Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin-Laden missed no time in claiming responsibility for the U.S. defeat in Somalia. The Saudi terrorist leader said that he had provided Somali militants with the sophisticated air-missiles that had shot down the two Black Hawk helicopters. He insisted that U.S. Army had no backbone to fight and die in such wars.32. He threatened to continue his own struggle until United States interests all over the world were in ruins. Thus, the new threat of Islamic radicalism effectively replaced fifty years of Cold War. This, however, was a different kind of enemy. Somalia always has been a strategic location, but the U.S. effectively neglected it between Clinton's 1994 pullout and the advent of the War on Terrorism in 2001. Washington feared the impact of terrorism growing all around the world,33 particularly in failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda threatened more than once that they would bring their jihad against the U.S. and its regional ally, Ethiopia. In response, Washington committed another foreign policy blunder. As allies, it solicited none other than the Somali warlords who had effectively feudalized and starved the country. Thus, against its policy and ideals, the United States effectively legitimized their reign of terror. In the process of continued feuding for control of territories, warlords established two semi-autonomous governments: Somaliland in the northwest and Puntland in the northeast of Somalia. Southern Somalia, including Mogadishu and Kismayo, were still lawless - ravaged by clan warfare and mired in destruction and starvation.34 American's primary goal was to partner any allies in support of the War on Terrorism in the Horn region. 32 Dinesh D'Souza, The Enemy at Home: The Culture Left and Its Responsibility for 9/11. (New York: Random House, 2007), 213 33 Mathew Blood, "The U.S. Role in Somali's Misery"; available from http://www.greenleft.org.au/2008/778/39996; Internet; accessed 25 November 2008 34 Ken Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia: Second Thoughts (Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 30, No. 97, The Horn of Conflict, Sep., 2003), 406 George W. Bush came to Oval Office promoting "compassionate conservatism."35 His balanced, humble foreign policy outlook quickly changed following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Starting in December 2001, President Bush decided to expand U.S. involvement in the Horn of Africa once again. He declared Ethiopia to be the principal regional ally against terrorism. Just as Somalia benefited from U.S. economic aid during the Cold War because of its strategic location, its neighbor (Ethiopia) now emerged as favored nation, benefitting from aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development. Thus, Ethiopian government and Somali warlords were sought to hunt and neutralize suspected terrorists hiding in the region. 35 David Frum, The Right Man: The Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Random House, 2003), 5 36 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, "Blowing the Horn". International Crisis Group - Foreign Affairs. (March/April 2007). Retrieved from www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4679 In Somalia, Washington endeavored to build a new association: The Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism. This was comprised of regional warlords. The United States paid each $150,000 per month for his cooperation. 36 This type of unilateral action severely undermined the new transitional government by further legitimizing states within a state and, effectively, feudalism. This is not what Somalia needed; the President of Somali government, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (who, like some of his ministers, had past lives as a warlord) continually reiterated the need for U.S. political, military, and humanitarian aid for his weak government. The American policy failed, as the Somali people rejected the coalition between violent warlords and Ethiopia. The former only brought lawlessness and instability; the latter was opportunistic at best, and more likely a prospective colonist. It is no surprise, then, that when conflict started between U.S. backed warlords and Islamic Court Union (ICU), the majority of Somalis supported the ICU - seen to be the only real hope for a peaceful Somalia. Washington's policy, already a failure, only escalated the crises by labeling the ICU as extremist and soliciting Ethiopia, a major recipient of American arms since the Cold War ended, to deal with the ICU in a sort of proxy war in the grander scheme of the War on Terror. Of course, U.S. officials declined to directly address the question of backing for Somali warlords, who styled themselves as a counterterrorism coalition in pursuit of continued American support. For instance, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack vaguely told reporters: "The United States would work with responsible individuals . . . in fighting terror. It's a real concern of ours - terror taking root in the Horn of Africa. We don't