the discussion. Despite the egotistic drivel by some and infantile bickering by others, I wish to thank the few who tried to keep the discussion on track. Now, let us see if we could steer the boat back on to civil waters. I strongly believe as many have pointed out that a federal system of government consummated on the spot and by the end of the meeting is the only practical way to resuscitate the ailing spirit of the nation, and as such the right decision has been taken. This takes into account the decade old gridlock and political stalemate, lack of cohesion amongst leaders, and failure to share power, failure by the elite (scholars and autocrats) in sharing the leadership role with the leaders, or removing the power from their hands at least as is the case in Banadir and its environs, passiveness on the part of the Isims who played their role in diluting the cultural hierarchy in valuing material objects (money in their case) than cultural and societal wellbeing not understanding the detrimental nature of their deeds all at the expense of the ordinary person. This is also the overriding argument presented by those with the foresight to put such proposal on the table, and in the end it has been concurred that the federal system and a whopping 450 MPs will constitute the future government of Somalia. Illmatic – I share the highlighted ambiguity at the state level of the prospective relations trade or otherwise between states, or states with foreign territories. It is not defined because it is deemed un-chartered waters to which implications none of the participants of the conference are privy, and is a process in motion or in progress along the lines of “will cross the bridge when I come to it” philosophy: a rather reactive mode of thinking if you will. Surely it will pose problems for a society like ours which has not produced enough autocrats, and will usher in a host of unforeseen particulars by itself. But there is also the advantage of developing and building as you go along considering circumstances and conditions on the ground which I trust suits the nature of the Somali conflict. Imposing grand ideas of textbook material is far more debilitating than adopting a locally cultivated and culturally adequate mode of governance fraught with its own ambiguities, uncertainties and of course problems. Dantay1 - Nothing I thinks is impossible so long as one keeps open-mind and sees the process as an ongoing, fluid one rather than morphemic morbid written on a slate as if inferred from the Holly Book. It is a human made systems erroneous in nature ridden with its own blemishes, flaws, and imperfections. Bari_Nomad – I read all three prior to the the discussion being commenced. Sorry if you obtain one late. And at that I reckon we could put this baby to rest. Perhaps now we could address the issues of: who should elect the parliament? Traditional Isims or the leaders? And on the same stroke, we could also study the issue of “war criminals” each under a separate thread. Again thank you for your contributions. So long!

Thank you again. It would appears most of us are more in favour of the immediate implementation of the constitution and formation of a decentralised federal system of government. Ilmatic, whilst I see your point, I think you will agree that there actually are three drafts, the original two drafted by the committee which has split into two camps due to difference in principal along with the copy drafted by the harmonisation team. Having said that, after a thorough review and participation of educated discussions examining all three drafts by persons acquainted with constitutional law and contemporary politics, suggestions as to the nature of the split and disagreement between the committee has been put forth in that proponents of the more centralised form of government were predominantly from the Banadir region (and not south per se) whereas existing administrations favoured a more decentralised federal form. The interpretation of this is said to stem from the notion that with a more centralised system of government law and order could be restored by the use of necessary force if need be, and considering the present situation in Mogadishu, it is logical to see why faction leaders in the former capital would take this type of system to heart. While on the other hand, existing administrations neither wish to see their embryonic systems disrupted, nor a repeat of the abuse of power by a centralised administration. After all, that has been the impetus of the struggle against the military regime. This by no means is to be regarded as the Holy Grail and should be viewed along those lines.It is noteworthy though that administrations in Shabeele and Hiraan actually are in favour of such a system much like Puntland, Southwest, and Somaliland (though its case is of a different genre at least for the time being). So you see my dear chap, it is not an issue of north-south divide rather more along the lines of regional aspiration and denomination. “Why would a region within a country need political relationship with another country?” you asked? I myself believe the notion is rather noble,theoretical, rather obscure, and is not defined for it to make meaning, but it is my understanding that it was regarded to be along the line of the US constitution where a State i.e. MN could engage in economic and trade treaties with a foreign country provided it does not violate Federal constitution. I do not know how much familiar you are with the US system of government, but consider the governor (ventura of MN) who travelled to Cuba and China under the premise of securing trade and economic pacts with the said counties to benefit state economy though in clear violation of the US foreign policy which does not sanction trade with Cuba, and to some extend with China. The question is how did he manage to reconcile state and federal constitutions? It is because the federal constitution neither prohibits not does it permit states exploring economic treaties of interest to the state economy in particular, and country as a whole whereas states reserve the right to pursue own interests so long as theirs do not conflict federal which has the overriding authority in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, I understand Scottish parliament is entertaining a plan to adopt the Euro even though no such plan has been tabled for approval or otherwise in 10 Downing Street. Will it happen? None the wiser! As for the issue concerning 450 MPs , though I see the enormity of the number relative to the resources, population and size of the country, I do not see much trouble with it at least to begin with. The reason being once you break the number into two chamber houses (senate and representatives – 170+/- as opposed to 280+/-) it becomes manageable, and thus less traumatic to conceive. Additionally, the wisdom here is to form an all include government, and not exclusive leaving individuals who might stagnate the fragile federal government prior to its taking shape. However, once the government retains