List of MPs of JL Parliament, Nov. 2024.

As flawed as it is, this is Somali in spirit and intent. @Qurac&Qansax @maakhiri1 Ma laha waad soo qaldanteene, tani ma aha tii gooni-goosadka ee aad u nacamlaynayseen.

Forgive me, but your naiveté is distressing. Could you recall even once during those dark days where Cirro denounced his regime's savage massacre let alone sending condolences. If anything Cirro is worse, and is no more than Qawsaar dameeraha aan waxba dhaamin. True, we do not wish any harm coming to the poor public.

F@ck them, and their cowardly fathers, and their warped, murderous ideology. The reason the secessionists did not blink an eye to slaughter innocent civilians, and continued bombarding a city full of innocent civilians for eight months was 'cos of that nonsense you are spinning. Next you will be telling me Isr@el is the only democracy in the MidEast.

MPs selection date set on Nov. 25th.

Unconfirmed reports say Xamza drafted his resignation letter, after he was ordered to travel to Kismayo to dislodge Madoobe, but his boss rejected it, as it does not fit in with his current plan.

Xasan had a plan all along to piddle on all things sacrosanct, but at first there was a ruse to be put into action: bring in JL and Madoobe as tools to implement his master plan, and in doing so commit enough damage to Madoobe's political capital that it would be easy to isolate it from its allies, and when done with, decapitate Madoobe, but it blew up in his face sooner than expected. Madoobe being Falstaff in Somali politics bellows "what is honour?" with as many lives as an astray cat sensing the dagger resting upon his nape late in the wee hours while recuperating in a German hospital quickly reverting to survival mode manoeuvering. In the last NCC session, full of morphene and newly acquired vigour, he looked round there realising he was a lone ranger seated among vultures, deciding to bring out the anemometer to test the wind by asking about PL and SSCKH as a gambit on the chessboard, only then his worries had been confirmed when he was told neither were a part to, nor relevant to the current scheme being brewed by Xadan & Co. Now, let us see how deep the cut, and how wide the wound.

I know he does not read, but you could have shown him these lines just to watch him nibble, and chase his bushy tail till dawn. 11. In recent years, with African Union support, successive FGS administrations have prioritized national issues and strengthened regional and international relations. Despite progress, challenges remain, including Puntland’s absence from regular NCC meetings and the unresolved dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Member State of Somaliland and Ethiopia.  Trouble is they are all imposters, and we are keep hoping the next one will be better than the current one, but then is found to be far worse. We are f@cked, and are losing the country at a pace faster than any in modern history: shocking the speed with which bantuzation is aggressively going on along the rivers and fertile farming land.

To the contrary, it is the inverse of [that] we should be thinking of. If that does not spurn you into action, and convulse your spleen, then I do not know what else would.

What odious souls luck more than any is the power of reflection in juxtaposing the past with the present, and in turn hardly able to envisage subsequently unfolding events. Further, when prevailing veracity challenges then fallacies, the former almost always wins, but then again, to be privy to, and be of the mind of, one must be of refined pedigree.

IV. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA AND RELATED ANALYSIS A. Political Landscape 9. Since the African Union’s deployment of a mission in Somalia in 2007, the country has been engaged in state-building and peacebuilding efforts. Key initiatives include the constitutional review process, finalizing the implementation of the national security architecture, developing a unified democratic electoral model, and achieving political and social reconciliation to fully implement a federal system. Since the election of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in May 2022, significant progress has been made in these critical areas, including the Somalia ’s accession to the East African Community, the lifting of the arms embargo, its election to the United Nations Security Council for the 2025–2026 term, and finalization of the debt relief. 10. Underpinning this progress has been the National Consultative Council (NCC), which since May 2022, has improved relations between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States. Despite some challenges, the NCC has facilitated discussions aligned with the FGS’s 2022–2026 work programme, which prioritizes security, justice, reconciliation, economic self -sufficiency, social development, and international relations to protect Somalia’s sovereignty and unity. This inclusive process supports Somalia’s commitment to democratization, preparing for one-person, one-vote elections in 2026. 11. In recent years, with African Union support, successive FGS administrations have prioritized national issues and strengthened regional and international relations. Despite progress, challenges remain, including Puntland’s absence from regular NCC meetings and the unresolved dispute over the Memorandum of Understanding between the Federal Member State of Somaliland and Ethiopia. 12. The FGS must engage with key stakeholders to resolve differences over national priorities, finalize the Constitution and prepare for universal elections in 2026. Continuous support from the AU and international partners is crucial to addressing these challenges. Therefore, the coming months will be pivotal for Somalia.

Occupying forces from Kismayo to Baydhaba to Beledweyn to Dhuusamareeb: XIII. MISSION COMPOSITION AND STRUCTURE 31. Strength: The authorized strength of the Mission is up to 11,911 personnel, comprising of 85 civilians, 11,146 military and 680 police personnel, deployed in 4 Sectors with 14 Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and 9 Tactical Operating Bases(TOBs). 32. Sectors: Sector I: Mogadishu; Sector II: Kismayo; Sector III: Baidoa; Sector IV:Jowhar. 33. Main and Tactical Operating Bases (MOBs/TOBs) layout per Sector are as follows: Sector I: MOB 1 (Mogadishu FHQ, Mogadishu (Sector HQ); MOB 2 (Mogadishu Aden Adde International Airport, Mogadishu Seaport); MOB 3 (Baledogle Airfield); MOB 4 (Barawe Airport); TOB 1 (Aljazeera II); TOB 2 (Aljazeera III); TOB 3 (Barawe Seaport); TOB 4 (Arbiska). Sector II: MOB 5 (Kismayo: Sector HQ, Kismayo New Airport); MOB 6 (Kismayo Seaport). MOB 7 (Garbaharey); TOB 5 (Baardheere). Sector III: MOB 8 (Baidoa: Sector HQ, ; Baidoa Airport); MOB 9 (Xudur); TOB 6 (Waajid); TOB 7 (Berdale); TOB 8 (Dinsoor) Sector IV: MOB 10 (Jowhar: Sector HQ; Jowhar Airport); MOB 11 (Mahaday); MOB 12 (Beletweyne); MOB 13 (Dhusamareeb); MOB 14 (Bulo Burto); TOB 9 (Xawadleey) 34. The above disposition may be revised as per the prevailing security situation

Good analyses. The good citizen in me wants Biixi to die in his sleep for the citizens to recover, prosper, and do well, yet the not-so-good citizen in me wants his reelection for the collapse to deepen, continue till said polity no longer poses a threat to the nation, its seas, neighbours, or citizenry. Let us see which of the two comes to pass.