want to see another safe haven for terrorists created. Our interest is purely in seeing Somalia achieve a better day."37 37 Emily Wax and Karen DeYoung, "US Secretly Backing Warlords in Somalia", Washington Post 17 May, 2006, sec. A01 The United States' gamble on the warlords failed when the increasingly well-supported ICU crushed them. The Islamic organization took control Mogadishu and most of southern Somalia. Now, in a disastrous blow to U.S. anti-terrorism initiative as a whole, it revealed its Islamist character. This included the introduction of a harshly-interpreted Sharia which punished all outlaws, prohibited the consumption of alcohol and use of stimulant khat, required women to wear veils, and banned movies and televised World Cup soccer games on television. The ICU brand of Islam might have been an abomination in better times, however most people saw no better choice. The United States failed to internalize just how unsecure Somalia had become, when it chose to support the warlords who had caused this problem. As a reward, it now had an incredibly hostile governing body to deal with. With the ICU effectively in power, the country's new, weak transitional government has been operating largely out of neighboring Kenya and the southern city of Baidoa. Most of Somalia was in anarchy, ruled by a patchwork of competing warlords; the capital was too unsafe for even Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Ghedi to visit. He described U.S. officials' involvement in the conflict between Somali warlords and ICU as dangerous and shortsighted, arguing that this was undermining his government: "We would prefer that the U.S. work with the transitional government and not with criminals. This is a dangerous game. Somalia is not a stable place and we want the U.S. in Somalia. But in a more constructive way. Clearly we have a common objective to stabilize Somalia, but the U.S. is using the wrong channels."38

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, so too did the polarization of the world. The United States no longer had any real need for Somalia. It was now convenient to withdraw the support that had long enabled Barre's rule and the illegalities that characterized it. When the United States suspended all financial aid to the Barre's regime, his security apparatus swiftly collapsed. Sensing the regime's vulnerability, rebel forces - taking the form of the United Somali Congress (USC) - led by Mohamed Farah Aideed stormed Mogadishu. Barre fled the capital in January, 1991.25 With the shared enemy eliminated, so too did any reason for the resistance movement to be unified. The same warlords who brought down the dictator continued to fight among themselves for power and control; thus regional, clan politics returned to Somalia at the worst possible time.26 The Rise of Warlord Phenomenon in Somalia The warlord phenomenon started soon after the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991. This was the era of the United Somali Congress (USC) rebel movement, characterized by much unfortunate chaos and violence. When USC leadership (predominately from the ****** tribe) could not reconcile its political differences, it descended into infighting which took the form of outright war, given that the USC was, in fact, a tribal militia at heart. This struggle had two sides: one side was loyal to self-appointed president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the other side to General Mohamed Farah Aideed. For a year the power struggle afflicted the Somali people with loss of lives and property. The two men's quarrel became everyone's problem. Too often, this is the case in modern-day Somalia. Neither leader could claim a decisive victory or take control of government institutions. Consequently, peace and security in the nation's capital were threatened. These leaders were entrapped in Somali tradition. They exploited that tradition while bearing the guise of modern diplomacy and tact. They effectively turned the struggle for control of the USC into a fight for clan supremacy. The combatants recruited fighters from their own clan-families and committed themselves to clan, rather than Somali nation interests. Aideed and Mahdi were vying for presidency of the entire nation. Although their collaboration had already toppled the Siad Barre regime, they did not understand that compromise worked. Now they had worked together to defeat a dictatorship: each settled to become a local political leader of his respective clan-family in the hope he would thereby control government institutions for the benefit of his own sector of the Somali people. Interestingly, the two "candidates" were members of the same ****** tribe of Mogadishu and central Somalia. Aideed belonged to Habar-Gidir sub-clan family, while Mr. Mahdi was a member of the Abgal sub-clan. Thus, General Aideed and Mr. Mahdi subdivided ****** tribe into two sub clans over which they presided as warlords. This development marked a "slippery slope" which was incompatible with the modern nation-state. Hence, "Warlordism" became an accepted part of Somali political culture. With so much