control and shapes itself as a functioning body past the initial tenure (3 or 5 year term not determined yet), the number could be halved or reduced to half the original size, say less than 250 for both houses still remaining cognisant of the 4.5 formula which would then leave us with a lean, less costly government. Entrepreneur, I share your grievances bruv, but if we do not learnt to forgive, not necessarily forget, how are we to proceed with our lives if we remain fixated upon our tragedy-ridden past? Are we not going against empirical and historical precedence of the old? For instance, where would Europe, the US or South Africa be today had they still been holding grudges and vendettas resulting form the first War, second War, apartheid, or internal conflicts for that matter. Think about the atrocities committed in Leningrad (St Petersburg) in the early forties, casualties of the civil wars in the US, the massacres by the British in India (1.5mm in a single day), and the list goes on, and on. Tribunals I believe shall be formed in good time, perhaps now is not quite the time. Nonetheless, I like your passion, and hope to see more people with such fervour so far as such issues are concerned. So long,

I thank you all for your contributions. Now, allow me to reflect upon a couple of points raised herein. HornAfrique, interestingly enough you brought up the case of Puntland and its likelihood of seeking to secede in the event of the conference falling short to produce the desired result: a decentralised federal system of government to the minutest level. Having reviewed both drafts of the proposed constitution along with the draft put forth by the harmonization team lead by Professor Samatar of University of Minnesota, I understand Puntland and Southwest share your view favouring the immediate formation of a federalist system of government as and when, and are opposed to vesting the power and authority of determining how and when in the hands of the executive office (PM), congress, or parliament. Their desire it has been suggested derives its energy from the fact that Puntland possesses a constitution, functioning institutions and embryonic institutions with the necessary state organs in place whereas Southwest though throttled at infant phase, and not as solid have commenced towards sustaining similar mechanism of some sort. And as such, it is therefore deemed that adopting a federal system at the completion of the meeting would favour these groups who are considered shall gain its full benefits. On the other hand, there are the faction leaders in Bandir and its environs who neither envisage nor seem able to form any type of social or governmental structure, and not willing to entrust anyone including themselves with the supreme authority to forging one. Their infatuation with a heavily centralised system of government it has been suggested has its roots in the fact that Mogadishu has remained the centre of the universe for Somali politics since independence, and for their failure to agree upon a mode of governance. The federalist system is said to be regarded unfavourable by this group for they could not fathom how it could benefit them since it shall be up to them to start from scratch in determining what and how to organise local authorities with minimal interference, but with the help of course of a federal government. Considering the aforementioned rendition of events how do you reckon an all inclusive, acceptable systems of government could be attained without alienating a group, or titling the scale to one side or another? How could one convince the Mogadishu faction leaders of the benefits of a decentralised, federal system whilst outlining the shortcomings and impracticalities of a centralised mode of governance? Entrepreneur, whilst I concur with you on the issue concerning war criminals and wish to see some form of retribution against perpetrators and compensation for victims of the civil war throughout Somali territories, I trust there is a committee that has been assigned to study and advise future government in ways to address such matters, and therefore do think it is probably outside the scope of this discussion. Perhaps once we reach an understanding of the suitable track in attaining a desirable constitution viewing things from various perspectives, then we could approach that case. Whilst still on the same issue, sister Maandeeq, I do hope you are not suggesting rewarding criminals for their unGodly deeds? Bari_Nomad, you mentioned attaining greater Somalia through peaceful means, could you elaborate as to how please if you do not mind my asking? So long!

A rather lengthy I understand but informative report providing some background information as to the nature and process of the present Somali R&P Process. Read along it might assist the formation of an opinion in one way or another. ././ An Undiscovered Option: A Way Forward for Somalia? Executive Summary For over a decade, the Somali crisis has represented the most complete and intractable case of state collapse to confront the international community. Despite the declaration of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia at Arta, Djibouti, in August 2000, sub-national polities such as Somaliland, Puntland and (to a lesser extent) the administration of the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA), continue to describe the political topography with greater meaning and authenticity than the concept of a transitional national government. Somali territory continues to serve as a transit zone for arms, drugs other contraband, and provides a potential platform for cross-border rebel groups and militant Islamist organizations. In sum, the Arta process has transformed Somalia from a “failed state” into a “quasi-state”: a state that possesses international juridical status, but empirically exists only in name. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, intensified reflections on Somalia’s enduring statelessness and its implications for regional instability have awakened renewed international interest in the search for a solution. The IGAD summit in Khartoum in early January concluded with an offer to bring Somali representatives together for a meeting soon, to be hosted in Nairobi and prepared by an IGAD Ministerial delegation. This new situation presents both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, there exists the potential for concerted international action in support of an enduring, broad-based political solution for Somalia; on the other hand, the international community’s heightened sense of urgency is likely to make quick fixes appear attractive, occluding less obvious, more durable solutions. A deliberate approach, based on detailed, comprehensive and objective assessment of the situation, is required if this opportunity for constructive engagement in Somalia is not to be missed. This paper outlines some of the: • challenges to be addressed in restoring peace and functional government to Somalia; • fundamental principles on which a peace process might be