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Everything posted by Illyria
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Could I ask you a question: what is with the nicknames? Did you grow up in a house full of women?
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JL Speaker of the House and deputies selected.
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List of MPs of JL Parliament, Nov. 2024.
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As flawed as it is, this is Somali in spirit and intent. @Qurac&Qansax @maakhiri1 Ma laha waad soo qaldanteene, tani ma aha tii gooni-goosadka ee aad u nacamlaynayseen.
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Forgive me, but your naiveté is distressing. Could you recall even once during those dark days where Cirro denounced his regime's savage massacre let alone sending condolences. If anything Cirro is worse, and is no more than Qawsaar dameeraha aan waxba dhaamin. True, we do not wish any harm coming to the poor public.
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F@ck them, and their cowardly fathers, and their warped, murderous ideology. The reason the secessionists did not blink an eye to slaughter innocent civilians, and continued bombarding a city full of innocent civilians for eight months was 'cos of that nonsense you are spinning. Next you will be telling me Isr@el is the only democracy in the MidEast.
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MPs selection date set on Nov. 25th.
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Xasan had a plan all along to piddle on all things sacrosanct, but at first there was a ruse to be put into action: bring in JL and Madoobe as tools to implement his master plan, and in doing so commit enough damage to Madoobe's political capital that it would be easy to isolate it from its allies, and when done with, decapitate Madoobe, but it blew up in his face sooner than expected. Madoobe being Falstaff in Somali politics bellows "what is honour?" with as many lives as an astray cat sensing the dagger resting upon his nape late in the wee hours while recuperating in a German hospital quickly reverting to survival mode manoeuvering. In the last NCC session, full of morphene and newly acquired vigour, he looked round there realising he was a lone ranger seated among vultures, deciding to bring out the anemometer to test the wind by asking about PL and SSCKH as a gambit on the chessboard, only then his worries had been confirmed when he was told neither were a part to, nor relevant to the current scheme being brewed by Xadan & Co. Now, let us see how deep the cut, and how wide the wound.
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I know he does not read, but you could have shown him these lines just to watch him nibble, and chase his bushy tail till dawn. 11. In recent years, with African Union support, successive FGS administrations have prioritized national issues and strengthened regional and international relations. Despite progress, challenges remain, including Puntland’s absence from regular NCC meetings and the unresolved dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Member State of Somaliland and Ethiopia. Trouble is they are all imposters, and we are keep hoping the next one will be better than the current one, but then is found to be far worse. We are f@cked, and are losing the country at a pace faster than any in modern history: shocking the speed with which bantuzation is aggressively going on along the rivers and fertile farming land.
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To the contrary, it is the inverse of [that] we should be thinking of. If that does not spurn you into action, and convulse your spleen, then I do not know what else would.
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What odious souls luck more than any is the power of reflection in juxtaposing the past with the present, and in turn hardly able to envisage subsequently unfolding events. Further, when prevailing veracity challenges then fallacies, the former almost always wins, but then again, to be privy to, and be of the mind of, one must be of refined pedigree.
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IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND RELATED ANALYSIS A. Political Landscape 9. Since the African Union’s deployment of a mission in Somalia in 2007, the country has been engaged in state-building and peacebuilding efforts. Key initiatives include the constitutional review process, finalizing the implementation of the national security architecture, developing a unified democratic electoral model, and achieving political and social reconciliation to fully implement a federal system. Since the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May 2022, significant progress has been made in these critical areas, including the Somalia ’s accession to the East African Community, the lifting of the arms embargo, its election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2025–2026 term, and finalization of the debt relief. 10. Underpinning this progress has been the National Consultative Council (NCC), which since May 2022, has improved relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States. Despite some challenges, the NCC has facilitated discussions aligned with the FGS’s 2022–2026 work programme, which prioritizes security, justice, reconciliation, economic self -sufficiency, social development, and international relations to protect Somalia’s sovereignty and unity. This inclusive process supports Somalia’s commitment to democratization, preparing for one-person, one-vote elections in 2026. 11. In recent years, with African Union support, successive FGS administrations have prioritized national issues and strengthened regional and international relations. Despite progress, challenges remain, including Puntland’s absence from regular NCC meetings and the unresolved dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Member State of Somaliland and Ethiopia. 12. The FGS must engage with key stakeholders to resolve differences over national priorities, finalize the Constitution and prepare for universal elections in 2026. Continuous support from the AU and international partners is crucial to addressing these challenges. Therefore, the coming months will be pivotal for Somalia.