threat from other clans, every major clan-family had to grow its military leaders and militias in order to protect itself. After all, the government itself was infested with warlords. So there was little protection - let alone examples of good state governance - coming from the Somali State Capital. In summary, while clan elders and chiefs were still responsible for clan family affairs in villages, warlords were the players upon the national stage. They kept away from clan business which might create conflicts with traditional elders and chiefs. The warlords concerned themselves with warfare; they knew no other way of getting things done. In effect, they were - and still are - Somalia's nightmare, an unending plague. U.S. Support for Somali Warlords The United States reevaluated its foreign policy following the Soviet collapse and the subsequent end of the Cold War. Somalia marked one of the changes. Since there was no longer significant strategic importance to the Horn region of Africa, the U.S. ended all economic and military aid to Siad Barre's regime, leaving him with no leg to stand on. Encouraged, insurgents rose to armed struggle against the demoralized and poorly equipped national army. Suddenly, Barre's government resembled a pushover. It quickly ceased to existed, but the transition was less than ideal. Somalia went from one to many rulers; already in battle mode, warlords took to fighting each other where there was no Barre to unite against. Thus, anarchy replaced law and order. Somali went back to traditional clan warfare. This sort of chaos was part of the old, nomadic culture but hardly compatible with the requirements of a modern nation state. The clan-family system and its culture of violence took its toll. Major clan-families aligned themselves behind warlords. All seeking protection of their own interests and territories, they wound up infringing heavily upon each other, fueling a prolonged civil war in the country. Countless innocent people lost their lives because of the fighting. More severe, however, was the starvation it left in its wake. 1992 saw a historic famine. A full quarter of Somalia's nine-million people experienced malnourishment. Here, conscience got the better of the United States and international community. The United Nations took up a humanitarian intervention geared at getting help to starving people in the countryside. This was easier said than done. It quickly became apparent that the United States could not aid Somalia without embroiling itself in the civil war. Warlords were blocking United Nations' aid shipments from reaching people in need. President George H. W. Bush's administration introduced a new initiative called "Operation Restore Hope" before it left office in late 1992. This effort saw the United States partner with United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali in the deployment of 30,000-strong peacekeeping force to oversee safe and effective delivery of humanitarian food to the starving people. President Bush went to the town of Baida, which the media had dubbed "City of Death," to witness what the effort was accomplishing - and exactly what it was up against. Bill Clinton replaced George H.W. Bush in office in 1993. He continued, and in fact expanded, his predecessor's involvement in Somalia. Now the humanitarian mission started to turn into a political and nation-building effort.27. However, in pursuit of the best government, U.N. and U.S. officials actually helped to exacerbate strife by pitting one warlord against another. One prime example was when Belgian peacekeepers enabled warlord Mohamed Said Morgan to capture the southern Somali town of Kismayo from General Mohamed Farah Aideed's ally, Mohamed Omar Jess.28 This action infuriated Aideed and his followers (see Figure 4). Many violent protests ensued against U.N. humanitarian efforts, involving road bombs and skirmishes with Pakistani peacekeepers. 27 Craig Unger, The Fall of the House of Bush: House of Bush, House of Saud. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 176 28 Peterson, 65 Here, U.S. policy completed its transformation from a humanitarian to military mission and ordered the arrest of General Aideed. This mistake shows the extent to which the United States failed to understand the culture and the clan politics of this nomadic nation. Admittedly, Aideed was a ruthless thug and a poor model for humanity; yet when U.S. and U.N coalition started to hunt him down, he became an automatic hero for Somalis because of his wiliness to stand up to the world's remaining superpower. As mentioned before, there has always been conflict among tribes; however, as soon as a foreign threat manifests itself, old clan rivalries give way to unity against the common threat. The clans, after all, are separate pieces of one shared, regional culture; here is where they become Somali. Aideed mobilized Somalia's clans, including rivals, against the foreigners. In response, the United States and United Nations escalated the conflict. This led to eighteen American servicemen losing their lives and the infamous shooting down of two Black Hawk helicopters.30 The nation-building effort never succeeded because of misunderstanding of Somali culture and misguided foreign policy based on unnecessary use of force rather than political resolution. The war became an embarrassment to the Clinton administration especially, particularly when images surfaced of an American serviceman being dragged through the street of Mogadishu. This was about enough. President Clinton admitted the failed U.S. policy toward Somalia and announced that he was bringing forces home.31 In 1994, U.S. and international forces left Somalia, having been defeated by militias a few-hundred strong. 