built; • institutional options for a future Somali state; and • considerations for a successful transition to democracy. It concludes by suggesting a possible design for such a peace process. Such a process would require sustained international commitment, disinterested and impartial leadership, realistic objectives, a flexible time frame, and broad participation from across Somali society. Even under the best of circumstances, however, realizing a comprehensive agreement at the conclusion of the process is highly unlikely (and possibly even undesirable). Instead, an iterative (and possibly conditional) implementation of the accords may be necessary. No single option can hope to satisfy everybody. But if a new initiative persuades a critical mass of the Somali people that a new agreement serves the interests of all, not of some, and that the way forward holds promise, not menace, then it will have broken new ground in the search for peace in Somalia. State collapse and political reconstruction in Somalia Somalia’s brief history as a corrupt and predatory state has left its mark on political dynamics in the country since the collapse of Mohamed Siyad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991. The abusive practices of the military regime – state-sponsored violence, institutionalized repression, authoritarian and corrupt leadership – comprehensively and enduringly damaged Somali confidence in the institutions of the state. Over the past decade, Somalis have resisted national solutions, instead establishing smaller, more accountable political arrangements in what some have termed ‘uncentralized’ political reconstruction. Through this diffuse process, nearly two-thirds of Somali territory achieved relative security, stability, and functional (or at least incipient) administration between 1996 and 2000: o In February 1997, after nearly two years of civil strife, peace was restored to Somaliland and the administration subsequently broadened and deepened its ambit. o In July 1998, the Puntland administration was established in northeast Somalia, and the region embarked on an unprecedented period of economic and political development. o In June 1999, the Rahanweyne Resistance Army (RRA) expelled occupying Habar Gidir militia from Bay and Bakool regions and took tentative steps to establish a regional administration. o In Mogadishu, following unsuccessful efforts to install a “Banadir” administration in late 1998, a loose coalition of business leaders and Islamic courts came together to provide the city with a degree of security and stability unprecedented since the government’s collapse. o In the Juba Valley and parts of central Somalia, community and political leaders took stock of developments elsewhere and began to explore the prospects for local administrations in their own areas. The international community acknowledged and endorsed these positive developments. The UN system began, in 1998, to describe Somalia in terms of recovery, transition, and crisis zones. In 1999, the members of the IGAD Partners Forum meeting in Rome endorsed a ‘peace-dividend, bottom-up’ approach to reconstruction intended to consolidate gains in stable regions and encourage less settled areas to follow suit, ultimately leading to form of political federation. More commonly known as the ‘building blocks approach’, it was less an ‘approach’ than an acknowledgement that people-driven political processes and the functional, responsible authorities they produced might eventually afford the basis for a national settlement. In this context, the President of Djibouti convened a Somali peace conference to be held at Arta, Djibouti, in August 2000. The conference resulted in the declaration of a Transitional National Government (TNG) for Somalia, including a president, parliament, and transitional charter. Its promise, however, has not been realized. Although an uneasy international consensus has endorsed the Arta framework as the basis for future peace-building efforts in Somalia, the lack of real progress so far towards establishing peace in Somalia calls for a new and more creative approach. At issue are not the qualitative merits or demerits of the TNG and its leadership, but rather the need to rethink the whole system of government of a future Somali state. The choice of appropriate and sustainable political institutions will be the pivotal factor in deciding whether a peace initiative succeeds or fails, and whether or not stable, democratic government evolves in Somalia over the long-term. First Principles Prior experience of political reconstruction in Somalia provides critical ‘lessons learned’ upon which future international engagement can build. Some of these lessons have become so sharply defined that they might serve as a set of “first principles” in pursuit of establishing sustained and meaningful dialogue leading to a durable, positive peace and a democratic system of government. Somali-driven The agenda and structure of the dialogue must reflect the individual and collective concerns of the key Somali actors. This will require considerable investment in process-design together with Somali leaders if they are to be convinced that it is in their interests to come to the bargaining table. Other measures to ensure an appropriate level of Somali leadership and commitment within the peace process may include the establishment of independent Somali advisory bodies and/or a Somali venue for parts of the process. Issue-oriented The definition of appropriate institutional arrangements, electoral systems, and instruments of justice is essential to a lasting peace and functioning democracy in Somalia. The fundamental issues of compensation, occupied territory, justice and self-determination must also be adequately addressed if peace accords are to have real substance. External technical support to the peace process could help to elaborate options for Somalis to consider and facilitate the deliberation of such issues. Impartial The peace process must not be perceived to favour one actor over others or to subvert key political actors. Since the Arta Conference, some external actors have aligned themselves with the TNG, whose claims to national leadership are disputed within the country and thus this alignment represents an obstacle to dialogue. Likewise the TNG’s perceived ‘ownership’ of the Arta process renders it an unattractive framework to other Somali leaders. While a new initiative may build on the achievements of the Arta conference, it should represent a new chapter in the Somali peace process in which the TNG leadership is encouraged to see itself as part of the solution, in cooperation with other de facto Somali authorities. Federative Broad consensus exists that Somalia’s future system of government will be federal (or confederal). The TNG Charter proposes it and Puntland insists on it; the only hope of peacefully reuniting Somaliland with Somalia depends on it. But the final form of Somalia’s government is less important than the process through which it comes together. In other words, Somalia