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Occupying forces from Kismayo to Baydhaba to Beledweyn to Dhuusamareeb: XIII. MISSION COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 31. Strength: The authorized strength of the Mission is up to 11,911 personnel, comprising of 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in 4 Sectors with 14 Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and 9 Tactical Operating Bases(TOBs). 32. Sectors: Sector I: Mogadishu; Sector II: Kismayo; Sector III: Baidoa; Sector IV:Jowhar. 33. Main and Tactical Operating Bases (MOBs/TOBs) layout per Sector are as follows: Sector I: MOB 1 (Mogadishu FHQ, Mogadishu (Sector HQ); MOB 2 (Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport, Mogadishu Seaport); MOB 3 (Baledogle Airfield); MOB 4 (Barawe Airport); TOB 1 (Aljazeera II); TOB 2 (Aljazeera III); TOB 3 (Barawe Seaport); TOB 4 (Arbiska). Sector II: MOB 5 (Kismayo: Sector HQ, Kismayo New Airport); MOB 6 (Kismayo Seaport). MOB 7 (Garbaharey); TOB 5 (Baardheere). Sector III: MOB 8 (Baidoa: Sector HQ, ; Baidoa Airport); MOB 9 (Xudur); TOB 6 (Waajid); TOB 7 (Berdale); TOB 8 (Dinsoor) Sector IV: MOB 10 (Jowhar: Sector HQ; Jowhar Airport); MOB 11 (Mahaday); MOB 12 (Beletweyne); MOB 13 (Dhusamareeb); MOB 14 (Bulo Burto); TOB 9 (Xawadleey) 34. The above disposition may be revised as per the prevailing security situation
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Good analyses. The good citizen in me wants Biixi to die in his sleep for the citizens to recover, prosper, and do well, yet the not-so-good citizen in me wants his reelection for the collapse to deepen, continue till said polity no longer poses a threat to the nation, its seas, neighbours, or citizenry. Let us see which of the two comes to pass.
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There is the propaganda to sustain and maintain the status quo, seek funding for [the] project, but then there is the reality on the ground. The reality: 4. The Joint Technical Assessment (JTA) report of March 2024 and the Joint Strategic Assessment (JSA) of May 2024 underscored the point that Al-Shabaab and other armed groups cannot be defeated by military means alone. As ATMIS implements its drawdown, Al-Shabaab continues to increase its numbers and maintain its capabilities. And the falsehood: 15. Since 2022, the FGS has developed a new strategy to counter Al-Shabab militarily, financially, and ideologically while preparing to take over security responsibilities from ATMIS. This has translated to the recovery of over 65,000 Square Kms and a marked improvement of the security in Mogadishu. To this end, the FGS recognises that ATMIS and international partners support have contributed to gains made. On the other hand, the SSF continue to increasingly demonstrate ability to maintain security responsibilities in handed over FOBs and critical facilities. However, this situation may significantly deteriorate with the planned exit of ATMIS on 31 December 2024. ATMIS’ exit will stretch SSF thin on the ground resulting to minimal manning strength, a situation that should be addressed by a follow -on mission with the support of partners. ------------------------------------- VII. POLITICAL DIRECTIVE (Mandated "Bide" occupation with no end in sight) 21. Political Objective. The Mission will support FGS in fulfilling its security and stabilisation objectives and contribute to the following: (a) Assist in strengthening State authority, as well as support national authorities in the protection of civilians, the reinforcement of security and public order through the implementation of appropriate measures and in line with human rights and international humanitarian law principles and standards; and contribute to the FGS stabilisation efforts. VIII. STRATEGIC END STATE (Sustain and maintain) 22. The security conditions are re-established for Somalia to exercise full authority over its territory and assume responsibilities for the protection of the population, properties and livelihoods and address national and regional security concerns, and allow the FGS to continue to implement its overall stabilization and development programmes. X. EXIT STRATEGY (No exit strategy, but an extension to 2029) 25. The SSDP establishes a comprehensive plan for Somalia’s security transition and stabilization with the overarching goal for Somalia to assume full ownership and responsibility for its security. 26. The Mission’s exit strategy is, therefore, linked to the successful implementation of the SSDP and achievement of the Mission’s benchmarks, focusing on enhancing the capacity of the SSF to maintain a sustainable security environment in the country. The performance of the Mission and its exit strategy will, therefore, be based on progressive steps in SSF capacity to take over full responsibility for security in Somalia. SC_2024_597-EN.pdf
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Try reading the 2 questions slowly again, and this time read as if a sober, rational person, outside of your batty friends and family circles in echo chambers.
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So out of your vast wisdom, and warped logic, the people who took arms against the TFG on the ground of patriotism and defending the nation against its number one enemy, who were later celebrating and embracing the presence of the same enemy in Xamar insofar as fondly referring to them as their brethren, and are now claiming the FGS as SOLELY their own, were right back then? Or are you suggesting they were the devil in disguise all along sputtering ill-formed froth for merry more? If by virtue of birth one is not reer Hregeysa, who is reer Hargeysa? You, son of saancadaale from the sticks with your pierced balls in tow?
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So, your barometer for neutrality and balance is extrapolated from names in use. If anything, Hiran Online is clanesque, HAG mouth piece only publicising Irir-centirc propaganda, but then again, you already know that, which is the reason you are hyping it up. We haven not forgotten the lies and rubbish it used to publish in the early 2000s, later promoting ICU, had been tacitly pro al Shabab, and the list goes on. Besides, do you think some dole-collecting tramp in Canada knows more about what is happening in our territories than we do. What a dimwit. By the way, owners of both Wardheer News and Daljir are reer Hargeysa.
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Fair and balanced just like Fox news, eh? This shite is beyond belief. I only consider Wardheer news & Daljir as being reliable, and the only thing I hear of Hiran Online is that it is pro secessionist mouth piece. The suqar must have worked on them.
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