30 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War. (New York: Penguin, 2000), 90 31 Richard Clarke, Your Government Failed You: Breaking the Cycle of National Security Disasters. (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008), 35

The U.S. in Somalia U.S involvement in Africa was limited before World War II, with the exception of a few commercial treaties signed with selected countries in West Africa. Generally speaking, Washington was not interested in African affairs and voiced no real objection to European domination of the continent. However, there was some attention to Africa when, on January 18, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson offered his famous Fourteen Points declaration to a Joint Session of Congress in which he spoke about the principle of self-determination and governance.16 At that time, President Wilson wanted to counter the German threat which had changed the American attitude toward European Colonies. His stance had obvious implications for the millions of Africans subjected to foreign rule. 16 Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties (New York: HarperCollins,1991), 429 17 Ibid., 21 The Atlantic Charter, signed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill, was another initiative to promote world peace by compromising imperialism. Both leaders recognized the importance of colonial people's rights to self-determination and self-governance. 17 After World War II, the Soviet Union entered world political affairs in opposing Western domination and imperialism. As a result, the Western bloc became still more proactive in promoting democracy in the former colonial countries. World War II's end marked the beginning of de-colonization in Somalia in earnest. The process was not always perfect. Upon Somali independence in 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland united under one flag, yet colonial boundaries granted Ethiopia, Kenya, and France control over territories in which ethnic Somalis make up the majority of the general population. While these three countries remained allies of the United States, the U.S did not want to sever relations with Somalia because of the Soviet threat and strategic importance of Africa's Horn region. As a result, the U.S promised financial and military aid to Somalia; however, the Soviet-led Eastern bloc also offered a similar deal in pursuit of its geographic advantages. Thus, Somalia became a prize during the Cold War; even President Kennedy recognized this development and met with Somali Prime Minister Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1962. However, the Soviet Union ultimately offered what Somalia wanted most: more military hardware (the Russian military aid agreement of 1963) to protect the Somali population in Kenya and Ethiopia.18 On October 21, 1969, the armed forces, led by General Siad Barre, overthrew the civilian regime (former democratically elected leader Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke was assassinated by one of his own security guards during his visit in the drought-stricken area of the Las-Anod Disrtict, in the northern part of Somalia). Quickly, the usurping government adopted scientific socialism, nationalized all major private corporations, prohibited political parties, and shut down the parliament. U.S influence in Somalia apparently ended as Somalia and the Soviet signed a prestigious treaty of friendship. On November 1, 1969, General Siad Barre established the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC). The organization announced its intention to fight and abolish tribalism and nepotism, major obstacles to progress and growth in the nine years of civilian, democratic government. The nation was in perpetual financial crisis and overly dependent on foreign assistance to meet its operating budget. A majority of Somali people welcomed the new military regime's promise to clean up the sort of corruption that had been tolerated in the previous administration. Popular acceptance helped facilitate Barre's initiatives like "Scientific Socialism" and the battle against tribalism, thought to be the true cancer of Somali society. Indeed, an official government slogan stated, "Tribalism divides where Socialism unites."19 18 I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somalia (London: Westview Press 1988), 209 19 I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somalia (London: Westview Press 1988), 209 20 Metz, 119 The new government won