needs a federation less than it needs a ‘federative’ process in which the founding members collectively transfer a limited amount of power to a jointly established central authority. Iterative It is unrealistic to seek full and simultaneous agreement on all aspects of the Somali crisis. The ambitious objectives of previous peace initiatives have inadvertently imposed an ‘all-or-nothing’ logic on the process, tackling reconciliation, sovereignty, constitutional arrangements and power sharing all at once. The failure of such comprehensive accords negates what limited agreement may have been reached on specific issues. A future peace process needs to be flexible enough to accommodate incremental or interim solutions such as the staggered engagement of Somali leaders, phased implementation of an agreement, or asymmetrical sovereign arrangements. Three dimensional o Time: previous initiatives have lasted for several weeks or at best several months; resolution of the Somali crisis will require sustained engagement over longer periods, as in Burundi, Western Sahara, Northern Ireland and the Middle East. o Depth: a successful process must engage the broadest possible participation at all levels of Somali society, not just political and civic ‘elites’, in order to ensure that agreements and decisions are deliverable. Public opinion in different regions must be accommodated within the process, not confronted ex post facto. o Breadth: previous accords have been of a general nature, postponing negotiation of specific issues (i.e. occupied land, war crimes, compensation etc.) until later. Their resultant superficiality has rendered them fragile, and of short duration. Future processes should take the form of parallel negotiations on multiple issues; the agreements reached on specific issues could then eventually be conflated in a single umbrella accord. Together, the above principles suggest a path by which democratic institutions, practices and beliefs could be built and strengthened in Somali society, and the development of a system of government in which competition and conflict are managed through established institutions and procedures rather than by resort to force. Lasting peace will require more than the momentary goodwill and determination generated in the heat of high-profile conferences: it will require the patient, painstaking restoration of trust of Somalis in one another, and in the institutions of government they will inevitably create. Institutional Options To a certain extent, the institutional contours of a future Somali state enjoy broad consensus among Somalis: o a constitutional republic enshrining Islam as the state religion and the Shari’a as the basis of law o a high degree of decentralization, probably within a federal framework o a democratic system of government characterized by some form of proportional representation and regular, competitive elections o a semi-presidential (possibly presidential) executive. This is not to deny the existence of alternative points of view, nor to endorse these features as representing the best institutional choices for Somalia, but simply an attempt to identify a common denominator. Unfortunately, these few points of consensus are far outnumbered by the points of contention– including the fundamental issue of whether or not the Somali Republic should be reconstituted as a single state. This section will attempt to describe the principal institutional options promoted by political elites from different clans and territorial affiliations. Such a categorization is necessarily simplistic, but it helps to describe the broad parameters of the debate. 1: The Arta Framework Federal or decentralized unitary structure, devolutionary process The framework developed at Arta, embodied in the transitional charter, assigns responsibility to transitional, national (read: ‘central’) institutions for the leadership of the national reconciliation process and the drafting of a federal constitution. The TNG represents an integrative approach to reconciliation, encouraging the formation of political alliances across lines of conflict within centralized transitional structures. The Arta process has been largely successful at securing participation from most main regions and clans, but in so doing it has to a large extent sacrificed meaningful representation, political influence, and administrative control. The Arta process posits an approach to future institutional arrangements that is devolutionary and distributive: during the interim period, sovereignty and authority are vested in centralized institutions, which will subsequently devolve specified powers to subordinate regions. The distribution of posts, territorial/administrative boundaries, executive responsibilities etc. will be centrally defined. Although the transition charter proposes a federal Somali government, such a process might de facto produce a decentralized unitary state. This approach has failed to win the support of other de facto Somali authorities who accept neither the TNG’s authority, nor its pre-eminent role within the Arta framework. 2: Building Blocks Federal structure, multilateral associative process This approach has primarily been advocated by Puntland’s leadership, but has at times been associated with the Rahanweyne, and also with ***** groups in the Juba valley. The ‘multilateral’ or ‘building blocks’ approach proposes a federal government comprising a limited number of states (probably four or five). The principal difference between this approach and the Arta framework is that the Arta framework emphasizes a federal outcome, while the ‘building blocks’ approach requires a federative process. In other words, the ‘building blocks’ approach proposes that de facto Somali authorities come together to establish a new central government. The powers and responsibilities of the national government would be negotiated between the federating entities, not devolved from the centre. One obvious drawback of this approach is that de facto authorities only exist in some parts of Somalia, not all. Another is that the definition of the internal boundaries of a federal state could become a major bone of contention within the peace process. 3: Re-unification Confederal structure, bilateral associative process This approach has emerged as an implicit proposal of the current Somaliland leadership and probably represents the minimum set of conditions through which Somaliland might be peacefully persuaded to accept continuing political association with Somalia. This approach implies a confederal union of two sovereign entities: Somaliland and Somalia. The rationale for this approach is based on Somaliland’s current de facto sovereign status and its prior existence as an independent state. Essentially, this approach represents an attempt by the Somaliland leadership to renegotiate an association of Somaliland and Somalia on more favourable terms than those agreed to in the failed 1960 union. This approach is unpopular within Somaliland, where it is perceived as a betrayal of Somaliland’s aspirations to international recognition, and also in southern Somalia where it is perceived as awarding to Somaliland political importance and prerogatives disproportionate to its population and territory. Confederation could potentially provide an alternative to Somaliland’s secession, but does not provide an institutional solution for the South. 4: Secession Unilateral or negotiated dissolution of union This platform is associated only with Somaliland; no other Somali political entity aspires to independence from Somalia. Proponents of this view typically argue that Somaliland has de facto already exercised its right to self-determination: dissolution of union was affected by the 1991 declaration of independence and subsequently reiterated at the conferences of Borama (1993) and Hargeysa (1996). The referendum of May 31, 2001, technically speaking, was not a plebiscite on the question of independence, but a vote in favour of a new constitution that reaffirms Somaliland’s sovereign status. A variation of this position acknowledges that achievement of de jure international recognition may be expedited by a negotiated settlement between Somalia and Somaliland: for example, were a friendly southern Somali government to recognize Somaliland or were attempts to negotiate a new confederal union to fail. Like confederation, secession fails to provide an institutional solution for the South. 5: Unexplored Options It appears that no single option described above can provide an institutional solution for Somalia. A combination of alternatives, or some other creative arrangement, would have a better chance of accommodating Somalia’s diverse political preferences. Setting aside, for the purposes of this paper, the question of Somaliland’s independence, possible scenarios might include: • a ‘one-country, two (or more) systems’ arrangement in which authorities of differing levels of autonomy co-exist within a single recognized state; • a north-south confederation, with a unitary state in one part and a federal government in the other; • an interim confederal or federal arrangement including a phased timetable for integration over the longer term (similar to the European process of integration); • focus on a southern Somali peace process prior to resolution of the North-South problem, leading to effective partition of the country (like Cyprus) over the mid- to long-term; • a period of international trusteeship (similar to that of East Timor) while new national institutions are negotiated and put in place. When combined with possible transitional considerations like those outlined in the next section, a great number of combinations and permutations are possible. Setting in motion a process that will ultimately define an option for Somalia rooted in the principles elaborated above should be the primary objective of a future Somali peace process. Transitional considerations Appropriate institutional arrangements constitute a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a lasting political settlement in Somalia. This section suggests some of the issues to be addressed if Somalia is to complete a successful transition to democracy. The list is by no means comprehensive and additional issues are certain to be raised by Somali leaders and their constituents during the course of a dialogue. Reconciliation Although peace has been achieved throughout most of Somali territory, reconciliation will take much longer. Left unresolved, some critical issues could yet undermine the force of a negotiated settlement. The most commonly raised concerns include the following: o Restoration: The issue of restoration of squatted homes and stolen property will be an important consideration, particularly in urban areas and the capital, Mogadishu. o Withdrawal: Military occupation of land obtains principally in areas of Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba, but may occur elsewhere on a smaller scale. o Compensation: Compensation for loss of life and/or property is a primordial component of Somali customary law. However, while compensation may still be relevant in local disputes, it is likely to be of only secondary importance in a national settlement. Electoral system An appropriate electoral system will contribute much to the perceived legitimacy of elected leaders and is more likely to contain political competition within agreed, non-violent parameters; an ill-conceived system may bring about the disengagement of disaffected groups from the democratic process and ultimately a return to armed conflict. Given the ‘segmentary lineage’ character of Somali society and the perceived importance of clan representation in political institutions and the civil service, an electoral system designed to produce an inclusive form of proportional representation will provide a degree of stability in the transitional period that majoritarian systems cannot deliver. The peace process must give Somali leaders the opportunity to study and deliberate different types of electoral systems in order to agree on the most appropriate choice for the transitional period. Transitional justice Like many conflicts, the Somali civil war has witnessed war crimes and/or crimes against humanity. Prospects for transitional justice arrangements are complicated by the involvement of senior officials of the Barre regime and alleged war criminals in the leadership of most Somali factions and administrations. However, it is unlikely that any peace accord will stick unless it includes some provisions for coping with the past. Possible options include: o Amnesty of alleged war criminals. In the long term, however, amnesty could undermine the legitimacy of future government by failing to satisfy a sense of justice among certain groups. Failure to bring known war criminals to account might also tarnish the moral authority of the new leadership and threaten democratic consolidation. o An international criminal tribunal could help to address crimes committed by government forces in northwest Somalia in the late 1980s and, on a smaller scale, in northeast Somalia in 1978-9. Factional militia have been accused of war crimes during the early 1990s, notably in Bay region, Kismayo and Mogadishu. o Disqualification (“lustration”) of certain categories of officials of the former government, or of faction leaders, might accomplish many of the same objectives as criminal prosecution with fewer political risks. o A truth commission, with limited powers of prosecution or punishment, could meet with greater political acceptance than more assertive strategies for coping with the past, but - like an amnesty - it may fail to satisfy the desire of aggrieved communities that justice be done, diluting the potency of the peace process. Here again, no single option may address Somali needs and perceptions of justice. An appropriate combination of measures needs to be considered within the framework of a future peace process. Rule of law: legislatures, legal traditions and the judiciary The vitality and integrity of the legislative and judicial branches can provide