the hearts and minds of the people by promoting a new self-reliance and self-supporting mentality. This helped to encourage a national, rather than clan, consciousness, for it lessened dependence on traditional clan lineage for survival. The main dream for every Somali was to be unified, including those living under Ethiopian and Kenyan rule. Over the first eight years of the Barre regime, the Soviet-Somali relationship grew into a significant military alliance. The two countries signed an agreement that brought Soviet military capabilities to Somalia. Numerous, sophisticated Russian weapon systems appeared, including MiG-21 jet fighters, T-54 tanks, and SAM-2 missile defense system.20 In return, the Soviets were allowed a base at the port of Berbara port, near the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. From this strategic location, they could counter United States military movement in the Middle East and North Africa and control trade. A more sinister aspect of the agreement saw the Soviet Union's KGB training Somalia's own secret police organization, the National Security Services (NSS), which could detain people indefinitely for any manufactured allegation.21The ambition of a greater, stronger Somalia come to fruition when Siad Barre invaded Ethiopia to liberate the ethnic-Somali ****** region in 1977. Ironically, the 1977-8 Somalia-Ethiopian War, enabled by Soviet support, was the severing point in the friendship between the Cold War nations. The Soviets elected to support Ethiopia against the nationalistic plans of its audacious neighbors. The Somali National Army lost the war when a full Eastern bloc (comprised of Cuba, East Germany, Libya, South Yemen, the Soviet Union army) attached themselves to the Ethiopian cause. Of course, Somalia was not doomed to float out at sea. In a polarized world, a Soviet enemy was automatically the United States' friend. Here, Washington found an opportunity to normalize relations with Mogadishu. It offered military equipment to Somalia in order to counterbalance Soviet and Cuban support for Ethiopia. Somalia, built by Soviet aid, joined the Western camp in 1978, thus verifying the old cliche' that there are "no permanent friends nor permanent enemies." 21 Metz, 188 During the Cold War, the United States had a definite history in its African Enterprise of supporting ruthless dictators, who committed atrocities and violate the fundamental human rights of their own citizens. It was only required that these thugs somehow suit American interests. This policy has long compromised key principles of the Constitution: due process of law, respect for individual freedom and human rights, free and fair democratic elections, and a free market economy. Yet such opportunism remains a fixture of American foreign policy. Somalia fits the trend. Despite Siad Barre's poor human rights records and corrupt government, the United States provided him with the economic aid to sustain his government and military aid to protect Somalia from Ethiopia's hostile Marxist regime. Here, one of many American-Soviet proxy wars was waged where mutually assured destruction prevented a direct clash. Like Zaire's notorious Mobutu Sese Seko, Barre benefited handsomely from America's support and blind eye (see Figure 3). His regime survived the 80s, receiving grants and flexible loans from the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and food aid through USAID22, which was distributed amongst camps and displaced communities, as a result of a refugee flood from war-torn Ogeden region of Eastern Ethiopia. In return, the United States received its strategic naval base at Berbera. 22 Graham Hancock, Lord of Poverty: The Freewheeling Lifestyles, Power, Prestige, and Corruption of the Multibillion Dollar Aid Business. (London: Macmillan London Ltd., 1989), 24 Strategically speaking, this was a win-win situation between the two allies. However, Barre's gloomy shadow lingered over American integrity. Here was an illegal dictator who neither tolerated political opposition nor so much as attempted to compromise in crafting solutions acceptable in all parties. Rather, he preferred to act as a thug, using force to eliminate any clan-family sympathizing with the opposition. His military forces committed unnecessary atrocities in central Somalia in particular, where they burnt villages, slaughtered thousands of innocent people, and raped women. Barre was highly antithetical to what the United States was supposedly pursuing. It is no wonder that, in mid 80s, a rising opposition movement demanded fair representation in the government. When Barre ignored this element, the opposition armed itself as the insurgent Somali National Movement (SNM), its aim simply to overthrow the Barre regime The SNM's guerrilla army briefly seized two major cities in Northern Somalia - Hargeisa and Buro - in 1988. Barre and his superior American weapons reacted by emphatically crushing the SNM movement. He essentially leveled the rebel cities.24 Many civilians died in the crossfire; thousands more fled their homes for the countryside, where water and shelter were short.