important checks on executive power. The development of these institutions in parallel with a new administration could help to broaden the opportunities for power-sharing, while limiting the real and perceived potential of a future Somali state to repeat past patterns of abuse. Their current weakness represents a serious handicap to the processes of peacebuilding and democratization. Strengthening of legislative and judicial institutions – before and after a comprehensive Somali peace settlement - will be crucial to the emergence of a stable democratic order. Military, security and police forces Given the record of abuses and atrocities perpetrated within Somalia by the military and security forces, the reconstitution of these institutions is especially sensitive. In addition to the many factional, commercial and freelance militia around the country, Somaliland, Puntland, and the TNG all possess standing military and police forces. In the short term, disarmament – a term too often used in Somalia to camouflage one-sided military consolidation – can only succeed if it is firmly situated in a comprehensive confidence-building process; over the longer term, a political settlement must accommodate concerns about clan and regional balance, integration of regional security forces and civil-military relations. A Way Forward? The principles and scenarios described above help to give shape to a possible Somali peace initiative. The final section of this paper suggests what a peace process might look like. But such a process will not materialize on its own: an element of international leadership, as well as some degree of co-operation from concerned governments, will be preconditions for its success. The suggestions that follow are intended to stimulate reflection and debate on a possible way forward, not to be prescriptive. How best to proceed can only be determined in consultation with – and preferably by – the Somali leaders themselves. Talks About Talks Over the years, the Somali peace process has been characterized by irregular, urgent spurts of dialogue in high-pressure conferences – the timing for which is decided by their international sponsors. Such meetings are not terribly different from inviting Somali leaders to enter a dark room, switch on lights, and strike a deal with whomever else they find there. Inevitably, critical issues are addressed inadequately, if at all, and agreements fail to take hold. Instead, the first phase of a new initiative should involve a period of conciliation intended to establish conditions favourable to a direct dialogue between the principal actors, to identify major issues of contention, and to map out a way forward. This will likely require intensive ‘shuttle mediation’ over a period of several months between Somali leaders, concerned governments and regional/international organizations. Through such consultation, it is almost inevitable that issues such as institutional alternatives, transitional justice, occupation, compensation and disarmament will be put forward as proposed items for the agenda. The outcomes of this phase should emphasize ‘process design’: the agenda for dialogue, the structure of negotiations (including the role of any third party), and possibly a declaration of “principles” governing the dialogue. In this phase, Somali civic leaders, professionals, and associations might play an advisory role, proposing items for the agenda and acting as a sounding board for specific elements of process design. Two-Tier (‘Research-based’) Dialogue The second phase might involve a ‘two-tier’ dialogue: a first ‘tier’ of formal negotiations between political leaders and a second “tier” of informal, country-wide, research-based consultations engaging a broad cross-section of Somali society. The formal dialogue could be structured as decision-making plenary group, supplemented by working subgroups. The plenary would serve as the formal decision making body, capable of confirming agreements reached by subgroups. A number of “standing” subgroups would probably be assigned to address separate agenda items, but ad hoc subgroups might also be required on specific issues. One evident advantage of this format would be the simultaneous involvement of several dozen people (almost certainly over 100) in the formal negotiating process, broadening the scope of negotiation beyond a select few. Given the contentious nature of many issues, and the futility of discussing them in the abstract, each working group would dispose of the services of a facilitation team whose responsibilities might include: o documenting the deliberations of the working group o conducting research and providing background materials upon request o organizing field visits and public consultations for members of the working group on specific issues (second tier dialogue). Second-tier dialogue would provide ‘research’ inputs from a broad-cross section of Somali society for the consideration of the working groups. At the same time, it would ensure that the public remain informed and engaged in critical issues under discussion in the first-tier negotiations. Ideally, members of the working groups would participate in second-tier consultations, allowing them to test particular moves or concessions with a broader constituency, while helping to engender a real and immediate sense of accountability among leaders towards their constituents. Since political leaders are unlikely to agree to be bound by the outcomes of ‘second tier’ deliberations, these should be perceived as a resource, not a substitute for, formal political dialogue. Judicious involvement of the media and civic education activities dedicated to key elements of the first tier dialogue would enhance the level of public engagement in - and influence on – the process. Cumulative, conditional outcomes The agreements achieved by each working group would eventually be formalized and amalgamated within a final ‘umbrella’ accord. However, it is highly unlikely (and possibly even undesirable, in light of past experience) that a comprehensive agreement can be realized immediately upon conclusion of the process. Instead, an iterative (and possibly conditional) implementation of the accords may be necessary. This might mean: • some groups may insist on withdrawal of militia from occupied lands as a precondition for disarmament; • disqualification of certain individuals from holding public office, or other transitional justice measures, may be demanded by some groups as a precondition to political integration; • the return of land and property to its rightful owners may be a necessary precursor to successful elections; • regional parliaments may remain intact until elections can be held; • leaders of administrations may require ratification of peace accords by their respective legislative assemblies before they can join a new power-sharing executive. No single option can hope to satisfy everybody. Any process will fail to match the dogmatic prescriptions of the ideologues in the various camps; it will move too fast for some, too slowly for others; and it will be neither as inclusive nor as exclusive as its detractors would like. But if a new initiative persuades a critical mass of the Somali people that a new agreement serves the interests of all, not of some, and that the way forward holds promise, not menace, then it will have broken new ground in the search for peace in Somalia. February 2002

Ladies and Gentlemen, As many of us are attuned to the ongoing Somali National Conference in Kenya, it has been proposed that Somalia is to have a federal system of government as a result of which autonomous states which shall be determined at will, and representative of the desire of populace by way of voting in all regions including existing administrations in the Northern (NW & NE) regions. This is to be undertaken within the first three years of the prospective government taking office with a prime minister with whom executive powers shall rest, a senate, and a house of representatives. Of the six committees conceived at the initial stages of the conference was to formulate symmetrical framework conducive to present conditions, a mechanism receptive to the needs of opposing parties, and ethnically acceptable structure of government nurturing cohesiveness, reconciliatory, and harmonisation in process, in procedure and in principal for a future government in Somalia. One of such committees assigned to draft a transitional constitution was challenged by two contending, though different in principal yet similar in appearance to the less technical eye, approaches. While federal is the unanimously desired and accepted structure and system of government, methods of attaining such a system of government are being examined, thus studied at the moment. One promotes the initial set-up of a unitary transitional national government pursuant of the Arte formulae, which shall then address the formation of autonomous regions/states as desired at sometime in the future. The other endorses establishing a federal system of government at the completion of the conference, cognizant of the failure, lessons learnt, and the shortcomings of the Arte ignominy. Each team builds its case outlining as to the reasoning that each favours one method over the other. Which of the two camps do you identify with, and why providing supporting material of substance? So long!

A rather sensitive chap, eh? You complain in one statement, and then reach for the shovel in another. One could hardly consider that a gentlemanly act in my neck of woods. Besides, last time I checked belonging to “ Togdheer swamps ” was something of a compliment, to be proud of if you will – a land full of swamps by the banks of the Togdheer suitable to animal husbandry, gazing, farming and most of all natural habitat. It appears I am rather outdated in that respect if I am to take your interpretation of the terms as in their present day definitions a somewhat unpleasant. Or is it the use of the word “ marauding - going from one place to another with view of taking - partly the definition of the word as used in this context in response to Angel-Dust’s rapturous stampede in arriving the scene, which got you in a bit of a twist? And as such it is all in the interpretation old boy. Ignorance in a rather subjective term with somewhat unpleasant connation applied with huge latitude in that one never knows what its true meaning constitutes. Of course there are many things I am ignorant of including the force that motives pro-secessionist groups, but one could hardly find it applicable in this context, and with respect to the subject matter. Prejudice, this all depends upon from which angle one views matters, and relative to the individual making the allegation. Ironic, do not think since the impetus driving the belief for a separate republic in Northwest regions of Somalia is based upon prejudicial fear, unfounded of course, and inferiority complex naturally incurable, on the part of the people in the said regions. Come up with better leverage than this old boy for your whole future is on the balance. And if this is all the brightest and most reasonable one could come up with, may the Almighty save your souls from the abyss of uncertainty and darkness. So long!

Angel, my dear what in devil’s name makes you think yours is the “reality and the truth”. Quote “….. lobby for charties at your host country -start a sponsership programme were say numberof people sponser the wages of schools back home”. And this you reckon is how institutions are built. So well meaning, yet so naïve in the same stride as to socio-economic structures of resource-deprived ethnic enclave, quote “…. Somaliland …. a established state that will not be another needy african nation will surely be a good start and make a case for seccession easier” . Seeking charity on one hand and trying to persuade the adoption of secessionism on the other do not quite go hand in hand my dear, do they? One of the prerequisites of secession is self-sufficiency, self-reliability and the ability to stand on own feet, hence the validity upon which the premise in itself hinges. Charity on the other hand is deemed cataclysmic, burdensome so susceptible that no right-thinking persons(s), organisation(s) or institutional will be forthcoming in promoting a yet another deprived, needy state in an already troubled region. Perhaps the only reason to distance oneself from secession is due to the lack of resources and the culture of dependence so inherent on the part of the seeker. Is one expected to hold rational dialogue with people with little or no understating of the subject matter other than off-the-cuff type statements circulated amongst family members, which amount to no more than disenchanted hear-say? Neither could these be substantiated, nor taken at face value. Astonishingly even the marauding ladies of Togdheer swamps are making claims for Hawd of all places. Is this not a crazy world we live in? Let us review the reasoning of Angel-Dust for a moment. Just because one was born, or resides in a region perhaps in large number by itself does not necessarily permit one to make a claim of ownership with respect to the said region or territory. The same logic that applies to a tenant or a squatter of a plot of land that neither warrants ownership rights, nor deed to the land, as one can be evicted as and when the landlord finds it to his pleasing. The same principle that just because I was born in Hargeysa does not warrant the right of claim on may part, as a Somali perhaps the right to reside, but not to rule or ravage, or does it? You see, the logic of your reasoning is not only half-baked, but blurred as you quite rightly said by you lacking of deep insight into the politics of the land. Conceptualise, deliberate and delve thoroughly into contested issues prior to engaging lest embarrass yourself by placing forth injudicious assertions and statements of claim lacking validity should you wish to engage in intellectual discourse. Could you just set the lunacy aside and think with your minds rather than with your hearts for a change. So long!

Ok, Lander, “ Facts. So-called government in Puntland. Puntland loyal militias, Verbose read on Puntalndstate.com ” these I do not consider the words of a man who wishes to remain objective on the issues; having said that, I am willing to take your word for it, give you credit for a mature, respectable discourse devoid of any assumption of your intent on my part, thus extend you the benefit of the doubt. Believe me when I say it your purported facts are far from the truth. Whist still on the issue of SS&H which I regard very much pertinent, very clever of you to have dodged to comment on a query in one my earlier postings: “ ….a simple question would be which administration provides public services such as institution building (that of organising townships and rural terrain in self-governing mode), allocating resources for the maintenance of state establishment including banks (Laascaanod’s primary bank opened a couple of month ago since 1991), government residences such town halls, local offices etc., tax anthology though infant yet rapidly taking shape, police forces to sustain order, promotion of the private sector, grass roots public cohesion and endorsement of the system of government in place, and above all enumerating the overall desire of the public in the aforementioned regions – a federal system of government in Somalia?” Do you care to venture an opinion here? This is to substantiate the basis of my argument and the rationale for my reasoning. Still on the issue, I will give you a scenario – On one hand proponents who desire a republic in Northwestern regions of Somalia who share many similarities with centralist, thus in principal secessionist camp want to break away from Somalia with no legally binding, logically acceptable, historically or authoratively justifiable valid reasoning of any kind other than colonial legacy whereas on the other supporters of federal system of government though tussle with the irrational behaviour on the part of the former group accept the will of the people in Hargeysa & Burco for it is a strongly held believe that one ought to be allowed to determine one’s destiny, future and with whom one desires to associate. But what is disturbing about the secessionist camp’s fanaticism with respect to the object of their desire is their unfortunate realisation and indisposition to accept the will and desire of the people in Somalia in general, SS&H in particular. An issue one would never find them in their illusive maneuvering willing to approach head-on. Surprise me, if you could. Nonetheless, let agree that we shall not agree upon the issue of SS&H at least for the moment as I trust the fate of the regions along with its future will eternally have been sealed shortly. Now, perhaps we could address some of the problems you have raised including the viability of a self-sufficient, and not foundered upon the premise of foreign aid and grants, republic with fully fledged, functional institutions providing, and sustaining public and social service crucial to its existence in all aspects; lack of autocratic leadership, which are missing from the scene in the region in its entirety, equipped to address pressing issues such as institutional, social, financial etc; adverse influence and pressure from regional governments opposed to a such initiative for fear of opening Pandora’s box; inherent difficulties that will have been confronting a country with limited resources, if any; the issue of settlement of multibillion, and accruing debts in hard currency owed to governments and multinational financial institution by the old republic; just to name a few. Pick one, let us develop it, and let us hope to remain objective so as to we keep out sanity. Until then so long!

Very good indeed! It appears we are making progress now, and here is where the trouble lies. I shall address a couple of points in your piece for simplicity. The desire of what could have been, or should have been is generally accepted as untenable, thus shall not bother with what you reckon the Riyaale government will or should do years to come. Though Somaliland of the old under the British colony comprised of a terrain approximating 5 (Awdal which was a district under the NorthWest region municipality & Sool part of Nugaal were the creation of the military regime) of the 18 regions of Somalia including SS&H, Somaliland of the present which is of interest in the discussion is a monster of a different kind: a tribal-hinged enclave deep in turmoil with neither the political leadership, resources, nor cohesive, significant structure of tangible substance of any kind. It, Somaliland of the present comprises of Hargeysa, Togdheer (excluding Buuhoodle, which was once the biggest district though now a region, Hawd under the Puntland administration), and arguably Awdal. And the “we” therefore excludes the people of SS&H including myself. Irrespective of what is being spewed out on public forums, Somalia including SS&H do not consider Somaliland a reality rather a mere dream which run its natural course, hit aground, and had outlasted the goal of its initial thinkers the last of which was the late Egal who in broad day light in Washington DC of all places hung his gloves for the bout was conceded. This I do not think is what you want to hear, but then reality in general is not that comforting, is it? Now, do you see how far apart you promoting pro-secessionist ideologies stationed in Hargeysa, and I, a pro-federalist situated in Lascanood, are on the simple definition of the issue? Why is this crucial you may wonder? It is so for it has to be noted that without SS&H, there is no Somaliland. A fact which none of you are brave enough, or willing to accept so as to let the past go and live in the future. Do we agree on that? Or do you have an approach of else? If so, please share before we get ahead of ourselves delving into matters social, governmental, institutional, historical, developmental, structural, legality and legitimacy. Distorted of course only to the bamboozled willing to believe anything and everything resembling what the mind desires, and to the few who are cut off from the actuality on the ground, but not to the sons and daughters of the region who are fully in touch with reality. Shall look forward to reading your responses on these matters. So long!